In her 2023 State of the Union address, European Commission President von der Leyen asserted that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. In doing so, it reiterated the EU’s promise made at the historic Thessaloniki Summit twenty years ago.

At the time, Yugoslavia’s devastating wars had just ended. International borders had changed with the independence of Montenegro and later Kosovo. And the wave of EU enlargement was about to happen, with ten Central and Eastern European countries joining in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The driving force behind this process was the powerful vision to reunify the European continent. But also a strong political will in the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to become members of the European family. For similar reasons, the countries of the Western Balkans were equally motivated to join the EU.

However, after twenty years, the Western Balkans have still not joined the European Union. Sometimes it even seems that EU membership has become less attractive for the region than it was two decades ago. With the world and the EU facing a series of crises in the past two decades, the Union’s appetite for enlargement has waned. At the same time, some Western Balkan countries showed limited political will to implement much-needed EU reforms, giving EU enlargement skeptics arguments against their integration. In general, the enlargement process has proceeded at a slower pace and with less visible and tangible results than expected, leading to disillusionment and departure from the EU. The Union and the Western Balkans – wittingly or unwittingly – found an unsatisfactory modus vivendi.

The window of opportunity for geostrategic expansion

Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, EU membership has become an even more attractive goal for the Eastern Partnership countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time, the countries of the Western Balkans are facing unprecedented challenges to their stability as well as amplified foreign policy dilemmas. However, there is also growing awareness of a new window of opportunity for enlargement, raising expectations vis-à-vis the EU.

We welcome that the EU is now approaching enlargement from a more geostrategic and less bureaucratic perspective than before. Last year’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on strategic considerations. There is a growing recognition that enlargement policy is the EU’s most powerful stabilizing instrument. That said, the EU’s new strategic approach will not lower the standards of enlargement. Full implementation of the reform remains essential.

The current situation is an opportunity for both the European Union and the Western Balkans to show more strategic foresight, to fully regain their enlargement credibility and to reinforce mutual trust, some of which had been lost over the years.

In fact, some concrete steps should be taken without any further delay.

First, the European Union must open EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of this year. Second, Montenegro must continue its path of reform in the EU, which depends on the formation of the new government in the country. Thirdly, the negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia must be advanced. In North Macedonia, the next steps depend on the country’s ability to pass the necessary constitutional changes. The latest case is a reminder that EU member states and Western Balkan countries must play a responsible role and refrain. from the presentation of bilateral problems and disputes, which are not related to the accession process.

For a gradual and accelerated integration of the Western Balkans into the EU

On the EU side, the discussion on the necessary institutional and financial preparations for the integration of new members is gathering momentum. However, this should not become a pretext to delay the enlargement process for our Western Balkan partners. We need to start implementing existing proposals to speed up the enlargement process now.

EU institutions must be more creative in adapting the enlargement process to today’s needs. The process should be less complex and more results-oriented. We must make it more tangible for citizens and link the progress of the reform with concrete benefits. We also need to engage more dynamically with the countries of the Western Balkans, so that they can really feel the heartbeat of Brussels. From June 2022, there is a clear task from the European Council to advance gradual integration already during the enlargement process. In June 2023, as “Friends of the Western Balkans” together with our colleagues from the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovakia, we called on the EU institutions to present a clear agenda for gradual and accelerated integration in steps concrete implementation until 2024 and beyond. This should be based on fair and rigorous conditioning as well as the principle of own merits. We see many possibilities, from more frequent invitations to our Western Balkan colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Council to the opening of other policy areas such as education, science, transport or trade for their gradual involvement.

The real value of EU enlargement lies in its transformative capacity: helping countries to raise living standards for their citizens and creating prosperous environments where young people can fulfill their dreams. Our Western and Eastern Balkan partners deserve this opportunity and EU citizens will benefit from greater stability and prosperity beyond the current EU borders. EU enlargement is not one of many political options; it is the geostrategic necessity of the day.

[1] By Tanja Fajon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Slovenia, 

Alexander Schallenberg, Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, 

Gordan Radman Grlic, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia

The post The Unfinished EU: Western Balkan Integration as a Geostrategic Necessity- 20 years of EU promise appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The Western Balkans are now joined by Ukraine and Moldova to follow together the race between geopolitics and cynicism

The Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003 (adopted at the first EU-Western Balkan Summit) stated that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union. The 2023 version of the Declaration of Athens, in honor of that of Thessaloniki, approved last night, ( August 21^st, 2023) [2] says that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union, and that Ukraine and Moldova have the same future.

The original declaration, that of 2003, was an EU effort to establish a strategic orientation for the Western Balkans, an agreement between the member states and the states of the Western Balkans (including Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK).

Last night’s Athens declaration is an attempt to create a strategic orientation of the EU for the Western Balkans together with Ukraine and Moldova.

And, at this point, that the EU has or will have a strategic orientation, the good news ends. In a match with reality, Ukraine and Moldova have now joined a European race between geopolitics and cynicism. In that race, the first thing that can come to mind is the next fatalistic barsoleta that in 2043 the summit of the leaders of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova will be held in Greece, and the prime minister of Georgia will also be a guest in it (and if will use a little imagination, Azerbaijan) with which the European future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and now also Georgia (and, with a little imagination, Azerbaijan) will be re-declared.

Geopolitics has its place both in 2003 and in 2023

In 2003, the wars of the former Yugoslavia had ended (the last one of R. Macedonia in 2001), the USA was busy in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the EU had the right vision that the stabilization of Europe means EU membership of space of its southeast (and that for this we should not wait for the American geopolitical return).

In 2023, Russia’s war against Ukraine gives an additional dimension to the vision of the EU, the definition of its eastern borders with the implication of the inclusion of the Western Balkans within the entirety of the European Union. And, while the EU has been established for the first time as a power that actively helps the war on the European continent, together with the USA, the decision on the membership of Ukraine and Moldova, as a permanent stabilization measure, belongs to the EU.

The problem of the EU’s geopolitical approach is the mismatch between the objectives and the capacity to achieve them. After the 2003 Summit, only Croatia joined the EU; all other participants have the promise of membership and candidate status (with the exception of Kosovo). But being a candidate for membership has not changed the relationship in the triangle of unfinished states Kosovo-Serbia-BH. Moreover, another candidate state, Montenegro, has suffered a major blow on its European path from identity friction, a significant part of which comes from the other candidate state, Serbia.

In 2023, the establishment of Ukraine as a geopolitical turning point, which should speed up the EU’s preparation for this great historical challenge that will define the border between Europe and Euro-Asia, is the right vision, but if I were in Kiev I would I analyzed Kosovo-Serbia relations and the EU’s mediation. For more than ten years, the EU has not reached an agreement on an issue in its own backyard. If it cannot reach an agreement with its own instruments on a secondary (or third-order) issue compared to the eastern crises, what can be expected of it in Ukraine or Moldova?

Geopolitics, therefore, was not enough

Yes, there was a period when geostrategic decisions were made. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, newly emerged from dictatorships, were turning points for the peoples of those states and for the well-being of the continent as a whole. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria, both countries that, as seen today, are in the immediate neighborhood of the Ukraine war, also significantly stabilized this part of the continent. But why this happened then, does not mean that it should happen now.

Instead of geopolitics, cynicism has entered the race. In the Athens 2023 Declaration, a historic turning point is made of the union of the great cause (the freedom and independence of the European Ukraine) with the smaller causes (the integration of the Western Balkans). And, this statement is made right when the EU fulfilled the (next) anniversary of the inability to mediate: in September of last year Kosovo and Serbia were offered on a “take it or leave it” basis the most ambitious project so far, of a basic agreement between two independent states establishing relations without mutual recognition of citizenship. A year later, round after round of poor mediation, Kosovo and Serbia are further from the basic agreement than they were in September of last year.

And while the EU declares its geostrategic intention to help push Russia out of Ukraine, it does not prove it can do so in the Western Balkans: for a year and a half, Russia has remained just as strong, if not more so, right in the middle of the Balkans, in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The geopolitical ambition to create a free Europe with the Western Balkans in it and extending to the border between Ukraine and Russia, manifested last night in Athens, is the ambition for the most ambitious Euro-Atlantic project of this century. For the Western Balkans, this meant a democratic Serbia at peace with its neighbors, an independent Kosovo at peace with Serbia, a democratic and functional Bosnia-Herzegovina at peace with its identity pluralism, and so on. That all these countries have a common security system based on NATO.

Against this geopolitical ambition is the cynicism of reality. It is difficult to imagine that the EU will create a democratic space under the umbrella of NATO from the space of unfinished conflicts without the decisive intervention of the United States, Great Britain and powerful EU member states, primarily Germany, France, Italy and why not Poland.

The instruments shown so far in the Kosovo-Serbia case, from the discussions on license plates and territorial exchanges, to the great “geopolitical” victory of the EU achieved in Ohrid in what was called the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement, show that behind Big words hide small actions. What was called the Agreement was fragile with the very fact that it was not signed and is considered an Agreement, because this is what the head of diplomacy J. Borell considers to be. Even, with the greatest seriousness, it was explained how this is a legally binding Agreement, because “it is found in chapter 35 for Serbia and the SAA for Kosovo”, a wording that neither convinces, nor stimulates, nor scares.

This is the paradigm of the EU before the geopolitical challenge of the century.

[1] Veton Surroi is a Kosovar Albanian publicist, politician and former journalist. Surroi is the founder and former leader of the ORA political party, and was a member of Kosovo assembly from 2004 to 2008.

[2] The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova, the prime ministers of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and the head of the council of ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to attend the dinner, being hosted by Greek Prime  Minister  Mitsotakis on the 20th anniversary of a summit between the EU and western Balkan countries in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki as Balkan states sought to join the European bloc.

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Opposition to NATO enlargement has been a constant in Russian foreign policy, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and up to the present day. This concept, defined in 2008, advocates opposition to further NATO expansion, in particular to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. In its Military Doctrine, approved in 2010, Russia identified NATO expansion as the main “external military danger“, i.e. threat to its national security.

After the consolidation of Putin’s power, and especially after Russia’s military aggression against Georgia in 2008, it has become apparent that Russia is attempting to undermine democracies in the West and encourage anti-NATO and anti-EU attitudes.

Although the Western Balkan region is less important to Russia than the post-Soviet space or its “near abroad“, Russia has been waging a “hybrid war“ in the Western Balkans for two decades. In this “war“, Russia managed to achieve significant success (primarily in Serbia, and through Serbia in Republika Srpska, one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina), but also faced defeats (in North Macedonia and Montenegro). The culmination of Russian success is its domination in the fuel and gas sector of Serbia and Republika Srpska. These days, in the circumstances of energy crisis and Russia’s military aggression, and the US and EU sanctions imposed against Russia, the Serbian public has learned that oil company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) and gas company Srbijagas are majority owned by Russian state controlled energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft. Given that a state-owned electric utility power company Elektroprivreda Srbije is facing huge losses, the energy system of Serbia is threatened with collapse. The Serbian leadership drove Serbia into this state by linking the country closely to Russian energy supplies. Serbia has become a state of energy insecurity, whereas it is well known that energy security is critically important to overall security and stability in each country.

The issue of Kosovo is used as a smokescreen to disguise strategic mistakes, such as handing over Serbia’s energy security to Moscow. For its part, Moscow uses its influence over the issue of Kosovo’s status as leverage to win over the Serbian public and to spread pro-Russian sentiments and policies. This is evidenced by the following mantra of Russian officials: by joining NATO, Serbia would lose Kosovo, part of its national sovereignty, and mutual understanding with a friendly brotherly country – Russia!

As a member of the Balkan Contact Group established by the UN, Russia was active in managing the war in BiH and still is in the process for determining Kosovo’s future status. At the same time, Russia is an advocate of the “status quo“, with the aim to prevent (with the support of China) the completion of the negotiations on the future status process led by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari. After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Russia started using the Kosovo case to justify its actions. It set Kosovo as a “precedent” and relied on it for actions in its “near abroad“ (in Georgia, where Russia formed two entities – South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and in Ukraine, where it annexed Crimea and formed two secessionist entities – Donetsk and Luhansk). At the same time, Moscow encourages Serbia to not recognize Kosovo and to seek “compensation“through secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russian influence and Serbia’s overall policies have somewhat isolated the country from its neighbors. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Serbia’s neighbors are NATO members, whereas Kosovo is under the NATO umbrella. The fact that Serbia pursues a policy of “military neutrality”, which can be interpreted as poorly concealed anti-NATO policy, poses a risk of taking sides in the war and spilling over tensions into this part of Europe, most critically in Bosnia and Herzegovina (through Republic Srpska) and Montenegro, and the northern part of Kosovo.

Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine forced the EU to build a unified response. The EU countries have so far agreed on five packages of sanctions against Russia, and the alignment efforts with those of its US and UK counterparts have been intensified. This narrows the space for Serbia to avoid the alignment of its foreign policy with EU foreign policy. The grim reality of the war in Ukraine and possible spill over into some EU countries and NATO, including Russia itself, confronts Serbia’s leadership with the fact that they have no opportunity to choose. The only way for Serbia to exist and rapidly develop is by pursuing reforms and membership in the EU and NATO. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo facilitates and accelerates Serbia’s path to joining the EU and NATO. In this regard, a “Strategic Compass” for the European Union adopted by the EU ministers of foreign affairs and defense on March 21, 2022, is another invitation and opportunity for all Western Balkan countries, including Serbia, to join the making of the EU common strategy, and take part in setting the priorities of security and defense policy, with the aim to enhance and coordinate the EU military and strategic autonomy.

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The early 1990s, a critically important period in Albania’s contemporary history, ushered in dramatic changes in Albania’s relations with the United States, which eventually would transform the two countries’ relationship from erstwhile enemies to strategic partners.  After a long absence of contacts, in 1990 Albania suddenly became the focus of high-level American attention. With rising public discontent against Ramiz Alia’s regime and the outbreak of anti-Communist demonstrations, the United States seized the opportunity to effect change in what was Europe’s last Stalinist country.  The United States’ objectives were clear:  to induce, through a variety of means, including Voice of America (VOA) Albanian-language broadcasts, Europe’s last Communist dictatorship to undertake much needed democratic and economic reforms; and assist the Albanians to lay the groundwork for a peaceful democratic transition that would help Albania assume its rightful place among free and democratic nations. 

Background

The troubled history of American-Albanian relations after the Communists seized political power in Tirana at the end of the Second World War is well known.  Suffice to note that from 1946, when the United States withdrew its diplomatic representation in Tirana after Enver Hoxha’s government refused to adhere to prewar treaties and obligations, until 1990, the two countries had no formal diplomatic contacts. Throughout this period, the two countries maintained diametrically opposed views on most important issues, and the Albanians were subjected to daily anti-American diatribes.

Hoxha imposed on his people a totalitarian, Stalinist system, pursuing a policy of terror and coercion that resulted in gross violations of human rights and the elimination of all internal opposition to the Communist regime.  He skillfully employed alliances with, in turn, Communist Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and finally the People’s Republic of China to ensure vital foreign economic assistance that helped him consolidate his regime.  While in the wake of the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, other Soviet bloc members gradually experimented with economic and political reforms, Albania’s regime became harsher, with the Communist Party effectively controlling all aspects of life. Albania entered a period of unprecedented international isolation after its break with the Soviet Union in 1960 and alliance with distant China, maintaining very limited contacts with the outside world.  The regime fostered a siege mentality, claiming that the United States and Tirana’s former Soviet bloc allies were determined to destroy Albania, the only “true” socialist state in Europe. By the mid-1970s, Hoxha became disillusioned with Beijing’s policies, particularly China’s rapprochement with the United States, and publicly denounced the post-Mao leadership for allegedly having betrayed Marxism-Leninism. Predictably, Hoxha’s defiance led Beijing to end its alliance with Tirana.  Albania embarked on a policy of self-reliance, which seriously retarded the country’s economic development.[1]

In the early 1950s, the United States and Britain made efforts to overthrow Hoxha’s repressive regime by training and parachuting émigré fighters into Albania in the hope of organizing a popular uprising. This policy was aimed at helping the Albanians regain their freedoms and roll-back Soviet influence in a region of strategic importance to the Western alliance.  But these half-hearted efforts failed, thanks in part to the betrayal of the plot by senior British intelligence official and Soviet agent, Kim Philby.  Philby shared the details of the operation with the Soviets, who in turn informed the Albanians.  Most of the fighters were either captured or killed.  These ended hopes of Albania’s early liberation from the Communist yoke.

Following these aborted attempts, the United States and its allies ceased their support of Albanian émigré groups’ resistant activity.  But while it gave up on efforts to overthrow the regime, Washington’s policy objectives were clearly defined and publicly enunciated: encourage Albania’s independence from Moscow and promote internal liberalization.  There was a realization that these objectives could not be effectively promoted in the absence of diplomatic ties.[2]  To this effect, in the late 1950s, the United States expressed its willingness to extend recognition to Hoxha’s government.  Although there were signs that Tirana desired to resume ties, the Albanian government was not forthcoming, continuing instead with its anti-American posture. Tirana’s break with Moscow in 1960 renewed Western interest in the tiny Balkan country. The United States was prepared to offer Albania – as it had done in the case of Yugoslavia after Tito’s break with Stalin – substantial economic and political assistance.  These efforts, however, were rebuffed by Albania.  The ruling Communist Party continued to exercise iron control over the public sphere, enforcing Hoxha’s personality cult, prohibiting any criticism of the regime, and denying the population any free information.  Albania seemed immune to reformist trends, when other East European countries were embracing them. Despite the repressive nature of the Albanian regime, at certain critical moments, such as after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Tirana’s break with Beijing, the United States made overtures to Albania.  Albania’s reclusive and paranoid regime rejected these overtures and showed no interest in resuming ties until April 1990.

The United States and its policies were consistently vilified by Hoxha’s regime. During this long period of a lack of diplomatic ties, the VOA’s Albanian Service was the only means by which Washington could emphasize the traditional friendship between the American and Albanian peoples.  Through its broadcasts, the Albanian Service attempted to debunk the claims of the official Tirana propaganda machine that the United States was hostile to Albania’s wellbeing and national aspirations.

            Albania’s atrocious human rights record and the terrible suffering of the Albanians had been well documented by Albanian émigrés as well as international human rights organizations.  However, during the high of the Cold War, higher priority was given to diminishing Soviet control and influence in Albania than in promoting regime change. The United States and its European allies had welcomed Tirana’s break with Moscow, which contributed significantly to Western interests in the Balkans.  Regime excesses during Albania’s Cultural Revolution, including the abolition of religion by law, did not attract much attention.  Although Hoxha had instituted the most repressive regime in Eastern Europe, Western policy gave short shrift to the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights, giving precedence to Albania’s strategic importance and anti-Soviet stance.   As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s policy of building bridges with Eastern Europe, in March 1967 the United States lifted curbs on travel to Albania, which were imposed in 1952. And in April 1973, in a major policy address delivered at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rosh said the United States was prepared to respond to an Albanian expression in resuming ties.^[3] But Tirana continued to view the United States as its main enemy, jointly with the Soviet Union. With Tirana’s defection from the Soviet bloc, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and rejection of Western overtures to normalize relations, Western capitals adopted a benevolent attitude toward Tirana’s government and made no serious efforts to encourage a regime change in Tirana and end the suffering of the Albanian people.  Against this sort of political and international backdrop, Albania simply fell from the America’s radar screen.[4]

Alia’s Cautious Reforms

Ramiz Alia’s accession to power after Hoxha’s death in 1985 was seen as a hopeful sign that Albania would finally embark on the road of reforms.  Indeed, Alia began experimenting with new approaches in an attempt to revitalize the economy and tackle growing social problems.  While Tirana was one of the harshest critics of perestroika and glasnost, there were signs that Alia was grudgingly emulating Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies.  Gradually Alia put his stamp on the country’s politics, revising some of Hoxha’s more radical policies, introducing small but potentially significant innovations, expanding relations with other countries, and advocating an Albanian-style glasnost campaign.  Arguably sluggish economic performance, the widening gap between Albania and its neighbors, rapid population growth, and increasing social pressures were forcing Alia to loosen some of the party’s severe controls over the society and modify the excessively rigid centralized economic system. Alia attempted to dilute the widespread popular discontent with a package of economic and political reforms.

The United States expressed willingness to resume ties with post-Hoxha’s Albania.  Washington was concerned that Hoxha’s death would offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to achieve its objective of normalizing relations with Tirana and Albania’s eventual reincorporation in the Soviet bloc.  The deteriorating situation in Kosova, which threatened the broad American interests in Yugoslavia’s unity, stability, and development, was another important factor.  While there was no evidence that the Albanian government was instigating unrest in Kosova,[5] there was concern that Moscow would attempt to take advantage of growing ethnic strife and political instability in Yugoslavia to extent its influence in the Balkans and perhaps gain access to naval bases in Albania.

After Hoxha’s death, senior American officials reiterated Washington’s view that “should Albania indicate an interest in resuming relations with us, we would be prepared to respond.”^[6] A VOA editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. government, issued on Albania’s 75th anniversary of independence on November 28, 1987, welcomed Alia’s efforts to end the country’s extreme isolation, adding, “The U.S. welcomes these moves by Albania to open up to the outsides world.  We have made it clear that Americans would be prepared to respond, should Albania indicate an interest in resuming relations with the U.S.  In the meantime, while the U.S. must deplore the repressive nature of the Albanian government, we also congratulate the Albanian people on the strong national spirit that led to their independence in 1912 – and that offers hope of an Albania that can be both independent and free in the future.”[7] The United States expressed public support for Albania’s gradual expansion of relations with the outside world.  Welcoming Tirana’s announcement that the Albanian Foreign Minister would attend a Balkans foreign ministers’ meeting in Belgrade, the State Department said this was “a step in the right direction.”  A senior American official indicated the United States would respond “positively” to any interest on Albania’s part for the normalization of ties.[8]

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the end of the Cold War had an immediate impact onAlbania.  The regime, isolated and unable to address daunting economic and social challenges, was now faced with increased domestic and external pressures to implement fundamental political reforms.  The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe caused the United States to review its posture toward Tirana.  While in the past Washington was willing to reward Albania for its independent stance toward Moscow, which was in line with the U.S. and NATO’s strategic interests, now the United States saw no reason to reach out to Europe’s last Stalinist regime. Communist Albania’s strategic importance had evaporated overnight with the end of the Cold War and the approaching disintegration of the Soviet Union. On the occasion of Albania’s national day, on November 28, 1989, VOA aired an interview with James W. Swihart, director of East European Affairs at the State Department. Swihart said the United States did not see “huge obstacles” to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania.^[9] Swihart’s lukewarm call for the resumption of diplomatic ties reflected the new political reality in Eastern Europe. 

            Before 1990, Albania had not been a significant American foreign policy issue. Shortly after Ceausescu’s demise, however, attention turned to Albania.  Many observers were making parallels between Albania and Romania. The question was no longer will the Albanian regime fall but when will it fall and how violent will it be.  U.S. officials predicted that Albania’s upheaval was likely to be violent.^[10]  In a February 1990 assessment, the CIA noted, “The Albanian military and security services have often demonstrated a ruthless loyalty to the dictates of the party; they will repress dissent in 1990 with the same verve as in the past.  This promises to make the showdown, when it comes, a Romanian-style bloodletting.”[11] An editorial in The New York Times put it this way: Albania “is the last remnant of an expiring old order in Europe.  And there are no walls high enough to keep its people from grasping truths that in time will surely set them free.”^[12]  Indeed, unlike other East European countries, Albania’s Communist regime did not renounce terror as an instrument of control.  As late as 1989-1990, young Albanians were being shot and killed while attempting to flee the country to Yugoslavia or Greece.

In early 1990, after years of disastrous policies pursued by Hoxha’s repressive and inward-looking regime and with increased international attention focused on the most repressive regime in Europe, Albania seemed ripe for change.  Many Albanians found subtle and sophisticated ways to urge reforms. In January 1990, the Yugoslav press reported unrest in Shkodër, claiming that “extraordinary measures” had been introduced in the northern city.^[13]  The information from Albania was so tightly controlled that Western media outlets were unable to confirm reports of unrest.^[14]  It was only months later that that reports were confirmed that demonstrations had indeed taken place in mid-January 1990 in Shkodër.^[15]

There were clear indications that the social compact that had ensured the regime’s survival was eroding rapidly, and that Alia was willing to compromise the regime’s long ideological stance to stay in power.  This became evident at the 10^th plenum of the Central Committee, in April 1990, when Alia announced some important policy changes.  He called for the normalization of U.S.-Albania relations.  He said that Albania had not imposed political conditions on the establishment of relations but insisted that Albania had to be “accepted as it is.”  He added that, “The choice of social systems is a sovereign matter for every people, and no one has the right to interfere in this matter.”^[16]

Washington’s reaction to Alia’s speech was mixed.  Some members of Congress welcomed Alia’s overtures.  Senator Dennis DeConcini, the Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, and Steny Hoyer, Co-Chairman of the commission, issued a joint statement welcoming Albania’s decision “to join the community of nations,” and expressing the desire to visit Tirana.^[17]  Reaction from the State Department was less enthusiastic.   Margaret Tutwiler, the State Department spokesperson, said the United States was ready “to pursue discussions” toward the resumption of diplomatic relations, but emphasized that the next move was up to Albania.  Asked why Washington wanted to establish diplomatic ties with a reclusive and repressive regime, Tutwiler said, “I don’t believe I came out here and said we did want them.  I said that the door is open; that’s all I said.”  She noted that the United States continued to regard the Albanian regime as repressive.^[18]  Disappointed by the slow pace of reform and suspicious of Alia’s intentions, the United States was now reluctant to normalize relations.

In May 1990, the Secretary General of the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar paid a widely publicized visit to Tirana.^[19] On the eve of de Cuellar’s visit, the Albanian government announced its desire to join the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  Albania had been the only European country to boycott the CSCE in 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was signed. Many foreign journalists, including VOA’s Laura Silber, were allowed to visit Tirana for the first time.  At a news conference, Alia complemented the VOA reporter on “her energetic work.”^[20] In talks with de Cuellar and interviews with visiting foreign journalists, Alia and other senior officials made it explicitly clear that while the government will implement “democratic” reforms, the Communist Party had no plans to give up its monopoly on political power and permit the creation of other political parties.

While Alia reached out to the West, he faced a serious dilemma:  fulfilling the majority of the CSCE membership criteria was inconsistent with Albania’s one-party state. The U.S. Helsinki Commission welcomed Albania’s announcement, but spelled out in detail the steps that Albania had to take to gain membership in the CSCE:  implement fully all the commitments contained in the Final Act and other CSCE documents; respect the rights of its citizens to freedom of expression, association, and assembly; freedom of movement; protection of minority rights, and free flow of information.  The Commission added that Albania would have to accept “the concepts of political pluralism and the rule of law, and to that end move toward free elections and undertake necessary legal reforms.”^[21]

Alia’s reforms were quite significant in Albania’s context, but in a larger context and in view of the democratic changes sweeping across the former Eastern bloc these were indeed minimal reforms.  In addition, Western governments were understandably suspicious about the sincerity of the Albanian leaders, who only months earlier dismissed with contempt criticism of Albania’s atrocious human rights situation.^[22]  With their contradictory public statements, Albanian officials further did not contribute much to improving Tirana’s image.  In early June 1990, after Albania was granted observer status to the CSCE, Sazan Bejo, a Foreign Ministry official, told reporters in Copenhagen that there was no need to hold free elections or introduce a multi-party system since “everyone in Albania supports the government and there is no opposition.”^[23] And in an interview with C.L. Sulzberger, a retired columnist for The New York Times, Alia said Albania would carry out democratic reforms, but emphasized that it would preserve its Marxist-Leninist system.^[24]  Such contradictory pronouncements led many to characterize Alia’s reforms as a diversionary tactic.  Many observers believed Alia’s small overtures and openings to the West were aimed at arresting the country’s economic collapse and preserving the APL’s rule.  But the opening up led to an increase in Western influence, which rapidly eroded internal security and the Communists’ hold on power.

De Cuellar’s visit was followed by another high-profile visit – that of Congressman Tom Lantos and former Congressman Joe DioGuardi.  This was the first U.S. official delegation to visit Tirana since the departure of the American diplomatic representatives in 1946.  Lantos was a harsh critic of Yugoslavia’s repressive policies toward ethnic Albanians, and this may have been a factor in Tirana’s decision to allow him to visit.  Lantos was told by Alia that Albania was interested in reestablishing diplomatic ties “as soon as possible.”^[25]  In an interview with VOA after his visit to Tirana, Rep. Lantos said Albania needed to implement the same reforms as the Eastern European countries.  He said, “A multiparty system should be created in Albania, the press should be free, and the Albanians should enjoy freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, and freedom to travel abroad.  These are necessary changes if Albania wants to be included in the Helsinki process.”^[26]

In the past, Washington had appeared willing to restore relations with Tirana’s government without preconditions.  By spring 1990, however, America’s position had evolved significantly.  The United States now saw an opportunity to promote political and economic changes that would end Albania’s long Communist nightmare.  Albania had finally become an important part of Washington’s vision of building, what President George H. Bush had called, “a Europe whole and free.” Applying lessons from the revolutions in the other East European countries, Washington began to articulate a clearer policy, assuming a more direct and prominent role in efforts to influence internal developments in Albania.  Working closely with its key European allies, the United States intensified pressure on the regime, and predicated the restoration of diplomatic relations and support for Albania’s membership into the CSCE with progress toward political pluralism. The U.S. decision to introduce conditionality in its policy toward Albania was aimed at encouraging Albania’s reformist forces and promoting democratic change.

The State Department and the National Security Council at the White House were responsible for the formulation of the policy toward Albania. However, influential members of the United States Congress – Rep. Tom Lantos, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, Sen. Claiborne Pell, and Senator Bob Dole – also played a critical policy role.  They began to focus on Albania, providing forthright support to calls for democracy and freedom.  And the Albanian-American community effectively lobbied the administration and the Congress for support and played a pivotal role in elevating the Albanian cause. Community activists used a variety of tactics and media outreach to pressure policy makers.

Washington responded to Alia’s overtures with a two-pronged approach – a policy similar to the package of “sticks and carrots” that had been so successfully employed a year earlier in other former East European countries.  It agreed to open a dialogue, and American and Albanian diplomats held several informal meetings during summer and fall. While agreeing to engage the Tirana government, the United States was not prepared to reward the last Communist dictatorship in Eastern Europe with a full normalization of ties without the implementation of fundamental political reforms. Secretary of State James Baker, in public testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1990, bluntly laid out the conditions that Albania had to meet if it wished to join the community of free nations: progress toward political pluralism, full respect for human rights, release of political prisoners, free elections, and the implementation of reforms that would eventually lead to the creation of a marked economy.^[27] Despite his public statements about Albania’s democratization, Alia, however, was not willing to implement fundamental political and economic reforms.  He was interested in reforming rather than changing the system. His domestic policy initiatives and calls for restoring relations with the United States were grounded in self-preservation.  Alia continued to respond to demands for change with insufficient measures.

On July 2, 1990, Albanians began storming Western embassies in Tirana.  Within days, some five thousand Albanians sought asylum in the embassies. The embassy events, which sent shock waves throughout the system, were a clear indication that the slow disintegration of the Albanian regime was picking up steam.  Although the government was still in control and had at its disposal many means of coercion, its power was slipping away.  Alia’s calculus was that his strategy would succeed because he believed the Communists retained sufficient popular support to weather any near-term pressure while the economic reforms he had introduced would give results.  However, the embassy events provided clear evidence that Alia’s strategy of controlling the pace of reform and maintaining one-party rule was not sustainable. 

 The July 1990 events captured the world’s attention, and the regime faced unprecedented domestic and international pressures.^[28]  More than any other development, the embassy events exerted unprecedented pressure on the government and exposed the fallibility of the Communist regime.  But these events also showed that Albania was not yet ripe for a regime change.  Although years of disastrous policies pursued by Tirana’s highly repressive and inward-looking regime had caused widespread disillusionment and disaffection, no organized opposition had emerged.  The agreement to let the refugees depart was not delayed just because of the Albanian government’s handling of the issue, but also because Western embassies in Tirana delayed issuing the visas to the refugees.^[29]  Western governments were reluctant to accept such a large number of refugees.  Some were hoping that the refugee crisis would serve as a catalyst for a general upheaval.  Had there been open support for those who sought asylum, it is questionably that the regime could have survived the July 1990 shock and humiliation.  The regime did not tumble because no leaders emerged to take advantage of the rising discontent, articulate opposition demands and lead the masses.

A delegation of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, led by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona), was allowed to visit Albania duringAugust 19-21, 1990.  The Commission described the situation in Albania “as glaringly out of step with the rapidly developing process of democratization, political pluralism, the rule of law and free market economies that is taking place throughout Europe.”^[30]  In an interview with VOA’s Albanian Service, Senator DeConcini said that since Albanian authorities had failed to implement “real reforms,” the U.S. Helsinki Commission had urged the State Department to oppose Albania’s request for membership in the CSCE at the organization’s upcoming summit in Paris in the fall 1990.  The Senator said, “The Albanian authorities had not yet concluded that they had to implement fundamental reforms.  Therefore, we will continue to exert pressure on them to respect human rights.”^[31]

            The embassy events and the government’s response had a chilling effect on those advocating change. In a speech at a government organized rally on July 13, 1990, Xhelil Gjoni, who had emerged as the number-two man in the Albanian hierarchy and was viewed as a hard liner, said Albania and “its people’s power are unshaken by degenerate people who abandon their homeland, or by anybody else.  They are not Albania; they are not the people.”^[32]

The Role of the Voice of America

            During the long period of Albania’s self-imposed isolation and absence of diplomatic ties with the United States, the Voice of America was essentially the only contact between the two peoples and the two countries.  Through its broadcasts, VOA gave Albanians hope that they had not been forgotten and expressed America’s commitment to one day see Albania join the ranks of free and democratic nations. The VOA also played a major role in bridging the gap between Albania and the United States.

The VOA has the distinction of being the longest, continuous international Albanian-language broadcaster.  The first Albanian broadcast was on May 13, 1943.  Albanian broadcasts were dropped at the end of the war, and then resumed on May 13, 1951 and have continued uninterrupted ever since. The Albanian Service has been a protagonist in the most remarkable chapters of the post-World War II history of the Albanian nation. VOA broadcasts had a multiplicity of purposes. In accordance with its Charter, VOA’s mission was to serve as a trusted source of reliable news and information, present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions, and present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively.

            Albania’s unique circumstances forced the Albanian Service to assume the role of a surrogate communicator.  Thus, from the very beginning, an important objective of the Voice of America was to help information-deprived Albanians keep their hope alive and encourage the implementation of fundamental political and economic reforms that would bring Albania a step closer to the European mainstream. By 1989-1990, VOA had succeeded in breaking the Communist regime’s information blockade, and had gained prominence as a credible, alternative news source for information-deprived Albanians.  VOA served as a significant agent of change by successfully challenging the regime’s monopoly on news and information and promoting the ideals of a free, pluralistic, and democratic society.  The Albanian Service targeted the urban, educated classes, whose loyalty and reliability were critical to the regime’s stability.

VOA provided extensive coverage of Albanian domestic events as well as cross-reporting of developments in Eastern Europe.  VOA broadcasts emphasized the contrast between political and economic reforms in other East European countries and Alia’s policies. Through careful gleanings from the Albanian press, VOA identified and highlighted reformist measures and statements.  By May-June 1990, VOA was able to conduct in-depth telephone interviews with opinion makers in Albania.   For the first time, officials and intellectuals with liberal, reformist inclinations were willing to express views which went beyond what were the standard Communist Party talking points. Through a careful gleanings from the Albanian press, particularly Zëri i Popullit, Drita, Zëri i Rinisë, Rruga e Partisë, and Probleme Ekonomike, VOA attempted to identify reformist measures and statements and highlight the intellectuals calling for change. The list of reformers was dauntingly short, but it was bound to expand.

Through direct telephone interviews, VOA engaged members of the political, economic, and intellectual elite on politically sensitive issues and thus attempted to frame the political debate in Albania: What were the benefits of the recently introduced political and economic changes? Did these reforms go far enough? Would they adequately address the country’s problems? Was Albania really different from other former Communist countries? What were the obstacles to the establishment of a multi-party system? Could Albania join the Helsinki process without fulfilling most of the CSCE membership criteria which was inconsistent with Albania’s one-party state? These issues were discussed with prominent intellectuals, writers, and journalists, including Ismail Kadare, Gramoz Pashko, Hamit Beqja, Fatos Nano, Aleks Luarasi, Luan Omari, Arben Puto, and Besnik Mustafaj. By providing news and information that was empowering, and engaging members of the political and intellectual elite on politically sensitive issues, VOA was able to some extent to frame the political debate in Albania.

            The period following the storming of foreign embassies in Tirana was marked by a backsliding of Alia’s managed reform process, intimidation of intellectuals, and increased international pressure on Tirana. Government actions had a chilling effect on those advocating change, which was also reflected in the reluctance of many intellectuals to talk to VOA. In the weeks following the embassy events, VOA aired a series of interviews with recent refugees, focusing on Albania’s political and economic crisis, the human rights situation, and prospects for fundamental reforms.  The refugees offered new political insight and analysis of the true state of affairs in Albania. All dismissed Alia’s reforms as window dressing and expressed pessimism for a peaceful transition to democracy.  Almost without exception, the refugees criticized the intellectuals for not taking a more independent stand.  Many of the refugees offered unrestrained criticism of Kadare, Albania’s most prominent writer and an advocate for the democratization of the country.^[33]

The refugees’ anger against Kadare seemed somewhat misplaced, since the writer, as early as October 1989, had clearly positioned himself in favor of reforms. In a favorable review of Neshat Tozaj’sThikat [Knives], a novel about secret police excesses and hideous crimes committed against innocent people, Kadare had urged the authorities to improve the human rights situation, arguing that only thus could Albania forge ahead.^[34] He had also challenged the party’s tight control over writers and artists.^[35]  And in an interview published in March 1990, Kadare broke many political, historical, and literary taboos.  He urged the intellectuals to take active part in the democratization of the country’s life.  He took to task his colleagues who were not willing to participate in the democratization process, saying they were exaggerating the risk of possible retaliatory actions by those in power.  Kadare added that, “…no intellectual can consider himself honest if he does not do something, as much as is within his power, for the democratization of life.  Democracy, culture, and justice are among a nation’s most fundamental values and everybody must do his utmost to cultivate them and ensure they prevail every day and every hour.”^[36]

In its broadcasts, VOA’s Albanian Service had provided extensive reports on and about Kadare, which included coverage of Kadare’s pronouncements, Western press reports, and reviews of his books published in the United States. On the other hand, VOA reported that many in Albania and abroad had come to view Kadare as the most viable potential opposition leader – an “Albanian Vaclav Havel.”  But Kadare was unwilling or unable to take on this role.  After his defection, Kadare maintained that people expected too much from him and that he was “tortured” by those who compared him with Havel.[37]

In the wake of the embassy events, there was a clear backsliding of reforms and it appeared that party conservatives had gained the upper hand.  But VOA continued to test the waters, making every effort to reengage Tirana’s intellectuals, journalists, and scholars.  In an interview broadcast on August 2, 1990, Fatos Nano, then an economist with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and professor at the University of Tirana, was asked to respond to comments in the West that the reforms underway in Albania were “too little, too late” and that more “radical reforms” were necessary.   He responded by saying that these were “cautious” measures that guaranteed that the process of reforms was irreversible, and that they would be followed by other measures.  He said the Albanians were thirsty for progress and committed to see their country join the ranks of “the community of civilized nations.”[38] Nano’s interview was followed with a remarkable interview with Tirana University Professor Aleks Luarasi, aired on August 23, 1990.  After the first question about his assessment of a decree that had been approved by the People’s Assembly on July 31, Professor Luarasi was asked piercing questions: Do you think that the Party of Labor will give up its monopoly on power? Will the authorities permit the creation of other political parties in the future?  Professor Luarasi handled the questions very skillfully.  He responded that President Alia had made it clear that other parties will not be allowed.  Asked how Albania will be able to meet the necessary conditions to join the Helsinki process, he answered that the West had now made political pluralism a precondition for Albania’s membership in the CSCE – a fact which may not have been widely known in Albania.  He emphasized that until now the idea of political pluralism had not been embraced.[39]  The implication was that the regime might be forced to change its decision soon.

On September 23, 1990, VOA broadcast an interview with Ismail Kadare.  It was the most powerful and courageous public statement from inside Albania in support of the country’s democratization. Kadare said the democratization process involves the entire nation and to succeed it needs the support of all segments of society.   He expressed optimism that the Albanian nation was ready and willing to embrace democracy and take its rightful place in the family of European nations.[40]

In September 1990, Alia travelled to New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.  In his address to the UNGA, Alia denounced what he referred to as “outside interference in Albania’s domestic affairs.”  He said, “The arrogance inspired by the policy of strength, which is reflected in the continuation of attempts at imposing various models, standards and schemes of political or social developments on others has not been overcome.”^[41] Alia also travelled to Boston, where he visited with the Albanian-American community.

In his speech, Alia assured Albanian-Americans that the measures he had introduced were not inspired by developments in Eastern Europe and indicated that changes will be implemented cautiously.  He said, “There is one thing that we must bear in mind:  We are not in a hurry, because equilibrium must be preserved.  Otherwise, there are dangers.  It must also be kept in mind that the people understand these measures correctly, and that the leadership and the masses are in agreement.”  Alia referred to the embassy asylum seekers as “wild boars” and “immature people.”^[42]

Less than a month after Alia’s visit to New York, Ismail Kadare announced that he had asked for political asylum in France. Kadare’s defection shook the foundations of Albania’s political systemand inspired intellectuals to act.  It was also a major blow to Alia personally, shattering the illusion that the intellectuals were solidly behind him. In an attempt to temper rising opposition, at a Central Committee Plenum, held on November 6-7, Alia announced a series of reforms, including measures to strengthen the rule of law, separate the party from the state, ending the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, but stopped short of introducing political pluralism. 

The Transition to a Multi-Party System

In early December 1990, student demonstrations broke out at the University of Tirana, propelling Albania to the top of the international agenda.  The students’ initial demands were economic, but soon they focused on calls for political pluralism.  With growing support for the students and fearing a popular uprising, Alia rejected the use of force to suppress the demonstrations and agreed to permit the establishment of opposition parties.  Albania was finally on the threshold of a dramatic political transformation.

Because of the harsh repressive nature of its regime, Albania was the only East European country which was not able to develop an opposition movement before the collapse of the old political order.  Moreover, unlike in other East European states, lack of contacts and presence in Tirana had prevented the United States from identifying, engaging, and cultivating relationships with individuals – potential agents of change – that could assume positions of responsibility once the country embarked on the road of democratic change.  Before the student demonstrations, there were no high-level defections from the regime. 

Immediately following the student demonstrations, Albania witnessed the creation of several non-Communist political parties, whose platforms called for the establishment of a Western-style democratic system based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, a free and independent media, a market economy, and a reorientation of Tirana’s foreign policy toward the United States and Europe. Almost immediately, the Democratic Party emerged as the most important party and Sali Berisha as the main opposition leader. The leadership of the emerging opposition forces was a combination of former communists and regime supporters, liberal democrats, students, and a small number of people who had been imprisoned for anti-regime activities.  Untried and with no experience, opposition leaders faced inordinate difficulties. Their understanding of democracy and the rule of law were rudimentary at best.  It was clear that the emerging leadership elites would desperately need assistance and guidance in their uphill battle to force the Communists to relinquish power.

Prior to the December events, Albania had rarely been the focus of high-level American attention.  Now, the United States saw its first, real opportunity to significantly influence the course of events in Albania.  Washington adopted a tough line, sharpening its criticism of the government, calling for a peaceful and orderly transition of power, expressing support for the emerging democratic opposition, and demanding the unconditional release of all political prisoners.  American actions and statements were coordinated with European allies and carefully calibrated to have the greatest impact on developments in Albania.

            The student demonstrations were followed by widespread violence and a dangerous breakdown in governance and authority. There were reports of violent demonstrations, acts of vandalism, and attacks against government forces and installations in Shkodër, Elbasan, Durrës, and Kavajë.  Troops and tanks were deployed to quell the unrest.^[43] The popular desire to settle score with the Communists was enormous.  There were legitimate fears that this would propel Albania into civil war.  Through their public pronouncements, U.S. officials attempted to exert a moderating influence, emphasizing national reconciliation and the need for Albanians to put their tragic past behind them and embrace democratic principles.

As Communists and the emerging opposition battled for control and with Albania facing economic meltdown, political collapse, and a real threat of descending into a civil war, the issue of normalizing relations with Tirana suddenly became an urgent matter for those shaping Washington’s Albania policy. There was strong opposition within the highest echelons of the State Department to the immediate normalization of ties with Tirana because of Albania’s terrible human rights record.  Key State Department policy makers, including Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning and an aide to Secretary of State James A. Baker, and Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, advocated postponing the resumption of relations until Albania had made significant progress toward democracy, arguing that Washington would have little leverage with the Albanian government once official ties were restored.  This position was apparently also endorsed by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State.  In a television interview on December 15, 1990, Eagleburger said, “What we are seeing is the Albanian Government and the Albanian nation finally moving in the direction that we have seen take place in other parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  It is too slow.  The Albanian Government is going to have to change and change substantially and we want to see that process take place.”^[44]  But others urged immediate recognition, arguing that this would significantly increase Washington’s leverage, strengthen Albania’s democratic forces, and speed up the transfer of power. Albanian opposition leaders as well as prominent Albanian-American personalities weighted in, urging the United States to restore ties. The Albanian Democratic Party leaders played a major role in convincing Washington on the urgency of an immediate restoration of ties.  Berisha was explicit in arguing that the normalization of ties “would surely strengthen democratic forces in Albania.”^[45]

After a break of more than fifty years, the United States and Albania restored diplomatic relations on March 15, 1991. The State Department ceremony, chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Raymond G.H. Seitz, was carefully organized to ensure that the Communists could not take credit for the diplomatic recognition.  The White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater emphasized that the United States viewed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania as “an opportunity to support democratic reform in that country.”[46]  In a highly unusual but significant move, Democratic Party leaders Sali Berisha and Gramoz Pashko were invited by the Department of State to attend the signing ceremony and to meet with senior U.S. officials.  This was the first face-to-face contact between the two opposition leaders and American officials.[47] While Albania was officially represented by its Foreign Minister, Muhamet Kapllani, American attention was focused almost exclusively on Berisha and Pashko.

            In the wake of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the United States was now in a position to provide forthright and effective support for the cause of freedom and democracy in Albania. The American vision of Albania was one of a country with a pluralistic system with full respect for democratic norms.  There was a widespread belief that only a quick transfer of power to a post-Communist government would put Albania on the path of democratic transition and economic recovery. A diplomatic delegation was dispatched to Tirana to prepare the ground for the opening of the U.S. embassy. The Communists continued to control the state television, radio, and most of the print media. On the eve of the first multi-party elections, March 31, 1991, VOA expanded its programming, adding a breakfast show. VOA went to great lengths to ensure that it represented views across the political spectrum.  But, of course, VOA reporting was critical of the APL and sympathetic to opposition forces.  VOA emphasized pro-democracy efforts and made a strong effort to provide coverage of opposition groups in the run-up to the elections, thus in a way becoming the voice of the democratic opposition. The Democratic Party-led opposition received open support from Western governments and prominent personalities.  Observer delegations from the United States, including a large U.S. Helsinki Commission delegation,^[48] and other Western countries arrived in Tirana.  Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter sent an open letter of support to Sali Berisha.^[49]

Unlike the swift revolutions in other former East European communist countries, the transition in Albania devolved into a protracted struggle between the Communists, who continued to control all levers of power, and the fledgling opposition. Albania failed to make a clean break with its Communist past in its first contested elections, on March 31, 1991, in which the Communists emerged victorious.  But despite their election victory, the Communists faced daunting challenges and their support collapsed rapidly under opposition and international pressure.  In early June 1991, the Communists were forced to enter into a coalition government with the opposition and agreed to hold new elections within a year.

The United States had laid out strict conditions and had effectively used its leverage in dealings with the Albanian Communist government.  The establishment of the coalition government, in which the Democratic Party-led opposition received seven posts, was seen as a significant step in Albania’s tumultuous and protracted transition.  In recognition of this progress, the United States endorsed Albania’s full membership in the CSCE, and Secretary Baker visited Tirana on June 22, 1991. Baker’s visit was clearly intended, as the Secretary of State emphasizes in his memoirs, to use American prestige “to prod the Albanians toward democracy and free markets.”[50] To this end, Baker expressed support for the democratization process; extended America’s moral and political backing to the democratic opposition – noting in his speech before the Communist-dominated parliament that he was visiting at Berisha’s invitation; and pledged economic inducements if the country’s political leadership continued to take concrete steps forward in implementing political and free market reforms. More than 200,000 Albanians gathered in Tirana’s main square to give Baker a massive and highly emotional welcome.  This outpouring of genuine affection for America and the hope that the United States would help Albania out of its dire situation was perhaps best reflected in this slogan, “Welcome Mr. Baker! Albania Has Been Waiting for You for 50 Years!” In the midst of this huge outpouring of affection and huge expectations, the Secretary of State told the Albanians gathered at Skenderbeg Square that, “America is returning to you!,” “Freedom works!” and “You are with us and we are with you!” In his speech before the People’s Assembly, Baker urged Albanians to put the vestiges of communism behind them.  He emphasized the imperative of the peaceful settlement of disputes, adding that in “the new Albania” there was no place for violence, intimidation, and the use of force. “Let us see an end to all fear in Albania.  This is a new Albania, and you are members of a new Europe.”[51]

            Although the Communists were forced to compromise and agree to a coalition government with the opposition, they still retained substantial power.  They continued to exercise indirect control and influence.  U.S. officials recognized that the Communists remained a serious obstacle to democratic reforms. In his talks with Alia and other senior officials, Baker emphasized that Albania needed rapid changes, arguing that the country could not afford any delays. Addressing deputies from both sides of the aisle, the Secretary of State said that Albania’s emerging political order had to reflect full respect for human rights; democratic control of repressive security organs; a free and pluralist media; the rule of law; democratization at every level of government and society; and the holding of fully free and fair elections at both the national and local levels.  “Here, as in America, democracy must be not only an ideal – it must be a reality.  In this endeavor, as long as you are true to these principles, we will stand with you…”[52]

            Baker announced that the United States would grant Albania $6 million in humanitarian aid. He held out the prospect of further assistance as an incentive to affect fundamental changes, which included taking concrete steps in building democratic institutions and a market economy. While reaction to Baker’s visit was overwhelmingly positive, many Albanians were disappointed that the Secretary of State had not come with a Marshall Plan for Albania. Perhaps it was to be expected that given their country’s dire situation, the Albanians would have unrealistic expectations of what the United States was prepared to do for their country.  Although Baker and other U.S. officials had attempted to introduce a sense of realism and keep Albanians’ expectations low, opposition leaders offered triumphant messages of hope and promises of U.S. foreign assistance, thus further increasing those expectations.[53]

The Communists, who seemed humiliated by Baker’s open support for the opposition, launched a well-coordinated campaign to belittle the results of the visit.  They underscored what they characterized as the low amount of assistance being provided by the United States, contrasting this with the much higher dollar value of the assistance offered by Italy.  This was perhaps best reflected in a Zëri i Popullit headline: “Six million dollars for three million Albanians!”^[54]

            Baker was visibly overwhelmed by the reception.  According to one of his top aides, on the plane returning from Tirana Baker ordered the implementation of new programs, “along with the instruction that he would tolerate no delay in implementation.”[55] In the wake of Baker’s visit, the United States launched a set of assistance programs, which were implemented during the period leading up to the March 1992 elections.  These focused on sustained democratization:  strengthening parliament and developing impartiality in the functioning of the political system; promoting democratic culture; helping with political party development; training in election techniques and the general workings of democratic elections; experts to help draft a new constitution and develop a functional, post-Communist legal system; and providing support for an independent media.  Washington also dispatched an economic assistance mission to assess Albania’s needs and to assist the authorities to design a strategy of economic recovery. In addition, the United States mobilized international support and was instrumental in Albania gaining membership in the IMF and the World Bank.

            The opening of the U.S. Embassy in Tirana in October 1991 represented a significant milestone in bilateral relations.  The small group of American diplomats, led by Ambassador William Ryerson and his deputy Chris Hill, played an extraordinary role in promoting Albania’s democratization process and in helping Albanians craft a transition plan.  In an interview with VOA following his confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Ambassador Ryerson stressed Washington’s view of a speedy transition to a market economy and the development of democratic institutions.[56]  While continuing to engage President Alia and other leading Communist officials, American diplomats focused their activities on helping the fledging democratic opposition. Baker, in his meeting with opposition representatives during his June 1991 visit to Tirana, had urged them openly to unite to defeat the Communists in the next elections. American diplomats as well as representatives of the International Republican Institute, former Congressman Jack Buchner and Mary Catherine Andrews, and the National Democratic Institute, Thomas Melia, helped the opposition develop a coherent strategy to oust the Communists from power, providing pre-election support, civic education, party training, and technical assistance.  They also worked to foster cohesion among opposition ranks and reconcile fractions, parties, and groups.[57]

            In the period leading to the elections of March 1992, the Albanian government announced a paper shortage and most of the opposition newspapers could not be published.  There was concern that Communist control and manipulation of the media and as a result VOA intensified its Albanian broadcasts. The U.S. Embassy in Tirana had urged VOA to increase its broadcasts, emphasizing that there was a need “for the impartial coverage VOA gives to events within Albania.”   The Embassy said “there is a tendency by some to try to exploit the economic and social mess here (the direct result of a half century of Communist mismanagement and mis-investment) and to place the blame for it (incorrectly) on a few months of government by a coalition.  The opposition will need all the help it can get in exposing this for the lie that it is, and utilization of increased hours and broadcasting on frequencies that would reach more people here would be of great value.”^[58] The VOA added a special 30-minute morning broadcast. While VOA went to great lengths to ensure that it represented views across the political spectrum, its reporting was critical of the Communists and sympathetic to opposition forces.  With the Communists still controlling and manipulating the media, VOA made a strong effort to provide coverage of opposition forces, thus in a way becoming the voice of the democratic opposition.

            American support for the Albania opposition was clear.  This was reflected in statements by senior State Department officials, the American Embassy in Tirana, and members of the U.S. Congress.  In an interview with VOA, Senator Bob Dole said it was “simple and clear” that, “If democracy wins in these elections in Albania, our relations will be strengthened and developed very rapidly, but if democracy does not win, many doors will be closed for Albania in the United States.”^[59]  Other prominent lawmakers expressed similar sentiments in interviews broadcast by VOA’s Albanian Service.

The Democratic victory in March 1992 signaled the end of Albania’s long Communist nightmare as well as the beginning of a new and very special, strategic relationship between Albania and the United States. Successive American administrations have pursued a consistent policy toward Albania.  America’s vision of Albania has been one of a stable, prosperous, and democratic country with full respect for democratic norms and processes.  Albania has been treated as an important part of Washington’s concept of building a Europe whole and free.  American policymakers have made it clear that it is in the U.S. national interest to see Albania firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic community. While the bilateral relationship has experienced dramatic transformations, the U.S.-Albania dialogue continues to be focused essentially on the same issues as three decades ago: the need for genuine democratization and strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, good governance, and clean elections.

During the last three decades, the United States has been the most important and impactful promoter of Albania’s democratization, providing substantial diplomatic, political, economic, and military support.  As Albania faced the danger of military confrontation with Serbia in the 1990s, Washington forged strong military ties with Tirana.  Albania became a key American partner in the Western Balkans and played an important role in the U.S. strategy of containing the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia and promoting regional peace, stability, and prosperity.  Washington was the driving force behind Kosova’s liberation and independence from Serbia and Albania’s accession to NATO. President George W. Bush choose Tirana, in 2007, to announce U.S. support for Kosova’s independence.  After Kosova’s declaration of independence, the United States undertook a major diplomatic offensive to encourage other countries to recognize the new state.  The U.S. also played a key role in the resolution of the ethnic conflict in North Macedonia, which has led to a significant improvement of the status of Albanians in that country.

In the wake of these momentous events and for the first time in its history, Albania no longer faced a real, external threat to its independence and territorial integrity. Kosova’s independence, Albania’s membership in NATO, and the increasing empowerment of Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro, gave Albanians throughout the region a new sense of confidence and unprecedented security.  Long known as the underdogs in the Balkans, the Albanians had never been in a more favorable geopolitical position.

Albania has become a staunch American ally. Tirana’s foreign policy interests have largely aligned with those of the United States in the Western Balkans: regional political and economic cooperation, the consolidation of Kosova’s statehood, integration of the countries of the region in Euro-Atlantic institutions, and full respect for minority rights.  Albania has been widely praised for its significant contribution to regional stability. Albania has also been very supportive of the U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and joined the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.  The two countries also share the objective of countering Russia’s malice influence and growing destabilizing efforts in the region as well as China’s use of it growing economic power to gain political influence.

During the last three decades, Albania, as well as Albanians in Kosova, Macedonia, and Serbia, has been the focus of considerable attention by Washington.  This has been reflected in regular delegation exchanges, close coordination, and cooperation on various issues of mutual interest, and high-level visits to Tirana. Albanian representatives have had relatively easy access to American policymakers. They have enjoyed bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress.  The most prominent Senators and Congressmen have been supportive of Albanian causes.  And President Joe Biden has had numerous personal contacts with Albanian leaders and is intimately familiar with Albanian issues, particularly Kosova. The strategic partnership between the United States and Albania has transcended changes in each country’s governments.  Albania has enjoyed bipartisan American support. Albania’s major political forces were and are strong proponents of deepening the relationship with the United States.  Albania is one of the most pro-American countries in the world.

While providing support aimed at bolstering Albania’s stability and prosperity, the U.S. has not hesitated to openly call out failures to abide by democratic norms, efforts by the executive to influence or control independent institutions, attacks on the media, election irregularities, and failure to tackle pervasive corruption.  American policymakers and representatives have often been frustrated with the inability or unwillingness of Albanian politicians to find common ground on truly important issues, live up to their commitments and back their statements with concrete actions. There is a huge gap between rhetorical declarations of support for much needed fundamental reforms and actual commitment to reforms. While providing frank criticism of backsliding, the United States has been engaged in a sustained manner in helping Albania confront those challenges. 

Building a viable democracy in Albania remains an important American foreign policy objective.  The United States has been forthright in its support of Albania’s democracy as well as in its criticism of democratic failings. Given the special relationship between the two countries and the highly favorable opinion that Albanians have of America, there is no other country that is in a better position than the United States to help Albania on its democratic path.  The U.S. has the leverage, credibility, and ability to exert positive influence and help Albanians shape a future that fosters an inclusive political process, the rule of law, and effective and accountable governance.

There is no question that since the demise of Communism, Albania has undergone profound transformations and has made great strides in building a functioning procedural democracy and institutionalizing democratic freedoms. Tirana’s profile in the region has been elevated, turning Albania into an increasingly constructive regional player. Nevertheless, three decades after the fall of Communism and after a series of parliamentary elections, there is much that is tentative and fragile about the quality of Albania’s democracy. Albania’s stability and democracy continue to be undermined by the fierce competition between the country’s two largest political forces and their inability to abide by democratic rules, along with poor governance and daunting social and economic challenges.

            The United States has made substantial political and economic investments toward Albania’s democratic development.  Yet despite this unwavering U.S. commitment, Albania’s future democratic development and prosperity will depend on the ability and willingness of its political leaders to put aside their narrow interests.  For in the final analysis, it will be Albania’s leaders who must take responsibility for tackling the myriad uncertainties and daunting challenges that their country faces and build a viable democracy that the Albanian nation has so long aspired to achieve.

Director

Eurasia Division

Voice of America

[1] For a review of Hoxha’s domestic and foreign policies, see Elez Biberaj, Albania and China: a Study of an Unequal Alliance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986) and Albania: A Socialist Maverick (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1990).

[2] Draft Paper Prepared by N. Spencer Barnes of the Policy Planning Staff, “Considerations of Policy Toward Albania and Bulgaria,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960,Vol. X, Part 2, Document 31. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d31.  See also Operations Coordinating Board Report, “Operations Plan for the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe,” July 2, 1959, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, Part 1, Document 18.  http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1/d18.

[3] Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Would Discuss Amity with Albania,” The New York Times, April 5, 1973, p. 3.

[4] A January 1975 State Department memorandum noted that, “We have publicly said that we are ready to talk about resuming diplomatic relations, but Tirana is harshly negative.  We propose to leave the initiative for the time being with the Albanians.”  See “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Springsteen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), January 23, 1975, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 1, Document 12, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p1/d12.

[5] A CIA report in August1987 termed Serbia as the instigator of the ethnic tensions in Kosova and accused Belgrade of using “the ethnic strains as a pretext to reassert control over the Albanian-dominated province.” While the Yugoslav government blamed Albania, the CIA report said, “…we have no solid evidence that Tirana is instigating Albanian separatism in Kosovo by providing arms, funds, or any training.”  See Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tensions Still High in Kosovo, August 20, 1987, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC-0000372029/DOC_0000372029.pdf, p. 4.

[6] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 6.

[7]“Albanian Anniversary,” VOA Editorial, 0-02793 (2AL81), November 28, 1987.

[8] Interview with Thomas Simons, VOA Albanian Service, February 4, 1988.

[9] Interview with James W. Swihart, director of East European Affairs at the State Department, VOA Albanian Service, November 28, 1989.

[10] See Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, “Albania, Last of Stalinist States, May Fall Next,” The Los Angeles Times, January 10, 1990, p. A8.

[11] Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence, Outlook For Eastern Europe in 1990, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, NI IIM 90-10001, February 1990, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000265642/DOC_0000265642.pdf, p. 36.

[12] “The Last Domino,” The New York Times, January 26, 1990, p. A30.

[13] A.D., “Revolts in Albania,” Politika (Belgrade), January 11, 1990, p. 4. “Harsh Security Measures Are Reported in Albania,” The New York Times, January 13, 1990, p. 7.

[14] See David Binder, “Westerners Discount Reports of Unrest in North Albania,” The New York Times, January 31, 1990, p. A12.  Binder quoted Western diplomats and people who reportedly had traveled recently to Albania as saying there had been no demonstrations in Shkodër.

[15] Jonathan C. Randal, “Hard-Line Albania’s Fear of Falling,” The Washington Post, April 2, 1990, p. A1, A16.

[16] See Alia’s speech to the Tenth APL Central Committee plenum on April 17 in Zëri i Popullit, April 21, 1990, p. 3.  See also “Albanian Leader Seeks to Restore Ties With U.S., Soviets,” The Washington Post, April 20, 1990, p. A21; and David Binder, “Hard-Line Albanians Signal Desire to Resume Ties,” The New York Times, April 20, 1990, p. A7.

[17] “Helsinki Commission Chairmen Welcome Albania’s Announcement on Diplomatic Ties; Request Permission to Visit,” CSCE News Release, April 20, 1990.

[18] Norman Kempster, “Ready to Resume Albania Relations, U.S. Says,” The Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1990, p. A7.

[19] David Binder, “Perez de Cuellar Visits Albanians,” The New York Times, May 12, 1990, p. 6.

[20] David Binder, “Albanian Leader Says the Country Will Be Democratized but Will Retain Socialism,” New York Times, May 14, 1990, p. A10.

[21] “Helsinki Commission Welcomes Albanian Desire To Participate in Helsinki Process and Improve Human Rights Record,” U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE News Release, May 10, 1990

[22] In a December 1989 report, the Minnesota Lawyers Committee released what was dubbed as the most comprehensive and objective study of the violation of human rights in Albania.  See Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, Human Rights in the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania (Minneapolis, MN, 1990).

[23] Quoted in The Financial Times, June 7, 1990, p. 14.

[24] C.L. Sulzberger, “Albania and America: Talking Again,” The International Herald Tribune, June 29, 1990.

[25] Frances d’Emilio, “Albania Seeks Full U.S. Diplomatic Links,” The Washington Post, May 31, 1990, p. A34.

[26] Interview with Rep. Tom Lantos was aired on June 16, 1990.

[27] VOA Albanian Service, June 13, 1990.

[28] A VOA editorial, reflecting the U.S. official view, noted that, “The U.S. understands that several changes have been made recently in the Albanian government, including the removal of some opponents of reform.  The U.S. hopes these changes will lead to needed political reform in Albania, so that the Albanian people can join the rest of Central and Eastern Europe in moving toward freedom and democracy.” “Albanians Seek Freedom,” VOA Editorial, 0-04172, July 11, 1990.

[29] “Albania Says West Causing Travel Delays,” The Washington Post, July 9, 1990, p. A16.

[30] “Helsinki Commission Delegation Visits Albania, Establishes Dialogue on Human Rights,” U.S. Helsinki Commission, press release, August 22, 1990.

[31] Interview with Senator Dennis DeConcini, VOA Albanian Service, September 16, 1990.

[32] Xhelil Gjoni, “As Always – Like a Fist Round the Party,” Zëri i Popullit, July 14, 1990, pp. 1-2.

[33] The Western media reported that the opinion of the embassy refugees was predominantly negative toward Kadare.  Some “scoffed at the mention of Kadare’s name,” identifying him as too close to the regime.  See Mary Battiata, “After Refugees Have Gone, Questions About Albania Remain,” The Washington Post, July 23, 1990, p. A13.

[34] Ismail Kadare, “‘Knives’: An Important Novel in the Albanian Literature,” Drita, October 15, 1989, p.11.

[35]Ismail Kadare, “Literature and Today’s Society,” Drita, November 19, 1989, pp. 5-6.

[36] Interview with Ismail Kadare by Chief Editor Remzi Lani, “Literature, Time, and Albanian Civilization,” Zëri i Rinisë, March 21, 1990, p. 4.

[37] Ismail Kadare, Nga një dhjetor në tjetrin [From One December to the Other] (Paris: Fayard, 1991).

[38] Interview with Fatos Nano, VOA Albanian Service, August 2, 1990.

[39] Interview with Aleks Luarasi, VOA Albanian Service, August 23, 1990.

[40] Interview with Ismail Kadare, VOA Albanian Service, September 23, 1990.

[41] ATA in English 0800 GMT, 29 September 1990, in FBIS-EEU-990-190, October 1, 1990.

[42]Bashkimi, October 3, 1990, p. 1.

[43]Teddie Weyr, “Troops, Tanks Deployed To Stop Albanian Unrest,” The Washington Post, December 15, 1990, p. A13, and David Binder, “Protests Against Communists Continue in Albania,” The New York Times, December 16, 1990.

[44] David Binder, “Restore Ties With Albania, Opposition Urges U.S.,” The New York Times, December 26, 1990, p. A5.

[45] Ibid.

[46] “U.S., Albania to Resume Diplomatic Relations After 52 Years,” The Washington Post, March 13, 1991.

[47] State Department spokesman Richard Boucher emphasized that “leaders of the democratic opposition in Albania had urged Washington to resume ties [with Albania] as soon as possible.”  Ibid.

[48] The U.S. Helsinki Commission delegation to Albania consisted of Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona), Representative Robert Dornan (R-California), Representative Bob McEwen (R-Ohio), Representative Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico), and Representative Clay Shaw, Jr. (R-Florida) as well as a number of Helsinki Commission and Congressional Staff, including Bob Hand.  Hand, a leading expert and author of numerous reports on Albania and the Balkans, has the distinction of having observed Albania’s 1991, 1992, 1996, 1997, 2001, and 2005 elections.

[49] President Carter’s letter to Berisha was broadcast by VOA’s Albanian Service on March 29, 1991, in its 2:30PM show.

[50] James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), p. 484.

[51]Ibid., pp. 484-86. 

[52]Bureau of Public Affairs, The U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, no. 26, July 1, 1991, pp. 466-67.

[53] Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 262.

[54] Zëri i Popullit, June 23, 1990.

[55] Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, p. 266.

[56] Interview with Ambassador William Ryerson, VOA Albanian Service, November 28, 1991. The transcript of the interview also appeared in Agjencia Telegrafike Shqiptare, Buletini i radiove te huaja ne gjuhen shqipe, no. 594, November 29, 1991, pp. 1-3.

[57] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Briefing Report for the Albanian Elections, March 22 and 29, 1992 (Washington, D.C., 1992), and The International Republican Institute, Trip Report: Albania Staff Mission, 9-16 December 1991 (Washington, D.C., 1991).

[58] Message from Ambassador William Ryerson faxed to the U.S. Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and VOA, January 12, 1992.

[59] Senator Bob Dole’s interview with VOA was republished in Tribuna Demokratike, March 21, 1992, p. 1.

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Albin Kurti’s Vetevendosje landslide victory on February 14 elections this year came as blow to the old elite of post-war Kosovo. He was elected Prime Minister after years of struggling in the streets of Kosovo against almost everyone. The Self-Determination Movement (Vetevendojse in Albanian) was founded as a protest grassroots movement while Kosovo was under the administration of the international community in the 2000s and then was transformed into a political party after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008.

Unlike most parties in the Balkans, Vetevendojse was inspired by leftist anti-colonial movements of the modern era mixed with a fervent nationalist rhetoric. In the 2000s Albin Kurti focused his movement’s target against international community’s policies in Kosovo. He opposed every single proposal of the internationals on the final status question of Kosovo, including Marti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status (Ahtisaari Plan) which ultimately granted Kosovo independence from Serbia. Kurti insisted Kosovo should unite with Albania through a national referendum. This way, Kosovo’s final status would be solved in line with the principle of self-determination of nations. Though Pristina declared its independence from Serbia according to the Ahtisaari Plan which prohibits the unification of Kosovo with any other country, Albin Kurti continued flying the banner of unification with Albania what rightly gave him a nationalist outlook.

Nevertheless, while Kosovo entered the post-independence era, Vetevendosje’s nationalist rhetoric waned. Kurti’s public discourse twisted more towards anti-corruption, employment and fight for justice spectres as Kosovo exhibited major flaws in these areas. The unemployment rate among the youth was reported to a high record of more than 40%, whereas corruption became a wide spread phenomenon and inequality increased. This brought about massive dissatisfaction among Kosovo citizens which was harnessed politically by Vetevendosje. Kurti stepped into the shoes of modern politicians and pressed the right buttons of the electorate. During the last electoral campaign Vetevendosje put forward a highly ambitious political manifesto on employment, economic equality and social justice. The leader of Vetevendosje deliberately downplayed the importance of one of the most pressing issues Kosovo’s statehood faces internally and externally, the dialogue with Serbia.

Being aware of unrealistic pledges Kurti made to the people of Kosovo on the road to the post of Premiership, he is now trying to deflect public’s attention from the acute challenges Kosovo faces both domestically and internationally by playing out with Albanians’ national sentiments. Kurti appeals to the idea of portraying himself as a leader that speaks to all Albanians in the region.

 On April 25, Kurti became the first incumbent Prime Minister of Kosovo to go and cast the ballot in Albania’s general elections. Two weeks ahead of elections, he appeared by the side of Vetevendosje’s (a separate branch of his party in Albania in opposition with Prime Minister Rama) candidate for MP in the historic city of Lezha. He openly called on Albanian citizens to vote for change. This interference in domestic affairs of Albania may not only lead to unnecessary tensions of Kosovo’s relations with the incumbent Albanian government, but also send wrong signals to the region and Western powers. Viola von Cramon, the rapporteur for Kosovo at the European Parliament, considered unacceptable that Albin Kurti voted for the elections in Albania. The same reaction came from Richard Grenell, former special envoy of President Trump for Pristina-Belgrade dialogue. At the end of the day why on earth should the international community work to strengthen Kosovo’s statehood while the incumbent Prime Minister does not fully believe in this project?

Kurti must know that Western powers are terrified of nationalist projects like Great Serbia and Great Albania. They have invested billions of dollars and massive human resources to secure peace and stability in the Balkans by cooling down ethnic divisions and preventing hyper nationalist projects. Therefore, instead of feeding international media outlets and Western powers with empty nationalist rhetoric, Kurti would better take tangible actions to foster Kosovo’s economic and cultural ties with Albania and other counties in the region. Both Albania and Kosovo can also align their foreign policies on national interests without ringing the bell of old-fashioned nationalism.

In the same vein, Prime Minister Kurti doesn’t seem ready to cope with the heavy burden of the EU mediated dialogue on normalisation of relations with Serbia. While in opposition, he has attacked every single agreement Kosovo has signed with Serbia. This has left him little room for manoeuvre now that he sits in the office of the Prime Minister and has to take tough decisions. That’s why his approach to the dialogue seems to be more tactical than genuinely concerned with a realist outcome. Whilst the international pressure is mounting on him to resume the EU mediated dialogue with Serbia, Kurti vowed to sue Serbia for genocide in the International Court of Justice. This may be right from a historical and justice perspective, but it does not really address the biggest problem Kosovo faces in international arena, striking a final comprehensive agreement with Serbia based on mutual recognition which would open the door of UN and other international organisations membership. Though, the EU mediated dialogue with Serbia has produces no sweet fruits for Kosovo, the incumbent Prime Minister in Pristina should not hinder it by misusing national and war legacy sentiments. He better engages smartly with the dialogue to flip the side of the international community to Kosovo when US-EU relations seem to have gained their pace after Joe Biden entered the White House this year.

In this regard, somebody close to Albin Kurti should shake him up and remind that now is the Prime Minister of Kosovo not the snobby rebellious of his early days. He should act like a Prime Minister and take decisions that benefit Kosovo and its citizens. A significant first step in this direction is to drop nationalist rhetoric and live up to the promises he made to the people.

 *Altin Gjeta holds a Master of Arts in International Relations and Politics from University of Westminster, London. He wrote his MA thesis on “Multiethnic Statebuilding in Kosovo”. Currently Altin is a visiting lecturer in politics at University of “Aleksander Moisiu” in Durres, Albania.

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There is a spectre haunting Europe, the spectre of partition, as authoritarian populists in the region and in the European Union itself have sought to expand the realm of the possible to include a final regional carve-up that would not only be detrimental to the region, but would demonstrate that the EU itself is on a downward trajectory, moving far away from the goals of a continent that is whole, free and at peace.

In spite of all the denials and disclaimers, it seems clear that the non-paper “Western Balkans – a way forward” – a document that explicitly proposes the redrawing of borders in the region according to ethno-national/territorial groupings – exists, though its origins and intent remain in doubt.

It was billed as having been promulgated by Slovenian prime minister Janez Janša; Albanian prime minister Edi Rama confirmed he was consulted about it.

In addition, the confirmation and later denial of having received the document by the office of the president of the European Council points in the same direction, indicating that the EU institutions were in fact presented with it.

Such ideas and agendas never left the minds of ambitious nationalist ideologies, but they resurface with virulent danger because the EU and the US have not demonstrated sufficiently strategic, constructive and credible engagement in the region for a decade and a half.

This most recent paper could be a more serious project than many would like to think, playing to Russia’s advantage. New chaos in the Balkans seems to suits Moscow.

Donald Trump’s rise, his transactional worldview, his contempt for liberal values, and his general disinterest in the Balkans was taken as a cue by regional leaders to pursue their own illiberal interests without artifice or restraint.

It led to the embrace of the proposed partition of Kosovo already in 2016, resurfacing in 2018 marketed with euphemistic labels (“land swap,” “demarcation,” or”border correction”), but not camouflaging their wider intentions.

This was the final straw for a West’s zombie policy in the region – the borders of the Western Balkan states was the only real stable element, and they were by implication as a whole guaranteed by the settlements at Dayton, Kumanovo, Ohrid, and the Montenegrin independence referendum.

Elite nationalist agendas never disappeared in the Balkans; they had been suppressed and deterred by a West that hoped the EU enlargement process would obviate the need for deterrence.

In the meantime, the EU’s transformational potential decreased, liberal values lost primacy and local leaders took advantage of the strategic vacuum left by the West to deploy their manipulative policies.

The global crisis of democratic liberalism laid bare the fragility of democracies – including in the western Balkans. They increasingly turned to illiberal practices, growing authoritarianism and all forms of (conservative) far-right populism.

The standard definition of stupidity: Repeating the same unsuccessful procedures, hoping that they will produce a different result.

At this point in time the only really stable element in terms of relations among the Balkan states are the borders.

Even very minor changes and disputes, real or fabricated, produced long-term and complicated disputes.

Prejudicial tropes

In addition, the non-paper is unhelpful for the prejudicial and orientalist tropes it perpetuates.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a state of Islamic fundamentalism, nor a Turkish proxy.

This is a myth and a lie perpetuated by violent nationalists since the earliest days of wartime ethnic cleansing, seeking to justify their own territorial ambitions, while also creating an “us and the other” aimed to implode the formerly diverse country.

Although nobody expects that the redrawing of borders in the Balkans is realistic at this point in time – nor that it could be done without bloodshed or massive population movements – the infamous non-paper has in a way already achieved its purpose by setting a bar for the most extreme and outlandish idea.

By suggesting a future defined by a shrivelled and land-locked Bosnia-Herzegovina, an amputated North Macedonia and a Kosovo grafted onto Albania, one can see that either the authors don’t envision an EU future for these countries, or see a future of an EU that is more nationalist/populist and less value-based itself.

No EU future?

Yet once on paper, what was unthinkable before, is a picture in people’s minds today.

Do the Balkan states have serious problems? Yes. Are they driven more by poor governance and self-serving and corrupt elites? Of course. Should we start solving these problems with the help of an active involvement of international anti-chaos alliance? Absolutely.

But giving in to the chauvinist passions of the worst among the Balkan politicians cannot assist in this process. It would be like trying to deal with race-relations through apartheid.

One should make no mistake: The non-paper is not a proposal for the last step in dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the first step in a plan for the dissolution of the EU.

The challenge of fostering a conducive environment for citizens in the Western Balkans to develop functioning, prosperous democracies is within the West’s capacity to meet, if it can summon the vision and will.

These remain lacking to date.

The general disposition of US president Joe Biden is clear on values; we have yet to see this demonstrated convincingly in practice in the Western Balkans.

The EU also has strong values assets, but these have been devalued through inattention, lack of leadership, and avowed illiberalism in the EU’s own ranks.

The West’s comparative advantages vis á vis authoritarian geopolitical challengers begin with liberal democratic values, followed by relative security and economic preponderance. Balkan leaders know this, but have never had to pay a price for radically deviating from democratic norms or advocating dangerous irridentism.

Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić has been the greatest beneficiary of the West’s rudderlessness, taking full advantage through a policy of arbitrage and regional power politics.

Given the EU’s current interregnum – the end of the Merkel era in Germany and France’s president Emmanuel Macron leaning ever rightward – there is no critical mass among member states to align on foreign policy matters. Therefore, the US must once again take a leadership role in rallying the West around a new strategic policy to ensure peace, progress, and prosperity in the Western Balkans.

Vesna Pusić was Croatian minister of foreign and European affairs from 2011 to2016.

 Sonja Biserko is founder and president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

The post The ‘non-paper’ Carving up Balkans and Undermining Europe appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Almost 20 years ago, in 2003, the European future of the Western Balkans looked secure: The European Council had adopted the Thessaloniki Agenda. This was a new and comprehensive roadmap, developed with concrete benchmarks, to safely guide the countries of the region to European Union membership.

The prospect of membership in a common family of European values provided enthusiasm and the impetus for change in these countries. It also brought hope that peace finally would be embedded – replacing conflict – and that democratic rule of law would reign – replacing authoritarianism, persecution of minorities and human rights violations. Prosperity would be the common goal uniting former foes in a beautiful kaleidoscope of ethnic diversity and traditions. This vision was to bring closure to the Balkan tragedy of the 1990s.

Since then the EU has done too little, too late. While Slovenia became an EU member in 2004, Croatia was the last of the region to be accepted, in 2013. And although Serbia and Montenegro have started accession negotiations, and Albania and North Macedonia have received the green light to begin negotiations, no starting date for them has been announced.

The consequence is that this vision is losing its shine. In its place nationalism has resurfaced with a renewed assertiveness. This trend in not exclusive to the Balkans. A resurgence of nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment is found in many corners of Europe, if not the world, possibly due to similar reasons: the failure of global cooperation to effectively deal with issues of inequality and social protection, population movements, health and environmental crises.

However, there is an important difference in the Western Balkans. The wounds of bloody conflict are fresh. And reverting to nationalism and cynical transactional foreign relations, an easy task for demagogues, risks reopening these wounds and conflicts.

It is no wonder we are also seeing a new geopoliticization in the region. As the prospects of EU membership pale it is understandable that regional actors are looking for new alliances, support and investment. This cannot be condemned in and of itself. Whether it is Russia or China or others such as players from the Middle East, building new ties is part of geopolitics. But as a region we will soon see competing proxy alliances that could further exacerbate divisions and conflicts. It is also tempting to stray from the European path in favor of going it alone (the UK did) in the hope of better and quicker (particularly) economic results.

But beyond the fragility of these economies, now further burdened by the pandemic, we may also see the values of European democracy severely challenged, and a vision of a unified Balkans around these values undermined.

The EU therefore needs to understand that nothing can be taken for granted.

Two non-papers have been circulating during recent weeks: the “Slovenian non-paper” and the “Franco-German non-paper.” They seem to underestimate the dangers and may open Pandora’s box once more in the Balkans.

The authors of these seem to be imbued with a frustration concerning the chronic problems the breakup of Yugoslavia has brought upon the region. However, the danger with these widely circulated non-papers is that they want to “finalize the breakup of former Yugoslavia.” What do they mean?

In essence, they propose finalizing the breakup of former Yugoslavia through new border changes and land swaps. In fact they want to continue where the Yugoslav wars stopped and further promote mono-ethnic or “ethnically pure” states.

But this was the core problem of the breakup. Ethnically pure states are a dystopia. They do not exist in reality. And when Yugoslavia did break up in the 90s ethnic cleansing was partially accomplished with massacres and bloodbaths.

Finishing up this job is the philosophy behind these non-papers.

Needless to say, these scenarios are a recipe for disaster as, if taken seriously, they could destroy all that we have accomplished together, with respect to human and democratic rights in the region since the mid-90s.

This is not the first time that the idea of territorial changes in the region has been discussed. During summer 2018, the idea of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia was discussed among some circles in Brussels and in Washington. Strong reactions from different sides halted all discussion – but it seems only for a while.

One truly wonders how leaders in the EU could sign off on such a proposal. Is the solution to our conflicts a redrawing of borders, along ethnic lines? This “final solution” caters to the worst of populistic xenophobia. It undermines any sense of conviviality in the Balkan Peninsula and carries dire overtones for diversity and tolerance in an ethnically diverse European Union.

We in the EU have the collective responsibility to speak out loudly and clearly and put an end to this debate.

One must realize that it is in fact the inertia of the EU in the region, since 2013, that has permitted these deadly scenarios to resurface.

The EU may still be the major trading partner of the Western Balkans with more that 75% of the total trade. However, the recurring debate on territorial changes and land swaps in the Western Balkans undermines the stability and the future of a tormented region which wishes to move beyond these conflicts.

We in the EU can no longer act as sleepwalkers, passively waiting for violence to erupt. Shortsighted and self-serving strategies of some member-states, illiberal and authoritarian approaches, and petty political calculations to muster support through fearmongering and xenophobia cannot be the way forward to the Balkans’ unfinished business.

A concerted and dynamic approach toward the region, based on the Thessaloniki decisions of 2003, is once more needed. One that renews a concrete strategy for the Balkans, a region in its inner courtyard, which should never again be drawn into conflict.

We therefore propose a recalibration of our policy and a renewed Western Balkan strategy.

This could take place as an “EU Conference on the Western Balkans” in order to openly discuss the new challenges for the region and map out a comprehensive plan with the governments of the region.

Rather than touting the chimera of “ethnically clean” societies, we need to reignite the vision of a Balkan Peninsula united through European values and democratic traditions, those that inspire us to live together, respecting and reveling in the beauty of our diversity.

The peoples of the Balkans would welcome this approach, if the EU once again uses its potential, steps up to the challenge and leads with its values.

George A. Papandreou, former prime minister of Greece, is president of Socialist International.

The post Europe and the Balkans – opening Pandora’s box? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Abstract

The recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Israel in September of 2020 is a very important geopolitical issue, as it has an impact on developments in the Middle East and the Western Balkans. Also, due to all parallels or artificial similarities between them, this recognition confirmed that Kosovo’s independence would set a legitimate precedent for Palestinians, at the same time leaving other cases within Spain, Slovakia, Romania and other non-recognizing countries unstable. What is unique in the case of Kosovo is the fact that this recognition is mediated and supported by the USA, whereas the EU and the Arab League were unsupportive due to the fact that Kosovo plans to open its embassy in Jerusalem. But, despite these attitudes, the leadership of Kosovo has shown determination to fulfill this commitment that is part of the agreement of September 4th signed in Washington by Kosovo and Serbia, under the mediation of the Administration of President Donald Trump.

However, one of the key questions that inevitably arises is why recognition by Israel was so important to Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians have always identified their fate, long suffering under foreign occupation and cyclical deportations, with the fate of the Jews. Moreover, they consider that the two countries owe the USA for their existence. Moreover, in the history of the two nations we find many similar points, historical parallels and, above all, an excellent cooperation since the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. And exactly five decades after the Jewish people survived the Holocaust and declared the independent state of Israel, the American-Jewish political and diplomatic elite came to the forefront, showing increased interest in the cause of Kosovo Albanians during the 1990s. And without such support, which led to NATO military intervention in 1999, Kosovo’s freedom and independence would be inconceivable.

In this context, what remains impressive is that the small Albanian people of Kosovo, long oppressed by the Ottoman and Serbian state, offered their assistance to the Jewish community during World War II, when they were facing total annihilation by the Nazi German regime. Recently, books and studies have been published in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania that reflect the authentic stories of members of the Jewish community in which this forgotten contribution is documented and affirmed. The historical presence of a small Jewish community in Kosovo can serve as a major impetus for rapprochement and cooperation between the two peoples, who have never had any visible issues.

Key Words: Jewish community, Kosovo’s independence, Israel, USA, EU, Holocaust, Vilayet of Kosovo, Palestine, diplomatic relations, NATO, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian intervention.

Introduction

13 years after the declaration of independence, Kosovo has been recognized by more than half of the world’s countries, by 117 United Nations countries.  But the recognition by Israel is of particular importance, due to the fact that it dispels all the taboos, claims and parallels used by non-recognizing countries that the case of Kosovo will set an unwanted precedent. In this context, this recognition has confirmed that the refusal of recognition by the five EU countries results in instability, both politically and legally. Mutual recognition between Kosovo and Israel is part of the agreement of September 4th, 2020 in Washington, which deals with the normalization of economic relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo has also committed to open its diplomatic mission in Jerusalem, whereas Serbia has committed to move its existing embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

In order to better understand the history of relations between Kosovo Albanians and Jews, namely Israel, this paper presents a detailed picture of the presence of the historical Jewish community in the Balkan region, namely in the present territory of Kosovo. So, this paper deals with the history of relations between Kosovo Albanians and the historical Jewish community from the period of the Ottoman state until today. On this occasion, parallels have been drawn in time between the political and cultural aspirations of Jews and Kosovars on their path to creating their own identities and independent states. At the end of the 20th century, when the socialist system ended in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, there was a lack of a complete and comprehensive treatment of Albanian-Jewish relations. Among the Albanians, tradition comprised a largely oral history, both for their national events and for their contacts and relations with the Jewish community in the former Vilayet of Kosovo.^[2] As a result, this story, as well as the alignment of Kosovo Albanians alongside Jews threatened by Nazi terror, were superficially recognized even in academic circles. Even the few studies that existed in the period of socialism did not lack certain ideological constructs and prejudices.

The story of the salvation of the Jews must be written continuously, because this is an affirmative chapter in the relations between the two peoples, that will serve generations of friendly ties. Undoubtedly, a special merit for the beginning of a more special treatment of the presence of the historical Jewish community in Kosovo and the region belongs to the well-known British historian Noel Malcom who, in his book on the history of Kosovo^[3], draws attention to this community and gives us a genuine scientific picture far from myth. Jews in Kosovo and other Albanian areas are a very important community in the Albanian environment, a harmonious environment in terms of minorities. The thesis comes as a genuine scientific study, far from the myths surrounding the reasons for rescuing and protecting Jews from extermination throughout history, with particular emphasis during World War II. It is a confirmed fact that Kosovo served as a safe place and transit to Albania for citizens from different countries in the region and Europe with different citizenships, but belonging to the Jewish nationality, who found salvation and protection among the Albanians. This contribution has also been documented by Albanian authors Shaban Sinani,^[4] Monika Stafa^[5], and  Jakoel Josef, a Jewish author from Tirana, who collectively illuminate the contribution of Albanians in the salvation and protection of the Jewish population throughout history. An admirable work in this direction is recently being done by the Institute of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians in Skopje, which has recently published studies (Skënder Asani and Albert Ramaj)^[6], and memoirs of Jewish families (Mimi Kamhi Ergas-Faragi)^[7] that survived the Holocaust during World War II. Faragi^[8], and the motive behind her work, contributed to my conversation in October 2019 with the Israeli Ambassador to Tirana, Noah Gal Gendler, a diplomat with an extensive career and knowledge of the region. He had advised me that more should be spoken and written on this topic, in order to make known the contribution of a small country to the salvation and protection of the Jews from danger during the course of history, with special emphasis during World War II.^[9] Therefore, in this paper, based on new recently published studies and documents, we have tried to provide a more original insight to the presence of the Jewish community in Kosovo, their relations with Kosovo Albanians in different historical periods. Here is evidenced the contribution of Jewish personalities to the culture and history of Albanians, with special emphasis on Kosovo, but which to date has been recognized in a peripheral way by Albanians themselves. Undoubtedly, a central spot has been dedicated to the assistance and contribution of Kosovo Albanians, who themselves had been persecuted by the Serbian governments in Belgrade, in rescuing the Jewish community from Nazi persecution during World War II.

The issue of relations between Kosovo Albanians and Jews gained a new dimension after the end of the Cold War, when the ranks of the American-Jewish political and intellectual elite – the likes of Tom Latosh, Eliot Engel, Elie Wisel, Medeline Albright and many others – became strong spokesmen for the more powerful involvement of the USA administration in Kosovo in 1989/1999, namely the voice of concern about the persecution of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian regime of Milosevic. Eliot Wiesel^[10], a Holocaust survivor, Nobel laureate and international human rights activist, called in 1999 to stop Milosevic and support NATO intervention in Kosovo. “This situation (in Kosovo) requires action,”^[11] was his message to US President Bill Clinton.

The last part deals with the role of the Israeli state and humanitarian organizations in providing assistance to the Albanian civilian population deported during 1998-1999 by the Milosevic regime, which will be remembered for the most serious crimes since the end of World War II. In this line, one thing is certain: the airstrikes, which were supported by the most powerful voices of the Jewish political and intellectual elite, paved the way for Kosovo’s independence and influenced the progressive development of international law. Whereas the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by Israel marks a very important moment in consolidating Kosovo’s international position and its integration into international organizations. What happened on February 1st, 2021 in Prishtina and Tel Aviv, which was considered a unique, important diplomatic event to the US Department of State as well. In addition, the development of Kosovo-Israel relations is a development which signals the non-recognizing countries, i.e., the five EU countries, that it is time to deepen their cooperation with Kosovo and give up the non-recognition attitude. On the other hand, Brussels and the Arab League have not welcomed the formalization of relations between the two countries, especially the establishment of the Kosovo embassy in Jerusalem.^[12] This is a turning point in Kosovo’s foreign policy, a delicate step at a time when Brussels is aiming to restore the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and reach an agreement on the normalization of relations between the two Balkan countries.

The questions that inevitably arise when we talk about the recognition of Kosovo by Israel are the following: What will be the future objectives of the USA in relation to Kosovo? Why did the USA support this recognition? What will be the actions of the EU and the Arab League regarding Kosovo’s decision to open a Kosovo embassy in Jerusalem? What will be the impact of this recognition in relation to the five EU countries and the Vatican that have not yet recognized Kosovo?

Regardless of the forthcoming debate on this issue and diplomatic alternatives, this recognition breaks all taboos and imaginary paradigms regarding the reasons for non-recognition of Kosovo, and proves that independence of Kosovo is “sui generis.” And as Yonatan Touval says, as an analyst at the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, “For the 12 years since Kosovo declared its independence, history has shown that it has not had a negative impact on [Israel’s] conflict with the Palestinians.”^[13]

Parallels in History and culture

Just a month before the declaration of the independence of Kosovo, in a public letter published in The Jerusalem Post on January 2nd, 2008, Political Science Professor Shlomo Avineri at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem wrote: “As Jews, who have been stateless for a long time, many of us understand and support their [Kosovar Albanians’] cause for self-determination and independence.”^[14]

The comparative remark of Professor Avineri is a meaningful parallel which points out that the two countries, as relatively small nations, have always fought for their right to live in freedom. The similarity of their historical journeys to freedom has led to reciprocal understanding, which was precisely the reason why Albanians offered shelter, protection and hospitality to the Jewish community in response to the horrors of World War II. Half a century later, it was the Jews, their diaspora, and the state of Israel that came to the aid of Kosovo Albanians, who were the target of the 1998-1999 genocidal threat by the fascist regime of Milosevic.

It is no coincidence that Milosevic’s crimes in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are in many ways comparable to those of Hitler and among the most serious crimes that have been carried out since World War II ended. According to Human Rights Watch and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nobody could have predicted the speed and scale of deportations of the Albanian civilian population within three months, March-May 1999, by the Serbian forces. These figures indicate that by early June 1999, more than 80 percent of the entire population of Kosovo and 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians were displaced from their homes.^[15]

The extermination attempts towards the two ethnic communities within a fifty-year span had tremendous impact on international law, marking fundamental positive changes. The atrocities the Jewish community experienced during World War II resulted in the independence of Israel, just one day after Britain’s withdrawal from the country in May 1948. The persecution and expulsion of Kosovo Albanians under the Yugoslav communist regime – precisely under the Serbian one – continued till the moment NATO intervened for humanitarian and regional security reasons, after the regime refused to agree on any compromise or political solution. The US and the EU were determined to show the Serbian regime in Belgrade that late 20th-century Europe reflected that of 1937, when the Munich Agreement was signed.

The intervention was undoubtedly the result of the democratic developments that took place after the end of the Cold War, when human rights were favored over state sovereignty. At the same time, the NATO intervention paved the way for the UN civilian and military administration in Kosovo. Under the mediation of UN Special Envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, exhaustive Albania-Serbia negotiations were held regarding the final status of Kosovo, and, in compliance with the recommendations of the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovo declared its independence on February 17th, 2008.^[16]

Most of the countries that recognized Kosovo’s independence, such as the US and those within the EU, justified their decisions arguing that Kosovo’s independence was a unique, unprecedented exception – sui generis – and it could not be compared to other cases elsewhere.^[17] Those countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s statehood, including Russia – which has recently annexed Crimea – China, Iran, and Syria, justify their non-recognition by referring to international law. This is in spite of the fact that in 2010, the International Court of Justice concluded that Kosovo’s independence does not violate any international law.^[18]

Belgrade’s opposition to Kosovo’s statehood is reminiscent of the denial of the state of Israel by some Middle Eastern countries, primarily Iran and Syria, as well as anti-Semitic groups such as Hezbollah. Their example has been actually embraced by Belgrade, which, apart from during the world war periods, has brutally ruled Kosovo since 1912. It is sabotaging and trying by all means to curb the internal and international consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood. Belgrade often makes use of offensive language and racist tones, such as the use of the detrimental term “shiftari“^[19] instead of the international term “Albanian.” Furthermore, the current Serbian government makes use of the very same policies followed by the Milosevic regime; it manipulates certain political groups of local Serbs, which make up about 5 percent of Kosovo’s population. These are mainly controlled by the supporters of the current Serbian President Vucic and other criminal groups established during the Milosevic regime, within Serbian settlements in Kosovo.

Among other things, Belgrade’s hostile attitude towards Kosovo’s independence is identical both in form and content to the Serbian hegemonic attitude and mentality towards Albania, in the first half of the 20^th century. In 1912 Serbian diplomacy claimed that the independence of Albania “is desired neither by us nor by Europe.” Similarly, in relation to the issue of Kosovo’s independence, it was not solely stipulated that it allegedly violated international law; it was also systematically promoted as a policy of division and violation of territorial integrity, speculations to which Kosovo was familiar following the establishment of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974.

Unlike Belgrade, the other non-recognizing countries – including the five of the EU – have never been considered by Kosovo as states with hostile intentions towards Kosovo. Rather, their stances have been interpreted as interest-determined approaches as well as attitudes for national and regional balance. However, after the July 2010 verdict of the International Court of Justice – the highest institution of justice of the UN – clearly stipulated that the declaration of Kosovo’s independence had violated neither international law nor UN norms, Kosovo has incessantly argued that there is no political or legal argument to delay its recognition. No parallels could be drawn between Kosovo and Catalonia^[20] or Palestine, whereas the Crimea occupied by Russia is utterly a different issue. Above all, the statehood of Kosovo must be considered within the context of the dissolution of the multinational Yugoslav state, which resulted in the creation of six new states, as it was the case with the dissolutions of the Soviet Union, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Nevertheless, the recognition of Kosovo by about 120 countries has openly demonstrated that the claims and so-called “arguments” of Serbia are unsustainable. The recent recognition of Kosovo by Israel on September 4, 2020^[21], is also noteworthy. Without a doubt, it was undertaken thanks to the contribution of the most important ally of Kosovo, the United States of America. The timing and the mode of this recognition has special significance for Kosovo. It debunks Belgrade’s attempt to draw an artificial parallelism between the state of Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority, which, due to its “rock-hard brotherhood with Serbia” voted against Kosovo’s membership in INTERPOL.^[22]

The Albanian Movement for Independence and Jewish Zionism

The efforts of the Albanians and those of the Jews for national emancipation developed roughly at the same period of time, both having belonged to the Ottoman Empire, precisely during the period of Sultan Abdyl Hamid II’s rule. In the last decades of the 19^th century, while the Ottoman vilayets containing Albanian populations launched the Albanian Movement for Independence – known in historiography as the Albanian League of Prizren (1878) – under the leadership of Abdyl Frashëri, a great Jewish visionary, the famous Zionist Theodor Herzl (1860- 1904), was trying to persuade Istanbul to allow the nucleic foundation of a Jewish state in the Palestinean territory^[23]. Just like the demands of the League of Prizren^[24], Herzl’s requests were turned down by the sultan. It is argued that the Ottoman Empire, at the time dealing with armed movements of Armenians in Asia Minor and elsewhere, was not eager to support ideas that could lead to the creation of new states within its territory. It feared further disintegration.

Nonetheless, during this period, the European interest towards the Albanian cause and the “Holy Land” increased. This coincided with the introduction of the new Jewish colonies that settled in Palestine. In the first Zionist Congress, which was held in Basel in 1897, Herzl coined the idea to establish a Jewish state. Indeed, in his diary, later included in his book The Old New Land (1902)^[25], he would write: “In Basel I founded the Jewish State.”^[26] At the time, Sami Frashëri (1850-1904), one of the great ideologues of Albanian Renaissance, was drafting the first political treatise for the establishment of the independent state of Albanians, ” Albania – What It Was, What It Is and What Will Become of It.” It was published in 1899 in a printing house in Bucharest, far from Constantinople, where the imperial authorities had banned the publication of texts in Albanian.^[27]

Obviously, the violent response of the Empire to suppress the Albanian Renaissance Movement, and its later concession in favor of the Balkan states in the Congress of Berlin, had a crucial impact on Sami Frashëri. On the other hand, the decisive turn for Herzl that marked his conversion to Zionism took place while he was working in Paris, as a correspondent for the prestigious Viennese newspaper Neue Freie Presse.^[28] It was the time of the Dreyfus^[29] case, a notorious anti-Semitic incident in France, which led to the set up trial of a Jewish captain of the French army on the false accusation of spying for the Germans.^[30] “If you want [a Jewish state], this is no dream,” Herzl claimed as the father of Zionism. Indeed, half a century later this was a reality pioneered by enthusiastic Zionist David Ben-Gurion, first prime minister of the State of Israel.^[31]

Hasan Prishtina and Alber Antebi

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 created the impression that the attitude of the new Ottoman government would favor the Albanian National Movement and the Zionist movement, considering the speculated influence of the Albanian and Jewish elements on the Young Turk party “Unity and Progress.” Taking this in consideration, prominent figures of the Albanian movement, such as Hasan Prishtina (1873 –1933), as well as their Zionist counterparts, such as Jewish community leader Albert Antebi (1873-1919)^[32], welcomed the political change. However, these figures eventually realized the fact that the Ottomans opposed any separatist tendency, rejecting the Albanian and Jewish demands, the way they rejected the Armenian ones. In the meantime, Albanian and Jewish politicians started to defy the “Turkism” policy and ask for more autonomy for the Ottoman vilayets. The rise of this opposition signified hope for both Albanians, as well as the Jewish population in Palestine.

As one of the main ideologues of national Albanian emancipation, and the leader of the Albanian struggle against Serbian occupation, the prominent Kosovo Albanian politician Hasan Prishtina^[33] commanded the Albanian rebellion and passed the demands of the Albanian population to the Ottoman government in Istanbul. At this time, in July 1912, well-known Albanian intellectual Mehdi Frashëri was appointed governor of Jerusalem. Although he governed there for only five months, he is remembered for his positive attitude towards the Jewish community in Ottoman Palestine. The attitude of the Ottoman official of Albanian origins was also reflected in the Jewish press in Palestine, Haor and Ha-Herut. On the other hand, the Arab press criticized his visit to the Jewish community in Richon Licion, and was especially unfavorable to Mehdi’s praise of the Jews. Impressed by the significant progress he witnessed in the Jewish settlements, in his speech, Mehdi had declared: “You are setting an example for the Arab villages. (…) You have become teachers for your Arab neighbors who do not know how to read and write, but look at what you are doing in this country.”^[34] It should be noted that it was precisely this Albanian figure who in the League of Nations, in 1937, presented a proposal for the resolution of the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine; his proposal was based on the Swiss model, and suggested the establishment of two cantons, one for Jews and one for Arabs.^[35]

Although the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and World War I had a negative effect on Kosovo Albanians, who were subject of the Serbian occupation and persecution,^[36] this period marked another turning point in the progress of the Zionist movement in Palestine. It culminated with the Balfourt Declaration of 1917,^[37] which considered the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. The public promise of the British is considered as a crucial step towards the foundation of the state of Israel.

After surviving the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust, the Jews, under the leadership of Ben Gurion, achieved their goal and fulfilled the dream of Theodor Herzl. Conversely, Hasan Prishtina and the succeeding Albanian leaders had to carry on with their efforts against Serbian occupation for another half century. Coincidentally, several decades later, the fate of Kosovo Albanians was determined by policymakers of Jewish descent. Traumatized by the collective persecution of Jews, in March 1999 they became the most ardent proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, which in turn stopped the implementation of Serbian policy for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo Albanians, like the Jews, had been expelled from their homes cyclically: during the period of the Eastern Crisis (1877-1878), between the two world wars, as well as during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the context of the post-Cold War developments.

Undoubtedly, another beautiful parallel can be drawn in the cultural field, the inspiration that has existed in these two peoples for the revival and preservation of the language: Hebrew and Albanian. As noted by Josef Jakoel, a Jew of Albania and a connoisseur of the two peoples, the revival of Hebrew is a unique case in the history of philology, from a language that was “dormant” for centuries, it was quickly transformed into a living and cultivated language. Almost the same happened with the Albanian language, which was banned during the entire period of Ottoman occupation. Unwritten for centuries, it took off in the period of the National Renaissance^[38] and in later periods became the most cohesive instrument of national unification.

Appreciative narrative on the Jews

The historical relationship and peaceful coexistence of Kosovo Albanians with the Jewish community is thought to date back to the period of ancient Dardania, when this territory was inhabited by the ancestors of the Albanians, the Illyrian-Dardanians. The presence of a Jewish community in Kosovo actually predates the Slavic invasion of the 7^th century. However, the largest Jewish presence in this area is credited to the period of Ottoman rule. Many Jews who were expelled from Spain and Portugal during the 15^th and 16^th century sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. The first specific mention of Jews in Kosovo comes in 1442, when two merchants in Prishtina, one Jewish, one Genoese, are described as holders of the tax-farm for silver production.^[39]

The settlements of the Jewish in the Balkans – including Kosovo – were to be found almost exclusively in cities, and in the vicinity of synagogues. Their religious leaders were responsible for administrative matters of their community. It is also believed that members of Jewish community, like numerous Albanians, held important positions in the Ottoman state apparatus. The status and prosperity of the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire, during the 15^th and 16^th century, is rooted in their contacts with Europe and the beneficial handling of these connections, not to mention the significant influence and wealth they brought along.

These elements also resulted in an increased presence of Jews in the territory of Kosovo – known then as the Vilayet of Kosovo – especially in its capital city of Skopje, with strong regional and international trade links. Skopje’s Jewish community grew rapidly, from thirty-two families in 1544 to a reported total of 3,000 people in the 1680s. The entire Jewish quarter was destroyed, however, when Piccolomini set fire to the city on October 26th, 1689.^[40]The settling of the Jewish in Kosovo intensified particularly during the second half of the 19^th century, and even the construction of the Skopje-fca railway is attributed to specialists of Jewish origin. According to the British historian Noel Malcolm, their presence in Kosovo during this period of time was noticeable in the big cities, such as Skopje, Pristina, Prizren and Gjakova.

According to the data from the Austrian archives, after the Salname of 1877 there were 50 Jews in the Sanjak of Pristina, that number growing to about 362 in 1903.^[41] A significant number of the members of this community were merchants, pharmacists, mechanics, engineers, doctors, clerks and professors. For this reason, their impact on the lives of the Albanians and the other peoples within the Empire was substantial. In fact, many enterprises, businesses, as well as cultural and sports groups were owned by Jews. Additionally, it was the Jews who brought the technology of typography to the Empire, making possible the publication of books in various languages. Obviously, their presence also had a positive impact on the development of many professions within the Albanian space. This is encapsulated in an expression that is used by Albanians even today; a common way of portraying someone positively and praising their skills is to tell them “You are as smart as a Jew,” intended to show the appreciative attitude of Albanians for the Jewish community.

Albanians and Jews alike

The second decade of the 20th century was marked by major political changes in Southeast Europe. As the result of the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913 and World War I, two major empires – the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian – disintegrated. This led to the foundation of several new independent states and the territorial expansion of others. The Serbian occupation of Kosovo in October-November 1912 was accompanied by violence, deportation, looting and killing of members of the Albanian community. The followed pattern of brutality was the one implemented between 1877 and 1878 to Albanians of the Sanjak of Nis when they were expelled from the occupied territory of about 600 settlements, such as Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje and Kursumlija. Even today, in Kosovo, they are called as “Muhaxhirs” (Trk.:muhacir), the Ottoman term which means emigrant, still widely used to refer to those who leave their homes and settle in another country.^[42]

The Serbian government considered Albanians, Jews and other ethnic communities as enemies. They aimed to found a Greater Serbia, in which there would be no place for Albanians or other communities. Both Albanians and Jews were seen as a tangible obstacle to the Greater Serbia project and were, consequently, treated as accomplices to former Ottoman rule. From then on, the relations of the local population with the Belgrade governments were generally inimical. In relation to this issue, the German scholar Konrad Clewing^[43] asserts that the conflict over Kosovo was, from the very beginning, a conflict for territory and political power between the Serbian/Yugoslav governments and the Albanian population in Kosovo. Yet, the Serbian expansionist projection was disguised with the forged myth that “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia.” Eerily reminiscent of other akin slogans, such as reference to the Port of Durrës and the north of Albania as “The lungs of Serbia”.

The significant contribution of Jewish scholars to Albanological studies

The Serbs, evidently perplexed by the fact that they reached the Balkans too late – they arrived only after the ethno-linguistic space of Albania was under Byzantine rule – had historically shown solid expansionist tendencies. These tendencies were rooted in myths and lies, which portrayed the Serbs as superior to Albanians. A parallel propaganistic approach was later used by the Nazi regime. In the face of the Serbian and Ottoman aggression alike, the sole arguments Albanians could rely upon were those related to their autochthony. Their position was reinforced by the work of several European scholars and Albanologists of Jewish origin. Norbert Jokl, Milan Shufflay, Joseph Roth, as well as Member of the Imperial Parliament and Austro-Hungarian publicist Leo Freundlich are among the most famous Jewish scholars who have contributed to Albanological studies.^[44] Their independent studies confirmed that the Albanian language descended from the Illyrian language which, in turn, pointed out the autochthony of Albanians as the descendants of Illyrians. In present-day Kosovo, they are known as Dardanians, while their country was known as Dardania. Likewise, the Lama Dinner is an ancient Illyrian-Albanian feast, which is celebrated in the region even today.

Albanians are obliged to Leo Freundlich, who documented the persecution and misery Serbian soldiers inflicted on Albanians during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Along with Leo Trotsky, the famous Jewish Russian intellectual serving at the time as a war correspondent in the Balkans^[45], Freundlich documented the Serbian atrocities against the Albanian population in two books, Albanien Golgatha: Anklageakten Gegen Die Vernichter Des Albanervolkes (Albania’s Golgotha: Indictments against the Destroyer of the Albanian People) and Die Albanische Korrespondenz (The Albanian Correspondence). The extermination policy, which, according to Trotsky, was implemented in the attempt “to correct ethnological statistical data that was not in their [Serbians’] favor,” was carried out throughout the years between the two world wars. However, the repressive policy culminated in 1938 with the signing of the Yugoslav-Turkish Agreement on the deportation of 400,000 Albanians to Turkey, preceded by the anti-Albanian doctrine of Serbian historian Vasa Çubrilovic entitled “Iseljavanje arnauta” (The Expulsion of the Albanians).^[46] With the implementation of this policy, Belgrade aimed to shatter the Albanian ethnic compactness of Kosovo. The Serbs, whose goal was to employ the Nazi model of persecution against the Jews onto Albanians, reasoned that the world was too preoccupied with its own troubles and that the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from their homeland would not be any country’s concern.

“At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the evacuation of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not set off a world war”^[47] Cubrilovic maintained in the memorandum “The Expulsion of the Albanians,” which was presented in Belgrade on March 7, 1937. The Albanians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were denied fundamental rights; they had no right to education, to books, newspapers or radio programs in the Albanian language, nor the right to merely declare themselves Albanians. In order to minimize their number, Albanians were forced to declare themselves as Muslim or Turkish. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why the official statistical data of this period shows an artificial several-folds higher number of Turks. Another Serbian author, Vladan Djordjevic, in his book “The Albanians and the Great Powers”^[48] did not manage tocontrol his hatred towards the community, and spat his venom openly. Indeed, in 1913, he went as far as to ask the Great Powers to allow the Serbian army to exterminate the Albanians from the face of the earth. He reasoned that they were “an inferior race with a tail.”

The Anti-Semitic press and anti- Semitic legislation of the Yugoslav Kingdom

Soon after the Serbian conquest, some of the Jewish population immigrated to Turkish territory. They were no doubt aware that the Serbs had traditionally regarded the Jews in Ottoman territory as adjuncts to Ottoman rule, and had often given them the same harsh treatment meted out to Islamism in the territories they conquered. According to Malcom, there had also been anti-semitic legislation in Serbia, rescinded only after Western diplomatic pressure in 1889.^[49] In parallel with the persecution of Albanians and their deportation to Turkey, a discriminatory political discourse towards the Jewish community also prevailed in the Yugoslav Kingdom of the 1930s, sustained by the press and anti-Semitic legislations. A typical example is the Belgrade-based daily newspaper Vreme^[50], a pro-government press company, according to which the Jewish community was a “closed and well-organized community, which strived solely for its interests, while exploiting and endangering the majority of the population.”

The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia were also approached and treated likewise. While the highest level of anti-Semitic climate was reached in the writings of Dimitrije Ljotic, who led the fascist party “Zbor”^[51] between 1935 and 1945, the anti-Albanian climate was being installed by the fascist doctrine of Cubrilovic. The Nazi Germans must have been extremely excited by the fact that the Belgrade government had issued two anti-Semitic decrees as early as October 1940. Six months before the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, the members of the Jewish community were banned from producing and distributing food, while their enrollment in universities and high schools was restricted. Albanians were made equally vulnerable by the denial of their right to public and official use of the mother tongue, as well as the denial of being educated in the Albanian language at any level. As it was the case with the Jews, Albanians had their rights restricted in schools, universities and the public administration. Ironically, an identical policy was reinstated in Kosovo in 1989 by the Milosevic regime, which at the time made clear that it would be a case of ​​ethnic cleansing.^[52]

“The house of God and the guest”

Albanian historiography has not yet fully shed light on the protection and rescue of Jews by Kosovo Albanians, while Serbia has politicized historiography containing often forged information. Additionally, with the exception of a few recent attempts, neither the sheltering of the Jews has been given the deserved attention by Albanian historiography, although numerous events and cases related to the sheltering of Jews persecuted during World War II in Albanian households are embedded in the historical memory and narratives of Kosovo Albanians. An admirable achievement in this direction is that of the Institute of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians in Skopje, which has recently established a Holocaust Education and Research Department and published several works focusing on the contribution of Kosovo Albanians in saving members of the Jewish community.

The surviving Jews’ memories about Albanian solidarity

It is an undeniable fact supported by archival data that it was quite likely for Kosovo Albanians – who for decades had neither a state, nor any national institutions, and were even denied their fundamental rights – to sympathize with the local Jewish community. Likewise was the likeliness of showing solidarity and collective commitment for the protection of the members of the communities coming from different territories of the Balkans, whether Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia or elsewhere.

During World War II, when most of southern Kosovo was occupied by the Italian troops and administered directly by the Tirana government, Italy was forced to surrender the northern part of Kosovo – Mitrovica, Vucitrna and Podujeva – to the German protectorate of Serbia.^[53] Due to the relatively positive climate predominating the Albanian territories controlled by the Tirana government, Albanians from Kosovo and Skopje rescued many Jews from Serbia and Macedonia and took them to Kosovo and Albania regions under the Italian occupation. In the northern part, which was controlled by the Nazi forces and where the Serbian chetnik units operated, Jews and Albanians were persecuted alike. “The north was surrounded by countries under Nazi occupation and there was no escape,”^[54] writes the mother of survivor Ita Bartuv in her autobiographical book.

Unlike other regions, the Kosovo of the time was not characterized by an anti-Semitic climate, nor had any anti-Semitic legistation been enforced. The Jews there were not forced to wear distinctive signs and symbols. However, as in any community of the time, there are a few isolated cases of Jews being persecuted and interned, in comparison to the numerous anti-fascist Albanians sent to labor camps. It was not uncommon for local Albanian authorities to disobey the Nazis’ requests to submit lists of Jews, as in the case of the two representatives of the Jewish community, Rafael Jakohel and Mateo Mathatia.

It is an undeniable fact that in Kosovo and other Albanian regions, which until the outbreak of World War II were victims of brutal Serbian oppression and persecution, there was no anti-Semitic legislation or spirit. The level of empathy of Albanians towards the Jewish community also reflected the attitude of King Zog,^[55] who approached Jews with great sympathy, and that of the government of Tirana,^[56] which administered most of the territory of present-day Kosovo as part of the Italian occupation.

The stories of surviving Jews help us understand their situation in the Kosovo of World War II. Yaffa Reuven Née Bachar who, at the time was thirteen, fled with her family from Pristina to Shkodra. She remembers: “…when we arrived in Pristina, the Shkurti family welcomed us and we found shelter there. Every time the Germans appeared in town, they would warn us and hide us outside the city until the difficult situation passed, when they would return us home.”^[57]

Previously unknown and impressive facts about the hospitality of Albanians are revealed by Mimi Kamhi Ergas-Faraji. In his memoir My Life under the Nazi Conquest, Faraji relates the experiences of his family and the role of the Sylejmani family from Ferizaj in rescuing and protecting them until they reached a safe destination. “After a few months of a quiet, suddenly the city (Shkup) was invaded by Serbian Jews on their way to Kosova. The south of Kosova was occupied by the Italian troops, being the only place to seek safety. The North was completely surrounded by the countries under Nazis occupation and there was no escape”^[58] would Mimi Kamhi Ergas-Faraji write in his diary.

The transferring of Jews from Tetovo, Struga, Dibra and Kosovo to the territory of present-day Albania was assisted by the local Albanian authorities in Kosovo, who issued false ID-s that enabled the members of the Jewish community to move without trouble in case of a Nazi administration search. The rescue of dozens of Jewish families from Macedonia – which had first moved to Kosovo and then to Albania – was possible thanks to the courage of Albanians who had kinships in Kosovo and Albania. This was also the case of Veli Meliq’s family from Hani i Elezit, who rescued 17 members of the Frances family. According to the account of Johana Jutta Neumann, a Jew from Hamburg, Germany, after the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Nazi troops, nearly 200 Jews crossed into Kosovo, and from there into Albania.

Things got especially difficult after the capitulation of Italy and the occupation of the country by the Nazis. The chances of succeeding were much lower. In the Albanian environment, even under these circumstances, national pride had bigger appeal than the tendency to endorse anti-Semitism. It is worth mentioning a document issued by the Albanian state in relation to a robbery committed by two Jews in Pristina. The local Albanian authorities did not agree with the Nazi occupation’s orders to hand over the two Jews, stating that it was “the competence to take of any measure against them belonged exclusively to the Albanian authorities.”^[59]

There is a long list of documents in the National Archive of Albania that debunks the claims of the Yugoslav communist historiography which allude that the Jews were also persecuted in Albanian territories. These documents ascertain the opposite; that is, the Jews were persecuted in the north of Kosovo, which, as previously stated, had been annexed to Serbia by the Nazis and was under the direct control of the Serbian General Nedic. It is also well-known that the Jews located in this area were sent to the Nazi camp of Belgrade or elsewhere. Nonetheless, several Jewish families, like the one of Shaul Gattenyo, escaped the “trains of death” thanks to the help provided by Albanians, both in Kosovo and Albania. As proved by documents found in the State Archive of Northern Macedonia and recently published by the Institute for the Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians in Skopje, many Jewish families that were targeted by the anti-Semitic legislation of the Bulgarian state^[60] managed to survive by escaping to the areas inhabited by Albanians.

Undoubtedly, the greatest credit for the assistance and relocation of Kosovo Jews to inland Albania belongs to the mayors of Prishtina, Riza Drini and Hysen Prishtina. Preng Uli, the mayor, and the doctor Spiro Lito convinced German authorities that Jewish prisoners had typhus and it was necessary to send the Jews to hospitals in Albania to avoid an epidemic. The Jews were taken to Berat given false documents and spread around Albania.^[61]

In order to save Jews from the mass extermination imposed on them by the Nazis, the Albanian doctors and judges of Kosovo sent several members of this community to Albania— for “medical treatment” and other justifications. According to archival documents of 1943, it was officially announced that the local administration of Gjakova also assisted the Jews by issuing false ID certificates. The activity of the local administration, which openly challenged the authority of the occupying party, could not have been carried out without the support of the Albanian civilian population of Kosovo. Similarly, the local administration of Pristina strived for the rescue of the Jews by implementing the instructions of the Tirana government.

In 2014, six decades after the end of World War II, an elementary school in Berlin was named after Refik Veseli, the Albanian anonymous hero who saved numerous Jews that had reached the Albanian territory after escaping from the former Yugoslavia.^[62]

The Albanian families that nobly risked their lives to contribute to the rescuing of Jews were numerous. It was this special connection forged in a dire situation that would pay off about six decades later. The Jewish children in the diaspora and in Israel alike would come to the aid of the Albanians during their most difficult times: the war of Kosovo, the subjection of Albanians to a “biblical wave” of expulsion, comparable only to the deportations of the Jews during World War II. In the face of the Nazi persecution, Albanian friendship and hospitality surely “had the effect of a panacea”^[63] for the wounded souls of the members of the Jewish community. It goes without saying that Albanians in Kosovo and elsewhere are proud that their community helped, protected and saved numerous Jews. Their humanist approach and the solidarity for the Jewish community once more shed light on the traditional multi-religious and multiethnic coexistence in Kosovo.

In spite of any misinterpretations, the exceptional attitude of Kosovo Albanians towards the Jewish community should be considered within the context of the solidarity expressed by the Albanians in Albania, as the reference is to a people that share the same culture, identity, values and traditions. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the members of the Jewish community of various regions sought refuge in Kosovo and Albania. The mutual solidarity of Albanians and Jews was also nurtured during their coexistence under the imperial Ottoman administration.

Albanians are one of the few European peoples who could not subscribe to religious prejudices and religion-based antagonism. The reason for this may lie in the fact that Albanians themselves belong to three religious beliefs: Islam, Catholicism and Orthodoxy. As a consequence, no anti-Semitic sentiment could be sustained in the political culture of Kosovo, or its society in general. Due to the commitment of Muslim and Christian Albanians alike, most of the Jews of Kosovo survived the Italian and German occupation. Unfortunately, the Jews have suffered more in the northern part of Kosovo administered by Milan Nedic— is was annexed by the Germans, along with the quisling Serbian government. Also due to the assistance of the Serbs, about 200 Jews from the city of Mitrovica were sent to the Nazi camp of Belgrade or elsewhere. The British historian Noel Malcolm and American historian Bernd Fischer notes that this Albanian division had surrendered 281 Jews to the Germans, who were then sent to the concentration camp in Germany, in Bergen-Belsen near Hannover.^[64] Samuilo Mandil was a Jew from Belgrade escaped to Albania during World War II^[65]. He is one of the first authors to address the issue of rescuing Jews from Albanians during World War II. He published the article “Israelis in Albania: before the occupation, during the occupation and after the liberation by the occupier” in the Tirana newspaper “Bashkimi” (February 20, 1945). He had fled from Belgrade to Berat in 1942, where he had taken refuge. Mandil mentions a very intense case that in 1942, a number of 53 Jews were arrested in Mitrovica^[66] and handed over to the Nazis.^[67] This can be understood as the fact that it happened in March of last year.

Traditionally, Yugoslav and especially Serbian communist historiography has manipulated figures and lists of Jews interned in Kosovo during World War II. That it was a matter of a manipulated number and list, this is confirmed by the findings of the French researcher Claire Lavone who specifies that of the 530 persons arrested and sent to Berg Belsen, 90 percent of them were communists, partisans, Albanian political opponents, Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians, while the rest were Jews.^[68] Also based on documents in the Central Archive of Albania  only 34 Jews were sent to labour camps in Germany,^[69] and not as Yugoslav communist historiography claimed that the number was around hundred people. From the list of persons to be escorted by the SS Skanderbeg^[70] Division, some authors had listed as missing the Jews who had in fact taken refuge in Albania, he claims.^[71]

Since Tirana was the main administrative center during the war, the archival documents are collected  also in the State Archive of Albania (AQSh) and these documents prove that the fate of the Jews of Kosovo during the Second World War (WWII) can not be separate from the fate of the Jews during the old royal Albania. In this sense, the view that there were two different Albanian attitudes from Albanians towards Jews, one in Albania and another in Kosovo does not stand

The ancient code of “Besa”

But why did the Albanians show solidarity with the Jews, while elsewhere in Europe they were the subject of persecution? The answer to this question can be found in the ancient Albanian code of honour, promise and hospitality. In Kosovo and Albania, there is no law on not crossing the courtyard door or“trespassing,” as the Americans say. There is another law: promise, hospitality, friendship. “The house of the Albanian belongs to God and his friend,”^[72] as noted by ancient Albanian word. Norman Greshaman, a well-known Jewish-American photographer, in the movie “Besa-The Promise” states the following: “Albanians do not have that much to export, but they have a unique product in the world: the Albanian promise.”^[73]

According to this code, when someone is offered hospitality and promised protection, it is to be respected regardless of the risks. Still according to the Albanian traditional code, if someone is offered help or if he is hosted at an Albanian household, then the house of the host is considered “the house of God and the guest.” This element is valued and recognized worldwide as the traditional practice that saved the lives of the many members of the Jewish community.

Another element that is frequently and rightly considered to have shaped the approach of Albanians to the Jews is their characteristic inter-religious tolerance. The renowned Canadian historian Bernd Fischer maintain that while “other countries in the Balkans and the rest of Europe institutionalized discrimination and participated, either passively or enthusiastically, in one of the greatest crimes against humanity – the persecution of the Jewish population – Albanians, often well aware of the risks, opened the doors of their country and also their homes. And not only to the local Jews, but to Jews of other countries. Nothing speaks more to the noble spirit of the Albanian people than this.”^[74]

The hospitality Albanians reserved for the Jewish has been widely esteemed, primarily from this community, although very little has been written about this issue. The contribution of Albanians was considered with the same regard as that of numerous Kosovo families who risked their lives for the noble mission of providing shelter to many Jewish families.

Kosovo and the support of the Jewish diaspora and Israel

The notion that history repeats itself seems to be true. At a time when Kosovo Albanians faced the risk of being exterminated by the Milosevic regime, the Jewish people eagerly protected them. This was perhaps rooted in the empathy of the Jewish community towards the sufferings of the Kosovo Albanian refugees. Although the communists of Yugoslavia, similarly to their counterparts all over Eastern Europe, had proclaimed that the socialist system was the model to be followed for the resolution of nationalistic issues, Albanians were in a dire situation during the two decades following WWII. The state of emergency implemented throughout Yugoslavia until 1948 was extended in Kosovo until the mid-1960s. The champion of repression and brutality against Albanians was the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, the Serbian Aleksandar Rankovic of extremist nationalistic beliefs, who continually terrorized Albanians by making use of Stalinist methods. In Kosovo, the years between 1947 and 1966 are remembered as “the Rankovic era.” During this period, Kosovo turned into a police state. Countless Albanians were executed or disappeared in the prisons of the Yugoslav secret police, while hundreds of thousands more were deported to Turkey or fled to the West.

It became obvious that even under the socialist rule and the proclaimed equality of nations, the anti-Albanian doctrine would go unpunished. In fact, at the beginning of the 1980s, it would be revived. The anti-Albanian policy culminated with the appearance of Milosevic on the political scene, and the removal of Kosovo’s autonomy. At the gathering of the Slovenian intellectual elite “Cankarjev dom” on February 27th, 1989, president Jožef Školč of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Slovenia compared the Albanian experience to that of the Jewish community during World War II. It was the time when Yugoslavia was moving towards disintegration, primarily because of the Serbian plans to create a centralized Yugoslav state controlled exclusively by the Serbs.

This was one of the most difficult periods in the history of Kosovo, marking the beginning of the internationalization of the Kosovo issue. Those who held senior positions in the U.S. administration were the main spokesmen in U.S. and NATO involvement in the Balkan conflict, voicing concern about developments in the region.^[75] The emerging of this issue in Washington’s offices owes, first and foremost, to the extraordinary and decisive commitment of two American congressmen of Jewish descent: Tom Lantos, a Holocaust survivor, has been a member of the U.S. Congress since 1981. He has consistently been a supporter of the Albanian cause, in support of its full independence from Belgrade since the establishment of its international protectorate in 1999.^[76] Congressman Eliot Engel is an equally influential figure in US politics. Senior official in the U.S. administration during this period was Wesley Clark, holding the rank of General of the U.S. Army and Supreme Commander of Operation Allied NATO from 1996-2000. He originates from a Jewish family from Belarus which experienced the Russian pogrom. Robert Gelbard is another U.S. diplomat of a Jewish origin, who served as ambassador to Bolivia and Indonesia. In this period, during military intervention in Kosovo, William Cohen was Secretary of Defense. His father was a Jew (his mother Irish) who had emigrated from Russia. During the Iraqi and Kosovar wars, he was a proponent of important activity. A precious personality with an extensive political career – he also served as a member of the US Senate – President Clinton appointed him to his cabinet, although he came from the Republican Party.^[77]

Thanks to their dedication, Kosovo was in the focus of the administration of President George H. W. Bush senior and especially that of President Bill Clinton, who entrusted the chief position of American diplomacy to a lady of Jewish descent: Mrs. Madeleine Albright.

In 1998-99, when it seemed as if the events of the Bosnian genocide would be repeated, the Kosovo tragedy acquired global proportions. The deportation and mass killing campaigns implemented by the regime of Milosevic and his statements were fashioned after Hitler. Declaring in front of Western officials that “he could walk on the corpses of Albanians,”^[78] he made the Serbian policy reprehensible for everyone. The carnage could not be ignored: the images of the persecution of Albanians, their expulsion by all means of transportation, and their marching were reminiscent of the images featuring the expulsion of Jews during World War II. Moshe Peretz, a Holocaust survivor, claimed: “I’m reminded of what I went through in World War II in Russia and Poland. After I watched this, I couldn’t sleep at all. It was exactly the same thing.”^[79]

“The Evil must be opposed …”

Besides Mrs. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, many other personalities of Jewish descent raised their voices, including the likes of former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark^[80], Dayton architect Richard Holbrook, Holocaust survivor and writer Elie Wiesel, philosopher Andre Glucksmann, former president of Israel Shimon Peres, the famous writer Amos Oz, Hyman Bookbinder, Deborah Dwork, Anna Cohen, as well as author and professor Daniel Goldhagen. The american advocates were well-aware that, as the Shoah (Holocaust) and the doctrine stipulated, the protection of human lives was a significantly greater responsibility than the issue of a state’s sovereignty. Large number of Jewish personalities have reacted against the systematic violation of human rights in Kosovo, and have opposed the inhumane Serbian policy exerted against Albanians in Kosovo in the late twentieth century. Second, Jews considered identification of the expulsion of Albanians from their lands, as similar with anti-Semitism, of course, smaller but similar to Jewish exodus.

Since the United States and its NATO allies began military intervention in Kosovo last month, representatives of American Jewish organizations have spoken out strongly in support of the action. American Jews – like most other Americans – see the Serbs as villains who are engaged in ethnic cleansing of Albanians, just as the Nazis engaged in ethnic cleansing of Jews. TV images of helpless, homeless Albanian refugees have brought the world to tears.^[81]

Past historical experience had taught them that evil should not be underestimated; it must be opposed. Madeleine Albright, born in the Czech Republic and traumatized by the Munich Agreement and the collective persecution of Jews, is rightfully considered as one of the greatest proponents of the humanitarian intervention doctrine. The appeal of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel, survivors of the Auschwitz concentration camp, and other personalities of Jewish descent were crucial for the US political and military engagement in the Kosovo war. The Shoah conclusions justified the military intervention of NATO member states in Kosovo in 1999. Wiesel expressed his whole-hearted support for the NATO bombing, stating, “…if the world had reacted (during World War II) the way we are reacting now, many tragedies would have been prevented.” Organization by organization, the mainstream Jewish community has declared its support for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, frequently citing parallels to the Holocaust. Some compare Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to Adolf Hitler”.^[82]

Wiesel’s Kosovo message was consistent in his recent writings: he supports NATO’s initiatives, and Milosevic must be stopped. “If we see governments doing something, we as individuals will do something,” he said.^[83] But, as a death camp refugee, Wiesel would not equate the reputed ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars with the Holocaust and Nazi Germany’s policy of exterminating Jews. “I am against comparisons because I have learned that everything is unique,” he said. “My advice is not to compare. Every suffering is unique. This situation demands action, not comparison”^[84].

It is speculated that Secretary Albright and President Clinton drafted General Short’s air campaign against Serbian military targets after the Serbian forces perpetrated the massacre of Reçak in January 1999. For this reason journalists baptized the Kosovo war as the “Madeleine war.” The motives that prompted this American politician to defend the threatened Albanian people in Kosovo are found in her biography. During her childhood, her family was the victim of dictatorial policies twice: the first time was when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, the second when Stalin’s troops occupied Hungary. Therefore, Albright considered Milosevic a “criminal” who should be given several blows to “clarify his mind.” The Washington Post elucidates on Albright’s stance, underlying that “the Secretary believes deeply that Adolf Hitler and other tyrants could have been deterred if confronted early”. She applied that view to her diplomacy in confronting the dictatorial regime of Milosevic, a regime that in March-May 1999 alone expelled nearly 80 percent of Kosovo’s population and executed some 12,000 Albanian civilians.

John G. Stoessinger, also a scholar of Jewish origins, maintains that “The intention was to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians in order to provide a lebensraum for Serbian settlers.” He notes that “Adolf Eichmann, the man in charge of deporting Jews during the Nazi regime, would likely have appreciated the scale of Operation Horseshoe.”^[85] Maintaining that the case of Kosovo was different from the Holocaust in scale, the well-known American historian Daniel Goldhagen claims “both Hitler and Milosevic commenced their crimes in the name of an ideology that undervalues ​​the lives of others and is based on the idea that people have the right to kill others if they get in their way.”

Israel and Kosovo

During the Kosovo war, when some Arab and Muslim countries supported the “Butcher of Balkan,” Israel – along with the Jewish diaspora – defended the Albanian population expelled from Kosovo and condemned the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign, supporting the NATO military intervention against Serbian military objectives. The country provided more support and assistance than any other country that was not a NATO member.

In addition to humanitarian aid for the Kosovar refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia, it is also the case of aid within the state of Israel. With the exception of Turkey, Israel is the single Middle Eastern country to have sheltered Albanian refugees from Kosovo. In April 1999, the Israeli Foreign Minister declared that his country would provide humanitarian aid to Albanian refugees from Kosovo. The Minister proclaimed full support of the NATO and US efforts to end their persecution. In the same spirit, the Israeli government condemned the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, appealing for its immediate end.

Israel was enthusiastically holding telethons, rallies and fund-raising drives in support of Kosovo Albanian refugees. Six planeloads of food, tents and other supplies have been dispatched and a 100-bed field hospital set up in Macedonia, which has sheltered many refugees.^[86] Israel also accepted an initial group of 100 Muslim refugees, giving them the same financial aid package that immigrating Jews received.^[87] While hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians had sought refuge in camps just outside the borders of Kosovo, a few hundred more had made their way much farther from the burning Kosovo— to outside countries that had agreed, at least temporarily, to host refugees. On April 12th, 1999, planes bearing about 100 ethnic Albanians each landed in Israel and Norway, where they had been welcomed with open arms.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife, Sarah, were on hand in Tel Aviv for their arrival, greeting the refugees on the eve of Israel’s annual day of remembrance for the 6 million Jews exterminated in the Nazi Holocaust.^[88] “You are arriving on a special day for the Jews of Israel,″ said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, greeting the 114 refugees – 17 families – on the tarmac.^[89] “As Jews, we have a special sensitivity for the suffering of others. When we see the cars, tractors, trains or the convoys of marching refugees, when we see the faces of frightened children and tearful mothers, we feel a responsibility to help.″^[90]In his speech Netanyahu declared: ”Israel condemns all mass murder, committed by the Serbs or by any other element,” he said. ”We condemn it because of our history and our moral view.”^[91] Moreover, when asked his position on the NATO campaign, he made  clear: “We stand behind the effort, the effort of NATO and President Clinton to end this tragedy.”^[92] In this context, former director-general of Isreali Foreign Ministry Shlomo Avineri said in an interview: ”You can’t be neutral between a murderer and his victim. That’s the criticism that we, as Jews, as Israelis, have always leveled at foreign nations, including the Swiss.”^[93]

Kosovo and Israel established diplomatic relations

Coincidentally, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the protagonist of the most recent international recognition of the state of Kosovo, 21 years later. This recognition has special and historical significance for both states, which share common orientations, allies, values ​​and interests. The agreement signed at the White House^[94] is short of the full diplomatic recognition that Kosovo seeks, the recognition that the Trump administration and the European Union have both worked to achieve.^[95] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement welcoming the agreements: “First country with a Muslim majority to open an embassy in Jerusalem. As I have said in recent days, the circle of peace and recognition of Israel is widening and other nations are expected to join it.”^[96] Belgrade, which in 2011 had voted for the membership of Palestine in UNESCO, was not pleased by Tel Aviv’s decision. But as the Israeli ambassador to Belgrade stated, “the recognition of Kosovo is a done deal.”

Based on the Principles of the UN Charter and in compliance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the agreement on mutual recognition between the Republic of Kosovo and the State of Israel is particularly significant for both countries, as the reciprocal recognition paves the way for an effective partnership between the two. Considering the experiences of the two people and the way the state of Israel and the state of Kosovo were established – mostly owing to the decisive support of the US – the recognition agreement holds strategic significance for its establishment of diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Israel. Some media reports suggested that Israel’s recognition of Kosovo was not yet in effect and would be formally declared “in the coming weeks.”^[97] However on September 21st the Israeli ambassador to Serbia, Yahel Vilan, confirmed that Israel had in fact recognized Kosovo on September 4th, 2020: “There is no doubt whether Israel will recognize Kosovo or not, because Israel already recognized Kosovo on  September 4th.”^[98] Even if Vučić did not appreciate the statement of Ambassador Vilan, the recognition of Kosovo is indeed a done deal. 

Yonatan Touval, an analyst at the Israel Institute for Regional Policy, says in an interview with Radio Free Europe that Israel’s recognition of Kosovo,^[99] 12 years after the declaration of independence, comes at a time when views that independence does not provoke feelings are dominant. “I think that these anxieties, these worries about this imaginary parallel between Kosovo and Palestine have been significantly alleviated over the past 12 years. For these 12 years, since Kosovo declared independence, history has shown that it has not had a negative impact on [Israel’s] conflict with the Palestinians.”^[100]

Five months after the recognition, the two countries finally formalized the establishment of diplomatic relations. The official (virtual) signing of the diplomatic relations on February 1, 2021 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of Kosovo, Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Gabriel Ashkenazi^[101], marks a historic moment for both countries: for Kosovo it represents a key step on the path towards further consolidation of statehood and its international subjectivity, while for Israel it’s the commitment of the Kosovar side to open its embassy in Jerusalem.^[102] Following the American example legitimizes the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In this line Ashkenazi, who noted that it was the first time two nations had established relations over cyberspace, thanked the United States for its efforts “to promote peace around the world,” calling the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Israel “yet another important, exciting, and historic step.”^[103]

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Mrs. Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla, stated that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel opens a new historical chapter between both states. “On this important day we open a new chapter in historical relations between our countries, the existence of the people and statehood of which has been challenged. Our states have been close to each other in most difficult times and today we start a journey as two states,” stated the Head of Kosovar Diplomacy,^[104] adding that Kosovo and Israel share a “Historic bond” and had both “witnessed a long and challenging path to existing as peoples and becoming states.”^[105]

In fact, the recognition by Israel and the opening of the Kosovo embassy in Jerusalem reveal the vital importance and influence of the United States in the foreign policy of these countries, which existentially owe their support to the United States.^[106] These relations mutually serve both countries, the consolidation of their regional and international positions, as well as the American foreign policy itself. This position is also clear in the statement of the US State Department: “When our partners are united, the United States is stronger,” describing this event as “a historic day.”^[107] Kosovo-Israel relations also add an important dimension to the wider US-mediated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. These relations between Tel Aviv and Pristina in the context of geopolitics promote peace and stability in the Balkans and the Middle East.^[108] At the same time, the establishment of Kosovo-Israel relations has a significant impact on the EU, and shows a diplomatic superiority of Washington over Brussels. If the Americans managed to convince Tel Aviv to recognize Kosovo and confirm that there is no parallel with Palestine, Brussels did not succeed. Nor was it determined enough to convince its five members – Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania^[109] – for the recognition of Kosovo, even 13 years after its declaration of independence and the decision of the ICJ. The issue becomes even more sensitive due to the fact that Brussels has continued since 2011 to mediate the dialogue for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations. European disunity in the field of foreign policy has weakened its power in the eyes of Kosovo and Serbia.^[110]

While this recognition of Kosovo by Israel is being considered as one of the most important in the last decade, reactions from abroad have been various. For the USA administration, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Israel is considered a historic day, while the EU has not welcomed such a development, especially concerning the opening of the Kosovo Embassy in Jerusalem.^[111] However, such an attitude has been ignored in Kosovo, as Prishtina considers that Brussels has done little in the process of European integration, and has left Kosovo isolated as the only European country without visa liberalization. But it remains to be seen how the EU will react when it comes to relocating Serbia’s embassy, which has opened talks on EU membership.

On the other hand, the new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden applauded the Kosovo-Israel agreement as a “historic day.” “We think that Israel normalizing relations with its neighbors and other countries in the region is a very positive development, and so we applauded them, and we hope that there may be an opportunity to build on them in the months and years ahead,”^[112] said recently confirmed Secretary of State Antony Blinken. In this line was also the statement of the Spokesperson of the Department of State, Ned Price, said the United States of America will stand by Kosovo as it continues to move forward in its Euro-Atlantic path. Price underlined “The United States congratulates Israel and Kosovo on formally establishing diplomatic relations. Yesterday was a historic day. Deeper international ties help promote stability, peace, and prosperity in both regions. When our partners are united, the United States is stronger. The United States will stand by Kosovo as it continues to move forward on its Euro-Atlantic path.”^[113]

However, the EU addressed criticism of Kosovo’s plan to open an embassy in Jerusalem as the two countries signed an agreement on establishing diplomatic relations, recalling the bloc’s position on the issue in line with a UN Security Council resolution. EU spokesperson Peter Stano said that the EU position is exactly the same as it was when this question was asked last year after the signing of the agreement between Kosovo and the Trump administration on September 4th, 2020.

“This decision is diverging Kosovo from the EU position on Jerusalem,” said EU spokesperson Peter Stano. He pointed out that all embassies of the EU countries in Israel, as well as the EU delegation, are located in Tel Aviv, based on the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions and European Council decisions.“^[114]

He underlined that Kosovo, through this, is undermining its path towards EU integration. “Kosovo has identified EU integration as its strategic priority. The EU expects Kosovo to act in accordance with this commitment so that its European perspective is not undermined,“^[115] Stano emphasized.

But on the other hand, many Kosovars asked what could be the consequences for Pristina, as well as what prompted the EU to ask Kosovo to honor its commitment while it is not recognized by five EU countries, and therefore cannot become an EU candidate or be granted visa liberalization.

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the recognition of Kosovo by Israel has not been well received by either Serbia or the Arab League, which condemns Kosovo’s opening of an embassy in Jerusalem. Serbian President Vucic warned that the agreement with Israel could hurt future ties.^[116] Meanwhile the Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit has condemned, in the strongest terms, Kosovo’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and its decision to open an embassy in the city under occupation. In a statement he stressed that the Kosovan decision violates the international consensus regarding the opening of embassies in occupied Jerusalem.”^[117]

Kosovo and Albanians could learn a lot from the state of Israel

The journey of the Jewish community has been one of suffering and sacrifice. The same is true for Kosovo Albanians, who, during the twentieth century, were the subject of three exterminating expulsions. In this context, Kosovo could learn a lot from the state of Israel, not only in relation to security and the process of state-building, but in relation to the culture of memory. At the same time, the Republic of Kosovo should restore the historical and cultural values of the Jewish community of Kosovo, as a sign of respect for the history and contribution of the Jewish community there. In this context, the memorial in the capital of Kosovo – across the road from the Parliament of the youngest European state – marks a piece of the Jewish community history, as it commemorates the 92 Jews deported during World War II. The memorial plaque placed at the site of Kosovo’s last synagogue, which was destroyed by the Serb-Yugoslav communist regime in 1963, also honors Kosovo’s historic Jewish community.^[118] The Museum of Kosovo should also dedicate a special sector to the Holocaust. Without the unmatched contribution of Jewish personalities in the field of Albanological studies, along with that of several members of the Jewish diaspora, publicly supporting the demands of Kosovo Albanians for independence, Kosovo’s journey to this point would have been impossible. 

Kosovo should also follow the example of the Institute of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians (ISCHA) in Shkup/Skopje.^[119] Scholarly publications in this field and the translated memoirs of Jewish individuals who survived the Holocaust would make a precious contribution for the clarification of the Jewish question in the Balkans. The decision of the Kosovar authorities to donate a building to the Jewish community is a step in the right direction, as it will be used as the Jewish museum^[120] to display the history of coexistence between Albanians and Jews.

The future should be marked by more effort and commitment on behalf of scholars and various institutions to further their studies on the Jewish question, taking into consideration the survival of the Jewish community throughout centuries and the solidarity that other peoples have shown to them. That is, Albanians need to learn from the Jewish tradition of cultivating and archiving the communal memory. A perfect example is Yad Vashem– The World Holocaust Remembrance Center, which could be included in school curricula along the rich tradition.

Conclusion

The history of relations between Kosovo Albanians and the Jewish community throughout different regimes and systems is one of cooperation, mutual solidarity and friendship. These relations of these two small peoples are characterized by numerous meeting points and parallels. The period under Ottoman occupation, which marks the main moments of acquaintance between the two peoples, is characterized by a great influence of the historical Jewish community on the Albanians, and on the Ottoman state itself. Moreover, members of the Jewish community appear to be innovators and transmitters of new ideas, products and professions from the West. Albanian and Jewish efforts to create independent states are simultaneous, holding different fates and epilogues at the same time.

Just as the long-stateless Jews once did, as did the Kosovo Albanians until 2008, fighting hard for survival and for their state. It was exactly this fate that was the driving force for many personalities of Jewish descent to properly understand and support the cause for self-determination and independence. The personal and past experience of the Jewish people was a motive, at the same time perceived as a necessity for military intervention in Kosovo. Such support also came from the Albanians, especially in the period of World War II, when the Jewish people faced the danger of collective annihilation (the Holocaust) by Hitler’s Nazi regime. Although no parallel can be drawn to a genocide of this scale, even that of Kosovo Albanians in 1998-1999 and in earlier periods, ethnic cleansing and mass murder pepper the history by the Milosevic regime, considered the “Saddam of the Balkans.”  When Kosovo Albanians lacked proper support by European diplomacy, many diplomats and intellectuals of Jewish descent appeared on the American diplomacy scene, which defended Kosovo Albanians. The Jewish personalities became the biggest drivers of NATO military intervention against Serbian military targets, and proponents of the avoidance of a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Above all, Jews who were in senior positions in the USA administration, were the main spokesmen in the involvement of the USA and NATO in the Kosovo war, as the voices of concern for developments in the Balkan region. This Western military intervention in Kosovo made independence in 2008 and Isreali recognition in 2020 inevitable, not to mention paved the way for Kosovo to be placed under international civilian (UNMIK) and military (NATO-KFOR) administration. Recognition was undoubtedly a contribution of the influence of American diplomacy and, in this context, it represents an important chapter in consolidating the international position of the state of Kosovo. It has served to bring peace and stability to the Western Balkans, and developments to the Middle East. But this recognition brought to light the weakness of European diplomacy in relation to Kosovo, as the EU failed to convince the five EU member states to recognize the state, resulting in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In this sense, the future ways and behaviour of the EU – as well as of some Arab countries – in relation to Kosovo remains open after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. Despite the remarks of Brussels, the leadership of Kosovo has followed its state agenda for the Kosovo embassy in Jerusalem. This represents a special moment for Israel, as Kosovo is the first country with a majority Muslim population to open a diplomatic mission in the spiritual capital of the Jewish people.

[1] Sylë Ukshini is a historian and expert of international relations who served as the Ambassador of Kosovo in Albania, 2016-2019. 

[2] Clayer, Nathalie: Kosova: The Building Process of a Territory from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, https://ef.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/europe/files/nathalie_clayer_kosova.pdf

[3] Malcom, Noel: Kosovo, A short history, New York University Press, 1998, p.202-216

[4] Sinani, Shaban: Albanians and Jews. Tirana, 2017.

[5] Stafa, Monika: Jews in Albania. Onufri, Tirana, 2019.

[6] Asani, Skënder-Ramaj, Albert: Journey, Skopje, 2017.

[7] Ergas-Faragi: Mimi Kamhi: My life under the Nazi Occupation. Skopje, 2018.

[8] Ergas-Faragi: Mimi Kamhi: My life under the Nazi Occupation. Skopje, 2018.

[9] Ukshini met the new Israeli ambassador to Tirana, Kosovo Embassy in Tirana, 16 October 2019, http://www.ambasada-ks.net/al/?page=1,8,277

[10] Elie Wiesel is a Holocaust survivor, Nobel laureate, international human rights activist, writer of more than 40 books and confidant of world leaders. In 1986, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He was raised in Romania and appeared safe from the Nazis until 1944, when they arrived in his small hometown. Then 15, he was separated from his mother and sister at Auschwitz and never saw them again. He remained with his father, who died shortly before the war ended. Wiesel spent much of the 1950s as a journalist in France. He later worked for a Yiddish newspaper in New York, where for 30 years he has conducted a lecture series at the 92d Street YMCA. Wiesel died in July 2, 2016, at his home in Manhattan, aged 87. Berger, Joseph (July 2, 2016). “Elie Wiesel, Auschwitz Survivor and Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Dies at 87”

[11] Conklin, Mike: Wiesel Cites Holocaust In Warning About Kosovo, Chicago Tribune, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-04-22/features/9904220425_1_elie-wieselholocaust-survivor-ethnic-cleansing, [Accessed: 2 February 2021].

[12] The US Embassy moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on 14 May 2018.

[13] “Touval: Israel owed the USA the recognition of Kosovo “, RFE/RL, 23.09.2020, https://www.evropaelire.org/a/izraeli-kosova-njohja-shba/30853227.html

[14] Avineri, Shlomo: “Letter to a Serbian friend”, Jerusalem Post January 2, 2008.

[15] Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (Human Right Watch report), p.5, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Under_Orders_En_Combined.pdf

[16] Summary of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC, February 22, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm

[17] Ukshini, Sylë: Die Kosovo-Frage als Herausforderung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der EU, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2020, pp. 234-23.

[18] International Court of Justice, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141

[19] “Serbian Defense Minister Sparks Controversy By Using Pejorative For Albanians”, Radio Free Europe, May 03, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbian-defense-minister-sparks-controversy-by-using-pejorative-for-albanians/29919664.html

[20] Michalopoulos, Sarantis :Kosovo is not Catalonia, Kosovo’s Thaci tells absent Spanish PM Rajoy,Euractiv, May 18, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/kosovo-is-not-catalonia-kosovos-thaci-tells-absent-spanish-pm-rajoy/

[21] Ahren, Raphael (9 September 2020). “Serbia won’t open the Jerusalem embassy if Israel recognizes Kosovo – Serbian source”. The Times of Israel. Retrieved 15 September 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/serbia-wont-open-jerusalem-embassy-if-israel-recognizes-kosovo-serbian-source/#gs.fm803t

[22] In July 2019, Palestine’s ambassador to Serbia, Mohamed Nabhan, thanked Serbia for its long-standing support and reaffirmed that Palestine would oppose Kosovo’s admission to Interpol. See: Palestinians Oppose Kosovo’s Membership at Interpol, RTK, 04.07.2019, https://www.rtklive.com/en/news-single.php?ID=14359 and Jegic, Denijal: “Why Kosovo keeps extending blind support to Israel”, Al Jazeera English, 26 Aug 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/8/26/why-kosovo-keeps-extending-blind-support-to-israel

[23] The Jewish State was a political pamphlet written by Zionist political theorist and playwright Theodor Herzl, and was originally published in German in February 1896. The work outlines a solution for a Jewish state, and is an important text in the early Zionist canon. Wherein he argues that the best way to avoid anti-Semitism in Europe would be to create an independent Jewish state, and he advised that Jews purchase land in Palestine as first steps towards this goal. See: Herzl, Theodor: Der Judenstaat. Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage. Verlag: Manesse Verlag, 2006.

[24] Elise, Robert:  The Resolutions of the League of Prizren 1878, http://albanianhistory.net/1878_League-of-Prizren/index.html

[25] The Old New Land (or “Altneuland” in the original German) is a utopian novel published by Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, in 1902. Outlining Herzl’s vision for a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, Altneuland became one of Zionism’s establishing texts. See: Herzl, Theodor: AltNeuLand. Books on Demand GmbH, Berlin,  2004.

[26] World Zionist Organization, https://knesset.gov.il/vip/herzl/eng/Herz_Zion_eng.html

[27] Elsie, Robert:  Sami Bey Frashëri: What will Become of Albania? http://www.albanianhistory.net/1899_Frasheri/index.html

[28] “Theodor Herzl und die „Neue Freie Presse“: Geschichte einer folgenreichen Beziehung”, Die Presse, 06.05.2018, https://www.diepresse.com/5417670/theodor-herzl-und-die-neue-freie-presse-geschichte-einer-folgenreichen-beziehung

[29] Saltz, Rachel: “Theodor Herzl, a Life From Journalism to Zionism”, The New York Times, Aug. 9, 2012

[30] Kotowski, Elke-Vera:“Der Fall Dreyfus und die Folgen”, AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE (APUZ 50/2007),29.11.2007, https://www.bpb.de/apuz/30051/der-fall-dreyfus-und-die-folgen

[31] Albania has recognized Israel as a state since April 19, 1949, See: “Albania and Israel in Accord To Establish Diplomatic Ties”.  Associated Press. August 20, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/20/world/albania-and-israel-in-accord-to-establish-diplomatic-ties.html

[32]  Antébi, Elizabeth: The Jewish little Pasha of Jerusalem, Crawford Publishing Cy, Adelaide, Australia1996

[33] Malcolm, Noel: Kosovo, p.250-256; Ukshini,  Sylë: Hasan Prishtina dhe kryengritja e vitit 1912, në Veprimtaria atdhetare e Hasan Prishtinës (conference shkencore 13-14 tetor 2012), Nr.4, Scupi, Shkup, 2012, p.171-214.

[34] Mufaku, Muahmed/ Al-Kayyali-Al. Abdul-hamed/Hassan, Hassan: Mehdi Frashëri si mytasarif I Jerusalemit më 1912: midis qëndrimeve kontradiktore arabe dhe hebraike, në: Albanology Studies, Institut of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanieans-Skopje, Nr. 19, Shkup 2019, p.93-113 (106).

[35] League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No.17, Records of the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly Meetings of the committees, Minutes of the Sixth Committee, (Political Question 6(, Geneva, 1937. Northwestern university Library, in: http:digital.library.nothwestern.edu/leagues/le0382a.pdf (accessed 24 February 2021),p.27

[36]  Malcolm, Noel: Is Kosovo Serbia? We ask a historian”, The Guardian, 26 Feb 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/26/kosovo.serbia

[37] Gutwein, Danny (2016). “The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist-British Cooperation”. Journal of Israeli History. 35 (2): 117–152, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13531042.2016.1244100?journalCode=fjih20

[38] Josef, Jakoel: Izraleitët në Shqipëri [Israelis in Albania]. Publishing House “Çabej”, Tirana 2020.

[39] Malcom, Noel: Kosovo, p.212.

[40] Malcom, Noel: Kosovo, p.212.

[41] BOA. Osmanli arsiv belgelerinde kosova vilayeti. T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu

Publications, Istanbul, 2007 and Seçkin Birbudak, Togay: Education life in the Kosovo province in the early part of twentieth century, August 2013International Journal of Academic Research 5(4):255-260, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272877546_Education_life_in_the_Kosovo_province_in_the_early_part_of_twentieth_century

[42] Malcol, Noel: Kosovo, p.228-229

[43] Clewing, Konrad: Der Kosovokonflikt als Territorial- und Herrschaftskonflikt 1878-2002: Chronologie und Beteiligte’, in: Hermann Beyer-Thoma, Olivia Griese and Zsolt K. Lengye (eds.), Münchener Forschungen zur Geschichte Ost- und Südosteuropas. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002, p.  181-214.

[44] Leo Freundlich: Albania’s Golgotha: Indictment of the Exterminators of the Albanian People, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913_Freundlich_Golgotha/index.html and Robert Elsie, Robert: Leo Freundlich: Die Albanische Korrespondenz, Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten. Oldenburg Verlag, 2013.

[45]Leo Trotsky in his article “Behind the Curtains of the Balkan Wars” writes: At the hotel in the evening, I meet a corporal whom I know. His unit is situated near Ferizović [Ferizaj], the centre of the Albanians in Old Serbia. The corporal and his soldiers had just hauled a heavy siege cannon over the Kačanik Pass to Skopje, from where it was to be sent on to Odrin [Adrianople/Edirne].

‘And what are you now doing in Ferizović among the Albanians?’ I ask.

‘We are roasting chickens and slaughtering Albanians. But we’ve had enough of it,’ he added with a yawn and a gesture of weariness and indifference. ‘Yet there are some very rich people among them. Near Ferizović we came across a village, a wealthy village, with houses like fortresses. So we went into one of the houses. The owner was a wealthy old man, who had three sons. So there were four of them, and lots of women, too. We drove them all out of the house, stood the women up in a line and slaughtered the men folk before their eyes. Nothing happened. The women did not break into tears. It almost looked as if they were indifferent. They only asked to be able to go back into the house to get their personal belongings. We let them. When they came out, they brought each of us expensive gifts. Then we set the whole place on fire.’ First published in: Kievskaya Mysl, Kiev, No. 355, 23 December 1912. Printed in Balkany i balkanskaya voyna, in Leo Trotsky, Sočinenia, vol. 6 (Moscow & Leningrad 1926), reprinted in German in Leo Trotzki, Die Balkankriege 1912-13 (Essen: Arbeiterpresse 1996), p. 297-303. Translated by Robert Elsie.]

[46] Elsie, Robert: Vaso Cubrilovic: The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, http://albanianhistory.net/1937_Cubrilovic/index.html

[47] Elsie, Robert: Vaso Cubrilovic: The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, http://albanianhistory.net/1937_Cubrilovic/index.html

[48] At the end of 1912, the Kingdom of Serbia occupied most of the Albanian-populated territory to the Adriatic coast. The army of Montenegro was present around Shkodër. During the attempt to annex the lands, Serbian and Montenegrin armies committed numerous crimes against the local Albanian population. (Wikipedia). The author, nevertheless, starts his book with the sentence: “The appearance and establishment of the victorious Serb armies on the east coast of the Adriatic worked miracles.” The author (former Serbian Prime-Minister from 1897 to 1900) makes the attempt to add to the “military establishment” of the Serbian appearance in the Albanian lands a “political establishment” of Serbian interests, in direct conflict with both the Italian and the Austrian interests in the region. See: Đorđević , Vladan: Die Albanesen und die Grossmächte [The Albanians and the Great Powers], Leipzig : S. Hirzel, 1913.

[49] Malcolm, Noel: Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University. Press, 1998, p. 213

[50] M. Ivanković, A. Stojanović: Anti-Semitic propaganda and legislation in Serbia 1939-1942: Content, Scale, Aims and Role of the German factor, August 2019, DOI: 10.29362/ist20veka.2019.2.iva.85-104 (89), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334847707_Anti-Semitic_propaganda_and_legislation_in_Serbia_1939-1942_Content_Scale_Aims_and_Role_of_the_German_factor

[51] Malcolm, Noel: Kosovo: A Short History, p. 213

[52]The Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2000, p.226

[53] In April of 1941, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was occupied and divided up by Nazi Germany and its allies, who organized new administrations in various parts of the territory. Only Serbia was subjected to direct German military administrative control and administration. The northern part of Kosovo (around  Mitrovica) was occupied by the Germans and placed under the administration of a German military government, the authorities who appointed Serbian General Milan Nedić to lead the new puppet government. See: Ramet, Sabrina P.; Lazić, Sladjana: “The Collaborationist Regime of Milan Nedić”. In Ramet, Sabrina P.; Listhaug, Ola (eds.). Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 17–43.

[54] Ergas-Faraxhi, Mimi Kamhi: My life under the Nazi Occupoation, pp. 106.

[55] Fischer, Bernd: “The Jews of Albania During the Zogist Period and the Second World War”. In Pettifer, James; Nazarko, Mentor (eds.). Strengthening Religious Tolerance for a Secure Civil Society in Albania and the Southern Balkans. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007,. pp. 95–101

[56] “There is no trace of any discrimination against Jews in Albania, because Albania happens to be one of the rare lands in Europe today where religious prejudice and hate do not exist, even though Albanians themselves are divided into three faiths.” Herman Bernstein, the United States Ambassador to Albania, 1934, Jeff Shucard , Jeff: “King Zog and the Secret Heart of Albania”, https://www.geist.com/fact/dispatches/king-zog-heart-of-albania/

[57] Stafa, Monika: Hebrenjtë në Shqipëri, f. 289.

[58] Mimi Kamhi Ergas-Faraggi: My Life under the Nazi occupation (memoirs), Instituti i Trashëgimisë Shpirtërore e Kulturore të shqiptarëve (ITSHKSH) & Shoqata “Acta Non Verba”, Shkup, 2018, p.106.

[59] The State of Albania / Ministry of Interior, No. 1277, May 24, 1944.

[60] Asani, Skender/Maliqi-Zylfiu, Nora/Popovski, Vllado (eds): Legjislacioni bazik antisemitik në Mbretërinë e Bullgarisë (përmbledhje dokumentesh). Institute of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians. Shkup, 2020.

[61] See: Sarner, Harvey: Rescue from Albania: One Hundred Percent of Jews in Albania Rescued from Holocaust., Brunswick, 1997, Vol. 12 (Fall 1998), pp. 141-146 and Sinani, Shaban: Shqiptarët dhe hebrenjtë, p.2337.

[62] „Refik Veseli – Namenspate für Berliner Schule – Berliner“, Berliner Morgenpost, May 10, 2016, https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article207547991/Refik-Veseli-Namenspate-fuer-Berliner-Schule.html

[63] Scarlet Epstein-a jewish girl from Vienna to Albania, in asani, Skender/Ramaj, Albert: Journey. Shkup 2017 p.332-36633 (361).

[64] Malcolm, Noel: Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University. Press, 1998, p .213 and Fischer, Bernd J.: Shqipëria gjatë luftës, 1939-1945. Çebej, 1999, p. 248.

[65] One of the rescuers was Refik Veseli, who, together with his parents and two brothers, took in the Mandil family of four, who had fled Yugoslavia to Tirana at the end of 1943, and three other people in the family house in the countryside and hid them from the German occupiers. Quote from Online- Exhibitions Besa, ein Ehrenkodex – Muslimische Albaner retten Juden während des Holocaust, Internationalen Schule für Holocauststudien (ISHS) der Gedenkstätte Yad Vashem: http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/de/education/lesson_plans/besa.asp and Brändli, Sabina / Pruschy, Eva: „Stille Helden“ und Shoah Education Ein Unterrichtsvorschlag zu Besa – ein Ehrenkodex: Wie Albaner im Zweiten Weltkrieg Juden retteten, https://phzh.ch/MAP_DataStore/148372/publications/Besa_Ausstellung_Doku_A4_04[1].pdf; „Refik Veseli – Namenspate für Berliner Schule – Berliner“, Berliner Morgenpost, May 10, 2016,

[66] During this period Mitrovica was administrated from the so-called Government of National Salvation of Milan Nedic, a puppet administration in Serbia during World War II that operated from August 1941 to October 1944. For more see: Occupied Rudic, Filip: “Serbia’s WWII Troops ‘Under German Orders”, Birn, March 26, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/26/occupied-serbia-s-wwii-police-answered-to-germans-not-nedic-03-26-2018/

[67] Elsie, Robert: Samuilo Mandil: The Jews in Albania, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1945_Mandil_Jews/index.html

[68] Document in German language: NOKN General: NOKN Slave Labour, p. 27, VIII, Abwehrlage [Situation of defence], point 4 Wehrhaftung, 31 July 1944: Sinani, Shaban: Albanians and Jews. Tirana, 2017, p. 212.

[69] Sinani, Shaban: Albanians and Jews. Tirana, 2017, p. 212 and Stafa, Monika: Hebrejtë në Shqipëri, f. 287.

[70] Until the fall of communism there were many inaccuracies and exaggerations regarding the operation of the Albanian Division “SS” Skanderbeg “, which was formed by the Germans in April-May 1944 in the region of Kosovo and Macedonia and operated for only six months, respectively until November 1. 1944. Williamson, Gordon: The Waffen SS (3): 11. to 23. Divisions. 2012, Oxford, England: Osprey.).

[71] AQSH, 1944, Fund 153, File 172, pp. 10-28; Sinani, Shaban: Albanians and Jews. Tirana, 2017, pp. 215-220: Stafa, Monika: Hebrenjtë në Shqipëri, p. 287..

[72] Josef, Jakoel: Israelis in Albania. Publishing House “Cabej”, Tirana 2020.

[73] Berisha, Mal: “Highlighting the book “Israelis in Albania” of the author Josef Jaokel”, https://malberisha.com/dy-fjale-per-librin-izrealitet-ne-shqiperi-te-autorit-josef-jakoel/?fbclid=IwAR0U1ZYu5GV5HzQIkASsdJ5WiyKL3jkHXDmwHzOVfgjQ86HpBBIEXjCZwHE[Accessed: 4 February 2021].

[74] Stafa, Monika: Hebrenjtlë në Shqipëri, p. 476.

[75] Maisel L. S. and Forman, I. N.,: Jews in American Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p.280.

[76] Lantos: Kosovo will be independent in very near future (2005), Available from: http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/03/lantos-kosovo-will-be-independent-in.html, [Accessed: 17 February 2021].

[77] Dalipi, Samet: American Jewish Altruism in Support of International Humanitarian Intervention, Iliria International Review – 2015/1 © Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo, p. 243-265 (253), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307820605_American_Jewish_Altruism_in_Support_of_International_Humanitarian_Intervention_and_Kosovo_Peace-building [Accessed: 27 February 2021].

[78] “Milosevic in a chilling conversation with NATO Generals Wesley Clark and Klaus Naumann in October 1998, said, “‘We know how to deal with the problem of these Albanians. We’ve done this before.’ We asked where. ‘In the Drenica region in central Kosovo in 1946,’ he told us. We asked what the solution was. He said right out: ‘We killed them. We killed them all. It took several years, but eventually we killed them all. And we had no problem.” See: Daalder, Ivo H. and O’Hanlon, Michael E.: Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington : Brookings Institution Press, 2001 pp. 58.

[79] Bajraktari, Haxhi: Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-hebraike, Prishtinë, p. 185.

[80] In the name of protecting the Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic abolished Kosovo’s autonomy, later trying to dislodge the Albanians, finally, to release unprecedented prey on them. Albright continuously stands beside the powerful actions taken in Kosovo by NATO humanitarian intervention, saying “what we did was illegal but fair”, Clark, W. K.: Të bësh Luftë Moderne [Waging Modern War], Zëri, Prishtinë, 2003, p.273

[81] Dubkin Yearwood, Pauline: Another side to the story of Kosovo, Jewish World Review April 19, 1999, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0499/serb.jews1.asp, [Accessed: 2 February 2021].

[82] Dubkin Yearwood, Pauline: Another side to the story of Kosovo, Jewish World Review April 19, 1999, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0499/serb.jews1.asp, [Accessed: 2 February 2021].

[83] Conklin, Mike: Wiesel Cites Holocaust In Warning About Kosovo, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Apr 22, 1999, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-04-22/features/9904220425_1_elie-wieselholocaust-survivor-ethnic-cleansing, [Accessed: 2 February 2021].

[84] Conklin, Mike: Wiesel Cites Holocaust In Warning About Kosovo, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Apr 22, 1999

[85] Stroessinger, John G.: Why Nations Go to War, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Boston, USA 11th edition, 2011, p. 159.

[86] “Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon directed the Ministry’s Director-General to organize an Israeli medical team to be sent as soon as possible to the Kosovo refugee centers, to provide medical aid to the many refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Sharon also directed him to prepare to send further Israeli aid to the refugees, including medicines, medical equipment, blankets and tents.” Aid to Kosovo Refugees: Communicated by Foreign Minister’s Spokesman, The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 April 1999, ttp://www.israel.org/MFA/PressRoom/1999/Pages/Aid%20to%20Kosovo%20Refugees.aspx

[87] Wikinson, Tracy: “Israeli’s Kosovo Remarks Raise Ire”, Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1999 12, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-apr-09-mn-25714-story.html

[88] “Refugees seek peace, security outside Balkans”, CNN, April 12, 1999, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/12/kosovo.refugees.01/index.html

[89] Gleit, J. Heidi: Netanyahu greets refugees at airport”, The Jerusalem Post, May, 27, 1999.

[90] Ben-Tal, Daniel: „Kosovar Refugees Welcomed in Israel“,  AP, April 12, 1999, https://apnews.com/article/77006a65a50f5c9a81c8c08fba48c1ed and Bajraktari, Haxhi: Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-hebraike, p.186.

[91] Greenberg, Joel: Crisis the Balkans: The Israelis, The New York Times, March 31, 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/31/world/crisis-balkans-israelis-netanyahu-s-absence-outrage-over-atrocities-ignites.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap

[92] “Why is Israel waffling on Kosovo”,  The Jewish News of Northern California, April 9, 1999, https://www.jweekly.com/contact-j/

[93] Greenberg, Joel: Crisis the Balkans: The Israelis, The New York Times, March 31, 1999

[94] Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić  pledged to normalize economic relations on September 4th, signing an agreement in the presence of US President Donald Trump in Washington.

[95] Gearan, Anne: “Serbia and Kosovo sign breakthrough economic accord that is short of normal relations”, September 4, 2020

[96] Robinson, Jack: “Kosovo and Serbia sign ‘economic normalisation’ agreements”. Balkan Insight. Retrieved September 4, 2020.

[97] Ambassador Noah Gal Gendler:” Israel will recognize Kosovo in the coming weeks”. b92. Tanjug. 11 September 2020. Retrieved 21 September 2020, https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2020&mm=09&dd=11&nav_id=109221

[98] Bjelotomic, Snezana: “Double slap for Serbia: Israel recognizes Kosovo and Vucic in conflict with the EU”, 22 September 2020, https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/double-slap-for-serbia-israel-recognizes-kosovo-and-vucic-in-conflict-with-the-eu/

[99] Israel becomes the 117th state to recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state.

[100] “Touval: Izraeli ia kishte borxh SHBA-së njohjen e Kosovës”, 23 .09. 2020,  https://www.evropaelire.org/a/izraeli-kosova-njohja-shba/30853227.html

[101] “Israel and Kosovo establish diplomatic relations in virtual ceremony”, February 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-kosovo-relations-idUSKBN2A12S0

[102] “I love Israel. What a great country. Kosovo is a friend of Israel,” former Kosovan President Hashim Thaçi said shortly before declaring independence in 2008. A decade later, Thaçi promised to open an embassy in Jerusalem if the Israeli state recognizes Kosovo. See: Jegic, Denijal: “Why Kosovo keeps extending blind support to Israel”, Al Jazeera English, 26 Aug 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/8/26/why-kosovo-keeps-extending-blind-support-to-israel

[103] “Kosovo Formally Establishes Ties With Israel, To Open Embassy In Jerusalem”, February 01, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-formally-establishes-ties-with-israel-to-open-embassy-in-jerusalem/31079492.html

[104] Kosovo and Israel established diplomatic relations, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of the Republic of Kosovo, February 2, 2021 https://www.mfa-ks.net/en/single_lajmi/4292 and “Kosova dhe Izraeli më 1 shkurt lidhin marrëdhënie diplomatike”, January 29, 2021,  https://www.evropaelire.org/a/31075782.html

[105] “Israel and Kosovo establish diplomatic relations in virtual ceremony”, February 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-kosovo-relations-idUSKBN2A12S0

[106] U.S. Embassy in Israel, “Economic Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia”, September, 4 2020, https://il.usembassy.gov/economic-normalization-between-kosovo-and-serbia/

[107] https://twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/1356276012703768580

[108] https://twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/1356276012703768580

[109] “Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue”, Crisis Group, Jan 25, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue

[110] “Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue”, Crisis Group, Jan 25, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue

[111] Kosovo is not relocating the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. According to the practice of international law, while establishing diplomatic relations, the parties cannot decide where to open embassies, respectively consular missions. The host country determines it, in this case Israel, determines the location of the Embassy. In this sense, Kosovo adheres to the commitments of the Washington Agreement of September 4, 2020.

[112] “Israel and Kosovo establish diplomatic ties”, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-and-kosovo-establish-diplomatic-ties/a-56409339

[113] Ned Price, Department Spokesperson, Department Press Briefing – February 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-2-2021/

[114] Gotev, Georgi: “EU regrets Kosovo’s decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem”, Euractiv.com with Reuters, Feb 2, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/eu-regrets-kosovos-decision-to-open-an-embassy-in-jerusalem/

 Ibidem

[115]

[116] “Serbia unhappy after Kosovo and Israel establish diplomatic ties”, Euronews with AP, AFP , 02/02/2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/02/serbia-unhappy-after-kosovo-and-israel-establish-diplomatic-ties

[117] Arab League condemns Kosovo’s opening of embassy in Jerusalem, Daily News, February 2, 2021, https://dailynewsegypt.com/2021/02/02/arab-league-condemns-kosovos-opening-of-embassy-in-jerusalem/

[118] Weizman, Jakob: “Kosovo’s Jews in Race to Preserve Heritage”, Pristina BIRN, December 11, 2019 https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/11/kosovos-jews-in-race-to-preserve-heritage/

[119] Institute of Spiritual and Cultural Heritage of the Albanians in Shkup/Skopje https://www.itsh.edu.mk/tribune-dhe-trajnim-mbi-holokaustin-ne-universitetin-e-gjakoves/

[120] Luxner, Larry: With US help, Muslim-majority Kosovo plans its first synagogue and Jewish museum, 22 December 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-us-help-muslim-majority-kosovo-plans-its-first-synagogue-and-jewish-museum/

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Sunday’s electoral earthquake must also translate into a reimagining of Kosovo’s approach to foreign affairs, one that enables the country to truly behave like a sovereign, independent state.

On Sunday, Vetevendosje won Kosovo’s latest parliamentary election in a landslide, in part on a ticket of socio-economic and political justice, and in part as a result of citizens’ dissatisfaction with previous governments’ poor performances.

 The party focussed its election campaign domestically, and made only modest promises on foreign policy. In its election manifesto, the party made commitments to pursue an active, innovative, and principled foreign policy and signalled its willingness to retain strategic relations with Albania, the US, the EU, and the UK. 

In regard to the European Union, Vetevendosje focused on the need to reach standards required for EU membership through education and development assistance, and pledged to restore the Ministry of European Integration. As for Albania, there is a brief reference to joint economic and political cooperation mechanisms, including on foreign policy and national security.

However, the party did not make any reference in its manifesto to the dialogue with Serbia, nor the country’s struggle to consolidate its international subjectivity by expanding diplomatic ties and access to international organizations. Essentially, Vetevendosje’s election manifesto outlined a niche and minimal foreign policy. To help flesh this out, here is my wish list for what an active, innovative and principled foreign policy should include.

First and foremost, the next Kosovo Government’s policy on foreign affairs should enable the country to start acting like a sovereign and independent state. This means changing the custodian and vassal relationships that Kosovo has developed towards its Western partners and allies, and pursuing a more multifaceted foreign policy. 

Ultimately, when countries recognized Kosovo they recognized it as a sovereign and independent state, and not as a territorial extension of great powers or other regional forces. The time is now ripe to develop a distinct and niche foreign policy, which reflects Kosovo’s own interests and values.

It can be anticipated that Kosovo’s relationship with Albania might deepen in the coming years, as it seems that the more isolated Kosovo is internationally, the higher the desire for some sort of neofunctionalist unification. However, as with other countries, cooperation with Albania should be pursued on the grounds of mutual respect and not create new and unequal hierarchical relations between the two. 

As for Serbia, the next government should not oppose the dialogue for normalization of relations entirely. But it should insist, as it has promised, to pursue it based on a detailed, structured, and transparent plan which promotes and protects Kosovo’s vital interests, and addresses many of the unresolved legacies from the past which have been so far ignored by the EU and past representatives. 

Kosovo should seek Serbia’s recognition, but it should not be obsessed by it. First, Kosovo should demand from Serbia respect, non-aggressive conduct and an absence of interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs. It should also seek respect for Serbia’s ethnic Albanian minority, whose rights are systematically ignored by Belgrade. 

Ultimately, mutual recognition must be a by-product of principled and constructive talks to resolve outstanding issues, which currently remains unattainable due to incompatible goals. 

Kosovo’s next government should also continue the pursuit of reciprocal economic and trade relations with Serbia, and the principle of reciprocity should be built into all aspects of its new sovereignist yet interdependent foreign policy. 

Kosovo needs to be treated as an equal member of the international community and not as a site for international experimentation and a never-ending norm-taker that satisfies the desire of other states to endlessly govern others. 

These principles must also be applied to relations with the European Union. So far, the relationship between the EU and Kosovo has been unidirectional. The EU has run the show and Kosovo has been the spectator. This must change. 

For example, there are sufficient grounds within Title II of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo to conduct a political dialogue on issues of mutual interests and on equal footing. This hasn’t happened so far, but it doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be utilised in the future. 

Kosovo should no longer accept the EU’s excuses to endlessly delay visa liberalization and must make it clear to the EU that its biased, unfair, and unjust policies towards Kosovo are no longer acceptable. 

If the EU wants to be taken seriously, it must develop a unified stance towards Kosovo, and ensure that all its members recognize Kosovo. Otherwise, the time is now ripe to search for alternatives to EU membership and open up to other possibilities that first and foremost preserve the dignity and rights of Kosovo citizens, and not allow them to be treated as regional leftovers. 

The same is true for the US. Kosovo should insist that the US take a leading role and work with the remaining four NATO member states to change their position on Kosovo and accept the country as an independent state and future NATO member, as well as lobby the EU on behalf of Kosovo for visa liberalization. 

If Kosovo were to join NATO, which the Biden Administration can deliver if it wants, then this would be a game-changer for Russia’s destabilizing efforts and China’s divisive policies in the region. Kosovo could even live without UN membership for a while. 

Beyond its existing partners, Kosovo must also develop a niche foreign policy and cultivate bilateral cooperation with other non-western countries that have recognized Kosovo. It should establish an agency for international cooperation and retain relations with countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific through non-financial humanitarian and development assistance and cooperation. 

This would preserve existing diplomatic recognitions and prevent the derecognitions that have occurred in the past three years, as well as help Kosovo’s efforts to join international organizations.

If Kurti’s government manages to achieve the wishes listed here it would not only achieve internal self-determination, but also realize external self-determination, and complete two vital pillars of a sovereign and independent statehood. 

Dr.Gëzim Visoka is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is lead editor of Routledge Handbook of State Recognition and author of forthcoming book ‘The Derecognition of States’ under contract with the University of Michigan Press.

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Albania’s Balkan policy throughout the last three decades has been an almost constant balancing of Greece through Turkey. Beginning in the 90s and continuing throughout the Kosovo War, the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reconciled a seven decades-long security problem in the Albanian Northeast.  The war resulted in a change of the Albanians’ status and position in the political life of North Macedonia, and led to Kosovo’s subsequent independence in 2008. Albania’s northern and eastern borders were no longer tormented by the security menace presented by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which later became the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

While the 90s removed one of Albania’s main external security challenges, it revived another security challenge to an extreme not seen since the end of the Second World War. Greek financial, economic, political and religious presence in Albania, especially in the South of the country, reached a level not seen since the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, extreme right-wing and nationalist groups in Greece revived their claims on Northern Epirus, even attempting military confrontations.

While Enver Hoxha’s Albania didn’t have the need to balance with any other power in the Balkans the security challenges of Greece and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of the regime’s heavy investment in the army and the militarization of the state, post-communist Albania because of the disintegration of the army in the beginning of the 90s, did have the need to balance in order to survive.

Survival was undertaken in two ways: First, by accommodating fallen Greek soldiers in the building of cemeteries for the Greco-Italian war of 1940-41, in contrast to the experience of similar cases of Italian, German, British and other fallen soldiers in the Albanian territory. The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania also accepted Greek influence in 2008. Furthermore, Berisha made the incredible decision to abolish the century-old, internationally recognized maritime border with Greece in order to negotiate a more favorable position for Greece— and consequently receive Greek approval of Albania’s NATO membership. Second, this “survival” was carried out by building closer political, military and economic ties with Turkey, Greece’s geopolitical rival in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.  These ties had been cultivated since the beginning of the 90s following the fall of the communist regime. They were especially important during the period of wars in former Yugoslavia, as well as during the Kosovo War of 1998-99, when Albania’s borders were directly threatened.

In the last 8 years, since coming to power, Edi Rama has increased the intensity of Albania-Turkey relations. After the devastating earthquake of November 26th, he said: ‘’We have a plan A, a plan B and then we have Turkey’’. In the post-earthquake reconstruction period Turkey was the main contributor to the building of over 500 new houses. In the last years, Turkey has become a kind of point of reference, a kind of “last resort”  upon which Albania can count on in periods of difficulty, when there is no other alternative.

This has been done mostly for two reasons: first, because of the continuing disappointment with the European Union in the Western Balkans in general about the on-going and never finishing integration process and new conditions which never seem to end and the considerable bureaucracy, while on the other hand Turkey’s approach is more direct and practical, more in the line of ‘’getting things done quickly’’; second, the opening of the maritime border issue by the Berisha government in 2008 and the subsequent 2010 decision by the Constitutional Court to annul the 2009 Greece-Albania agreement as unconstitutional and the other open issues between Albania and Greece have returned the need for Turkey as a balancer.

Albanian Prime Minister Rama’s visit to Ankara in January was the most impressive and symbolic of any Albanian high official in recent times. The visit and the agreements signed represented a considerable increase in the standing of Albania-Turkey relations. Turkey’s construction of a new hospital in Fier in a record three months period, the renovation of old parts of Gjirokastra and Berat, the reconstruction of Mosques and other Muslim heritage sites and the creation of the Strategic Cooperation Council were all signs of the deepening of amicable relations between Albania and Turkey, to an extent not previously seen before. 

Albania’s Turkey policy has gone hand-in-hand with Turkish President Erdogan’s policy of an increased presence and influence in the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East.

Rama’s visit to Turkey and his next visit to Greece cast Albania in a new light— a potential regional power-broker between Turkey and Greece. This potential intensified as Rama proposed to host a Turkish-Greek Summit in Tirana. In the last year, the two countries have been at odds because of Turkey’s search for oil and gas in the Aegean shelf, as this is considered illegal under Greek international law. Most of the EU and the US have supported Greece, while Albania hasn’t taken any clear-cut position in the issue. Nevertheless, Rama’s proposition was accepted by Turkey but not by Greece. In the end, the next round of Turkish-Greek negotiations were conducted in Istanbul, not in Tirana.

While Albania’s relations with Turkey have become closer, even personal between Rama and Erdogan, in the last seven years Albania’s relations with Greece have been overshadowed by suspicions, accusations of internal treason, and discord between the Prime Minister and the President. On the issue of negotiations with Greece they remain divided, as the endless negotiations have, until now, produced nothing. A charged atmosphere between the two countries which can be provoked by any small incident involving the Greek minority in Albania or any grand declaration of Greek power extension in the Ionian Sea. Many Albanians and sharers of this attitude see the expansion of Turkey’s power in its rivalry with Greece in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. While Rama has repeatedly denied accusations about Turkey’s influence, the course of events and declarations towards Greece and Turkey leaves some doubts.

But Rama’s proposition to host a Greek-Turkish meeting in Tirana was a strategic way to encourage Turkey to put aside its prior differences with Greece, at least in the frame of publicity. The meeting was supposedly to be used to help achieve a probable solution for the Greek-Turkish dispute, as well as to affirm Albania’s – and consequently Rama’s – position as an important power-broker in the region, in line with his carefully cultivated image as an important leader in the region. Also There was also the perception that Turkey was in fact indirectly inviting Greece to a Summit in Tirana through Albania, as the proposition came after Rama’s visit in Ankara. This was not the case.

In paper, the proposition was well-intentioned, but there were two problems with it: First, Greece and Turkey have had more than 60 bilateral meetings on this issue without reaching solution— consequently, this raises the question of why Albania would be more successful where more experienced and capable diplomats have failed. In at least the last 30 years, Albania’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Ministry have been in constant flux, not particularly proven to be able to solve issues pertaining to Albania itself. Let alone very complicated and demanding issues like the one between Turkey and Greece, an issue with which Albania had no experience or involvement. The preparation for the Summit alone would have taken a considerable time. There is also considerable doubt in Albania’s expertise and know-how in these kinds of Summits.

The second problem is that Albania itself has major issues at play with Greece. Particularly these regard the maritime border, but also the Greek cemeteries in South Albania, and the representation of Çamëria and North Epirus in the respective textbooks of Albania and Greece, among other issues. With a plethora of issues with Greece, Rama’s proposition to host a Summit on the problems between Turkey and Greece seemed untimely, as Albania itself has been negotiating with Greece for years without a solution. Albania and Greece have even gone so far as to seek the mediation of an international court to solve their issues. When you can’t solve your own issues with Greece, how can you be expected to solve other country’s issues?

Apart from Rama’s proposition, the new condition of relations between Albania and Turkey has the potential to damage their relations with Greece. Consequently, this makes it more difficult to solve the open issues between the two countries. The perceptions that Albania is a close ally of Turkey, that Albania serves as a mouthpiece for Turkey in certain moments, that Turkey conditions Albania’s foreign policy with neighboring countries – i.e. Greece – have the potential to damage Albania’s relations with Greece. In general, Turkey is perceived as a strategic rival of Greece, but at the same time it has the potential to damage Albania’s policy towards the region and the European Union, solidifying its position as a potential ‘fifth column’.

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