By David J. Kostelancik

January 20, 2026

When Congress passed the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act as part of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it sent a clear signal: energy security in Southeastern Europe is no longer a peripheral economic issue — it is a core U.S. national security concern.

The Western Balkans sit at a geopolitical crossroads between Euro-Atlantic institutions and sustained Russian and Chinese influence. For years, energy dependence has been an effective tool used by unscrupulous powers to exert pressure. Control over supply, opaque infrastructure deals, and corruption linked to energy contracts have undermined democratic governance and regional stability. Congress recognized a basic reality: countries that lack control over their energy are easier to pressure, manipulate, and destabilize.

The new NDAA establishes a long-term US strategy for the region with energy at its center. It mandates cooperation with Balkan countries to diversify energy sources, reduce reliance on Russian energy, accelerate the transition to renewables, and modernize infrastructure to withstand cyberattacks and external interference. It also strengthens sanctions measures that can be used against individuals and entities that employ corruption — often through energy deals — to threaten regional stability.

Markets: Regulatory reform can help ensure market transparency through modernized energy markets. Russian ownership of critical energy assets, including midstream and downstream companies, presents a serious challenge in some countries (for example, the Russian-owned oil refinery in Serbia). US and European energy and infrastructure investment in these countries can help drive sector modernization and a competitive investment environment where transparency and market-based decision-making counter malign Russian and Chinese foreign investment.

Diversification: Advancing diversification in the Balkan gas, electricity, and oil sectors counters Russian dominance and political leverage. Existing and/or new pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals can be better used and coordinated to diversify gas imports. Greek and Croatian LNG infrastructure already delivers alternatives to Russian gas throughout the Balkans. Investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and expanded grid integration will reduce wholesale energy prices and subsidies and boost resilience.

Mobilization of Public/Private Investment: The U.S. must continue to make energy diplomacy a priority. Low investment has long plagued the Balkans. Opportunities now exist to modernize energy systems to optimize the electricity and heating sectors, including through gas-to-power and energy efficiency methods. By focusing diplomatic engagement and facilitating financing through the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the US can boost investment in an energy sector that increases competitiveness and ensures security, including cyber security and investment screening mechanisms that uncover attempts by malign actors to gain influence.

Albania provides a good example. In the country’s north, the 600-megawatt Tropojë Wind Renewable Energy Park is moving forward as one of the largest renewable energy projects in the Western Balkans. Developed by CWP, a leading American renewable energy company, the project illustrates how US-aligned investment can deliver both economic and strategic returns.

For Albania, Tropojë represents a decisive step toward energy sovereignty. The country has historically relied almost entirely on hydropower, leaving it vulnerable to droughts and volatile international energy markets. In dry years, Albania has been forced to purchase large quantities of imported energy at inflated prices, exposing the economy to shocks and external pressure.

By diversifying into wind and solar, Albania is reducing that vulnerability and insulating itself from supply disruptions. By the end of this decade, renewables such as wind and solar are expected to account for roughly 30% of Albania’s energy mix — enough to ensure domestic self-sufficiency and generate surplus energy for export to European markets. Energy demands that once drained national resources through electricity and fossil fuel imports will be replaced by revenues and economic resilience.

The broader implications extend beyond Albania. By expanding clean energy capacity, Albania is positioning itself as a net contributor to Europe’s energy security at a time when the continent is actively working to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Every additional source of reliable energy in Europe strengthens the transatlantic alliance and reduces the strategic space available to adversaries.

For the US, this matters because energy-secure partners are more stable partners. Equally important, American companies bring more than capital. They bring transparency, competitive procurement, and compliance with rule-of-law norms. Countries that can meet their own energy needs are less susceptible to coercion and better positioned to sustain democratic institutions.

Congress explicitly addressed this risk in the NDAA by requiring reporting on foreign influence in the energy sector and authorizing assistance to secure infrastructure against cyber and physical threats. Energy systems are strategic targets. Protecting them is essential to regional stability and alliance security.

This is why energy investment in the Western Balkans belongs within the national security conversation. It lowers the risk of instability on NATO’s southeastern flank, reduces the need for crisis-driven US engagement, and reinforces democratic governance through economic resilience.

Sustained US engagement in Balkans energy investment will not only support economic growth — it will strengthen America’s national security and the stability of Europe as a whole. We have a strategic opportunity, if we take it. Courtesy of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

David J. Kostelancik is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was a career member of the US Senior Foreign Service, holding the rank of Minister Counselor. David served as deputy coordinator for terrorism prevention and detention in the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism from 2024 to 2025. From 2021 to 2023, he was foreign policy adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His overseas postings as deputy chief of mission and chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Hungary and two postings to Russia. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and political science from Northwestern University, a master’s degree in Russian and East European studies from the University of Michigan, and a Master of Science degree in national security strategy from the National War College.

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Thirty-five years after Albania’s emergence from one of Europe’s most repressive communist regimes, the country’s democratic trajectory remains emblematic of post-authoritarian transformation, reflecting the promise of political renewal while exposing the challenges of durable consolidation. In this context, the May 2025 parliamentary elections stand out as a test of Albania’s resilience and a measure of its capacity to translate reform dynamics into democratic practice. 

Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist Party secured a sweeping victory, winning 83 of 140 parliamentary seats, while the opposition, led by Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party, suffered a significant setback with only 50 seats. International observers judged the elections technically well-administered, yet emphasized the deeply polarized environment and uneven playing field. ODIHR’s final report cited misuse of state resources, vote buying, intimidation of opposition supporters, and unequal media access. These irregularities highlight the persistent vulnerabilities of Albania’s political order.

In the coming years, and particularly over the next four-year mandate, Albania’s democratic trajectory will hinge on whether reform momentum can be sustained while systemic constraints are addressed. This interplay provides the framework for assessing Rama’s record of achievements and the broader dynamics of power and fragility that define Albania’s political landscape.

Rama’s Record of Achievements

Rama begins an unprecedented fourth term with a commanding mandate, presenting his victory as a historic opportunity to advance judicial reform, administrative modernization, and Albania’s accession to the European Union.

Over the past decade, Albania has undergone significant transformations, experiencing steady economic growth with GDP averaging around 4 percent in recent years, a reduction in poverty, and the expansion of tourism. Infrastructure projects – from highways and energy connectivity to port modernization – have reshaped the country’s economic landscape. Judicial reforms, particularly the vetting of judges and prosecutors, have strengthened the credibility of the justice system, while administrative reforms have streamlined governance. These efforts have earned Albania international recognition and positioned Rama as an influential regional statesman.

Building on these accomplishments, Rama aims to prepare the country for full EU membership by 2030. The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report praised Albania’s reform drive and signaled that EU membership within the next five years is a realistic goal. This optimism reflects not only domestic reforms but also Albania’s foreign policy posture. As a NATO member since 2009, Albania has maintained a proactive role in alliance operations and regional security, while aligning closely with EU foreign and security policy. Albania is seen as a frontrunner in accession negotiations, having advanced through a significant number of negotiating chapters.

Rama’s fourth term is guided by the government plan approved by parliament in September 2025, which sets EU accession as Albania’s strategic anchor. The plan prioritizes closing all negotiating chapters by 2027, deepening rule of law and anticorruption reforms, strengthening media freedom and institutional resilience, and modernizing public administration.

Nonetheless, democracy assessments highlight persistent fragility. Freedom House continues to classify Albania as “partly free,” and the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks it as a “hybrid regime.” Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Albania 80^th globally, a modest improvement over previous years, but still among the most corrupt in Europe. These assessments underscore that Albania’s democratic institutions, while showing reform momentum, continue to exhibit structural fragility.

Power Consolidated, Democracy Eroded

Rama’s consolidation of power is unprecedented, extending across nearly all levers of governance at both national and local levels. His leadership style – a blend of charismatic command, media-savvy messaging, and tight executive control – has proven effective in mobilizing support and sustaining political momentum. But beneath this consolidation lies a fragile framework of governance, hollowed by personalized decisionmaking, weakened institutions, corruption, media influence, and entrenched clientelism.

Rama governs in a highly insulated environment, where limited transparency and weakened accountability define the political landscape. Decisionmaking has become highly personalized, with parliament reduced to a rubber-stamp and the Socialist Party functioning largely as an extension of his authority. Debate is minimal, consultations rare, and dissent actively discouraged. Most recently, the government’s program and cabinet were approved without parliamentary discussion. Cabinet appointments were made unilaterally, with ministers reportedly learning of their roles during Rama’s public addresses. Genuine political competition has eroded, as a divided opposition struggles to remain relevant. 

Although personalization of power may expedite legislation and streamline decision-making, it magnifies the risk of executive overreach and erodes the principle of collective governance – the idea that authority should be shared, deliberative, and accountable.

Political unaccountability has deepened the country’s socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Institutions remain illequipped to address poverty, inequality, and the exodus of human capital. Albania remains one of Europe’s poorest countries, with more than onefifth of the population living below the relative poverty line. Wealth is concentrated among a narrow elite tied to political and business networks, while healthcare and education remain underfunded and unevenly distributed. Persistent underinvestment has widened the skills gap and accelerated brain drain, with some 700,000 Albanians, mostly young professionals, emigrating in the past fifteen years. 

These socioeconomic vulnerabilities are compounded by corruption, which has further eroded institutional credibility. Rama’s administration has entrenched a system of political favoritism, opaque contracting, and elite enrichment. The fusion of political and economic interests has fostered a kleptocratic dynamic, enabling systemic graft, opening the door for organized crime to penetrate state institutions, and weakening judicial and media independence.

Public tenders and infrastructure projects have frequently served as vehicles for rent-seeking, enriching senior officials and networks close to the government. High-profile scandals involving figures such as Saimir Tahiri, Arben Ahmetaj, Ilir Beqja, Lefter Koka, Erion Veliaj, and Belinda Balluku reveal a broader pattern of elite misconduct. In September, Rama reappointed Balluku as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, the cabinet’s second most important post, despite persistent allegations of corruption. Following her indictment for allegedly rigging public tenders in the Llogara Tunnel project, he dismissed calls for her resignation, signaling a readiness to shield loyalists even at the expense of institutional credibility. That stance proved a precarious, selfinflicted wound: the Special Court for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime dismissed Balluku from her post – a humiliating outcome that exposes Rama’s inability to act decisively, even in cases that can turn into a boomerang against his own leadership.

Balluku and other high-profile cases cast doubt on Rama’s professed commitment to clean governance and highlight the inescapable burden of his political responsibility. These cases are not isolated; they reflect a broader pattern that underscores a culture of impunity at the highest levels of government, where senior officials exploit public office for personal gain. Misconduct has become normalized, with accountability mechanisms steadily weakened. While Rama has consistently denied personal wrongdoing, as prime minister he bears responsibility to uphold accountability, confront misconduct among senior officials, and ensure democratic standards are not compromised. Ultimately, the buck stops with him.

Organized crime has also embedded itself in Albania’s formal economy, particularly in construction, tourism, and real estate. The 2025 Organized Crime Index underscores Albania’s vulnerability, citing entrenched criminal networks and state-embedded actors. The European Commission’s annual progress report highlights persistent weaknesses in rule of law, corruption, and governance, underscoring the fragility of Albania’s institutions despite reform efforts. Construction permits and real estate projects are frequently linked to opaque financing and criminal networks, illustrating how enforcement remains weak and selective. The paradox is stark: Rama’s tight grip on power has become bound to the system itself. If he confronts the entrenched corrupt interests within it, he risks shaking the very foundation of his own rule.

These patterns of corruption and state capture are reinforced by a media landscape that is coopted and constrained, further narrowing civic space and weakening public scrutiny. 

Despite a formally pluralistic landscape, the media often mirrors partisan narratives. This stems from a toxic mix of political cooptation, concentrated ownership, and intimidation tactics. Rama has cultivated influence over key outlets through patronage and proximity to proprietors. His frequent attacks on journalists, often laced with derision and threats, have chilled reporting and further restricted scrutiny. Many media owners, businessmen benefiting from state contracts, act as proxies, securing favorable coverage and suppressing damaging stories. As a result, leading platforms remain fixated on opposition dysfunction, while institutionalized misconduct under Rama receives little sustained analysis. Even during crises, talk shows with ostensibly independent voices often sidestep scrutiny of the ruling party, spotlighting opposition missteps instead. This pattern, under the veneer of independence, reveals a deeper alignment between political power and media influence. Selective framing distorts public discourse and indirectly facilitates executive consolidation by deflecting attention from abuses and weakening institutional checks. 

Civic disengagement further deepens Albania’s institutional erosion. Society appears increasingly fragmented, marked by low civic engagement and rising political apathy. Leading intellectuals and scholars, research institutions, and the Academy of Sciences, remain largely peripheral to national debate. Their input is vital to fostering critical discourse and evidencebased policymaking.

At the same time, Rama has benefited from declining international scrutiny. With global attention diverted to democratic backsliding and crises elsewhere, Albania’s internal governance failures have attracted less sustained pressure from key partners and watchdogs. This vacuum has enabled the prime minister to consolidate power with fewer external constraints, even as corruption, organized crime, media control, and civic apathy intensify.

Entrenched Elites, Democratic Stagnation

Albania’s political system has ossified, eroding institutional capacity, stifling renewal, and constraining democratic choice. Politics remains dominated by the Socialist Party and a weakened Democratic opposition, with access to power tightly guarded and fresh alternatives systematically obstructed. Patronage networks and elite entrenchment sustain a stagnant political system, while the success of Albania’s younger generation abroad highlights the wasted potential at home. Emigration has drained human capital, deepening inertia and widening the gap between societal dynamism and political stagnation.

In view of growing authoritarian tendencies and the erosion of institutional checks, Albania’s democratic future demands a broad reckoning and mobilization across political, institutional, and societal spheres, transforming governance, accountability, and civic culture. This requires a systemic shift: political parties offering credible alternatives, a reinvigorated civil society, engaged intellectual voices, and a participatory citizenry – above all, a younger generation ready to act as agents of change.

Both major parties now face crises of regeneration, albeit in different ways: the Democratic Party through fragmentation and exhaustion, and the Socialist Party through over-centralization and conformity. 

This crisis of stagnation is most visible in the Democratic Party, which confronts a pivotal reckoning. Missteps in recent years – the failure to participate in the debate on territorial administrative changes, withdrawal from parliament and boycott of local elections – left it marginalized. The U.S. designation of Sali Berisha as persona non grata, followed by his legal troubles and house arrest, deepened internal strife and eroded credibility. Although the party competed in an electoral environment heavily tilted against it, the results revealed a deeper truth: its message failed to resonate. Its rhetoric, leadership style, and political vision appear increasingly out of step with the aspirations of the electorate.

Today, the Democratic Party survives largely on the strength of Berisha’s personal endurance and legacy. His charisma and historical stature continue to command loyalty, but they cannot substitute for a coherent program or a future-facing agenda. Without bold reimagining – internal democracy, new voices, and a compelling vision – the party risks being perceived as a relic of its past rather than a vehicle for democratic relevance. Berisha remains one of the most consequential figures in Albania’s post-communist history: the country’s first democratic president, a two-term prime minister, and a resilient opposition leader. Now, he has the opportunity to conclude his public career by stepping into the role of elder statesman and paving the way for new leadership. By guiding a transparent and competitive transition, he can help ensure that the party’s future is shaped not by loyalty to a single figure, but by open debate, merit, and vision.

In the final analysis, no leader, however consequential, can indefinitely carry the burden of sustaining a party’s standing – its credibility, relevance, and position within the political landscape. Delaying the inevitable day of reckoning will only prolong the Democratic Party’s agony, deepening internal paralysis, eroding public trust, and making the eventual leadership transition more fraught and costly.

While Berisha’s departure could trigger factional battles and short-term instability, it is more likely to galvanize the opposition, unlocking the energy and talent long stifled. The Democratic Party already has promising younger members whose potential has been overshadowed by internal strife and the dominance of entrenched leadership. With space to flourish, they could help reshape the party’s future. At the same time, the Democratic Party must broaden its base by attracting new members and voices, ensuring revitalization is not confined to generational turnover but rooted in inclusive participation. With local elections in 2027 and national elections in 2029, the party has a critical window to regroup and rebuild. 

Renewal must also begin within the ruling Socialist Party, where loyalty has replaced accountability and internal pluralism has given way to uniformity. Ironically, the party was more internally democratic under Fatos Nano in the 1990s than it is today. The Socialist Party must confront the dangers of one-man rule and rediscover its institutional character, fostering genuine policy debate and tolerating dissent.

This narrowing of internal pluralism is mirrored in the broader political landscape, where thirtyfive years after the fall of communism, no credible alternatives have emerged to challenge the dominance of the two major parties. Following his arrest on corruption charges, former President Ilir Meta’s party has largely disintegrated, leaving Albania’s political landscape monopolized by Socialists and Democrats. 

The absence of alternatives underscores not only systemic stagnation and the narrowing of democratic choice, but also the urgency of opening pathways for new actors. Albania’s younger generation has proven its capacity for innovation abroad, yet remains stifled at home. To take the helm, this generation must channel its skills into civic engagement, grassroots organizing, and the creation of new political platforms that reflect their lived realities. Universities, professional networks, and diaspora connections can incubate leadership, helping young Albanians turn experience abroad into reform at home. Harnessing this potential through civic movements and institutional renewal could spark regeneration. Without such change, Albania risks becoming a nation rich in talent but constrained by political inertia. Its democracy would benefit greatly from new, modern political forces with platforms that speak to the realities of a generation born after communism, rather than remaining bound to the legacies of the past.

Yet the urgency of renewal extends beyond parties to the foundations of democratic life itself. The country’s future cannot hinge solely on the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, or any single political actor. What is required is a renewal that engages citizens, civil society, media, and international partners to ensure accountability and foster civic participation. Together, these pillars form the foundation of democratic reinvigoration, but each is fragile and requires long-term investment

Albania faces a deepening crisis of civic participation. Voter turnout in May 2025 fell to just 41 percent, with sharp declines among young voters, underscoring disillusionment and a sense that participation carries little weight. At the same time, civil society has seen its role as watchdog and catalyst for reform steadily eroded by funding constraints, political pressure, and public apathy. Empowering the youngest generation requires institutional reforms that make participation meaningful, educational initiatives that foster civic literacy, and platforms that amplify youth voices. Equally, civil society must reclaim its space in public discourse, defend institutional autonomy, and mobilize citizens around accountability and justice. Revitalized civic participation can reawaken the democratic conscience of the nation and serve as a counterweight to executive dominance, but its vulnerability demands sustained commitment.

A free and independent media is equally indispensable to democratic reinvigoration. Reforms must ensure transparency, protect journalists, and invest in publicinterest reporting. Only an empowered media can hold power to account. Yet here too, feasibility is uncertain: entrenched political influence and concentrated ownership make reform difficult, even as the need for scrutiny grows more urgent.

Finally, the international community, particularly the European Union, remains critical. Conditionality is one of the few remaining levers for reform, but it must be applied with clarity and conviction. Support should be contingent not on the perfunctory compliance evident today, but on demonstrable progress in judicial independence, electoral integrity, and media freedom. Albania’s path to Europe must be paved with democratic substance, not symbolic gestures.

Conclusion

Albania’s democratic experiment confronts both peril and possibility. Concentrated executive power, weakened institutions, marginalized opposition, and civic apathy have created conditions for authoritarian consolidation. Yet the possibility of democratic renewal remains within reach. Albania faces a stark choice: authoritarian entrenchment, patronage networks, and civic withdrawal, or democratic renewal through pluralism, institutional independence, and meaningful citizen participation. 

With his overwhelming electoral victory, Rama holds unparalleled leverage to shape Albania’s trajectory. While his unchallenged position could suggest that he has little incentive to change course, the country’s formidable challenges and the fragile credibility of its EU aspirations require a correction in leadership style, away from authoritarian, kleptocratic tendencies that undermine Albania’s democratic foundations. How he chooses to wield his power will, to a large degree, define not only the trajectory of Albania’s democracy but also his legacy. Before assuming office in 2013, he cultivated the image of a visionary, forwardlooking leader, pledging to establish the rule of law, revitalize institutions, ensure free and fair elections, and safeguard media freedoms. It would be a paradox if he were ultimately remembered as the hopeful democrat turned embodiment of unchecked authority, who chose authoritarian consolidation over democratic renewal.

The same dominance that grants Rama such latitude also exposes the fragility of the system he presides over. His concentration of power has produced a governance model that appears formidable but rests on brittle foundations, proving less stable than it appears. The paradox of his rule is that while he can consolidate power with ease, the system’s durability is far less assured. Without credible checks and institutional resilience, Albania’s political order remains vulnerable to shocks, whether from waning popularity, intensifying dissent, or shifting alliances among entrenched interests.

This reality underscores the imperative for other forces to step forward. Albania’s future cannot be decided by Rama alone. The resilience of institutions, the renewal of political parties, the vitality of civil society, the engagement of youth, and the principled stance of strategic partners are equally decisive. If these stakeholders rise to the challenge, Albania can move beyond authoritarian drift and extractive governance, laying the foundations for democratic resilience. The task is urgent, but achievable. By mobilizing its democratic assets, Albania can turn fragility into strength, transform obstacles into opportunities, and fulfill its longheld democratic aspirations.

The Albanians deserve nothing less than a democracy genuine in substance, dignified in spirit, and firmly anchored in Europe.

________________

*Presentation at the national convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), Washington, D.C., November 22, 2025.

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In her 2023 State of the Union address, European Commission President von der Leyen asserted that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. In doing so, it reiterated the EU’s promise made at the historic Thessaloniki Summit twenty years ago.

At the time, Yugoslavia’s devastating wars had just ended. International borders had changed with the independence of Montenegro and later Kosovo. And the wave of EU enlargement was about to happen, with ten Central and Eastern European countries joining in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The driving force behind this process was the powerful vision to reunify the European continent. But also a strong political will in the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to become members of the European family. For similar reasons, the countries of the Western Balkans were equally motivated to join the EU.

However, after twenty years, the Western Balkans have still not joined the European Union. Sometimes it even seems that EU membership has become less attractive for the region than it was two decades ago. With the world and the EU facing a series of crises in the past two decades, the Union’s appetite for enlargement has waned. At the same time, some Western Balkan countries showed limited political will to implement much-needed EU reforms, giving EU enlargement skeptics arguments against their integration. In general, the enlargement process has proceeded at a slower pace and with less visible and tangible results than expected, leading to disillusionment and departure from the EU. The Union and the Western Balkans – wittingly or unwittingly – found an unsatisfactory modus vivendi.

The window of opportunity for geostrategic expansion

Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, EU membership has become an even more attractive goal for the Eastern Partnership countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time, the countries of the Western Balkans are facing unprecedented challenges to their stability as well as amplified foreign policy dilemmas. However, there is also growing awareness of a new window of opportunity for enlargement, raising expectations vis-à-vis the EU.

We welcome that the EU is now approaching enlargement from a more geostrategic and less bureaucratic perspective than before. Last year’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on strategic considerations. There is a growing recognition that enlargement policy is the EU’s most powerful stabilizing instrument. That said, the EU’s new strategic approach will not lower the standards of enlargement. Full implementation of the reform remains essential.

The current situation is an opportunity for both the European Union and the Western Balkans to show more strategic foresight, to fully regain their enlargement credibility and to reinforce mutual trust, some of which had been lost over the years.

In fact, some concrete steps should be taken without any further delay.

First, the European Union must open EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of this year. Second, Montenegro must continue its path of reform in the EU, which depends on the formation of the new government in the country. Thirdly, the negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia must be advanced. In North Macedonia, the next steps depend on the country’s ability to pass the necessary constitutional changes. The latest case is a reminder that EU member states and Western Balkan countries must play a responsible role and refrain. from the presentation of bilateral problems and disputes, which are not related to the accession process.

For a gradual and accelerated integration of the Western Balkans into the EU

On the EU side, the discussion on the necessary institutional and financial preparations for the integration of new members is gathering momentum. However, this should not become a pretext to delay the enlargement process for our Western Balkan partners. We need to start implementing existing proposals to speed up the enlargement process now.

EU institutions must be more creative in adapting the enlargement process to today’s needs. The process should be less complex and more results-oriented. We must make it more tangible for citizens and link the progress of the reform with concrete benefits. We also need to engage more dynamically with the countries of the Western Balkans, so that they can really feel the heartbeat of Brussels. From June 2022, there is a clear task from the European Council to advance gradual integration already during the enlargement process. In June 2023, as “Friends of the Western Balkans” together with our colleagues from the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovakia, we called on the EU institutions to present a clear agenda for gradual and accelerated integration in steps concrete implementation until 2024 and beyond. This should be based on fair and rigorous conditioning as well as the principle of own merits. We see many possibilities, from more frequent invitations to our Western Balkan colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Council to the opening of other policy areas such as education, science, transport or trade for their gradual involvement.

The real value of EU enlargement lies in its transformative capacity: helping countries to raise living standards for their citizens and creating prosperous environments where young people can fulfill their dreams. Our Western and Eastern Balkan partners deserve this opportunity and EU citizens will benefit from greater stability and prosperity beyond the current EU borders. EU enlargement is not one of many political options; it is the geostrategic necessity of the day.

[1] By Tanja Fajon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Slovenia, 

Alexander Schallenberg, Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, 

Gordan Radman Grlic, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia

The post The Unfinished EU: Western Balkan Integration as a Geostrategic Necessity- 20 years of EU promise appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

VALENTINA DEDI[1]

Located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula in South-eastern Europe, Albania hardly makes the headlines when it comes to its developments and aspirations in the energy sector. However, the country’s energy mix has one of the highest shares of renewable energy in Europe.

In 2020, the share of renewables reached 45% of the total primary energy supply, up from the 38% target that the government had set in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP, 2018-2020). A year later, in December 2021, Albania adopted the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), with the country pledging to further increase the share of renewables to 55% by 2030.

Hydro-Dependency

The country’s renewable energy expansion to date has been mainly driven by the deployment of its hydropower capacity. Hydropower is the second largest contributor to Albania’s primary energy supply, after fossil fuels, and accounts for almost entirely the country’s electricity generation. While hydropower seems to have been the “forgotten giant of clean electricity” as pointed out by IEA in its Hydropower Special Market Report, Albania, in that respect, on the contrary, has done a great job at harnessing its hydropower potential, which has undoubtedly contributed positively to the decarbonisation of its electricity sector.

However, at the same time, the country’s sole reliance on hydropower has made its domestic energy production more vulnerable to climate conditions. Changing weather patterns over the years have forced the country to import energy to cover domestic needs, as a lack of storage capacity requires Albania to sell its generated power during peak months of production. Imports can reach up to 40% of power needs, especially during periods with low rainfall levels, as it happened in 2017 when import costs were equivalent to about 1.5% of the country’s GDP.

While wind and solar investments have recorded a significant growth over the past decade, they still represent a very small share of the country’s energy supply as they started from a very low base.

Energy Security at Stake

Energy imports do not only have an adverse impact on the country’s trade deficit, but they also pose significant risks to the country’s energy security.

Today, Albania remains a net energy importer as domestic energy production is not able to meet demand. When it comes to renewable energy imports, Eurostat data shows that the country ranks 8^th in Europe. This is even greater than the dependence of other countries in the Balkan region which have fewer renewable resources to expand their domestic production capacity.

The reliance on imports has made the future sustainability of power supply one of the key national challenges. Power cuts seem to be a regular phenomenon, posing a further economic quandary for the country. According to World Bank, Albania ranks second only to Kosovo among European countries for the number of power outages that establishments might encounter in a typical month.

Things might even deteriorate further this winter. The current energy crisis seems to be threatening an already precarious energy situation, with the Prime Minister cautioning that this winter could be the hardest Albania has ever encountered.

Capitalising on Potential

The deployment of a diversified energy mix which will include more renewable sources will be critical for the country to bolster its energy security, which is expected to be a key factor in sustainably meeting energy demand growth and enabling economic growth in the years ahead.

Opportunities for renewables, and especially for solar and wind energy, are extensive in Albania. According to IRENA’s Renewables Readiness Assessment report (2021), the solar radiation is very high throughout most of its territory, with the country enjoying some of Europe’s highest number of sunshine hours per year. Although Albania has currently no wind power capacity, the country also presents a significant cost-competitive wind potential based on IRENA’s estimates.

Integrating solar and wind resources in the energy mix can, thus, provide the country with a higher, cost-competitive domestic supply that could meet not only current electricity demand, but also be used in new end-use applications that are transitioning towards electrification. A good example of that is the transportation sector which is the largest energy consumer and a major contributor to the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.

The increasing share of variable renewable resources can also help offset some of the hydro used. In this case, the latter can instead start acting as a baseload renewable resource, effectively displacing fossil fuels where intermittent sources struggle by filling in any gaps between supply and demand. Hydropower enjoys significant operational flexibility, which in tandem with its storage potential can make it a reliable and economic option in supporting the use of intermittent sources of renewable energy. Such a scenario would help Albania balance its system, while, at the same time, it would contribute to the reduction of its carbon footprint.

In addition to eliminating the electricity deficit and taking electrification to new sectors, Albania can increase its potential to unlock new industries and investment using clean energy. The country can explore opportunities to produce green hydrogen through solar and wind power. Hydrogen could be used domestically in hard to abate industries, another important source of emissions in the country which cannot be electrified.

Policy and Regulatory Commitment

The government of Albania seems to have already acknowledged the need for a diversified energy production mix. The Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, Belinda Balluku, has repeatedly highlighted that one of the key pillars of focus is the national strategy on energy diversification. However, any efforts towards that goal need to be bolder and more concrete.

The government should develop a holistic energy roadmap, which will provide clarity and visibility on the country’s national targets, how these are going to be achieved (including demand creation) and investments that should be made over the next few decades. Especially for renewable energy projects, which are usually low margin and long term in nature, a stable policy and regulatory framework will be vital to reduce any related risks for investors. An enabling legislation with the right incentives and supporting mechanisms for the greater uptake of renewable resource capitalisations will also be essential.

Assessing the required infrastructure to reach the national goals should also be part of the energy roadmap. The strengthening of the distribution network to better handle the phased addition of variable renewable energy sources, upgrading of hydropower facilities so they become faster and more efficient in the ramp-up/ramp-down processes, as well as the improvement of the reservoir management should be some of the key projects that require a detailed planning.

A thorough technical and economic assessment of the renewable resource potential across the country will further be important as it will help the government set achievable targets and understand the areas that should be prioritized for development. These steps will, in turn, provide investors with the right foresight and motivation to participate in the domestic developments.

When it comes to renewable energy resources, Albania has a competitive advantage, but it is in a tight spot in terms of investment interest. As such, participation of private investors and project developers will be crucial for the deployment of clean energy projects in the country. To date, renewable energy projects have been largely supported by government funding or with the assistance of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). While the government has restated that Albania is a safe country for foreign investments, the country is still perceived as a difficult place to do business. According to World Bank’s ease of doing business index, it ranks 82^nd out of 190 countries, far below its Balkan neighbours.

Exporting Opportunities

Capitalising on renewable energy potential will undoubtedly help Albania enhance its security of energy supply and reduce its carbon footprint, positioning the country on the right path with Europe’s long-term aspiration of a climate-neutral continent by 2050.

However, besides the national energy security and decarbonisation objectives, Europe’s net zero target by 2050, enhanced by the current energy crisis could provide Albania with a unique opportunity to take centre stage in European energy developments. Given its strategic location, the country could play a key role not only in the Balkan region, but more importantly in Europe’s efforts for a net zero economy. A resilient renewable energy mix could create export opportunities for Albania, which could see electricity and hydrogen, produced using renewable energy, being exported to key European demand centers. But the country needs to act swiftly!

[1] Dr Valentina Dedi is an energy economist with consulting experience in international oil and gas markets and a recent focus on energy transition. She has also been involved with academic institutions, teaching at the University of Surrey in the UK, Bayes Business School, London City University and the University of Ioannina in Greece. Valentina currently works for KBR serving within the international consulting business as a Lead Economist.

The post Albania: The ‘Sleeping Renewable Energy Giant’ of The Balkans? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Albania’s transition from communist dictatorship to democracy has been marked by high political polarization. The political discourse has been characterised by harsh rhetoric and soon emerged two opposing antagonist camps. Democracy is inherently plagued by division and competition of conflicting interests. Antagonism and polarization have been seen as the unavoidable predicament of a democratic polity; indeed as a challenge to be actively assumed and not as a symptom of a political pathology to be eliminated”.¹ In the same vein, Larry Diamond contends that democracy is, by its nature, a system of institutionalized competition for power, but any society that sanctions political conflict runs the risk of becoming too intense, producing a society so conflict-ridden that civil peace and political stability are jeopardized.²

Political polarization has been one of main features of most post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.³ However, what distinguishes Albania from other countries is the fact that polarization has not taken place along ideological or programmatic lines, rather it seems to have its roots in the communist past, is elite driven and anti-political. Sharp political polarization results where different social groups create and operate categories and mechanisms where members of different groups and social groups are fiercely loyal to their “own group”, want to win at all costs, and dehumanize, depersonalize and stereotype other group members. All of this emotional hatred produces pervasive psychology of polarization, where it causes or deepens fear and insecurity.⁴ Political opponent is constantly casted as an enemy to be destroyed, dehumanized and depersonalized. The recent report of the Institute for Political Studies notes that the parliamentary debate in Albania is dominated by harsh rhetoric, derogatory language and personal offences between political opponents.⁵

Unlike other Eastern European countries, the boycotts of parliament and violent protests have been a unique feature of Albania’s transition towards democracy. In 2019 the opposition relinquished its seats from the parliament and boycotted the local elections. This was ensued by large opposition-led demonstrations in the streets of Tirana. The radicalization of political life has created cleavages that cut across the whole social life of the people. In absence of other alternatives, people are forced to side either with the Socialist Party or the Democratic Party, the two main political parties in Albania. Whether or not people support a particular side, in a highly polarized society, they are forced to choose a side or be labelled by others as belonging to a side or group.⁶

The division of the people into two hostile poles has foreclosed the democratic life of Albania and protracted its post-communist transition towards a functioning democracy. Therefore, it is normatively and theoretically relevant to investigate and analyse the origins of political polarization in Albania. In the first section of the paper I discuss shortly the theoretical tenets of political polarization and then move to the second part where I analyse the root causes of the political polarization in Albania, namely the traumatic experience of the communist past, the role of the political elite in polarization and the emergence of the politics of anti-politics as a driver of political polarization.

Political Polarization in short
Polarization occurs when a normal multiplicity of interests and identities in a society begins to group along a single dimension, splitting into two opposing camps.⁷ Whereas political polarization is normally defined as an ideological distance between political parties – political elite or voters
in society and their positions or attitudes toward each other.⁸ Thus, difference, the dichotomy us/them becomes the identifying feature of a polarized society. Polarized democracies reveal that members are fiercely loyal to their group sides, want it to win at all costs and that mechanisms of dehumanization, depersonalization, and stereotyping work as a whole to the other group party.⁹ The formation of two poles along a single dimension is especially sharpened in the persistence of high-level political tensions. Polarization, in which identities and interests clash in tension, “simplifies rather than complicates the structures of division” unlike other types of identity-based mobilization and “mutually aligns divisions that cut diagonally across a single rift”.¹⁰

Polarization manifests itself in a series of lines such as populism-anti-populism, religious-secular, national-cosmopolitan, traditional-modern, urban-rural, austerity-anti-austerity, market- statist economy.¹¹ These cleavages are more than often exploited by political actors, namely political parties or leaders to reinforce more division, gather support and rule the population.
In this process, polarizing rhetoric and political tactics become instrumental. Polarization that
emerges in this context suppresses “in-group” differences and combines multiple and intergroup
differences into one difference or even one that becomes negatively charged and is used to define the other.¹²

The other is casted as alien to us, and in a polarized society people define politics and society through the distinction between “we” and “they”. This makes consensus, interaction and tolerance around policy issues highly unlikely and costly for the political actors. For instance, a wide range of political and national security issues begin to come to the centre of meaningless and bitter debates, and a political climate that constantly generates risks emerges.¹³

McCoy and Somer have made a significant contribution to the literature on political polarization by identifying the most common features of political polarization, which can enable a general framework for political polarization to be drawn as follows: The division of the people into two hostile poles, where multiple divisions are aligned around a single dominant division or demarcation line between the two camps; the transformation of the political demands and interests around these identities; both sides’ moral characterization of the division as “good” and “bad” ignoring the possibility of common interests between different groups; greater cohesion within groups and the possibility and reality of greater conflict and hostility between groups; stereotyping and prejudice towards the out-group due to lack of direct communication and/or social interaction; disintegration of the centre and polarized camps trying to label all individuals and groups in society as “we” or “other”; weakening the middle ground in public and political discourses; the hostile relationship manifests itself as an element of distinction in the spatial and psychological worlds-situations of polarized groups.¹⁴

In a polarized society each camp questions the moral and legal legitimacy of the others and sees the opposing camp and its policies as an existential threat to their way of life or the nation as a whole.¹⁵ The “other” is not perceived as a political opponent to compete with but as an enemy or criminal that must be defeated and destroyed altogether. In this regard, peaceful coexistence is no longer perceived as possible by citizens.¹⁶ Such strong feelings of dislike and distrust towards opposition parties, candidates, and social groups make this extreme polarization particularly dangerous.¹⁷ People standing in the middle ground are constantly pressured to side with one group or the other, making societal consensus impossible to be achieved. Instead of referring to others as ‘you’, people begin referring to the out-group as ‘them’. This change in language reflects and reinforces the politics of alienation and exclusion at the social level.¹⁸

The communist past divides the present

Albania experienced one of the most Stalinist communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe where the majority of its citizens were subject to state’s surveillance and draconian punishment practices. The communist regime had built a particularly repressive security apparatus, which oppressed all forms of dissidence, expropriated individuals, interned and sentenced to life or to death tens of thousands of people that disagreed with its policies. Under the Communist leadership of Enver Hoxha, Albania was described as one of the most repressive regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and “one of the most tightly closed societies in the world”.¹⁹

Its policy towards social and cultural customs was the harshest of all, and it was the only regime in the world that banned religious practices altogether.²⁰ The unprecedented scope and severity of the communist repression against human rights would make one argue that Albania had strong reasons to make a clear brake with its communist past and mature democratically.

In fact Albania undertook some transitional justice measures in the beginning of the 1990s, such as amnesty, public administration purges, lustration and criminal trails. Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, these measures were ill-framed and politicised – thereby they lacked cross party consensus and their implementation was significantly hindered by the communist political legacy.²¹ As a result, Albania fell short of regime’s victims and wider public aspirations to seriously and sincerely address communist regime’s human rights violation.²² The inability of Albania to implement transitional justice measures has amplified political and social polarization towards its totalitarian past. A survey conducted by the OSCE Presence in Tirana on citizens’ understanding and perceptions of the communist past in Albania and expectations for the future revealed that 62% of the respondents did not see the communist past as a problem. However the most controversial figure was that when asked about the role of the former dictator Enver Hoxha in the history of the country, more than half of the respondents had a positive perception.²³ This was explained mainly by Albanian’s society not being sufficiently informed about the dictatorship and by the lack of de-communisation.²⁴

However, the survey shows that society is divided about the past. The failure Albania to deal with its totalitarian past has perverted the uncovering of the past state’s human rights abuses, thereby undermining the establishment of a shared understanding and memory of its totalitarian past. Public education in every post-conflict or post-authoritarian rule is important in order “to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in the public discourse”.²⁵

According to a study more than 60% of the school teachers were not aware about the number of victims of the communist regime because the country’s criminal past is not reflected into the school curricula.²⁶ In the absence of an official history regarding the communist regime’s abuses, particularly the youth has rested upon confusing and conflicting information coming mainly from family members, media and communist period films produced by Kinostudio e Re (the communist state-owned film production agency) which was part and parcel of its propaganda. This has created a confusing and conflicting assemblage of communist historical account among the youth, which in turn has neither helped the acknowledgment of victims’ sufferings, nor reconstruction of a shared understanding about the communist regime’s wrongs.

Albania’s inability to expose the abuses of its totalitarian regime and establish justice has thus led to the downplaying and denial of the communist dictatorship’s human rights abuses. This has nurtured a distorted historical narrative in the public sphere, which keeps portraying communist Albania in schoolbooks as a progressive state that provided electrification, free health care and education as well as universal suffrage (the right to vote only for the ruling party) – overshadowing the crimes, economic and social misery it brought about to the country. Keeping this narrative alive has made it impossible to build a unifying collective memory over the communist past in Albania.²⁷ Failing transitional justice has thereby hardened political and social cleavages. As Etkind maintain, if we fail to achieve justice for those wronged, to fully understand the nature of what happened – if we fail to mourn for the collective suffering of the nation, we enter into a post-catastrophe period. In the post-catastrophic world, “the past haunts the citizenry, divides the society and limits political choice”.²⁸
Three decades after the fall of the communist regime, Albania continues living a post-catastrophe period. The communist rule has left behind painful memories of oppression, stigmatization, humiliation and a culture of deep distrust, extreme friend-foe thinking and a violence mentality.²⁹ The debate about the past human rights abuses is divisive, hijacked and instrumentalised by both main political parties to their ends. The Socialist Party, the successor of the Labour Party has not broken away from its own past. To the contrary, it has maintained a strong link to the past by promoting the historical narrative of the communist regime and packing its leadership with former communists. While, on the other hand, the Democratic Party has utilised the communist past to attack its political opponent, and gather support around itself from the former political prisoners and those who suffered under the communist dictatorship.

In addition to that, failing transitional justice in Albania has produced consequences on the social realm as well. As it is already known, thousands of people were interned, persecuted, sentenced to life in prison or kept under tight surveillance. After the demise of the communist
regime, people were able to discover who reported on them to the secret police. In a small country where ‘everyone knows everyone’, the peculiar and particularly brutal repression
methods and failed transitional justice, injustice and suffering have left behind countless unresolved personal and family conflicts.³⁰

This has added more to the social polarization in Albania where societal relations are hunted by the communist past human rights abuses and its distorted historical account. This assemblage of failures in dealing with the communist regime’s crimes and building a shared truth and memory has inflicted tensions in the society, thus dividing Albanians in communists and anti-communists. This has left no room for moderation and foreclosed the democratic life of the country.

The politics of anti-politics Historical accountability sets off transition’s dynamics, is transformative and plays a forward-looking role in a country’s liberalisation process. No viable democracy can afford to accept amnesia, forgetfulness and the loss of memory. An authentic democratic community cannot be built on the denial of past crimes, abuses, and atrocities.³¹ It is assumed that holding individuals accountable for crimes committed under the previous regime lays the foundation for a democracy committed to the rule of law and prevents future abuses under the new political system.
The failure of Albania to bring to justice the wrongdoers of the communist regime has nurtured old elite continuation. This has constantly plunged the country into a political crisis and undermined citizens’ political choices. As a result, Albania was turned into a fertile ground for political polarization and the emergence of anti-politics.

The political discourse in post-communist Albania is not framed around politics, by which
democratic politics theorist Chantal Mouffe understands the wide range of practices, discourses
and institutions which aim to establish a peaceful co-existence of different conceptions over what
constitutes a good or moral life.³² To the contrary, the unsettled historical account of the communist past is misused to construct a divisive political narrative for electoral benefits, creating two antagonist camps, the anti-communists and the successor of the communists. This has not served the needs of citizens and democracy building but rather has hardened political polarization. As Mouffe suggests if a political unit cannot transform antagonism into agonism it risks tearing apart the very social fabric of the society and dismantling democracy in the first place.³³

Moreover, by emphasising the threat of ‘Communism’ versus ‘Berishizëm’, the unpolitical discourse deemphasised other internal social divisions and subsumed political alternatives, what has in turn perverted democratic representation and political choice. In April 2021 Albania held its 10th general elections since the fall of the communist dictatorship. However, most of electoral campaigns did not address peoples’ concerns and needs, but instead they were dominated by anti-politics which merely intend degrading political opponent. Political articulation of different social strata’s problems is substituted by an empty narrative which portrays the opponent as the biggest evil who should be destroyed. For instance, in 2009 parliamentary elections the then Socialist Party leader Edi Rama declared that he is not a politician at all and denounced his opponent, the then Prime Minister Sali Berisha, as a symbol of the backwardness. Nevertheless, Rama’s party did not deliver any political manifesto where farmers, labourers, teachers or other social groups’ concerns were addressed – rather he declared a total war against the ‘old politics’ without offering any alternative.

On the other hand the Democratic Party has played the anticommunism card during the 90s and continues to use and reuse it for electoral benefits without genuinely addressing social groups’ needs. This has brought to the surface a deep crisis of representation in Albania, expressed in increasing public’s distrust towards political parties and public institutions in general.³⁴ These failures, coupled with the economic stagnation of Albania during these years and slow progress in the EU integration path have nurtured popular disillusionment towards democratic system. As post-communist Albania struggled to make progress and deliver tangible results for its population, the letter started feeling nostalgic for the communist past.

This mass dissatisfaction has been politically harnessed by communist era politicians and ancient regime’s successors to cling to power and thus protract Albania’s path towards a functioning democracy. The 2022 Freedom House report defines Albanian as a partly free country and a hybrid democracy³⁵, while in the same vein Transparency International ranks Albania as a highly corrupt country.³⁶ Instead of debating about policies, tackling corruption and facilitating economic growth, the political elite have operated through a binary conception of the political, where the opponent is not seen as legitimate but as an enemy. This Schmitt’s friend-enemy conception of the political has been pervasive in the political discourse in post-communist Albania. According to Kajisu, the anti-politics discourse should be seen as the outcome of two interrelated factors: the sedimentation of identities in the new post-communist horizon and the failure of political parties to articulate their positive identity.³⁷ The two biggest political parties did shy away from programmatic articulation. Instead, they have been throwing anti-political accusations against each other. This has deepened the crisis of representation and has hardened political and social polarization in Albania.

Elite-driven polarization
There has been much debate among scholars about the role of elites in political and social polarization. According to Zingher and Flynn polarization on the elite level can dramatically affect
electoral behaviour even if it is not associated with any type of dramatic change of the electorate’s basic underlying ideological or policy orientations.³⁸ In the same vein, Mullinix contend that elite partisan polarization alters the influence of partisanship in preference formation in the mass public in at least two ways. First, when elites are divided along party lines, they provide clearer signals about the parties’ positions on a given issue to the mass public. Second, elite polarization that emphasizes conflict between competing sides increases the salience of partisan identities.³⁹

The political elite in Albania has inflicted tension at the political and societal level by emphasizing division as a tool to cling to power. Two main opposing camps emerged after the fall of the communist regime, the Socialist Party on the left and the Democratic Party on the right political spectrum. Both parties worked behind the scene to ensure that their monopoly over the political system is upheld. They have changed the electoral law and the constitution several times to make sure that a two-party system is maintained in the country. During the last 25 years, the two major parties have changed the electoral system before every general election in order to guarantee their political dominance.⁴⁰

This has further entrenched division in Albania. The high degree of political bipolarization has successfully divided the Albanian political discourse and electorate into two antagonistic camps.⁴¹ Both sides have worked to divide the public opinion, media and civil society through the enverist [Enver Hoxha] philosophy of “he who is not with me is my enemy”.⁴²
Though after the fall of the communist dictatorship more than one hundred political parties
were founded, the political scene has been dominated by two biggest parties. A quick glance at
the effective number of legislative parties in Albania during the last 22 years shows that the political scene has been dominated by an average of 2.33 parties for this period.⁴³

TABLE 5.

By 1991, the Albanian society was deeply divided into two antagonistic camps. On the one hand was the anti-communist bloc, primarily amidst the urban, youth and better-educated population that was highly critical of the communist regime and called for deep and rapid political and economic transformations. On the other hand, there were the supporters of the communist regime, primarily amidst the rural and lesser educated part of population that called for gradual transformations and held a less critical view of the communist past^.44 The political elite used these historical differences between the left and the right to craft a harsh and divisive rhetoric where the political opponent is casted as the enemy of the people. The more the two parties have converged, ideologically and policy wise, the more they have tended to polarize the political scene by portraying their political opponent as a threat to ‘the people’.⁴⁵ In this regard, the voters’ behaviour was not defined by programmatic differences, but by the empty rhetoric of political leaders. Political parties in post-communist Albania were dominated by strong leaders who presided over the party structures. This gave them almost absolute power in the party which was utilised to further tight the grip on the party and delegitimise the political opponent.

Most of electoral campaigns were marked by derogatory language against opponents. This has come up as a result of the concentration of power in the hands of party leaders who seek to dehumanise and humiliatetheir political opponent, instead of delivering a political manifesto to the electorate.⁴⁶ According to some experts this is a result of the communist legacy where the political opponent is framed as an enemy that must be destroyed. The lack of democratic culture is also blamed on for the failure of Albania to appeal to moderation.⁴⁷ The authoritarian-style leadership has thus divided the society. The divisive rhetoric has intended to rally the mass public behind certain leaders. This has been the hallmark of Albania’s post-communist protracted transition towards democracy.

Conclusion
Political polarization seems to have been deeply embedded into the political and social life of post-communist Albania. It has manifested itself through heated divisive political discourse about the communist past, empty and non-programmatic rhetoric between party leaders. This has established two antagonist camps that have nurtured division in order to cling to power. Political polarization in Albania has its roots in the communist dictatorship legacy, is anti-political and elite driven. Particularly the failure of Albania to deal with the communist regime’s massive human rights abuses has exposed the country to communist-era-like policy making and its historical account where the past is portrayed as progressive.

Political elite seems to be more a continuation of the old communist nomenclature and the communist dictatorship’s crimes are not punished. This has undermined the establishment of a shared collective memory about the communist past which has divided Albanians into communists and anti-communists. This has been instrumentalized by the post-communist political elite for electoral benefits. Thus, societal relations and political choice are hunted by the communist past human rights abuses and its distorted historical account.

Apart from that, political polarization in Albania has not emanated from programmatic differences. Both political sides have not articulated political manifestos, rather they have appealed to the people on populist grounds. The anti-political discourse has dominated the parliamentary and the political debate. Instead of debating about policies, the political elite has operated through a binary conception of the political, where the opponent is not seen as legitimate but as an enemy that must be defeated and humiliated. This Schmittian conception of the political where the opponent is seen as the enemy hasn’t left room for moderation and consensus. To the contrary, it has entrenched both political life and social relations. The political elite has added more to this division by maintaining a Westminster-like party system,
where two biggest parties dominate the political life.

The constitution and electoral law has been changed several times to ensure that biggest parties reap the benefits of the system. Political bipolarization and authoritarian-style party leaders have fuelled more societal polarization by de-emphasizing social strata needs. Rather than debating about policies, harsh rhetoric, derogatory language and building of clientelistic networks has been the modus operandi of the political elite. This has inflicted tension and generated artificial political crises, which has divided more the people into two antagonist camps, socialists and democrats.

____________________________________________________________________________

1 Stavrakakis, Y. (2018). Paradoxes of Polarization: Democracy’s Inherent Division and the (Anti-) Populist Challenge. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 43-58.
2 Diamond, L. (1990), ‘Three Paradoxes of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 1(3): 48-60
3 20 vjet demokraci në Shqipëri, DW, 20 mars 2012, https://www.dw.com/sq/20-vjet-demokracin%C3%ABshqip%C3%ABri/a-15817781
4 Green, D., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
5 Kuvendi dhe deputetët: Roli kushtetues, bilanci dhe Kodi i Sjelljes, Instituti i Studimeve Politike, Tirane. https://isp.com.al/kuvendi-dhe-deputetet-roli-kushtetues-bilanci-dhe-kodi-i-sjelljes/

6 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42
7 MaCoy, J. and Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework.
8 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy.
9 Fatih, E. (2022). Historical origins of political polarization in Turkey. Collective memory.
10 LeBas, A. (2006). Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe. Comparative Politics, 38(4), 419-438.
11 McCoy, J. L., & Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework.
12 Fatih, E. (2022). Historical origins of political polarization in Turkey. Collective memory.
13 Dixit, A. K., & Weibull, J. W. (2007). Political Polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United

14 McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 681(1), 1-69.
15 García-Guadilla, M. P., & Ma, A. (2019). Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic Erosion in Venezuela’s Twenty-First Century Socialism. ANNALS, AAPSS, 681(1), 62-77.
16 Lozada, M. (2014). Us or Them? Social Representations and Imaginaries of the Other in Venezuela. Papers on Social Representations, 23(21), 1-16.
17 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42
18 MacCoy, J. and Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework, International Political Science Association conference, Poland, July 23-28, 2016.
19 Kritz, N. (1995). Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
20 Pandelejmoni, E. (2019). Kujtesa dhe rrëfimi i historive jetësore mbi kampet e punës së detyruar, internimet dhe burgjet në Shqipërinë Komuniste, Tek, TË MOHUAR NGA REGJIMI. Përmbledhje e kumtesave dhe referateve të mbajtura në Konferencën organizuar nga Autoriteti për Informimin mbi Dokumentet e ish Sigurimit të Shtetit, Tiranë, 338-35.

21 Gjeta, A. (2020). Transition without justice in post-communist Albania: Its implications to collective memory building and democracy promotion, Compilation of Paper, OSCE Presence in Albania.
22 Ibid
23 Citizens understanding and perceptions of the Communist past in Albania and expectations for the future, OSCE Presence in Albania, 2016. https://www.osce.org/presence-in-albania/286821
24 Godole, J. (2019). The young generation’s borrowed memory of the communist period, in: Godole, J. and Idrizi, I.(eds). Between Apathy and Nostalgia: Public and private recollections of communist in contemporary Albania. Tirana: IDMC.
25 Ignatieff, M. (1998). The warrior’s honour: Ethnic war and the modern conscience. New York: Metropolitan Books.
26 Godole, J. (2020). Mësuesit mungesë informacioni për periudhën e komunizmit, Godole: Duhet ndërhyrje urgjente. ABC News, 14 February. Available from https://abcnews.al/mesuesit mungese-informacioni-per-periudhen-e-komunizmit-godole-duhet-nderhyrje-urgjente/
27 Gjeta, A. (2021). Albania Remains Hostage to its Communist Past, Balkan Insight, 21 May 2021. https://balkaninsight. com/2021/05/21/albania-remains-hostage-to-its-communist-past/

28 Etkind, J. (2013). Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
29 Idrizi,I. (2021). Debates About the Communist Past as Personal Feuds: The Long Shadow of the Hoxha Regime in Albania, Cultures of History Forum, published: 27.04.2021
30 Ibid
31 Tismaneanu, V. (2008). Democracy and Memory: Romania Confronts Its Communist Past. ANNALS, 617, 166-180.
32 Mouffe, Ch. (2006).The paradox of democracy, Verso: London.

33 Mouffe, Ch. (2006).The paradox of democracy, Verso: London.
34 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with Politics! The Crisis of Representation in Post-Communist Albania. East European Politics and Societies, 24 (2), 229-253.
35 Freedom House report, Albania, 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedomworld/2022
36 Transparency International report, Albania 2023.https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/albania
37 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with politics.

38 Joshua N. Zingher and Michael E. Flynn, (2015). From on High: The Effect of Elite Polarization on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972–2012. British Journal of Political Science, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/S0007123415000514
39 Mullinix, K. (2016). Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance.
40 Çeka, B. (2013). Tezë Doktorature: Marrdhënia Mes Sistemeve Zgjedhore, Sistemit Partiak dhe Sjelljes Zgjedhore në Shqipëri. Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Shkencave Sociale, Departamenti i Shkencave Politike. Accessed September 10, 2015 http://www.doktoratura.unitir.edu.al/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ Doktorature-Blendi-Ceka-Fakulteti-i-Shkencave-Sociale-
Departamenti-i-Shkencave-Politike.pdf
41 Kajsiu, B. (2016). Polarization without radicalization: political radicalism in Albania in a comparative perspective, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24:2, 280-299.
42 Ibid
43 Kajisiu, B. (2016). Polarization without radicalization: political radicalism in Albania in a comparative perspective, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24:2, 280-299.
44 Vickers, M. 1999. The Albanians: A Modern History. London: I.B. Tauris

45 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with politics.
46 Arapi, L. (2013). E pakompromis, e personalizuar – Retorika politike në fushatën 2013, DW, 14 qershor 2013, https://www.dw.com/sq/e-pakompromis-e-personalizuar-retorika-politiken%C3%AB-fushat%C3%ABn-2013/a-
47 Ibid

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The post The Origins of Political Polarization in Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

On September 11th – that fateful day – a young Muslim from Pakistan was evacuated from the World Trade Centre where he worked. He saw a dark cloud coming towards him. Trying to escape, he fell. A Hasidic Jew held out his hand, saying, ‘Brother, there’s a cloud of glass corning at us, grab my hand, let’s get the heck out of here.’
People of all faiths have condemned that act of terrorism and held hands to support and comfort each other and joined together in prayer. As the young Muslim said afterwards ‘We need to continue to hold hands as we shape a more just and peaceful society.’ Likewise, Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the UN, has said, ‘Nine-eleven made us look with new eyes at each other’s faiths… We need to come together.’
Even so, the world seems a more dangerous place. Although the deadly danger of terrorism is now all too clear, the war against terror has also claimed many innocent lives. The gap between rich and poor grows wider.
The Chinese word for crisis consists I gather of two characters – one of which means Danger and the other Opportunity. In this sense, we are at a critical moment in interfaith relations. It is a time both of danger and opportunity.
The danger is only too evident in the worrying increase in anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and racism, as well as the situations of conflict, especially in Israel/ Palestine and between India and Pakistan. There is alarming, but I believe misguided, talk in some quarters about a clash of civilizations.
Yet the very dangers of the situation emphasize the urgent importance of interfaith understanding and cooperation. Recently the British Foreign Office arranged a Faith and Foreign Policy Week, including a seminar to which a number of religious leaders were invited to meet the Foreign Secretary and some key staff members of the FO. It was another welcome sign that governments recognize the vital importance of encouraging interfaith understanding as a contribution to social cohesion and international peace.
Let me then say a little more about the dangers.
Religion for many people is more a question of identity than a matter of belief. Ask a Christian to define religion and she is likely to say that religion is a matter of belief, particularly of belief in God. But half the world does not think in these terms. For them, religion is first and foremost what you do, not what you think. A Hindu or a Jew must avoid certain foods. What is your religion? It says on the form, that the terrorist asks the same question. Protestant and Catholic in Ulster, Hindu and Sikh in the Punjab… In this sense, religion cannot be quite separated from politics or indeed from racism.¹
Because of the important link between religion and identity, although the main causes of a conflict may be political and economic if the antagonists belong to different religions, which differences, and long-remembered injustices, will fuel the bitterness and be used to vilify the enemy. Because of this in the popular mind and maybe the media, the conflict may be spoken of as a religious one or even as ‘a holy war.’ Then the expectation is aroused that ‘religious leaders’ ought to be able to put an end to the conflict: but this is unrealistic.
There are other ways in which religion can be a cause of conflict or add to conflict.

First, Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism, strictly speaking, was a term used at the end of the nineteenth century by Christians who affirmed the verbal inerrancy of the Bible. In a broader sense, fundamentalists, to be found in most religions, are those who reject historical change and claim an absolute truth for their beliefs. This implies that other religions are false.² It is therefore a religious duty to oppose false teaching and those who try to change traditional beliefs and practices. This is even more the case when it is felt that the undermining of tradition is orchestrated by outsiders.
Let me add that it is misleading to assume that all Muslims are fundamentalist in this modern sense, just because they accept the Qur’an as a direct revelation from God. Muslim scholarship and the development over centuries of Shari’a law allow a considerable variety of interpretations.

Secondly, exclusive claims to the truth encourage people to look down on ‘the heathen’ who do not share them.
The relation of religions to each other has become an important issue for theological debate in most religions. I myself believe that the God of Love whom Jesus revealed is a God who loves all people. We are discovering that religious diversity is enriching and that friendship transcends religious difference. We should rejoice in the truths which we hold dear but learn to appreciate what others treasure. As the Native American spiritual leader Black Elk said, I saw the hoop of my people and I saw that it was holy – and then I saw that it was one hoop of many hoops – all of which are holy. Quite a lot of my writing has been exploring how we can affirm our belief that God’s love has been revealed in Jesus Christ and at the same time respect and learn from other traditions.

Thirdly, religions have too often endorsed the use of violence. Whereas Jesus chose the way of the Cross, the Prophet Muhammad was willing to use force to defend the message of God. Yet although the early Christians were pacifists, more Christians on this point seem to have followed Muhammad rather than Jesus.

What can People of Faith do to reduce Conflict?
I find it hard to see what people of faith can actually do in the midst of war and conflict. In Israel/Palestine, peace activists are virtually prevented from meeting by the respective governments. A chosen few may bravely act as peace messengers. All of us can pray for and call for peace and we can try to ensure that we do not demonize the enemy. It is also important to try to prevent regional conflicts in other parts of the world from damaging community relations in this country.
Religious people can, however, make a major contribution to preventing conflict and to peace-building following a conflict. They have a major preventative task in helping to remove causes of religious hostility. This has been the work of the interfaith movement, which dates back to the World Parliament of Religions, which was held in Chicago in 1893. I have been involved in this work for forty years.
(1) Dispelling ignorance and prejudice – For example, just as Christians have struggled to remove ignorance of Judaism, now there is a lot to do in the West to dispel ignorance about Islam and my small book What Can We Learn about Islam is an attempt to do this. Even between different Christian denominations there is still misunderstanding and I was blessed as a student in the cities to be a member of the United Church of South India.
(2) Encouraging people of different faiths to meet – especially young people. Personal friendship is vital in breaking down false stereotypes. Such personal encounters can be life-changing. In my case, as a student in India, helping at a leprosy clinic with Muslims, Hindus and other Christians helped me see that Christianity has no monopoly on goodness or salvation.
(3) Such a meeting may lead us to rethink our beliefs and recognize that God is active in all the great religions. (4) As the sense of fellowship with people of other faiths develops there is a growing desire to work and discuss and pray together.

Secondly, People of faith can make a valuable contribution to peace-building after conflict.
Where there has been conflict, faith communities have the opportunity to play a healing role. The most striking recent example is South Africa. Desmond Tutu, who chaired the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has said, ‘We here in South Africa are a living example of how forgiveness may unite people’.³ The example was set by Nelson Mandela. When he was released after twenty-seven years in jail, he declared that his mission was to be the victim and the victimizer. I agree with Desmond Tutu that ‘Without Forgiveness there really is no future’. It also requires courage to apologize, but that too can help to heal division. For religious leaders to call for reconciliation instead of revenge and to affirm the common humanity of oppressed and oppressors requires great courage, but it is the authentic message of all the great faiths.

Thirdly, we need to champion human rights. It is difficult to know when it is right to call for reconciliation and when it is right to confront cruel and immoral misuse of power. Desmond Tutu himself spoke out courageously against apartheid and I believe we should speak out against all abuse of human rights, perhaps especially at present on behalf of the Tibetan and Palestinian people. In 1939, the poet W.H. Auden said, ‘All I have is a voice to undo the folded lie.’⁴ And at least, in Britain, we have the freedom to protest. The Jubilee 2000 Campaign or the Campaign Against Landmines shows the power of public opinion.

Fourthly, we need to share in creating a more just and peaceful world order. This is the new agenda. The most encouraging development in recent years has been the growing willingness of some politicians, economists and business leaders to take seriously the spiritual and moral dimension of the great problems that face our world. In 1998 a meeting on ‘World Faiths and Development’ was held at Lambeth Palace, London, jointly chaired by James D Wolfensohn President of the World Bank and by Dr George Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury. From this emerged the World Faith Development Dialogue. In December with the Chief Rabbi and the Muslim leader Dr Zaki Badawi, I was asked to speak to the new Commission on Globalization which the State of the World Forum is establishing.
This suggests that if the faiths are willing to speak together then their contribution to building a new world order will be welcome. I have never felt that interfaith dialogue is just an internal matter of interest to those who happen to be religious. It is I believe vital for the health of a society and for the world community. Only if a new world order is based on the ethical values shared by the great religions will we create a world society of justice and peace in which no one is hungry and in which the environment is treated with reverence.

Soon after September 11th, I had an Email from someone I did not know. He said that after he heard the news of the attack on the Twin Towers he went home and gathered the family together. Then he opened the post which had brought him a copy of the book of prayers which I had edited called “Bridge of Stars”. Let me read the prayer at which he opened the book and on which he tried to focus during that terrifying afternoon. It has a message for us all.
“Friendship to all I give friendship to all, and enmity to none. Know that violence is the root cause of all miseries in the world. Violence, in fact, is the knot of bondage.
Do not injure any living being.
This is the eternal, perennial and unalterable way of spiritual life.
A weapon, however powerful it may be, can always be superseded by a superior weapon; however, no weapon can be superior to non-violence and love”.⁵
By mutual respect and understanding and by working together, we can offer the world a message of hope that love is stronger than hatred and that unity with God’s grace, can overcome division.

Dr Marcus Braybrooke, Vicar of the Baldons, near Oxford, is President of the World Congress of Faiths, Patron of the International Interfaith Centre and Co-Founder of the Three Faiths Forum.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 R. Gombrich, ‘What Kind of Thing is Religion? in Shap Handbook on World Religions in Education, Commission for Racial Equality, 1987.
2 See further my article ‘Interfaith Can Save Religion for the World in Faith and Freedom, Vol. 52, No 149, Autumn and Winter 1999, pp. 125-133 and Leonard Swidler, The Meaning of Life at the Edge of the Third Millennium, Paulist Press 1992.
3 Desmond Tutu in Exploring Forgiveness, Ed Robert D. Enright and Joanna North, University of Wisconsin Press, 1998, p .xiii
4 W.H. Auden’s poem ‘September 1, 1939, published in 1940. The poem includes the line ‘We must love one another or die.
5 A Jain Prayer, from Bridge of Stars, Ed Marcus Braybrooke, Duncan Baird 2001.

The post Religion as a Cause of Conflict appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Abstract

This paper provides a critical viewpoint on the governance of Islam in Albania. Governance is understood as the relationship between state intervention and societal autonomy. The findings suggest that the governance of Islam in Albania is largely based on societal autonomy. The paper argues that this mode of governance, which has evolved since the end of the communist regime, has allowed the creation of opportunity structures for radicalisation and promotion of Islamist ideology. To illustrate this argument the paper analyses the legal and institutional framework for the relations between the Albanian state and the Albanian Muslim Community. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on religion and security by making evident the logic of governance and to propose a research agenda that contributes to policy solutions through a theoretically guided approach.

Introduction

Radicalisation became a salient issue in the public policy and academic domains in Albania when a hundred or more Albanian citizens joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  (ISIS). Considering the Albanian tradition of religious tolerance and moderation the quest to understand and explain the phenomenon has sparked an extensive media, public and academic debate.  The main analytical approach to explaining this trend has focused mainly on the examination of the socioeconomic factors affecting given local communities and individuals,¹ and the failure of state institutions in certain policy fields such as security and intelligence or education.² In general, academic studies and punditry alike argue in favour of greater involvement of the government.^3,4 

Indeed, the government has responded to the problem by undertaking a number of policy actions most notably the criminalization of foreign fighting, the introduction of harsher sentences for supporting, financing and participating in terrorist activities,⁵ the adoption of a strategy to combat violent extremism,⁶ and the arrest and trial of nine individuals suspected of recruiting and financing the travel to Syria and Iraq of Albanian citizen. Moreover, the Albanian government has renewed the emphasis on religious tolerance and has pledged to assume a greater role in tackling the problem by lobbying for the establishment in Albania of a regional centre to combat
violent extremism.⁷ This paper acknowledges the need for greater state intervention but maintains that it is difficult to empirically assess and demonstrate the effectiveness of state intervention in particular policy fields given that the regulation of the Islamic presence in the society involves many policy fields and a large number of state and private institutions and actors.⁸

Therefore, in order to cope with the analytical complexity of the issue this paper uses the concept of governance in order to examine how the society creates opportunities or constraints for radicalisation and violent extremism. Governance in this paper implies ‘every mode of political steering involving public and private actors, including traditional modes of government and different types of steering, from hierarchical imposition to sheer information measures’.⁹

The governance concept presupposes the existence of a multitude of public and private actors interacting with each other in the conditions of interdependence.¹⁰ As a result, collective action takes place vertically, across multiple levels of government and horizontally, across multiple arenas. By analysing the interaction of public and private actors at the policy, polity or political dimensions, different modes of governance can be identified on a continuum between state intervention and societal autonomy.¹¹

In the policy dimension the mode of governance can be defined by examining elements such as the abidingness of the legal provisions, the approach to implementation, or the presence or absence of sanctions, among others. In the political dimension, it is the degree of involvement of public and private actors in the decision-making system, while in the polity dimension, the mode of governance may be defined by examining elements such as the hierarchical or non-institutionalised structure of interactions, the centralised or decentralised locus of authority, or the degree to which decision-making processes are formally institutionalised.¹² In the case of Albania using governance as a framework for analysing radicalism and violent extremism in Albania can be helpful for the following reasons.

First, although the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism was triggered by the emergence of ISIS and the recruitment of Albanian citizens to fight along it, radicalisation has been an ongoing process that has been taking place in Albania irrespective of ISIS. According to a survey conducted in 2011-2012 by Pew Research Center, 12% of Albanian Muslims surveyed supported making Sharia the official law in their country while 6% of them justified suicide bombing in the defence of Islam.¹³ While one can argue about the differences between cognitive radicalization and violent radicalisation – the former being the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely contrary to the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure while the latter occurring when an individual employs violence to further the views,¹⁴ – the adoption of radical views by such high number of Albanian Muslims within e relatively short period cannot be linked only with failures in particular policy fields. Therefore a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the problem is needed. Secondly, the governance approach allows for the examination of the problem by moving the focus of the analysis from the level of individuals or given communities to the analysis of the opportunities and constraints the system of governance can create for the development of radicalism and violent extremism.

The main finding is that the mode of governance of Islam in Albania is largely based on societal self-regulation and a reduced role of public authority. This mode of governance does not appear to be based on any overarching concept rather it has resulted from processes that have evolved over the last two and half decades. Although this paper doesn’t pretend to establish a purely scientific causal link between this mode of governance and radicalisation it argues that this mode of governance has led to the creation of opportunity structures that advance the Islamist ideology and promote radicalism.

Legal framework
Albania has four traditional religious communities: the Sunni Muslim, the Bektashi Muslim, the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. Although no exact figures exist, the Sunni Muslim community is acknowledged as the largest one.¹⁵

The regulatory framework on religions in Albania applies to all four religious communities but the focus of this paper will focus on the regulation of the Sunni Muslim community called the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC).¹⁶ Albania has no law on religion or on Islam. Relations between the state and Islam are based the provisions on religions, laid down by the Constitution, on laws regulating different policy areas, and on the agreement between the Albanian government and the AMC.

The current regulatory framework on Islam has evolved over the last two and half decades since freedom of religion was re-established in 1991. In the early period after the end of communism, the legal provisions on religions were quite broad. The Provisional Constitution that was adopted soon after the first pluralist election took place in March 1991 stated that ‘Albania is a secular state’ and that ‘the state respects the freedom of religion and creates the conditions for practising it.¹⁷ Religious freedom and limitations were provided by specific laws. The obstruction of activities of religious organizations and ruining or damaging places of worship became punishable by the criminal code,¹⁸ while limitations were provided in politics and on the education field.

The formation of political parties on a religious basis was banned by law,19 while the law on preuniversity education provided secular education and the ban of any religious indoctrination.²⁰Differently from the Provisional Constitution, the Constitution adopted in 1998 laid down broader provisions on the religions. A notable conceptual development was the removal of the explicit reference to ‘secularism’ provided in the Provisional Constitution that was replaced with the concept of ‘neutrality’. Article 10 states that: ‘in the Republic of Albania there is no official religion and the state is neutral in questions of belief and conscience while it guarantees the freedom in their expression in public life’.²¹

In terms of the analysis of the mode of governance by examining the involvement of the public and private actors in the politics dimension,²² this policy outcome showed that differently from the immediate post-communist period, when state-religion relations were defined exclusively by public actors, the drafting of the 1998 Constitution involved religious actors whose role was important in dropping the explicit notion of ‘secularism’. The increased relevance of religions in determining policy outputs was evident in the recognition by the state of sects and cults, in addition to the religious communities. Another criterion to examine the mode of governance is the approach to the implementation of policy outputs, which may be ‘rigid’ in the case when state intervention prevails or ‘flexible’ when the autonomy of societal actors is greater.²³ Empiric evidence shows the implementation of the Constitution has been flexible regarding the regulation of state-religion relations.

As the influence of religious communities in the political dimension grew they managed to establish relations with the Albanian state based on their perspectives rather than the state perspective. A draft law on Religious Communities drafted in 1991 was floated for over a decade but was never adopted. The draft law provided for the regulation of religious freedom and practice on the principle of state-church relations, with no distinction between the religious communities.²⁴ Differently from the regulation of state-religion relations based on a unified approach the 1998 Constitution provided for a regulatory regime that was based on agreements signed between the Religious Communities and the Council of Ministers (CoM) to be ratified by the parliament.²⁵

As religious communities strived to promote their agendas it took several years to sign the agreements between the CoM and the religious communities. The agreement with the Catholic Church was signed in April 2002,²⁶ four years after the adoption of the Constitution, while the agreements with the AMC, the Orthodox Church and the Bektashi Community were signed in 2009.²⁷ Moreover, differently from the draft law of religions that laid down unified provisions for all religions the agreements with the religious communities vary in content.

What is worth noting in this context, is that for eighteen years no law has been in place to govern relations between the Albanian state and the AMC. Various policy responses such as the adoption of the law on financing terrorism, seizure of terrorist-financed assets or expelling and arrests of foreign suspected terrorists,²⁸ did not account for a comprehensive regulatory basis. The immediate implication of this omission is that state-religion relations have been largely regulated on a market basis rather than based on a hierarchical approach, which would limit the
number of actors involved.²⁹

As many authors have already pointed out, it is during this time span that the major developments that have shaped Albanian post-communist Islam have taken place, including the development of locally grown radicals.

The involvement of powerful actors in the Albanian religious market with no constraints led to the development of opportunity structures,³⁰ which put Albanian traditional Islam under huge pressure to transform, leading among others to the establishment of locally grown Salafi and Wahhabi groups. In the 1990s, the actors from the Arab world were the most influential while in the following decade, attempts were made to remove the Arab influence by allowing a greater Turkish involvement,^31,32 have only led to further fragmentations while the Arab influence has remained entrenched.³³

Two outcomes that have taken place during this period but have gone unnoticed are the normative ‘Arabization of Albanian Islam’,³⁴ and the normative shift from the Albanian tradition of fusion of national and religious identities, where national identity prevailed,³⁵ towards an Islam concerned mainly with religious identity shaping. Let’s examine first the religion-national identity relations. As the agreement between the government and the AMC stipulates the statute is the fundamental legal document that recognizes AMC as a legal entity. ³⁶

The AMC charted its first statue in 1993, but it has been amended a few times since then, in 1998, 2002 and 2005. In the first statute adopted in 1993, Article 2 stated that ‘the AMC has the duty to instil and develop the feeling of love and loyalty towards the fatherland’.³⁷ In the following statutes ‘love and loyalty towards the fatherland’ is no longer stated as the main objective of the AMC’. In the 1998 amendment, Article 2 was modified as follows: ‘the AMC has the duty to instil the love for the Islamic religion, the fatherland and the whole Albanian nation’,³⁸ while in 2005 the same Article was amended as follows: ‘the AMC has a religious and charity purpose. It has as an object of its activity to ‘propagate, awake and strengthen the Islamic faith to the Muslims believers, to protect the dignity, rights and interests of the Muslims, to enhance and develop a sense of love and loyalty to the homeland and the people of Albania’.³⁹
Another relevant aspect to note in the continuum of the statute amendments is the introduction
of the Arabic language as the only liturgical language to be used during religious services. The 1993 statute provided only limited requirements on the Arabic language stating it as a requirement for the appointment of the Director of Cultural Affairs.⁴⁰

The 1998 statute extended this requirement to the position of the Deputy Chairman of the AMC also,⁴¹ while the 2002 amendment introduced Arabic as an obligatory requirement for the election of the Chairman of the AMC.⁴² Compulsory knowledge of Arabic was introduced to a number of officials and clerks. The 2005 statute introduced Arabic as the only liturgical language to be used during religious services.⁴³ From the governance perspective, these developments are important because identity formation based on language and not on religion has long been the cornerstones of Albanian national identity,⁴⁴ so any modification should have triggered the involvement of state actors.

The case of the Albanian Orthodox League and the Ottoman Sublime Porte could be enlightening in this respect. In 1910 the Albanian Orthodox League wrote to the Sublime Porte demanding the opening of an orthodox church where the Albanian language was to be used for providing liturgical services, the grand Vezir replied that he was not against it but would leave this decision to the Ottoman parliament.45 From this perspective the analysis of the institutional structures that serve as meeting points between the state and Islamic actors begs closer attention.

Institutional framework
With the aim of maintaining relations with the religious communities and helping create the conditions for practising religion in 1992, the Albanian government established the State Secretariat on Relations with Religious Communities (SSRRC). Since its establishment, the SSRRC, which in 1999 was transformed into the State Committee on Cults (SCC),⁴⁶ has been the main and only government structure dealing with religious affairs.

However, despite its relevance of being the main point of contact between the state authorities
in the context of the growing relevance of religion in the public sphere, the SCC has remained weak in terms of capacities and performance.

When it was established in 1992 the SSRRC had a staff of three people: from the Sunni Muslim community, the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. In 1999 when the SSRRC was transformed into the State Committee on Cults the number of staff was increased to five.⁴⁷

This number was doubled in 2006 so currently the SCC has ten people: the chairman, five representatives from the religious communities and four civil servants. Given that the representatives of the religious communities are mainly concerned with lobbying with the government to further the agendas of their respective communities practically there are only three civil servants dealing with the whole range of issues that concern the state vis-a-vis religions.

The disproportions in terms of human resources are evident when the organisation and capacities of the AMC are examined. While the AMC is organised at the central and the local governmental level (the AMC and the Muftiates) the SCC has no representation at the local level, making it impossible to reflect the local dynamics into the governance system. Moreover, there has been a lack of long-term focus and planning as the continuous institutional relocation demonstrates. When it was established in 1992, the SCC (then SSRRC) was placed under the Ministry of Culture to be moved two years later under the Council of Ministers. In 2005 it was returned again under the Ministry of Culture and since 2013 it has been placed under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.⁴⁸
In terms of performance, the SCC has both the tasks, of providing advice in policy-making
processes as well as conducting administrative and executive functions. More specifically the SCC’s tasks are: to coordinate the relations of the government with the religious communities, religious associations or religious-humanitarian; to negotiate the agreements between the Council of Ministers and the representatives of the religious communities; to cooperate with the religious
communities in drafting laws and regulations; to guarantee the freedom of belief and religious
development, understanding and tolerance; to advise the Ministry of Education on the teaching programs and number of schools that provide religious education; to advise the Ministry of Finances on the import of goods of a religious nature.⁴⁹

The poor performance of the SCC advisory functions can be easily inferred by the overall failure to provide the state and non-state actors with viable policy options and tools to effectively radicalise trends. More specifically it can be inferred by the analysis of the terms of the agreement between the CoM and the AMC, which the SCC has negotiated. For instance one of the omissions of the agreement between the AMC and the CoM is the lack of sanctions in case of failure to comply. The presence or absence of sanctions is another criterion for defining the mode of governance. ⁵⁰

In order to ensure the implementation of the regulatory regime there have to be sanctions in place which can be applied in case a private actor fails to comply. The agreement between the AMC and the CoM provides as one of the aims of the agreement to ‘recognise the AMC’s reactions and actions towards deformations, extremist trends and any other acrimony expressed by its believers and to provide for the obligation of the AMC to notify the relevant authorities on cases of this nature.⁵¹ However the agreement does not provide for any sanction in case of failure to comply with this provision, except for the overall provision that the AMC abide by the Constitution and laws.⁵²
From the empirical perspective, the AMC indeed failed to comply with this provision of the agreement because it proved unable to prevent the radicalisation of Albanian Muslims from taking place, as proved by the investigation and trial of Muslim clerics,⁵³ while no sanction could be imposed for such failure.
On the other hand, the SCC could have relied on its administrative powers to demand the enforcement of the AMC statute which provides for sanctions in case of failure to implement the
statute and regulations and for failure to act in accordance with the Albanian laws.⁵⁴
According to the statute, the AMC should have administered sanctions to the Muftis and other
relevant clerics and clerks within the AMC that had failed to prevent ‘extremist trends and any
other acrimony expressed by its believers, as the agreement with the CoM provides. Although the Muftiates are responsible for registering all mosques under the property of the AMC, including those ‘built by any legal or physical person’, they had failed to comply with this provision⁵⁵

When the foreign fighters’ problem emerged the AMC admitted that some 200 mosques in Albania were outside its control.⁵⁶ On the other hand it has been argued that the so-called ‘illegal mosques’ were among the main drivers for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in Albania. ⁵⁷

Similarly, the Muftiates, together with the Department of Education in the AMC Headquarters failed to ensure that religious education is not used to further radicalisation and extremist agendas although their mandate according to the statute is to control the entire Islamic teaching
and educational organized in the religious schools and the training courses organised by the
mosques.⁵⁸

As the investigation on foreign fighters revealed, radicalisation courses were taking
place in mosques based in Tirana,⁵⁹ and assumingly in remote areas, as distance for the central
authority is considered among the key radicalisation factors as studies suggest.⁶⁰

Conclusions

This paper discussed the governance of Islam and radicalisation trends in Albania. Based on the governance approach as the interaction of public and private actors the paper has analysed the regulatory and institutional framework as they have evolved for over two decades and the involvement of public and private actors in shaping regulations, institutions and policy outcomes.
The analysis shows that the influence and role of private actors have increased over the years while the role of the Albanian state has been continually reduced.

However, when tens of Albanian citizens joined ISIS in the Syrian conflict there was a growing demand for an increased role of the state even by Albanian Islamic actors.
In this respect, the tailoring of state intervention through the governance perspective may
yield better and more sustainable outcomes.

First, government institutions for the regulation of Islam should exist at different levels of the state, including the central government, the regional, municipal, city and neighbourhood levels. So when tackling radicalisation trends it is important to ensure the existence and interaction of government institutions at different levels.

Second, Islamic presence and practice in society involve a wider range of spheres and policy fields that should be coherently interlinked such as education, employment, finances, and health. Third, there is a wider set of actors, institutions and instruments that should be considered when tackling radicalism such as NGOs, businesses, schools personnel, prison authorities and staff, etc.,

The analysis of radicalism from the governance of Islam perspective is a useful tool for analysing opportunity structures that may otherwise remain unnoticed. Further research from this perspective in fields such as Islamic education, building and function of mosques, admission and training of imams and religious authorities will provide a more nuanced picture of the problem and will help to better tailor the course of action of state intervention.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf
2 Enri Hide, Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism and in Albania, Albanian Institute for International Studies, AIIS, November 2015,

3 Albert Rakipi, ‘Lindja e një ndikimi të ri radikal fetar në Shqipëri’, Mapo, 21 Mars 2015, at http://www.mapo.al/2015/03/lindja- e-nje-ndikimi-te-ri-radikal-fetar-ne-shqiperi/1

4 Aleksandra Bogdani, ‘Albania Faces ‘Jihadi Fighters in the Shadows’ Threat’, in ‘Balkan Jihadists: The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, BIRN, March 2016. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf

5 Penal Code of the Republic of Albania, Articles 265/a and 265/b (amended in February 2014)
6 Council of Ministers Decision Nr. 930, date 18.11.2015, On the approval of the national strategy to combat violent extremism and the action plan.
7 ‘Violent extremism, together we can succeed: Premier Edi Rama summit of world leaders in the fight against ISIS and violent extremism, organized by President Barack Obama’. 29 September 2015. http://www.kryeministria.al/al/newsroom/lajme/eks- tremizmi-i-dhunshem-sebashku mund-t-ia-dalim

8 Marcel Maussen, The governance of Islam in Western Europe: A state of the art report. IMES, Inst. for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2006.
9 Adrienne Héritier, New modes of governance in Europe: policy-making without legislating?. MPI collective goods preprint 2001/14 (2001).
10 Adrienne Héritier, New modes of governance in Europe: policy-making without legislating?. MPI collective goods preprint 2001/14 (2001).

11 Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr, and Gerda Falkner. Modes of governance: towards a conceptual clarification’, European Governance Papers, No.N-05-02, Vienna 2005

12 Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr, and Gerda Falkner. Modes of governance: towards a conceptual clarification’, European Governance Papers, No.N-05-02, Vienna 2005

13 Luis Lugo, Alan Cooperman, James Bell, Erin O’Connell, and Sandra Stencel. “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Washington: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2013 (p. 15 and p. 29)
14 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon. “Countering radicalization in Europe.” London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Accessed December 12 (2012): 2012.

15 According to a census organised by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) in 2011 Sunni Muslims constitute nearly 57 per cent of the population (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Europe and the New Independent States (US Dept of State, 2014) while according to Pew Muslim Population in Albania is 79.9% (Miller, Tracy. “Mapping the global Muslim population:
A report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population.” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center (2009)
16 A part form the four traditional religious communities two new communities have been recognized since 2011 by the state, based on agreements with the government: the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania (VUSH)
17 Law Nr. 7491, date 29.4.1991, On Main Constitutional Provisions, Article 7

18 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania 1995, Articles 131- 133
19 Law Nr. 7502, date 25.7.l991, On political parties, Article 6 and Law Nr.8580, date 17.2.2000, On political parties, Article 7
20 Law on the Pre-university education system, Nr. Nr.7952, date 21.6.1995, Article 7
21 Law nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 10/1,2
22 Treib et al, p.7
23 Treib et al, p.8

24 Silvo Devetak, Liana Kalcina, and Miroslav F. Polzer. “Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe.” (2004). pp. 200-206

25 Law nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Article 10/5
26 Law Nr. 8902 dated 23.05.2002, On the ratification of the ‘Agreement between the Republic of Albania and the Holy See for regulation of mutual relations (Official Gazette No. 26, 2002, Page 836)
27 Law No. 10056 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 121). Law No. 10 057 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and
the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church on the regulation of mutual relations” (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 130). Law No. 10058 dated 22.01.2009, On the ratification of the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and
the World Bektashi Order on the regulation of mutual relations “ (Official Gazette No. 7, 2009, Page 146)

28 Eduart Bala, ‘The Financing of Islamist Groups in Albania’, in Freeman, Michael, (eds.), Financing terrorism: case studies.
Routledge, 2016
29 Treib et al, p.9
30 Douglas McAdam, ‘Conceptal origins, current problems, future directions’, in: Douglas McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer Y. Zald (eds.) ‘Comparative perspectives on social movements. Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings’, Cambridge University press 1996, p.37

31 Cecilie Endresen. “Faith, Fatherland or Both? Accommodationist and Neo-Fundamentalist Islamic Discourses in Albania.”
The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. 222-241.
32 Arolda Elbasani. “Religion and Democratization in Post-Communist Albania: Is it Possible to Be Islamic, Democratic and European at the Same Time?” (December 1, 2010). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.
33 According to the AMC, all the new mosques that have been built over the last four years have been funded by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates either directly or through foundations funded by these countries such as ‘Mercy International’, ‘Kuwaiti Joint Relief ’, ‘Zekat House’, or ‘Mirësia’ (See: http://www.kmsh.al/al/category/lajme/)

34 Arolda Elbasani. “Religion and Democratization in Post-Communist Albania: Is it Possible to Be Islamic, Democratic and European at the Same Time?” (December 1, 2010). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.
35 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe.
KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009).
36 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 2
37 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 1993, Article 2
38 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 1998. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=222&lang=en

39 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community, 14 May 2005, Article 2. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=226&lang=en
40 Statute of the AMC, 1993, Article 23
41 Statute of the AMC, 1998, Article 14
42 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community, 28 April
2002, Article 10. http://licodu.cois.it/?p=224&lang=en
43 Statute of the AMC, 2005, Article 6
44 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe. KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009). p.11
45 Nathalie Clayer, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: la naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe. KARTHALA Editions, 2007. (Albanian Translation : Nathalie Clayer, «Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi
me shumicë myslimane në Evropë.» Tirana: Botime: Perpjekja 2009). p. 595-596
46 Council of Minsters DecisionNr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults
47 Council of Minsters DecisionNr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults

48 Background of the State Committee for Cults. http://kshk.gov.al/historiku-i-komitetit-2/
49 Council of Minsters Decision Nr.459, date 23.9.1999, On the establishment of the State Committee on Cults
50 Treib et al, p.8
51 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 3
52 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Albanian Muslim Community. Article 3
53 Benet Koleka, Albanian court jails nine for recruiting fighters for Syria, Reuters, 3 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-albania-idUSKCN0XU2AB

54 Statute of the AMC, 2005. Articles 59-60
55 Statute of the AMC, 2005. Article 51
56 Fatjona Mejdini, ‘Uncontrolled Mosques Proliferate in Albania’, BIRN Tirana, 17 December 2015, http://www.balkaninsight. com/en/article/state-slams-albanian-muslim-over-uncontrolled-mosques-12-17-2015
57 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf, p.33-36
58 Statute of the Albanian Muslim Community, Adopted by the General Council of the Albanian Muslim Community in 2005, Article 34
59 Etleva Delia, ‘Secret schools within the mosques: arrested the 2 imams that recruited 70 Albanians to go to Siria’, Panorama,

12 March 2014. http://www.panorama.com.al/shkolla-sekrete-brenda-ne-xhami-pranga-dy-imameve-qe-rekrutuan-70-shqiptare-per-ne-siri/

60 Gjergji Vurmo, Religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania, IDM Tirana 2015, http://idmalbania.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf, p.80

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Be Islamic, Democratic and European at the Same Time?” (December 1, 2010). APSA 2011
Annual Meeting Paper.
Cecilie Endresen. “Faith, Fatherland or Both? Accommodationist and Neo-Fundamentalist
Islamic Discourses in Albania.” The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan
UK, 2015. 222-241.

Douglas McAdam, ‘Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions, in: Douglas McAd-
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Eduart Bala, ‘The Financing of Islamist Groups in Albania’, in Freeman, Michael, (eds.), Financing terrorism: case studies. Routledge, 2016

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Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.” Washington: Pew Forum on Religion and Public
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Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon. “Countering radicalization in Europe.” London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Accessed December 12 (2012): 2012.
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gious Communities in South-Eastern Europe.” (2004).

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http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf
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The post Radicalisation and Governance of Islam in Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

According to literature, there is still a general opinion that Violent Extremism (VE) and terrorism are issues that concern men only. However, as the data show, about 550 Western women have travelled to ISIL / Da’esh-occupied territory and 17% of foreign European fighters/ warriors are women (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Rad- Jankovic. A., 2018). Moreover, according to Europol, one in four people arrested in Europe for terrorist activities in 2016 was a woman (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018). Furthermore, recent studies highlight the fact that women’s involvement in extremist organizations and their role in conflicted countries or violent situations are often more complicated than assumed (Eggert, 2018), and that women at the same time “can be victims, violent actors or agents of positive change” (Dufour-Genneson, S. Alam, M., 2014).
This paper analyzes the factors that push Albanian women towards religious radicalization
and participation in foreign conflicts.

The paper challenges the existing gap in studies which have focused on men, given that the number has been higher and hence has missed the nuances from a gender perspective. The methodology uses first-hand testimonies, interviews and focus groups as well as a literature review to address specific factors at both the micro level: psycho-sociological and ideological factors; and the macro one: socio-economic, political, and specific cultural factors. Women may act as peace-builders, including through women’s organizations, using their influence in the families and communities to establish unique solutions to support prevention, de-radicalization, psycho-sociological support, and rehabilitation from radicalization and violent extremism (Dufour-Genneson, S. Alam, M., 2014). On the other hand, women are not only the victims of VE. They can also serve as mobilizers and supporters for terrorist organizations, recruiters, fundraisers, and even as doers of terrorist acts (Bhulai, R., Peters, A., Nemr, C., 2016).

Throughout the review of the existing literature on “push and pull factors of Albanian women in violent extremism,” it was noted that, as in men, there is no one specific factor for women and girls that affects the process of radicalization and/or their participation in terrorist groups or their travelling to the conflicted areas of Syria and Iraq (Jakupi, R., Kelmendi, V., 2017).

As field researchers in Albania, we reached the same agreement as well. Based on existing literature and analysis of information obtained from several state and non-state actors, one in-depth interview with a woman returned from Syria and Iraq and their families and relatives, as well as perceptions of respondents in the national survey, the push and pull factors are divided into two levels: macro and micro. Guided by the interaction of these factors and the complexity for addressing them, women’s influencing factors in violent extremism in the Albanian context are analyzed based on two main pillars:

1. Factors at the macro level comprise the political system, the good-governance, socio- economic and social elements, faith and religion, influence of social groups, violence against women, gender inequality, and marginalization. Addressing these factors requires appropriate policy direction from both central and local government institutions with particular focus also on the community’s behavior and resilience.
2. Factors at the micro level include psycho-sociological and ideological factors that can be addressed through individual work and support to the families of women belonging in these categories.

Findings on macro-level factors
Based on the academic agreement so far, the category of macro factors includes three main separate groups, such as socio-economic, political, and specific cultural factors. Within each of these factors, a wide range of conditions interact: Interactions under the socio-economic factors include high levels of social marginalization, poorly governed areas, human and women’s rights violations, and unmet social and economic needs.
In contrast, interactions under the political factors include involving high levels of corruption, impunity for elites and specific cultural factors in Albania (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018) including the influence of local religious clerics, and level of religious education. These factors, combined with other factors at the personal level (micro-level), can create the right “ground” to develop individuals/groups of vulnerable people who can be easily manipulated by extremist ideology (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018).

The analysis of these factors, as well as the identification of the most specific factors for women and girls, is essential in addressing and further drafting appropriate interventions for families, communities, or other groups/ or people who may be vulnerable to this phenomenon (Holmer, G., Bauman, P., 2018).
The surveyed population in this study was presented with several options, as to which are the most concerning issues for Albania (chart no.5). As noted, the three most problematic issues the respondents are most concerned about are youth unemployment, which holds the highest level at 63.9%¹(64.2% of male respondents and 63.6% of female respondents), followed by high levels of corruption with 53.7% of the general surveyed population (54.9% of male respondents and 52.5% of female respondents) and the inequality between rich and poor comprising 51.5% of the general surveyed population (54.5% of male respondents and 48.6% of female respondents).

From a gender perspective, there is no difference in responses among all male and female survey respondents. Variation can be seen as regards the high level of corruption, which is mostly listed as a problematic issue among respondents in urban areas (58.7%), compared with 47.6% of the respondents in rural areas. The perception of the presence of crime in the country is high (36.1%), as is the “decline in the moral values of the society” (33.4%). The data from the survey is also a reflection of the socio- economic situation of the Albanian population, especially of the Albanian youth. According to the latest data of the INSTAT, the unemployment rate in the 15-29 age group is 21.4% (21.2% males and 21.5% females) (De Bruijn, B., Filipi, Gj., Nesturi, M., Galanxhi, E., 2015). Although these figures rank Albania in the first place among the countries of the Western Balkans for a low unemployment rate among youth, still the unemployment figures remain twice as high as those of the states of the European Union (World Bank Group, 2019). According to another study, unemployment and lack of security have also pushed many young people into leaving Albania during 2018-2019, where 40% of youth claimed that they wanted to leave the country (Kamberi, G., Çela, A., 2019).
The financial situation and economic polarization play an essential role in the overall “well-being” of the population and in the context of violent extremism. As such, individuals radicalized into violent extremism over the last few years in the Western Balkans (including those who have become foreign fighters) have come mostly from the economic margins (Vlado Azinović, Kimberly Storr, 2017). Even though the financial situation cannot stand as a single factor influencing VE, when combined with other factors such as widespread corruption and lack of security and justice may be a factor exploited by VE groups, which may offer wages or services. It is not poverty however that elicits support for VE but rather the acute form of social exclusion by government and society (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018). The surveyed population states that it is difficult for them to make a living on their income. In percentage terms, the male and female respondents share more or less the same approach in terms of difficulty they have in making a living, where the highest percentage is present at the levels “coping on present income” and “difficult” as presented in chart no 6.

In fact, the difficulties in affording life are closely related to the employment rate and monthly income. Among the survey respondents, there is a high difference between women who do not have any income (31.6% of respondents) and male respondents (16.6%). There is little difference in revenue for the category of women and men who earn 23,000 Albanian Lek (ALL) (21.4% – women and 20.6% – men). Reversely, this difference increases for women and men who earn over 50,000 ALL per month; thus, there is a gender pay gap with a higher percentage of men who make over 50,000 ALL compared to women.
The survey, the focus group discussion, and the interviews noted the difficult economic situation (intertwined with other factors further discussed in this study) as one of the reasons why Albanian women (mainly from rural areas) have travelled to warring areas or the Islamic State. One example is the case of 16-year-old Besa², who was married at the age of 14 and faced a challenging economic and social situation.³ After her husband left, her financial condition worsened. She lived in a mosque for a certain period because she alone could not afford to pay the rent of the house until she joined her husband abroad.⁴ However, the poor economic conditions of people who travelled to Syria or Iraq are not the only factor. There are also other cases where most FTF families have had average living standards⁵, owned small businesses, and were not to be considered poor since they could cover the travelling expenses by themselves⁶. These cases were reported from interviews with the returned woman and relatives of other returnees. One of the testimonies shows that the people who are currently in the war camps (including women) were, on their arrival to Syria/Iraq, initially treated well. Their minimum living conditions were met, and the daily budget spent on a family reached hundreds of dollars a day. ⁷ It is precisely this misinformation that “seduces” unemployed people, those with economic difficulties and from deep rural areas. However, other testimonies were taken by other families who still communicate with their family members who are in the Al-Hol camps. They claim that their situation is miserable, as the interviewee says: “Recently they desperately want to return, the situation is terrible and they are starving…” claiming that they are continually asking for financial help.⁸
On the other hand, difficult economic situations are related to the low employment rates of the population; however, it is difficult to say that unemployment is the only factor influencing Albanians to travel to Syria and Iraq. In the context of radicalization and violent extremism, unemployment constitutes an essential resource to individuals or extremist groups in radicalizing individuals (men and women) by promising a solution to their poverty and offering more lucrative economic opportunities through illegal ways.
Civil society representatives in the focus group discussions state that people, particularly those from rural areas, have been more “attractive” for the recruiters given their difficult economic situations. The high level of corruption is more evident in rural areas, combined with a lack of proper religious education too.⁹ Endemic corruption is part of the multi-faced set of drivers of violent extremism. Evidence from Transparency International suggests that the lowest-scoring countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) are often those experiencing conflict or war (UNDP, 2018). On the same note, the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism suggests that countries that fail to control corruption (amongst other indicators like poverty, unemployment, and diversity management in accordance with human rights obligations) tend to witness a more significant number of incidents linked to violent extremism (UNDP, 2018). Survey respondents list corruption as one of the three problematic issues that most concern them (see graph. no.5).
The same concern among the Albanian population is visible in the opinion poll, “Trust in Governance 2019.” Most Albanian citizens perceive petty corruption (87.5%) and grand corruption (85.2%) as a widespread or very widespread phenomenon in Albanian society. Furthermore, the same opinion poll in 2019 reveals that 15% of the Albanian population has personally witnessed government corruption at the central level and 25.2% at the local level (Vrugtman L, Bino, B, 2020).
Chart no. 7 provides an overview of the perceptions of respondents on the main reasons why people (both women and men) have left Albania to join warring countries such as Syria and Iraq. What is noticeable is the high percentage of respondents who think that one of the main reasons is “financial benefits” (62.5% female respondents and 59.7% male respondents). This percentage is followed by a “lack of economic opportunities” (58.0% of female respondents and 63.8% of male respondents) and then “for ideological and religious faith” (53.3% of female respondents and 54.7% of male respondents).

In the meantime, based on the perceptions from the general survey’s population, the factors that lead women in Albania to travel to warring countries of Syria and Iraq are reported as follows (Chart no.8). The highest percentage stands for “to join the husband” from both male and female respondents (59.1% female respondents and 59.7% male respondents). Also, other reasons are highly considered by the respondents, such as “lack of economic opportunities” (51.6% female respondents and 53.7% male respondents) and “financial benefits” (44.6% female respondents and 44.7% male respondents).

The dominance of these factors, particularly of the fact that the Albanian women have flown to war zones to join their husbands, is also underlined by civil society representatives engaged in preventing violent extremism in Albania, who from their experience (albeit based on little information they possess given their limited engagement at concretely working with returnees, women and their families) show that most Albanian women have not played an active role in the Islamic state.¹⁰ Still, they have travelled there to have a better life and to escape from extreme poverty. Many of them think that in these warring countries, they will find the house they did not have and the rights they believe they have been denied regarding lack of job opportunities and lack of equal earnings (Ramkaj, 2019). Also, they believe they will be able to provide a good living for their children, as is the case of the woman named Moza,¹¹ who followed her husband due to the lack of income in raising their three children. ¹²

The information from experts on VE in Albania shows that “Albanian girls and women, once in Syria, have been isolated at home, under constant pressure from other women with foreign citizenship. There were many non-Albanian women engaged in the fighting areas. Their contacts with the family were rare due to field engagement. The children did not receive normal education but only manipulative instructions in selected centres from the organizations they had joined” (Gjinishi, 2020).
Although women constitute the main priorities of some policies in Albania (INSTAT, 2020), the context given above shows once again that women’s economic empowerment, labor market engagement, labor force participation, and unpaid work in the family, particularly in rural/ remote areas, as well as the position of youth and especially girls in the labor market, continues to remain a challenge in the Albanian society. This is also highlighted in the “Gender Equality Index Report for Albania” (2020). The interaction and amelioration of these factors, under the perspective of violent extremism, are essential for building women’s resilience and increasing their role in peace-building and prevention of VE (Coutur, 2014).

Gender Inequality and Patriarchy as a Cultural Factor

The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are fundamental principles of the International Law on Human Rights. Promoting gender equality is a priority of all Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member states, which have taken the commitment to promote gender equality as an integral part of their policy (OSCE, 2000). Although the literature so far suggests that women are led into VE by the same group of socio-economic and political factors, other existing literature sheds light on specific factors that influence women’s engagement in VE, such as gender inequality, gender-based discrimination, and lack of economic and educational opportunities (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018).
Apart from the traditional factors leading to the VE, the analysis and the strong link between gender inequality and violent extremism have been addressed by Valerie Hudson and her co-authors in “Sex and World Peace.” They state that the best predictor of peace in a nation is not its level of democracy or wealth but rather the level of physical security enjoyed by its women (Hudson, Valerie M., 2012). Historically, women have been included in the category of marginalized groups in terms of access to the labor market, low opportunities for education, and low levels of participation in decision-making. The experience of living in a society that denies women’s full civil rights and economic opportunities can make some women perceive involvement in terrorism as a way to gain freedom, emancipation, respect, and equality (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018). Violation of these rights can deepen feelings of alienation, isolation, and exclusion that may make individuals more sensitive to radicalism (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018).
In the Albanian context, the General Gender-Equality Index for 2017 marked 60.4 points, demonstrating a significant gender gap of 7 points below the EU-28 average (67.4), except for the area of governance, where Albania has a higher level of gender equality than other European Union countries. The most significant shortcomings in the gender gap in Albania are encountered in the fields of knowledge, money, and time spent doing unpaid labor (INSTAT, 2020).
Gender inequality is noted to be at high levels even among respondents of this study, where 47.3% of men and 70.4% of women claim that there is noticeable inequality between men and women in Albanian society (chart no 9).

Higher levels of gender inequality, especially in terms of education, are more visible in rural areas of the country. In these areas, the number of men with secondary or higher education is higher than the number of women with secondary or higher education which is due to fewer possibilities for proper education, low rates of attendance at high school, and lower enrollment rates in vocational schools. Quality assessments (Housing and Population Census, and PISA study) raise concerns about the deterioration of the education system in rural areas. Some of the causes of this difficult situation are insufficient investments in infrastructure and human resources, high distance from residential areas, and vocational training institutions. Also, very few women participate in training programs, due to insufficient time and how training programs are organized (Zhllima, E., Merkaj, E., Tahsini, I., Imami, D., Çela, E., 2016).
From a geographical point of view, there is no specific cause or group of reasons that affect women differently in different parts of the Balkans and European countries. However, some of the instigators and tendencies of radicalism and women’s participation in terrorist/radical organizations are exposed differently in the Balkans, compared to other European countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Kelmendi, 2018).
This is due to the more significant challenges faced by women in the Balkans in terms of domestic violence, high levels of discrimination in socio-economic issues, and the dominance of patriarchal societies (Kelmendi, 2018). In the Albanian context, it is still challenging to address domestic violence, protect victims of domestic violence, guarantee gender equality and gender equity, and provide minimum health and social services, especially at the local level (EC Albanian 2019 report, 2019). For example, in the first two months of 2020 in Albania, five women were assassinated by their husbands. (Tushi, 2020). According to data provided by INSTAT and the survey on violence against women and girls in 2018 (INSTAT, 2019), it turns out that 1 in 2 women (52.9%) between the ages of 18-74 have experienced one or more than five kinds of violence (intimate partner violence, violent encounters, non-partner violence, sexual harassment and/or intimidation) during their lifetime (INSTAT, 2019).

Moreover, according to the same study, traditional patriarchal attitudes remain prevalent throughout Albania thus contributing to gender inequalities in all spheres of social and economic life, as well as the prevalence of violence against women.¹³ We also notice the “legitimacy” of violence against women among the respondents in the study, as shown from chart no.10, where 7.6% of men and 3.5% of women agree with the fact that violence against women is justifiable in certain circumstances.

Patriarchal norms, the dominance of the male figure in the Albanian family, and “power” over women are noted by participants in the target group discussions to be among the most significant factors as to why Albanian women have travelled to war areas in Syria 14 and Iraq. From the data of this study, there is only one case identified of a woman being raped by her husband and forced to accompany him to Syria. In contrast, most of the interviews taken from relatives of women and men still in war zones do not support the hypothesis that these women have been forced to follow their husbands. Instead, they have voluntarily (for a better life)¹⁵ joined their husbands to be near them (even when asked to do otherwise), and this shows once again the deep roots of patriarchal norms within the Albanian family, mainly in rural areas¹⁶ based on the “family code” (Kuko, 2020).
However, even in one case where the mother refused to join her son who had already left for war, the decision of the head of the family (father) was dominant, forcing his wife and his two other daughters and son to go to war. This example clearly shows that the man’s role as the head of the family enforces the patriarchal factor of society. ¹⁷
The “patriarchal” factor is also supported by the interviewees and participants in the discussion meetings from different areas of Albania. According to them, “Albanian women have travelled to warring zones because they did not want to oppose their husbands. Whether ideologically convinced or not, the women obeyed their husbands. Still, they did not travel there to fight”. ¹⁸ Such statements confirm the patriarchal context that prevails in the family structure in Albania. This context is also present and rich in evidence from women who returned to other Balkan countries where patriarchal norms (especially those within the Muslim community) have played a significant role in their participation in conflicted areas in Syria and Iraq (Kelmendi, 2018).
In this patriarchal context, the majority of Albanian women who have travelled to the Islamic State have also “legitimized” the reasons why their husbands left “to earn money and provide the family with a better income for a better life.” The statement “A husband’s primary task is to be the breadwinner” is also supported at high levels by 48.2% of men and 45.7% of women surveyed.¹⁹ Given the social and economic differentiation between men and women and the “duties” that women exercise in a patriarchal context, most women remained without any financial or family support after their husbands fled to the war zones. Some of these women were supported by their parents; while others were to remain with their husband’s families, with their in-laws, and some women were left without any support at all. In this situation, the only solution for them was to join their husbands wherever they were. ²⁰ This situation is criticized by various civil society actors in the country who emphasize the need to focus on the role of women and girls, especially in rural areas. The CSO representatives suggest that more efforts should be made to educate the younger generation on gender equality to break gender stereotypes.
Furthermore, they deem it important to boost economic empowerment and vocational education for women and girls. “Such interventions will help prevent cases such that of the girl from a low-income family, who was married at the age of 14 and at the age of 16 she left for Syria with her child to join her husband, who died there. The misfortune of this girl seems never to end as she was forced to remarry and give birth to another child” ²¹.
Another case of a woman who testified that she did not want to stay there shows that she simply joined her husband after he had assured her that they could have a better life in Syria because the situation would soon get normal.²²

Factor Analysis at the Micro-Level
The individual factors and nuclear family

The analysis of the micro-level factors influencing the decision of Albanian women to join the Islamic State is based mainly on the testimonies of relatives of women who have gone to Syria and Iraq. Also, it is based on the testimony of the returned woman and other evidence gained from civil society representatives and state institutions in Albania. Analysis at the micro-level is vital to understand factors that involve, as described by Dr. Alex P. Schmid: identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalization, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatization, and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge (Schmid, 2013).
In this category of micro factors, we find out that Albanian women are driven by individual motives, mainly related to the perspective/structure of their marriage, which is again closely associated with patriarchal norms. Almost all the evidence in this study sees the women as “victims” of their husbands and their aggravated financial situation. They are unable to raise and educate their children on their own. Some of them were even lied to by their husbands over the real situation in Syria, as the woman returnee Mira (not her real name) testifies: “My husband left 3-4 months before us. He asked me to go there, telling me that the situation was normal. I didn’t tell anyone I was leaving; even the kids didn’t know. They thought they were flying to England.” ²³ The same testimony comes from relatives of another case who emphasize that “the woman didn’t even have a say in her husband’s decision to leave for Syria, but simply went after him. She respected his decision because that is how it should be.” ²⁴
In this analysis of the personal motives that led Albanian women to fly to war countries, a crucial role is played by the close family (parents, in-laws, sisters, and brothers) and the interaction of family members. From the information obtained from the interviews with the relatives and acquaintances of people who fled to Syria and Iraq, almost none of the parents, sisters, or brothers were aware of the fact that the sons of the family at first and their wives were planning to leave to join the Islamic State. This is the case of a woman named Mira, whose family supposed that she went with her children to England to join her husband. It was her brother who, on occasion, noticed that her sister was not in England, one day when she wrongly had left the computer’s location on. Testimonials show that the moment when the parents have understood where their children are has been shocking. The case of woman returnee Mira can be considered a positive one, given the fact that her family managed to bring her and her two children back. However, this is not the case for other parents looking for help from the state institutions to turn back home their children.
Despite being unaware of this phenomenon, the traditional and patriarchal form of the family organization is still visible. In such families, the men of the family are supposed to be the ones who should take care not only of their wives and children but also, in some cases, even increasing the responsibility and pressure of young men to take care of their parents as well. With this mindset, men who have left for war countries have easily been able to lie to their families by making them believe that they are immigrating to Western European countries, such as England, Greece, and Germany, or to study in the Middle East. The control of radicalization as a process and the role of the nuclear family in preventing this phenomenon are issues that have also recently begun to come to the attention of actors dealing with violent extremism. However, so far in Albania, there is no evidence of cases of families that prevent the travelling of their children to Syria/Iraq.
From our observations for this study, people (men and women) come from families with traditional backgrounds of the Albanian family, respecting and considering the role of the husband as a pillar of the family. In contrast, the respondents in the study emphasize that the structure of the Albanian family has changed since the ‘90s. It faces more issues that affect its “sustainability” due to the socio-economic problems, especially in rural areas, the perceived reduction of moral values in society by young people, and the complete lack of care for their old parents (Ramkaj, 2019). The decrease in moral values in the community is also listed as one of the issues that concern the most 32.1% of male respondents and 24.6% of female respondents in the survey of the presented study (see graph no.5 above).

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 This is the average value

2 Not her real name.
3 Participants in this focus group discussion included representatives from the municipality of Pogradec, teachers, high school students, representatives of healthcare institutions, journalists, and religious community representatives (Pogradec, January 19, 2020).
4 Interview with the grandmother of the man foreign fighter W, (January 16, 2020).

5 Interview with the friend of a woman Mira, (January 5, 2020).
6 Interview with the sister and daughter of the family of fighter Y, (November 8, 2019).
7 Interview with the sister and the daughter of the dead fighter, (November 8, 2019).
8 Interview with the sister-in-law of the foreign fighter Z, (November 1, 2019).
9 Participants in this focus group include local actors in Vlora municipality such as: high school representatives, teachers, students, CSOs, representatives from shelters, youth groups, members of the Security Council. (Vlora, January 24, 2020).

10 Focus group “PVE Forum” discussion meeting, Tirana, (February 20, 2020),
11 Not her real name
12 Testimony of Y woman mother-in-law who died in Syria, (January 12, 2019).

13 Participants in this focus group included local actors in Tirana municipality such as teachers, social workers, psychologists, lawyers, and members of the National Forum of CSOs in PVE in Albania. (Tirana, February 20, 2020).
14 Participants in this focus group included local actors in Tirana municipality such as teachers, social workers, psychologists, lawyers, and members of the National Forum of CSOs in PVE in Albania. (Tirana, February 20, 2020) Ibid.
15 Interview with the friend of the returned woman X. (January 5, 2020).

16 Ibid.
17 Interview with the sister of the Y fighter who is currently in Syria and at the same time the daughter of the family (who is there to stay close to the Y fighter), (November 8, 2019).
18 Participants in this focus group include local actors in Vlora municipality such as high school representatives, teachers, students, CSOs, representatives from shelters, youth groups, and members of the Security Council. (Vlora, January 24, 2020).
19 Nationwide survey for this study, WCDCA, 2020.
20 Testimonies from relatives of women who are currently in camps in Syria and Iraq.

21 Participants in this focus group discussion include representants from the municipality of Pogradec, teachers, high school students, representatives of healthcare institutions, journalists, and religious community representatives, (Pogradec, January 19, 2020)
22 Interview with woman returnee Mira, (October 28, 2020).
23 Interview with woman returnee Mira. This is not her real name, (October 28, 2020).
24 Testimony of members of the family of the returned woman Mira, (December 1, 2019).

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