Abstract

This paper provides a critical viewpoint on the governance of Islam in Albania. Governance is understood as the relationship between state intervention and societal autonomy. The findings suggest that the governance of Islam in Albania is largely based on societal autonomy. The paper argues that this mode of governance, which has evolved since the end of the communist regime, has allowed the creation of opportunity structures for radicalisation and promotion of Islamist ideology. To illustrate this argument the paper analyses the legal and institutional framework for the relations between the Albanian state and the Albanian Muslim Community. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on religion and security by making evident the logic of governance and to propose a research agenda that contributes to policy solutions through a theoretically guided approach.

Introduction

Radicalisation became a salient issue in the public policy and academic domains in Albania when a hundred or more Albanian citizens joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  (ISIS). Considering the Albanian tradition of religious tolerance and moderation the quest to understand and explain the phenomenon has sparked an extensive media, public and academic debate.  The main analytical approach to explaining this trend has focused mainly on the examination of the socioeconomic factors affecting given local communities and individuals,¹ and the failure of state institutions in certain policy fields such as security and intelligence or education.² In general, academic studies and punditry alike argue in favour of greater involvement of the government.^3,4 

Indeed, the government has responded to the problem by undertaking a number of policy actions most notably the criminalization of foreign fighting, the introduction of harsher sentences for supporting, financing and participating in terrorist activities,⁵ the adoption of a strategy to combat violent extremism,⁶ and the arrest and trial of nine individuals suspected of recruiting and financing the travel to Syria and Iraq of Albanian citizen. Moreover, the Albanian government has renewed the emphasis on religious tolerance and has pledged to assume a greater role in tackling the problem by lobbying for the establishment in Albania of a regional centre to combat
violent extremism.⁷ This paper acknowledges the need for greater state intervention but maintains that it is difficult to empirically assess and demonstrate the effectiveness of state intervention in particular policy fields given that the regulation of the Islamic presence in the society involves many policy fields and a large number of state and private institutions and actors.⁸

Therefore, in order to cope with the analytical complexity of the issue this paper uses the concept of governance in order to examine how the society creates opportunities or constraints for radicalisation and violent extremism. Governance in this paper implies ‘every mode of political steering involving public and private actors, including traditional modes of government and different types of steering, from hierarchical imposition to sheer information measures’.⁹

The governance concept presupposes the existence of a multitude of public and private actors interacting with each other in the conditions of interdependence.¹⁰ As a result, collective action takes place vertically, across multiple levels of government and horizontally, across multiple arenas. By analysing the interaction of public and private actors at the policy, polity or political dimensions, different modes of governance can be identified on a continuum between state intervention and societal autonomy.¹¹

In the policy dimension the mode of governance can be defined by examining elements such as the abidingness of the legal provisions, the approach to implementation, or the presence or absence of sanctions, among others. In the political dimension, it is the degree of involvement of public and private actors in the decision-making system, while in the polity dimension, the mode of governance may be defined by examining elements such as the hierarchical or non-institutionalised structure of interactions, the centralised or decentralised locus of authority, or the degree to which decision-making processes are formally institutionalised.¹² In the case of Albania using governance as a framework for analysing radicalism and violent extremism in Albania can be helpful for the following reasons.

First, although the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism was triggered by the emergence of ISIS and the recruitment of Albanian citizens to fight along it, radicalisation has been an ongoing process that has been taking place in Albania irrespective of ISIS. According to a survey conducted in 2011-2012 by Pew Research Center, 12% of Albanian Muslims surveyed supported making Sharia the official law in their country while 6% of them justified suicide bombing in the defence of Islam.¹³ While one can argue about the differences between cognitive radicalization and violent radicalisation – the former being the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely contrary to the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure while the latter occurring when an individual employs violence to further the views,¹⁴ – the adoption of radical views by such high number of Albanian Muslims within e relatively short period cannot be linked only with failures in particular policy fields. Therefore a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the problem is needed. Secondly, the governance approach allows for the examination of the problem by moving the focus of the analysis from the level of individuals or given communities to the analysis of the opportunities and constraints the system of governance can create for the development of radicalism and violent extremism.

The main finding is that the mode of governance of Islam in Albania is largely based on societal self-regulation and a reduced role of public authority. This mode of governance does not appear to be based on any overarching concept rather it has resulted from processes that have evolved over the last two and half decades. Although this paper doesn’t pretend to establish a purely scientific causal link between this mode of governance and radicalisation it argues that this mode of governance has led to the creation of opportunity structures that advance the Islamist ideology and promote radicalism.

Legal framework
Albania has four traditional religious communities: the Sunni Muslim, the Bektashi Muslim, the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. Although no exact figures exist, the Sunni Muslim community is acknowledged as the largest one.¹⁵

The regulatory framework on religions in Albania applies to all four religious communities but the focus of this paper will focus on the regulation of the Sunni Muslim community called the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC).¹⁶ Albania has no law on religion or on Islam. Relations between the state and Islam are based the provisions on religions, laid down by the Constitution, on laws regulating different policy areas, and on the agreement between the Albanian government and the AMC.

The current regulatory framework on Islam has evolved over the last two and half decades since freedom of religion was re-established in 1991. In the early period after the end of communism, the legal provisions on religions were quite broad. The Provisional Constitution that was adopted soon after the first pluralist election took place in March 1991 stated that ‘Albania is a secular state’ and that ‘the state respects the freedom of religion and creates the conditions for practising it.¹⁷ Religious freedom and limitations were provided by specific laws. The obstruction of activities of religious organizations and ruining or damaging places of worship became punishable by the criminal code,¹⁸ while limitations were provided in politics and on the education field.

The formation of political parties on a religious basis was banned by law,19 while the law on preuniversity education provided secular education and the ban of any religious indoctrination.²⁰Differently from the Provisional Constitution, the Constitution adopted in 1998 laid down broader provisions on the religions. A notable conceptual development was the removal of the explicit reference to ‘secularism’ provided in the Provisional Constitution that was replaced with the concept of ‘neutrality’. Article 10 states that: ‘in the Republic of Albania there is no official religion and the state is neutral in questions of belief and conscience while it guarantees the freedom in their expression in public life’.²¹

In terms of the analysis of the mode of governance by examining the involvement of the public and private actors in the politics dimension,²² this policy outcome showed that differently from the immediate post-communist period, when state-religion relations were defined exclusively by public actors, the drafting of the 1998 Constitution involved religious actors whose role was important in dropping the explicit notion of ‘secularism’. The increased relevance of religions in determining policy outputs was evident in the recognition by the state of sects and cults, in addition to the religious communities. Another criterion to examine the mode of governance is the approach to the implementation of policy outputs, which may be ‘rigid’ in the case when state intervention prevails or ‘flexible’ when the autonomy of societal actors is greater.²³ Empiric evidence shows the implementation of the Constitution has been flexible regarding the regulation of state-religion relations.

As the influence of religious communities in the political dimension grew they managed to establish relations with the Albanian state based on their perspectives rather than the state perspective. A draft law on Religious Communities drafted in 1991 was floated for over a decade but was never adopted. The draft law provided for the regulation of religious freedom and practice on the principle of state-church relations, with no distinction between the religious communities.²⁴ Differently from the regulation of state-religion relations based on a unified approach the 1998 Constitution provided for a regulatory regime that was based on agreements signed between the Religious Communities and the Council of Ministers (CoM) to be ratified by the parliament.²⁵

As religious communities strived to promote their agendas it took several years to sign the agreements between the CoM and the religious communities. The agreement with the Catholic Church was signed in April 2002,²⁶ four years after the adoption of the Constitution, while the agreements with the AMC, the Orthodox Church and the Bektashi Community were signed in 2009.²⁷ Moreover, differently from the draft law of religions that laid down unified provisions for all religions the agreements with the religious communities vary in content.

What is worth noting in this context, is that for eighteen years no law has been in place to govern relations between the Albanian state and the AMC. Various policy responses such as the adoption of the law on financing terrorism, seizure of terrorist-financed assets or expelling and arrests of foreign suspected terrorists,²⁸ did not account for a comprehensive regulatory basis. The immediate implication of this omission is that state-religion relations have been largely regulated on a market basis rather than based on a hierarchical approach, which would limit the
number of actors involved.²⁹

As many authors have already pointed out, it is during this time span that the major developments that have shaped Albanian post-communist Islam have taken place, including the development of locally grown radicals.

The involvement of powerful actors in the Albanian religious market with no constraints led to the development of opportunity structures,³⁰ which put Albanian traditional Islam under huge pressure to transform, leading among others to the establishment of locally grown Salafi and Wahhabi groups. In the 1990s, the actors from the Arab world were the most influential while in the following decade, attempts were made to remove the Arab influence by allowing a greater Turkish involvement,^31,32 have only led to further fragmentations while the Arab influence has remained entrenched.³³

Two outcomes that have taken place during this period but have gone unnoticed are the normative ‘Arabization of Albanian Islam’,³⁴ and the normative shift from the Albanian tradition of fusion of national and religious identities, where national identity prevailed,³⁵ towards an Islam concerned mainly with religious identity shaping. Let’s examine first the religion-national identity relations. As the agreement between the government and the AMC stipulates the statute is the fundamental legal document that recognizes AMC as a legal entity. ³⁶

The AMC charted its first statue in 1993, but it has been amended a few times since then, in 1998, 2002 and 2005. In the first statute adopted in 1993, Article 2 stated that ‘the AMC has the duty to instil and develop the feeling of love and loyalty towards the fatherland’.³⁷ In the following statutes ‘love and loyalty towards the fatherland’ is no longer stated as the main objective of the AMC’. In the 1998 amendment, Article 2 was modified as follows: ‘the AMC has the duty to instil the love for the Islamic religion, the fatherland and the whole Albanian nation’,³⁸ while in 2005 the same Article was amended as follows: ‘the AMC has a religious and charity purpose. It has as an object of its activity to ‘propagate, awake and strengthen the Islamic faith to the Muslims believers, to protect the dignity, rights and interests of the Muslims, to enhance and develop a sense of love and loyalty to the homeland and the people of Albania’.³⁹
Another relevant aspect to note in the continuum of the statute amendments is the introduction
of the Arabic language as the only liturgical language to be used during religious services. The 1993 statute provided only limited requirements on the Arabic language stating it as a requirement for the appointment of the Director of Cultural Affairs.⁴⁰

The 1998 statute extended this requirement to the position of the Deputy Chairman of the AMC also,⁴¹ while the 2002 amendment introduced Arabic as an obligatory requirement for the election of the Chairman of the AMC.⁴² Compulsory knowledge of Arabic was introduced to a number of officials and clerks. The 2005 statute introduced Arabic as the only liturgical language to be used during religious services.⁴³ From the governance perspective, these developments are important because identity formation based on language and not on religion has long been the cornerstones of Albanian national identity,⁴⁴ so any modification should have triggered the involvement of state actors.

The case of the Albanian Orthodox League and the Ottoman Sublime Porte could be enlightening in this respect. In 1910 the Albanian Orthodox League wrote to the Sublime Porte demanding the opening of an orthodox church where the Albanian language was to be used for providing liturgical services, the grand Vezir replied that he was not against it but would leave this decision to the Ottoman parliament.45 From this perspective the analysis of the institutional structures that serve as meeting points between the state and Islamic actors begs closer attention.

Institutional framework
With the aim of maintaining relations with the religious communities and helping create the conditions for practising religion in 1992, the Albanian government established the State Secretariat on Relations with Religious Communities (SSRRC). Since its establishment, the SSRRC, which in 1999 was transformed into the State Committee on Cults (SCC),⁴⁶ has been the main and only government structure dealing with religious affairs.

However, despite its relevance of being the main point of contact between the state authorities
in the context of the growing relevance of religion in the public sphere, the SCC has remained weak in terms of capacities and performance.

When it was established in 1992 the SSRRC had a staff of three people: from the Sunni Muslim community, the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. In 1999 when the SSRRC was transformed into the State Committee on Cults the number of staff was increased to five.⁴⁷

This number was doubled in 2006 so currently the SCC has ten people: the chairman, five representatives from the religious communities and four civil servants. Given that the representatives of the religious communities are mainly concerned with lobbying with the government to further the agendas of their respective communities practically there are only three civil servants dealing with the whole range of issues that concern the state vis-a-vis religions.

The disproportions in terms of human resources are evident when the organisation and capacities of the AMC are examined. While the AMC is organised at the central and the local governmental level (the AMC and the Muftiates) the SCC has no representation at the local level, making it impossible to reflect the local dynamics into the governance system. Moreover, there has been a lack of long-term focus and planning as the continuous institutional relocation demonstrates. When it was established in 1992, the SCC (then SSRRC) was placed under the Ministry of Culture to be moved two years later under the Council of Ministers. In 2005 it was returned again under the Ministry of Culture and since 2013 it has been placed under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.⁴⁸
In terms of performance, the SCC has both the tasks, of providing advice in policy-making
processes as well as conducting administrative and executive functions. More specifically the SCC’s tasks are: to coordinate the relations of the government with the religious communities, religious associations or religious-humanitarian; to negotiate the agreements between the Council of Ministers and the representatives of the religious communities; to cooperate with the religious
communities in drafting laws and regulations; to guarantee the freedom of belief and religious
development, understanding and tolerance; to advise the Ministry of Education on the teaching programs and number of schools that provide religious education; to advise the Ministry of Finances on the import of goods of a religious nature.⁴⁹

The poor performance of the SCC advisory functions can be easily inferred by the overall failure to provide the state and non-state actors with viable policy options and tools to effectively radicalise trends. More specifically it can be inferred by the analysis of the terms of the agreement between the CoM and the AMC, which the SCC has negotiated. For instance one of the omissions of the agreement between the AMC and the CoM is the lack of sanctions in case of failure to comply. The presence or absence of sanctions is another criterion for defining the mode of governance. ⁵⁰

In order to ensure the implementation of the regulatory regime there have to be sanctions in place which can be applied in case a private actor fails to comply. The agreement between the AMC and the CoM provides as one of the aims of the agreement to ‘recognise the AMC’s reactions and actions towards deformations, extremist trends and any other acrimony expressed by its believers and to provide for the obligation of the AMC to notify the relevant authorities on cases of this nature.⁵¹ However the agreement does not provide for any sanction in case of failure to comply with this provision, except for the overall provision that the AMC abide by the Constitution and laws.⁵²
From the empirical perspective, the AMC indeed failed to comply with this provision of the agreement because it proved unable to prevent the radicalisation of Albanian Muslims from taking place, as proved by the investigation and trial of Muslim clerics,⁵³ while no sanction could be imposed for such failure.
On the other hand, the SCC could have relied on its administrative powers to demand the enforcement of the AMC statute which provides for sanctions in case of failure to implement the
statute and regulations and for failure to act in accordance with the Albanian laws.⁵⁴
According to the statute, the AMC should have administered sanctions to the Muftis and other
relevant clerics and clerks within the AMC that had failed to prevent ‘extremist trends and any
other acrimony expressed by its believers, as the agreement with the CoM provides. Although the Muftiates are responsible for registering all mosques under the property of the AMC, including those ‘built by any legal or physical person’, they had failed to comply with this provision⁵⁵

When the foreign fighters’ problem emerged the AMC admitted that some 200 mosques in Albania were outside its control.⁵⁶ On the other hand it has been argued that the so-called ‘illegal mosques’ were among the main drivers for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in Albania. ⁵⁷

Similarly, the Muftiates, together with the Department of Education in the AMC Headquarters failed to ensure that religious education is not used to further radicalisation and extremist agendas although their mandate according to the statute is to control the entire Islamic teaching
and educational organized in the religious schools and the training courses organised by the
mosques.⁵⁸

As the investigation on foreign fighters revealed, radicalisation courses were taking
place in mosques based in Tirana,⁵⁹ and assumingly in remote areas, as distance for the central
authority is considered among the key radicalisation factors as studies suggest.⁶⁰

Conclusions

This paper discussed the governance of Islam and radicalisation trends in Albania. Based on the governance approach as the interaction of public and private actors the paper has analysed the regulatory and institutional framework as they have evolved for over two decades and the involvement of public and private actors in shaping regulations, institutions and policy outcomes.
The analysis shows that the influence and role of private actors have increased over the years while the role of the Albanian state has been continually reduced.

However, when tens of Albanian citizens joined ISIS in the Syrian conflict there was a growing demand for an increased role of the state even by Albanian Islamic actors.
In this respect, the tailoring of state intervention through the governance perspective may
yield better and more sustainable outcomes.

First, government institutions for the regulation of Islam should exist at different levels of the state, including the central government, the regional, municipal, city and neighbourhood levels. So when tackling radicalisation trends it is important to ensure the existence and interaction of government institutions at different levels.

Second, Islamic presence and practice in society involve a wider range of spheres and policy fields that should be coherently interlinked such as education, employment, finances, and health. Third, there is a wider set of actors, institutions and instruments that should be considered when tackling radicalism such as NGOs, businesses, schools personnel, prison authorities and staff, etc.,

The analysis of radicalism from the governance of Islam perspective is a useful tool for analysing opportunity structures that may otherwise remain unnoticed. Further research from this perspective in fields such as Islamic education, building and function of mosques, admission and training of imams and religious authorities will provide a more nuanced picture of the problem and will help to better tailor the course of action of state intervention.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf
2 Enri Hide, Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism and in Albania, Albanian Institute for International Studies, AIIS, November 2015,

3 Albert Rakipi, ‘Lindja e një ndikimi të ri radikal fetar në Shqipëri’, Mapo, 21 Mars 2015, at http://www.mapo.al/2015/03/lindja- e-nje-ndikimi-te-ri-radikal-fetar-ne-shqiperi/1

4 Aleksandra Bogdani, ‘Albania Faces ‘Jihadi Fighters in the Shadows’ Threat’, in ‘Balkan Jihadists: The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, BIRN, March 2016. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf

5 Penal Code of the Republic of Albania, Articles 265/a and 265/b (amended in February 2014)
6 Council of Ministers Decision Nr. 930, date 18.11.2015, On the approval of the national strategy to combat violent extremism and the action plan.
7 ‘Violent extremism, together we can succeed: Premier Edi Rama summit of world leaders in the fight against ISIS and violent extremism, organized by President Barack Obama’. 29 September 2015. http://www.kryeministria.al/al/newsroom/lajme/eks- tremizmi-i-dhunshem-sebashku mund-t-ia-dalim

8 Marcel Maussen, The governance of Islam in Western Europe: A state of the art report. IMES, Inst. for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2006.
9 Adrienne Héritier, New modes of governance in Europe: policy-making without legislating?. MPI collective goods preprint 2001/14 (2001).
10 Adrienne Héritier, New modes of governance in Europe: policy-making without legislating?. MPI collective goods preprint 2001/14 (2001).

11 Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr, and Gerda Falkner. Modes of governance: towards a conceptual clarification’, European Governance Papers, No.N-05-02, Vienna 2005

12 Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr, and Gerda Falkner. Modes of governance: towards a conceptual clarification’, European Governance Papers, No.N-05-02, Vienna 2005

13 Luis Lugo, Alan Cooperman, James Bell, Erin O’Connell, and Sandra Stencel. “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Washington: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2013 (p. 15 and p. 29)
14 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon. “Countering radicalization in Europe.” London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Accessed December 12 (2012): 2012.

15 According to a census organised by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) in 2011 Sunni Muslims constitute nearly 57 per cent of the population (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Europe and the New Independent States (US Dept of State, 2014) while according to Pew Muslim Population in Albania is 79.9% (Miller, Tracy. “Mapping the global Muslim population:
A report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population.” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center (2009)
16 A part form the four traditional religious communities two new communities have been recognized since 2011 by the state, based on agreements with the government: the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania (VUSH)
17 Law Nr. 7491, date 29.4.1991, On Main Constitutional Provisions, Article 7

18 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania 1995, Articles 131- 133
19 Law Nr. 7502, date 25.7.l991, On political parties, Article 6 and Law Nr.8580, date 17.2.2000, On political parties, Article 7
20 Law on the Pre-university education system, Nr. Nr.7952, date 21.6.1995, Article 7
21 Law nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 10/1,2
22 Treib et al, p.7
23 Treib et al, p.8

24 Silvo Devetak, Liana Kalcina, and Miroslav F. Polzer. “Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe.” (2004). pp. 200-206

25 Law nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 10/5
26 Law Nr. 8902 dated 23.05.2002, On the ratification of the ‘Agreement between the Republic of Albania and the Holy See for regulation of mutual relations (Official Gazette No. 26, 2002, Page 836)
27 Law No. 10056 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 121). Law No. 10 057 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and
the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 130). Law No. 10058 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and
the World Bektashi Order on the regulation of mutual relations “ (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 146)

28 Eduart Bala, ‘The Financing of Islamist Groups in Albania’, in Freeman, Michael, (eds.), Financing terrorism: case studies.
Routledge, 2016
29 Treib et al, p.9
30 Douglas McAdam, ‘Conceptal origins, current problems, future directions’, in: Douglas McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer Y. Zald (eds.) ‘Comparative perspectives on social movements. Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings’, Cambridge University press 1996, p.37

31 Cecilie Endresen. “Faith, Fatherland or Both? Accommodationist and Neo-Fundamentalist Islamic Discourses in Albania.”
The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. 222-241.
32 Arolda Elbasani. “Religion and Democratization in Post-Communist Albania: Is it Possible to Be Islamic, Democratic and European at the Same Time?” (December 1, 2010). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.
33 According to the AMC, all the new mosques that have been built over the last four years have been funded by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates either directly or through foundations funded by these countries such as ‘Mercy International’, ‘Kuwaiti Joint Relief ’, ‘Zekat House’, or ‘Mirësia’ (See: http://www.kmsh.al/al/category/lajme/)

34 Arolda Elbasani. “Religion and Democratization in Post-Communist Albania: Is it Possible to Be Islamic, Democratic and European at the Same Time?” (December 1, 2010). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.
35 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe.
KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009).
36 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 2
37 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 1993, Article 2
38 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 1998. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=222&lang=en

39 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community, 14 May 2005, Article 2. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=226&lang=en
40 Statute of the AMC, 1993, Article 23
41 Statute of the AMC, 1998, Article 14
42 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community, 28 April
2002, Article 10. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=224&lang=en
43 Statute of the AMC, 2005, Article 6
44 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe. KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009). p.11
45 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe. KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009). p. 595-596
46 Council of Minsters DecisionNr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults
47 Council of Minsters DecisionNr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults

48 Background of the State Committee for Cults. http://kshk.gov.al/historiku-i-komitetit-2/
49 Council of Minsters Decision Nr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults
50 Treib et al, p.8
51 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 3
52 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 3
53 Benet Koleka, Albanian court jails nine for recruiting fighters for Syria, Reuters, 3 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-albania-idUSKCN0XU2AB

54 Statute of the AMC, 2005. Articles 59-60
55 Statute of the AMC, 2005. Article 51
56 Fatjona Mejdini, ‘Uncontrolled Mosques Proliferate in Albania’, BIRN Tirana, 17 December 2015, http://www.balkaninsight. com/en/article/state-slams-albanian-muslim-over-uncontrolled-mosques-12-17-2015
57 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf, p.33-36
58 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 2005, Article 34
59 Etleva Delia, ‘Secret schools within the mosques: arrested the 2 imams that recruited 70 Albanians to go to Siria’, Panorama,

12 March 2014. http://www.panorama.com.al/shkolla-sekrete-brenda-ne-xhami-pranga-dy-imameve-qe-rekrutuan-70-shqiptare-per-ne-siri/

60 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf, p.80

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clarification’, European Governance Papers, Nr.N-05-02, Vienna 2005
Marcel Maussen, The governance of Islam in Western Europe: A state of the art report. IMES,
Inst. for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2006.

Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritaire-
ment musulmane en Europe. KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie

Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në
Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009).

Silvo Devetak, Liana Kalcina, and Miroslav F. Polzer. “Legal Position of Churches and Reli-
gious Communities in South-Eastern Europe.” (2004).

Media articles and speeches

Albert Rakipi, ‘Lindja e një ndikimi të ri radikal fetar në Shqipëri’, Mapo, 21 Mars 2015, at
http://www.mapo.al/2015/03/lindja-e-nje-ndikimi-te-ri-radikal-fetar-ne-shqiperi/1

Aleksandra Bogdani, ‘Albania Faces ‘Jihadi Fighters in the Shadows’ Threat’, in ‘Balkan Jihad-
ists: The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, BIRN, March 2016.

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf
Benet Koleka, Albanian court jails nine for recruiting fighters for Syria, Reuters, 3 May 2016.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-albania-idUSKCN0XU2AB

Etleva Delia, ‘Secret schools within the mosques: arrested the 2 imams that recruited 70 Al-
banians to go to Siria’, Panorama, 12 March 2014. http://www.panorama.com.al/shkolla-
sekrete-brenda-ne-xhami-pranga-dy-imameve-qe-rekrutuan-70-shqiptare-per-ne-siri/

Fatjona Mejdini, ‘Uncontrolled Mosques Proliferate in Albania’, BIRN Tirana, 17 December

2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/state-slams-albanian-muslim-over-uncon-
trolled-mosques-12-17-2015

‘Violent extremism, together we can succeed: Premier Edi Rama summit of world leaders in
the fight against ISIS and violent extremism, organized by President Barack Obama’. 29

September 2015. http://www.kryeministria.al/al/newsroom/lajme/ekstremizmi-i-dhunsh-
em-sebashku-mund-t-ia-dalim

Internet sources

Official website of the State Committee for Cults. http://kshk.gov.al/
Official website of the Albanian Muslim Community. http://www.kmsh.al/

Laws

Council of Minsters DecisionNr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Com-
mittee on Cults

Council of Minsters Decision Nr. 930, date 18.11.2015, On the approval of the national strate-
gy to combat violent extremism and the action plan.

Law Nr. 7491, date 29.4.1991, On Main Constitutional Provisions
Law Nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania
Law Nr. 7502, date 25.7.l991, On political parties
Law Nr. 8580, date 17.2.2000, On political parties
Law on Pre-university education system, Nr. Nr.7952, date 21.6.1995
Law Nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 10/5
Law Nr. 8902 dated 23.05.2002, On the ratification of the ‘Agreement between the Republic of
Albania and the Holy See for regulation of mutual relations (Official Gazette Nr. 26, 2002,
Page 836)

Law Nr. 10056 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette Nr. 7, 2009, Page 121).

Law Nr. 10 057 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette Nr. 7, 2009, Page 130).

Law Nr. 10058 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Albania and the World Bektashi Order on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette Nr. 7, 2009, Page 146)
Penal Code of the Republic of Albania, 1995
Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian
Muslim Community in 1993. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=220&lang=en
Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian
Muslim Community in 1998. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=222&lang=en
Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian
Muslim Community, 28 April 2002, Article 10. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=224&lang=en
Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian
Muslim Community, 14 May 2005, Article 2. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=226&lang=en

The post Radicalisation and Governance of Islam in Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Veton Surroi

The first lesson of the events of these days in the four northern municipalities of Kosovo is that the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is not over. Even after 24 years, since Serbia signed the capitulation with NATO, it still has not signed the peace and cooperation agreement with Kosovo. During various negotiation processes, for which the European Union has been authorized, Serbia has consistently defended its position on keeping the conflict with Kosovo unfinished. This conflict is called the “final status” of Kosovo, which according to Serbia is still undefined, and for the determination of which Serbia’s final consent is needed.

The international community and the representatives of Kosovo have been accommodated with this attitude since the beginning of the negotiation process in 2011. The EU believed it had overcome this attitude with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, which began as the Franco-German Plan. This plan had to establish from the beginning the principle of relations between the two sovereign states, which at the moment do not recognize each other. But Serbia remained consistent with its position, even not admitting at all that it has agreed with the “Basic Normalization Agreement”.

In Serbia’s interpretation, there is no signature of the president or his verbal agreement for the “Basic Normalization Agreement”, therefore it does not exist.
Consequently, it is within this logic that a Dragan Smigic, a policeman from Rudari, a village in the Municipality of Kurshumli, appears at the barricades in Zveçan and beats KFOR soldiers with his official baton. He beats the “occupiers” in the logic of Serbia’s power.

The second lesson is that logic has the elasticity of conflict. The more the conflict is prolonged, the more this particular form of logic is accommodated in this prolongation.
Sending a plainclothes policeman—along with hundreds of others who share the dress code, crowd discipline, and aggressiveness of a trained mob and crowd-control assault group—against NATO units. In Kosovo, it should not have made sense. A state like Serbia no matter how twisted its ruling logic is, would still be kicking itself if it attacked NATO. But, such a logic has undergone elasticity.

Serbia has challenged the limits of the decency of a European state on two primary levels. It has challenged it in the case of Russia, by feeding its people in state and para-state propaganda with a determination from above to lean on the side of the aggressor in the war in Ukraine, and therefore complete distancing from European politics. He also challenged it in the case of Kosovo, following the narrative of the unfinished conflict that should not end with the independence of Kosovo.
This elasticity brings the logic to inversion.

So, it would be common sense for Serbia to align itself with the European continent, to which it belongs, and to distance itself from Russia, and at the same time to find ways of accommodation with independent Kosovo as part of good neighborliness, so that integrated and supported financially and politically. But in the inversion of logic, Serbia has shown that it has European and American attention if it simultaneously pushes the limits of its support for Russia and non-normalization of relations with Kosovo.

This inversion has a reason for existence. Serbia has successfully transformed its role from a state that is being pressured to be a political part of the continent (“do this or you will face sanctions”) to a state that is waiting to be enticed to be a political part of the European continent. Dragan Smigić beating KFOR soldiers is a symbol of inversion. Now Serbia must be begged to be polite; it was once expected to be so, and if not the punishment followed.

The third lesson is that not everything has to do with Kosovo. Events in the north concerned Ukraine, Russia and Belgrade. In official Pristina, it might seem perfectly logical to send three mayors with special police to their offices. But sending in special police, although part of the legality, could not compensate for their lack of legitimacy. Even, far beyond this debate between legality and legitimacy, from the perspective of European security, the Zvecan barricades were seen as a good opportunity to test NATO when it is engaged in supporting Ukraine. When Dragan Smigiqi beats NATO soldiers in Zveçan, his baton is raised in Moscow. From Putin’s perspective, he is a volunteer in the war that Russia is waging against Western civilization.

Consequently, Dragan Smigic’s stick is a warning to the peaceful demonstrators in Belgrade, to that silent part of Serbian society that the government is afraid of, that they too are opponents of the great war that is being waged against the West.

Finally, it’s not the first time. When Milosevic’s power felt that it was in danger, he declared war on the neighboring peoples. When he once brought out the tanks against his own opposition in 1991, he quickly managed to consolidate himself by directing them against Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians.

Thirty years later, it is not difficult to understand that the stick of Dragan Smigic, which beat the NATO soldiers, also beats the citizens of Belgrade who are peacefully protesting against the power of violence in Serbia.

The fourth lesson is like the first. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia has not ended. Barricades are erected and dismantled, soldiers and policemen are beaten, deployed and retreat-
ed, big words are uttered and forgotten – but in the end, however, a negotiation process must
take place that reaches an end to the conflict.
This achievement cannot be done without the USA and the EU and the United Kingdom, and without some of the European countries such as Germany, France and Italy, with greater involvement in matters of peace and security in Kosovo.

Dragan Smigiqi and his stick that beats KFOR soldiers should be considered as an episode, but a serious episode, of confronting the fact that peace is not built with the illusion of a ceremonial declaration that a normalization agreement has been reached.

It’s time for serious action. Perhaps the first step for Kosovo would have to be an agreement on how to proceed, with the biggest supporters of its independence, based on an outline of the roadmap that this country believes in.

The post Why Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo are Flaring appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By Albert Rakipi PhD.

Any hopes that the Parliamentary Elections of the 25^th of April would break the vicious circle of contested election results turning into the predominant cause of conflict between political parties in post-communist Albania have been quashed.

On the 25^th of April, the Democratic Party managed to secure 59 parliamentary seats. The frequent chants prophesizing a landslide victory slowly died out on that day, giving way to silence and eventually to accusations, that in securing the number of seats necessary for a third mandate, the Socialist Party had in fact orchestrated an “electoral massacre”. In all likelihood, it seems that the Opposition Parties are intent on disputing the election results.

Shortly thereafter, The Democratic Party requested a repeat of the elections in 9 out of 12 electoral districts, citing widespread electoral fraud and procedural issues during the vote-counting process. In a preliminary report, foreign observers have identified the “absence of a clear division between the ruling party and the state” together with “pervasive practices of vote-buying” as fundamental problems which threaten the integrity of the elections. These findings mirror the allegations of the Opposition Parties, namely that the Socialist Party has instrumentalized the public administration, misused public funds and called upon the help on local strongmen and other people of influence in an effort to buy votes.

This Article seeks to analyze and provide an answer to two important issues that stem from this latest development. On the onset, it will seek to clarify the effect of the contested electoral process on the stability of the system of governance. Parliamentary elections represent an opportunity to examine the functionality and adherence of a political system to democratic norms. Against this backdrop, this article will provide a critical examination of the current status of Albanian Democracy, 30 years after the fall of communism.

Where we come from

During the electoral campaign, the Prime-Minister made a remarkable statement to voters. “There is no program, we will keep moving forward.” This statement accurately encapsulates a unique moment in the political history of modern liberal societies, where the Prime-Minister is re-elected for a third term without being able to tell citizens neither what he has accomplished, nor what he plans to accomplish. Insofar as the Socialist Party’s track record may be used as a benchmark, an examination of the most important socio-political developments during the last 8 years of socialist rule may provide some insights of the government’s ability to really move things forward.  

During the last 8 years, more than 400,000 Albanian citizens have left their home-country in the hope of building a future for themselves elsewhere. A 2018 study by the UNDP ranks Albania at the top of the world-rankings on the emigration of tertiary-educated individuals. A predominant majority of those who leave are part of a talented generation of trained professionals, scientific experts and young academics who would have otherwise formed the backbone of the Albanian middle-class. Recent polls indicate that about 90% of young adults want to emigrate, and officials statistics show that the number of Albanian asylum-seekers in the EU has increased by 30% percent during the last two years. Albanians are on top of the list for the number of asylum applications submitted to EU member states,  ranking second only to applicants from war-torn Syria.

Immigration from developing countries is a pervasive phenomenon in today’s globalized world.

Creating a life for oneself in a foreign country is however not an easy feat. Statistical studies demonstrate again and again that mass-emigration is not necessary linked to low levels of development, but to a perceived sense of hopelessness and inability to “move forward” in one’s home country. In Albania, the rate of emigration is considerably higher when compared to its neighboring countries. In light of a sclerotic labor market, the lack of foreign investments, the inadequate protection of property rights and the creation of unfavorable conditions for SME’s, emigration is the last alternative.

Thirty years after the fall of communism Albania exhibits all the characteristics of a Rentier State, whose sustenance depends less and less on the remittances of the 50% of the population which has emigrated. Its sustenance is increasingly dependent on the profit that it accrues from “renting out” its territories to criminal groups which have established within Albania safe corridors for the international traffic of human beings and drugs, erected countless cannabis farms and which invest in  Albania’s  now “flourishing” construction sector in order to launder their profits. Such organizations operate in the grey zone are closely connected to the government. Public contracts and tenders on the other hand are almost always given to a small group of companies, although in several cases it has been established that they lacked capacities and experience to fulfill their contractual obligations.

As per a report of Transparency International, Albania represents a clear case of a captured state.

Before coming to power in 2012, the Socialist Party promised to provide free public healthcare. In 2020, the public healthcare system finds itself in a miserable condition,  leading individuals to turn to private hospitals which provide treatments which are extremely expensive and unaffordable to close to 90% of the population.

During its first years in power, the socialist government did implement measures which led to the closure of several private universities, which – rather than being in the business of education – serviced the Albanian youth with freshly printed diplomas in exchange for money and material goods. Despite the reforms initiated by the government, the education system remains corrupt and substandard. A frequent complaint of IT students in public universities is that the concepts and programming languages taught as part of the curriculum are so outdated that they are no longer of practical relevance in the modern IT industry.

The reform of the Justice System on the other hand had created great expectations due to the fact that the initiative found bipartisan support and because its implementation is supervised by the international community. Independent experts claim that throughout the last 5 years both parties have sought to undermine the reform or manipulate the implementation process for their benefit. The just dismissal of members of the judicial system through the vetting process left Albania without a constitutional and high court. The resulting lack of checks and balances was used by the government to its advantage, as it frequently passed legislation which could otherwise have been deemed unconstitutional.

Political conflict, disagreements and clashes, that are in fact central features of post-communist Albania, intensified during the second mandate of the socialist government.  The Opposition accused the government of manipulating the elections in 2017, made allegations of  systemic corruption towards and organized massive protests. In a rather extreme decision, the Opposition decided to leave parliament, effectively rendering useless an institution that is essential for the functioning of a democratic system. Furthermore, the Opposition boycotted the 2019 local elections, which were of course completely won by the Socialist Government.

Throughout the last four years and especially during the last two years the Socialists, who are in power since 2013, managed to put all independent state institutions under their control. It is not hard to understand that Albanian democracy presently lacks a system of checks and balances. In addition to parliament, the government has placed the media and civil-society groups under “democratic control”, thus reinforcing cleat autocratic tendencies. International experts have increasingly pointed out to the fact there has been a sort of governmentalization of the state, that is the use of state institutions and resources in order to illegitimately advance the personal interests of those in charge of government.

Albania’s accession to NATO 2009, the removal of the visa-regime with EU Member States and the granting of the candidate status for EU membership in 2014 represent  high-points in Albania’s International Relations. However, during the last 8 years the Albanian government has failed to develop closer ties with international parties, except with Turkey, and this can be explained by Prime-Minister Rama’s close relationship with President Erdogan. In light of the Albanian government’s failure to uphold and enforce the rule of law,  a “conditio sine qua non” expected to be fulfilled by EU candidate states, Albania’s accession negotiations have come to a halt.

If one is to consider all the above-mentioned facts and draw a conclusion as to the government’s performance in its last eight years in power, the Prime-Minister’s decision not to count his victories during the campaign would not seem so strange after all.

Instead, the Socialist Party sought to demonize the candidates of the opposition parties and present them as a threat. This strategy was markedly different from that of the Democratic Party, which presented voters with a clear program detailing their solutions to all of the important issues listed in the previous section.  

The Prime-Minister told the people that this election provided them with an opportunity to choose good over evil, with the latter in this case being personified by Sali Berisha and President Meta. The Socialist Party’s electoral campaign sought to construct and reinforce a simple and effective narrative, namely that the leader of the opposition Mr. Basha was being controlled by the two evil master-puppeteers of Albanian politics. Mr. Berisha is the historic leader of the first anti-communist opposition in 1991 who has served one term as President and two times as Prime-Minister. Mr. Berisha officially resigned as leader of the Democratic Party in 2013 after losing the elections. Despite this fact, he continued to wield some influence behind the scenes, although several commentators argue that this influence within the party is weaning. Ilir Meta served as Prime-Minister during a previous socialist government and, together with a faction within the Socialist Party founded and led the Socialist Movement for Integration before becoming President. In his role as president, Mr. Meta was actively engaged against the government throughout the electoral campaign in order to “protect democracy and its future in Albania.”

The main message of the Socialist Party to the people was that a victory of the Opposition would signify the return of the dictator (Mr. Berisha) and the corrupt Meta couple, referring to the President and his wife, Monika Kryemadhi, who currently serves as leader of the Socialist Party for Integration, founded by her husband. During the campaign the Socialist Party sought to gather support from the international community by presenting the opposition as the enemies of the justice reform.

Mr. Basha had made it clear in interviews as well as in the program of the Democratic Party, that the justice reform would certainly be carried out and might only be subject to very minor adjustments which are necessary in order to ensure that the reform may be implemented. In fact, the Leader of the Opposition Lulzim Basha built and led a modern election campaign backed by a concrete program wherein a detailed plan for Albania’s economic recovery was laid out. Mr. Basha promised to achieve economic growth through a redesign of the tax-system,  by attracting foreign investments and through the use of incentives and offered in his program concrete proposals to stop the massive migration of Albanian youth. The plan also contained proposals for reforms in healthcare, education and reforms in the governance system based on principles of good-governance which would ensure that there was a clear line of division between organized crime and organized politics.

The ruling party is the state.

On the 25^th of April 2021, the situation in Albania looked much different when compared to March 1991, the year when Albania sought to hold free and fair elections for the first time. The situation in 2021 is however quite similar to that of 30 years ago in one crucial regard: A political culture which equates the party in power with the state still exists. As the first pluralist elections were held in 1991, the people of Albania were presented with a choice between the Communist  Party and the Opposition. The latter however was not simply running against a political party, but against the entirety of the state institutions and the influence that they wield. The Opposition was running against the police, the public administration, the secret service, the state-ran-media and its propaganda machine, as well as the financial resources that they possessed.

During the last few years, the political landscape in Albania has regressed to that of 30 years ago. In 2019, the opposition parties decided to leave parliament. This was a grave strategic error, which enabled the government to change the electoral code with the help of a surrogate Parliament in such a way as to benefit the Socialist Party during the elections. This change ensured that the Socialist Party would receive at least 5 more seats in Parliament. As it did in 1991, in 2021 the Socialist Party controlled almost 100% of the local administration, with the exception of the Municipality of Shkoder. This is yet another strategic mistake of the opposition, which boycotted the 2019 local elections.

But the fact that the government was in complete control of parliament and the local administration cannot by itself lead us to the conclusion that in these elections the opposition was running against the state.  And when the head of OSBE/ODHIR, Ambassador Gacek stated that in these elections there was no clear line of division between the ruling party and the state, she is surely not referring to the fact that the government used a rubber-stamp parliament to change the rules of the game, nor to the governments total control of the local administration. Both these “victories” were handed to the government by the opposition itself. The point of the matter is that the socialist government instrumentalized state institutions in order to pressure and convince citizens into selling their votes.

The grave incident in Elbasan where a citizen was killed raises serious doubts as to the impartiality of the police and the prosecution services. Independent local and international news outlets published evidence that prove their lack of impartiality and event showcase the absence of a divisive line between the police and members of criminal gangs.  Like in 1991, the “institution of fear” was used , with members of the administration being threatened to vote for the government. In 1991 the Communist Party was sure that the top administration would for the party simply because they were a militant and politicized administration. Thirty years later the government was not so sure about the loyalty of the administration, even though during its first three years in power it undertook a purge to cleanse the public administration of employees who were not ideologically aligned with the socialist party. This time they needed to be reminded by Pandeli Majko that if the Democrats came to power, they would lose their jobs.

A change of power in Albania has been historically accompanied by deep purges in the public administration, even though a civil service law whose purpose is to dissuade new governments from laying  off employees for political reasons has been in place for quite a while. Imagine the  devastating effect this phenomenon would have on the functionality of the state, if it were to take place in Italy, where governments have changed at least 50 times in the last 60 years. According to official statistics, the Albanian Government has paid 110 Million euros as compensation to employees of the public administration whom it illegitimately fired during the last 6 years.

In addition to using the public administration, in which the number of employees rose considerably in the months leading up to the election, the Socialist Party also made use of a database containing highly sensitive and confidential information regarding 910,000 citizens living in Tirana. So in addition to strong-men the government also used state structures and resources in order to buy votes. According to Open Data the government handed out 125 Million euros for people whose property had been damaged during the earthquake last years. This represent a 500% increase in the hand-out rate when compared to the previous year.

Actually 62 Percent of Albanians think that the current government cannot be changed through free and fair elections. The first country to come to mind when thinking that a country’s government cannot be changed through elections is… Russia.

Social-Democrats marching in Tirana and vote buying allegations.

The dice was thrown on the 25^th of April 2021. On the 28^th of April, the Socialist Party triumphantly celebrated their victory on Skanderbeg square. On the 1^st of May, citizens were able to witness the Social Democrats marching in Tirana on expensive cars, decorated with the Flags of a long-forgotten party which had almost been cast into oblivion after the 1992 elections. The Social-Democratic party, founded in 1991, was the brainchild of a caste of intellectuals, academics, scientists, journalists and artists who sought to challenge the totalitarian rule of the communist party. Having ran a successful campaign in 1992, the SDP managed to  secure 7 seats in Parliament. Its new-found success was rather short-lived however, as political infighting led to its eventual decimation. Under the direction of Tomë Doshi, a successful businessmen, the SDP managed to capture 3 seats in the 2021 Parliamentary Elections, although the man responsible for SDP’s spectacular rise in popularity resigned during the vote counting process, just as SDP’s electoral success was becoming a surety.

 Local observes opined that Mr. Doshi’s resignation provided the Prime-Minister with an opportunity to form a parliamentary majority in the event that the Socialist-Party would not have been able to capture the required number of seats. In 2018, Mr. Doshi was declared a persona-non-grata by the US State Department, and during the electoral campaign the Prime-Minister assured the Albanian public, and perhaps more importantly, the American ambassador, that Mr. Doshi would not form part of his government. Mr. Doshi’s resignation would facilitate the forming of a coalition between the SP and the SDP, in the event that the letter would emerge as a king-maker in the parliamentary elections.

If one leaves aside questions as to Mr. Rama’s and Tomë Doshi’s purported backstage-dealings for a moment, another important issue which merits discussion comes to light. What could possibly explain the electoral success of a nearly defunct Party under the guidance of this extremely wealthy and successful businessman?  The SDP managed to elect three of its candidates in the districts of Tiranē and Shkodër. But Mr. Doshi’s party also managed to gather a considerable number of votes in the small, south-eastern municipality of Pustec, home to a Macedonian minority. When asked about this rather strange development, Mr. Lutfi Dervishi, a well-known journalist, stated for A1 CNN news that this was “surely the result of the dissemination of social-democratic ideals in Pustec.” The dissemination of social-democratic ideas may come as a result of the Maoist theory “the village surrounds the city”. From Pustec, these social-democratic ideals may go on to take root in important industrial cities where principles of social-democracy have been historically developed.

It has never been easier, yet at the same time more difficult to prove allegations of electoral fraud. Vote-buying allegations have been ever present in Albanian elections. What serves to differentiate this particular electoral process is the alleged massive scale of electoral fraud, which was denounced by both the opposition parties and international observers. Proving such allegations is extremely difficult from a legal perspective however, except in circumstances when people are literally caught-in-the-act, which again necessitates a willing and resourceful police-force.

Besides the SDP’s success, there other instances where unknown individuals managed to gather an extraordinary amount of votes in these elections. Most remarkable is perhaps the case of Orlando Rakipi, who ran for the socialist party. The son of an ex-member of parliament who was barred from holding public office in light of his failure to report his criminal dealings during the decriminalization process, Orlando managed to gather more than 16,000 votes in Tirane, thus gaining more votes than the Prime-Minister himself or the leader of the opposition did. Furthermore, Mr. Rakipi outperformed all the cabinet ministers that ran in the same district. Mr. Majko, a socialist who served two terms as Prime Minister was also outperformed by young Orlando, and did not manage to get a seat in parliament. The son in law of the ex-member of parliament, Aqif Rakipi, also managed to get elected as part of the socialist ticket in the district of Elbasan, where he managed to gather the highest amount of votes.

Albania has a troubled history with rigged soccer matches. F.C Skanderbeg, the champions of the national league as well as other teams have been sanctioned by international courts due to the fact that they had rigged international matches in exchange for cash. As of today, none of the members of political teams which compete against one another for control of parliament has been penalized for committing electoral fraud. Previous cases of potential vote-buying efforts such as the infamous “case-file 184”, containing audio-recordings of members of the public administration have still not been reviewed, despite the fact that the proceedings have commenced in 2017. The international community has repeatedly called upon the new judicial authorities to thoroughly investigate the vote buying allegations concerning the 2021 Parliamentary Elections.

A lame-duck president and the future of checks and balances

The Central Electoral Commission is currently reviewing the submissions of the opposition parties, in which they denounce what they refer to as “an electoral massacre” perpetuated through massive vote-buying efforts. The Democratic Party is seeking a repeat of the elections in 9 out of 12 electoral districts.  This legal battle is set to continue for a considerable amount of time, and it is highly unlikely that the opposition parties will achieve their aim of upturning the election results. The International community was quick to acknowledge the socialists’ win and offer their congratulations to the Prime-Minister. It seems reasonable to assume that in their view, these highly disputed elections are a done deal.

Despite the ongoing legal proceedings regarding the electoral process, the Democratic Party seems intent on entering parliament, presumably also because it drew the necessary lessons out of its catastrophic decision to abandon Parliament in 2019. And although an upturn of the elections results is quite unlikely, it stands to reason that the Democratic Party will continue to fight this fight within parliament. This will inevitably further political conflict between the two parties.

The Prime-Minister seems to be open to the idea of collaborating with the Democrats and has already “waived the white flag” to coin it in his terms, asking them to list the issues which they wish to discuss. In fact this sounds quite cynical. In June 2020, three great powers ( the U.S, the U.K and the EU) brokered a deal between the opposition and the government in regard to the electoral code. Three months later Mr. Rama reputed the deal and the assurances that the three great powers had given to the Democrats by changing the electoral  rules in his favor with the help of a rubber-stamp parliament. It is estimated that the Socialist Party won up to 7 seats in Parliament due to this change alone. This change alone gave the socialists an almost unbeatable lead in the 2021 Parliamentary Elections.

Even if one were to be convinced of the fact that the Prime-Minister is promising cooperation in good faith, it would seem rather undemocratic if political issues in this country was resolved through the Prime-Minister sending the opposition a request to list their issues, which would then be magically resolved. If this were to happen, the opposition would have effectively turned into a governmental department in a country where, during 70 of its 100 years of existence, members of opposition parties have either been murdered or outlawed.

An important questions that begs to be answered is whether after these elections it will be possible to restore a system of checks and balances. Parliament has initiated the procedures for the dismissal of the President. If such efforts prove to be successful, they will inevitably lead to the neutralization of a center of power which provides checks and balances to the otherwise unfettered powered of the executive. And even if Mr. Meta remains in power until the constitutional court are able to review the legality of the decision to dismiss the president, his position and de-facto ability to exercise his role, especially in the manner in which he recently has seen fit, will be severely weakened. It is also difficult or perhaps naive to assume that a presidential candidate chosen by the Socialist Party will exercise his duties in a manner that is impartial. If Mr. Rama controls the Parliament, the Government, the Presidency and given that he enjoys the “right influence” over the new justice system, it is not hard to see a clear power-consolidation trend that is turning Albania into a one-party-state.

Instead of conclusions

Two days before voting day, the Government signed a new contract for the construction of an airport in the south, whereas the Prime-Minister personally took park in the inauguration of a new airport in the north, where he also promised that by the end of his third mandate 4 international airports will be operating in Albania. Lutfi Dervishi, the journalist mentioned above who is also known for his excellent sense of humor commented the following: “Given that 400,000 Albanians left at a time where we had only one airport, securing a fourth mandate will be certainly easy, if the Prime-Minister keeps his promise to build other three”

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Justice for victims has often been claimed as the raison d’être and the rallying call of international criminal justice mechanisms.  This noble goal has been at the heart of the work of hybrid and ad hoc international criminal tribunals as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The recognition of victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings is a novelty in international criminal law.[1] As such, the incorporation of victims as civil parties (partie civile) in international criminal proceedings has marked a significant advance for victims’ rights. This development is the product of a broad movement and parallel advancements in both domestic and international legal systems towards greater acknowledgment of victims’ rights. It was a response to the growing criticism by victims’ rights advocates and organisations that concerned the apparent marginalisation of victims within the criminal justice process.[2] The pronounced trend towards enhancing victim participation at the international level was reflected in the efforts made by the ICC, established under the Rome Statute, which became the first international criminal tribunal to endorse active victim participation by recognising victims as ‘participants’. This new dimension of victims’ rights was further heightened at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), mainly by offering an unprecedented characterisation of victims as full ‘parties’ to rather than just ‘participants’ in proceedings. This trend has been reflected also in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the newly established Kosovo’s Specialist Chambers (Kosovo’s special crimes court) in The Hague. This development and the shift in international criminal law towards greater victim recognition and centrality, mirror to a great extent the growing prominence of restorative justice and the rise of victims’ rights in Western domestic justice systems.[3]

Human Rights Instruments, Institutions and the Advancement of Victims’ Rights

The evolution and strengthening of victims’ rights have found expression in two important international legal instruments: first, in the 1985 United Nations (UN) Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (the Victims’ Declaration), with a focus primarily on victims of domestic crimes; and secondly, in the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (the Basic Principles), which has been described as ‘for all practical purposes, an international bill of rights of victims’,[4] with a principal focus on victims of international crimes. A multitude of measures and advances have contributed to the increasingly prominent role afforded to victims in contemporary international criminal law. These developments were triggered and influenced by numerous factors, in particular the Basic Principles, the expansion of victims’ rights under international human rights and humanitarian law, coupled with increasing recognition of victims’ rights in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The establishment of various diverse ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, and subsequently of the ICC, have made further important contributions to progress in this area, leading to enhanced procedural, substantive and remedial rights for victims. This is apparent in the greater rights afforded to victims in the context of court proceedings, including inter alia disclosure of documents, victim protection, and the availability of remedies, in particular reparations.

Typologies of Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process

There are five main typologies of victim participation.[5] The most basic form of participation granted by all legal systems is that of complainant: the victim makes an official complaint to the police or other judicial or prosecutorial state institution, thereby triggering a criminal investigation and, potentially, charges against the accused. Secondly, victim-complainants often also fulfil the role of victim-witnesses, in particular during the pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings. A third type of victim participation is that of private or auxiliary prosecutor. Indeed, most civil law jurisdictions permit private prosecutions for minor crimes, and recognise ‘auxiliary prosecutors’, whose role is attached to that of a public prosecutor.[6] In most common law systems such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, crimes were traditionally regarded as being offences against the state or the Crown as much as against the victim himself, and the right to act as a private prosecutor survives in those jurisdictions. The right to bring private prosecutions is most prevalent in England and Wales.

A more recent development has, fourthly, been impact statements provided by victims, known as the Victim Personal Statement. This type of statement has become common in particular in common law countries, the first such statement being introduced in California in 1976.[7] Such statements were introduced in New Zealand in 1987, in Canada in 1988, and rolled out nationally across England and Wales in 2001. This allows victims to submit a formal statement to be read out in open court, testifying to the victims’ personal, physical, emotional, and financial trauma and suffering. Some jurisdictions go further and allow victims to make observations related to sentencing in their impact statements.[8]

Finally, a more enhanced and somewhat different form of participation is civil party participation, with which this article is concerned. The participation of victims as civil party or partie civile in criminal proceedings finds its genesis in French law and other civil law jurisdictions, although the precise parameters of civil party participation vary from one system to another; it is, however, unknown to most common law systems. Unlike witnesses, civil parties do not give evidence or testimony under oath.[9] Subject to exceptions, they generally have similar rights as other parties to proceedings, including the right to question the accused and to make closing submissions. The participation of a victim as a civil party must however pertain to a specific claim for damages.[10]

Civil Party Participation and Its Application in Practice

In a landscape of evolving jurisprudential and academic discourse on victim participation as well as practice in international criminal trials, the incorporation of victim participation as a restorative justice element into an inherently retributive justice process, has brought into sharper focus the need for a more critical and comprehensive normative and empirical examination of victim participation as both an approach and a principle. The seemingly innovative approach endorsed by the ICC, the ECCC and other tribunals, by including victims of alleged crimes as civil parties, rather than as mere witnesses, offering an unprecedented expansion of victims’ rights, has revealed potential strengths and weaknesses as well as the possibilities for the future direction of development in international criminal justice. There has been a significant shift on the domestic and international planes where the focus is no longer solely on retribution or the utility of punishment, but also on restorative principles. This development has led to enhanced service and procedural rights for victims, and to greater recognition of the harm suffered. However, given the nature of international criminal trials including subject-matter limitations, the structure and composition of international criminal tribunals, as well as the magnitude of cases and the nature of mass victimisation – distinguishing them in many significant ways from domestic criminal proceedings – victim participation in international criminal proceedings has posed some unique and specific questions and themes, which in turn have given rise to complex answers and challenges.

A Balancing Act: Civil Party Participation and Equality of Arms

In spite of this noteworthy development, the complex civil party process has not been without challenges. One of the most evident procedural issues arising out of participation has been the frequent criticism that this ‘impedes the equilibrium between prosecution and defence’^[11] and that it impinges upon the right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. My research on civil party participation at the ECCC in Cambodia, has demonstrated that civil party participation has had a bearing on equality of arms and the functionality of trial proceedings. Furthermore, the outcome of trial proceedings has also led to questions about the assumption that expansive participation in criminal proceedings furthers victims’ interests. The application of the complex civil party participation scheme at the ECCC has also raised, from a legal and procedural standpoint, some important questions regarding the intended and unintended effects on civil parties and victims.

Prolongation of Court Proceedings

One major challenge posed by civil party participation relates to the impact that civil party participation has had on the prolongation of trial proceedings, thus increasing the cost of trials. A requirement of first principle in any criminal trial is the protection of the defendant’s right to a fair and expeditious trial.

Effects on Prosecution and Defence

The implications of and the costs created by victim participation for the prosecution and defence have brought into sharper focus the need for the ECCC and other international criminal tribunals to shape victim participation so as best to accommodate competing interests. One of the fundamental principles upon which the ECCC and all other international criminal tribunals function is that proceedings shall be fair and adversarial and preserve a balance between the rights of the parties. At the ECCC trials, civil party participation often became a trial management issue, prompting the Chamber (judges) to impose a system of time limits on all the parties as a response to concerns over the slow pace of the proceedings. The defence often objected to the time allocated to them, arguing that they faced ‘two prosecutors’ and expected to respond to a barrage of motions by the civil parties, and that the imbalance amounted to a violation of the rights of the defendant. Another remarkable angle, which is not instinctively apparent, is that civil party participation can have a bearing not only on the defence, but also on the prosecution’s job, often resulting in continuous tension over inconsistencies that range from theories of criminal responsibility to questionable evidence and so forth.

Unintended Effects on Victims

While acknowledging that efforts to enhance victims’ rights can lead, at least in theory, to the realisation of the aspiration of restorative justice for victims, a practical evaluation demands a careful consideration of the often unquestioned assumption that expanded participation is in the victims’ best interests. There are two dimensions to the effects of victim participation; first in respect of victims recognised as civil parties, and second in respect of un-recognised victims. With regards to the former, the victim is required to choose quite early on in the proceedings whether he or she wants to participate as a witness or as a civil party. Therefore participating victims may be denied the opportunity to testify under oath as witnesses, which on the other hand affects the prosecution’s opportunity to present information that could further assist in incriminating the accused.^[12] By contrast, civil party testimony is not given under oath, and it should therefore carry less weight than witness evidence, especially since civil parties, unlike witnesses, attend all closed and public hearings before testimony, which could have an impact on the information that they provide. With regard to the second dimension, compared to approximately 1.7 million people who perished under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, victims recognised as civil parties by the ECCC represent only a fraction of the overall number of direct and indirect victims. In determining the role and impact of victim participation at the ECCC, one should be cautious about the effects that such participation could have on victims who are not granted permission by the Court to take part in the proceedings. Granting permission to some victims at the exclusion of others could potentially bring about unintended and undesirable consequences, especially in light of the quest for national reconciliation and victims’ aspirations to unearth the truth, both key objectives of any international criminal tribunal.

A Promising Route Forward?

What emerges from the way in which victim participation has been crafted and applied so far at the ECCC, the ICC and other international criminal tribunals, is the understanding that despite victim involvement being a salient feature of the process, the trials have appeared more as ‘experimenting laboratories’ than as processes guided by sound and well-crafted rules and procedures. The incorporation of victim participation as a restorative justice element into an inherently retributive justice process is in its nascent stage in international criminal justice and the inclusion of various provisions relating to victims’ rights within international criminal tribunals has in principle broadened the scope of procedural and substantive rights afforded to victims. However, my research on the civil party participation regime has found that the incorporation of victims as civil parties into proceedings raises significant questions and gives rise to a number of challenges inherent in the tension between an increase in the rights afforded to victims on the one hand, and the established due process rights available to the defence on the other. Five key findings have emerged:

First, whilst victims have taken advantage of their procedural rights, their role remains largely symbolic and they have yet in full to realise their substantive rights. Evidently there is a disconnect between victims’ expectations and practice on the ground, and the tribunals’ shortcomings stand in stark contrast to victims’ high expectations in relation to reparations. Although symbolic justice for victims may be the current approach at the ECCC, the ICC as well as other international criminal tribunals that have afforded victims greater participatory rights, it is important that these tribunals take the necessary measures to overcome jurisdictional and structural limitations inherent in their reparations mandate in order to move beyond rhetoric by delivering more meaningful justice to victims of international crimes.

Second, if international criminal tribunals afford victims the right to participate in proceedings, it is imperative that they develop a sound statutory and procedural foundation with clear and detailed rules and procedures from the outset. Legislation needs to clearly specify the rights of victims recognised as civil parties and the responsibilities of the criminal justice system and the court’s personnel regarding victims.

Third, the implications of the civil party participation scheme suggest that any effort to valorise expanded participatory rights by affording victims a role beyond that of complainant or witness demands first of all careful consideration of whether increased participation is in the best interests of victims and of justice more generally. We need to develop a realistic understanding of the potential shortcomings that civil party participation could have with regards to the vital objectives of fairness, functionality of court proceedings, and victims’ needs and interests.           

            Fourth, what emerged from the manner in which civil party participation has been dealt with by the ECCC and other tribunals, is that members of the court, including judges, legal officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and victims’ legal representatives, all seemed to be caught ‘off guard’ by this recent development, and not fully prepared to implement such a novel mechanism. It is, therefore, important to have a knowledgeable and supportive criminal justice community. Victims’ views, insights and experiences are guided by the information provided to them, as well as by the way their requests are received by the Court. Giving due consideration to victims’ interests and needs in this regard is crucial.

            Finally, victim participation is still in its nascent stage on the international scene, and its application in practice is therefore quite fluid, and at times vague and contradictory. There is a critical need for well-developed common standards, at both a legal and normative level, to guide the application of victim participation in practice. Ultimately, recognising victims’ rights to equal and effective access to justice, providing protection and support as well as adequate and prompt reparation for harm suffered demands a comprehensive and integrated approach, something that courts are not best placed to achieve on their own.

Dr. Rudina Jasini is a lecturer and a researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, specialising in international criminal law and human rights law. Prior to her time at Oxford, Rudina worked as an attorney for the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. She has also worked with the legal team providing representation and assistance to victims of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.

Bibliography

Ashworth, Andrew. ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing.’ Criminal Law Review 498; 1993.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif. ‘International Recognition of Victim’s Rights.’ 6 Human Rights Law Review 203; 2006

Baumgartner, Elisabeth. ‘Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal Court.’ International Review of the Red Cross 432. 90(870). 2008

Brienen Marion E. and Hoegen, Ernestine H. Victims of Crime in “European Criminal Justice Systems: The Implementation of Recommendation” (85) 11 of the Council of Europe on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure (Wolf Legal Publishers 2000).

Hoyle, Carolyn. ‘Victims, the Criminal Process, and Restorative Justice’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (5th edn Oxford University Press 2012) 398.

Manikis, Marie and Roberts, Julian V.. ‘Victim Personal Statements: Latest (and Last) Trends from the Witnesses and Victims Experience Survey in England and Wales’ 13:3 Criminology and Criminal Justice 245, 246. 2013.

McGonigle Leyh, Brianne. “Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings” (Intersentia 2011) 78-86.

Schabas, William A. “An Introduction to the International Criminal Court.” 2nd edn Cambridge University Press 2004. See also Emily Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal Policy and Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 315.

Sheehan, Albert V. Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office). 1975

Trumbull, Charles P. ‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’. Michigan Journal of International Law 777, 810. 2008.

van Dijk, Jan. ‘Victim Rights: A Right to Better Services or a Right to Active Participation?’ in Jan van Dijk, Charles Haffmans et al. (eds), Criminal Law in Action. Kluwer Law International, 1998.

Zedner, Lucia. Criminal Justice, Clarendon Law Series. Oxford University Press, 2004.

[1] William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2^nd edn Cambridge University Press 2004) 328; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 144, 167; See also Emily Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?’in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal Policy and Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 315.

[2] Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice, Clarendon Law Series (Oxford University Press 2004) 143.

[3] Carolyn Hoyle, ‘Victims, the Criminal Process, and Restorative Justice’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (5^th edn Oxford University Press 2012) 398.

[4] M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victim’s Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203.

[5] Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (Intersentia 2011) 78-86.

[6] Marion E. Brienen and Ernestine H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems: The Implementation of Recommendation (85) 11 of the Council of Europe on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure (Wolf Legal Publishers 2000).

[7] Marie Manikis and Julian V. Roberts, ‘Victim Personal Statements: Latest (and Last) Trends from the Witnesses and Victims Experience Survey in England and Wales’ (2013) 13:3 Criminology and Criminal Justice 245, 246.

[8] See generally Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ (1993) Criminal Law Review 498.

[9] Albert V. Sheehan, Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office 1975) 22.

[10] Jan van Dijk, ‘Victim Rights: A Right to Better Services or a Right to Active Participation?’ in Jan van Dijk, Charles Haffmans et al. (eds), Criminal Law in Action (Kluwer Law International 1988) 351.

[11] Elisabeth Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 90(870) International Review of the Red Cross 432.

[12] Charles P. Trumbull, ‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’(2008) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 777, 810.

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The Western Balkans Six Western Balkans Six (WB6/WB) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia (NM), and Serbia have been recipients of EU democracy assistance for more than three decades. The European Union is heavily involved in the political processes of these countries, not the least because these countries are also on the accession pipeline. To date, all the countries are stuck in the hybrid status and a political landscape dominated by corrupt strongmen, democratic erosions and illiberal practices. Despite the EU’s substantial support and democracy assistance, WB6 have been experiencing serious backsliding in democratic components for over a decade. What’s more in the recent decade, the role of China and Russia is pushing back the democratic establishment and compliance with the EU standards. Here, I argue that the role of China and Russia inadvertently diminishes further the role of the EU and the US in furthering democratic norms in the region.

While Western Balkan countries have proceeded gradually in the EU membership, they have not improved democratic conditions. In contrary, while proceeding in accession criteria, the region, has experienced democratic erosions.[1] Moreover, several authors argue that the EU’s successful use of political conditionality in aspiring member countries has reduced following the enlargement of 2004 and 2007. In the case of the Western Balkan countries, the EU’s support has allowed leaders with undemocratic tendencies to strengthen their power and entrench informal networks. This is the case of Vucic in Serbia, Djukanovic in Montenegro, Rama in Albania.[2] Even though, among WB6 Serbia and Montenegro are frontrunners in the EU accession process to date they are both considered electoral autocracies.[3]

On the other hand, the European Union’s has not been able to maintain a credible commitment perspective and involvement with the WB. In the words of Professor Florian Bieber “The European Union has been invisible, slow and undecided.“ Notably, the lack of unity between EU member countries toward Western Balkans future has sent mixed signals to the people and WB6 leaders. To begin with, the lack of EU presence during Serbia’s elections in June 2020 which were one of the most fraudulent elections in Serbia’s history.[4]The invisibility of the EU in Montenegro during protests against church law and the August 2020 elections that witnessed the victory of several parties including the Serbian nationalist party, but also marked an end to Djukanovic’s “one-man rule” for the first time in more than three decades. The slowness of the EU to act as a meditator on the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations, that led to the involvement of the US with a vague and highly politicized economic agreement which could pave the way for more problems than solutions in the future.  The lack of a clear path for BiH accession path and last but not least, the delay of accession negotiation for North Macedonia and Albania despite their fulfilment of criteria’s – mainly due to the lack of unity inside the EU, has left the region confused and hopeless to maintain a credible EU accession prospect. This, in turn, has created grounds for actors like China and Russia to gain traction and instrumentalize the lack of economic development, weak democratic institutions and in some cases exacerbate ethnic divisions to push their policies.

When the EU and the US have watered down their commitment to the region, Beijing and Moscow have gained momentum by offering quick solutions without conditionality for democratic reforms. China and Russia when offering financial support do not require that WB member states reform their state enterprises, rule of law or ousting of the corrupted officials. On the contrary, they prefer top-down, state-led, leader to leader agreements. More often than not, with agreements signed behind closed doors without providing transparency to the public, facilitating the already prevalent grand corruption at the highest levels of elites, which haunts every country in the region.

Small, developing, economically unstable countries dominated with rife corruption give opportunity to powerful actors like China and Russia to acquire influence. Moreover, russian elites have overtly announced that they are not hesitant to support self-interested groups against western international influence.[5] This is shown in the case of Russian support to Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) one of the most corrupt and scandalous parties in Macedonia’s history; the separatist group in Bosnia – the Republika Srpska; the support of Serbian autocratic strongman Aleksandar Vučić and even leading a coup attack in Montenegro in 2016.

Strikingly, China has included WB6 countries into one of its largest investment frameworks worldwide – the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). WB countries excluding Kosovo are part of the China-Central Eastern Europe Cooperation Forum, 17 + 1 with Greece as the last participant included in this project.[6] Important to note, compared to other Central and Eastern European countries and other EU members, the capacities in the region are on average are much lower when it comes to transport infrastructure – railways, highways and energy production.[7] This initiative will fill some of these gaps in transport and infrastructure.

  The WB region is geostrategically important for China to deepen its influence on the European continent and their involvement with the EU markets. This project is a bridge that connects the Chinese road with the port of Piraeus in Greece (owned by Chinese Companies 67%) which means access to the Mediterranean Sea and other markets in the EU. For Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries between 2007-2017 the investment loans amounted up to 12.2 bn EUR. In Serbia alone, China has invested 1 billion euros mostly loans, to develop infrastructure and energy projects. In terms of cooperation, Serbia remains the key partner of China in the region. Also, Serbia considered by V-Dem Report 2020 an electoral autocracy is currently among the top ten autocratizing countries worldwide.[8]Over the past year, Serbia has increased media censorship, violations of civil rights and freedoms, and election irregularities and fraudulence have become more prevalent.

Figure 1: Comparing World Bank and Chinese Financial Flows by Country per population (Data: GeoQuery AidDATA)

Other countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and to a lesser extent Albania and Kosovo have also been targeted by Chinese financial flows. To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the amount of funds by the World Bank and China to WB countries by population. Compared to each country’s population, it is clear that Montenegro and North Macedonia have received largest sums. It is evident that in Serbia, Chinese funds still seem much smaller compared to World Bank funds. On the other hand, in the case of Montenegro, the amount of Chinese investment exceeds the initiatives of the World Bank. As Montenegro hosts only one Chinese infrastructure project yet it is the largest and most ambitious project in the Western Balkans.[9]

An important point of contention between international actors in the region is Kosovo’s statehood. Kosovo’s independence in 2008 is supported by both the EU (as an institution) and the US while it is strongly opposed by Russia, China and Serbia.  China recognizes Kosovo as part of Serbia, citing this as the main point of the “Sino-Serbian” partnership. Thus, China and Russia’s support of Serbia in Kosovo-Serbia conflict and this shared anti-Western sentiment, remain the foundation of the partnership with Serbia. To boost, president Vucic has consistently leveraged their support to undermine democratic institutions, strengthen his grip of power, much like Chinese and Russian styles of governance. Although, president Vucic has been good at maintaining a pro-European facade, praising democratic values and using pro-European rhetoric while doing the opposite. And so, China and Russia’s support to autocratic leaders has by far paved the way for more autocratic practices and also contributed to increasing tensions between ethnic groups.

Moreover, in the Western Balkan countries, Chinese-led initiatives do not prioritize strict measures for clean and environmentally friendly projects. Two accidents that showed that lack of environmental measures are the calamity of Tara river in Montenegro, with soil and chemical waste released into the river caused by the construction project led by China.  Also, the hazardous accident with black powder smoke from the steel power plant in Smederevo river port in Belgrade, owned by China’s Heibei Iron & Steel Group.[10] Both incidents related to China led the regional project “Road and Bridge Corporation” initiative. Several activists have called them “ecological terrorism.” These incidents not only offer quick and risky solutions that pose multiple problems but also further the alignment with the EU standards and procedures. As a result, these unsafe infrastructures posing environmental hazards, further the divide between the WB and the EU standards and delay WB countries path towards meeting the conditions for the EU accession.

Among the main issues of concern is that Chinese investments are mainly based on loans rather than financial aid. As in the case of African countries, which have been the target of Chinese investment and are considered among the fastest-growing economies in the world, their debt burden has soared. Moreover, with the current economic crisis brought by Covid19 pandemic, these countries are already seeking debt relief as they are unable to pay. To some, the Chinese investment approach has been coined as “Debt Trap Diplomacy,” – an attempt to attract poor countries with small emerging economies, which in reality can never pay back.[11]Additionally, China’s investments are bestowed upon with higher interests’ rates and shorter repayment schedules as compared to loans from the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. Montenegro’s government borrowed from China €1.3bn, this huge amount of debt for such a small country has increased its GDP-to-debt ratio to 80 percent.[12] MNE could fall into the “debt trap” similar to the case of Sri Lanka – which was forced to lease one of its port to China.[13]To make matters worse, with this high percentage of debt Montenegro cannot enter the EU.

While the EU is the largest donor in the region, few people in the region are aware that the EU granted around 3.3 billion dollars as a recovery package during COVID19 crisis. Meanwhile, China sent medical equipment help and only 6 doctors to Belgrade. The President of Serbia – Aleksander Vucic greeted them in person and kissed the Chinese flag. This gesture marked Serbia’s participation in “mask diplomacy.”[14] On the other hand, the EU’s inability to voice its efforts and the large assistance they give to these countries has overshadowed their endeavours in the eyes of citizens in WB. Whereas, Chinese counterparts ostentatiously show their assistance, making citizens more susceptible to think that China is more ready to assist in times of crisis than other Western donors.  

In the words of the senior fellow for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Nadège Rolland “It is not so much the physical manifestation  (roads and railways) of the Belt and Road Projects, it’s about the intangible outcomes, people- to -people exchanges, elite capture, the formation of future elites, penetration of universities, changing the minds of the journalists. Investments are just a tool to open doors and entice other parties to cooperate with China, to create a community that respects China’s interest,  doesn’t criticise its activities and abides by China’s rules.” [15]

While China’s influence in the region is largely based on economic ties, Russia’s influence rests on ethnological and political connections. Their approaches although different, they complement each other. Both China and Russia undermine democratic values and support for strongmen whose past is marred with corruption scandals, nationalist movements, share anti-Western ideals in the region and provide financial support unconditional on democratic progress.

On the other hand, Russia provides support to the orthodox church and religious communities in Serbia, BiH, and Montenegro and North Macedonia. However, Moscow’s interference is limited in Albania and almost none in Kosovo, which Russia strongly rejects as an independent country.

Russian intervention is felt mainly through the widespread Russian media in the region, support for Serb nationalist communities and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the supply of weapons to ethnic groups, and siding with nationalist and often undemocratic leaders.

Russia’s biggest ally in the region is Serbia, as they enjoy deep cultural and political ties. Moscow is also the biggest supporter of Belgrade’s stance on Kosovo-Serbia conflict. For several years now, Serbia has been reluctant to make any concession in the EU and US-led Kosovo- Serbia negotiations, if it jeopardizes its relation with Russia.[16] According to Gallup International poll, Putin is the most popular leader in Serbia, and 47% of respondents are convinced that Russia provides the largest amount of aid to Serbia.[17] While in fact, the EU and the US provide 90% of foreign aid to Serbia.

 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country already divided along ethnoreligious lines, Croatians and Bosniak entities follow a pro-Western policy. In fact, Serbian counterparts “Republika Srpska” led by Dodik receive direct support and assistance from Serbian and Russian leaders. Moscow’s support to the Serbian entity, hinders BiH accession to EU and NATO membership. Moreover, although Dodik-led Republika Srpska does not have an army, Russia donated weapons and training troops to their special branch of force, rising the tensions in the country. As a consequence, of Russia’s of the Serbian ethnic group in an already divided society encourages further fragmentation of existing divisions and destabilization of the country, which may have a spill-over effect on other existing conflicts in the region.

On the other hand, relations between Russia and Montenegro and North Macedonia are rather bitter. Both countries accuse Russia of interfering in their domestic political landscape. In 2016, the Montenegrin government accused Russia of launching a coup attack in cooperation with the opposition parties, to overthrow the MNE government and prevent NATO membership. Nevertheless, Montenegro eventually joined NATO in 2017. In Montenegro, Serbian Orthodox Church is the largest religious institutions attempting to position itself among key political players, also backed heavily by Russian. To date, Russia continues to support the Serbian nationalist party supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church, in forming a new government and ousting the ruling pro-Western party which held power for 30 years. Although we have yet to see the formation of a government after the August 2020 elections, it is likely that Russian and Serbian influence will dominate and anti-Western sentiments will rise.

In the case of Northern Macedonia, the Russian government is suspected of interfering in the referendum in 2018 on the name issue with Greece. Western diplomats claimed that Russia led a boycott campaign on Facebook.  People would see up to forty posts a day in their feed with the text “Are you going to let Albanians change your name”? an attempt to increase the tension among ethnic minorities in the country.[18] The results of the referendum results supported the Russian position and the turnout was very low. However, the Macedonian government pushed the name change through the parliamentary vote, which eventually paved the way for NATO accession and proceeding with EU accession criteria.

What does it Mean for the State of Democracy?

Foreign aid and direct investment are not in themselves a threat to the already weak democratic regimes in the Western Balkans. These provide opportunities for the WB to meet its demands and develop a modern infrastructure, high-speed rail, modern ports. What is troubling are the intended and unintended consequences of China’s and Russia’s support of undemocratic leaders, ethnic and religious groups, media censorship, surveillance, data collection breaches, the spread of control and misinformation which are likely to hamper the development of fragile institutions of these countries.

While it remains to be analyzed how foreign powers influence citizens’ perception of democratic values in the region, recent polls show that support for Russia in Serbia has increased by 20% and China is viewed more positively than the EU and U.S.[19] Existing literature on democratization highlights that citizens’ perception and support for democratic structures is essential for the establishment and consolidation of democratic regimes.

One the other hand the EU has given priority to stability, conflict resolution and has made secondary democratic reforms.[20] This has enabled autocratic leaders to strengthen their grip of power and rely on the EU as an external source of legitimation. Despite, the European Union’s deep involvement in the region with EU membership prospect, conditionality reforms and democracy aid programs the region has experienced democratic erosions. Although, countries of the Western Balkans have never fully democratized, and these erosions have occurred against the backdrop of fragile democratic institutions.[21]

The main impediments to democratic progress in WB countries are attacks on media freedoms, election irregularities and the overlap of the executive, judiciary and legislative branches (see figure 3 for more details). Other indicators which are not directly related to democracy, that are widespread and impact largely the democratic institutional qualities include grand corruption, clientelistic networks, ethnic and religious divisions, polarization, unresolved conflicts from the past and the interference of undemocratic foreign powers.

Figure 2: Electoral Democracy Index for each country, 1990-2019.

Figure 2 shows that almost every country has experienced democratic erosion, besides North Macedonia and Kosovo, I give a brief overview below. For specific democracy indicators for each country, please check Figure 3.

To start with, democracy in Serbia has struggled since Aleksandar Vučić came to power.  First as deputy minister, then as prime minister and finally as president, he has steadily strengthened his control over the executive, the judiciary, the security services and all media outlets. While one of the most advanced countries in EU membership project, to this day Serbia has not only become more autocratic over the years but is also currently among the leading countries in the world that experienced major human rights violations and restrictions on democratic freedom during the Covid19 pandemic.

The government of Montenegro ruled by a pro-Western leader for more than three decades coined as “one-man” rule has experienced regression in democratic qualities with issues related to judicial institutions and scandals undermining public trust, high profile corruption and deep political and societal cleavages. The results of Montenegro’s election in August 2020 marked an end to Djukanovic’s rule. However, a new government is likely to form between opposition parties that include a radical right-wing party that is pro-Serbian and pro-Russian and could potentially destabilize the whole region.

 On the other hand, Kosovo’s institutions suffer from informal international intervention, contested pluralism within the country, endemic corruption, state capture, and almost a failed judiciary system. Although several democracy indices have praised Kosovo’s election results and the forming of government from opposition-led coalitions and independence of media.[22]This was short-lived (less than two months) and the government was ousted through a no-confidence vote in parliament. Showing that state capture and political corruption are prevalent in almost every institution in the country.

            The main impediments in Bosnia & Hercegovina are the complex decision-making procedures, ethnicity-based veto power, entrenched ethnic divisions and the rise of nationalistic populism. As well as support from international powers for certain ethnic groups like the Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS), which trigger a constant political crisis. While, Albania an official candidate in EU accession is among the most corrupt countries in Europe dealing with massive organized crime issues, challenges to free media and low electoral integrity.

Lastly, North Macedonia is the only country that has shown progress first with the name change from “Republic of Macedonia” to “Republic of North Macedonia” paving the way to NATO accession and EU membership. Over the past years, NM has improved its election quality, media independence, cooperation between government and civil society, however, high-profile corruption, judicial independence and state capture by partisan forces remain key issues. 

It remains an empirical puzzle on how different actors in the region, who pursue opposing policies are impacting the process of democratization in these countries. By disregard of democratic values and empowering of certain political elites, the growing influence of non-democratic actors such as Russia, China and Turkey is likely to have an impact on WB countries ‘weak institutions, but also in altering citizens’ perceptions of democratic ideals. And, we have yet to see if the influence of different international actors will present new alternative models of governance and if democratization will remain the only aspiration in these countries.

Figure 3: V-Dem Indicators For Each Country, 1990-2019

Adea Gafuri is PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Gothenburg University. Sweden. She holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Sabanci University. Her main research interests include democratization, democracy, foreign aid, and political methodology. She works with quantitative and qualitative methods and previously has conducted fieldwork in the countries of the Western Balkans on EU integration and democracy assistance. She is also affiliated with the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) at Gothenburg University.

[1] Adea Gafuri and Meltem Muftuler-Bac. “Caught between Stability and Democracy in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Analysis of Paths of Accession to the European Union.” East European Politics, 1–25, 2020.

[2] Richter Solveig and Natasha Wunsch. “Money, Power, Glory: the Linkages between EU Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans.” Journal of European Public Policy 27:1, 41-62 .2020. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1578815

Florian Bieber. “The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

[3] Varieties of Democracy Report. 2020. “Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows”

[4] Aleksandar Ivković. “Election Day in Serbia: Massive Irregularities Even without True Competition and Uncertainty,” European Western Balkans, 2020.

[5] Mark Galeotti. “Do the Western Balkans Face a Coming Russian Storm?,” ECFR, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/do_the_western_balkans_face_a_coming_russian_storm.

[6] “China’s Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans,” Bertlesmann Stiftung, 2020. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/asia-policy-brief-chinas-economic-footprint-in-the-western-balkans-28c4d775834edcc469f4f737664f79f932d6f9a1.pdf.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Varieties of Democracy Report. 2020. “Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows– “ https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf.

[9] “China’s Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans,” 2020. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/asia-policy-brief-chinas-economic-footprint-in-the-western-balkans-28c4d775834edcc469f4f737664f79f932d6f9a1.pdf.

[10] Igor Todorović. “Protest Held in Serbia’s Smederevo against Pollution from China-Owned Steelworks,” 2020. https://balkangreenenergynews.com/protest-held-in-serbias-smederevo-against-pollution-from-china-owned-steelworks/.

[11] Austin Doehler. “How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans.” 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/how-china-challenges-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/

[12] James Kynge and Valerie Hopkins. “Montenegro Fears China-Backed Highway Will Put It on Road to Ruin,” 2019. https://www-ft-com.newman.richmond.edu/content/d3d56d20-5a8d-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a.

[13] Due to Sri Lanka’s government inability to pay its debt to China, Sri Lanka was forced to allow China to take physical control of one of its port.

[14] Vesko Garcevic. “Russia and China Are Penetrating Balkans at West’s Expense,” 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/08/18/russia-and-china-are-penetrating-balkans-at-wests-expense/.

[15] Nadège Rolland. “Presented at the Power 3.0 Podcast Episodes: The Evolution Of China’s Belt And Road: A Conversation With Nadège Rolland” 2019. https://www.power3point0.org/2019/01/08/the-evolution-of-chinas-belt-and-road-a-conversation-with-nadege-rolland/.

[16] Abdullah Keşvelioğlu. “European Union Challenged: Russia and China in the Western Balkans.” Accessed September 25, 2020. https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/publications/policy-outlook/european-union-challenged-russia-and-china-in-the-western-balkans.

[17] Snezana Bjelotomic. “The Pope and Merkel the Most Popular World Leaders; Putin ‘Wins’ in Serbia,” 2020. https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/the-pope-and-merkel-the-most-popular-world-leaders-putin-wins-in-serbia/.

[18] Simon Tisdall. “Result of Macedonia’s Referendum Is Another Victory for Russia,” 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/01/result-of-macedonia-referendum-is-another-victory-for-russia.

[19] “Between East and West: Public Opinion & Media Disinformation in the Western Balkans.” National Democratic Institute, May 23, 2019. https://www.ndi.org/publications/between-east-and-west-public-opinion-media-disinformation-western-balkans.

[20]Marko Kmezić and Florian Bieber “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion”Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. 2017.

Gafuri, Adea, and Meltem Muftuler-Bac. “Caught between Stability and Democracy in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Analysis of Paths of Accession to the European Union.” East European Politics, 1–25, 2020.

[21] Florian Bieber. “The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

[22] “Freedom in the World” Accessed 2020. from:https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Luhrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Johannes von Römer, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2020. ”V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.

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Democracy cannot be taken for granted. Democracy is complicated, diverse and not guaranteed anywhere. Not in the United States of America, not in the United Kingdom, not in Spain, not in Italy and certainly not in Poland or Hungary. Democracy must be protected everywhere. This is the highlight of Anne Applebaum’s new book “Twilight of Democracy”.

Applebaum brings on modern authoritarian regimes her insights as historian, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Gulag: A History, whichnarrates the history of the Soviet Union concentration camps. She brings also her gravitas as acknowledged journalist who has written for the Economist, Washington Post and the Atlantic.

Differently from most of Applebaum’s previously published work, “Twilight of Democracy” it is a natural blend of political analysis, philosophy and personal stories. What makes the book special is the fact that Anne Applebaum speaks her mind as much as her heart.

The book opens up with Anne and her husband, Radosław Sikorski, throwing a party for their Polish guests and friends who were part of the Polish “intelligentsia”[1], in December 1999, in a village in rural Poland. The book closes with another party hosted by Anne and Radosław in the same village in 2019 but definitely with different guests. In the timeframe of two decades not only politics had changed but also their friends. Many of Anne’s guests and friends in the 1999 party, had shifted their political views from liberalism towards authoritarianism. She is not afraid to name and shame every one of her guests who once were partying with her and now they were ashamed of even admitting the participation in her party. On the other side, Anne admits that “I would now cross the street to avoid some of the people who were at my New Year’s Eve party”. What led Anne’s friends to change their political views from liberalism to authoritarianism? What caused their unpredicted transformation into vocal sympathizer of autocratic regimes?

Applebaum dares to state that “when given the right conditions any society can turn against democracy. Indeed, if history is anything to go by, all of our societies eventually will”. The recent rise of the far-right rhetoric and illiberalism, not only in the “East” but “West” and globally, demonstrates that authoritarianism can easily replace democracy everywhere.

Initially, “Twilight of Democracy” takes place in Poland where the current government of Law and Justice party is known for their conservative ideology, the homophobic agenda and the destruction of media freedom especially in the case of the national television station.

Applebaum discusses the case of Hungary where nepotism, state capture and corruption are clearly visible. In both countries, citizens are being served and fed with conspiracy theories and “Medium size lies”. In Poland, Kaczynski has used the Smolensk tragedy to electrify its followers. Meanwhile, in Hungary, Orban is using “Medium-size lies” such as George Soros and the Muslim migrants and blames them for the problems that the country is having. In the 90s Muslim immigrants coming from former Yugoslavia and Chechnya settled in Hungary and Poland and such settlements have never caused any distress or tension within the societies. Truth is that immigration is an imaginary problem in Hungary and Poland.

Applebaum believes that the promotion of the conspiracy theories and “Medium size lies” by governments has an extraordinary impact on societies beliefs and morale. She dares to question what was the role of Polish state television in the assassination of the Mayor of Gdansk, Pawel Adamowicz? Jo Cox, a member of the British parliament was also murdered by a man who believed that England would be destroyed by brown foreigners. Needless to say, what is happening in Poland or United Kingdom might be some sort of “conspiracy” problem connected with the propaganda apparatus.

Applebaum turns her attention toward the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The British are dealing with Brexit and since the 1960s, as Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State under President Truman said, “has not yet found a role”. The Brexit campaign revived the idea that a world where the UK could make the rules does exits. The British people are to believe they are special, so special that the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has suggested that the coronavirus infection rate is higher in the United Kingdom than in Germany or Italy because Britons love freedom more[2].

The political situation is similar in the United States. Trump’s victory in November 2016 gave end to the common morale of the American people. Americans are more divided than ever thanks to “Medium size lies” that the Trump campaign and then later administration has been fueling into the society. Trump and his advisors have introduced into the political spectrum “another version” of events which are being used to furthermore brainwash the conservative followers into engaging “at least part of the time, with an alternative reality”. Applebaum argues that people have always had different opinions but now it seems that they have different facts.

The ideas of “alternative facts”, “alternative reality” were used by U.S. Counselor to President Trump, Kellyanne Conway during a Meet the Press interview on January 2017. Conway totally fits the description of what Applebaum calls “clercs”. Steve Banon, executive chairman of Breitbart News and former White House’s chief strategist in the administration of President Donald Trump is also a “clerc”. The Brits have their “clercs” such as Neil Farage, leader of the Brexit Party and previously leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Dominic Cummings, chief spin doctor of the Leave campaign and now Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister Johnson. Poles, Hungarians, Spaniards they also have their “clercs” but of course less famous.

The term “clercs” was coined by the French philosopher Julien Benda in the short book “La Trahison des Clercs” from 1927. The “clercs” are intellectuals, writers, television producers, people of influence, spin doctors who help the spread and rise of authoritarianism. The “clercs” are “restorative” nostalgic about the past. According to Applebaum they want the world to be as it has been in the past. They want to behave like their predecessors did and they want to do it now and that is why restorative nostalgia “goes hand in hand with conspiracy theories and “Medium size lies”.

Applebaum observes that “clercs” are in every society and that authoritarianism can cross cultures and borders easily. She is troubled and worried about the future. In the meantime, Applebaum wonders and hopes that the pandemic that we are going through will wake up in us the sense of lost solidarity, but she is also skeptical that the situation might also enforce autocrats in power. In the end, will democracies will be able to defeat authoritarianism and prevail? The answer to the question relies on the future but “we must accept that both futures are possible. No political victory is ever permanent. …”

Ogerta Lala is a communication expert at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw. Previously, she has worked as an anti-money laundering and compliance consultant for Deloitte Warsaw. Ogerta is a graduate of College of Europe and SUNY New Paltz, New York. Her research is mainly focused on anti-money laundering, anti-corruption and transatlantic relations.

[1] Intelligentsia. —Informed intellectual people; the educated or professional group, class, or party; —often derisive.” The Oxford Dictionary defines the term as “That part of a nation that aspires to independent thinking.”

[2] https://www.thelocal.de/20200922/coronavirus-boris-johnson-contrasts-germanys-lower-infection-rate-with-freedom-loving-uk

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Abstract

Social problems take different shapes, depending on the individual, cultural, socio-economic characteristics and political life of a country. Their explanation consists in identifying the actors, factors, processes, situations and mechanisms that generate, shape and increase the purpose and impact of this problem in society. At the same time, it is equally important to consider opposing processes aimed at eliminating or reducing the influence of generating factors and mechanisms. This paper aims to explain the phenomenon of trafficking of human beings from these two dimensions.

Despite the efforts to define human trafficking, there is still no agreement in the international community on how human trafficking should be defined. In addition, the fight against trafficking in human beings is conditioned by the will of states to proactively fight this phenomenon by punishing the perpetrators, reintegrating the victims and drafting policies to prevent the phenomenon.

Globally, 47 countries have not yet recognized human trafficking as a crime in accordance with international standards. Approximately, 100 states have not yet criminalized or punished forced labour.[1]

The paper explores and justifies the background, extent, factors and actors that lead to human trafficking. At the same time, it analyzes the policies, mechanisms and measures taken to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings. Also, it provides ideas and recommendations for further debate and developments in this area.

Keywords: rule of law, human rights, trafficking in human beings, slavery, organised crime

Introduction

Trafficking in human beings is a sad reality where men, women and children remain victims of modern slavery. It constitutes a serious violation of human rights by restricting freedom and endangering the lives and safety of victims. It places the trafficked person in a state of slavery for the purpose of abusing and exploiting him/her. Victims are deceived, sold, bought, abducted and exploited for various purposes such as marriage, work, sale of body organs as well as recruitment to terrorist and organized crime organizations. Many of the products we use in our daily life are obtained through coercion, violence, deception, intimidation and victimization.

The consequences of this crime negatively affect the individual victims, their families, communities as well as the economic stability of a country, the rule of law, human rights and the democracy. Victims of trafficking are isolated from the rest of society. They sever their relationship with family, society and social institutions by limiting their access to services such as health and education.

Trafficking in human beings creates feelings of anxiety, fear, insecurity as well as reduces mutual trust between members of society with each other and with state institutions. Moreover, it hinders the development of the economy by enabling states, organized crime networks, businesses/corporations as well as individuals to maximize their benefits through the exploitation of unpaid (or poorly unpaid) labour.

Despite the efforts of the international community, the fight against trafficking in human beings remains strong on paper but weak in practice. Globally, 47 countries have not yet recognized trafficking in human beings as a crime in line with international standards. Approximately 100 states have not yet criminalized forced labour, but even in cases where they have done so, punishment for perpetrators is accompanied by an administrative measure (fine). Meanwhile, less than a third of states protect women and girls from injury as a result of forced marriage.[2]

Currently, about 40.3 million people worldwide are victims of human trafficking. Seventy-one per cent of people “stuck” in modern slavery are women and 29 per cent are men.[3] About 24.9 million people are in forced labour and 15.4 million of them live in a forced marriage.[4] In the past five years, 89 million people experienced some form of modern slavery for periods of time ranging from a few days to the whole five years.[5]

According to ILO, the income provided by forced labour reaches the figure of approximately US$150 billion per year ($99 billion from commercial sexual exploitation; $34 billion in construction, manufacturing, mining and utilities; $9 billion in agriculture, including forestry and fishing; $8 billion dollars is saved annually by private households that employ domestic workers under conditions of forced labour. Revenue from organ trafficking is estimated to range between US$840 million and US$1.7 billion.[6]

Meanwhile, developed countries are highly exposed to the risk of slavery within support chains. The G20 countries import over US$354 billion worth of ‘at-risk’ products each year, produced in countries where people are subject to forced labour. The US is the largest importer of products at risk (US$144 billion). Data for the US are three times higher than the second-largest importer of the G20, Japan (US$47 billion), followed by Germany with (US$30 billion, the UK with (US$18 billion) and France with (US$16 billion). Products such as laptops, computers and mobile phones represent the largest category of imports at risk with value (US$200 billion), followed by clothing (US$127.7 billion), fisheries (US$12.9 billion), cocoa (US$3.6 billion) and sugar cane (US$2.1 billion). Australia imports over US$4 billion at-risk clothing and accessories provided by slavery in support chains.[7]

Meanwhile, the criminal justice system is powerless to respond to the challenge and dynamics of human trafficking. According to the US State Department, in 2019, 118,932 victims were identified (or 0.27% of the total number of trafficked people) and 11,841 prosecutions were launched which resulted in 9,548 convictions.[8] In Europe, the number of victims identified is 17,383 persons and 2,896 prosecutions launched which resulted in 1,346 convictions.[9] During the period 2014-2017 around 36 per cent of countries have not had any convictions or have recorded less than ten convictions.[10]

In Albania, the Global Slavery Index estimates show that there are about 20,000 victims of modern-day slavery, approximately 6.87 victims per 1,000 inhabitants.[11] During 2019 the Albanian government and NGOs identified 96 potential victims of which only 7 of them received the official status of a victim of trafficking.[12] The Albanian State Police (ASP) investigated 41 cases with 62 suspects. The General Prosecution Office (GPO) investigated 25 new cases with 14 defendants for adult trafficking and child trafficking. GPO prosecuted 3 cases with 3 defendants. Courts convicted 5 traffickers.[13] These data show that the efforts of the Albanian government to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings as well as to identify, protect and reintegrate its victims are far from being considered successful.

In 2019, the G20 leaders committed to promoting due diligence on human rights in corporate operations and supply chains in line with internationally recognized standards, such as the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). However, efforts made by the international community have not yet provided a realistic assessment of the extent of the phenomenon. The G20 countries are still far from formalizing laws or policies that prevent businesses from providing services and products provided by forced / slave labour. More than half of them have not yet formally adopted laws, policies or practices aimed at barring business and government resources from products and services produced by forced labour.[14]

The above data show that the international community as well as the Albanian state will not be able to achieve SDG target 8.7 to eradicate human trafficking by 2030. If we want to eradicate modern slavery by 2030, we must liberate 10,000 victims every day. Similarly, referring to data on human trafficking in Albania, 5 victims per day will have to be identified and rescued in order to eradicate modern slavery. These forecasts are relevant as long as the number of victims of trafficking remains unchanged.

Problem definition

The purpose of the fight against trafficking in human beings is to prevent its impact on the lives of people and society (locally and globally), to punish the perpetrators, reintegrate the victims and eliminate the factors and actors that make people vulnerable to exploitation.

Understood as a principle according to which laws have ultimate authority over the actions of all individuals (including government representatives) and that governmental authority is exercised only in accordance with publicly disclosed laws and regulations and is subject to the normal controls of an independent judiciary, the rule of law is a prerequisite for a comprehensive approach to understanding and responding to trafficking in human beings (preventing and combating the phenomenon as well as identifying, protecting and reintegrating victims of trafficking).

The penal approach is not sufficient in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. Often, it is undermined by corruption, legal loopholes, law enforcement incompetence as well as the interaction between state actors with organized crime and business, making individuals and societies more vulnerable to trafficking, enslavement and exploitation.

The paper aims to give an understanding of human trafficking from a perspective of human rights and the rule of law, in the Albanian context. It explores the Albanian state’s approach to trafficking in human beings and its consequences both in the context of preventing and combating the phenomenon and in promoting, supporting or spreading it.

Thus, this paper provides an overview of human trafficking, its extent, factors and actors involved in this crime. It highlights the source of the state’s liabilities and explains how the state is legally responsible for the spread of the phenomenon and the harm caused by it, although this may not be a direct intent. It supports the approach that the protection of human rights and the promotion of the rule of law are the most effective strategies for preventing and combating trafficking and exploitation.

Trafficking in human beings as a problem related to human rights and the rule of law

International law recognizes trafficking in human beings as a crime against human rights. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (art. 6) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 35)—contain a substantive reference to trafficking. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the European Union Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, identify trafficking as a violation of human rights. The United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have repeatedly affirmed that trafficking violates and impairs fundamental human rights, as have many of the international human rights mechanisms.

The Declaration adopted on 24 September 2012 by the United Nations General Assembly at the High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels reaffirmed that “human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations”.[15]

The rule of law is not just an instrument for establishing and enforcing the law in the interest of society as a whole. At the same time, the rule of law is the key to guaranteeing and developing democracy and good governance.[16] The UNDP recognises the rule of law as “the centre of the relationship between society and the state. Measures to establish or strengthen the rule of law are the basis for creating accountability among people as well as between citizens and their governments”.[17]

Effective rule of law reduces corruption, combats poverty and disease, and protects people from injustices. It is the foundation for communities of justice, opportunity, and peace—underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights. Traditionally, the rule of law has been viewed as the domain of lawyers and judges. But everyday issues of safety, rights, justice, and governance affect us all; everyone is a stakeholder in the rule of law.[18]

There are several ways to explain the link between human rights and the prevention and fight against trafficking in human beings.

Slavery and trafficking in human beings go against human nature. In this context, the possession of one or more people for purposes of exploitation by individuals, groups or states is considered not only illegal but also amoral.

Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, politics, sexual orientation, exposes individuals to trafficking and makes victims of trafficking invisible to law enforcement, policymakers, service providers, and researchers.

Also, the concept of human rights and the rule of law is of particular importance in understanding the efforts of states and the international community in the fight against trafficking in human beings (including preventing and combating the phenomenon as well as identifying, protecting and reintegrating of victims of trafficking). Such an approach enables the identification of discriminatory practices as well as the unequal distribution of power which favour trafficking, prevent the perpetrators from being punished, and deny justice to victims. In this context, the fight against trafficking in human beings is closely linked to the situation of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

In democratic societies, human rights and the rule of law aimed at achieving equality or a set of equal rights for all. They prohibit illegal detention, forced labour, debt bondage, forced marriage as well as the sexual exploitation of women and children. At the same time, they give priority to freedom of movement and the right to leave and return to one’s country.

Thus, the rule of law and human rights are two closely related concepts guided by the same principle, the freedom to live with dignity: all human beings have the right to be treated with dignity and respect (para. 27). Their common goal is: to protect the life, health and dignity of the people. This relationship has been known since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that it is essential “if a man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”.[19]

The rule of law is the key instrument that protects and promotes human rights by giving people the opportunity to enjoy them and thus live with dignity and respect. This principle, of freedom to live with dignity, is also the basis of the international human rights framework, in accordance with the international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law. The rule of law provides a structure through which the exercise of power is subjected to agreed rules, guaranteeing the protection of all human rights (United Nations). It enables the implementation of human rights mechanisms, turning them from principles into reality.

According to the United Nation Organisation, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Also, it requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.[20]

World Justice Project uses two principles to assess the rule of law:

The first principle measures whether the law imposes limits on the exercise of power by the state and its agents, as well as individuals and private entities.

The second principle measures whether the state limits the actions of members of society and fulfils its basic duties toward its population so that the public interest is served, people are protected from violence, and all members of society have access to dispute settlement and grievance mechanisms.[21]

The World Justice Project defines the rule of law as a durable system of laws, institutions, norms, and community commitment that delivers:

• Accountability: The government, as well as private actors, are accountable under the law
• Just Laws: The laws are clear, publicized, and stable; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and contract, property, and human rights.
• Open Government: The processes by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient.
• Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution: Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.[22]

Efforts of the international community in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings

The year 2000 represents a significant moment on the commitment of the international community in the fight against Trafficking in Human Beings. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000 (the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000) represents one of the key documents drafted in the fight against trafficking in human beings. From it arose the Protocols and Conventions which required States parties not only to sign them but also to make them part of their domestic legislation.

One of the purposes of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Trafficking in Persons Protocol, is to protect and assist victims of trafficking, in respect of full of human rights (Art. 2 (b)). The protocol sets out specific standards of assistance and protection for victims of trafficking for their physical, psychological and social recovery (e.g. housing; counselling; medical, psychological and material assistance; employment; educational and training opportunities; availability of residence permits; facilitation of repatriation and non-liability).

Meanwhile, the European Union is strongly committed to preventing and combating trafficking in human beings as well as protecting its victims. To address trafficking in human beings the EU has put in place a comprehensive, gender-specific and victim-centred legal and policy framework, namely the Directive 2011/36 / EU on combating and preventing trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims as well as the EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings for the period 2012-2016.[23] It establishes robust provisions on victim’s protection, assistance and support, but also on prevention and prosecution of the crime.[24]

At the same time, EU recognises trafficking in human beings as: as a priority crime threat area in the EU Policy on Organised and Serious International Crime 2014-2017 and the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2017. To this effect, a European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT THB) has been developed to focus on trafficking in human beings. Under EMPACT THB a multi-annual strategic plan and an annual operational action plan are developed and implemented for the whole policy cycle.[25]

In 2012, the United Nations Conference in Rio de Janeiro adopted the Sustainable Development Goals as an instrument to set a universal goal of helping to meet the environmental, political and economic challenges of society worldwide. Also, the focus of this document is the fight against human trafficking, modern slavery and the reduction of unemployment on a global scale. The objective 8.7 of this document states: “Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.”[26]

The approach of the Albanian state to human trafficking

Albania has been part of international conventions for the fight against trafficking in human beings since the beginning of its formation as a state. Thus, aiming to put an end to what was called “white trade”, two conferences were held in Paris in 1902 and 1910, respectively, which were finalized with the signing of the International Convention on the Suppression of White-Slave Trafficking (Paris, 4 May 1910), accompanied by the International Convention on the Suppression of the Trafficking in Women and Children (September 30, 1921) and the International Convention on the Suppression of the Trafficking in Older Women (Geneva, October 11, 1933). These conventions were also signed by the Albanian governments of that time:

• The International Convention on the Suppression of the Trafficking in Women and Children signed on October 13, 1924 (signed by the government of Fan Noli); and
• The International Convention on the Suppression of Trafficking in Older Women, Geneva, 11 October 1933, (signed by the government of King Ahmet Zog).

The Convention on the Suppression of the Trafficking in Persons and of the Exploitation of Others for Prostitution (New York, 2 December 1949) repealed and partially replaced the measures of previous international instruments. This convention was not signed by the Albanian government of that time claiming that:

“Thanks to the conditions created by the popular democratic regime in Albania, the violations covered by this Convention do not find suitable ground for development, given that the social conditions that give rise to these crimes have been eliminated. However, taking into account the importance of the campaign against these criminal offences in the countries where they still exist and the international importance of this campaign, the People’s Republic of Albania has decided to accede to the Convention on the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Exploitation of Others for Prostitution, Adopted on December 2, 1949, at the Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.”

Legislation drafted during the communist regime did not criminalize trafficking. For the most part, there was a law banning prostitution. With the change of the political system, the Albanian state faced the lack of adequate legislation to recognize the phenomenon of trafficking as well as to prevent and fight it effectively. The Criminal Code adopted in 1995 was a very weak tool to identify, combat and prevent the phenomenon.

In 2001, trafficking was defined as a criminal offence in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, provided in Law 8733 date 24.01.2001 with the following crimes:

Trafficking in human beings, article 110/a;

Trafficking in women for prostitution, Article 114/b;

Child trafficking, Article 128/b.

From 2001 onwards, the Albanian state drafted a series of strategies aimed at preventing and combating trafficking as well as the identification, protection and reintegration of victims, such as:

The National Anti-Trafficking Strategy 2001-2004;

The National Action Plan 2003-2004;

The Albanian National Strategy for the Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings. Strategic Framework and National Action Plan 2005-2007;

The Anti-Trafficking Strategy and Action Plan 2014-2017.

Also, the Albanian government signed different agreements, convents and protocols, such as:

“United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” and its two additional protocols:

• “Protocol against the Traffic of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea” and
• “Protocol to prevent, deter and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children”.
• UN Protocol on the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Minors 2000.[27]

Currently, in its efforts to integrate into the family of the European Union, Albania must meet 15 conditions where at least two of them are closely related to the fight against trafficking in human beings:

• Judicial reform
• Tangible and sustainable achievements in fighting corruption and organized crime at all levels, including the initiation and conclusion of judicial proceedings against high functionaries and politicians.[28]

Limitations of understanding human trafficking in Albania

Data from Albania show that trafficking in human beings is mostly discussed in terms of trafficking in women and children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The following is a picture of the main views dominating the discourse on trafficking in human beings in Albania.

Firstly, trafficking in human beings is a new phenomenon for Albanian society, which emerged after the fall of the communist regime;

Secondly, trafficking in human beings is a phenomenon related to the Albanian tradition;

Thirdly, trafficking is a prostitution-related phenomenon;

Fourthly, trafficking is a phenomenon that affects only children and women;

Fifthly, trafficking necessarily involves the transfer of the victim.

The claim that the Albanian state created the appropriate social conditions to end trafficking in human beings and the belief that it (the Albanian state) achieved this goal, continues to dominate in today’s literature. “In the studies of some Albanian authors, to whom we have referred, it has been asserted that in Albania “there is no history” of trafficking for the purpose of prostitution or other forms of exploitation for financial gain. At least it is not a typical Albanian phenomenon”.[29]

The advent of the communist regime in Albania (1944-45) ended the period of professional prostitution created during that time. But it, similarly, did not allow trafficking in women, adolescents or human beings in general. Even the fight against this type of trafficking (“wound of capitalism”) was considered part of the class war, while trafficked persons, drug addicts, prostitutes, etc …, were considered “a waste of society”.[30]

“The communist regime prevented trafficking” in its own way “, even without anti-trafficking laws”.[31]

A similar narrative is provided in the “National Strategy Against Child Trafficking and Child Protection Victims of Trafficking 2005-2007”. The introductory part of the strategy states that:

“Over the last decade, Albania has gone through a difficult and complex transition process, which has been accompanied by unemployment and poverty, previously unforeseen, uncontrolled demographic movements inside and outside the country and a new phenomenon, as a result of these changes. Initially, mass movements and departures to the West were made as a result of changing the political system, the need to open borders and a better life. Thus, by early 1992 there were massive outflows to the West, mainly to Greece and Italy, as the two closest countries. After 1992, after this mass emigration, criminal and corrupt elements began to create illegal trafficking routes, from where they secured huge profits. At this stage began the criminal activity of trafficking in human beings, including trafficking in women and children for the purpose of exploitation, a profoundly negative phenomenon in Albanian society, bringing huge profits to traffickers.[32]

Also, the report “Monitoring the print media for trafficking in women and girls” states that:

“Trafficking in human beings and, in particular, trafficking in women and girls is an accompanying problem of the post-communist transition in Albania.”[33]

These views have failed to accurately assess the policies and practices pursued by the communist regime which led to the enslavement of Albanian citizens.

Firstly, the authors offer a contradictory view of the trafficking in human beings as they initially claim that trafficking for the purpose of exploitation for prostitution or other purposes of exploitation “has no history” as “it has not been a typical Albanian phenomenon.” They then estimate that: “the arrival of the communist regime in Albania (1944-45), ended the period of professional prostitution created during that time”, implying, in this way, that there has been an extension of the phenomenon in Albania.

Secondly, the authors treat trafficking in terms of the movement of victims from within the country abroad or vice-versa by overshadowing (leaving) trafficking (slavery) within the country. They also appreciate the work of the communist state in preventing trafficking in human beings for the purpose of exploitation for prostitution by excluding other forms of slavery such as forced labour in labour camps or prisons.

Thirdly, the claim that the regime prevented trafficking “in its own way, even without anti-trafficking law” is incorrect. In the absence of a law defining trafficking, it is difficult to recognize similar practices.

Fourthly, data and studies show that both men, women and children were trafficked during the communist era in Albania. They prove that slavery was a normal (institutionalized) practice under the communism. Labour and internment camps are one form of how the so-called enemies of the people and “ordinary criminals” were enslaved, isolated and/or exploited by the communist regime. They (labour camps) were built in areas with significant economic resources and the main purpose of setting them up was to exploit labour and punish opponents of the system. Also, the internment process was based on the legislation of that time. Article 21 of the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of Albania (1959) defined internment as: “the removal of a convict from his country and the obligation to stay in a certain place with or without corrective labour. “Internment is granted for a period of up to 10 years.”

In these labour camps, the convicts were forced to work in slave labour, in miserable conditions. As the following Amnesty International (AI) 1982 report states:

“Political prisoners have also been held in other prisons, such as Burrel and employed in labour camps in different parts of the country, to build factories and residential buildings, as well as to build drainage canals and mines. Under Decree no. 5912 of 1979 people may, formally, be interned or barred from moving, without trial (contrary to Article 56 of the constitution), for an indefinite period. This measure can be used against “family members of a fugitive living abroad” – which serves as a punitive measure against people who, themselves, have not necessarily violated Albanian law”.[34]

Meanwhile, referring to the Amnesty International Report 1956-1957:

“Conditions in prisons and concentration camps are reported to be very poor, with medical assistance completely inadequate. Amnesty International has identified 31 labour camps and prisons in Albania, although such data should not be seen as completely accurate (comprehensive). The number of prisoners in each of the labour camps should be around 1,500 and according to Amnesty International, some of these camps have only political and religious prisoners. “Many political prisoners are employed in industrial jobs, such as copper….”.[35]

The convicts in these camps were of different age groups including children, adults and the elderly who were forced to live in slavery conditions and performed hard labour in extreme conditions.

Another limitation on understanding human trafficking refers to the tendency to treat it as a phenomenon related to traditions (Albanian culture). According to this approach, trafficking is closely linked to the Kanun. According to Kara: “in countries where marriage is the only way for a woman to secure social acceptance, basic rights and avoid perpetual persecution, fictitious marriages are particularly effective in securing slaves in rural Albania. The gender rules of the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini make life extremely difficult for unmarried women.[36] He also emphasizes that “the aggressive submission of the Kanun to women as well as the strict laws of personal honour and blood feuds are two of the main contributors to the slave trade crisis in Albania”.[37] These approaches place significant limitations on understanding the phenomenon (focusing on prostitution), creating stereotypes about victims and perpetrators of trafficking (treating women as victims, and men as traffickers), and overshadowing other forms of trafficking (eg labour exploitation).

Firstly, the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini does not apply in rural Albania but in some areas of northern Albania (urban or rural). Also, the data show that most of the trafficked girls come from the area where the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini does not apply. Referring to the Different and Equal Report 2012: 48% of trafficking cases came from urban areas while 52% of cases came from rural areas. The areas with the highest number of cases are Tirana, Durrës and Berat.[38]

Secondly, Kara offers an over-generalization when he states that: “many parents in Albania sell their children to employment agents even though they know the risks”.[39] In his assertion, he offers no convincing evidence. Above all, it does not provide a description of the background (characteristics) of these parents as well as the agencies (their ways of acting) which buy and traffic these victims.

Issues related to the prevention and fight against trafficking as well as the identification, protection and reintegration of victims

The identification, protection and reintegration of victims of trafficking is an essential issue for their well-being, recovery and rehabilitation as well as for the prevention and fight against the phenomenon. Inadequate identification of victims has serious consequences for the victim such as re-exposure to trafficking, further exploitation as well as an unsafe environment. Unidentified victims are exposed to further traumatic experiences (eg homelessness, abortion, alcohol and drug addiction, disability, involvement in criminal activity and mental disorders) which have long-term effects on their life.

Informal economy. Trafficking in human beings is characterized by labour exploitation, disrespect for workers’ rights, non-payment or under-payment as well as lack of work safety.

In 2004, the Albanian Ombudsman raised concerns about workers’ rights violation: “as the unemployment rate is very high and consequently people are willing to work in the black, the violation of workers’ rights is becoming more and more common. There are a relatively large number of employers who do not register their employees and, as a result, do not pay social security. In these cases, employees also receive a lower payment than the minimum wage provided by law. Poor working conditions are also a worrying problem. There have been some cases of injuries or deaths as a result of employers not providing safe working conditions for their employees”.[40]

These issues are still relevant. Thus, only during the first 9 months of 2019, the labour inspectors conducted 10042 inspections identifying 2565 informal employees of which 882 were women, 237 employees under 18 years of which 81 were women and 903 foreign employees of whom 18 were without work permits.[41] At the same time, the above data do not help us to understand the real extent of the problem, due to the fact that the total number of businesses inspections by labour inspectors is very low when considering the total number of registered businesses nationwide that is about 162,342.[42]

Another problem is that of migrant workers. IOM states that: “State institutions and agencies rarely address the rights of migrant workers in Albania. Also, the legal and institutional framework on migrant workers’ rights is not supported by human capacities in addressing these issues… Police and law enforcement officials are not fully aware of the requirements and flow management standards migration, the rights of migrant workers and in particular migrant women. Migration issues are mainly addressed by central government institutions. Local government is almost not involved in treating, guaranteeing, supporting or monitoring the rights of migrant workers. The worker’s unions in the country have not shown any particular interest in protecting them. The most critical institutional gap is the fact that in Albania there are no state institutions to collect, analyze, monitor, or inform about respecting or violation of migrants’ rights”.[43]

According to IOM: “Currently Albania does not have any operational mechanism for collecting information on the implementation of migrants’ rights in the country. All institutions that are thought to be involved in the implementation of migrants ‘rights or the fight against the violation of migrants’ rights (State Labor Inspectorate, General Directorate of Border and Migration, Prosecution, Courts, Trade Unions, Ombudsman) have not regularly collected information on the implementation (violation) of migrants’ rights. Consequently, none of these institutions has been able to provide detailed information on these issues”.[44]

Also, the US Department of State Report on Trafficking in Person has raised several issues related to the work of labour inspectorate and victim’s identification:

• The government lacked screening efforts for vulnerable populations—particularly migrants, asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, and children—and authorities did not consistently participate in mobile victim identification units.[45]
• The government did not make efforts to regulate or punish labour recruiters for illegal practices that increased migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation abroad. Labour inspectors did not have the authority to inspect informal work activities, including unregistered businesses.[46] Also, in 2016 the US Department revealed that: 28 out of 47 employment agencies in Albania, were legal operators.[47]
• The Labor Inspectorate lacked the training to identify victims of forced labour, and identification of forced begging remained inadequate, particularly among unaccompanied children, street children, and children crossing borders for begging.[48]

Prosecution. Punishing perpetrators is an important aspect of preventing and combating trafficking. At the same time, it enables the early identification of victims as well as ensuring justice for them. According to the US State Department Report, there are a number of issues that hinder the effectiveness of criminal justice:

• The low number of sentences. During 2018-2019, the Albanian government convicted five traffickers of human beings (the lowest number since 2014).
• Lack of experience and capacity of district prosecutors to combat the phenomenon. District courts prosecuted trafficking cases without an organized crime nexus. District prosecutors did not have the specialized experience and capacity to prosecute trafficking cases successfully.
• Confusion between overlapping elements of exploitation of prostitution and trafficking and at times applied the lesser charge because it required less specialization and time, or due to the false belief that trafficking crimes required a transnational element.
• Limited resources and constant turnover within law enforcement.
• The absence of any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking offences. For instance, in 2015 the US Department revealed that: A Member of Parliament has previously been convicted of trafficking-related crimes.[49]

Victims protection. Poor state funding indicates that there is a lack of emphasis on political will to enable and providing quality protection to victims.

Financimimi i dobët nga ana e shtetit tregon se ka mungesë të theksuar të vullnetit politik për të mundësuar ofrimin e shërbimeve cilësore për viktimat.

The US Department of State Report Trafficking in Person shows that the Albanian government: did not consistently apply a victim-centred approach in investigations and prosecutions. In previous years, law enforcement did not consistently offer sufficient security and support, and victims and their families received threats during court proceedings.

The government did not transfer resources to a fund of seized criminal assets for victim support services in 2018 or 2019.

Also, the report states that: NGO-run shelters continued to operate under financial constraints and relied on outside sources for operating costs. Additionally, funding delays hindered shelter operations. Municipality grants prioritized NGOs that provided local assistance rather than the national scope needed for trafficking shelters, and experts alleged solicitation and bidding procedures at the municipal level were rife with corruption.

The government continued to delay funding for NGO-run shelters, and social services lacked resources for long-term care and reintegration efforts, particularly for child victims and victims with children. For example, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection did not approve funds for the government-run shelter to hire a part-time teacher for victims unable to attend school. Similarly, the government provided free textbooks to children in “social-economic difficulties,” but the definition of that phrase did not explicitly include trafficking victims, and some regional directorates of the Ministry of Education used that omission to exclude child victims from receiving free textbooks.

The government lacked screening efforts for vulnerable populations—particularly migrants, asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, and children—and authorities did not consistently participate in mobile victim identification units.[50]

Lack of research on trafficking in human beings. There is a lack of support from the Albanian government to fund research in order to assess the spread of the phenomenon as well as other aspects related to trafficking.

Punishing victims of trafficking. In Albania, victims have been arrested and convicted of crimes committed under the trafficking situation. According to the US Department of State Report: the government prosecuted two victims and punished one victim for illegal acts committed as a result of being trafficked, although the law exempts victims from punishment for acts committed in these circumstances.[51]

CONCLUSIONS

Trafficking in human beings constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights. This puts the state at the centre of the problem as well as makes it necessary to study the phenomenon from a human rights and rule of law perspective.

High levels of corruption hamper the fight against traffickers in human beings, weak criminal processes (which lead to impunity for perpetrators), poor research on trafficking, and a lack of capacity and professionalism to identify victims, as well as legal loopholes. among the key factors hindering the fight against trafficking as well as the identification, protection and reintegration of victims.

Strategies and policies to combat trafficking in human beings will be successful if they are guided by the principles of the rule of law and centred on the protection of victims’ rights and access to justice and the restoration of human dignity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Counting the culture of impunity by bringing to justice all perpetrators, including officials involved in crime.
2. Support and finance research work and improve data collection.
3. Increase institutional capacity in order to respond as well as possible to trafficking in human beings.
4. Increasing the access of victims to justice, by providing identification, protection and training for more successful integration in society. At the same time, victims should be provided with access to compensation.
5. Ongoing funding for service providers.

Ervin Muço is a Social Worker graduated at the University of Tirana. In 2018 he completed his PhD studies on Social Work, in the field of human trafficking. His field of research include: human trafficking, gender, domestic violence and organized crime. His research work is guided by the passion to develop critical thinking as well as to offer solutions to various social problems. He is the author of two books as well as a series of scientific articles in the field of Trafficking of Human beings. Also, he has participated in a number of conferences and projects at national and international levels. Recently he was selected by OSCE as an expert for the: “Research Expert to write a paper on a topic related to Criminology”. Ervin is a member of IASSW (International Association of Schools of Social Work).

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[1] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[2] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[3] Global estimates of modern slavery: Forced labour and forced marriage International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva, 2017 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf>

[4] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[5] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[6] May, C 2017, Transnational Crime and the Developing World, Global Financial Integrity, p. 29. <Available from: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf.> accessed 20 September 2020.

[7] Claire Press. “Fashion identified as one of five key industries implicated in modern slavery,” in Vogue Australia, 2018. https://www.vogue.com.au/fashion/news/fashion-identified-as-one-of-five-key-industries-implicated-in-modern-slavery/news-story/4cbd8bdc1168f3925bc8cbc96b1f6e6e

[8] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 43 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[9] Ibid, p. 43.

[10] United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), ‘Global Report on Trafficking in Persons’ (United Nations 2018) <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[11] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[12] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 58 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[13] Ibid, p. 58.

[14] Global Slavery Index 2019. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2019/findings/foreword/ accessed 20 September 2020

[15] See para. 5 in “Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels” (A/67/L.1), 19 September 2012, available athttp://unrol.org/files/Official%20Draft%20Resolution.pdf.

[16] The “rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies”, 23 August 2004 (S/2004/616), para. 6, recalled in “Delivering justice: the programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels”, 16 March 2012 (A/66/749), para. 2, <available at http://www.unrol.org/files/SGreport%20eng%20A_66_749.pdf>, accessed 20 September 2020.

[17] “Rule of Law Annual Report 2016”, UNDP. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/access_to_justiceandruleoflaw/rule-of-law-annual-report-2016/ accessed 20 September 2020.

[18] World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020. <https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf> accessed 20 September 2020, p. 9.

[19] https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/#:~:text=The%20rule%20of%20law%20is%20the%20implementation%20mechanism%20for%20human,a%20principle%20into%20a%20reality.&text=The%20rule%20of%20law%20and,an%20indivisible%20and%20intrinsic%20relationship accessed 20 September 2020

[20] https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ accessed 20 September 2020

[21] World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020. <https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf> accessed 20 September 2020, p. 9.

[22] World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020. <https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf> accessed 20 September 2020, pp. 9-10.

[23] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-human-beings_en

[24] Ibid.

[25] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-human-beings_en

[26] https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8

[27] Ministria e Brendshme. Raport Vlerësimi për Zbatimin e Strategjisë Kombëtare Kundër Trafikimit të Qenieve Njerëzore 2005-2007, Tiranē, 2008.

[28] Tobias Ruettershof. “The Opening of Accession Negotiations: A New Hope for Albania,” Tirana Observatory, 2020. https://tiranaobservatory.com/2020/05/08/the-opening-of-accession-negotiations-a-new-hope-for-albania/

[29] Lekë Sokoli dhe Ilir Gëdeshi. Trafikimi Rasti i Shqipërisë. Tiranë, 2006. Instituti i Sociologjisë, p. 20.

[30] Ibid, p. 23.

[31] Ibid, 23.

[32] Ministria e Brendshme. Raport Vlerësimi për Zbatimin e Strategjisë Kombëtare Kundër Trafikimit të Qenieve Njerëzore 2005-2007, Tiranē, 2008.

[33] UN Women. Raport, Monitorimi i shtypit të shkruar për trafikimin e grave dhe vajzave, 2014, p. 10. <https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20eca/attachments/publications/country/albania/printed%20media%20monitoring%20on%20trafficking%20of%20women%20and%20girls%20-%20final.pdf?la=en&vs=1308> accessed 20 September 2020.

[34] The Amnesty International Report 1982. Amnesty International Publications. United Kingdom, pp. 256-258.  <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000041982ENGLISH.PDF>  accessed 20 September 2020.

[35] The Amnesty International Report, 1 June 1975-31 May 1976. (1976). Amnesty International Publications. London, pp. 156-157. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000011976ENGLISH.PD> accessed 20 September 2020.

[36] Siddharth Kara. Sex trafficking. Inside the Business of Modern Slavery. New York, 2009. Columbia University Press, p. 7.

[37] Ibid, 130.

[38] Different and Equal. Study on the socio-economic reintegration of victims of trafficking in Albania 2012, pp. 5-9. <http://www.stopvaw.org/uploads/study_on_social_economic_reintegration_-d_e.pdf> Accessed 16 September 2020.

[39] Siddharth Kara. Sex trafficking. Inside the Business of Modern Slavery. New York, 2009. Columbia University Press, 148.

[40] OSCE. (2004). Raport në Këshillin e Përhershëm Ambasadori Osmo Lipponen, Kryetar i Prezencës, p. 12. <http://www.osce.org/sq/albania/38064?download=true> accessed 16 September 2020.

[41] Inspektoriati i Punës. Analizë Statistikore e Treguesve të Inspektimit, 2019, pp. 7-8 <Analizë Statistikore e Treguesve të Inspektimit> Accessed 24 September 2020.

[42] http://www.instat.gov.al/en/themes/industry-trade-and-services/business-register/publication/2020/press-release-business-register-2019/ accessed 24 September 2020.

[43] IOM. (2016). Vlerësim për mbrojtjen e të drejtave të punëtorëve migrantë në Shqipëri. Albania, p. 33.

[44] Ibid, p. 39.

[45] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 69 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[46] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 69 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[47] US Department of State. (2016). Trafficking in Persons Report. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258876.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[48] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 69 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[49] US Department of State, Trafficking in Person. Country Narratives, 2015 < https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[50] US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, p. 69 <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

[51] US Department of State. (2017). Trafficking in Person. Country Narratives. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271341.pdf> accessed 16 September 2020.

The post Human Rights, Rule of Law and Trafficking in Human Beings appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

While COVID-19 quickly spread around the globe and the term ‘pandemic’ opened news programs ranging from CNN to small local stations in virtually every town, citizens soon understood that, besides the unknown threatening virus, they had to face another ‘virus’, that of fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories. Thus, along with the term ‘pandemic’, the World Health Organization coined the new term, ‘infodemics’.

On the other hand, locked in their homes, politicians, journalists, researchers and strategists reflected and still continue to reflect on what impact the pandemic has on the current world, but also on our future. The concern on how the pandemic will reconfigure international relations and the current world order led to the term ‘geopolitics of pandemics’ to become another buzzword in this context.

Both these aspects, infodemics and coronavirus geopolitics, affected the Balkans and Albania and became objects of debate and discussion, oftentimes heated. These are two aspects this essay wants to examine. First, the reach of disinformation and conspiracy theories in a country as small as Albania is worth analyzing. Second, but not any less important, are the geopolitical games ongoing in the Balkans as a result of this crisis.

Conspiracy theories have always been present among us in order to explain what was deemed to be ‘unexplainable’; however, COVID-19 has brought them to the forefront with such a magnitude that one could not help but wonder what was real news and what was not. While practically every country has dealt with its own issues in reporting numbers of infections and deaths (understandable, due to different methods of testing and other causes of death exacerbated by the coronavirus), we have also had to face the rise of rather odd theories about the origins, spread, and cure of COVID-19. Disinformation, on the other hand, has never been stronger.

The European External Action Service’s report on COVID-19 related disinformation in Europe, including in the Balkans, was widely cited in Albanian media outlets. Interestingly, however, Albania was subject to the least amount of pro-Russian and pro-Chinese disinformation when compared to other European countries, even within the Western Balkans, as per the EEAS report.

In any case, it should be said that a part of Albanian media were not able to avoid what was deemed the Chinese propagandistic offensive towards the world, in order to present itself as the model to face COVID-19, which for some also market the triumph of the Chinese authoritarian model over the Western liberal model. Likewise, there has not been a lack of publications by RT or Sputnik, which echo fake news and conspiracies according to which COVID-19 was created in American laboratories, and especially what Kremlin propaganda considers as the failure of Western countries to face the pandemic. Furthermore, the numerous publications that present Turkey as the best model when facing the crisis at the global level have also been present in Albanian media. Finally, Iranian sources and anti-Western conspiracies coming from Tehran have not been absent either, having been published in a small number of portals and then spread through social media.

It may not be a mistake to say that there is a clear link between disinformation sources, who, as a rule, are from those countries considered as ‘third actors’ in the Balkans, and regional geopolitics, which currently presents a clash between these ‘third actors’ and the democratic West in our region. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that it would be a mistake to reduce the infodemic phenomenon solely as a threat coming from third actors. Fake news and disinformation factories (as will be seen below) work at a high rate of productivity even in the West, from the U.S. to France, from Italy to Germany, where radical extremist groups spread conspiracy theories that reach our soil.

One of the main conspiracy theories around COVID-19 has been the purported link between 5G technology and the spread of the virus. According to the proponents of this theory, there are several possible links: COVID-19 is masking the health risks that 5G technology presents; 5G networks weaken immune systems; or the coronavirus is using network waves to communicate with and choose its victims.

Another conspiracy theory that reverberated in Albanian media was the “Bill Gates ploy”. Doctors Shiva Ayyadurai and Rashid Buttar, most notably, spread the theory that the ‘Deep State’, which allegedly includes the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Mark Zuckerberg, Hilary Clinton, and even Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), himself, is plotting with United Nations elites in order to instill fear towards the virus, destroy the global economy, and promote Big Pharma. This goes hand-in-hand with another theory, which says that Bill Gates, being the second largest benefactor for the World Health Organization, has an interest in pushing for a vaccination agenda in order to achieve population control through the implantation of a microchip-like-vaccine.

The US-China blame game on the issue of how the virus was first spread did not go unnoticed by Albanian media either. The mutual accusations of creating a biological weapon between the two superpowers were also echoed by Iranian news republished in the media. Iran joined Russia and China in the allegations that the US created the virus to use as a bio-weapon against these states.

Furthermore, there have been conspiracy theories originating from the other side of the Adriatic Sea, where the virus most affected Europe. A story that first appeared in Italian television in 2015, in TV program TGR Leonardo, rapidly circulated among both Italian and Albanian media. The story presented a ‘supervirus’ “which was being created by Chinese scientists, would largely affect the lungs, and was being generated through the crossing of the SARS virus and bat and mice cells.” The video story was debunked by Italian daily La Repubblica, but that did not stop it from circulating, even being referenced by former Vice-Prime Minister Matteo Salvini.

While the conspiracy theories above have been imported from Western media, there has not been a lack of local theories. An Albanian doctor of main Tirana hospital stated on a Facebook post that the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone wildfires of April 2020 were not accidental, arguing that the fire raised radioactivity levels. Radioactivity has been proven to destroy viruses, and the doctor’s argument follows that the fires may have been set deliberately to prevent the virus from spreading, which could explain the low number of infections in Eastern Europe, and, more generally, the areas that were affected in the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Another explanation comes from conspiracy theorist Alfred Cako, who declared that COVID-19 is a biological weapon spread by the “White Brotherhood”, a result of a battle between US President Donald Trump and the Illuminati. He was the organizer of two protests in the capital against mandatory vaccination for COVID-19.

Disinformation and conspiracy theories related to the pandemic are neither a new nor a passing phenomenon. They are part of the post-truth era we are living in. Their impact in the democratic process is serious. As Florian Bieber writes, “conspiracy theories are poisonous for democracies, as they both thrive on weak trust and a sense of powerlessness and reinforce it…” In this sense, “the pandemic might very well strengthen politics of fear, paranoia, and distrust to the severe disadvantage of democracy, including those in the Western Balkans.”

***

While the disinformation and conspiracy theories surrounding COVID-19 are an impactful phenomenon that consolidated itself with the outbreak of this pandemic, its implications are far larger than just ‘fake news’ versus ‘real news’.

The already tense relations between the US and China have been exacerbated by the mutual accusations explained above. Scholars are now talking of a Second Cold War with the two powers in the center. However, in reality, the geopolitical situation is much more complicated, and the Western Balkans are the prime example to illustrate this.

An important geopolitical act that occurred in the middle of the pandemic was the European Union’s decision, in the virtual Zagreb Summit, to give the green light to the opening of accession  negotiations to Albania and North Macedonia. Ursula van der Leyen’s “geopolitical commission”, as she has coined it herself,  thus gave proof that Europe is acting geopolitically by seeing the Balkans as its area of influence, which is also in accordance with the public’s aspirations in these countries, first and foremost in Albania. Now, the ball is in Albania’s court to further advance in enforcing the demanded conditions for accession.

Coronavirus pandemics can be somewhat considered a litmus test for Balkan countries. The first and most visible geopolitical effect of the pandemic was the ‘address’ Balkan countries first headed to in order to ask for help, or how they reacted to the aid offered by various countries. As rightly observed by regional politics observers in the Balkans, the already clear lines that divide influence areas for extra-Balkan actors have been further demarcated.

Albania looked at the European Union for help and was supported by Brussels. Likewise, the pandemic period further consolidated the Rome-Tirana axis, particularly reflected by Albania’s sending of 90 doctors and nurses to help neighboring Italy. The United States also offered aid and assistance to Albania. In a sense, it can be said that the pandemic proved Albania’s Western orientation even more clearly.

On the other hand, Serbia used the pandemic to continue its power games between the EU, Russia, and China. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was swift in announcing that “EU solidarity is dead” after the EU’s decision on March 15^th to halt the export of medical supplies outside the EU. A few days after Vucic personally travelled to the Belgrade airport to receive Chinese aid. The streets of the Serbian capital were filled with banners reading “Thank you, Brother Xi.” Chinese “mask diplomacy” on the one hand and the Serbian policy of “multiple chairs” were thus in complete unison.

The Balkans could not be an exception from what can be considered “pandemic nationalism,” which was reflected by the fast closing of borders and the search for solutions within the walls of the house. While there was the occasional episode or gesture of cooperation or regional solidarity, such as Serbia’s gift of 1000 medical kits to Kosovo, generally, the Balkans failed to act as a region. Regional solidarity was absent; regional cooperation inexistent. Even the border between Albania and Kosovo became completely impenetrable.

Along with indicating once again the different strategic orientations of the region’s countries, the pandemic also evidenced the fragility and vulnerability of each Balkan country in its entirety. Balkan democracies were fragile in the first place, but the pandemic froze them to a certain extent. Pandemic populism was popular in its first phase, but resulted not as popular in the long term. The fear of a pandemic-propelled inertia in Balkan hybrid systems is not as baseless as one might think. Viruses have the capacity to resist longer than we think.

KRISTINA LANI holds a MA in International Relations from Utrecht University.

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