After letting go of its dictatorial past, Albania has embarked on a transformative journey, transitioning into a democratic society supported by a growing open market economy. This period of transition has been marked by significant strides in social, economic, and institutional arenas, culminating in improved productivity across a significant number of sectors. The resulting uptick in employment (although there is a lot of room for improvement), incomes, and standards of living paints a picture of a nation on the rise. However, as Albania looks towards 2025 and beyond, it is imperative to craft a long-term vision that not only acknowledges past achievements but also addresses the development constraints that may hinder a path of durable, sustainable, and inclusive growth.

The strategic priorities for Albania, as it evolves towards the future, must be rooted in a clear vision that seeks to enhance the quality of life for all citizens, support higher education and skills’ development, bring forth new growth sources that expand the revenue base, augment local government capabilities, mitigate environmental issues, and uphold diversity. This vision needs a deep dive into Albania’s developmental performance, particularly in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, to identify strategic opportunities that can propel the nation forward.

Albania faces a plethora of challenges that threaten to overturn its development trajectory, most of them with deep roots in the country’s past. Beyond key topics such as poverty reduction, mass migration, corruption, and a sizable informal economy, issues such as gender disparities, discrimination, and other societal troubles pose significant hurdles. These systemic issues necessitate comprehensive strategies that not only address the symptoms but tackle the root causes to foster a more equitable society.

The EU Integration Process: A Strategic Asset

The European Union integration process stands as a beacon of hope and a strategic opportunity for many Balkan countries’ continued and sustained development. For Albania, this process has catalysed reforms and institution-building efforts, leading to Albania gaining more and essential financial and technical support, and market access. The strategic importance of EU accession, underscored in key policy documents, serves as a cornerstone for Albania’s future strategy. The recent progression towards EU membership negotiations highlights Albania’s reform achievements and sets the stage for deeper integration into the European framework.

Post-COVID

The COVID-19 pandemic has undeniably impacted Albania, like many of its regional and global counterparts. Despite these challenges, Albania’s management of the health crisis and the subsequent economic downturn presents an opportunity for strategic recalibration. The post-pandemic recovery phase offers a unique moment to focus on strategic priorities that can address existing constraints and leverage new growth opportunities.

Strategic Priorities: Education, Economic Diversification, and Quality of Life

The strategic priorities for Albania are varied, focusing on enhancing education and skills, creating dynamic drivers of growth, and improving the overall quality of life and environment, for the benefit of its citizens. Addressing these areas is crucial for Albania to realise its potential, stimulate economic opportunities, and ensure a sustainable future.

Supporting the education system’s needs for evolution and addressing the skills gap stand as critical components for Albania’s future success. A robust education system not only fuels personal development but also drives economic growth by equipping citizens with the necessary skills to thrive in a dynamic global economy. A focused approach to the skills of the future will position Albania in the leading pack of countries with a clear vision of what work will mean in the next decades.

Identifying and nurturing new sources of economic growth through digitalization, green growth, and broadening the manufacturing and services sectors are also vital. This diversification will create the need for quality jobs, generate essential revenue, and ensure Albania’s competitiveness on the global stage. And, if backed by a supportive and “productive” education system, that provides the economy with employees with the specific skills needed, the circle will be closed in a positive way.

Ensuring that Albania is an attractive place to live and invest in is essential for its future prosperity. This entails significant investments in healthcare, social protection, environmental conservation, and regional development to ensure balanced growth and improved living conditions across the country. Studies show that people don’t necessarily leave a country due to lack of finances, they do so mostly because of overall quality of life problems. These can be solved with a strategic citizen-first approach to policymaking. This also ensures that better-educated workers decide to stay in the country and boost Albania’s economy, rather than Germany’s.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

¹Global Analyst and Consultant, Former Prime Ministerial Adviser in Romania and Moldova

The post Albanian Statecraft for 2025+: Sustainable Development and Regional Leadership appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

In her 2023 State of the Union address, European Commission President von der Leyen asserted that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. In doing so, it reiterated the EU’s promise made at the historic Thessaloniki Summit twenty years ago.

At the time, Yugoslavia’s devastating wars had just ended. International borders had changed with the independence of Montenegro and later Kosovo. And the wave of EU enlargement was about to happen, with ten Central and Eastern European countries joining in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The driving force behind this process was the powerful vision to reunify the European continent. But also a strong political will in the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to become members of the European family. For similar reasons, the countries of the Western Balkans were equally motivated to join the EU.

However, after twenty years, the Western Balkans have still not joined the European Union. Sometimes it even seems that EU membership has become less attractive for the region than it was two decades ago. With the world and the EU facing a series of crises in the past two decades, the Union’s appetite for enlargement has waned. At the same time, some Western Balkan countries showed limited political will to implement much-needed EU reforms, giving EU enlargement skeptics arguments against their integration. In general, the enlargement process has proceeded at a slower pace and with less visible and tangible results than expected, leading to disillusionment and departure from the EU. The Union and the Western Balkans – wittingly or unwittingly – found an unsatisfactory modus vivendi.

The window of opportunity for geostrategic expansion

Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, EU membership has become an even more attractive goal for the Eastern Partnership countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time, the countries of the Western Balkans are facing unprecedented challenges to their stability as well as amplified foreign policy dilemmas. However, there is also growing awareness of a new window of opportunity for enlargement, raising expectations vis-à-vis the EU.

We welcome that the EU is now approaching enlargement from a more geostrategic and less bureaucratic perspective than before. Last year’s decision to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on strategic considerations. There is a growing recognition that enlargement policy is the EU’s most powerful stabilizing instrument. That said, the EU’s new strategic approach will not lower the standards of enlargement. Full implementation of the reform remains essential.

The current situation is an opportunity for both the European Union and the Western Balkans to show more strategic foresight, to fully regain their enlargement credibility and to reinforce mutual trust, some of which had been lost over the years.

In fact, some concrete steps should be taken without any further delay.

First, the European Union must open EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of this year. Second, Montenegro must continue its path of reform in the EU, which depends on the formation of the new government in the country. Thirdly, the negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia must be advanced. In North Macedonia, the next steps depend on the country’s ability to pass the necessary constitutional changes. The latest case is a reminder that EU member states and Western Balkan countries must play a responsible role and refrain. from the presentation of bilateral problems and disputes, which are not related to the accession process.

For a gradual and accelerated integration of the Western Balkans into the EU

On the EU side, the discussion on the necessary institutional and financial preparations for the integration of new members is gathering momentum. However, this should not become a pretext to delay the enlargement process for our Western Balkan partners. We need to start implementing existing proposals to speed up the enlargement process now.

EU institutions must be more creative in adapting the enlargement process to today’s needs. The process should be less complex and more results-oriented. We must make it more tangible for citizens and link the progress of the reform with concrete benefits. We also need to engage more dynamically with the countries of the Western Balkans, so that they can really feel the heartbeat of Brussels. From June 2022, there is a clear task from the European Council to advance gradual integration already during the enlargement process. In June 2023, as “Friends of the Western Balkans” together with our colleagues from the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovakia, we called on the EU institutions to present a clear agenda for gradual and accelerated integration in steps concrete implementation until 2024 and beyond. This should be based on fair and rigorous conditioning as well as the principle of own merits. We see many possibilities, from more frequent invitations to our Western Balkan colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Council to the opening of other policy areas such as education, science, transport or trade for their gradual involvement.

The real value of EU enlargement lies in its transformative capacity: helping countries to raise living standards for their citizens and creating prosperous environments where young people can fulfill their dreams. Our Western and Eastern Balkan partners deserve this opportunity and EU citizens will benefit from greater stability and prosperity beyond the current EU borders. EU enlargement is not one of many political options; it is the geostrategic necessity of the day.

[1] By Tanja Fajon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Slovenia, 

Alexander Schallenberg, Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria, 

Gordan Radman Grlic, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia

The post The Unfinished EU: Western Balkan Integration as a Geostrategic Necessity- 20 years of EU promise appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The Western Balkans are now joined by Ukraine and Moldova to follow together the race between geopolitics and cynicism

The Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003 (adopted at the first EU-Western Balkan Summit) stated that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union. The 2023 version of the Declaration of Athens, in honor of that of Thessaloniki, approved last night, ( August 21^st, 2023) [2] says that the future of the Western Balkans is in the European Union, and that Ukraine and Moldova have the same future.

The original declaration, that of 2003, was an EU effort to establish a strategic orientation for the Western Balkans, an agreement between the member states and the states of the Western Balkans (including Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK).

Last night’s Athens declaration is an attempt to create a strategic orientation of the EU for the Western Balkans together with Ukraine and Moldova.

And, at this point, that the EU has or will have a strategic orientation, the good news ends. In a match with reality, Ukraine and Moldova have now joined a European race between geopolitics and cynicism. In that race, the first thing that can come to mind is the next fatalistic barsoleta that in 2043 the summit of the leaders of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova will be held in Greece, and the prime minister of Georgia will also be a guest in it (and if will use a little imagination, Azerbaijan) with which the European future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and now also Georgia (and, with a little imagination, Azerbaijan) will be re-declared.

Geopolitics has its place both in 2003 and in 2023

In 2003, the wars of the former Yugoslavia had ended (the last one of R. Macedonia in 2001), the USA was busy in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the EU had the right vision that the stabilization of Europe means EU membership of space of its southeast (and that for this we should not wait for the American geopolitical return).

In 2023, Russia’s war against Ukraine gives an additional dimension to the vision of the EU, the definition of its eastern borders with the implication of the inclusion of the Western Balkans within the entirety of the European Union. And, while the EU has been established for the first time as a power that actively helps the war on the European continent, together with the USA, the decision on the membership of Ukraine and Moldova, as a permanent stabilization measure, belongs to the EU.

The problem of the EU’s geopolitical approach is the mismatch between the objectives and the capacity to achieve them. After the 2003 Summit, only Croatia joined the EU; all other participants have the promise of membership and candidate status (with the exception of Kosovo). But being a candidate for membership has not changed the relationship in the triangle of unfinished states Kosovo-Serbia-BH. Moreover, another candidate state, Montenegro, has suffered a major blow on its European path from identity friction, a significant part of which comes from the other candidate state, Serbia.

In 2023, the establishment of Ukraine as a geopolitical turning point, which should speed up the EU’s preparation for this great historical challenge that will define the border between Europe and Euro-Asia, is the right vision, but if I were in Kiev I would I analyzed Kosovo-Serbia relations and the EU’s mediation. For more than ten years, the EU has not reached an agreement on an issue in its own backyard. If it cannot reach an agreement with its own instruments on a secondary (or third-order) issue compared to the eastern crises, what can be expected of it in Ukraine or Moldova?

Geopolitics, therefore, was not enough

Yes, there was a period when geostrategic decisions were made. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, newly emerged from dictatorships, were turning points for the peoples of those states and for the well-being of the continent as a whole. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria, both countries that, as seen today, are in the immediate neighborhood of the Ukraine war, also significantly stabilized this part of the continent. But why this happened then, does not mean that it should happen now.

Instead of geopolitics, cynicism has entered the race. In the Athens 2023 Declaration, a historic turning point is made of the union of the great cause (the freedom and independence of the European Ukraine) with the smaller causes (the integration of the Western Balkans). And, this statement is made right when the EU fulfilled the (next) anniversary of the inability to mediate: in September of last year Kosovo and Serbia were offered on a “take it or leave it” basis the most ambitious project so far, of a basic agreement between two independent states establishing relations without mutual recognition of citizenship. A year later, round after round of poor mediation, Kosovo and Serbia are further from the basic agreement than they were in September of last year.

And while the EU declares its geostrategic intention to help push Russia out of Ukraine, it does not prove it can do so in the Western Balkans: for a year and a half, Russia has remained just as strong, if not more so, right in the middle of the Balkans, in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The geopolitical ambition to create a free Europe with the Western Balkans in it and extending to the border between Ukraine and Russia, manifested last night in Athens, is the ambition for the most ambitious Euro-Atlantic project of this century. For the Western Balkans, this meant a democratic Serbia at peace with its neighbors, an independent Kosovo at peace with Serbia, a democratic and functional Bosnia-Herzegovina at peace with its identity pluralism, and so on. That all these countries have a common security system based on NATO.

Against this geopolitical ambition is the cynicism of reality. It is difficult to imagine that the EU will create a democratic space under the umbrella of NATO from the space of unfinished conflicts without the decisive intervention of the United States, Great Britain and powerful EU member states, primarily Germany, France, Italy and why not Poland.

The instruments shown so far in the Kosovo-Serbia case, from the discussions on license plates and territorial exchanges, to the great “geopolitical” victory of the EU achieved in Ohrid in what was called the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement, show that behind Big words hide small actions. What was called the Agreement was fragile with the very fact that it was not signed and is considered an Agreement, because this is what the head of diplomacy J. Borell considers to be. Even, with the greatest seriousness, it was explained how this is a legally binding Agreement, because “it is found in chapter 35 for Serbia and the SAA for Kosovo”, a wording that neither convinces, nor stimulates, nor scares.

This is the paradigm of the EU before the geopolitical challenge of the century.

[1] Veton Surroi is a Kosovar Albanian publicist, politician and former journalist. Surroi is the founder and former leader of the ORA political party, and was a member of Kosovo assembly from 2004 to 2008.

[2] The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova, the prime ministers of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and the head of the council of ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to attend the dinner, being hosted by Greek Prime  Minister  Mitsotakis on the 20th anniversary of a summit between the EU and western Balkan countries in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki as Balkan states sought to join the European bloc.

The post Geopolitics 20 Years After appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Albania’s transition from communist dictatorship to democracy has been marked by high political polarization. The political discourse has been characterised by harsh rhetoric and soon emerged two opposing antagonist camps. Democracy is inherently plagued by division and competition of conflicting interests. Antagonism and polarization have been seen as the unavoidable predicament of a democratic polity; indeed as a challenge to be actively assumed and not as a symptom of a political pathology to be eliminated”.¹ In the same vein, Larry Diamond contends that democracy is, by its nature, a system of institutionalized competition for power, but any society that sanctions political conflict runs the risk of becoming too intense, producing a society so conflict-ridden that civil peace and political stability are jeopardized.²

Political polarization has been one of main features of most post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.³ However, what distinguishes Albania from other countries is the fact that polarization has not taken place along ideological or programmatic lines, rather it seems to have its roots in the communist past, is elite driven and anti-political. Sharp political polarization results where different social groups create and operate categories and mechanisms where members of different groups and social groups are fiercely loyal to their “own group”, want to win at all costs, and dehumanize, depersonalize and stereotype other group members. All of this emotional hatred produces pervasive psychology of polarization, where it causes or deepens fear and insecurity.⁴ Political opponent is constantly casted as an enemy to be destroyed, dehumanized and depersonalized. The recent report of the Institute for Political Studies notes that the parliamentary debate in Albania is dominated by harsh rhetoric, derogatory language and personal offences between political opponents.⁵

Unlike other Eastern European countries, the boycotts of parliament and violent protests have been a unique feature of Albania’s transition towards democracy. In 2019 the opposition relinquished its seats from the parliament and boycotted the local elections. This was ensued by large opposition-led demonstrations in the streets of Tirana. The radicalization of political life has created cleavages that cut across the whole social life of the people. In absence of other alternatives, people are forced to side either with the Socialist Party or the Democratic Party, the two main political parties in Albania. Whether or not people support a particular side, in a highly polarized society, they are forced to choose a side or be labelled by others as belonging to a side or group.⁶

The division of the people into two hostile poles has foreclosed the democratic life of Albania and protracted its post-communist transition towards a functioning democracy. Therefore, it is normatively and theoretically relevant to investigate and analyse the origins of political polarization in Albania. In the first section of the paper I discuss shortly the theoretical tenets of political polarization and then move to the second part where I analyse the root causes of the political polarization in Albania, namely the traumatic experience of the communist past, the role of the political elite in polarization and the emergence of the politics of anti-politics as a driver of political polarization.

Political Polarization in short
Polarization occurs when a normal multiplicity of interests and identities in a society begins to group along a single dimension, splitting into two opposing camps.⁷ Whereas political polarization is normally defined as an ideological distance between political parties – political elite or voters
in society and their positions or attitudes toward each other.⁸ Thus, difference, the dichotomy us/them becomes the identifying feature of a polarized society. Polarized democracies reveal that members are fiercely loyal to their group sides, want it to win at all costs and that mechanisms of dehumanization, depersonalization, and stereotyping work as a whole to the other group party.⁹ The formation of two poles along a single dimension is especially sharpened in the persistence of high-level political tensions. Polarization, in which identities and interests clash in tension, “simplifies rather than complicates the structures of division” unlike other types of identity-based mobilization and “mutually aligns divisions that cut diagonally across a single rift”.¹⁰

Polarization manifests itself in a series of lines such as populism-anti-populism, religious-secular, national-cosmopolitan, traditional-modern, urban-rural, austerity-anti-austerity, market- statist economy.¹¹ These cleavages are more than often exploited by political actors, namely political parties or leaders to reinforce more division, gather support and rule the population.
In this process, polarizing rhetoric and political tactics become instrumental. Polarization that
emerges in this context suppresses “in-group” differences and combines multiple and intergroup
differences into one difference or even one that becomes negatively charged and is used to define the other.¹²

The other is casted as alien to us, and in a polarized society people define politics and society through the distinction between “we” and “they”. This makes consensus, interaction and tolerance around policy issues highly unlikely and costly for the political actors. For instance, a wide range of political and national security issues begin to come to the centre of meaningless and bitter debates, and a political climate that constantly generates risks emerges.¹³

McCoy and Somer have made a significant contribution to the literature on political polarization by identifying the most common features of political polarization, which can enable a general framework for political polarization to be drawn as follows: The division of the people into two hostile poles, where multiple divisions are aligned around a single dominant division or demarcation line between the two camps; the transformation of the political demands and interests around these identities; both sides’ moral characterization of the division as “good” and “bad” ignoring the possibility of common interests between different groups; greater cohesion within groups and the possibility and reality of greater conflict and hostility between groups; stereotyping and prejudice towards the out-group due to lack of direct communication and/or social interaction; disintegration of the centre and polarized camps trying to label all individuals and groups in society as “we” or “other”; weakening the middle ground in public and political discourses; the hostile relationship manifests itself as an element of distinction in the spatial and psychological worlds-situations of polarized groups.¹⁴

In a polarized society each camp questions the moral and legal legitimacy of the others and sees the opposing camp and its policies as an existential threat to their way of life or the nation as a whole.¹⁵ The “other” is not perceived as a political opponent to compete with but as an enemy or criminal that must be defeated and destroyed altogether. In this regard, peaceful coexistence is no longer perceived as possible by citizens.¹⁶ Such strong feelings of dislike and distrust towards opposition parties, candidates, and social groups make this extreme polarization particularly dangerous.¹⁷ People standing in the middle ground are constantly pressured to side with one group or the other, making societal consensus impossible to be achieved. Instead of referring to others as ‘you’, people begin referring to the out-group as ‘them’. This change in language reflects and reinforces the politics of alienation and exclusion at the social level.¹⁸

The communist past divides the present

Albania experienced one of the most Stalinist communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe where the majority of its citizens were subject to state’s surveillance and draconian punishment practices. The communist regime had built a particularly repressive security apparatus, which oppressed all forms of dissidence, expropriated individuals, interned and sentenced to life or to death tens of thousands of people that disagreed with its policies. Under the Communist leadership of Enver Hoxha, Albania was described as one of the most repressive regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and “one of the most tightly closed societies in the world”.¹⁹

Its policy towards social and cultural customs was the harshest of all, and it was the only regime in the world that banned religious practices altogether.²⁰ The unprecedented scope and severity of the communist repression against human rights would make one argue that Albania had strong reasons to make a clear brake with its communist past and mature democratically.

In fact Albania undertook some transitional justice measures in the beginning of the 1990s, such as amnesty, public administration purges, lustration and criminal trails. Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, these measures were ill-framed and politicised – thereby they lacked cross party consensus and their implementation was significantly hindered by the communist political legacy.²¹ As a result, Albania fell short of regime’s victims and wider public aspirations to seriously and sincerely address communist regime’s human rights violation.²² The inability of Albania to implement transitional justice measures has amplified political and social polarization towards its totalitarian past. A survey conducted by the OSCE Presence in Tirana on citizens’ understanding and perceptions of the communist past in Albania and expectations for the future revealed that 62% of the respondents did not see the communist past as a problem. However the most controversial figure was that when asked about the role of the former dictator Enver Hoxha in the history of the country, more than half of the respondents had a positive perception.²³ This was explained mainly by Albanian’s society not being sufficiently informed about the dictatorship and by the lack of de-communisation.²⁴

However, the survey shows that society is divided about the past. The failure Albania to deal with its totalitarian past has perverted the uncovering of the past state’s human rights abuses, thereby undermining the establishment of a shared understanding and memory of its totalitarian past. Public education in every post-conflict or post-authoritarian rule is important in order “to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in the public discourse”.²⁵

According to a study more than 60% of the school teachers were not aware about the number of victims of the communist regime because the country’s criminal past is not reflected into the school curricula.²⁶ In the absence of an official history regarding the communist regime’s abuses, particularly the youth has rested upon confusing and conflicting information coming mainly from family members, media and communist period films produced by Kinostudio e Re (the communist state-owned film production agency) which was part and parcel of its propaganda. This has created a confusing and conflicting assemblage of communist historical account among the youth, which in turn has neither helped the acknowledgment of victims’ sufferings, nor reconstruction of a shared understanding about the communist regime’s wrongs.

Albania’s inability to expose the abuses of its totalitarian regime and establish justice has thus led to the downplaying and denial of the communist dictatorship’s human rights abuses. This has nurtured a distorted historical narrative in the public sphere, which keeps portraying communist Albania in schoolbooks as a progressive state that provided electrification, free health care and education as well as universal suffrage (the right to vote only for the ruling party) – overshadowing the crimes, economic and social misery it brought about to the country. Keeping this narrative alive has made it impossible to build a unifying collective memory over the communist past in Albania.²⁷ Failing transitional justice has thereby hardened political and social cleavages. As Etkind maintain, if we fail to achieve justice for those wronged, to fully understand the nature of what happened – if we fail to mourn for the collective suffering of the nation, we enter into a post-catastrophe period. In the post-catastrophic world, “the past haunts the citizenry, divides the society and limits political choice”.²⁸
Three decades after the fall of the communist regime, Albania continues living a post-catastrophe period. The communist rule has left behind painful memories of oppression, stigmatization, humiliation and a culture of deep distrust, extreme friend-foe thinking and a violence mentality.²⁹ The debate about the past human rights abuses is divisive, hijacked and instrumentalised by both main political parties to their ends. The Socialist Party, the successor of the Labour Party has not broken away from its own past. To the contrary, it has maintained a strong link to the past by promoting the historical narrative of the communist regime and packing its leadership with former communists. While, on the other hand, the Democratic Party has utilised the communist past to attack its political opponent, and gather support around itself from the former political prisoners and those who suffered under the communist dictatorship.

In addition to that, failing transitional justice in Albania has produced consequences on the social realm as well. As it is already known, thousands of people were interned, persecuted, sentenced to life in prison or kept under tight surveillance. After the demise of the communist
regime, people were able to discover who reported on them to the secret police. In a small country where ‘everyone knows everyone’, the peculiar and particularly brutal repression
methods and failed transitional justice, injustice and suffering have left behind countless unresolved personal and family conflicts.³⁰

This has added more to the social polarization in Albania where societal relations are hunted by the communist past human rights abuses and its distorted historical account. This assemblage of failures in dealing with the communist regime’s crimes and building a shared truth and memory has inflicted tensions in the society, thus dividing Albanians in communists and anti-communists. This has left no room for moderation and foreclosed the democratic life of the country.

The politics of anti-politics Historical accountability sets off transition’s dynamics, is transformative and plays a forward-looking role in a country’s liberalisation process. No viable democracy can afford to accept amnesia, forgetfulness and the loss of memory. An authentic democratic community cannot be built on the denial of past crimes, abuses, and atrocities.³¹ It is assumed that holding individuals accountable for crimes committed under the previous regime lays the foundation for a democracy committed to the rule of law and prevents future abuses under the new political system.
The failure of Albania to bring to justice the wrongdoers of the communist regime has nurtured old elite continuation. This has constantly plunged the country into a political crisis and undermined citizens’ political choices. As a result, Albania was turned into a fertile ground for political polarization and the emergence of anti-politics.

The political discourse in post-communist Albania is not framed around politics, by which
democratic politics theorist Chantal Mouffe understands the wide range of practices, discourses
and institutions which aim to establish a peaceful co-existence of different conceptions over what
constitutes a good or moral life.³² To the contrary, the unsettled historical account of the communist past is misused to construct a divisive political narrative for electoral benefits, creating two antagonist camps, the anti-communists and the successor of the communists. This has not served the needs of citizens and democracy building but rather has hardened political polarization. As Mouffe suggests if a political unit cannot transform antagonism into agonism it risks tearing apart the very social fabric of the society and dismantling democracy in the first place.³³

Moreover, by emphasising the threat of ‘Communism’ versus ‘Berishizëm’, the unpolitical discourse deemphasised other internal social divisions and subsumed political alternatives, what has in turn perverted democratic representation and political choice. In April 2021 Albania held its 10th general elections since the fall of the communist dictatorship. However, most of electoral campaigns did not address peoples’ concerns and needs, but instead they were dominated by anti-politics which merely intend degrading political opponent. Political articulation of different social strata’s problems is substituted by an empty narrative which portrays the opponent as the biggest evil who should be destroyed. For instance, in 2009 parliamentary elections the then Socialist Party leader Edi Rama declared that he is not a politician at all and denounced his opponent, the then Prime Minister Sali Berisha, as a symbol of the backwardness. Nevertheless, Rama’s party did not deliver any political manifesto where farmers, labourers, teachers or other social groups’ concerns were addressed – rather he declared a total war against the ‘old politics’ without offering any alternative.

On the other hand the Democratic Party has played the anticommunism card during the 90s and continues to use and reuse it for electoral benefits without genuinely addressing social groups’ needs. This has brought to the surface a deep crisis of representation in Albania, expressed in increasing public’s distrust towards political parties and public institutions in general.³⁴ These failures, coupled with the economic stagnation of Albania during these years and slow progress in the EU integration path have nurtured popular disillusionment towards democratic system. As post-communist Albania struggled to make progress and deliver tangible results for its population, the letter started feeling nostalgic for the communist past.

This mass dissatisfaction has been politically harnessed by communist era politicians and ancient regime’s successors to cling to power and thus protract Albania’s path towards a functioning democracy. The 2022 Freedom House report defines Albanian as a partly free country and a hybrid democracy³⁵, while in the same vein Transparency International ranks Albania as a highly corrupt country.³⁶ Instead of debating about policies, tackling corruption and facilitating economic growth, the political elite have operated through a binary conception of the political, where the opponent is not seen as legitimate but as an enemy. This Schmitt’s friend-enemy conception of the political has been pervasive in the political discourse in post-communist Albania. According to Kajisu, the anti-politics discourse should be seen as the outcome of two interrelated factors: the sedimentation of identities in the new post-communist horizon and the failure of political parties to articulate their positive identity.³⁷ The two biggest political parties did shy away from programmatic articulation. Instead, they have been throwing anti-political accusations against each other. This has deepened the crisis of representation and has hardened political and social polarization in Albania.

Elite-driven polarization
There has been much debate among scholars about the role of elites in political and social polarization. According to Zingher and Flynn polarization on the elite level can dramatically affect
electoral behaviour even if it is not associated with any type of dramatic change of the electorate’s basic underlying ideological or policy orientations.³⁸ In the same vein, Mullinix contend that elite partisan polarization alters the influence of partisanship in preference formation in the mass public in at least two ways. First, when elites are divided along party lines, they provide clearer signals about the parties’ positions on a given issue to the mass public. Second, elite polarization that emphasizes conflict between competing sides increases the salience of partisan identities.³⁹

The political elite in Albania has inflicted tension at the political and societal level by emphasizing division as a tool to cling to power. Two main opposing camps emerged after the fall of the communist regime, the Socialist Party on the left and the Democratic Party on the right political spectrum. Both parties worked behind the scene to ensure that their monopoly over the political system is upheld. They have changed the electoral law and the constitution several times to make sure that a two-party system is maintained in the country. During the last 25 years, the two major parties have changed the electoral system before every general election in order to guarantee their political dominance.⁴⁰

This has further entrenched division in Albania. The high degree of political bipolarization has successfully divided the Albanian political discourse and electorate into two antagonistic camps.⁴¹ Both sides have worked to divide the public opinion, media and civil society through the enverist [Enver Hoxha] philosophy of “he who is not with me is my enemy”.⁴²
Though after the fall of the communist dictatorship more than one hundred political parties
were founded, the political scene has been dominated by two biggest parties. A quick glance at
the effective number of legislative parties in Albania during the last 22 years shows that the political scene has been dominated by an average of 2.33 parties for this period.⁴³

TABLE 5.

By 1991, the Albanian society was deeply divided into two antagonistic camps. On the one hand was the anti-communist bloc, primarily amidst the urban, youth and better-educated population that was highly critical of the communist regime and called for deep and rapid political and economic transformations. On the other hand, there were the supporters of the communist regime, primarily amidst the rural and lesser educated part of population that called for gradual transformations and held a less critical view of the communist past^.44 The political elite used these historical differences between the left and the right to craft a harsh and divisive rhetoric where the political opponent is casted as the enemy of the people. The more the two parties have converged, ideologically and policy wise, the more they have tended to polarize the political scene by portraying their political opponent as a threat to ‘the people’.⁴⁵ In this regard, the voters’ behaviour was not defined by programmatic differences, but by the empty rhetoric of political leaders. Political parties in post-communist Albania were dominated by strong leaders who presided over the party structures. This gave them almost absolute power in the party which was utilised to further tight the grip on the party and delegitimise the political opponent.

Most of electoral campaigns were marked by derogatory language against opponents. This has come up as a result of the concentration of power in the hands of party leaders who seek to dehumanise and humiliatetheir political opponent, instead of delivering a political manifesto to the electorate.⁴⁶ According to some experts this is a result of the communist legacy where the political opponent is framed as an enemy that must be destroyed. The lack of democratic culture is also blamed on for the failure of Albania to appeal to moderation.⁴⁷ The authoritarian-style leadership has thus divided the society. The divisive rhetoric has intended to rally the mass public behind certain leaders. This has been the hallmark of Albania’s post-communist protracted transition towards democracy.

Conclusion
Political polarization seems to have been deeply embedded into the political and social life of post-communist Albania. It has manifested itself through heated divisive political discourse about the communist past, empty and non-programmatic rhetoric between party leaders. This has established two antagonist camps that have nurtured division in order to cling to power. Political polarization in Albania has its roots in the communist dictatorship legacy, is anti-political and elite driven. Particularly the failure of Albania to deal with the communist regime’s massive human rights abuses has exposed the country to communist-era-like policy making and its historical account where the past is portrayed as progressive.

Political elite seems to be more a continuation of the old communist nomenclature and the communist dictatorship’s crimes are not punished. This has undermined the establishment of a shared collective memory about the communist past which has divided Albanians into communists and anti-communists. This has been instrumentalized by the post-communist political elite for electoral benefits. Thus, societal relations and political choice are hunted by the communist past human rights abuses and its distorted historical account.

Apart from that, political polarization in Albania has not emanated from programmatic differences. Both political sides have not articulated political manifestos, rather they have appealed to the people on populist grounds. The anti-political discourse has dominated the parliamentary and the political debate. Instead of debating about policies, the political elite has operated through a binary conception of the political, where the opponent is not seen as legitimate but as an enemy that must be defeated and humiliated. This Schmittian conception of the political where the opponent is seen as the enemy hasn’t left room for moderation and consensus. To the contrary, it has entrenched both political life and social relations. The political elite has added more to this division by maintaining a Westminster-like party system,
where two biggest parties dominate the political life.

The constitution and electoral law has been changed several times to ensure that biggest parties reap the benefits of the system. Political bipolarization and authoritarian-style party leaders have fuelled more societal polarization by de-emphasizing social strata needs. Rather than debating about policies, harsh rhetoric, derogatory language and building of clientelistic networks has been the modus operandi of the political elite. This has inflicted tension and generated artificial political crises, which has divided more the people into two antagonist camps, socialists and democrats.

____________________________________________________________________________

1 Stavrakakis, Y. (2018). Paradoxes of Polarization: Democracy’s Inherent Division and the (Anti-) Populist Challenge. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 43-58.
2 Diamond, L. (1990), ‘Three Paradoxes of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 1(3): 48-60
3 20 vjet demokraci në Shqipëri, DW, 20 mars 2012, https://www.dw.com/sq/20-vjet-demokracin%C3%ABshqip%C3%ABri/a-15817781
4 Green, D., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
5 Kuvendi dhe deputetët: Roli kushtetues, bilanci dhe Kodi i Sjelljes, Instituti i Studimeve Politike, Tirane. https://isp.com.al/kuvendi-dhe-deputetet-roli-kushtetues-bilanci-dhe-kodi-i-sjelljes/

6 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42
7 MaCoy, J. and Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework.
8 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy.
9 Fatih, E. (2022). Historical origins of political polarization in Turkey. Collective memory.
10 LeBas, A. (2006). Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe. Comparative Politics, 38(4), 419-438.
11 McCoy, J. L., & Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework.
12 Fatih, E. (2022). Historical origins of political polarization in Turkey. Collective memory.
13 Dixit, A. K., & Weibull, J. W. (2007). Political Polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United

14 McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 681(1), 1-69.
15 García-Guadilla, M. P., & Ma, A. (2019). Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic Erosion in Venezuela’s Twenty-First Century Socialism. ANNALS, AAPSS, 681(1), 62-77.
16 Lozada, M. (2014). Us or Them? Social Representations and Imaginaries of the Other in Venezuela. Papers on Social Representations, 23(21), 1-16.
17 McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42
18 MacCoy, J. and Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework, International Political Science Association conference, Poland, July 23-28, 2016.
19 Kritz, N. (1995). Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
20 Pandelejmoni, E. (2019). Kujtesa dhe rrëfimi i historive jetësore mbi kampet e punës së detyruar, internimet dhe burgjet në Shqipërinë Komuniste, Tek, TË MOHUAR NGA REGJIMI. Përmbledhje e kumtesave dhe referateve të mbajtura në Konferencën organizuar nga Autoriteti për Informimin mbi Dokumentet e ish Sigurimit të Shtetit, Tiranë, 338-35.

21 Gjeta, A. (2020). Transition without justice in post-communist Albania: Its implications to collective memory building and democracy promotion, Compilation of Paper, OSCE Presence in Albania.
22 Ibid
23 Citizens understanding and perceptions of the Communist past in Albania and expectations for the future, OSCE Presence in Albania, 2016. https://www.osce.org/presence-in-albania/286821
24 Godole, J. (2019). The young generation’s borrowed memory of the communist period, in: Godole, J. and Idrizi, I.(eds). Between Apathy and Nostalgia: Public and private recollections of communist in contemporary Albania. Tirana: IDMC.
25 Ignatieff, M. (1998). The warrior’s honour: Ethnic war and the modern conscience. New York: Metropolitan Books.
26 Godole, J. (2020). Mësuesit mungesë informacioni për periudhën e komunizmit, Godole: Duhet ndërhyrje urgjente. ABC News, 14 February. Available from https://abcnews.al/mesuesit mungese-informacioni-per-periudhen-e-komunizmit-godole-duhet-nderhyrje-urgjente/
27 Gjeta, A. (2021). Albania Remains Hostage to its Communist Past, Balkan Insight, 21 May 2021. https://balkaninsight. com/2021/05/21/albania-remains-hostage-to-its-communist-past/

28 Etkind, J. (2013). Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
29 Idrizi,I. (2021). Debates About the Communist Past as Personal Feuds: The Long Shadow of the Hoxha Regime in Albania, Cultures of History Forum, published: 27.04.2021
30 Ibid
31 Tismaneanu, V. (2008). Democracy and Memory: Romania Confronts Its Communist Past. ANNALS, 617, 166-180.
32 Mouffe, Ch. (2006).The paradox of democracy, Verso: London.

33 Mouffe, Ch. (2006).The paradox of democracy, Verso: London.
34 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with Politics! The Crisis of Representation in Post-Communist Albania. East European Politics and Societies, 24 (2), 229-253.
35 Freedom House report, Albania, 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedomworld/2022
36 Transparency International report, Albania 2023.https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/albania
37 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with politics.

38 Joshua N. Zingher and Michael E. Flynn, (2015). From on High: The Effect of Elite Polarization on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972–2012. British Journal of Political Science, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/S0007123415000514
39 Mullinix, K. (2016). Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance.
40 Çeka, B. (2013). Tezë Doktorature: Marrdhënia Mes Sistemeve Zgjedhore, Sistemit Partiak dhe Sjelljes Zgjedhore në Shqipëri. Universiteti i Tiranës, Fakulteti i Shkencave Sociale, Departamenti i Shkencave Politike. Accessed September 10, 2015 http://www.doktoratura.unitir.edu.al/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ Doktorature-Blendi-Ceka-Fakulteti-i-Shkencave-Sociale-
Departamenti-i-Shkencave-Politike.pdf
41 Kajsiu, B. (2016). Polarization without radicalization: political radicalism in Albania in a comparative perspective, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24:2, 280-299.
42 Ibid
43 Kajisiu, B. (2016). Polarization without radicalization: political radicalism in Albania in a comparative perspective, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24:2, 280-299.
44 Vickers, M. 1999. The Albanians: A Modern History. London: I.B. Tauris

45 Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with politics.
46 Arapi, L. (2013). E pakompromis, e personalizuar – Retorika politike në fushatën 2013, DW, 14 qershor 2013, https://www.dw.com/sq/e-pakompromis-e-personalizuar-retorika-politiken%C3%AB-fushat%C3%ABn-2013/a-
47 Ibid

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in Albania.
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https://balkaninsight.com/2021/05/21/albania-remains-hostage-to-its-communist-past/
Godole, J. (2019). The young generation’s borrowed memory of the communist period, in: Godole,
J. and Idrizi, I.(eds). Between Apathy and Nostalgia: Public and private recollections of communist
in contemporary Albania. Tirana: IDMC.
Godole, J. (2020). Mësuesit mungesë informacioni për periudhën e komunizmit, Godole: Duhet
ndërhyrje urgjente. ABC News, 14 February. Available from https://abcnews.al/mesuesit-mungese-
informacioni-per-periudhen-e-komunizmit-godole-duhet-nderhyrje-urgjente/
Green, D., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and
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Idrizi,I. (2021). Debates About the Communist Past as Personal Feuds: The Long Shadow of the
Hoxha Regime in Albania, Cultures of History Forum.
Ignatieff, M. (1998). The warrior’s honour: Ethnic war and the modern conscience. New York: Metropolitan
Books.
Joshua N. Zingher and Michael E. Flynn, (2015). From on High: The Effect of Elite Polarization
on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972–2012. British Journal of Political Science.
Kajsiu, B. (2010). Down with Politics! The Crisis of Representation in Post-Communist Albania.
East European Politics and Societies, 24 (2), 229-253.
Kajsiu, B. (2016). Polarization without radicalization: political radicalism in Albania in a comparative
perspective, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24:2, 280-299.
Kritz, N. (1995). Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

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Tirane. https://isp.com.al/kuvendi-dhe-deputetet-roli-kushtetues-bilanci-dhe-kodi-i-sjelljes/
LeBas, A. (2006). Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe. Comparative
Politics, 38(4), 419-438.
Lozada, M. (2014). Us or Them? Social Representations and Imaginaries of the Other in Venezuela.
Papers on Social Representations, 23(21), 1-16.
MacCoy, J. and Rahman, T. (2016). Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a
Conceptual Framework, International Political Science Association conference, Poland, July
23-28, 2016.
McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms
Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies.. Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Sciences, 681(1), 1-69
McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy:
Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American
Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42
Mouffe, Ch. (2006).The paradox of democracy, Verso: London.
Mullinix, K. (2016). Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization,
and Issue Importance.
Pandelejmoni, E. (2019). Kujtesa dhe rrëfimi i historive jetësore mbi kampet e punës së detyruar,
internimet dhe burgjet në Shqipërinë Komuniste, Tek, TË MOHUAR NGA REGJIMI. Përmbledhje
e kumtesave dhe referateve të mbajtura në Konferencën organizuar nga Autoriteti për
Informimin mbi Dokumentet e ish Sigurimit të Shtetit, Tiranë, 338-35.
Stavrakakis, Y. (2018). Paradoxes of Polarization: Democracy’s Inherent Division and the (Anti-)
Populist Challenge. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 43-58.
Tismaneanu, V. (2008). Democracy and Memory: Romania Confronts Its Communist Past. ANNALS,
617, 166-180.
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albania
Vickers, M. 1999. The Albanians: A Modern History. London: I.B. Tauris
20 vjet demokraci në Shqipëri, DW, 20 mars 2012, https://www.dw.com/sq/20-vjet-demokracin%
C3%AB-shqip%C3%ABri/a-15817781

The post The Origins of Political Polarization in Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The United States holds its presidential election on Nov. 3. The choice of the American people between incumbent President Donald Trump and Democratic challenger Joe Biden will have a large impact not only on their country, but also the rest of the world — including the Western Balkans.

In countries like Albania and Kosovo, where America is largely venerated, unwavering support for the United States will continue regardless of the outcome of the presidential election. Albanians have long memories that go back to President Woodrow Wilson’s help in sealing Albania’s independence a century ago. The U.S.-led intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 and its support for an independent Kosovo have created one of the most pro-American populations in the world. More recently, the United States was the driving force behind Albania’s NATO membership in 2009, further cementing the country’s security and Euro-Atlantic orientation.

But the election results will have an impact on larger global trends, which directly and indirectly affect the Western Balkans. As the U.S. image plummeted around the world under the Trump presidency and the country has been beset by internal divisions and multiple crises, much is at stake.

Three weeks ahead of the election, when this article was written, Biden consistently led Trump on every major poll. While chances are Biden will be the next U.S. president, recent history shows opinion polls are no longer a guarantee on the outcome of the election. Moreover, there is the prospect of damage to American democracy by a potentially conflictual transfer of power. Trump seems determined to use any means at his disposal to win or at least cast doubt on the results of the elections, which could lead to a protracted period of uncertainty and litigation until the presidential inauguration in January 2021. That uncertainty could cause further distraction in a country that is already handling multiple crises caused by the coronavirus pandemic and civil unrest.

Would a Biden win return certainty?  

A Biden victory will likely mark a return to reliable and predictable policies in American foreign affairs in general and in the Western Balkans in particular. Biden is very familiar with the region, having been involved in it since the early 1990s and has long been a supporter of Kosovo’s independence. He represents the steady hand of the American political establishment that helped Kosovo gain its independence and has continued to offer unwavering support for stability, democracy and economic development in the region.

A Biden presidency would likely take off the table the idea of a radical redesign of the post-war order in the Western Balkans. Moreover, it will likely lead to the United States working closer with the European Union to solve political problems in the region. The Trump Administration’s ambivalence about border changes — a toxic notion for Europeans — introduced a new and unnecessary level of rivalry between the European Union and the United States in a region where both powers have the same goals — to promote peace, stability and democracy — and eventual EU membership for the entire region.

A Biden Administration will also bring some stability to international institutions on which the countries of the Western Balkans depend. Trump’s view of international institutions in general has been critical. But his comments on U.S. commitments to NATO in particular, have caused major concern in Europe. While the American push for European countries to boost defense spending is fair, the way Trump has railed on the issue has made many uncomfortable. Even more worrying are reports that Trump spoke in private repeatedly about withdrawing the United States from NATO altogether, a move that would do unimaginable damage to global and regional stability.

Trump’s unorthodox presidency

Trump’s election four years ago caught many by surprise. Trump had promised to be an unorthodox president, and he delivered on that promise, creating upheaval in domestic and international policies and using a communication style unlike any other president before him.

But the United States is a country of strong institutions. Its 244-year-old checks and balances system is designed to make sure the better angels of human nature prevail. Yet, a messy American election or a second Trump term, combined with the effects of a global pandemic and increasing international hostilities could have unpredictable effects on American institutions and the world order the United States has been leading since the end of the Cold War.

Some of those effects have already been felt in the Western Balkans. When Trump was elected, many believed there would be benign neglect of the region as the U.S. became more focused on domestic issues. For much of the past four years that was true, but then Trump turned to a high-profile effort at forcing a deal between Kosovo and Serbia. The result was lackluster for the two countries and created unnecessary acrimony with the European Union.

Failing to make headway on the political status quo, the deal focused on improving the economy and increasing infrastructural ties — all efforts that have been ongoing for years. Increased American investment in the region is a welcomed move. Yet, on the political level there was so little progress in the substance of the deal, that many international affairs experts believe that it was more smoke and mirrors looking to boost Trump’s re-election chances than anything of substance for solving the acrimonious relations between an independent Kosovo and a perennially scorned Serbia.

The wrong role model

Trump is an unusual American president also in the fact that he and his supporters do not shy away from authoritarianism. Beliefs that the country should be governed by a strong leader with few limits set by elected bodies or that the freedom of the press should be curtailed are generally seen as un-American, yet they are no longer taboo in Trump’s America. 

The issue is that the United States sets the standard of freedom and democracy around the world. As such, authoritarian leaders worldwide, including in the Western Balkans, have received the wrong message over the past four years. While there are also other factors at play, the resulting democratic decline in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the world is there for anyone to witness.

An American president that rails against the free press, erodes independent institutions or calls into question the fairness of elections in the world’s oldest democracy is simply the wrong row model for the leaders of the weak democracies of the Western Balkans.

A new Cold War?

The world is headed for an uncertain future. The worldwide pandemic and the economic crisis it created are now combined with unprecedented tensions between the United States and China.

The Trump Administration has already started to push Western Balkan countries to be careful with China’s growing influence in the region. A Biden Administration would likely do the same in the next four years, albeit the way of communicating the message might change.

For Albanians in the region, loyalty to the United States and the European Union have never come into question. However, other countries, like Serbia, might take a more nuanced approach, introducing a new level of geopolitical discord in the region.

Albania and the Western Balkans are no stranger to cold wars, having sat on the faultline of the previous one. They have had to deal with the damage from geopolitical earthquakes. In fact, the region is still rebuilding from the last ones in the 1990s.

The worry now is that in a distracted world, the risk of conflict in previously dormant spots is as high as ever. The current armed conflict in the Caucasus is proof of that. The Western Balkans are not immune. Regional and global stability needs the United States to be strong and continue its leadership role in the world.

Andi Balla is a journalist and author. He holds an M.Sc. from Columbia University in New York City and B.Sc. from the University of Wyoming.  

The post U.S. Presidential Elections and the Western Balkans: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

On 25 March 2020, Kosovo parliament dismissed the government of Albin Kurti, less than two months after it was formed[1]. Vetëvendosje Movement and LDK failed to implement the results of October 2019 which brought a significant shift of power and hope to a large portion of the population. Change of the government from one of warriors-led to that of Vetëvendosje, to many voters, meant change of government business, fight against corruption and nepotism, improvement of accountability of public officials and more prosperity.  International community had also welcomed the formation of an LVV-led government which marked a major policy shift compared to a few years back. 

The LVV-LDK government was formed on 03 February. The U.S. and EU were quick to remind the elected Prime Minister, Albin Kurti on their demands, removal of the 100 per cent tariffs on the Serbian goods and active participation in the bilateral dialogue. Kurti had long promised not to prioritise the dialogue with Serbia and that he will gradually replace the tariffs with full reciprocity.

The government began optimistically, but the relations between the coalition partners cracked down soon. They had started from a very low point of trust and had left many issues opened, to be addressed at a later stage. For the first time in the government, LVV members of the cabinet began over-controlling the institutions, including those run by LDK.  In numerous cases VV government officials bypassed their LDK colleagues and avoided consultations processes. LDK did not like this and was unwilling to accept Kurti’s grip. 

More critically, while negotiating the coalition, they failed to develop a common position on numerous sensitive issues, which turned to determine the fate of the government. Not surprising, their differences were large. A key one was on how the government will handle the dialogue with Serbia and the elements accompanying this difficult agenda. In a matter of weeks this became an unbearable challenge. 

Both the U.S. and EU (and member states) had reminded the election winning parties of their demands, removal of tariff and full participation in the dialogue.  Yet there was some significant difference on their approach.

The U.S. had made clear that its administration wanted tariffs suspended as soon as the government took office. At some point when their special envoy, Richard Grenell became impatient with the lengthy talks between LVV and LDK, he reached out to all party leaders and sought their support for the process of the dialogue. Americans decided not to wait for the government formation and eagerly brokered an accord between Kosovo and Serbia on a flight connection between Belgrade and Prishtina on 20 January 2020. Another agreement, facilitated by Ambassador Grenell, on railways and the highway connection was reached on 14 February in Munich, just 10 days after Prime Minister Albin Kurti took office. 

U.S. considered that the LVV-LDK government had enough legitimacy and popularity to make the necessary decisions to reach a comprehensive deal with Serbia during 2020. It soon became clear that Kurti’s plans did not match with this agenda, despite increased U.S. pressure on coalition partners and other institutions. Kurti felt “the train was already moving” and he was not in charge of it, thus he decided not to go along with it. LDK leader, Isa Mustafa repeatedly pressed on Kurti to remove the tariffs and align the government position with that of Washington. Whispers began to come from U.S.  for sanctions against Kosovo. Worryingly, important officials called for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Kosovo and the Millennium Cooperate Challenge (MCC) announced the suspension of USD 49 Million program.

Kosovo has rarely confronted the U.S. Administration or either any in the international community.  In late 2017, U.S. angerly opposed attempts of the parliament to revoke legislation on the Specialist Chambers and SPO. The move orchestrated by the war-time leaders was initiated by one-third members of the parliament. Europeans also took a firm stance against the move; Germany and France had deployed their envoys and threatened to sanction these leaders. The pressure made the assembly to step back.  Apparently, Kosovo leaders brought the issue back again recently which made the U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo to warn of possible repercussions for Kosovo in a letter he sent to President Hashim Thaçi. The Specialist Chambers were established in 2016 with a mandate to try alleged crimes committed by the former KLA members. The chambers operate under Kosovo law but are located in Hague.  

This time, reactions coming from Washington D.C were much stronger and harmfully exposed Kosovo’s inability to work with its key allies. This unprecedented development provoked serious domestic debates about the Kosovo commitment to the alliance with the United States. In an unconventional move, Prime Minister Albin Kurti blamed Ambassador Richard Grenell for the fall of his government.   

Kurti opposed to lifting of the tariffs for two reasons; he did not want to engage in the dialogue modelled by the current U.S. administration and more importantly, for domestic reasons, he refused to participate in the process together with President Hashim Thaçi. In other words, he would have fully removed the tariffs and participated in the dialogue only if the international community was to choose him over any other local Kosovo actor and that process of the dialogue would adapt to his views. In practice this meant that Prime Minister Albin Kurti to be in charge of the dialogue and sit face to face with President of Serbia Alexandar Vučić 

Comparatively the EU was less pressuring on the new government whom they sympathetically welcomed. Their position is much more complex. While U.S. mediating agreements between two capitals, the EU was still in the process of establishing their institutions and appointing staff after the change of the Commission. Secondly the newly appointed EEAS chief Joseph Borell was selecting a special envoy for the Kosovo Serbia talks. The EU failure to deliver the free visa regime had left it with little leverage over Kosovo authorities.  Serbian national elections scheduled for April 2020 had made EU to be more realistic on the prospect that talks between Prishtina and Belgrade will not restart before June. In the meantime, the world-wide crisis with COVID-19 had put all other agendas on hold.   

While the EU was planning to restart talks by June, the U.S. aimed at reaching an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia by October 2020. Last few months, Kosovo countered a wave of different and somehow contradictory messaging and approaches from the U.S. and EU member states against which domestic political elites reacted prematurely. The truth is neither elites nor the society wants to be brought to a situation where they have to choose one over the other between the U.S. and EU. Leaders’ reactions simply present ‘a Kosovo fear of having to favour one and if so than they have to choose America”. U.S. “threats” were received with high concern in Kosovo. For the LDK, the decision to initiate a vote of no-confidence on the government became inevitable.  Prime Minister Kurti may have not planned on it, but ultimately, he chose to go into a collision course with the Trump Administration. 

Tensions between two transatlantic powers over “numerous other agendas” have also had an impact in Kosovo, both domestically and on the dialogue with Serbia. During the Mohgerini-led dialogue Germany opposed the U.S. supported plan to conclude an agreement between two centuries long enemies, Kosovo and Serbia, which presumably was more flexible to include border modifications.  Under Joseph Borrell, no new efforts from either side have been made to reconcile positions. The U.S. has continued with their schedule and the EU has been busy with their internal coordination and planning, including here the controversial selection of special envoy, Miroslav Lajčák”.

Their divisions became even more apparent on Kosovo’s domestic affairs. In an unprecedented move, Germany and France sent a démarche to the LDK against their initiative for a vote of no-confidence against the government of Albin Kurti. This action  provoked the U.S. to react in support of the parliamentary procedure in support of vote of no-confidence on the government.  Given Kosovo’s incomplete statehood, many locals fear it could become a proxy for the complex relations between EU and U.S, a generally negative development for the country itself.

Looking deeper, the EU and U.S. have a common goal, both want to see Prishtina and Belgrade reach a comprehensive and long-lasting peace agreement. The differences occur on the content of a potential accord and about the dynamics of the process. The U.S. and only a few EU member states encourage an arrangement that involves mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia. EU institutions and other member states may search for a “working” normalisation agreement that could still leave Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo aside. This difference cannot prevent the EU and U.S. and their envoys to coordinate their efforts and they will certainly do so once the talks resume. Yet, the real obstacles are the actors of the dialogue, Serbia and Kosovo are simply not ready for a compromise, that both, Brussels and Washington seek from them. 

What next?

The care-taker government has successfully administered the pandemic COVID-19. Citizens support at large the government instructions though many of their decisions are legally and constitutionally ambiguous. 

Yet the outgoing government cannot stay in office for much longer. As the winner of elections, LVV leader Albin Kurti has refused to put forward a candidate to form a new government.  Kurti insists on new elections to be held as soon as the country goes back to normality. All parliamentary parties but Vetëvendosje, refuse new elections and insist on forming a new ruling majority.   After weeks of exchanges between the president Thaçi and Albin Kurti, the former mandated an LDK nominee, Avdullah Hoti, to form a new government. Hoti soon agreed with AAK, NISMA and minorities and collected 61 out of 120 signatures for an assembly session to vote his government.  LVV was quick to put a complaint to the Constitutional Court; the later suspended the Presidents’ degree. The assembly cannot vote on a new government until the court rules, likely before the end of May.

The court intervention was necessary, now or later, and key to alleviate the contradicting positions between LVV and others. In case the court ruling favours LVV stance, elections will be inevitable, to be held no later than July; and Albin Kurti is expected to   win.  Should the presidents’ decree prove legal, the parliament will vote an LDK-led government rather soon.

Neither option will resolve Kosovo’s pressing problems. LVV would need new partners to govern if elections are held this summer. An LDK government will have its own challenges, internally and in relation with a strong opposition of LVV and PDK. It already enjoys a low public trust and will find it difficult to demonstrate a change from early governments of 2015-2019. Ruling partners will disagree among themselves about the dialogue with Serbia and tensions with the President will rise again. It is destined to be yet again a provisional government. In spring 2021, the country needs to elect a new president; as proven by experience, the process will most likely provoke a new crisis. In between, Albin Kurti and his Vetëvendosje movement, counting at large on angry citizens disgusted with the establishment, will go back to their old habits, street protests, as soon as the talks with Serbia resume. Kurti will likely come back, this time the hope is that he will mature, appreciate institutions, build alliances and uphold Kosovo’s commitments to its allies. 

No government has been able to improve Kosovo’s outlook. The country’s limited and obscure political class finds difficult to resolve its demanding agenda. While improving its domestic development requires urgent action, Kosovo should seek to conclude the conflict with Serbia and aims to become a full member of the International Community with no delay. The unresolved conflict with Serbia continues to backpedal the country, domestically and internationally.

NAIM RASHITI is Executive Director and Senior Policy Analyst for Western Balkans and EU in the Balkans Policy Research Group

[1] For more details on Kosovo developments you can read the latest BPRG publication: “Kosovo 2020: A Complex Agenda for the New Government”

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