In 1919, Vatra, a pan-Albanian association functioning as something of a shadow Albanian government in the United States, made an unprecedented request to Secretary of State Robert Lansing: Albania should become an American protectorate. Just three months later, at the Paris Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson rejected the Secret Treaty of London, which would have effectively erased Albania from the map as an independent state. Thereafter, in the  autumn of 1946, Albania issued an ultimatum to the US to withdraw its diplomatic mission, forcing its members to flee under the protection of American warships. For the next 50 years, the US was branded Albania’s greatest and most dangerous enemy by the communist regime. Yet, through it all, two generations of Albanians held onto the hope that one day ‘the Americans would come to liberate the country from communism’. In 1991, Albania and the United States re-established diplomatic ties and today Albania is perhaps the most pro-American country in the world, as well as being the only aspiring EU member with near-unanimous support for membership.

Throughout modern Albanian history, relations with the US have either been exclusive and privileged or non-existent. To understand and explain contemporary Albanian-American relations, it is essential to deconstruct myths and explain paradoxes as a necessity for encouraging democratisation of the asymmetric relations between a great power and a small state so as to protect and develop these relations in the years ahead.

‘Myths are lies that tell the truth’

On June 5, 2007, President George W. Bush was greeted in Prague by two thousand protesters opposing US plans to install a missile defence system in Europe. Five days later, tens of thousands gathered to welcome him in Tirana’s main square, decorated as if for a grand celebration with portraits, Albanian and American flags together with slogans for the occasion. For the older generation, this might have evoked memories of similar receptions during communist times when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev or Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania in 1959 and 1965 respectively. This resemblance, along with Albania’s history of asymmetric relationships with great powers, leads some scholars to categorise Albania-US relations as ‘client-patron’. As with many small states, over the past one hundred years Albania has sought various alliances, first with the Soviet Union, then China and finally the United States.

However, careful observation of Albania’s foreign relations does not necessarily support this pattern, with Albanians’ love for the US at first glance seeming irrational. Looking back over one hundred years of relations, this love has certainly been grounded in rationality – even as it was becoming a myth. As the ancient thinker Aphthonius noted, “Myths are lies that tell the truth”. However, where does the rationality lie in Albanians’ love for America and what are some of the truths behind the myth? Regardless of their asymmetry, Albania’s ties with the US have always revolved around crucial issues vital to the Albanian state and nation. For instance, in 1919 President Wilson became a national hero for Albanians when he intervened to save the country from partition. Relations with the US, in Albania’s case, have defined its relations with the West. After the Second World War, Albania’s society was split: pro-Western Albanians, which were in the majority, looked to the US for economic and cultural guidance, while pro-Eastern factions turned to the Soviet Union. It is important to note that at this time, when the country had less than one million inhabitants, more than a quarter of a million Albanians had either emigrated to the US or had family there.

As mentioned earlier, in modern Albanian history, relations with the US have been either exclusive and privileged or non-existent. When they have existed, they have been deeply rooted in principles of freedom and democracy. Hence, in 1945 the US refused to recognise rigged elections and the communist regime of Enver Hoxha, with the result that less than twelve months later Albania’s new communist government forced the US to withdraw its diplomatic mission. In 1991, restoration of relations hinged on America’s demand for the existence of a democratic opposition in Albania. Hence, from 1992 Albania embraced democratic reforms and strengthened ties with the West. In 2008, Washington championed Albania’s NATO membership, the greatest achievement of modern Albania since the fall of communism, thereby firmly linking Albania’s present and future with the West and as such becoming the United States’ most reliable Balkan ally.

As a sign of its gratitude, all Albania’s governments over the past thirty years have supported US foreign policy and moreover have become actively involved, for example in Afghanistan and by joining the coalition against ISIS led by the US. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, America spearheaded NATO’s intervention and supported Kosovo’s subsequent independence in 2008. Albania’s strategic partnership with the US was formalised in 2013, when Tirana and Washington signed a strategic partnership agreement. In popular sentiment too, the US is perceived by Albanians as their country’s most important strategic ally, a relationship more valued than that with the European powers, including the European Union, with which Tirana claims strategic relations.

According to annual surveys conducted by the Albanian Institute of International Studies, both the US and the EU enjoy strong public support in Albania, with approval ratings of 90 % and 91 %, respectively. They are regarded as the most important strategic partners in Albania’s international relations. 

“It’s (not) the economy, stupid!”

For decades, Albanians believed that the US would one day liberate them from communism. This hope endured for 50 years, until it finally happened in 1991, when Secretary of State James Baker was welcomed in Tirana with much popular fanfare. Since then, Albania has built a solid relationship with the US, a relationship which is contributing to Albania’s democratic transformation. Yet, one key area remains underdeveloped: the economy.

Despite various economic agreements, trade between the two countries remains minimal, and US investments in Albania continue to be small. The reasons can be attributed to Albania’s unattractive investment environment, weak rule of law and high corruption levels. Moreover, Albania’s small market size makes it of peripheral interest for American companies and other FDI. Western countries dominate in foreign investments in Albania. These include Italy, Switzerland, Canada, the Netherlands, Greece and Austria, with Hungary also emerging as a player in the last three years. Within this group, the majority of investments come from EU member states in strategic sectors like banking, energy and construction, with Switzerland accounting for 16% and Canada 12%. Turkey is another significant foreign investor, contributing 7.6%. Regarding trade, China currently holds the third position after the EU and Turkey, although Chinese investments have been inconsistent.

Moreover, other Balkan states have much stronger economic ties to the US than Albania. In 2023, US investments amounted to a modest figure of 32 million euros, just four million more than investments from Kosovo. Countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, Turkey and Greece all have a larger presence. Over the past 20 years, US investments in Albania amounted to 232 million dollars, while US investments in Serbia were 4 billion dollars for the same period. On the other hand, trade and economic investments from the EU are vastly larger, confirming that the EU is the strategic ally for Albania when it comes to the economy. The volume of trade for 2022 alone between Albania and the EU was 7.1 billion euros, while investments reached 382 million euros. Since 2020, through the European Investment Plan, the EU has already mobilized 1.4 billion euros in investments, of which 470 million are grants.

Back to the future

More than 30 years after re-establishing ties, Albania-US relations are in transition. What does the future hold at a time when foreign policy is becoming increasingly transactional, raising concerns that a strategic partnership can become a ‘client-patron’ relationship. A century ago, Albanian leaders lobbied in Washington for the independence and existence of Albania as an independent sovereign state. In April 1939, just 48 hours before fascist Italy invaded Albania, King Zog tearfully summoned the American ambassador for an urgent and special audience, asking for help, saying that “only the US can save Albania and its independence”. Against this historical legacy and in sharp contrast to how foreign democratic powers such as Germany or Norway gain influence in Washington, contemporary Albanian leaders, caught in an extreme zero-sum game for power, try to buy support in Washington to gain advantages over their political opponents at home.

How will this strategic partnership develop? Will Albania continue to say ‘yes’ to every US request, as it did when it sheltered MEK, a former terrorist group, and Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban regime? Will Albania continue to favour the US over Western Europe, as it did in 2003 when it chose an alliance with ‘New Europe’ against ‘Old Europe’? Moreover, how will this affect Albania’s EU ambitions, when the US itself supports Albania’s future in the EU? This readiness to agree to every request risks transformation into a client-patron relationship, thereby making it harder to maintain a strategic partnership.

Besides being the ‘guardian angel’ of Albania’s independence and statehood, the US has known since the rigged 1945 elections that only a democratic Albania can be a partner to the US and the West. Moreover, only a democratic Albania can join the EU. Sliding into autocracy and the failure to build a democratic and functional state undermines the strategic partnership. Albania’s economic relations with the US shone brightly 75 years ago, but today must be regarded as poor. The reasons can be found in Albania’s market economy not functioning properly as the rule of law is not being strictly enforced.

Finally, with a culture of total dependency, Albania behaves as if it were a protectorate or as if it has just emerged from a colonial regime. Every group or individual with a grievance – students, unions, prisoners, LGBT groups, minorities, journalists, women’s organisations, veterans, political parties and their leaders, the mayor, the chief justice, the opposition leader – even the head of parliament and the president – pen letters of complaint or clarification to the international community. This starts with the US ambassador, who is at the centre of media attention as if he or she were the country’s viceroy.

A potential turning point in US-Albanian relations might emerge with the new US  administration. It is difficult to believe that President Trump would give significant attention to the Western Balkans, given the more pressing preoccupation with Russian aggression against Ukraine and a worsening crisis in the Middle East. However, geopolitically, the Balkans are significant in light of Russia’s proxy policies in its confrontation with the US and the West. As such, it is not impossible for the Trump administration to mediate a resolution to the frozen conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, thereby neutralising the main source of tensions in the region and Russia’s proxy policies. In 2020, Trump personally engaged in an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, while over the past four years Washington and the EU have encouraged dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on vehicle licence plates and other peripheral issues, hoping that a bottom-up approach would end the frozen conflict between the two states. It is not impossible that, with a top-down approach typical of Trump’s style, the two states could move toward mutual recognition as two independent states during his second term.

Changes are also expected in terms of intrastate relations. In recent years, we have seen a growing trend toward a more transactional approach in US foreign policy. Washington and the West, in general, have turned a blind eye to the increasingly autocratic regimes in the Western Balkans, including Albania.  Although such a trend may strengthen,  moving forward, a reflection and a more neutral role for Washington in Albania’s internal politics is needed.

After the Cold War, Albania managed to establish a privileged and exclusive relationship with the United States, mainly due to the unparalleled influence and role it played in an unstable Balkan region. Unfortunately, over the last ten years, this role has gradually diminished. So the future of Albania’s relations with the United States will depend on Albania’s ability to regain the key role it once held in the Balkans, at a time when Serbia has almost restored its relations with the US and the West.

Recommendations

Albania is a key country, alongside Serbia, for the stability and security of the Western Balkans. Surrounded by EU nations, the region directly impacts the European and Euro-Atlantic security environment. Since the end of the Cold War, US intervention was crucial in ending violent conflicts in the Balkans. Now, three decades later, only the continued engagement of the US and the EU can resolve the frozen conflict between Albanians and Serbs through the mutual recognition of Kosovo and Serbia as sovereign states.

Democratic backsliding, authoritarian tendencies and lingering totalitarian culture among Albania’s current political leaders could lead the country toward a one-party system, undermining relations with the US. Given the special relationship Albania shares with the US and the EU, both are in the best position to prevent the rise of a stabilocracy and the drift toward one-party rule.

Short-term transactional approaches and interests may entrench stabilocracies in the Western Balkans and will not foster democratic, responsible and uncorrupted governance. The new generation of Albanian political leaders — the ones who will take over from those who have dominated the political scene for three decades, whether in power or opposition — must move away from the dependency on the international community. They should offer fresh ideas to maintain US and EU support, ending the practice of purchasing influence for personal political gain in Washington or Brussels.

At the diplomatic level, US and EU envoys can assist in strengthening Albanian democracy by not acting as, or being perceived as, being external rulers of the country.

The essay ”From Staunch Enemy to Strategic Partner: Albanian-American Relations in Transition “ by Albert Rakipi is part of the book : “The United States and the Future of Europe,”  recently published (May 2025) by Springer.

Albert Rakipi currently serves as Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) a think tank based in Tirana, Albania. He has PhD in International Relations from Bilkent University. Before assuming this position, he had previously served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania. Representative of AIIS to the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) .Albert Rakipi has played a key role  in establishing  the Tirana  Campus of the College of Europe  in 2022- 2024  through a special inception proposal and dedicated advocacy Dr. Rakipi is the Founder and Editor of the Albanian Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy issues “Tirana Observatory”. Co-founder and co-editor of Tirana Times a weekly English Newspaper published in Tirana . His latest books are: “The Perils of Change” Albania’s Foreign Policy in transition”Albanian -Turkey Relations Continuity and Change,’ “Albania and Kosovo, Is Unification the Common Future “

The post From staunch enemy to strategic partner: Albanian-American relations in transition appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

In her 2023 State of the Union address, European Commission President von der Leyen asserted that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. In doing so, it reiterated the EU’s promise made at the historic Thessaloniki Summit twenty years ago.

At the time, Yugoslavia’s devastating wars had just ended. International borders had changed with the independence of Montenegro and later Kosovo. And the wave of EU enlargement was about to happen, with ten Central and Eastern European countries joining in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The driving force behind this process was the powerful vision to reunify the European continent. But also a strong political will in the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to become members of the European family. For similar reasons, the countries of the Western Balkans were equally motivated to join the EU.

However, after twenty years, the Western Balkans have still not joined the European Union. Sometimes it even seems that EU membership has become less attractive for the region than it was two decades ago. With the world and the EU facing a series of crises in the past two decades, the Union’s appetite for enlargement has waned. At the same time, some Western Balkan countries showed limited political will to implement much-needed EU reforms, giving EU enlargement skeptics arguments against their integration. In general, the enlargement process has proceeded at a slower pace and with less visible and tangible results than expected, leading to disillusionment and departure from the EU. The Union and the Western Balkans – wittingly or unwittingly – found an unsatisfactory modus vivendi.

The window of opportunity for geostrategic expansion

Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, EU membership has become an even more attractive goal for the Eastern Partnership countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time, the countries of the Western Balkans are facing unprecedented challenges to their stability as well as amplified foreign policy dilemmas. However, there is also growing awareness of a new window of opportunity for enlargement, raising expectations vis-à-vis the EU.

We welcome that the EU is now approaching enlargement from a more geostrategic and less bureaucratic perspective than before. Last year’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on strategic considerations. There is a growing recognition that enlargement policy is the EU’s most powerful stabilizing instrument. That said, the EU’s new strategic approach will not lower the standards of enlargement. Full implementation of the reform remains essential.

The current situation is an opportunity for both the European Union and the Western Balkans to show more strategic foresight, to fully regain their enlargement credibility and to reinforce mutual trust, some of which had been lost over the years.

In fact, some concrete steps should be taken without any further delay.

First, the European Union must open EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of this year. Second, Montenegro must continue its path of reform in the EU, which depends on the formation of the new government in the country. Thirdly, the negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia must be advanced. In North Macedonia, the next steps depend on the country’s ability to pass the necessary constitutional changes. The latest case is a reminder that EU member states and Western Balkan countries must play a responsible role and refrain. from the presentation of bilateral problems and disputes, which are not related to the accession process.

For a gradual and accelerated integration of the Western Balkans into the EU

On the EU side, the discussion on the necessary institutional and financial preparations for the integration of new members is gathering momentum. However, this should not become a pretext to delay the enlargement process for our Western Balkan partners. We need to start implementing existing proposals to speed up the enlargement process now.

EU institutions must be more creative in adapting the enlargement process to today’s needs. The process should be less complex and more results-oriented. We must make it more tangible for citizens and link the progress of the reform with concrete benefits. We also need to engage more dynamically with the countries of the Western Balkans, so that they can really feel the heartbeat of Brussels. From June 2022, there is a clear task from the European Council to advance gradual integration already during the enlargement process. In June 2023, as “Friends of the Western Balkans” together with our colleagues from the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovakia, we called on the EU institutions to present a clear agenda for gradual and accelerated integration in steps concrete implementation until 2024 and beyond. This should be based on fair and rigorous conditioning as well as the principle of own merits. We see many possibilities, from more frequent invitations to our Western Balkan colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Council to the opening of other policy areas such as education, science, transport or trade for their gradual involvement.

The real value of EU enlargement lies in its transformative capacity: helping countries to raise living standards for their citizens and creating prosperous environments where young people can fulfill their dreams. Our Western and Eastern Balkan partners deserve this opportunity and EU citizens will benefit from greater stability and prosperity beyond the current EU borders. EU enlargement is not one of many political options; it is the geostrategic necessity of the day.

[1] By Tanja Fajon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Slovenia, 

Alexander Schallenberg, Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, 

Gordan Radman Grlic, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia

The post The Unfinished EU: Western Balkan Integration as a Geostrategic Necessity- 20 years of EU promise appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

VALENTINA DEDI[1]

Located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula in South-eastern Europe, Albania hardly makes the headlines when it comes to its developments and aspirations in the energy sector. However, the country’s energy mix has one of the highest shares of renewable energy in Europe.

In 2020, the share of renewables reached 45% of the total primary energy supply, up from the 38% target that the government had set in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP, 2018-2020). A year later, in December 2021, Albania adopted the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), with the country pledging to further increase the share of renewables to 55% by 2030.

Hydro-Dependency

The country’s renewable energy expansion to date has been mainly driven by the deployment of its hydropower capacity. Hydropower is the second largest contributor to Albania’s primary energy supply, after fossil fuels, and accounts for almost entirely the country’s electricity generation. While hydropower seems to have been the “forgotten giant of clean electricity” as pointed out by IEA in its Hydropower Special Market Report, Albania, in that respect, on the contrary, has done a great job at harnessing its hydropower potential, which has undoubtedly contributed positively to the decarbonisation of its electricity sector.

However, at the same time, the country’s sole reliance on hydropower has made its domestic energy production more vulnerable to climate conditions. Changing weather patterns over the years have forced the country to import energy to cover domestic needs, as a lack of storage capacity requires Albania to sell its generated power during peak months of production. Imports can reach up to 40% of power needs, especially during periods with low rainfall levels, as it happened in 2017 when import costs were equivalent to about 1.5% of the country’s GDP.

While wind and solar investments have recorded a significant growth over the past decade, they still represent a very small share of the country’s energy supply as they started from a very low base.

Energy Security at Stake

Energy imports do not only have an adverse impact on the country’s trade deficit, but they also pose significant risks to the country’s energy security.

Today, Albania remains a net energy importer as domestic energy production is not able to meet demand. When it comes to renewable energy imports, Eurostat data shows that the country ranks 8^th in Europe. This is even greater than the dependence of other countries in the Balkan region which have fewer renewable resources to expand their domestic production capacity.

The reliance on imports has made the future sustainability of power supply one of the key national challenges. Power cuts seem to be a regular phenomenon, posing a further economic quandary for the country. According to World Bank, Albania ranks second only to Kosovo among European countries for the number of power outages that establishments might encounter in a typical month.

Things might even deteriorate further this winter. The current energy crisis seems to be threatening an already precarious energy situation, with the Prime Minister cautioning that this winter could be the hardest Albania has ever encountered.

Capitalising on Potential

The deployment of a diversified energy mix which will include more renewable sources will be critical for the country to bolster its energy security, which is expected to be a key factor in sustainably meeting energy demand growth and enabling economic growth in the years ahead.

Opportunities for renewables, and especially for solar and wind energy, are extensive in Albania. According to IRENA’s Renewables Readiness Assessment report (2021), the solar radiation is very high throughout most of its territory, with the country enjoying some of Europe’s highest number of sunshine hours per year. Although Albania has currently no wind power capacity, the country also presents a significant cost-competitive wind potential based on IRENA’s estimates.

Integrating solar and wind resources in the energy mix can, thus, provide the country with a higher, cost-competitive domestic supply that could meet not only current electricity demand, but also be used in new end-use applications that are transitioning towards electrification. A good example of that is the transportation sector which is the largest energy consumer and a major contributor to the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.

The increasing share of variable renewable resources can also help offset some of the hydro used. In this case, the latter can instead start acting as a baseload renewable resource, effectively displacing fossil fuels where intermittent sources struggle by filling in any gaps between supply and demand. Hydropower enjoys significant operational flexibility, which in tandem with its storage potential can make it a reliable and economic option in supporting the use of intermittent sources of renewable energy. Such a scenario would help Albania balance its system, while, at the same time, it would contribute to the reduction of its carbon footprint.

In addition to eliminating the electricity deficit and taking electrification to new sectors, Albania can increase its potential to unlock new industries and investment using clean energy. The country can explore opportunities to produce green hydrogen through solar and wind power. Hydrogen could be used domestically in hard to abate industries, another important source of emissions in the country which cannot be electrified.

Policy and Regulatory Commitment

The government of Albania seems to have already acknowledged the need for a diversified energy production mix. The Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, Belinda Balluku, has repeatedly highlighted that one of the key pillars of focus is the national strategy on energy diversification. However, any efforts towards that goal need to be bolder and more concrete.

The government should develop a holistic energy roadmap, which will provide clarity and visibility on the country’s national targets, how these are going to be achieved (including demand creation) and investments that should be made over the next few decades. Especially for renewable energy projects, which are usually low margin and long term in nature, a stable policy and regulatory framework will be vital to reduce any related risks for investors. An enabling legislation with the right incentives and supporting mechanisms for the greater uptake of renewable resource capitalisations will also be essential.

Assessing the required infrastructure to reach the national goals should also be part of the energy roadmap. The strengthening of the distribution network to better handle the phased addition of variable renewable energy sources, upgrading of hydropower facilities so they become faster and more efficient in the ramp-up/ramp-down processes, as well as the improvement of the reservoir management should be some of the key projects that require a detailed planning.

A thorough technical and economic assessment of the renewable resource potential across the country will further be important as it will help the government set achievable targets and understand the areas that should be prioritized for development. These steps will, in turn, provide investors with the right foresight and motivation to participate in the domestic developments.

When it comes to renewable energy resources, Albania has a competitive advantage, but it is in a tight spot in terms of investment interest. As such, participation of private investors and project developers will be crucial for the deployment of clean energy projects in the country. To date, renewable energy projects have been largely supported by government funding or with the assistance of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). While the government has restated that Albania is a safe country for foreign investments, the country is still perceived as a difficult place to do business. According to World Bank’s ease of doing business index, it ranks 82^nd out of 190 countries, far below its Balkan neighbours.

Exporting Opportunities

Capitalising on renewable energy potential will undoubtedly help Albania enhance its security of energy supply and reduce its carbon footprint, positioning the country on the right path with Europe’s long-term aspiration of a climate-neutral continent by 2050.

However, besides the national energy security and decarbonisation objectives, Europe’s net zero target by 2050, enhanced by the current energy crisis could provide Albania with a unique opportunity to take centre stage in European energy developments. Given its strategic location, the country could play a key role not only in the Balkan region, but more importantly in Europe’s efforts for a net zero economy. A resilient renewable energy mix could create export opportunities for Albania, which could see electricity and hydrogen, produced using renewable energy, being exported to key European demand centers. But the country needs to act swiftly!

[1] Dr Valentina Dedi is an energy economist with consulting experience in international oil and gas markets and a recent focus on energy transition. She has also been involved with academic institutions, teaching at the University of Surrey in the UK, Bayes Business School, London City University and the University of Ioannina in Greece. Valentina currently works for KBR serving within the international consulting business as a Lead Economist.

The post Albania: The ‘Sleeping Renewable Energy Giant’ of The Balkans? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

On September 11th – that fateful day – a young Muslim from Pakistan was evacuated from the World Trade Centre where he worked. He saw a dark cloud coming towards him. Trying to escape, he fell. A Hasidic Jew held out his hand, saying, ‘Brother, there’s a cloud of glass corning at us, grab my hand, let’s get the heck out of here.’
People of all faiths have condemned that act of terrorism and held hands to support and comfort each other and joined together in prayer. As the young Muslim said afterwards ‘We need to continue to hold hands as we shape a more just and peaceful society.’ Likewise, Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the UN, has said, ‘Nine-eleven made us look with new eyes at each other’s faiths… We need to come together.’
Even so, the world seems a more dangerous place. Although the deadly danger of terrorism is now all too clear, the war against terror has also claimed many innocent lives. The gap between rich and poor grows wider.
The Chinese word for crisis consists I gather of two characters – one of which means Danger and the other Opportunity. In this sense, we are at a critical moment in interfaith relations. It is a time both of danger and opportunity.
The danger is only too evident in the worrying increase in anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and racism, as well as the situations of conflict, especially in Israel/ Palestine and between India and Pakistan. There is alarming, but I believe misguided, talk in some quarters about a clash of civilizations.
Yet the very dangers of the situation emphasize the urgent importance of interfaith understanding and cooperation. Recently the British Foreign Office arranged a Faith and Foreign Policy Week, including a seminar to which a number of religious leaders were invited to meet the Foreign Secretary and some key staff members of the FO. It was another welcome sign that governments recognize the vital importance of encouraging interfaith understanding as a contribution to social cohesion and international peace.
Let me then say a little more about the dangers.
Religion for many people is more a question of identity than a matter of belief. Ask a Christian to define religion and she is likely to say that religion is a matter of belief, particularly of belief in God. But half the world does not think in these terms. For them, religion is first and foremost what you do, not what you think. A Hindu or a Jew must avoid certain foods. What is your religion? It says on the form, that the terrorist asks the same question. Protestant and Catholic in Ulster, Hindu and Sikh in the Punjab… In this sense, religion cannot be quite separated from politics or indeed from racism.¹
Because of the important link between religion and identity, although the main causes of a conflict may be political and economic if the antagonists belong to different religions, which differences, and long-remembered injustices, will fuel the bitterness and be used to vilify the enemy. Because of this in the popular mind and maybe the media, the conflict may be spoken of as a religious one or even as ‘a holy war.’ Then the expectation is aroused that ‘religious leaders’ ought to be able to put an end to the conflict: but this is unrealistic.
There are other ways in which religion can be a cause of conflict or add to conflict.

First, Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism, strictly speaking, was a term used at the end of the nineteenth century by Christians who affirmed the verbal inerrancy of the Bible. In a broader sense, fundamentalists, to be found in most religions, are those who reject historical change and claim an absolute truth for their beliefs. This implies that other religions are false.² It is therefore a religious duty to oppose false teaching and those who try to change traditional beliefs and practices. This is even more the case when it is felt that the undermining of tradition is orchestrated by outsiders.
Let me add that it is misleading to assume that all Muslims are fundamentalist in this modern sense, just because they accept the Qur’an as a direct revelation from God. Muslim scholarship and the development over centuries of Shari’a law allow a considerable variety of interpretations.

Secondly, exclusive claims to the truth encourage people to look down on ‘the heathen’ who do not share them.
The relation of religions to each other has become an important issue for theological debate in most religions. I myself believe that the God of Love whom Jesus revealed is a God who loves all people. We are discovering that religious diversity is enriching and that friendship transcends religious difference. We should rejoice in the truths which we hold dear but learn to appreciate what others treasure. As the Native American spiritual leader Black Elk said, I saw the hoop of my people and I saw that it was holy – and then I saw that it was one hoop of many hoops – all of which are holy. Quite a lot of my writing has been exploring how we can affirm our belief that God’s love has been revealed in Jesus Christ and at the same time respect and learn from other traditions.

Thirdly, religions have too often endorsed the use of violence. Whereas Jesus chose the way of the Cross, the Prophet Muhammad was willing to use force to defend the message of God. Yet although the early Christians were pacifists, more Christians on this point seem to have followed Muhammad rather than Jesus.

What can People of Faith do to reduce Conflict?
I find it hard to see what people of faith can actually do in the midst of war and conflict. In Israel/Palestine, peace activists are virtually prevented from meeting by the respective governments. A chosen few may bravely act as peace messengers. All of us can pray for and call for peace and we can try to ensure that we do not demonize the enemy. It is also important to try to prevent regional conflicts in other parts of the world from damaging community relations in this country.
Religious people can, however, make a major contribution to preventing conflict and to peace-building following a conflict. They have a major preventative task in helping to remove causes of religious hostility. This has been the work of the interfaith movement, which dates back to the World Parliament of Religions, which was held in Chicago in 1893. I have been involved in this work for forty years.
(1) Dispelling ignorance and prejudice – For example, just as Christians have struggled to remove ignorance of Judaism, now there is a lot to do in the West to dispel ignorance about Islam and my small book What Can We Learn about Islam is an attempt to do this. Even between different Christian denominations there is still misunderstanding and I was blessed as a student in the cities to be a member of the United Church of South India.
(2) Encouraging people of different faiths to meet – especially young people. Personal friendship is vital in breaking down false stereotypes. Such personal encounters can be life-changing. In my case, as a student in India, helping at a leprosy clinic with Muslims, Hindus and other Christians helped me see that Christianity has no monopoly on goodness or salvation.
(3) Such a meeting may lead us to rethink our beliefs and recognize that God is active in all the great religions. (4) As the sense of fellowship with people of other faiths develops there is a growing desire to work and discuss and pray together.

Secondly, People of faith can make a valuable contribution to peace-building after conflict.
Where there has been conflict, faith communities have the opportunity to play a healing role. The most striking recent example is South Africa. Desmond Tutu, who chaired the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has said, ‘We here in South Africa are a living example of how forgiveness may unite people’.³ The example was set by Nelson Mandela. When he was released after twenty-seven years in jail, he declared that his mission was to be the victim and the victimizer. I agree with Desmond Tutu that ‘Without Forgiveness there really is no future’. It also requires courage to apologize, but that too can help to heal division. For religious leaders to call for reconciliation instead of revenge and to affirm the common humanity of oppressed and oppressors requires great courage, but it is the authentic message of all the great faiths.

Thirdly, we need to champion human rights. It is difficult to know when it is right to call for reconciliation and when it is right to confront cruel and immoral misuse of power. Desmond Tutu himself spoke out courageously against apartheid and I believe we should speak out against all abuse of human rights, perhaps especially at present on behalf of the Tibetan and Palestinian people. In 1939, the poet W.H. Auden said, ‘All I have is a voice to undo the folded lie.’⁴ And at least, in Britain, we have the freedom to protest. The Jubilee 2000 Campaign or the Campaign Against Landmines shows the power of public opinion.

Fourthly, we need to share in creating a more just and peaceful world order. This is the new agenda. The most encouraging development in recent years has been the growing willingness of some politicians, economists and business leaders to take seriously the spiritual and moral dimension of the great problems that face our world. In 1998 a meeting on ‘World Faiths and Development’ was held at Lambeth Palace, London, jointly chaired by James D Wolfensohn President of the World Bank and by Dr George Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury. From this emerged the World Faith Development Dialogue. In December with the Chief Rabbi and the Muslim leader Dr Zaki Badawi, I was asked to speak to the new Commission on Globalization which the State of the World Forum is establishing.
This suggests that if the faiths are willing to speak together then their contribution to building a new world order will be welcome. I have never felt that interfaith dialogue is just an internal matter of interest to those who happen to be religious. It is I believe vital for the health of a society and for the world community. Only if a new world order is based on the ethical values shared by the great religions will we create a world society of justice and peace in which no one is hungry and in which the environment is treated with reverence.

Soon after September 11th, I had an Email from someone I did not know. He said that after he heard the news of the attack on the Twin Towers he went home and gathered the family together. Then he opened the post which had brought him a copy of the book of prayers which I had edited called “Bridge of Stars”. Let me read the prayer at which he opened the book and on which he tried to focus during that terrifying afternoon. It has a message for us all.
“Friendship to all I give friendship to all, and enmity to none. Know that violence is the root cause of all miseries in the world. Violence, in fact, is the knot of bondage.
Do not injure any living being.
This is the eternal, perennial and unalterable way of spiritual life.
A weapon, however powerful it may be, can always be superseded by a superior weapon; however, no weapon can be superior to non-violence and love”.⁵
By mutual respect and understanding and by working together, we can offer the world a message of hope that love is stronger than hatred and that unity with God’s grace, can overcome division.

Dr Marcus Braybrooke, Vicar of the Baldons, near Oxford, is President of the World Congress of Faiths, Patron of the International Interfaith Centre and Co-Founder of the Three Faiths Forum.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 R. Gombrich, ‘What Kind of Thing is Religion? in Shap Handbook on World Religions in Education, Commission for Racial Equality, 1987.
2 See further my article ‘Interfaith Can Save Religion for the World in Faith and Freedom, Vol. 52, No 149, Autumn and Winter 1999, pp. 125-133 and Leonard Swidler, The Meaning of Life at the Edge of the Third Millennium, Paulist Press 1992.
3 Desmond Tutu in Exploring Forgiveness, Ed Robert D. Enright and Joanna North, University of Wisconsin Press, 1998, p .xiii
4 W.H. Auden’s poem ‘September 1, 1939, published in 1940. The poem includes the line ‘We must love one another or die.
5 A Jain Prayer, from Bridge of Stars, Ed Marcus Braybrooke, Duncan Baird 2001.

The post Religion as a Cause of Conflict appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

According to literature, there is still a general opinion that Violent Extremism (VE) and terrorism are issues that concern men only. However, as the data show, about 550 Western women have travelled to ISIL / Da’esh-occupied territory and 17% of foreign European fighters/ warriors are women (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Rad- Jankovic. A., 2018). Moreover, according to Europol, one in four people arrested in Europe for terrorist activities in 2016 was a woman (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018). Furthermore, recent studies highlight the fact that women’s involvement in extremist organizations and their role in conflicted countries or violent situations are often more complicated than assumed (Eggert, 2018), and that women at the same time “can be victims, violent actors or agents of positive change” (Dufour-Genneson, S. Alam, M., 2014).
This paper analyzes the factors that push Albanian women towards religious radicalization
and participation in foreign conflicts.

The paper challenges the existing gap in studies which have focused on men, given that the number has been higher and hence has missed the nuances from a gender perspective. The methodology uses first-hand testimonies, interviews and focus groups as well as a literature review to address specific factors at both the micro level: psycho-sociological and ideological factors; and the macro one: socio-economic, political, and specific cultural factors. Women may act as peace-builders, including through women’s organizations, using their influence in the families and communities to establish unique solutions to support prevention, de-radicalization, psycho-sociological support, and rehabilitation from radicalization and violent extremism (Dufour-Genneson, S. Alam, M., 2014). On the other hand, women are not only the victims of VE. They can also serve as mobilizers and supporters for terrorist organizations, recruiters, fundraisers, and even as doers of terrorist acts (Bhulai, R., Peters, A., Nemr, C., 2016).

Throughout the review of the existing literature on “push and pull factors of Albanian women in violent extremism,” it was noted that, as in men, there is no one specific factor for women and girls that affects the process of radicalization and/or their participation in terrorist groups or their travelling to the conflicted areas of Syria and Iraq (Jakupi, R., Kelmendi, V., 2017).

As field researchers in Albania, we reached the same agreement as well. Based on existing literature and analysis of information obtained from several state and non-state actors, one in-depth interview with a woman returned from Syria and Iraq and their families and relatives, as well as perceptions of respondents in the national survey, the push and pull factors are divided into two levels: macro and micro. Guided by the interaction of these factors and the complexity for addressing them, women’s influencing factors in violent extremism in the Albanian context are analyzed based on two main pillars:

1. Factors at the macro level comprise the political system, the good-governance, socio- economic and social elements, faith and religion, influence of social groups, violence against women, gender inequality, and marginalization. Addressing these factors requires appropriate policy direction from both central and local government institutions with particular focus also on the community’s behavior and resilience.
2. Factors at the micro level include psycho-sociological and ideological factors that can be addressed through individual work and support to the families of women belonging in these categories.

Findings on macro-level factors
Based on the academic agreement so far, the category of macro factors includes three main separate groups, such as socio-economic, political, and specific cultural factors. Within each of these factors, a wide range of conditions interact: Interactions under the socio-economic factors include high levels of social marginalization, poorly governed areas, human and women’s rights violations, and unmet social and economic needs.
In contrast, interactions under the political factors include involving high levels of corruption, impunity for elites and specific cultural factors in Albania (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018) including the influence of local religious clerics, and level of religious education. These factors, combined with other factors at the personal level (micro-level), can create the right “ground” to develop individuals/groups of vulnerable people who can be easily manipulated by extremist ideology (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018).

The analysis of these factors, as well as the identification of the most specific factors for women and girls, is essential in addressing and further drafting appropriate interventions for families, communities, or other groups/ or people who may be vulnerable to this phenomenon (Holmer, G., Bauman, P., 2018).
The surveyed population in this study was presented with several options, as to which are the most concerning issues for Albania (chart no.5). As noted, the three most problematic issues the respondents are most concerned about are youth unemployment, which holds the highest level at 63.9%¹(64.2% of male respondents and 63.6% of female respondents), followed by high levels of corruption with 53.7% of the general surveyed population (54.9% of male respondents and 52.5% of female respondents) and the inequality between rich and poor comprising 51.5% of the general surveyed population (54.5% of male respondents and 48.6% of female respondents).

From a gender perspective, there is no difference in responses among all male and female survey respondents. Variation can be seen as regards the high level of corruption, which is mostly listed as a problematic issue among respondents in urban areas (58.7%), compared with 47.6% of the respondents in rural areas. The perception of the presence of crime in the country is high (36.1%), as is the “decline in the moral values of the society” (33.4%). The data from the survey is also a reflection of the socio- economic situation of the Albanian population, especially of the Albanian youth. According to the latest data of the INSTAT, the unemployment rate in the 15-29 age group is 21.4% (21.2% males and 21.5% females) (De Bruijn, B., Filipi, Gj., Nesturi, M., Galanxhi, E., 2015). Although these figures rank Albania in the first place among the countries of the Western Balkans for a low unemployment rate among youth, still the unemployment figures remain twice as high as those of the states of the European Union (World Bank Group, 2019). According to another study, unemployment and lack of security have also pushed many young people into leaving Albania during 2018-2019, where 40% of youth claimed that they wanted to leave the country (Kamberi, G., Çela, A., 2019).
The financial situation and economic polarization play an essential role in the overall “well-being” of the population and in the context of violent extremism. As such, individuals radicalized into violent extremism over the last few years in the Western Balkans (including those who have become foreign fighters) have come mostly from the economic margins (Vlado Azinović, Kimberly Storr, 2017). Even though the financial situation cannot stand as a single factor influencing VE, when combined with other factors such as widespread corruption and lack of security and justice may be a factor exploited by VE groups, which may offer wages or services. It is not poverty however that elicits support for VE but rather the acute form of social exclusion by government and society (Vurmo, Gj., Sulstarova, E., 2018). The surveyed population states that it is difficult for them to make a living on their income. In percentage terms, the male and female respondents share more or less the same approach in terms of difficulty they have in making a living, where the highest percentage is present at the levels “coping on present income” and “difficult” as presented in chart no 6.

In fact, the difficulties in affording life are closely related to the employment rate and monthly income. Among the survey respondents, there is a high difference between women who do not have any income (31.6% of respondents) and male respondents (16.6%). There is little difference in revenue for the category of women and men who earn 23,000 Albanian Lek (ALL) (21.4% – women and 20.6% – men). Reversely, this difference increases for women and men who earn over 50,000 ALL per month; thus, there is a gender pay gap with a higher percentage of men who make over 50,000 ALL compared to women.
The survey, the focus group discussion, and the interviews noted the difficult economic situation (intertwined with other factors further discussed in this study) as one of the reasons why Albanian women (mainly from rural areas) have travelled to warring areas or the Islamic State. One example is the case of 16-year-old Besa², who was married at the age of 14 and faced a challenging economic and social situation.³ After her husband left, her financial condition worsened. She lived in a mosque for a certain period because she alone could not afford to pay the rent of the house until she joined her husband abroad.⁴ However, the poor economic conditions of people who travelled to Syria or Iraq are not the only factor. There are also other cases where most FTF families have had average living standards⁵, owned small businesses, and were not to be considered poor since they could cover the travelling expenses by themselves⁶. These cases were reported from interviews with the returned woman and relatives of other returnees. One of the testimonies shows that the people who are currently in the war camps (including women) were, on their arrival to Syria/Iraq, initially treated well. Their minimum living conditions were met, and the daily budget spent on a family reached hundreds of dollars a day. ⁷ It is precisely this misinformation that “seduces” unemployed people, those with economic difficulties and from deep rural areas. However, other testimonies were taken by other families who still communicate with their family members who are in the Al-Hol camps. They claim that their situation is miserable, as the interviewee says: “Recently they desperately want to return, the situation is terrible and they are starving…” claiming that they are continually asking for financial help.⁸
On the other hand, difficult economic situations are related to the low employment rates of the population; however, it is difficult to say that unemployment is the only factor influencing Albanians to travel to Syria and Iraq. In the context of radicalization and violent extremism, unemployment constitutes an essential resource to individuals or extremist groups in radicalizing individuals (men and women) by promising a solution to their poverty and offering more lucrative economic opportunities through illegal ways.
Civil society representatives in the focus group discussions state that people, particularly those from rural areas, have been more “attractive” for the recruiters given their difficult economic situations. The high level of corruption is more evident in rural areas, combined with a lack of proper religious education too.⁹ Endemic corruption is part of the multi-faced set of drivers of violent extremism. Evidence from Transparency International suggests that the lowest-scoring countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) are often those experiencing conflict or war (UNDP, 2018). On the same note, the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism suggests that countries that fail to control corruption (amongst other indicators like poverty, unemployment, and diversity management in accordance with human rights obligations) tend to witness a more significant number of incidents linked to violent extremism (UNDP, 2018). Survey respondents list corruption as one of the three problematic issues that most concern them (see graph. no.5).
The same concern among the Albanian population is visible in the opinion poll, “Trust in Governance 2019.” Most Albanian citizens perceive petty corruption (87.5%) and grand corruption (85.2%) as a widespread or very widespread phenomenon in Albanian society. Furthermore, the same opinion poll in 2019 reveals that 15% of the Albanian population has personally witnessed government corruption at the central level and 25.2% at the local level (Vrugtman L, Bino, B, 2020).
Chart no. 7 provides an overview of the perceptions of respondents on the main reasons why people (both women and men) have left Albania to join warring countries such as Syria and Iraq. What is noticeable is the high percentage of respondents who think that one of the main reasons is “financial benefits” (62.5% female respondents and 59.7% male respondents). This percentage is followed by a “lack of economic opportunities” (58.0% of female respondents and 63.8% of male respondents) and then “for ideological and religious faith” (53.3% of female respondents and 54.7% of male respondents).

In the meantime, based on the perceptions from the general survey’s population, the factors that lead women in Albania to travel to warring countries of Syria and Iraq are reported as follows (Chart no.8). The highest percentage stands for “to join the husband” from both male and female respondents (59.1% female respondents and 59.7% male respondents). Also, other reasons are highly considered by the respondents, such as “lack of economic opportunities” (51.6% female respondents and 53.7% male respondents) and “financial benefits” (44.6% female respondents and 44.7% male respondents).

The dominance of these factors, particularly of the fact that the Albanian women have flown to war zones to join their husbands, is also underlined by civil society representatives engaged in preventing violent extremism in Albania, who from their experience (albeit based on little information they possess given their limited engagement at concretely working with returnees, women and their families) show that most Albanian women have not played an active role in the Islamic state.¹⁰ Still, they have travelled there to have a better life and to escape from extreme poverty. Many of them think that in these warring countries, they will find the house they did not have and the rights they believe they have been denied regarding lack of job opportunities and lack of equal earnings (Ramkaj, 2019). Also, they believe they will be able to provide a good living for their children, as is the case of the woman named Moza,¹¹ who followed her husband due to the lack of income in raising their three children. ¹²

The information from experts on VE in Albania shows that “Albanian girls and women, once in Syria, have been isolated at home, under constant pressure from other women with foreign citizenship. There were many non-Albanian women engaged in the fighting areas. Their contacts with the family were rare due to field engagement. The children did not receive normal education but only manipulative instructions in selected centres from the organizations they had joined” (Gjinishi, 2020).
Although women constitute the main priorities of some policies in Albania (INSTAT, 2020), the context given above shows once again that women’s economic empowerment, labor market engagement, labor force participation, and unpaid work in the family, particularly in rural/ remote areas, as well as the position of youth and especially girls in the labor market, continues to remain a challenge in the Albanian society. This is also highlighted in the “Gender Equality Index Report for Albania” (2020). The interaction and amelioration of these factors, under the perspective of violent extremism, are essential for building women’s resilience and increasing their role in peace-building and prevention of VE (Coutur, 2014).

Gender Inequality and Patriarchy as a Cultural Factor

The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are fundamental principles of the International Law on Human Rights. Promoting gender equality is a priority of all Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member states, which have taken the commitment to promote gender equality as an integral part of their policy (OSCE, 2000). Although the literature so far suggests that women are led into VE by the same group of socio-economic and political factors, other existing literature sheds light on specific factors that influence women’s engagement in VE, such as gender inequality, gender-based discrimination, and lack of economic and educational opportunities (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018).
Apart from the traditional factors leading to the VE, the analysis and the strong link between gender inequality and violent extremism have been addressed by Valerie Hudson and her co-authors in “Sex and World Peace.” They state that the best predictor of peace in a nation is not its level of democracy or wealth but rather the level of physical security enjoyed by its women (Hudson, Valerie M., 2012). Historically, women have been included in the category of marginalized groups in terms of access to the labor market, low opportunities for education, and low levels of participation in decision-making. The experience of living in a society that denies women’s full civil rights and economic opportunities can make some women perceive involvement in terrorism as a way to gain freedom, emancipation, respect, and equality (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018). Violation of these rights can deepen feelings of alienation, isolation, and exclusion that may make individuals more sensitive to radicalism (Orav, A., Shreeves, R., Radjenovic. A., 2018).
In the Albanian context, the General Gender-Equality Index for 2017 marked 60.4 points, demonstrating a significant gender gap of 7 points below the EU-28 average (67.4), except for the area of governance, where Albania has a higher level of gender equality than other European Union countries. The most significant shortcomings in the gender gap in Albania are encountered in the fields of knowledge, money, and time spent doing unpaid labor (INSTAT, 2020).
Gender inequality is noted to be at high levels even among respondents of this study, where 47.3% of men and 70.4% of women claim that there is noticeable inequality between men and women in Albanian society (chart no 9).

Higher levels of gender inequality, especially in terms of education, are more visible in rural areas of the country. In these areas, the number of men with secondary or higher education is higher than the number of women with secondary or higher education which is due to fewer possibilities for proper education, low rates of attendance at high school, and lower enrollment rates in vocational schools. Quality assessments (Housing and Population Census, and PISA study) raise concerns about the deterioration of the education system in rural areas. Some of the causes of this difficult situation are insufficient investments in infrastructure and human resources, high distance from residential areas, and vocational training institutions. Also, very few women participate in training programs, due to insufficient time and how training programs are organized (Zhllima, E., Merkaj, E., Tahsini, I., Imami, D., Çela, E., 2016).
From a geographical point of view, there is no specific cause or group of reasons that affect women differently in different parts of the Balkans and European countries. However, some of the instigators and tendencies of radicalism and women’s participation in terrorist/radical organizations are exposed differently in the Balkans, compared to other European countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Kelmendi, 2018).
This is due to the more significant challenges faced by women in the Balkans in terms of domestic violence, high levels of discrimination in socio-economic issues, and the dominance of patriarchal societies (Kelmendi, 2018). In the Albanian context, it is still challenging to address domestic violence, protect victims of domestic violence, guarantee gender equality and gender equity, and provide minimum health and social services, especially at the local level (EC Albanian 2019 report, 2019). For example, in the first two months of 2020 in Albania, five women were assassinated by their husbands. (Tushi, 2020). According to data provided by INSTAT and the survey on violence against women and girls in 2018 (INSTAT, 2019), it turns out that 1 in 2 women (52.9%) between the ages of 18-74 have experienced one or more than five kinds of violence (intimate partner violence, violent encounters, non-partner violence, sexual harassment and/or intimidation) during their lifetime (INSTAT, 2019).

Moreover, according to the same study, traditional patriarchal attitudes remain prevalent throughout Albania thus contributing to gender inequalities in all spheres of social and economic life, as well as the prevalence of violence against women.¹³ We also notice the “legitimacy” of violence against women among the respondents in the study, as shown from chart no.10, where 7.6% of men and 3.5% of women agree with the fact that violence against women is justifiable in certain circumstances.

Patriarchal norms, the dominance of the male figure in the Albanian family, and “power” over women are noted by participants in the target group discussions to be among the most significant factors as to why Albanian women have travelled to war areas in Syria 14 and Iraq. From the data of this study, there is only one case identified of a woman being raped by her husband and forced to accompany him to Syria. In contrast, most of the interviews taken from relatives of women and men still in war zones do not support the hypothesis that these women have been forced to follow their husbands. Instead, they have voluntarily (for a better life)¹⁵ joined their husbands to be near them (even when asked to do otherwise), and this shows once again the deep roots of patriarchal norms within the Albanian family, mainly in rural areas¹⁶ based on the “family code” (Kuko, 2020).
However, even in one case where the mother refused to join her son who had already left for war, the decision of the head of the family (father) was dominant, forcing his wife and his two other daughters and son to go to war. This example clearly shows that the man’s role as the head of the family enforces the patriarchal factor of society. ¹⁷
The “patriarchal” factor is also supported by the interviewees and participants in the discussion meetings from different areas of Albania. According to them, “Albanian women have travelled to warring zones because they did not want to oppose their husbands. Whether ideologically convinced or not, the women obeyed their husbands. Still, they did not travel there to fight”. ¹⁸ Such statements confirm the patriarchal context that prevails in the family structure in Albania. This context is also present and rich in evidence from women who returned to other Balkan countries where patriarchal norms (especially those within the Muslim community) have played a significant role in their participation in conflicted areas in Syria and Iraq (Kelmendi, 2018).
In this patriarchal context, the majority of Albanian women who have travelled to the Islamic State have also “legitimized” the reasons why their husbands left “to earn money and provide the family with a better income for a better life.” The statement “A husband’s primary task is to be the breadwinner” is also supported at high levels by 48.2% of men and 45.7% of women surveyed.¹⁹ Given the social and economic differentiation between men and women and the “duties” that women exercise in a patriarchal context, most women remained without any financial or family support after their husbands fled to the war zones. Some of these women were supported by their parents; while others were to remain with their husband’s families, with their in-laws, and some women were left without any support at all. In this situation, the only solution for them was to join their husbands wherever they were. ²⁰ This situation is criticized by various civil society actors in the country who emphasize the need to focus on the role of women and girls, especially in rural areas. The CSO representatives suggest that more efforts should be made to educate the younger generation on gender equality to break gender stereotypes.
Furthermore, they deem it important to boost economic empowerment and vocational education for women and girls. “Such interventions will help prevent cases such that of the girl from a low-income family, who was married at the age of 14 and at the age of 16 she left for Syria with her child to join her husband, who died there. The misfortune of this girl seems never to end as she was forced to remarry and give birth to another child” ²¹.
Another case of a woman who testified that she did not want to stay there shows that she simply joined her husband after he had assured her that they could have a better life in Syria because the situation would soon get normal.²²

Factor Analysis at the Micro-Level
The individual factors and nuclear family

The analysis of the micro-level factors influencing the decision of Albanian women to join the Islamic State is based mainly on the testimonies of relatives of women who have gone to Syria and Iraq. Also, it is based on the testimony of the returned woman and other evidence gained from civil society representatives and state institutions in Albania. Analysis at the micro-level is vital to understand factors that involve, as described by Dr. Alex P. Schmid: identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalization, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatization, and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge (Schmid, 2013).
In this category of micro factors, we find out that Albanian women are driven by individual motives, mainly related to the perspective/structure of their marriage, which is again closely associated with patriarchal norms. Almost all the evidence in this study sees the women as “victims” of their husbands and their aggravated financial situation. They are unable to raise and educate their children on their own. Some of them were even lied to by their husbands over the real situation in Syria, as the woman returnee Mira (not her real name) testifies: “My husband left 3-4 months before us. He asked me to go there, telling me that the situation was normal. I didn’t tell anyone I was leaving; even the kids didn’t know. They thought they were flying to England.” ²³ The same testimony comes from relatives of another case who emphasize that “the woman didn’t even have a say in her husband’s decision to leave for Syria, but simply went after him. She respected his decision because that is how it should be.” ²⁴
In this analysis of the personal motives that led Albanian women to fly to war countries, a crucial role is played by the close family (parents, in-laws, sisters, and brothers) and the interaction of family members. From the information obtained from the interviews with the relatives and acquaintances of people who fled to Syria and Iraq, almost none of the parents, sisters, or brothers were aware of the fact that the sons of the family at first and their wives were planning to leave to join the Islamic State. This is the case of a woman named Mira, whose family supposed that she went with her children to England to join her husband. It was her brother who, on occasion, noticed that her sister was not in England, one day when she wrongly had left the computer’s location on. Testimonials show that the moment when the parents have understood where their children are has been shocking. The case of woman returnee Mira can be considered a positive one, given the fact that her family managed to bring her and her two children back. However, this is not the case for other parents looking for help from the state institutions to turn back home their children.
Despite being unaware of this phenomenon, the traditional and patriarchal form of the family organization is still visible. In such families, the men of the family are supposed to be the ones who should take care not only of their wives and children but also, in some cases, even increasing the responsibility and pressure of young men to take care of their parents as well. With this mindset, men who have left for war countries have easily been able to lie to their families by making them believe that they are immigrating to Western European countries, such as England, Greece, and Germany, or to study in the Middle East. The control of radicalization as a process and the role of the nuclear family in preventing this phenomenon are issues that have also recently begun to come to the attention of actors dealing with violent extremism. However, so far in Albania, there is no evidence of cases of families that prevent the travelling of their children to Syria/Iraq.
From our observations for this study, people (men and women) come from families with traditional backgrounds of the Albanian family, respecting and considering the role of the husband as a pillar of the family. In contrast, the respondents in the study emphasize that the structure of the Albanian family has changed since the ‘90s. It faces more issues that affect its “sustainability” due to the socio-economic problems, especially in rural areas, the perceived reduction of moral values in society by young people, and the complete lack of care for their old parents (Ramkaj, 2019). The decrease in moral values in the community is also listed as one of the issues that concern the most 32.1% of male respondents and 24.6% of female respondents in the survey of the presented study (see graph no.5 above).

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1 This is the average value

2 Not her real name.
3 Participants in this focus group discussion included representatives from the municipality of Pogradec, teachers, high school students, representatives of healthcare institutions, journalists, and religious community representatives (Pogradec, January 19, 2020).
4 Interview with the grandmother of the man foreign fighter W, (January 16, 2020).

5 Interview with the friend of a woman Mira, (January 5, 2020).
6 Interview with the sister and daughter of the family of fighter Y, (November 8, 2019).
7 Interview with the sister and the daughter of the dead fighter, (November 8, 2019).
8 Interview with the sister-in-law of the foreign fighter Z, (November 1, 2019).
9 Participants in this focus group include local actors in Vlora municipality such as: high school representatives, teachers, students, CSOs, representatives from shelters, youth groups, members of the Security Council. (Vlora, January 24, 2020).

10 Focus group “PVE Forum” discussion meeting, Tirana, (February 20, 2020),
11 Not her real name
12 Testimony of Y woman mother-in-law who died in Syria, (January 12, 2019).

13 Participants in this focus group included local actors in Tirana municipality such as teachers, social workers, psychologists, lawyers, and members of the National Forum of CSOs in PVE in Albania. (Tirana, February 20, 2020).
14 Participants in this focus group included local actors in Tirana municipality such as teachers, social workers, psychologists, lawyers, and members of the National Forum of CSOs in PVE in Albania. (Tirana, February 20, 2020) Ibid.
15 Interview with the friend of the returned woman X. (January 5, 2020).

16 Ibid.
17 Interview with the sister of the Y fighter who is currently in Syria and at the same time the daughter of the family (who is there to stay close to the Y fighter), (November 8, 2019).
18 Participants in this focus group include local actors in Vlora municipality such as high school representatives, teachers, students, CSOs, representatives from shelters, youth groups, and members of the Security Council. (Vlora, January 24, 2020).
19 Nationwide survey for this study, WCDCA, 2020.
20 Testimonies from relatives of women who are currently in camps in Syria and Iraq.

21 Participants in this focus group discussion include representants from the municipality of Pogradec, teachers, high school students, representatives of healthcare institutions, journalists, and religious community representatives, (Pogradec, January 19, 2020)
22 Interview with woman returnee Mira, (October 28, 2020).
23 Interview with woman returnee Mira. This is not her real name, (October 28, 2020).
24 Testimony of members of the family of the returned woman Mira, (December 1, 2019).

The post Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: Role of Women appeared first on Tirana Observatory.