For more than a century, the Serbian state and Church have mythologized the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 as a defining moment of Serbian identity—a narrative culminating each year in the celebration of Vidovdan, Serbia’s national and religious holiday observed on June 28. Originally linked to the feast day of Saint Vitus, Vidovdan has since been transformed into a potent symbol of Serbian martyrdom and nationalist pride. But this myth, far from being a benign cultural tradition, is in fact a calculated ideological construction. It has served to justify territorial claims against Kosovo and to propagate a hegemonic vision of Serbian exclusivity in the Balkans.

In historical terms, the Battle of Kosovo was a relatively minor confrontation. Some historians have even questioned its factual veracity. What is indisputable, however, is that the event has been deliberately transformed into a foundational myth—an origin story for the Serbian national project. Beginning in the 19th century, with the emergence of the modern Serbian state, this myth was carefully cultivated by the Serbian Academy and the Orthodox Church to serve political purposes. Kosovo, in this narrative, was cast as the “cradle of the Serbian nation,” a sacred land eternally tied to Serbian destiny.

But this version of history is not only factually distorted—it is dangerous.

The battle itself was part of a broader Christian coalition, one that included not only Serbs but also Hungarians, Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians, who at the time were predominantly Christian. Yet, in the nationalist retelling, all others are erased. The myth excludes non-Serbs from Kosovo’s past and present, creating a fabricated sense of historical entitlement. It is a hegemonic tale that positions Serbs as the sole inheritors of the land, disregarding centuries of multiethnic coexistence.

More importantly, this myth has not remained confined to folklore or liturgy. It has deeply shaped Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy. In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the battle, Slobodan Milošević delivered his infamous speech at Gazimestan, transforming Vidovdan into a rallying cry for nationalist mobilization. Since then, the holiday has been celebrated not as a cultural event, but as a chauvinistic display of exclusivism and dominance. This has had devastating consequences for the region—fueling ethnic tensions, legitimizing war crimes, and obstructing reconciliation.

In the diplomatic arena, the myth of Vidovdan has also been instrumentalized. The Serbian Church and state have produced countless publications invoking this narrative, embedding it not only in their own institutional documents but also influencing international academic and diplomatic discourse. In the early 20th century, Serbia capitalized on favorable geopolitical alignments—presenting itself as anti-German, anti-Austrian, and aligning with French and British interests. Through active propaganda, the myth found sympathetic ears in Western diplomatic and scholarly circles, particularly during and after the First World War.

But the logic of ancient entitlement is a flawed and perilous one. If historical claims were to dictate modern statehood, then much of the Balkans could belong to Rome, Byzantium, or the Ottomans. States cannot be built on myths or memory alone—especially when such memory is weaponized against others.

It is time to confront the myth of Vidovdan for what it is: not a sacred memory of national martyrdom, but a political instrument of exclusion and domination. The Balkans deserve a future grounded in truth, coexistence, and mutual respect—not in the ghosts of a selectively remembered past.

The post Vidovdan: A Dangerous Myth Turned Political Weapon appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By GENC POLLO[1]

Ten days ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, standing on the side of visiting Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told the media that he was against the bilateralization of the European Union enlargement process. 

The chancellor was apparently referring to the non-signing by the ambassador of Greece to the EU of a circular letter authorizing the European Commission to open negotiations with Albania for some clusters and chapters of the membership draft/treaty. Since this step requires unanimity from all the member states, the Commission cannot act. As it is known, the Beleri case has triggered Athens to harden its stance. 

1-Identity vetoes

Chancellor Scholz is right. The EU member states have often abused their veto in Brussels as they dealt with issues with neighbouring countries. Greece started this game in the early 90s when an adventurous foreign minister declared Macedonia an “enemy” that was stealing the Greek name, history and culture. Although in private conversations politicians and friends of mine admitted this approach was useless, the Greek public opinion was enthralled making it difficult to compromise and reach an agreement (it happened only in 2018). So with this issue, for a quarter of a century, Greece blocked the path of membership of (North) Macedonia into NATO and the EU.

Bulgaria, in various intervals, did the same to Macedonia. Sometimes with the claim that the Macedonians denied that they were Bulgarians and later with the contradictory claim that they didn’t recognise the Bulgarian minority. A few years ago, this issue was resurrected by a populist-nationalist president incensing public opinion and most parliamentary parties had to follow willy-nilly. 

Wise personalities who considered this extremism absurd were not listened to anymore. Also Skopje did not remain idle, provoking Greece by erecting neo-Hellenistic statues and Bulgaria by rebroadcasting the films of the Yugoslav era that shows Bulgarians as barbaric Mongols.

But, at the end of the day, there remains a veto with negative consequences for the region and Europe and motivated by identity and historical-cultural issues that are incomprehensible outside the region.

 2- Material vetoes

But the bilateral veto is a European sport for other EU countries as well. Except state motives are more concrete and material. For example, Slovenia blocked Croatia’s membership for several years because they wanted a favorable agreement on the maritime border in the Piran Bay. Slovenia relented when Croatia accepted international arbitration on the matter.

Likewise, the Czech Republic in 2014 threatened to veto Albania’s candidate status if Tirana didn’t withdraw from the international arbitration on the dispute with CEZ (a Czech state-owned power distribution operator that bought the Albanian counterpart and had issues) and did not accept their terms. Although in the arbitration the chances of winning were high, the Rama government caved in. 

A year later, the Supreme State Audit Office found that this agreement was illegal, it cost the state 479 million euro in damages and filed a criminal complaint against the minister in charge (of course nothing happened). A bizarre aspect of this agreement was the obligation of the Albanian side to under no circumstances file criminal charges against the Czech personnel of CEZ Albania: neither for corruption nor for anything else. This type of amnesty is not only immoral but also clearly unconstitutional. For the sake of the “European cause”, the Rama government did not mind the tax money wasted or the constitutionality.  

The reasons for the veto in the above and other similar cases can be fair or unfair, reasonable or exaggerated, ethical or selfish. Be that as it may, the use of the European veto for issues unrelated to the EU membership integration process is unfair, exaggerated and selfish. Therefore Mr. Scholz and many like him are right when they speak out against “bilateralization”

 3-Is the Beleri case a genuine Albanian-Greek bilateral issue?

If we refer to the typology of the above cases Athens’ motivations seem different 

– it is not claiming that Albania is appropriating its history (in fact, the mother of Alexander the Great of Macedonia was a princess from the Molossian tribe, cousins with the Illyrians, but we have not officially claimed that great conqueror was (half) Albanian);

– it is not pretending that we are Greeks and that Albanian is a dialect of Greek (we live in the time of a Facebook infatuation about the Pelasgians a common linguistic roof, but fortunately this has not yet become an argument for diplomacy);

– it is not claiming to make the issue of the maritime border with Albania a precondition in the European Union process (this has been a strictly bilateral process that for 15 years has gone through agreements, their cancellations, fruitless negotiations and agreement on international arbitration);

– is not insisting that our state pay compensation for such a Greek company (it would not be surprising, but this is not the case).

Beyond these typical bilateral cases, one should be noted that Athens is not using its veto with regard to the Greek minority, which theoretically would have a legal basis (the Copenhagen criteria, which must be met by the candidate states for the EU, speak expressly about the rights of minorities) while for instance Budapest signals that it may vote against the opening of Ukraine’s EU membership negotiations precisely because of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

As I have argued in previous articles, Beleri is a clear case of violation of the rule of law, of democracy and of civil/political rights; Fredi Beleri himself is a political prisoner, the first political prisoner in the 21st century in Albania and therefore a dangerous precedent (looking at the developments of the last month, it should be noted with sadness that he is no longer the only political prisoner).

Beleri’s only formal connection with Greece is his double Albanian and Greek citizenship. But Beleri’s opponent in the municipal race was also a dual citizen of the two countries.

4-Rehabilitation of the veto 

By raising the Beleri issue in Brussels, Athens has not raised a bilateral Greek-Albanian issue but an absolutely internal, serious and important issue of the Albanian state. Greece is a small country in the EU where the influence is seen in proportion to the size of each member state. The Greek veto, due to the past experience with Skopje, can be seen with suspicion in Brussels as the shepherd who falsely cried wolf. But Greece’s intervention seems to fill the vacuum created by the inertia, silence and even blindness of the European Commission. Precisely the Commission, this primary body of the European Union with the functional task of verifying the Copenhagen Criteria in candidate countries such as Albania, was silent until November about Beleri while condemning arbitrary arrests in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. The Commission’s “Albania 2023” report, published this month, presents the Beleri case briefly and formally correctly, but surprisingly not in the chapter on democracy and fundamental rights, but in the one on relations with neighbours (for the sake of truth, we need to say that for the first time in this decade the report has two or three timid paragraphs describing the violation of the parliamentary rights of the opposition; this is a welcome development, although ten years late). 

This attitude of the European Commission may have several reasons. But the most obvious is the need to present as a success story the justice reform in Albania where the Commission invested considerable political and financial capital; with the best intention of course. Although various diplomats privately admit that the reform turned out to be very problematic, the bureaucrats of the Commission don’t have the institutional interest and moral courage to assert that the post-reform judicial bodies produce political prisoners; which the old justice, despite its sins and weaknesses, did not do since 2000. In order to complete the EU framework with positive notes, it is necessary to say that the European Parliament and the main political party there have taken a clear and proper stance on the Beleri case.

We can also talk about the silence of two European organizations with a focus on fundamental rights and which have offices in Tirana: the Council of Europe and the OSCE have not expressed themselves and this raises questions and invites a debate about their usefulness. It should be added here that the Congress of Local Authorities (within CoE)  has denounced Beleri’s arrest and ODIHR (within OSCE) mentions his case in the May 2023 local elections report. 

In this context, it is worth considering what could happen in the hypothetical scenario where the Greek government would have taken no interest in Fredi Beleri’s case. The burden of denouncing and fighting this neo-precedent of political imprisonment would remain mainly with the opposition, which is currently like a lone fireman in front of fires in every neighborhood of the city.

The EU and the US, in addition to the above inhibitions, are absorbed by crises, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as other challenges. As a result, they see the Balkans more in the geopolitical prism and less in the democratic one. Therefore it seems to me, even though I am allergic to bilateral vetoes, that the Greek intervention in Brussels on the Beleri issue could have positive consequences as it could force cynical bureaucrats to open their eyes. 

And to close with a non-ironic contextualization of an evolution: the prime minister, who in 2014 sacrificed hundreds of million euro of tax money and breached the constitution to get the EU candidate status, was not surprised by the loss of hundreds of millions of euros from the state budget and the violation of the constitution, ten years later he says to hell with EU membership if I can’t grab Himara’ coastal land plots for my “businesspeople”.

This article was written on November 27, 2023.

[1] Genc Pollo is an Albanian former cabinet minister and MP.

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In November last year (2022) Albert Rakipi, a prominent figure in Albania’s international relations and think tank circles, contemplated a pressing question. With the European Union membership process losing momentum and leaving many disillusioned, he sought a way to ensure Albania’s enduring connection to the EU. His solution: bringing the College of Europe to Albania. 

The last time the College of Europe expanded, it was more than three decades ago to Warsaw’s Nanolin suburb, with its second campus opening before Poland’s EU membership. It was an anchor in the process. It was also a story that could be replicated in Albania, Rakipi believed.  

He then first shared the idea with trusted colleagues, including at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania’s top-rated think tank where Rakipi serves as chairman and where he has been a civil society leader for nearly 30 years. There was some disbelief, but not easily discouraged, Rakipi prepared a concrete project proposal and was looking for an opening. 

It came in early December 2022, at the massive EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Tirana, shortly before which Rakipi had secured a private meeting with Prime Minister Edi Rama to seek his support in making College of Europe’s campus in Tirana a reality. 

“It’s the type of thing that can happen only once in a 1000 years — or never,” Rakipi says as he recalls how his idea drew the support of the Albanian prime minister who immediately moved to include Rakipi’s project proposal in the folders of the EU leaders attending the meeting. By the summit’s end, the idea had received “in principle” support from the EU’s top leaders. 

Rakipi says it would not have become a reality without the support of Prime Minister Rama, who understood the project’s importance for Albania. Rama’s extensive connections with EU member state leaders and at times unorthodox lobbying efforts also played a significant role. “I am very grateful to Prime Minister Edi Rama for enthusiastically supporting the project. Having the College of Europe in Albania would have never been possible without Edi Rama as Prime Minister,” Rakipi says.  

Rama has spoken highly of the EU’s reaction, calling it a “great gift” and something “exceptionally important and significant for us.” 

The proposal had come at a strategic moment during the EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana, which was an ideal opportunity to signal the importance of the enlargement policy in the Balkans. 

Rakipi firmly believes that Tirana was the perfect location for the College’s third campus in the Balkans.

Apart from the geopolitical dynamics and the prime minister’s personal involvement, Rakipi emphasizes the role of the College of Europe’s Rector, Federica Mogherini, an Italian and a friend of Albania, was also invaluable. He suggests that the educational institution might not have come to Albania without her involvement. 

“I am grateful to Federica Mogherini, a friend of Albania, who said ‘yes’ without hesitation and with special dedication and passion,” Rakipi says.  “The College probably would not have come to Albania if the Rector had not been Mogherini.”

With the official ceremony, Tirana is ready for the College of Europe

For her part, Mogherini was clear-eyed and full of smiles as she delivered her speech at the official opening ceremony at the Tirana Pyramid, which will host the College and its first 31 students.

“We are inaugurating today in the beautiful Tirana, the first office of the College of Europe here in Tirana, which will lead the way for the establishment of our campus, which will start activities next September 2024-2025. It’s really an honor for me, I’m very proud, you see my smile, it’s a real smile, ” Mogherini said. “I would first like to thank all those who made such a thing possible.”

Of course, beyond Mogherini, it took the support of EU’s top leaders, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who viewed the establishment of the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision for the Balkans.

“This is fantastic. First and foremost, it is fantastic because adding a College of Europe in pursuit of higher education and excellence can only contribute to Albania’s and the region’s development and prosperity. But also, because the College of Europe will also reinforce all the efforts being made to bring Albania and the region into the European Union,” President von der Leyen said in a statement.

At the ceremony on Oct. 16, Von der Leyen described the college as a gift that Europe gives to Albania, but also a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe.

“Here we will have students from Albania, from all over the Western Balkans from the EU. They will lay the foundations as leaders of the future. This college will be the third campus because we have the first in Belgium, the second in Poland and the third here. This college came before Poland became a member country and I am convinced that the same will happen with Albania. Yesterday they opened the application process. Now students from all over Europe can apply. You can do these fantastic studies while exploring the fantastic Europe. This campus is a great gift from Europe to Albania. But not only this, but a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe,” von der Leyen said.

Prime Minister Edi Rama, during his speech at the inauguration ceremony, said that this project is something wonderful and that it happened faster than he thought it would happen.

“Who would have thought that this would happen so quickly? Yesterday the president of the Commission announced the opening of applications, today the doors of the representative office are opened and next year people will start studying at the College of Europe in Tirana. Something is happening and it is so amazing. This is a path full of lessons, and the European Union is a blessing for all our countries, it is a great blessing because it is the deepest source of how to build institutions.

“In the end, it is the institutions that matter,” Rama said. “Our past has been characterized by many bad things that are the result of the lack of institutions, even when some institutions were built from scratch, so the building of democratic institutions cannot be done unless you have the European Union to learn these. Knowledge is the most extraordinary gift that the European Union can give us.” 

Tying Albania permanently to the West

The EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana back in December 2022 was an ideal moment because of the state of EU’s relations with the Western Balkans. The European Union opened the campus in Natolin in 1992. “It was a very symbolic action to integrate the former East. In a way, the time had come to give a signal for the enlargement policy in the Balkans, after almost a ‘freezing’ of the enlargement process in the Balkans. And the idea of the College of Europe project in Tirana was right. And there is no doubt,” Rakipi says, “that Tirana was the capital where the third campus of the college of Europe in the Balkans should be located.”

“President Ursula or President Michel and anyone else in Brussels or Tirana can now see the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision in the Balkans. But the idea and the project was born in Tirana at the Institute of International Studies, a leading reputable think tank that has been contributing to Albania’s bilateral relations during the last two decades. It’s all like a dream,” says Rakipi. “Since December of last year, nine months have passed and the College of Europe is like a baby that has just been born. I am very proud to have helped the country with a beautiful, useful and unrepeatable idea and project.” 

For Rakipi, this is ultimately “extraordinary and historic” because it is another step in tying Albania permanently to the West, said Albert Rakipi, the chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the College of Europe to Tirana means bringing the first truly Western post-university educational institution since the creation of Albania’s modern state. It is the biggest development of its kind in education in 100 years, and will have the same impact in Albanian history as the pre-WWII French Lyceum in Korca and Harry Fultz’s American school in Tirana,” Rakipi said.

The College of Europe is the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training in European affairs. It was founded in 1949 by leading European figures in the wake of the Hague Congress, which led to the creation of the European Movement. Its original campus is in Bruges, Belgium. A second Natolin (Warsaw), Poland campus of the college was established in 1992 ahead of Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU. 

“It is first and foremost a signal of hope, a symbol of the serious commitment that the EU has towards the region despite all the doubts cast by the delays and stagnation of certain milestones,” Rakipi says “It will also bring forward academic, social and cultural cooperation between the countries in the region, with their peers in the EU as well as naturally foster the process of reconciliation.” 

The think tank where the project was written

AIIS, the think tank where the project was written by Rakipi, is a non-governmental, non-profit research and policy institute created in recognition of the need for independent, in-depth analysis of the complex issues surrounding Albania’s security. AIIS was founded by a group of academics and analysts with extensive experience in foreign policy and policy-making issues. Over the three decades since its establishment, AIIS has sharpened its technical capacities to become a leading think-tank trusted by Albanian policy-makers and international partners in the fields of security studies, democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation.

To promote discussion and debate among the policy community, AIIS engages Albanian and international scholars as well as provides its products free of charge on its website. These services are made possible by the contributions of national and international donor communities to fund its activities. As a results-oriented, methodologically interdisciplinary team, AIIS aims to produce timely advice as well as analysis of the challenges facing Albania’s policy-makers. 

As of March 2023, AIIS is a member of the College of Security and Defense of the European Union. AIIS is also internationally ranked as Albania’s top and among the region’s top think tanks by the University of Pensylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index.

In the words of Daniel P. Serwer, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Albania has made tremendous progress in the last thirty years and is moving smartly towards its European home. AIIS is both a cause and a consequence. Its sharp analytical focus on the world beyond Tirana has helped what was once one of the most isolated countries on earth, become an active contributor to the international order. These have been marvelously productive years for both Albania and its leading institute!”

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The Western Balkans are now joined by Ukraine and Moldova to follow together the race between geopolitics and cynicism

The Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003 (adopted at the first EU-Western Balkan Summit) stated that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union. The 2023 version of the Declaration of Athens, in honor of that of Thessaloniki, approved last night, ( August 21^st, 2023) [2] says that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union, and that Ukraine and Moldova have the same future.

The original declaration, that of 2003, was an EU effort to establish a strategic orientation for the Western Balkans, an agreement between the member states and the states of the Western Balkans (including Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK).

Last night’s Athens declaration is an attempt to create a strategic orientation of the EU for the Western Balkans together with Ukraine and Moldova.

And, at this point, that the EU has or will have a strategic orientation, the good news ends. In a match with reality, Ukraine and Moldova have now joined a European race between geopolitics and cynicism. In that race, the first thing that can come to mind is the next fatalistic barsoleta that in 2043 the summit of the leaders of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova will be held in Greece, and the prime minister of Georgia will also be a guest in it (and if will use a little imagination, Azerbaijan) with which the European future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and now also Georgia (and, with a little imagination, Azerbaijan) will be re-declared.

Geopolitics has its place both in 2003 and in 2023

In 2003, the wars of the former Yugoslavia had ended (the last one of R. Macedonia in 2001), the USA was busy in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the EU had the right vision that the stabilization of Europe means EU membership of space of its southeast (and that for this we should not wait for the American geopolitical return).

In 2023, Russia’s war against Ukraine gives an additional dimension to the vision of the EU, the definition of its eastern borders with the implication of the inclusion of the Western Balkans within the entirety of the European Union. And, while the EU has been established for the first time as a power that actively helps the war on the European continent, together with the USA, the decision on the membership of Ukraine and Moldova, as a permanent stabilization measure, belongs to the EU.

The problem of the EU’s geopolitical approach is the mismatch between the objectives and the capacity to achieve them. After the 2003 Summit, only Croatia joined the EU; all other participants have the promise of membership and candidate status (with the exception of Kosovo). But being a candidate for membership has not changed the relationship in the triangle of unfinished states Kosovo-Serbia-BH. Moreover, another candidate state, Montenegro, has suffered a major blow on its European path from identity friction, a significant part of which comes from the other candidate state, Serbia.

In 2023, the establishment of Ukraine as a geopolitical turning point, which should speed up the EU’s preparation for this great historical challenge that will define the border between Europe and Euro-Asia, is the right vision, but if I were in Kiev I would I analyzed Kosovo-Serbia relations and the EU’s mediation. For more than ten years, the EU has not reached an agreement on an issue in its own backyard. If it cannot reach an agreement with its own instruments on a secondary (or third-order) issue compared to the eastern crises, what can be expected of it in Ukraine or Moldova?

Geopolitics, therefore, was not enough

Yes, there was a period when geostrategic decisions were made. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, newly emerged from dictatorships, were turning points for the peoples of those states and for the well-being of the continent as a whole. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria, both countries that, as seen today, are in the immediate neighborhood of the Ukraine war, also significantly stabilized this part of the continent. But why this happened then, does not mean that it should happen now.

Instead of geopolitics, cynicism has entered the race. In the Athens 2023 Declaration, a historic turning point is made of the union of the great cause (the freedom and independence of the European Ukraine) with the smaller causes (the integration of the Western Balkans). And, this statement is made right when the EU fulfilled the (next) anniversary of the inability to mediate: in September of last year Kosovo and Serbia were offered on a “take it or leave it” basis the most ambitious project so far, of a basic agreement between two independent states establishing relations without mutual recognition of citizenship. A year later, round after round of poor mediation, Kosovo and Serbia are further from the basic agreement than they were in September of last year.

And while the EU declares its geostrategic intention to help push Russia out of Ukraine, it does not prove it can do so in the Western Balkans: for a year and a half, Russia has remained just as strong, if not more so, right in the middle of the Balkans, in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The geopolitical ambition to create a free Europe with the Western Balkans in it and extending to the border between Ukraine and Russia, manifested last night in Athens, is the ambition for the most ambitious Euro-Atlantic project of this century. For the Western Balkans, this meant a democratic Serbia at peace with its neighbors, an independent Kosovo at peace with Serbia, a democratic and functional Bosnia-Herzegovina at peace with its identity pluralism, and so on. That all these countries have a common security system based on NATO.

Against this geopolitical ambition is the cynicism of reality. It is difficult to imagine that the EU will create a democratic space under the umbrella of NATO from the space of unfinished conflicts without the decisive intervention of the United States, Great Britain and powerful EU member states, primarily Germany, France, Italy and why not Poland.

The instruments shown so far in the Kosovo-Serbia case, from the discussions on license plates and territorial exchanges, to the great “geopolitical” victory of the EU achieved in Ohrid in what was called the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement, show that behind Big words hide small actions. What was called the Agreement was fragile with the very fact that it was not signed and is considered an Agreement, because this is what the head of diplomacy J. Borell considers to be. Even, with the greatest seriousness, it was explained how this is a legally binding Agreement, because “it is found in chapter 35 for Serbia and the SAA for Kosovo”, a wording that neither convinces, nor stimulates, nor scares.

This is the paradigm of the EU before the geopolitical challenge of the century.

[1] Veton Surroi is a Kosovar Albanian publicist, politician and former journalist. Surroi is the founder and former leader of the ORA political party, and was a member of Kosovo assembly from 2004 to 2008.

[2] The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova, the prime ministers of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and the head of the council of ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to attend the dinner, being hosted by Greek Prime  Minister  Mitsotakis on the 20th anniversary of a summit between the EU and western Balkan countries in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki as Balkan states sought to join the European bloc.

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Fredi Bejleri’s case should be dealt with as a democracy issue, not as an ethnic minority one 

A wave of political commentary and debate has recently erupted in Albania, especially coming from sources that are always ready to declare Greece an enemy of Albania. Unfortunately, these pseudo-patriotic and pseudo-nationalist commentators often dominate the public opinion space. 

Always ready to make conspiracy theory links, some have gone so far as to link the visit of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni to Albania and the return of the EU Ambassador Luigi Soreca to the fact that Albania’s justice reform needs defending from an aggressive Greece and Albania’s own political opposition. It’s a tragic comedy. 

The arrest of the Himara mayor Albanian opposition candidate, who also happens to be a member of the Greek minority in Albania, just two days before the election day, has had negative implications in Albania’s relations with Greece.

That candidate, Fredi Bejleri, who went on to win the local elections, has been charged with vote buying in a sting operation that raised many doubts: A person infiltrated by the police, according to the local media, offered cooperation to Mr. Bejleri or his electoral staff, to buy votes.

Vote-buying is actually a national sport in Albania and if all those who buy votes in political or local elections were arrested, all of the prisons in Albania might not be able to hold them, but maybe the prisons of Greece would not be enough either. Perhaps not even those in far-flung Turkey. 

Greece has requested the release of Bejleri to give him the opportunity to be sworn in as mayor. However, Albanian courts have repeatedly denied his requests to be released from detention while he awaits trial. 

Prime Minister Edi Rama has said that Albania is a democratic country with an independent judiciary, expressing irritation at the Greek pressure as Greek officials participated in a protest in Himara, including the mayors of Athens and other Greek cities.

The case is a test for the justice system in Albania. But, at a political level, this incident will have negative effects on the relations between the two countries. 

This week, for example, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis avoided having the Prime Minister of Albania at an informal dinner with the prime ministers of the Western Balkan Region to commemorate the Thessaloniki Summit 20 years ago, in which all of the region was promised eventual EU membership. The Greek government sent the invitation to the President of Albania instead, in what appeared to be seen in Tirana as a provocation since the President in Albania has an honorific role, not an executive one. Albania went unrepresented, as the head of state declined the invitation.

During the past 30 years, the relations between Albania and Greece have gone through several periods of crisis. Relations between the two countries take place in two spheres, parallel worlds. One is the “sphere/world of peace,” where political, economic and social relations take place, and the other is the “sphere/world of war,” where they are fought in the old trenches of nationalism and conspiracy.

The problem is that this is an important moment for Albania and its relations with a strategically important country like Greece are entering a crisis which is not good for either country, but especially for Albania.

What is happening with the case of Bejleri in Himara has nothing to do with the relations of Albanians as a people or the policies of the Albanian government toward the small Greek minority in Albania. In this context, it would have been good for Greece to raise its concerns as a member of the EU for negative developments related to elections and democracy and not be guided only by the fact that the opposition candidate is a member of its ethnic minority.The implications from the Himara incident will be political first, but economic implications are not excluded. Greece has been and continues to be a strategic economic partner for Albania in terms of trade and investments. It is not impossible that potential Greek investments would no longer feel welcome in Albania either.

Tirana Observatory

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In the last days of March, the Foreign Affairs ministers of Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo launched the “Western Balkans Quad – 100% alignment with EU Common Foreign Security Policy”¹ as a platform to address CFSP in the sensitive geopolitical context brought about by Russian aggression in Ukraine. All countries are on the path to accession into the European Union, although at different specific points. The focus of the first meeting of Quad was reported to be “the full alignment of the four countries from the Quad group with the EU’s foreign and security policy in light of the new geopolitical reality, hybrid threats, energy crisis, and economic consequences caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.” These issues have repeatedly been the focus of almost every regional or European meeting since February 2022. This new informal platform is the latest addition to an overwhelming myriad of regional constellations, mechanisms, initiatives, annual forums, etc. Alignment with the EU’s standard foreign security policy is a non-negotiable condition embedded in the integration process. It is a separate dedicated chapter in the negotiations plan with all the homework and commitments that entails.
The four countries have numerous opportunities, almost monthly ones, to meet and discuss issues of common interest and coordination in the field of foreign policy and security and subsequently agree on common positions or actions. Additionally, we haven’t explored all the possibilities of integrating this issue into the Berlin Process, the only one that actually gathers all six of them and could address the real issues: the countries that differ from EU CFSP and pressure them to change course. It is unclear what the concrete purpose of this initiative is and, more specifically, what its added value can be. It is no secret that the modest administrations of the foreign policy sector in the region’s countries are already struggling under the weight of managing a juggernaut of meetings, reports, and action plans, and keeping track of their participation and contribution.

Perceptions and alignments

In Serbia the Quad, is seen by some experts as not just another locally proposed initiative but as the counterpart to the dangerous idea of the Serbian world- Srbski svet- vocally defended by Serbian Minister Vulin. This has been reinforced by other international experts which see in the region the delineation of projects to align the interest of ethnic majorities.²
Serbia has never aligned itself with the EU CSDP when it comes to sanctions. Its influence is decisive also in the position of Bosnia Herzegovina that is in the same association due to the Republika Srpska’s stance. Yet Serbia remains de facto the front runner in the process of integration and despite the initial calls for the country to take sides convincingly, including here a resolution from the EU Parliament to condition negotiations upon doing so³, not much has happened. The EU does not want to alienate further the Serbian political elite or even the public whose numbers of support are falling consistently.

EU: the destructive ambiguity

The position of the European Union towards the new geopolitical realities in the continent has moved very little form its trademark ambiguity. The Union has not rewarded the alignment of the countries with its sanctions policy and most importantly has not exerted any real pressure let alone punishment on those who don’t. Coming to natural end of the mandate of EU institutions, due to be renewed after EU elections next summer, EU officials are scrambling for an achievement that can be considered their legacy in the region. So far the opening of the College of Europe in Tirana seems to be the sole North Star in this respect.
With enlargement frozen in its tracks, bilateral disputes still far from finding a path forward and the war at its doorstep the EU is watching passively as a myriad of initiatives and alignments, formal and informal try to fill in its void as countries seek to anchor themselves to the new realities.

So many initiatives yet few resources to make an impact

Quantity is not the only problem. With so many regional constellations in place, controversy is almost inevitable. Recently, competing narratives, such as the case of Open Balkans, have sown divisions among countries in the region when it comes to the modalities and vision of cooperation and ways of moving forward. The Open Balkans with its juxtaposition to the Berlin process and its ad-hoc series of meetings nature has started to resemble a soft power club of sorts with the most memorable meetings of he Prime Ministers in local wine promotion events.
The focus for the Ministries should be instead in increasing human resources capabilities and even expanding the directories in charge of the existing regional mechanisms in order to ensure better impact, coordination, monitoring and outreach. In addition, they should enhance and recalibrate their openness towards civil society cooperation. The integration process will
take care of the CSFP on its own just fine. This year alone will see these administrations struggling to meet the preparation and organizational needs of the Berlin Process Summit in Tirana in October and two EPC Summits in Moldova and Spain respectively in addition the usual workload of other regional platform conventions. In this light, the Quad seems like a cheerful club of the like-minded, positive but not convincingly necessary.

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1 ‘Four Western Balkan countries launched “100% Alignment with CFSP” platform’, https://europeanwesternbalkans. com/2023/03/29/four-western-balkan-countries-launched100-alignment-with-cfsp-platform/

2 Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Dividing Western Balkans into Spheres of Influence https://istraga.ba/ janusz-bugajskis-washington-view-dividing-western-balkans-into-spheres-of-influence/

3 ‘European Parliament Links Serbia’s Progress to Sanctions on Russia’ https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/23/european-parliament-links-serbias-progress-to-sanctions-on-russia/

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Veton Surroi

The first lesson of the events of these days in the four northern municipalities of Kosovo is that the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is not over. Even after 24 years, since Serbia signed the capitulation with NATO, it still has not signed the peace and cooperation agreement with Kosovo. During various negotiation processes, for which the European Union has been authorized, Serbia has consistently defended its position on keeping the conflict with Kosovo unfinished. This conflict is called the “final status” of Kosovo, which according to Serbia is still undefined, and for the determination of which Serbia’s final consent is needed.

The international community and the representatives of Kosovo have been accommodated with this attitude since the beginning of the negotiation process in 2011. The EU believed it had overcome this attitude with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, which began as the Franco-German Plan. This plan had to establish from the beginning the principle of relations between the two sovereign states, which at the moment do not recognize each other. But Serbia remained consistent with its position, even not admitting at all that it has agreed with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”.

In Serbia’s interpretation, there is no signature of the president or his verbal agreement for the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, therefore it does not exist.
Consequently, it is within this logic that a Dragan Smigic, a policeman from Rudari, a village in the Municipality of Kurshumli, appears at the barricades in Zveçan and beats KFOR soldiers with his official baton. He beats the “occupiers” in the logic of Serbia’s power.

The second lesson is that logic has the elasticity of conflict. The more the conflict is prolonged, the more this particular form of logic is accommodated in this prolongation.
Sending a plainclothes policeman—along with hundreds of others who share the dress code, crowd discipline, and aggressiveness of a trained mob and crowd-control assault group—against NATO units. In Kosovo, it should not have made sense. A state like Serbia no matter how twisted its ruling logic is, would still be kicking itself if it attacked NATO. But, such a logic has undergone elasticity.

Serbia has challenged the limits of the decency of a European state on two primary levels. It has challenged it in the case of Russia, by feeding its people in state and para-state propaganda with a determination from above to lean on the side of the aggressor in the war in Ukraine, and therefore complete distancing from European politics. He also challenged it in the case of Kosovo, following the narrative of the unfinished conflict that should not end with the independence of Kosovo.
This elasticity brings the logic to inversion.

So, it would be common sense for Serbia to align itself with the European continent, to which it belongs, and to distance itself from Russia, and at the same time to find ways of accommodation with independent Kosovo as part of good neighborliness, so that integrated and supported financially and politically. But in the inversion of logic, Serbia has shown that it has European and American attention if it simultaneously pushes the limits of its support for Russia and non-normalization of relations with Kosovo.

This inversion has a reason for existence. Serbia has successfully transformed its role from a state that is being pressured to be a political part of the continent (“do this or you will face sanctions”) to a state that is waiting to be enticed to be a political part of the European continent. Dragan Smigić beating KFOR soldiers is a symbol of inversion. Now Serbia must be begged to be polite; it was once expected to be so, and if not the punishment followed.

The third lesson is that not everything has to do with Kosovo. Events in the north concerned Ukraine, Russia and Belgrade. In official Pristina, it might seem perfectly logical to send three mayors with special police to their offices. But sending in special police, although part of the legality, could not compensate for their lack of legitimacy. Even, far beyond this debate between legality and legitimacy, from the perspective of European security, the Zvecan barricades were seen as a good opportunity to test NATO when it is engaged in supporting Ukraine. When Dragan Smigiqi beats NATO soldiers in Zveçan, his baton is raised in Moscow. From Putin’s perspective, he is a volunteer in the war that Russia is waging against Western civilization.

Consequently, Dragan Smigic’s stick is a warning to the peaceful demonstrators in Belgrade, to that silent part of Serbian society that the government is afraid of, that they too are opponents of the great war that is being waged against the West.

Finally, it’s not the first time. When Milosevic’s power felt that it was in danger, he declared war on the neighboring peoples. When he once brought out the tanks against his own opposition in 1991, he quickly managed to consolidate himself by directing them against Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians.

Thirty years later, it is not difficult to understand that the stick of Dragan Smigic, which beat the NATO soldiers, also beats the citizens of Belgrade who are peacefully protesting against the power of violence in Serbia.

The fourth lesson is like the first. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia has not ended. Barricades are erected and dismantled, soldiers and policemen are beaten, deployed and retreat-
ed, big words are uttered and forgotten – but in the end, however, a negotiation process must
take place that reaches an end to the conflict.
This achievement cannot be done without the USA and the EU and the United Kingdom, and without some of the European countries such as Germany, France and Italy, with greater involvement in matters of peace and security in Kosovo.

Dragan Smigiqi and his stick that beats KFOR soldiers should be considered as an episode, but a serious episode, of confronting the fact that peace is not built with the illusion of a ceremonial declaration that a normalization agreement has been reached.

It’s time for serious action. Perhaps the first step for Kosovo would have to be an agreement on how to proceed, with the biggest supporters of its independence, based on an outline of the roadmap that this country believes in.

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On behalf of Spain, I earnestly welcome the new phase in Albania’s EU integration process, of strategic importance for Albania and for the EU as a whole. We live in an age of spectacular strides for humanity, but also of grave crises and looming threats to our security and well-being; as well as exacerbated great power competition.

The EU – along with an increasingly European NATO –are our main frameworks for effectively defending our security, upholding our interests and values, and jointly addressing the challenges of our time. I am firmly convinced that EU integration will contribute decisively to making Albania’s society more prosperous, its economy more competitive, and its institutions more resilient. I am also convinced of the strategic added value that Albania brings to the European Union.

Albania’s key geostrategic position as a Mediterranean gateway to the Western Balkans, its active role in NATO, its leadership within the UN Security Council, the vibrant energy of its society, the dynamism of its youth portrayed in Tirana as European Youth Capital, the constructive regional approach of its foreign policy, its interconfessional harmony … these and other factors underline the strategic benefits that Albania will provide to the EU as a whole, as I see it, at a crucial point in history.

As we look towards the future and roll up our sleeves for the hard work ahead, I would
like to express Spain’s encouragement and support to Albania for giving momentum to her reform process –the main driving force of EU enlargement.

As Spanish poet Antonio Machado once wrote, “Se hace camino al andar” (We make our path by walking).

The Prime Minister of Spain, during his historic visit to Tirana in August, stated that Albania can count on Spain as its friend, as we walk, together, down our shared path of European integration. Spain will hold, for the fifth time, the Presidency of the Council of the EU throughout the second semester of 2023.

We will work tirelessly to further the works within the EU Council and live up to the mammoth challenges we face, in the age of the greatest interdependence and globalisation in history.

An age which began, arguably, on the specific date which we are commemorating today: October 12th, when Christopher Columbus, at the behest of the Catholic monarchs of Spain, Fernando and Isabel discovered America and ushered in an unprecedented era of global exchanges.

This milestone for humanity coincided with the process of national unification in Spain. The unification enabled the Spanish monarchy to become, from the late 15th century, one of the most extensive and complex political constructs in history.

For centuries, Spain marked decisively the course of history, uniting continents and oceans, building bridges between civilizations; and thus contributing, to no small degree, to the emergence of globalisation. The silver peso, transported across the Atlantic and the Pacific, became the first global currency, facilitating the development of an international economic system.
The introduction of agricultural technologies and new crops from both sides of the Atlantic
helped to feed the world. Cultures came closer to each other: For example, it was a Spanish friar who finished, in the city of Fu-Zhou, the first Chinese grammatical study written by a westerner.

All the while, a group of Spanish scholars known as the school of Salamanca laid the foundations of public international law and human rights. Cervantes showed us in Don Quijote de la Mancha that, sometimes, dreams deemed impossible, are nonetheless worth pursuing.

Velazquez inspired entire generations of painters across the world with las meninas and other masterpieces. Goya depicted the lights and shadows of the European enlightenment. And the Spanish language forged an everlasting link between peoples and cultures in different hemispheres.

As a Spaniard and a European, as the ambassador of Spain to Albania, I feel that these timeless contributions to shaping global history remain today ever compelling. 500 million people across the world are currently native Spanish speakers. Spanish culture is truly global, as our language is the second most spoken mother tongue in the world, after mandarin, and the third most used language on the internet.

As the fourth largest economy in the EU, we contribute resolutely to the deepening of European integration; to a strengthened and enlarged NATO, in the wake of the Madrid Summit; and to effective multilateral diplomacy through the UN and its specialised organisations, the G20, NATO, CELAC, OSCE, OECD, the Council of Europe, and, more recently, the European political community, among others.

Spain is a world leader in tourism, having received pre-Covid 85 million visits per year – a figure that comes close to doubling Spain’s population. Spain has notable global projection also in sports: records set by Rafael Nadal, Real Madrid, Barcelona, and this year’s Eurobasket gold medal are just a few examples; although, it must be said that Albania’s impressive national football team put up a seriously good fight when Spain last played them in march.

Last but not least, Spanish gastronomy is also known throughout the world, and, in a similar way to Albania’s extraordinary cuisine, it reflects the different cultures and traditions that make Spain the unique nation it is today.

In sum, Spain is a European and Mediterranean country, a member of the Latin American community, a bridge between Europe and America, and a nation with a global outlook. The daunting challenges international society faces today require concerted action on a global scale. Spain will pursue, responsibly and relentlessly, in the light of our history and our culture, such concerted action, more necessary than ever.

As we honour the national day of Spain, I thank wholeheartedly Albania and all of the friends here today, for your support in contributing to this common purpose of paramount importance for humanity.

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By ALBERT RAKIPI

In a trajectory of extreme ups and downs in relations between Albania and the United States, President George W. Bush’s visit to Albania in 2007 marked the highest point. In international relations, the visit of a president is always important and reflects a very high level of bilateral interstate relations. But if we take into account the asymmetry between a very small country like Albania and a global power like the United States, President Bush’s visit is quite significant and reflects a privileged relationship with Albania.

But what made the visit even more extraordinary, historic and decisive was the fact that it served to make public in Tirana the strategic decisions of the Bush Administration on the future of the Albanian people and the Albanian state: First, Kosovo’s independence and, second, Albania’s NATO membership.

Kosovo’s independence put an end to the dilemmas surrounding the Albanian national issue that stemmed from the recognition of the Albanian state with many Albanian territories left outside of it more than 100 years ago. And it is clear Kosovo’s independence would not have been possible without the determination of the United States and without the leadership of President George W. Bush.

NATO membership is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of modern Albania, the best thing to happen since the fall of the communist regime. NATO membership has strongly linked Albania’s present and future with the West. And no matter how deformed, long, with ups and downs the road to truly belonging to the West is — with its values ​​of freedom, democracy, development and peace — NATO membership has not left any space or opportunity for dilemmas as to the destination. But Albania’s NATO membership too would not have been possible without the will of the United States and the leadership of President Bush.

Albanian diplomacy has had some specific times that have seen extraordinary achievements.

In June 2007, on his visit to Tirana, U.S. President Bush publicly announced Kosovo’s independence and Albania’s NATO membership.

In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. The United States, the main sponsor of that independence, was one of the first countries to recognize the new state in the Balkans.

In March 2008, Albania received an invitation to join NATO as a member.

In 2009, Albania joined NATO.

And in 2011, Albania achieved another extraordinary aspiration with the fall of the visa wall, which opened the opportunity for Albanians to freely visit most of Europe.

Basic characteristics of Albania-U.S. relations

The visit of President Bush in 2007 confirmed a basic characteristic of Albania-U.S. relations, however asymmetrical they are and will continue to be: The state of relations is continually important on issues of a strategic nature — even determining the destinies of the state and the nation.

Throughout the modern history of the Albanian state, relations with the United States have been either exclusive and privileged, or have not existed at all.

I believe this sounds almost mythical and totalitarian. It is true that the relations between Albania and the United States are mythical in a way in which no one has any dilemmas and the reviews are not useful, in fact might be  prohibited, as in all mythological narratives. 

However, today’s conference is a good opportunity to reflect on the necessity of democratization of the study of Albanian-U.S. relations and therefore the necessity of deconstructing myths. But as Aphthonius, an enlightened mind of antiquity put it: “Myths are lies that tell the truth.”

But what are some of the truths of the myth in Albania-U.S. relations?

President Woodrow Wilsonbecame a myth in the eyes and hearts of Albanians for his pro-Albanian intervention precisely when European powers were deciding the fate and future of an Albanian state. And, in fact, the Europeans were deciding against the existence of an Albanian state in the Balkans.

In 1945, the decision was made not to recognize the communist government that emerged from the Dec. 2 elections. The decision of Enver Hoxha’s communist government to remove the U.S. diplomatic mission in Tirana in the autumn of 1946, creating a shocking situation, was the final step to end relations with the West in the most absurd and obscure way.

In 1991, the United States made the restoration of diplomatic relations conditional on the recognition and presence of the Democratic opposition.

From 1992 onward, Albania supported the transformation toward a democratic system in its international relations and its national security in relations with the West and NATO, a path led by the United States.

From Ahtisaari Plan to “the time is now”

But Kosovo’s independence is undoubtedly the best case to witness the basic characteristics of Albanian-American relations, which, when they existed, had to do with fundamental things for the nation and state and their progress.

The United States led an international coalition against the Milosevic regime in Serbia, ending the war, the horrors of which were very similar to those of World War II.

It was very important that all European Powers, including important powers such as France, had to overcome the fact that Serbia, as President Miteran said, had stood by its side in two world conflicts.

But the end of the war in international relations does not necessarily mean the triumph and establishment of peace.

Eight years after the end of the war in Kosovo, the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo had not produced any results and the temporary peace was expected to turn into a new conflict.

In April 2007, Special Envoy of the United Nations Martti Ahtisaari presented the plan for resolving the status of Kosovo.

The truth is that the Ahtisaari Plan contained the perspective of independence, but of course, to implement that plan, there was the need for political will in an unfavorable environment in the UN Security Council, but also some lack of enthusiasm among European allies.

We just have to speculate today what would have happened and what course the events would have taken and what would have been the fate of Kosovo and the future of its state and independence if the Ahtisaari Plan had not been accepted.

But the fact is that in less than a year, on Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence based on the Ahtisaari Plan.

And the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, in fact the independence of Kosovo itself became possible with the will and leadership of the United States and President Bush.

“The end result is independence … and the time is now,” President Bush told foreign and local journalists in Tirana on June 10, 2007.

President Bush publicly rejected in Tirana the idea of ​​an endless dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which in fact maintained a dangerous status quo.

In a way, Washington gently rejected the proposal of a European power to reflect on the future and status of Kosovo at least for a period of six months.

Again, we would speculate if he would try to give an answer to the question of what would have happened if this six-month reflection period could have been accepted by Washington.

And if this proposal was accepted, what security would there be that another European power could not make a similar proposal.

But the rejection of what President Bush still called “endless dialogue,” ,was not only for the opponents of Kosovo’s independence, but also for the non-opponents and democratic countries and states that were still hesitant for one reason or another.

The United States put an end to these hesitations by announcing the international recognition of the new state.

Finally, the commemoration of President Bush’s visit 15 years ago is an opportunity to reflect on the role the United States played in addressing a number of issues related to peace, security and reconciliation in the Balkans.

The determination of the United States and the strategic vision of President Bush gave an end to the status quo in Kosovo.

But regardless of the developments, the growth and strengthening of the state of Kosovo, the international recognitions, the frozen conflict between Serbia and Kosovo still continues in the Balkans.

The United States and EU member states support the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. This is the second period of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in more than two decades.

The first period of the “dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo” was the one that began immediately after the end of the war in 1999, which President Bush called an “endless dialogue.”

And as we saw, it was the United States and its President who put an end to this endless dialogue in 2007 in Tirana by announcing the independence of Kosovo.

This is the second period of dialogue hosted by the European Union that continues to develop for more than a decade. And what is the substance of the current negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia? The issue of car license plates. In the words of Veton Surroi, think if almost 25 years after the end of WWII, two great enemies, Germany and France, continued to talk about vehicle license plates.

The question today then is: Will the United States act for a second time to end an absurd and endless dialogue like it did in 2007 and finally lead to a solution of the frozen conflict?

*This article adapted from remarks of Albert Rakipi at a conference by the Council of Albanian Ambassadors, with the support of the Council of American Ambassadors, “The first historic visit of an American President to Albania,” in the framework of the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of U.S.-Albania diplomatic relations.

The author is Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies ( AIIS)

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The expression above is commonly used in English-speaking countries to show inertia as an often decisive force in political and social developments even when everything seems to be changing shape. This expression came to my mind as I read the scenarios in the Western Balkans Futures report published by Visegrad Insight (Read the Report)

The above-mentioned report underlines the fact that the war in Ukraine was unimaginable in this form and at the scale we see today. The Russian invasion of Ukraine took all experts by surprise and even more so those who try to make predictions by looking at the various long-term trends as is the case of this report.

Of course, many variables and assumptions are taken for granted and naturally, other trends take on primary importance in this context. And yet after reading the report I had to give the authors an encouraging message that resembles that expression at the beginning. The report sheds light and highlights various developments whose value does not fall even in this new context, on the contrary, some of them take on more importance.

The Scenarios

The report outlines several scenarios regarding the future of the region, from a dark vision where the status quo turns into a conflict to a utopian vision where cooperation between Balkan countries emerges victorious over global challenges. The scenarios are entitled:

1. Forced Hand
2. Dark future
3. Elusive Europeanization
4. De-fragmentation of the Western Balkans
5. Tied together

In all these scenarios, some more realistic and some more triumphant, there are some very important links that cross the narratives of European integration, regional cooperation, the role of third countries like Russia and China and economic and demographic change.

These topics have been the focus of attention, politics, reforms, protests, public discussions and social media posts. The ensuing war in Ukraine has restored the importance of geopolitics, something that the first scenario carefully treats as a choice and solution that the European Union has the potential to make in the face of systemic rivals.

Stagnation Lead Innovation

The regional cooperation that has gained momentum in recent years also due to the stagnation of the enlargement process is seen as something with tremendous potential but only if it becomes comprehensive and non-destructive.

Pandemics and public health, the environment and climate change are global concerns that continue in parallel with the war and require regional collective action. But also the economy and the need to move closer to average EU standards are an impetus for market expansion and the removal of barriers. Scenarios 4 and 5 provide arguments and details about exactly how this collaboration might affect the future.

Personally, I feel that the scenario that comes closest to the analysis of the research work we have developed at the Institute of International Studies (AIIS) in recent years is scenario 3: Elusive, inaccessible Europeanisation, something that seems to be approaching but we know is still so far away, so much so that it loses meaning.

This scenario starts from the painful premise of a weakening democracy in many countries both in the region and within the EU.

Corruption Erodes Gains

In this pessimistic scenario, the corrupt dynamics between politics, business and the media, a trend that is present and perceptible, becomes such that it completely erodes democratic and economic progress.

On the other hand, low trust and limited interaction between citizens and the active part of civil society do not bring the required result.

As the report quotes, ‘The product of this scenario is that in fact, insecurity will increase, human rights will be violated (and important allies — the EU — will have less incentive to protect and promote them) as well as autocratic and populist  regimes will be consolidated.’

This scenario recognizes well and indirectly denounces hypocrisy that is growing and taking shape in the relationship between the Western Balkans region and the European Union. The prospect of membership remains on paper and is recited as a cliché at every visit of senior officials but in reality, both parties are simply buying time up to the next step.

It is this hypocrisy that with the war in Ukraine can and must end. The European Union must think and act strategically for the region, and make room in its own home — for our countries which are part of the European family — and through which the challenges that keep it awake at night pass: refugees, pollution, intimidation of ethnic conflicts.

On the other hand, the countries of the region, especially those accustomed to flirting with third parties, must convincingly anchor themselves in the foreign policy of the organizations they aspire to belong to and complete reforms that guarantee the power and independence of institutions.

If this does not happen scenario 2: the dark future, where a complete disintegration of the integration and development processes that have taken place so far is always a possibility. And for those who shrug their shoulders in disbelief, even war in Ukraine seemed impossible until recently!

*This article was first published in Visegrad Insight. 

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