The strategic geography of extremism is shifting. The next global shock may come not from the capture of a capital, but from the insecurity of a maritime chokepoint..

By Dr. Arben Ramkaj

On the morning of September 11, 2001, when hijacked aircraft struck the Twin Towers in New York and the world watched their collapse almost in real time, international terrorism entered a new era. Al-Qaeda did not seek to occupy American territory; it struck symbols of the economic and political power of the United States and, through them, the confidence of the free world. Within hours, it became clear that an organization without a state, a conventional army, or sovereign territory could turn the very infrastructure of the modern world against it.

Twenty-five years later, as we remember the victims of that morning, the question is no longer simply whether the world is better protected against another 9/11, but what terrorism itself has learned over the past quarter-century. Al-Qaeda demonstrated that a network could strike at the heart of a superpower; ISIS showed that terrorism could seize territory, control populations, and attempt to construct a state; while what is emerging today between Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and Bab el-Mandeb points to another transformation: extremist organizations may no longer need to strike a tower or capture a capital if they can threaten the corridors through which the global economy moves.

When ISIS transformed Raqqa into its de facto capital, thousands of militants from dozens of countries converged on Syria and Iraq and seized cities, oil fields, border crossings, and strategic corridors. When the territorial “caliphate” collapsed, it created the impression that a chapter in the history of international terrorism had come to an end. Today, there are reasons to believe that only one of its forms had ended.

History also teaches us that doctrine is not always stronger than interest. The Thirty Years’ War in Europe began with a powerful religious dimension but gradually evolved into a struggle over territory and the balance of power, culminating in the paradox of Catholic France under Richelieu supporting Protestant powers against the Catholic Habsburgs. The comparison with contemporary conflicts is not direct, but the lesson remains relevant: strategic interest can overcome even profound religious divisions.

This makes what is emerging between Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab particularly significant. The two originate from opposing ideological universes: the Houthis from a Zaydi environment and with an important strategic and military relationship with Iran; Al-Shabaab from radical Sunni jihadism and the Al-Qaeda network. Yet United Nations experts have identified a transactional and opportunistic relationship, alongside reports of transfers of weapons and expertise from Yemen to Al-Shabaab. This does not prove the existence of a political alliance or a unified command structure. But that is precisely where the concern lies: operational cooperation does not necessarily require ideological reconciliation.

The Houthis have accumulated experience in missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare against maritime targets—capabilities developed in part through Iranian technological and military support—while Al-Shabaab possesses networks, financing, and territorial reach in the Horn of Africa, with annual revenues estimated by UN-related sources at approximately $100–200 million. If technological expertise moves from one ecosystem to another, the nature of the threat changes. Weapons can be seized and missiles can be destroyed, but knowledge, once transferred, can be reproduced.

THIS IS WHERE WE ARRIVE FROM RAQQA TO BAB EL-MANDEB.

The “Gate of Tears,” between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. In the second quarter of 2026, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, an average of approximately 8.1 million barrels per day of petroleum and other liquid fuels passed through this corridor.

ISIS had to capture Mosul and Raqqa to demonstrate its power. To destabilize Bab el-Mandeb, however, it is not necessary to occupy territory. It is enough for risk to raise insurance premiums, alter shipping routes, and force carriers to choose longer alternatives. In the modern economy, an artery does not have to be physically closed to become a weapon; it merely has to lose its security.

The danger becomes even greater when Bab el-Mandeb is placed on the same strategic map as the Strait of Hormuz. If both waterways were simultaneously subjected to sustained pressure, they would not have to be completely closed to trigger a global crisis. It would be enough for markets to lose confidence in the security of navigation.

Risk becomes insurance; insurance becomes transportation cost; transportation cost becomes price. And ultimately, that price is paid by an ordinary citizen thousands of kilometres away from the conflict.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, this is the emerging challenge for the free world. It learned how to pursue Al-Qaeda’s networks and how to fight the territorial state created by ISIS. It must now confront a threat that may require neither a capital nor borders, but merely the capacity to endanger a maritime strait, a port, or an energy corridor.

On September 11, 2001, terrorism struck two towers that symbolized the power of the global economy. A quarter-century later, it may no longer require such a monumental target.

From the Twin Towers to Raqqa, and from Raqqa to Bab el-Mandeb, extremism has changed its method: first it attacked the symbol, then it sought the territory, and today it may seek to disrupt circulation itself.

And the danger is not that the Houthis will become Al-Shabaab, or that Al-Shabaab will embrace the Houthis’ doctrine. The danger is that they may discover that they do not need to agree on doctrine in order to agree on using terror against the free world.

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About the author

Dr. Arben Ramkaj is a researcher and expert in interfaith dialogue, international relations, and religious diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Middle East and the Western Balkans. He serves as Chairman of the Interfaith Cooperation Center (QBNF) and Director of the Program for the Middle East and Arab World at the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS). He is also Vice-President of the European Muslims League (EML) and a member of the General Council of the Muslim Community of Albania. His work focuses on interfaith dialogue, the prevention of extremism, religious diplomacy, peaceful coexistence, and the geopolitical dynamics connecting the Western Balkans with the Middle East.

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There are moments in history when a country’s future is shaped by a single document. Such agreements are rare, but their impact can endure for generations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement is one such example. On Aug. 13, 2001, 25 years ago, North Macedonia’s political leaders, backed by the European Union and the United States, signed an agreement that would have a defining historical impact on the country and shape its trajectory for decades to come.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement remains one of the region’s most important political and diplomatic achievements in modern history. It showed that ethnic conflicts in the Balkans could be addressed not through force, but through dialogue, political compromise, respect for rights and the creation of institutions that ensure all citizens have an equal place in the state.With the region still bearing the scars of the Yugoslav wars, the Ohrid Agreement offered an alternative based on coexistence rather than division, compromise rather than victory for one side, and inclusion rather than exclusion, helping redefine how the state should function for all its citizens. The Ohrid Agreement represented, and continues to represent, a strategic commitment to peace, coexistence and the creation of a multi-ethnic state where differences are no longer a source of conflict, but part of a shared political and social framework. It gave North Macedonia the opportunity to break free from the legacy of conflict and build a more democratic, inclusive and stable state with a clear European path. 

Twenty-five years later, this remains Ohrid’s most important legacy and the greatest responsibility of the current generation: to safeguard its achievements, carry its principles forward and ensure that peace, coexistence and the country’s European orientation become irreversible. Albania has never viewed North Macedonia’s stability and prosperity simply as the concern of another country. For us, they have always been directly linked to the stability and security of the Western Balkans.

Good relations between communities, equality, respect for identity and language, fair representation and ensuring that every citizen feels fully part of the state are not merely matters of principle and fundamental rights. They are also essential to peace, security, stability and the region’s European future. This was precisely the understanding that was reached and put into practice in Ohrid a quarter of a century ago. This is the most important lesson the Ohrid Agreement offers the region today. Peace is not secured simply by bringing a conflict to an end; it becomes sustainable when it is anchored in institutions, rights, equal opportunities and mutual trust. A peace agreement fulfils its purpose not merely when the guns fall silent, but when future generations no longer have reasons to turn back to conflict. By safeguarding the rights of communities, ensuring fairer representation in public administration and recognising the country’s multi-ethnic character, the agreement established a new political and social balance. For this reason, the Ohrid Agreement should not be treated as something set in stone. It should instead be viewed as an enduring political commitment that requires constant attention, given its importance to North Macedonia’s future and its role in shaping a democratic, multi-ethnic, inclusive and European state. 

Preserving the spirit of Ohrid does not mean dwelling on the memory of conflict, but ensuring that the grievances and conditions that fuelled it never again become a source of division. In this context, North Macedonia’s NATO membership, genuine regional cooperation, good-neighbourly relations and European path are both a realisation and a natural continuation of the spirit of Ohrid. Europe does not seek to erase differences; rather, it calls for them to coexist within strong institutions, the rule of law and a democracy that guarantees equality and dignity for all.

In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, the Ohrid Agreement recognised a fundamental reality that was already clear in 2001: Albanians are an essential part of North Macedonia’s society and a constituent community of the state.Their rights are not concessions bestowed by the majority, nor privileges that can be reconsidered according to the political climate of the day. They form part of the country’s political compact and are among the foundations of a democratic and multi-ethnic state.

Europe’s strongest examples, along with the most positive experiences in our region, have shown that a state is stronger when it protects and guarantees the identity, language, culture and rights of its communities, both in law and in practice, in letter and in spirit. Similarly, communities that feel equal and properly represented are more likely to see the state as their own, contribute to its strength and invest in its future. In this sense, Ohrid did more than secure rights for Albanians. It reshaped the understanding of the state itself — not as a temporary balance between communities, but as a system where equality and state strength reinforce each other; where diversity is seen as part of a shared identity rather than a threat; and where ethnicity does not determine the rights or status of citizenship. On this anniversary, one lesson remains particularly relevant. The Ohrid Agreement reminds us that peace cannot be taken for granted. It must be preserved and nurtured through democratic institutions, respect for diversity and a shared vision for the future. For Albania, the stability, security and prosperity of North Macedonia are inseparable from the development and resilience of the region as a whole. Our two countries share not only a border, strategic interests and a path towards the European Union, but also the conviction that inter-ethnic relations based on respect and equality are the foundation on which modern European societies are built. 

Albania remains firmly convinced that lasting peace in the Balkans can be built by bringing people closer together, strengthening democratic institutions and bilateral and multilateral relations, respecting human rights, and giving all members of society, without distinction, a reason to see their future as part of the same shared project. Ohrid forged this path 25 years ago. It is the responsibility of today’s generation to carry it forward.The anniversary is also a moment to take stock of the agreement’s implementation, assess its effectiveness and consider what remains unfinished. Upholding the spirit of Ohrid is still an ongoing task: this year’s debate over the use of Albanian in the justice system highlights that the rights secured in 2001 require continuous institutional attention and protection, rather than being confined to formal commemorations. 

North Macedonia today is not the same country it was 25 years ago. Its society has evolved, as have the region and Europe. The very concepts of security, sovereignty and cooperation have also undergone significant change. For this reason, Ohrid must also be understood in the context of this future. Preserving the Ohrid Agreement means continuing to build a state in which a return to confrontation and division becomes impossible. This requires responsibility from everyone, both social groups and political elites. As is expected of all countries in our region, we must recognise that the stability of one cannot be built on the insecurity of another. For Albania, its relationship with North Macedonia carries particular importance. We are neighbours, friends, NATO allies, partners in the European integration process and part of the same Balkan space, which knows the high cost of past conflicts but also the value of genuinely investing in a shared future. Albania will continue to support the rights of Albanians wherever they live, while also strongly supporting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic functioning of the states in which they live.These two positions are not contradictory. On the contrary, they reflect the same principle: the rights of communities and the strength of the state are not mutually exclusive. Each reinforces the other. This is one of Ohrid’s important lessons. 

Twenty-five years after it was signed, the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains foundational because it answered a fundamental question: can a common state be built in the Western Balkans while respecting different identities and making them part of its strength? The answer provided by the past 25 years of history is undoubtedly yes. That answer must be reaffirmed every day through trust and genuine investment in a future that moves the country forward. A quarter of a century later, perhaps the best way to honour the decision made on Aug. 13, 2001, and celebrate its achievements is not to view Ohrid simply as the agreement that ended conflict and division, but as the agreement that taught us all how to build lasting peace.

The post A Quarter Century Since Ohrid: The Agreement That Gave North Macedonia Its Future appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

For more than a century, the Serbian state and Church have mythologized the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 as a defining moment of Serbian identity—a narrative culminating each year in the celebration of Vidovdan, Serbia’s national and religious holiday observed on June 28. Originally linked to the feast day of Saint Vitus, Vidovdan has since been transformed into a potent symbol of Serbian martyrdom and nationalist pride. But this myth, far from being a benign cultural tradition, is in fact a calculated ideological construction. It has served to justify territorial claims against Kosovo and to propagate a hegemonic vision of Serbian exclusivity in the Balkans.

In historical terms, the Battle of Kosovo was a relatively minor confrontation. Some historians have even questioned its factual veracity. What is indisputable, however, is that the event has been deliberately transformed into a foundational myth—an origin story for the Serbian national project. Beginning in the 19th century, with the emergence of the modern Serbian state, this myth was carefully cultivated by the Serbian Academy and the Orthodox Church to serve political purposes. Kosovo, in this narrative, was cast as the “cradle of the Serbian nation,” a sacred land eternally tied to Serbian destiny.

But this version of history is not only factually distorted—it is dangerous.

The battle itself was part of a broader Christian coalition, one that included not only Serbs but also Hungarians, Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians, who at the time were predominantly Christian. Yet, in the nationalist retelling, all others are erased. The myth excludes non-Serbs from Kosovo’s past and present, creating a fabricated sense of historical entitlement. It is a hegemonic tale that positions Serbs as the sole inheritors of the land, disregarding centuries of multiethnic coexistence.

More importantly, this myth has not remained confined to folklore or liturgy. It has deeply shaped Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy. In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the battle, Slobodan Milošević delivered his infamous speech at Gazimestan, transforming Vidovdan into a rallying cry for nationalist mobilization. Since then, the holiday has been celebrated not as a cultural event, but as a chauvinistic display of exclusivism and dominance. This has had devastating consequences for the region—fueling ethnic tensions, legitimizing war crimes, and obstructing reconciliation.

In the diplomatic arena, the myth of Vidovdan has also been instrumentalized. The Serbian Church and state have produced countless publications invoking this narrative, embedding it not only in their own institutional documents but also influencing international academic and diplomatic discourse. In the early 20th century, Serbia capitalized on favorable geopolitical alignments—presenting itself as anti-German, anti-Austrian, and aligning with French and British interests. Through active propaganda, the myth found sympathetic ears in Western diplomatic and scholarly circles, particularly during and after the First World War.

But the logic of ancient entitlement is a flawed and perilous one. If historical claims were to dictate modern statehood, then much of the Balkans could belong to Rome, Byzantium, or the Ottomans. States cannot be built on myths or memory alone—especially when such memory is weaponized against others.

It is time to confront the myth of Vidovdan for what it is: not a sacred memory of national martyrdom, but a political instrument of exclusion and domination. The Balkans deserve a future grounded in truth, coexistence, and mutual respect—not in the ghosts of a selectively remembered past.

The post Vidovdan: A Dangerous Myth Turned Political Weapon appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By GENC POLLO[1]

Ten days ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, standing on the side of visiting Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told the media that he was against the bilateralization of the European Union enlargement process. 

The chancellor was apparently referring to the non-signing by the ambassador of Greece to the EU of a circular letter authorizing the European Commission to open negotiations with Albania for some clusters and chapters of the membership draft/treaty. Since this step requires unanimity from all the member states, the Commission cannot act. As it is known, the Beleri case has triggered Athens to harden its stance. 

1-Identity vetoes

Chancellor Scholz is right. The EU member states have often abused their veto in Brussels as they dealt with issues with neighbouring countries. Greece started this game in the early 90s when an adventurous foreign minister declared Macedonia an “enemy” that was stealing the Greek name, history and culture. Although in private conversations politicians and friends of mine admitted this approach was useless, the Greek public opinion was enthralled making it difficult to compromise and reach an agreement (it happened only in 2018). So with this issue, for a quarter of a century, Greece blocked the path of membership of (North) Macedonia into NATO and the EU.

Bulgaria, in various intervals, did the same to Macedonia. Sometimes with the claim that the Macedonians denied that they were Bulgarians and later with the contradictory claim that they didn’t recognise the Bulgarian minority. A few years ago, this issue was resurrected by a populist-nationalist president incensing public opinion and most parliamentary parties had to follow willy-nilly. 

Wise personalities who considered this extremism absurd were not listened to anymore. Also Skopje did not remain idle, provoking Greece by erecting neo-Hellenistic statues and Bulgaria by rebroadcasting the films of the Yugoslav era that shows Bulgarians as barbaric Mongols.

But, at the end of the day, there remains a veto with negative consequences for the region and Europe and motivated by identity and historical-cultural issues that are incomprehensible outside the region.

 2- Material vetoes

But the bilateral veto is a European sport for other EU countries as well. Except state motives are more concrete and material. For example, Slovenia blocked Croatia’s membership for several years because they wanted a favorable agreement on the maritime border in the Piran Bay. Slovenia relented when Croatia accepted international arbitration on the matter.

Likewise, the Czech Republic in 2014 threatened to veto Albania’s candidate status if Tirana didn’t withdraw from the international arbitration on the dispute with CEZ (a Czech state-owned power distribution operator that bought the Albanian counterpart and had issues) and did not accept their terms. Although in the arbitration the chances of winning were high, the Rama government caved in. 

A year later, the Supreme State Audit Office found that this agreement was illegal, it cost the state 479 million euro in damages and filed a criminal complaint against the minister in charge (of course nothing happened). A bizarre aspect of this agreement was the obligation of the Albanian side to under no circumstances file criminal charges against the Czech personnel of CEZ Albania: neither for corruption nor for anything else. This type of amnesty is not only immoral but also clearly unconstitutional. For the sake of the “European cause”, the Rama government did not mind the tax money wasted or the constitutionality.  

The reasons for the veto in the above and other similar cases can be fair or unfair, reasonable or exaggerated, ethical or selfish. Be that as it may, the use of the European veto for issues unrelated to the EU membership integration process is unfair, exaggerated and selfish. Therefore Mr. Scholz and many like him are right when they speak out against “bilateralization”

 3-Is the Beleri case a genuine Albanian-Greek bilateral issue?

If we refer to the typology of the above cases Athens’ motivations seem different 

– it is not claiming that Albania is appropriating its history (in fact, the mother of Alexander the Great of Macedonia was a princess from the Molossian tribe, cousins with the Illyrians, but we have not officially claimed that great conqueror was (half) Albanian);

– it is not pretending that we are Greeks and that Albanian is a dialect of Greek (we live in the time of a Facebook infatuation about the Pelasgians a common linguistic roof, but fortunately this has not yet become an argument for diplomacy);

– it is not claiming to make the issue of the maritime border with Albania a precondition in the European Union process (this has been a strictly bilateral process that for 15 years has gone through agreements, their cancellations, fruitless negotiations and agreement on international arbitration);

– is not insisting that our state pay compensation for such a Greek company (it would not be surprising, but this is not the case).

Beyond these typical bilateral cases, one should be noted that Athens is not using its veto with regard to the Greek minority, which theoretically would have a legal basis (the Copenhagen criteria, which must be met by the candidate states for the EU, speak expressly about the rights of minorities) while for instance Budapest signals that it may vote against the opening of Ukraine’s EU membership negotiations precisely because of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

As I have argued in previous articles, Beleri is a clear case of violation of the rule of law, of democracy and of civil/political rights; Fredi Beleri himself is a political prisoner, the first political prisoner in the 21st century in Albania and therefore a dangerous precedent (looking at the developments of the last month, it should be noted with sadness that he is no longer the only political prisoner).

Beleri’s only formal connection with Greece is his double Albanian and Greek citizenship. But Beleri’s opponent in the municipal race was also a dual citizen of the two countries.

4-Rehabilitation of the veto 

By raising the Beleri issue in Brussels, Athens has not raised a bilateral Greek-Albanian issue but an absolutely internal, serious and important issue of the Albanian state. Greece is a small country in the EU where the influence is seen in proportion to the size of each member state. The Greek veto, due to the past experience with Skopje, can be seen with suspicion in Brussels as the shepherd who falsely cried wolf. But Greece’s intervention seems to fill the vacuum created by the inertia, silence and even blindness of the European Commission. Precisely the Commission, this primary body of the European Union with the functional task of verifying the Copenhagen Criteria in candidate countries such as Albania, was silent until November about Beleri while condemning arbitrary arrests in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. The Commission’s “Albania 2023” report, published this month, presents the Beleri case briefly and formally correctly, but surprisingly not in the chapter on democracy and fundamental rights, but in the one on relations with neighbours (for the sake of truth, we need to say that for the first time in this decade the report has two or three timid paragraphs describing the violation of the parliamentary rights of the opposition; this is a welcome development, although ten years late). 

This attitude of the European Commission may have several reasons. But the most obvious is the need to present as a success story the justice reform in Albania where the Commission invested considerable political and financial capital; with the best intention of course. Although various diplomats privately admit that the reform turned out to be very problematic, the bureaucrats of the Commission don’t have the institutional interest and moral courage to assert that the post-reform judicial bodies produce political prisoners; which the old justice, despite its sins and weaknesses, did not do since 2000. In order to complete the EU framework with positive notes, it is necessary to say that the European Parliament and the main political party there have taken a clear and proper stance on the Beleri case.

We can also talk about the silence of two European organizations with a focus on fundamental rights and which have offices in Tirana: the Council of Europe and the OSCE have not expressed themselves and this raises questions and invites a debate about their usefulness. It should be added here that the Congress of Local Authorities (within CoE)  has denounced Beleri’s arrest and ODIHR (within OSCE) mentions his case in the May 2023 local elections report. 

In this context, it is worth considering what could happen in the hypothetical scenario where the Greek government would have taken no interest in Fredi Beleri’s case. The burden of denouncing and fighting this neo-precedent of political imprisonment would remain mainly with the opposition, which is currently like a lone fireman in front of fires in every neighborhood of the city.

The EU and the US, in addition to the above inhibitions, are absorbed by crises, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as other challenges. As a result, they see the Balkans more in the geopolitical prism and less in the democratic one. Therefore it seems to me, even though I am allergic to bilateral vetoes, that the Greek intervention in Brussels on the Beleri issue could have positive consequences as it could force cynical bureaucrats to open their eyes. 

And to close with a non-ironic contextualization of an evolution: the prime minister, who in 2014 sacrificed hundreds of million euro of tax money and breached the constitution to get the EU candidate status, was not surprised by the loss of hundreds of millions of euros from the state budget and the violation of the constitution, ten years later he says to hell with EU membership if I can’t grab Himara’ coastal land plots for my “businesspeople”.

This article was written on November 27, 2023.

[1] Genc Pollo is an Albanian former cabinet minister and MP.

The post The dilemma over the criticism of the Greek veto appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

In November last year (2022) Albert Rakipi, a prominent figure in Albania’s international relations and think tank circles, contemplated a pressing question. With the European Union membership process losing momentum and leaving many disillusioned, he sought a way to ensure Albania’s enduring connection to the EU. His solution: bringing the College of Europe to Albania. 

The last time the College of Europe expanded, it was more than three decades ago to Warsaw’s Nanolin suburb, with its second campus opening before Poland’s EU membership. It was an anchor in the process. It was also a story that could be replicated in Albania, Rakipi believed.  

He then first shared the idea with trusted colleagues, including at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania’s top-rated think tank where Rakipi serves as chairman and where he has been a civil society leader for nearly 30 years. There was some disbelief, but not easily discouraged, Rakipi prepared a concrete project proposal and was looking for an opening. 

It came in early December 2022, at the massive EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Tirana, shortly before which Rakipi had secured a private meeting with Prime Minister Edi Rama to seek his support in making College of Europe’s campus in Tirana a reality. 

“It’s the type of thing that can happen only once in a 1000 years — or never,” Rakipi says as he recalls how his idea drew the support of the Albanian prime minister who immediately moved to include Rakipi’s project proposal in the folders of the EU leaders attending the meeting. By the summit’s end, the idea had received “in principle” support from the EU’s top leaders. 

Rakipi says it would not have become a reality without the support of Prime Minister Rama, who understood the project’s importance for Albania. Rama’s extensive connections with EU member state leaders and at times unorthodox lobbying efforts also played a significant role. “I am very grateful to Prime Minister Edi Rama for enthusiastically supporting the project. Having the College of Europe in Albania would have never been possible without Edi Rama as Prime Minister,” Rakipi says.  

Rama has spoken highly of the EU’s reaction, calling it a “great gift” and something “exceptionally important and significant for us.” 

The proposal had come at a strategic moment during the EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana, which was an ideal opportunity to signal the importance of the enlargement policy in the Balkans. 

Rakipi firmly believes that Tirana was the perfect location for the College’s third campus in the Balkans.

Apart from the geopolitical dynamics and the prime minister’s personal involvement, Rakipi emphasizes the role of the College of Europe’s Rector, Federica Mogherini, an Italian and a friend of Albania, was also invaluable. He suggests that the educational institution might not have come to Albania without her involvement. 

“I am grateful to Federica Mogherini, a friend of Albania, who said ‘yes’ without hesitation and with special dedication and passion,” Rakipi says.  “The College probably would not have come to Albania if the Rector had not been Mogherini.”

With the official ceremony, Tirana is ready for the College of Europe

For her part, Mogherini was clear-eyed and full of smiles as she delivered her speech at the official opening ceremony at the Tirana Pyramid, which will host the College and its first 31 students.

“We are inaugurating today in the beautiful Tirana, the first office of the College of Europe here in Tirana, which will lead the way for the establishment of our campus, which will start activities next September 2024-2025. It’s really an honor for me, I’m very proud, you see my smile, it’s a real smile, ” Mogherini said. “I would first like to thank all those who made such a thing possible.”

Of course, beyond Mogherini, it took the support of EU’s top leaders, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who viewed the establishment of the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision for the Balkans.

“This is fantastic. First and foremost, it is fantastic because adding a College of Europe in pursuit of higher education and excellence can only contribute to Albania’s and the region’s development and prosperity. But also, because the College of Europe will also reinforce all the efforts being made to bring Albania and the region into the European Union,” President von der Leyen said in a statement.

At the ceremony on Oct. 16, Von der Leyen described the college as a gift that Europe gives to Albania, but also a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe.

“Here we will have students from Albania, from all over the Western Balkans from the EU. They will lay the foundations as leaders of the future. This college will be the third campus because we have the first in Belgium, the second in Poland and the third here. This college came before Poland became a member country and I am convinced that the same will happen with Albania. Yesterday they opened the application process. Now students from all over Europe can apply. You can do these fantastic studies while exploring the fantastic Europe. This campus is a great gift from Europe to Albania. But not only this, but a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe,” von der Leyen said.

Prime Minister Edi Rama, during his speech at the inauguration ceremony, said that this project is something wonderful and that it happened faster than he thought it would happen.

“Who would have thought that this would happen so quickly? Yesterday the president of the Commission announced the opening of applications, today the doors of the representative office are opened and next year people will start studying at the College of Europe in Tirana. Something is happening and it is so amazing. This is a path full of lessons, and the European Union is a blessing for all our countries, it is a great blessing because it is the deepest source of how to build institutions.

“In the end, it is the institutions that matter,” Rama said. “Our past has been characterized by many bad things that are the result of the lack of institutions, even when some institutions were built from scratch, so the building of democratic institutions cannot be done unless you have the European Union to learn these. Knowledge is the most extraordinary gift that the European Union can give us.” 

Tying Albania permanently to the West

The EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana back in December 2022 was an ideal moment because of the state of EU’s relations with the Western Balkans. The European Union opened the campus in Natolin in 1992. “It was a very symbolic action to integrate the former East. In a way, the time had come to give a signal for the enlargement policy in the Balkans, after almost a ‘freezing’ of the enlargement process in the Balkans. And the idea of the College of Europe project in Tirana was right. And there is no doubt,” Rakipi says, “that Tirana was the capital where the third campus of the college of Europe in the Balkans should be located.”

“President Ursula or President Michel and anyone else in Brussels or Tirana can now see the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision in the Balkans. But the idea and the project was born in Tirana at the Institute of International Studies, a leading reputable think tank that has been contributing to Albania’s bilateral relations during the last two decades. It’s all like a dream,” says Rakipi. “Since December of last year, nine months have passed and the College of Europe is like a baby that has just been born. I am very proud to have helped the country with a beautiful, useful and unrepeatable idea and project.” 

For Rakipi, this is ultimately “extraordinary and historic” because it is another step in tying Albania permanently to the West, said Albert Rakipi, the chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the College of Europe to Tirana means bringing the first truly Western post-university educational institution since the creation of Albania’s modern state. It is the biggest development of its kind in education in 100 years, and will have the same impact in Albanian history as the pre-WWII French Lyceum in Korca and Harry Fultz’s American school in Tirana,” Rakipi said.

The College of Europe is the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training in European affairs. It was founded in 1949 by leading European figures in the wake of the Hague Congress, which led to the creation of the European Movement. Its original campus is in Bruges, Belgium. A second Natolin (Warsaw), Poland campus of the college was established in 1992 ahead of Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU. 

“It is first and foremost a signal of hope, a symbol of the serious commitment that the EU has towards the region despite all the doubts cast by the delays and stagnation of certain milestones,” Rakipi says “It will also bring forward academic, social and cultural cooperation between the countries in the region, with their peers in the EU as well as naturally foster the process of reconciliation.” 

The think tank where the project was written

AIIS, the think tank where the project was written by Rakipi, is a non-governmental, non-profit research and policy institute created in recognition of the need for independent, in-depth analysis of the complex issues surrounding Albania’s security. AIIS was founded by a group of academics and analysts with extensive experience in foreign policy and policy-making issues. Over the three decades since its establishment, AIIS has sharpened its technical capacities to become a leading think-tank trusted by Albanian policy-makers and international partners in the fields of security studies, democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation.

To promote discussion and debate among the policy community, AIIS engages Albanian and international scholars as well as provides its products free of charge on its website. These services are made possible by the contributions of national and international donor communities to fund its activities. As a results-oriented, methodologically interdisciplinary team, AIIS aims to produce timely advice as well as analysis of the challenges facing Albania’s policy-makers. 

As of March 2023, AIIS is a member of the College of Security and Defense of the European Union. AIIS is also internationally ranked as Albania’s top and among the region’s top think tanks by the University of Pensylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index.

In the words of Daniel P. Serwer, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Albania has made tremendous progress in the last thirty years and is moving smartly towards its European home. AIIS is both a cause and a consequence. Its sharp analytical focus on the world beyond Tirana has helped what was once one of the most isolated countries on earth, become an active contributor to the international order. These have been marvelously productive years for both Albania and its leading institute!”

The post Albert Rakipi and The College of Europe: The Bold Idea that Brought EU’s Venerable Institution to Albania. appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The Western Balkans are now joined by Ukraine and Moldova to follow together the race between geopolitics and cynicism

The Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003 (adopted at the first EU-Western Balkan Summit) stated that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union. The 2023 version of the Declaration of Athens, in honor of that of Thessaloniki, approved last night, ( August 21^st, 2023) [2] says that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union, and that Ukraine and Moldova have the same future.

The original declaration, that of 2003, was an EU effort to establish a strategic orientation for the Western Balkans, an agreement between the member states and the states of the Western Balkans (including Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK).

Last night’s Athens declaration is an attempt to create a strategic orientation of the EU for the Western Balkans together with Ukraine and Moldova.

And, at this point, that the EU has or will have a strategic orientation, the good news ends. In a match with reality, Ukraine and Moldova have now joined a European race between geopolitics and cynicism. In that race, the first thing that can come to mind is the next fatalistic barsoleta that in 2043 the summit of the leaders of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova will be held in Greece, and the prime minister of Georgia will also be a guest in it (and if will use a little imagination, Azerbaijan) with which the European future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and now also Georgia (and, with a little imagination, Azerbaijan) will be re-declared.

Geopolitics has its place both in 2003 and in 2023

In 2003, the wars of the former Yugoslavia had ended (the last one of R. Macedonia in 2001), the USA was busy in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the EU had the right vision that the stabilization of Europe means EU membership of space of its southeast (and that for this we should not wait for the American geopolitical return).

In 2023, Russia’s war against Ukraine gives an additional dimension to the vision of the EU, the definition of its eastern borders with the implication of the inclusion of the Western Balkans within the entirety of the European Union. And, while the EU has been established for the first time as a power that actively helps the war on the European continent, together with the USA, the decision on the membership of Ukraine and Moldova, as a permanent stabilization measure, belongs to the EU.

The problem of the EU’s geopolitical approach is the mismatch between the objectives and the capacity to achieve them. After the 2003 Summit, only Croatia joined the EU; all other participants have the promise of membership and candidate status (with the exception of Kosovo). But being a candidate for membership has not changed the relationship in the triangle of unfinished states Kosovo-Serbia-BH. Moreover, another candidate state, Montenegro, has suffered a major blow on its European path from identity friction, a significant part of which comes from the other candidate state, Serbia.

In 2023, the establishment of Ukraine as a geopolitical turning point, which should speed up the EU’s preparation for this great historical challenge that will define the border between Europe and Euro-Asia, is the right vision, but if I were in Kiev I would I analyzed Kosovo-Serbia relations and the EU’s mediation. For more than ten years, the EU has not reached an agreement on an issue in its own backyard. If it cannot reach an agreement with its own instruments on a secondary (or third-order) issue compared to the eastern crises, what can be expected of it in Ukraine or Moldova?

Geopolitics, therefore, was not enough

Yes, there was a period when geostrategic decisions were made. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, newly emerged from dictatorships, were turning points for the peoples of those states and for the well-being of the continent as a whole. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria, both countries that, as seen today, are in the immediate neighborhood of the Ukraine war, also significantly stabilized this part of the continent. But why this happened then, does not mean that it should happen now.

Instead of geopolitics, cynicism has entered the race. In the Athens 2023 Declaration, a historic turning point is made of the union of the great cause (the freedom and independence of the European Ukraine) with the smaller causes (the integration of the Western Balkans). And, this statement is made right when the EU fulfilled the (next) anniversary of the inability to mediate: in September of last year Kosovo and Serbia were offered on a “take it or leave it” basis the most ambitious project so far, of a basic agreement between two independent states establishing relations without mutual recognition of citizenship. A year later, round after round of poor mediation, Kosovo and Serbia are further from the basic agreement than they were in September of last year.

And while the EU declares its geostrategic intention to help push Russia out of Ukraine, it does not prove it can do so in the Western Balkans: for a year and a half, Russia has remained just as strong, if not more so, right in the middle of the Balkans, in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The geopolitical ambition to create a free Europe with the Western Balkans in it and extending to the border between Ukraine and Russia, manifested last night in Athens, is the ambition for the most ambitious Euro-Atlantic project of this century. For the Western Balkans, this meant a democratic Serbia at peace with its neighbors, an independent Kosovo at peace with Serbia, a democratic and functional Bosnia-Herzegovina at peace with its identity pluralism, and so on. That all these countries have a common security system based on NATO.

Against this geopolitical ambition is the cynicism of reality. It is difficult to imagine that the EU will create a democratic space under the umbrella of NATO from the space of unfinished conflicts without the decisive intervention of the United States, Great Britain and powerful EU member states, primarily Germany, France, Italy and why not Poland.

The instruments shown so far in the Kosovo-Serbia case, from the discussions on license plates and territorial exchanges, to the great “geopolitical” victory of the EU achieved in Ohrid in what was called the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement, show that behind Big words hide small actions. What was called the Agreement was fragile with the very fact that it was not signed and is considered an Agreement, because this is what the head of diplomacy J. Borell considers to be. Even, with the greatest seriousness, it was explained how this is a legally binding Agreement, because “it is found in chapter 35 for Serbia and the SAA for Kosovo”, a wording that neither convinces, nor stimulates, nor scares.

This is the paradigm of the EU before the geopolitical challenge of the century.

[1] Veton Surroi is a Kosovar Albanian publicist, politician and former journalist. Surroi is the founder and former leader of the ORA political party, and was a member of Kosovo assembly from 2004 to 2008.

[2] The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova, the prime ministers of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and the head of the council of ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to attend the dinner, being hosted by Greek Prime  Minister  Mitsotakis on the 20th anniversary of a summit between the EU and western Balkan countries in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki as Balkan states sought to join the European bloc.

The post Geopolitics 20 Years After appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Fredi Bejleri’s case should be dealt with as a democracy issue, not as an ethnic minority one 

A wave of political commentary and debate has recently erupted in Albania, especially coming from sources that are always ready to declare Greece an enemy of Albania. Unfortunately, these pseudo-patriotic and pseudo-nationalist commentators often dominate the public opinion space. 

Always ready to make conspiracy theory links, some have gone so far as to link the visit of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni to Albania and the return of the EU Ambassador Luigi Soreca to the fact that Albania’s justice reform needs defending from an aggressive Greece and Albania’s own political opposition. It’s a tragic comedy. 

The arrest of the Himara mayor Albanian opposition candidate, who also happens to be a member of the Greek minority in Albania, just two days before the election day, has had negative implications in Albania’s relations with Greece.

That candidate, Fredi Bejleri, who went on to win the local elections, has been charged with vote buying in a sting operation that raised many doubts: A person infiltrated by the police, according to the local media, offered cooperation to Mr. Bejleri or his electoral staff, to buy votes.

Vote-buying is actually a national sport in Albania and if all those who buy votes in political or local elections were arrested, all of the prisons in Albania might not be able to hold them, but maybe the prisons of Greece would not be enough either. Perhaps not even those in far-flung Turkey. 

Greece has requested the release of Bejleri to give him the opportunity to be sworn in as mayor. However, Albanian courts have repeatedly denied his requests to be released from detention while he awaits trial. 

Prime Minister Edi Rama has said that Albania is a democratic country with an independent judiciary, expressing irritation at the Greek pressure as Greek officials participated in a protest in Himara, including the mayors of Athens and other Greek cities.

The case is a test for the justice system in Albania. But, at a political level, this incident will have negative effects on the relations between the two countries. 

This week, for example, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis avoided having the Prime Minister of Albania at an informal dinner with the prime ministers of the Western Balkan Region to commemorate the Thessaloniki Summit 20 years ago, in which all of the region was promised eventual EU membership. The Greek government sent the invitation to the President of Albania instead, in what appeared to be seen in Tirana as a provocation since the President in Albania has an honorific role, not an executive one. Albania went unrepresented, as the head of state declined the invitation.

During the past 30 years, the relations between Albania and Greece have gone through several periods of crisis. Relations between the two countries take place in two spheres, parallel worlds. One is the “sphere/world of peace,” where political, economic and social relations take place, and the other is the “sphere/world of war,” where they are fought in the old trenches of nationalism and conspiracy.

The problem is that this is an important moment for Albania and its relations with a strategically important country like Greece are entering a crisis which is not good for either country, but especially for Albania.

What is happening with the case of Bejleri in Himara has nothing to do with the relations of Albanians as a people or the policies of the Albanian government toward the small Greek minority in Albania. In this context, it would have been good for Greece to raise its concerns as a member of the EU for negative developments related to elections and democracy and not be guided only by the fact that the opposition candidate is a member of its ethnic minority.The implications from the Himara incident will be political first, but economic implications are not excluded. Greece has been and continues to be a strategic economic partner for Albania in terms of trade and investments. It is not impossible that potential Greek investments would no longer feel welcome in Albania either.

Tirana Observatory

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In the last days of March, the Foreign Affairs ministers of Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo launched the “Western Balkans Quad – 100% alignment with EU Common Foreign Security Policy”¹ as a platform to address CFSP in the sensitive geopolitical context brought about by Russian aggression in Ukraine. All countries are on the path to accession into the European Union, although at different specific points. The focus of the first meeting of Quad was reported to be “the full alignment of the four countries from the Quad group with the EU’s foreign and security policy in light of the new geopolitical reality, hybrid threats, energy crisis, and economic consequences caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.” These issues have repeatedly been the focus of almost every regional or European meeting since February 2022. This new informal platform is the latest addition to an overwhelming myriad of regional constellations, mechanisms, initiatives, annual forums, etc. Alignment with the EU’s standard foreign security policy is a non-negotiable condition embedded in the integration process. It is a separate dedicated chapter in the negotiations plan with all the homework and commitments that entails.
The four countries have numerous opportunities, almost monthly ones, to meet and discuss issues of common interest and coordination in the field of foreign policy and security and subsequently agree on common positions or actions. Additionally, we haven’t explored all the possibilities of integrating this issue into the Berlin Process, the only one that actually gathers all six of them and could address the real issues: the countries that differ from EU CFSP and pressure them to change course. It is unclear what the concrete purpose of this initiative is and, more specifically, what its added value can be. It is no secret that the modest administrations of the foreign policy sector in the region’s countries are already struggling under the weight of managing a juggernaut of meetings, reports, and action plans, and keeping track of their participation and contribution.

Perceptions and alignments

In Serbia the Quad, is seen by some experts as not just another locally proposed initiative but as the counterpart to the dangerous idea of the Serbian world- Srbski svet- vocally defended by Serbian Minister Vulin. This has been reinforced by other international experts which see in the region the delineation of projects to align the interest of ethnic majorities.²
Serbia has never aligned itself with the EU CSDP when it comes to sanctions. Its influence is decisive also in the position of Bosnia Herzegovina that is in the same association due to the Republika Srpska’s stance. Yet Serbia remains de facto the front runner in the process of integration and despite the initial calls for the country to take sides convincingly, including here a resolution from the EU Parliament to condition negotiations upon doing so³, not much has happened. The EU does not want to alienate further the Serbian political elite or even the public whose numbers of support are falling consistently.

EU: the destructive ambiguity

The position of the European Union towards the new geopolitical realities in the continent has moved very little form its trademark ambiguity. The Union has not rewarded the alignment of the countries with its sanctions policy and most importantly has not exerted any real pressure let alone punishment on those who don’t. Coming to natural end of the mandate of EU institutions, due to be renewed after EU elections next summer, EU officials are scrambling for an achievement that can be considered their legacy in the region. So far the opening of the College of Europe in Tirana seems to be the sole North Star in this respect.
With enlargement frozen in its tracks, bilateral disputes still far from finding a path forward and the war at its doorstep the EU is watching passively as a myriad of initiatives and alignments, formal and informal try to fill in its void as countries seek to anchor themselves to the new realities.

So many initiatives yet few resources to make an impact

Quantity is not the only problem. With so many regional constellations in place, controversy is almost inevitable. Recently, competing narratives, such as the case of Open Balkans, have sown divisions among countries in the region when it comes to the modalities and vision of cooperation and ways of moving forward. The Open Balkans with its juxtaposition to the Berlin process and its ad-hoc series of meetings nature has started to resemble a soft power club of sorts with the most memorable meetings of he Prime Ministers in local wine promotion events.
The focus for the Ministries should be instead in increasing human resources capabilities and even expanding the directories in charge of the existing regional mechanisms in order to ensure better impact, coordination, monitoring and outreach. In addition, they should enhance and recalibrate their openness towards civil society cooperation. The integration process will
take care of the CSFP on its own just fine. This year alone will see these administrations struggling to meet the preparation and organizational needs of the Berlin Process Summit in Tirana in October and two EPC Summits in Moldova and Spain respectively in addition the usual workload of other regional platform conventions. In this light, the Quad seems like a cheerful club of the like-minded, positive but not convincingly necessary.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 ‘Four Western Balkan countries launched “100% Alignment with CFSP” platform’, https://europeanwesternbalkans. com/2023/03/29/four-western-balkan-countries-launched100-alignment-with-cfsp-platform/

2 Janusz Bugajski’s Washington View: Dividing Western Balkans into Spheres of Influence https://istraga.ba/ janusz-bugajskis-washington-view-dividing-western-balkans-into-spheres-of-influence/

3 ‘European Parliament Links Serbia’s Progress to Sanctions on Russia’ https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/23/european-parliament-links-serbias-progress-to-sanctions-on-russia/

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Veton Surroi

The first lesson of the events of these days in the four northern municipalities of Kosovo is that the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is not over. Even after 24 years, since Serbia signed the capitulation with NATO, it still has not signed the peace and cooperation agreement with Kosovo. During various negotiation processes, for which the European Union has been authorized, Serbia has consistently defended its position on keeping the conflict with Kosovo unfinished. This conflict is called the “final status” of Kosovo, which according to Serbia is still undefined, and for the determination of which Serbia’s final consent is needed.

The international community and the representatives of Kosovo have been accommodated with this attitude since the beginning of the negotiation process in 2011. The EU believed it had overcome this attitude with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, which began as the Franco-German Plan. This plan had to establish from the beginning the principle of relations between the two sovereign states, which at the moment do not recognize each other. But Serbia remained consistent with its position, even not admitting at all that it has agreed with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”.

In Serbia’s interpretation, there is no signature of the president or his verbal agreement for the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, therefore it does not exist.
Consequently, it is within this logic that a Dragan Smigic, a policeman from Rudari, a village in the Municipality of Kurshumli, appears at the barricades in Zveçan and beats KFOR soldiers with his official baton. He beats the “occupiers” in the logic of Serbia’s power.

The second lesson is that logic has the elasticity of conflict. The more the conflict is prolonged, the more this particular form of logic is accommodated in this prolongation.
Sending a plainclothes policeman—along with hundreds of others who share the dress code, crowd discipline, and aggressiveness of a trained mob and crowd-control assault group—against NATO units. In Kosovo, it should not have made sense. A state like Serbia no matter how twisted its ruling logic is, would still be kicking itself if it attacked NATO. But, such a logic has undergone elasticity.

Serbia has challenged the limits of the decency of a European state on two primary levels. It has challenged it in the case of Russia, by feeding its people in state and para-state propaganda with a determination from above to lean on the side of the aggressor in the war in Ukraine, and therefore complete distancing from European politics. He also challenged it in the case of Kosovo, following the narrative of the unfinished conflict that should not end with the independence of Kosovo.
This elasticity brings the logic to inversion.

So, it would be common sense for Serbia to align itself with the European continent, to which it belongs, and to distance itself from Russia, and at the same time to find ways of accommodation with independent Kosovo as part of good neighborliness, so that integrated and supported financially and politically. But in the inversion of logic, Serbia has shown that it has European and American attention if it simultaneously pushes the limits of its support for Russia and non-normalization of relations with Kosovo.

This inversion has a reason for existence. Serbia has successfully transformed its role from a state that is being pressured to be a political part of the continent (“do this or you will face sanctions”) to a state that is waiting to be enticed to be a political part of the European continent. Dragan Smigić beating KFOR soldiers is a symbol of inversion. Now Serbia must be begged to be polite; it was once expected to be so, and if not the punishment followed.

The third lesson is that not everything has to do with Kosovo. Events in the north concerned Ukraine, Russia and Belgrade. In official Pristina, it might seem perfectly logical to send three mayors with special police to their offices. But sending in special police, although part of the legality, could not compensate for their lack of legitimacy. Even, far beyond this debate between legality and legitimacy, from the perspective of European security, the Zvecan barricades were seen as a good opportunity to test NATO when it is engaged in supporting Ukraine. When Dragan Smigiqi beats NATO soldiers in Zveçan, his baton is raised in Moscow. From Putin’s perspective, he is a volunteer in the war that Russia is waging against Western civilization.

Consequently, Dragan Smigic’s stick is a warning to the peaceful demonstrators in Belgrade, to that silent part of Serbian society that the government is afraid of, that they too are opponents of the great war that is being waged against the West.

Finally, it’s not the first time. When Milosevic’s power felt that it was in danger, he declared war on the neighboring peoples. When he once brought out the tanks against his own opposition in 1991, he quickly managed to consolidate himself by directing them against Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians.

Thirty years later, it is not difficult to understand that the stick of Dragan Smigic, which beat the NATO soldiers, also beats the citizens of Belgrade who are peacefully protesting against the power of violence in Serbia.

The fourth lesson is like the first. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia has not ended. Barricades are erected and dismantled, soldiers and policemen are beaten, deployed and retreat-
ed, big words are uttered and forgotten – but in the end, however, a negotiation process must
take place that reaches an end to the conflict.
This achievement cannot be done without the USA and the EU and the United Kingdom, and without some of the European countries such as Germany, France and Italy, with greater involvement in matters of peace and security in Kosovo.

Dragan Smigiqi and his stick that beats KFOR soldiers should be considered as an episode, but a serious episode, of confronting the fact that peace is not built with the illusion of a ceremonial declaration that a normalization agreement has been reached.

It’s time for serious action. Perhaps the first step for Kosovo would have to be an agreement on how to proceed, with the biggest supporters of its independence, based on an outline of the roadmap that this country believes in.

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On behalf of Spain, I earnestly welcome the new phase in Albania’s EU integration process, of strategic importance for Albania and for the EU as a whole. We live in an age of spectacular strides for humanity, but also of grave crises and looming threats to our security and well-being; as well as exacerbated great power competition.

The EU – along with an increasingly European NATO –are our main frameworks for effectively defending our security, upholding our interests and values, and jointly addressing the challenges of our time. I am firmly convinced that EU integration will contribute decisively to making Albania’s society more prosperous, its economy more competitive, and its institutions more resilient. I am also convinced of the strategic added value that Albania brings to the European Union.

Albania’s key geostrategic position as a Mediterranean gateway to the Western Balkans, its active role in NATO, its leadership within the UN Security Council, the vibrant energy of its society, the dynamism of its youth portrayed in Tirana as European Youth Capital, the constructive regional approach of its foreign policy, its interconfessional harmony … these and other factors underline the strategic benefits that Albania will provide to the EU as a whole, as I see it, at a crucial point in history.

As we look towards the future and roll up our sleeves for the hard work ahead, I would
like to express Spain’s encouragement and support to Albania for giving momentum to her reform process –the main driving force of EU enlargement.

As Spanish poet Antonio Machado once wrote, “Se hace camino al andar” (We make our path by walking).

The Prime Minister of Spain, during his historic visit to Tirana in August, stated that Albania can count on Spain as its friend, as we walk, together, down our shared path of European integration. Spain will hold, for the fifth time, the Presidency of the Council of the EU throughout the second semester of 2023.

We will work tirelessly to further the works within the EU Council and live up to the mammoth challenges we face, in the age of the greatest interdependence and globalisation in history.

An age which began, arguably, on the specific date which we are commemorating today: October 12th, when Christopher Columbus, at the behest of the Catholic monarchs of Spain, Fernando and Isabel discovered America and ushered in an unprecedented era of global exchanges.

This milestone for humanity coincided with the process of national unification in Spain. The unification enabled the Spanish monarchy to become, from the late 15th century, one of the most extensive and complex political constructs in history.

For centuries, Spain marked decisively the course of history, uniting continents and oceans, building bridges between civilizations; and thus contributing, to no small degree, to the emergence of globalisation. The silver peso, transported across the Atlantic and the Pacific, became the first global currency, facilitating the development of an international economic system.
The introduction of agricultural technologies and new crops from both sides of the Atlantic
helped to feed the world. Cultures came closer to each other: For example, it was a Spanish friar who finished, in the city of Fu-Zhou, the first Chinese grammatical study written by a westerner.

All the while, a group of Spanish scholars known as the school of Salamanca laid the foundations of public international law and human rights. Cervantes showed us in Don Quijote de la Mancha that, sometimes, dreams deemed impossible, are nonetheless worth pursuing.

Velazquez inspired entire generations of painters across the world with las meninas and other masterpieces. Goya depicted the lights and shadows of the European enlightenment. And the Spanish language forged an everlasting link between peoples and cultures in different hemispheres.

As a Spaniard and a European, as the ambassador of Spain to Albania, I feel that these timeless contributions to shaping global history remain today ever compelling. 500 million people across the world are currently native Spanish speakers. Spanish culture is truly global, as our language is the second most spoken mother tongue in the world, after mandarin, and the third most used language on the internet.

As the fourth largest economy in the EU, we contribute resolutely to the deepening of European integration; to a strengthened and enlarged NATO, in the wake of the Madrid Summit; and to effective multilateral diplomacy through the UN and its specialised organisations, the G20, NATO, CELAC, OSCE, OECD, the Council of Europe, and, more recently, the European political community, among others.

Spain is a world leader in tourism, having received pre-Covid 85 million visits per year – a figure that comes close to doubling Spain’s population. Spain has notable global projection also in sports: records set by Rafael Nadal, Real Madrid, Barcelona, and this year’s Eurobasket gold medal are just a few examples; although, it must be said that Albania’s impressive national football team put up a seriously good fight when Spain last played them in march.

Last but not least, Spanish gastronomy is also known throughout the world, and, in a similar way to Albania’s extraordinary cuisine, it reflects the different cultures and traditions that make Spain the unique nation it is today.

In sum, Spain is a European and Mediterranean country, a member of the Latin American community, a bridge between Europe and America, and a nation with a global outlook. The daunting challenges international society faces today require concerted action on a global scale. Spain will pursue, responsibly and relentlessly, in the light of our history and our culture, such concerted action, more necessary than ever.

As we honour the national day of Spain, I thank wholeheartedly Albania and all of the friends here today, for your support in contributing to this common purpose of paramount importance for humanity.

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