by Marco Alberti, Ambassador of Italy to Albania 

Digitalization is reshaping the Public Administration in both policy-making and service delivery. Data revolution helps governments meet public expectations and become more efficient and resilient, improving their performance. Yet, while accelerating the innovation of public sector, the deployment of digital technologies brings another key-challenge: speed. 

Speed is the new currency 

Speed has become a strategic factor, because it is linked to innovation, which is the driving force of digital society. Ensuring speed and agility leads to superior performance. “Speed ​​is the new currency,” says Marc Benioff, founder and CEO of Salesforce. Sycamore, Google’s quantum processor, takes a few minutes to process as many as calculations that a common laptop would do in 10,000 years. In the international relations domain, the ability to respond quickly to volatile, unpredictable circumstances has become a critical factor for defining the new balance of power, and perhaps for defining the same concepts of influence and power. 

Unlike in the past, diplomacy and international affairs can no longer afford to slowly adapt to changes, as their pace demands almost business-like agility to stay abreast and relevant. Data technologies, and especially generative AI, are changing the mechanisms that regulate international relations, bringing continuous innovation and growing speed. Consequently, they will affect all diplomatic activities: from geopolitical analysis to negotiation; from support to export and internationalization of companies to consular services. The need to adopt data-driven models in order to manage political, institutional and economic pressures raises the bar and stretches diplomacy. On one hand, technology is expanding the sphere of diplomatic competence, with multiple and diverse calls for action; on the other hand, increasingly shorter action/reaction time is requested to face circumstances and perform well. In such digitized context, the main challenge for diplomacy consists in combining two kinds of “intelligence”: the contextual one, i.e. the ability to understand the context, leveraging on-the-ground presence and powerful multi-stakeholder networks of diplomats, with the artificial one, i.e. the ability to exploit and optimize the increasing power of data and algorithms.

Key factors to be fast: throughput and latency 

The primary objective for diplomacy is to unlock public value through greater efficiency and improved performance. In digital contexts, reaching out to such goals mostly depends on speed, which, in turn, is the result of multiple variables. Two of them, similarly to what happens in IT systems, are essential to work faster and increase productivity: throughput and latency.

Throughput 

The throughput indicates the maximum capacity of a system to support the workload in a due unit of time. In information technology, this variable is measured in queries or bytes per second. By analogy, the throughput of diplomacy consists of the ability of central and peripheral structures to absorb the requests received, and carry out the various tasks, in a given time. Speed includes the ability to deliver new or highly appropriate content, with no delay. When a system is overloaded, that is, it receives more “queries” than it can handle, it becomes slow and loses efficiency. If it is not possible, to reduce loads or, alternatively, to increase resources, a viable solution to restore speed is a load balancing among servers. The same concept applies to organizations. Overloading people or teams, even if they can handle it, reduces efficiency and is detrimental to the organization outcome. Dividing tasks maximizes skills and knowledge of each individual, with positive impact on the working capacity (and speed) of the whole organization. Another solution is diversifying peoples’ professional experience. Being skilled to do something, helps do it better and faster. Innovation communities and cross-functional teams, as well as “off-career” job experiences, make the diplomats’ expertise multidisciplinary, and diversify the spectrum of their skills, with positive effects on workload capacity, executive speed and quality of performance. 

Latency

Latency indicates how quickly a system responds to stimuli. More precisely, in the IT field, latency measures the interval between the moment the input is sent and the moment the output is available. When a server is so much loaded that its latency exceeds the so-called “user timeout”, i.e. the maximum time the user is willing to wait before reacting, requests begin to fail, with negative impact on efficiency and reputation. According to a recent survey, 47% of online consumers demand that a web page replies in less than 4 seconds before abandoning it^[1]. In computer systems, latency is improved by increasing the bandwidth, i.e. the support infrastructure. To provide quality services, the bandwidth must be broad, which means able to allow transmission and reception of data at a connection speed faster than 2Mbit/s. The same for diplomacy. The widespread presence of embassies and consulates throughout the world grants public diplomacy the geographical proximity essential to collect, transmit and manage big data, minimizing the action/reaction time of its structures. However, to be efficient, diplomacy 5.0 must have its “broadband”, which consists of technological architecture and human resources skilled enough to manage digitalized processes, leveraging on data to design and execute strategies. The challenge posed by data-driven models, hence, does not only concern updating certain tools and infrastructures, but also (and maybe above all) designing advanced skilling, upskilling and re-skilling processes.

The correlation between speed and leadership 

Speed is the combination of doing things fast and right. Effective leaders are able to plan and execute with speed, because they are quick without being sloppy. A study carried out by Zenger and Folkman finds that in 95% of cases the quality of leadership refers to the speed shown by leaders in spotting problems, learning, anticipating scenarios, pro-acting or re-acting to circumstances^[2]. Digitalization, and especially AI, can empower people, but only if leaders take a broad view of their capabilities and deeply consider the implications of applying technologies to the organization. To promote innovation in public and private organizations (including diplomacy) is a foremost accountability of leaders; it should push them to reflect not only on the potential factors that make innovation work, but also on the organizational and contextual factors that prevent innovation from achieving its outcomes. In such perspective, the correlation between (transformational) leadership and speed relies on three main nexus. The first nexus is speed/style of leadership. A rigid pyramid-like top-down management attitude is too slow to keep the quick pace of digitalization, while a shift to an open, more flexible leadership style can bring performance from average to excellence. Today, rather than control, leaders should provide ability of designing and redesigning creative and collaborative relationships within teams, useful for creating value. The second nexus is speed/competence. As skills grow and improve in quality, the speed of planning and executing strategies increases, while mistakes and inefficiencies reduce. The answer to an increasingly complex, multidisciplinary and dynamic international environment, therefore, relies on an increasingly agile, fast and competent leadership. This rule applies to every kind of profession, and diplomacy is no exception. The last nexus refers to trust. Within an organization, be it public or private, low levels of trust inevitably slow down processes and generate high operating costs. Conversely, a work environment based on mutual trust encourages the devolution of power and accountability, speeding up processes and reducing costs. Building trust is functional to creating value, and, therefore, it is a leadership imperative. 

Big vision, small steps: speeding-up a data-driven diplomacy

Digital and data technologies accelerate the shift towards a data-driven paradigm. Even foreign policy strategies depend every day more on the (systematic) collection and (analytical) reading of massive amounts of data. While digital diplomacy is how diplomats use some digital tools to perform their activity, data-driven diplomacy refers to “turning bytes into insights”, which means understanding how data is challenging (and changing) the traditional way to conduct diplomacy. The UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, for example, created the FCDO Labs, to develop the skills required for consolidating data-driven models in foreign policy. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established internal “Big Data Units”, made up of professionals specialized in the analysis and systematization of data, to make it accessible to diplomats and policy-makers. The U.S. Department of State launched the first-ever Enterprise Data Strategy (EDS), to empower its global workforce with the tools and skills to use data as a critical instrument of diplomacy. 

McKinsey latest research estimates that generative AI has the potential to create value equivalent to $2.6 trillion to $4.4 trillion in global corporate profits annually^[3]. Almost every Government, large company and organization in the world is working to outline an AI strategy, because it enables to harness the power of data and to unlock new possibilities. In just a short time, indeed, the focus has shifted from digital technologies to data and from data to the technologies capable of creating and processing it, i.e. generative artificial intelligence. Such automated systems help simulate scenarios and predict the evolution of trends, but, in so doing, they also contribute to accelerate the operational speed. In the first round of Iranian nuclear negotiations, the US Department of Energy used AI applications to build the replica of an Iranian nuclear site, foreseeing evolutions of uranium enrichment. According to trustworthy sources^[4], within five years the AI systems will be able to manage 100 trillion parameters, with deep transformative impacts on any domain of human action. 

To keep the pace and stay relevant, diplomacy should integrate the value-laden judgment of diplomats with data-driven insights, combining contextual and artificial intelligence. The former allows diplomats to acquire deeper knowledge and tacit wisdom, which often remain beyond the reach of algorithms, and adapt that knowledge to real world scenarios. The latter augments the output of diplomacy, including ability to predict, pro-act or re-act in real time to various circumstances. Excessive faith in data would lead diplomacy to serious mistakes, but keeping diplomacy completely away from data would risk to limit, or even to disrupt, it. 

Adapting a data-driven model, built for flexibility and high speed, to public diplomacy is a complex process. Some steps to mitigate it are the following: a) defining a data-driven vision for diplomacy, based on a measurable, target-oriented and time-bound action plan; b) outlining a tech-forward strategy, which consists not simply of updating some software and tools, but building a strong foundational “digital core” for diplomacy, able to integrate data, AI and other technologies. Such evolution would allow creating large-scale information systems and interoperability both among diplomatic structures and between them and other Ministries or Institutions. For example, between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense, that are quickly progressing in the application of AI to the national security and the warfare, or even between public and private sector; c) breaking the “big vision into small steps”^[5]. If conceived in a bigger vision, realistic shorter-term goals and manageable subtasks help build momentum, overcome procrastination and get faster to the desired goal.

Conclusions

For Milan Kundera, speed is the ecstasy offered to human kind by the technological revolution. Human inclination is to go faster and faster. This fact has boosted progress, but it has also generated concerns. Besides ethical questions, for example, the rise of generative AI has a deep (and still partially unknown) impact on security, on both physical and cyber sides. Furthermore, speed overstresses the structural weaknesses of people, organizations and even of national States, enhancing social paradoxes and environmental costs. The ICT sector, for example, already generates the same quantity of CO2 emissions as aviation. Continuing on this way, by 2025 it will constitute 5.5% of global emissions^[6]. 

Key insight #1: Combine conventional approaches with a data-driven model. Humans assisted by AI could outperform both human-alone and AI-alone. In a tech-driven, faster-paced international environment, diplomacy could rely on a tech-forward strategy to augment its professional output and its value generation. Endowing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs with scalable IT architectures, and with competent data analysts, is key to provide diplomats, as well as policy makers, with qualified information and future-proof knowledge. 

Key insight #2: Embrace technology to close up the “tech-fluency” gap. Technology is exponentially increasing the number of hard choices, and simultaneously reducing the time available to make decisions. Data-driven models improve the throughput of diplomacy and reduce its latency time, with positive impact on its operational speed and efficiency. Yet, such models require massive investments to support infrastructures and workers, as they need new skills. Lifelong learning and practice in adapting to change are increasingly more important. From this point of view, a public-private cooperation is key for both parties.  

Key insight #3: Incorporate AI as an enabler to scale value. Artificial intelligence is pervasive; it will change everything, including the mechanisms that regulate international relations and how diplomacy creates value. As AI grows more sophisticated and widespread, it offers diplomacy unprecedented opportunities to accelerate strategy cycle times and be more responsive. On the other hand, AI will subject diplomacy to (stronger) pressures, (unpredictable) risks and (relevant) concerns. Rethinking diplomacy in a data-driven fashion implies to modernize its operational code, while preventing it from downsides. 

The question is not “if” we need diplomacy, but “what” diplomacy we need to face the digital transformation. Even though big data and technologies boost tremendous advancements in diplomacy, the human factor will remain fundamental. No matter how powerful technology becomes, diplomats are here to stay, as their contextual intelligence will continue to bring a unique set of skills and perspectives to the table. Speed is inextricably linked with digital innovation and becomes a critical factor of success for diplomacy too. Yet, instead of rushing into new technologies and processes, a progressive and methodical approach can ultimately accelerate the adoption of data-driven models. Focusing on the core capabilities and the organizational enablers that support those capabilities can build a strong foundation for sustainable innovation and tech modernization of diplomacy. The key is staying committed to a long-term vision, while remaining flexible and adaptable to the frequent changes in the digital landscape. Big vision and small steps is the best way to get there. 

The opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not attributable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 

^[1]https://www.hobo-web.co.uk/your-website-design-should-load-in-4-seconds/#:~:text=following%20key%20findings%3A-,47%20percent%20of%20consumers%20expect%20a%20web%20page%20to%20load,render%20before%20abandoning%20the%20site.

^[2] https://www.leadershipnow.com/leadershop/9781259837388.html

^[3] https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/in-the-news/ai-could-increase-corporate-profits-by-4-trillion-a-year-according-to-new-research

^[4] Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, quoted by Amb. Stefano Ronca in: “Lettera diplomatica n. 1360”, Rome, 20.09.23

^[5]https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/small-steps-big-vision-scaling-a-purpose-driven-business-at-coachhub

^[6] https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/12/11/tsunami-data-consume-one-fifth-global-electricity-2025/

The post Diplomacy 5.0: Speed As A Strategic Factor appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By David J. Kostelancik

January 20, 2026

When Congress passed the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act as part of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it sent a clear signal: energy security in Southeastern Europe is no longer a peripheral economic issue — it is a core U.S. national security concern.

The Western Balkans sit at a geopolitical crossroads between Euro-Atlantic institutions and sustained Russian and Chinese influence. For years, energy dependence has been an effective tool used by unscrupulous powers to exert pressure. Control over supply, opaque infrastructure deals, and corruption linked to energy contracts have undermined democratic governance and regional stability. Congress recognized a basic reality: countries that lack control over their energy are easier to pressure, manipulate, and destabilize.

The new NDAA establishes a long-term US strategy for the region with energy at its center. It mandates cooperation with Balkan countries to diversify energy sources, reduce reliance on Russian energy, accelerate the transition to renewables, and modernize infrastructure to withstand cyberattacks and external interference. It also strengthens sanctions measures that can be used against individuals and entities that employ corruption — often through energy deals — to threaten regional stability.

Markets: Regulatory reform can help ensure market transparency through modernized energy markets. Russian ownership of critical energy assets, including midstream and downstream companies, presents a serious challenge in some countries (for example, the Russian-owned oil refinery in Serbia). US and European energy and infrastructure investment in these countries can help drive sector modernization and a competitive investment environment where transparency and market-based decision-making counter malign Russian and Chinese foreign investment.

Diversification: Advancing diversification in the Balkan gas, electricity, and oil sectors counters Russian dominance and political leverage. Existing and/or new pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals can be better used and coordinated to diversify gas imports. Greek and Croatian LNG infrastructure already delivers alternatives to Russian gas throughout the Balkans. Investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and expanded grid integration will reduce wholesale energy prices and subsidies and boost resilience.

Mobilization of Public/Private Investment: The U.S. must continue to make energy diplomacy a priority. Low investment has long plagued the Balkans. Opportunities now exist to modernize energy systems to optimize the electricity and heating sectors, including through gas-to-power and energy efficiency methods. By focusing diplomatic engagement and facilitating financing through the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the US can boost investment in an energy sector that increases competitiveness and ensures security, including cyber security and investment screening mechanisms that uncover attempts by malign actors to gain influence.

Albania provides a good example. In the country’s north, the 600-megawatt Tropojë Wind Renewable Energy Park is moving forward as one of the largest renewable energy projects in the Western Balkans. Developed by CWP, a leading American renewable energy company, the project illustrates how US-aligned investment can deliver both economic and strategic returns.

For Albania, Tropojë represents a decisive step toward energy sovereignty. The country has historically relied almost entirely on hydropower, leaving it vulnerable to droughts and volatile international energy markets. In dry years, Albania has been forced to purchase large quantities of imported energy at inflated prices, exposing the economy to shocks and external pressure.

By diversifying into wind and solar, Albania is reducing that vulnerability and insulating itself from supply disruptions. By the end of this decade, renewables such as wind and solar are expected to account for roughly 30% of Albania’s energy mix — enough to ensure domestic self-sufficiency and generate surplus energy for export to European markets. Energy demands that once drained national resources through electricity and fossil fuel imports will be replaced by revenues and economic resilience.

The broader implications extend beyond Albania. By expanding clean energy capacity, Albania is positioning itself as a net contributor to Europe’s energy security at a time when the continent is actively working to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Every additional source of reliable energy in Europe strengthens the transatlantic alliance and reduces the strategic space available to adversaries.

For the US, this matters because energy-secure partners are more stable partners. Equally important, American companies bring more than capital. They bring transparency, competitive procurement, and compliance with rule-of-law norms. Countries that can meet their own energy needs are less susceptible to coercion and better positioned to sustain democratic institutions.

Congress explicitly addressed this risk in the NDAA by requiring reporting on foreign influence in the energy sector and authorizing assistance to secure infrastructure against cyber and physical threats. Energy systems are strategic targets. Protecting them is essential to regional stability and alliance security.

This is why energy investment in the Western Balkans belongs within the national security conversation. It lowers the risk of instability on NATO’s southeastern flank, reduces the need for crisis-driven US engagement, and reinforces democratic governance through economic resilience.

Sustained US engagement in Balkans energy investment will not only support economic growth — it will strengthen America’s national security and the stability of Europe as a whole. We have a strategic opportunity, if we take it. Courtesy of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

David J. Kostelancik is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was a career member of the US Senior Foreign Service, holding the rank of Minister Counselor. David served as deputy coordinator for terrorism prevention and detention in the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism from 2024 to 2025. From 2021 to 2023, he was foreign policy adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His overseas postings as deputy chief of mission and chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Hungary and two postings to Russia. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and political science from Northwestern University, a master’s degree in Russian and East European studies from the University of Michigan, and a Master of Science degree in national security strategy from the National War College.

The post How a Balkan Wind Farm Aids US National Security appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Thirty-five years after Albania’s emergence from one of Europe’s most repressive communist regimes, the country’s democratic trajectory remains emblematic of post-authoritarian transformation, reflecting the promise of political renewal while exposing the challenges of durable consolidation. In this context, the May 2025 parliamentary elections stand out as a test of Albania’s resilience and a measure of its capacity to translate reform dynamics into democratic practice. 

Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist Party secured a sweeping victory, winning 83 of 140 parliamentary seats, while the opposition, led by Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party, suffered a significant setback with only 50 seats. International observers judged the elections technically well-administered, yet emphasized the deeply polarized environment and uneven playing field. ODIHR’s final report cited misuse of state resources, vote buying, intimidation of opposition supporters, and unequal media access. These irregularities highlight the persistent vulnerabilities of Albania’s political order.

In the coming years, and particularly over the next four-year mandate, Albania’s democratic trajectory will hinge on whether reform momentum can be sustained while systemic constraints are addressed. This interplay provides the framework for assessing Rama’s record of achievements and the broader dynamics of power and fragility that define Albania’s political landscape.

Rama’s Record of Achievements

Rama begins an unprecedented fourth term with a commanding mandate, presenting his victory as a historic opportunity to advance judicial reform, administrative modernization, and Albania’s accession to the European Union.

Over the past decade, Albania has undergone significant transformations, experiencing steady economic growth with GDP averaging around 4 percent in recent years, a reduction in poverty, and the expansion of tourism. Infrastructure projects – from highways and energy connectivity to port modernization – have reshaped the country’s economic landscape. Judicial reforms, particularly the vetting of judges and prosecutors, have strengthened the credibility of the justice system, while administrative reforms have streamlined governance. These efforts have earned Albania international recognition and positioned Rama as an influential regional statesman.

Building on these accomplishments, Rama aims to prepare the country for full EU membership by 2030. The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report praised Albania’s reform drive and signaled that EU membership within the next five years is a realistic goal. This optimism reflects not only domestic reforms but also Albania’s foreign policy posture. As a NATO member since 2009, Albania has maintained a proactive role in alliance operations and regional security, while aligning closely with EU foreign and security policy. Albania is seen as a frontrunner in accession negotiations, having advanced through a significant number of negotiating chapters.

Rama’s fourth term is guided by the government plan approved by parliament in September 2025, which sets EU accession as Albania’s strategic anchor. The plan prioritizes closing all negotiating chapters by 2027, deepening rule of law and anticorruption reforms, strengthening media freedom and institutional resilience, and modernizing public administration.

Nonetheless, democracy assessments highlight persistent fragility. Freedom House continues to classify Albania as “partly free,” and the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks it as a “hybrid regime.” Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Albania 80^th globally, a modest improvement over previous years, but still among the most corrupt in Europe. These assessments underscore that Albania’s democratic institutions, while showing reform momentum, continue to exhibit structural fragility.

Power Consolidated, Democracy Eroded

Rama’s consolidation of power is unprecedented, extending across nearly all levers of governance at both national and local levels. His leadership style – a blend of charismatic command, media-savvy messaging, and tight executive control – has proven effective in mobilizing support and sustaining political momentum. But beneath this consolidation lies a fragile framework of governance, hollowed by personalized decisionmaking, weakened institutions, corruption, media influence, and entrenched clientelism.

Rama governs in a highly insulated environment, where limited transparency and weakened accountability define the political landscape. Decisionmaking has become highly personalized, with parliament reduced to a rubber-stamp and the Socialist Party functioning largely as an extension of his authority. Debate is minimal, consultations rare, and dissent actively discouraged. Most recently, the government’s program and cabinet were approved without parliamentary discussion. Cabinet appointments were made unilaterally, with ministers reportedly learning of their roles during Rama’s public addresses. Genuine political competition has eroded, as a divided opposition struggles to remain relevant. 

Although personalization of power may expedite legislation and streamline decision-making, it magnifies the risk of executive overreach and erodes the principle of collective governance – the idea that authority should be shared, deliberative, and accountable.

Political unaccountability has deepened the country’s socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Institutions remain illequipped to address poverty, inequality, and the exodus of human capital. Albania remains one of Europe’s poorest countries, with more than onefifth of the population living below the relative poverty line. Wealth is concentrated among a narrow elite tied to political and business networks, while healthcare and education remain underfunded and unevenly distributed. Persistent underinvestment has widened the skills gap and accelerated brain drain, with some 700,000 Albanians, mostly young professionals, emigrating in the past fifteen years. 

These socioeconomic vulnerabilities are compounded by corruption, which has further eroded institutional credibility. Rama’s administration has entrenched a system of political favoritism, opaque contracting, and elite enrichment. The fusion of political and economic interests has fostered a kleptocratic dynamic, enabling systemic graft, opening the door for organized crime to penetrate state institutions, and weakening judicial and media independence.

Public tenders and infrastructure projects have frequently served as vehicles for rent-seeking, enriching senior officials and networks close to the government. High-profile scandals involving figures such as Saimir Tahiri, Arben Ahmetaj, Ilir Beqja, Lefter Koka, Erion Veliaj, and Belinda Balluku reveal a broader pattern of elite misconduct. In September, Rama reappointed Balluku as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, the cabinet’s second most important post, despite persistent allegations of corruption. Following her indictment for allegedly rigging public tenders in the Llogara Tunnel project, he dismissed calls for her resignation, signaling a readiness to shield loyalists even at the expense of institutional credibility. That stance proved a precarious, selfinflicted wound: the Special Court for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime dismissed Balluku from her post – a humiliating outcome that exposes Rama’s inability to act decisively, even in cases that can turn into a boomerang against his own leadership.

Balluku and other high-profile cases cast doubt on Rama’s professed commitment to clean governance and highlight the inescapable burden of his political responsibility. These cases are not isolated; they reflect a broader pattern that underscores a culture of impunity at the highest levels of government, where senior officials exploit public office for personal gain. Misconduct has become normalized, with accountability mechanisms steadily weakened. While Rama has consistently denied personal wrongdoing, as prime minister he bears responsibility to uphold accountability, confront misconduct among senior officials, and ensure democratic standards are not compromised. Ultimately, the buck stops with him.

Organized crime has also embedded itself in Albania’s formal economy, particularly in construction, tourism, and real estate. The 2025 Organized Crime Index underscores Albania’s vulnerability, citing entrenched criminal networks and state-embedded actors. The European Commission’s annual progress report highlights persistent weaknesses in rule of law, corruption, and governance, underscoring the fragility of Albania’s institutions despite reform efforts. Construction permits and real estate projects are frequently linked to opaque financing and criminal networks, illustrating how enforcement remains weak and selective. The paradox is stark: Rama’s tight grip on power has become bound to the system itself. If he confronts the entrenched corrupt interests within it, he risks shaking the very foundation of his own rule.

These patterns of corruption and state capture are reinforced by a media landscape that is coopted and constrained, further narrowing civic space and weakening public scrutiny. 

Despite a formally pluralistic landscape, the media often mirrors partisan narratives. This stems from a toxic mix of political cooptation, concentrated ownership, and intimidation tactics. Rama has cultivated influence over key outlets through patronage and proximity to proprietors. His frequent attacks on journalists, often laced with derision and threats, have chilled reporting and further restricted scrutiny. Many media owners, businessmen benefiting from state contracts, act as proxies, securing favorable coverage and suppressing damaging stories. As a result, leading platforms remain fixated on opposition dysfunction, while institutionalized misconduct under Rama receives little sustained analysis. Even during crises, talk shows with ostensibly independent voices often sidestep scrutiny of the ruling party, spotlighting opposition missteps instead. This pattern, under the veneer of independence, reveals a deeper alignment between political power and media influence. Selective framing distorts public discourse and indirectly facilitates executive consolidation by deflecting attention from abuses and weakening institutional checks. 

Civic disengagement further deepens Albania’s institutional erosion. Society appears increasingly fragmented, marked by low civic engagement and rising political apathy. Leading intellectuals and scholars, research institutions, and the Academy of Sciences, remain largely peripheral to national debate. Their input is vital to fostering critical discourse and evidencebased policymaking.

At the same time, Rama has benefited from declining international scrutiny. With global attention diverted to democratic backsliding and crises elsewhere, Albania’s internal governance failures have attracted less sustained pressure from key partners and watchdogs. This vacuum has enabled the prime minister to consolidate power with fewer external constraints, even as corruption, organized crime, media control, and civic apathy intensify.

Entrenched Elites, Democratic Stagnation

Albania’s political system has ossified, eroding institutional capacity, stifling renewal, and constraining democratic choice. Politics remains dominated by the Socialist Party and a weakened Democratic opposition, with access to power tightly guarded and fresh alternatives systematically obstructed. Patronage networks and elite entrenchment sustain a stagnant political system, while the success of Albania’s younger generation abroad highlights the wasted potential at home. Emigration has drained human capital, deepening inertia and widening the gap between societal dynamism and political stagnation.

In view of growing authoritarian tendencies and the erosion of institutional checks, Albania’s democratic future demands a broad reckoning and mobilization across political, institutional, and societal spheres, transforming governance, accountability, and civic culture. This requires a systemic shift: political parties offering credible alternatives, a reinvigorated civil society, engaged intellectual voices, and a participatory citizenry – above all, a younger generation ready to act as agents of change.

Both major parties now face crises of regeneration, albeit in different ways: the Democratic Party through fragmentation and exhaustion, and the Socialist Party through over-centralization and conformity. 

This crisis of stagnation is most visible in the Democratic Party, which confronts a pivotal reckoning. Missteps in recent years – the failure to participate in the debate on territorial administrative changes, withdrawal from parliament and boycott of local elections – left it marginalized. The U.S. designation of Sali Berisha as persona non grata, followed by his legal troubles and house arrest, deepened internal strife and eroded credibility. Although the party competed in an electoral environment heavily tilted against it, the results revealed a deeper truth: its message failed to resonate. Its rhetoric, leadership style, and political vision appear increasingly out of step with the aspirations of the electorate.

Today, the Democratic Party survives largely on the strength of Berisha’s personal endurance and legacy. His charisma and historical stature continue to command loyalty, but they cannot substitute for a coherent program or a future-facing agenda. Without bold reimagining – internal democracy, new voices, and a compelling vision – the party risks being perceived as a relic of its past rather than a vehicle for democratic relevance. Berisha remains one of the most consequential figures in Albania’s post-communist history: the country’s first democratic president, a two-term prime minister, and a resilient opposition leader. Now, he has the opportunity to conclude his public career by stepping into the role of elder statesman and paving the way for new leadership. By guiding a transparent and competitive transition, he can help ensure that the party’s future is shaped not by loyalty to a single figure, but by open debate, merit, and vision.

In the final analysis, no leader, however consequential, can indefinitely carry the burden of sustaining a party’s standing – its credibility, relevance, and position within the political landscape. Delaying the inevitable day of reckoning will only prolong the Democratic Party’s agony, deepening internal paralysis, eroding public trust, and making the eventual leadership transition more fraught and costly.

While Berisha’s departure could trigger factional battles and short-term instability, it is more likely to galvanize the opposition, unlocking the energy and talent long stifled. The Democratic Party already has promising younger members whose potential has been overshadowed by internal strife and the dominance of entrenched leadership. With space to flourish, they could help reshape the party’s future. At the same time, the Democratic Party must broaden its base by attracting new members and voices, ensuring revitalization is not confined to generational turnover but rooted in inclusive participation. With local elections in 2027 and national elections in 2029, the party has a critical window to regroup and rebuild. 

Renewal must also begin within the ruling Socialist Party, where loyalty has replaced accountability and internal pluralism has given way to uniformity. Ironically, the party was more internally democratic under Fatos Nano in the 1990s than it is today. The Socialist Party must confront the dangers of one-man rule and rediscover its institutional character, fostering genuine policy debate and tolerating dissent.

This narrowing of internal pluralism is mirrored in the broader political landscape, where thirtyfive years after the fall of communism, no credible alternatives have emerged to challenge the dominance of the two major parties. Following his arrest on corruption charges, former President Ilir Meta’s party has largely disintegrated, leaving Albania’s political landscape monopolized by Socialists and Democrats. 

The absence of alternatives underscores not only systemic stagnation and the narrowing of democratic choice, but also the urgency of opening pathways for new actors. Albania’s younger generation has proven its capacity for innovation abroad, yet remains stifled at home. To take the helm, this generation must channel its skills into civic engagement, grassroots organizing, and the creation of new political platforms that reflect their lived realities. Universities, professional networks, and diaspora connections can incubate leadership, helping young Albanians turn experience abroad into reform at home. Harnessing this potential through civic movements and institutional renewal could spark regeneration. Without such change, Albania risks becoming a nation rich in talent but constrained by political inertia. Its democracy would benefit greatly from new, modern political forces with platforms that speak to the realities of a generation born after communism, rather than remaining bound to the legacies of the past.

Yet the urgency of renewal extends beyond parties to the foundations of democratic life itself. The country’s future cannot hinge solely on the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, or any single political actor. What is required is a renewal that engages citizens, civil society, media, and international partners to ensure accountability and foster civic participation. Together, these pillars form the foundation of democratic reinvigoration, but each is fragile and requires long-term investment

Albania faces a deepening crisis of civic participation. Voter turnout in May 2025 fell to just 41 percent, with sharp declines among young voters, underscoring disillusionment and a sense that participation carries little weight. At the same time, civil society has seen its role as watchdog and catalyst for reform steadily eroded by funding constraints, political pressure, and public apathy. Empowering the youngest generation requires institutional reforms that make participation meaningful, educational initiatives that foster civic literacy, and platforms that amplify youth voices. Equally, civil society must reclaim its space in public discourse, defend institutional autonomy, and mobilize citizens around accountability and justice. Revitalized civic participation can reawaken the democratic conscience of the nation and serve as a counterweight to executive dominance, but its vulnerability demands sustained commitment.

A free and independent media is equally indispensable to democratic reinvigoration. Reforms must ensure transparency, protect journalists, and invest in publicinterest reporting. Only an empowered media can hold power to account. Yet here too, feasibility is uncertain: entrenched political influence and concentrated ownership make reform difficult, even as the need for scrutiny grows more urgent.

Finally, the international community, particularly the European Union, remains critical. Conditionality is one of the few remaining levers for reform, but it must be applied with clarity and conviction. Support should be contingent not on the perfunctory compliance evident today, but on demonstrable progress in judicial independence, electoral integrity, and media freedom. Albania’s path to Europe must be paved with democratic substance, not symbolic gestures.

Conclusion

Albania’s democratic experiment confronts both peril and possibility. Concentrated executive power, weakened institutions, marginalized opposition, and civic apathy have created conditions for authoritarian consolidation. Yet the possibility of democratic renewal remains within reach. Albania faces a stark choice: authoritarian entrenchment, patronage networks, and civic withdrawal, or democratic renewal through pluralism, institutional independence, and meaningful citizen participation. 

With his overwhelming electoral victory, Rama holds unparalleled leverage to shape Albania’s trajectory. While his unchallenged position could suggest that he has little incentive to change course, the country’s formidable challenges and the fragile credibility of its EU aspirations require a correction in leadership style, away from authoritarian, kleptocratic tendencies that undermine Albania’s democratic foundations. How he chooses to wield his power will, to a large degree, define not only the trajectory of Albania’s democracy but also his legacy. Before assuming office in 2013, he cultivated the image of a visionary, forwardlooking leader, pledging to establish the rule of law, revitalize institutions, ensure free and fair elections, and safeguard media freedoms. It would be a paradox if he were ultimately remembered as the hopeful democrat turned embodiment of unchecked authority, who chose authoritarian consolidation over democratic renewal.

The same dominance that grants Rama such latitude also exposes the fragility of the system he presides over. His concentration of power has produced a governance model that appears formidable but rests on brittle foundations, proving less stable than it appears. The paradox of his rule is that while he can consolidate power with ease, the system’s durability is far less assured. Without credible checks and institutional resilience, Albania’s political order remains vulnerable to shocks, whether from waning popularity, intensifying dissent, or shifting alliances among entrenched interests.

This reality underscores the imperative for other forces to step forward. Albania’s future cannot be decided by Rama alone. The resilience of institutions, the renewal of political parties, the vitality of civil society, the engagement of youth, and the principled stance of strategic partners are equally decisive. If these stakeholders rise to the challenge, Albania can move beyond authoritarian drift and extractive governance, laying the foundations for democratic resilience. The task is urgent, but achievable. By mobilizing its democratic assets, Albania can turn fragility into strength, transform obstacles into opportunities, and fulfill its longheld democratic aspirations.

The Albanians deserve nothing less than a democracy genuine in substance, dignified in spirit, and firmly anchored in Europe.

________________

*Presentation at the national convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), Washington, D.C., November 22, 2025.

The post Albania: Between Reform Dynamics and Democratic Fragility appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Labor immigration has been the focus of Serbia’s governmental agendas for years now. The labor regulations related to immigrants have been amendedmost recently in 2023 to attract and utilize to the fullest the potential of immigrant laborers. Whereas the legislation is partially in compliance with the EU acquis, the implementation thereof has struggled with numerous challenges to result in a rather low proportion of immigrant laborers on the national labor market. In the introductory part of the paper, we present in brief the overall situation on the national labor market. After that, we explore the national labor market characteristics and accompanying legislation concerning immigrant laborers. This is followed by the presentation and comparison of data on immigrant laborers, as well as their factual situations on the labor market. In the concluding part we point to further considerations of importance for the topic, first of all regarding future challenges for the labor immigration to Serbia, calling for more extensive measures of empowering immigrant laborers to integrate into society. The deployed methodological approach consisted of the desk review, including the review of the relevant legislations, description and analysis of the statistical data and reports from the relevant stakeholders.

Keywords: employment, immigration, immigrant laborers, labor migration, labor market, labor legislation

Introduction

In recent decades, Serbia’s economic development has been characterized by a relatively unstable relationship between economic growth and labor market performance, frequently framed under “growth without development” (Perišić 2016). The consequences thereof started to be experienced as of 2008, when the world economic crisis of 2007 showed to present a long-lasting threat to achievements in the sphere of human development realized in the period from the beginning of the 2000s (Arandarenko, Jorgoni, Stubbs 2009). The end of this decade was marked by high concerns about the labor market performance, which was characterized by a shrinking economy resulting in declining employment and increasing unemployment and poverty (Vuković, Perišić 2011). After 2012, which saw the employment rate as low as 35.5% and unemployment rate of as high as 23.9% (Republičkizavod za statistiku 2015), labor market indicators started to significantly improve to result in an employment rate of 51.4% and unemployment rate of 8.6% in the last quarter of 2024 (Republičkizavod za statistiku 2025). Whereas the low unemployment rates partially mask high inactivity rates, the employment rates, and even more, the characteristics of employment, are worrisome.

Numerous advancements in the national labor market, first of all, regarding the harmonization of the national legislation with the EU acquis, have been planned and gradually implemented within the context of Serbia’s aspirations towards EU membership. Serbia started its negotiations with the EU in 2012, but the progress in labor relations in general still remains limited.

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse characteristics of labor immigration in Serbia and the changes that occurred more recently as a result of the complex domestic and international circumstances. In the first part of the paper, we explain briefly the main impacts of the national legislation on labor relations on the labor market in general. Then, we present in more detail and analyze the regulations on the employment of immigrants in Serbia. The immigrants have been seen as a means to facilitate the complex demographic situation, resulting in shrinking and aging of the population in combination with high emigration rates of the young to middle-aged population, requiring additional workforce in certain sectors of the economy. In the second part of the paper, we present and analyze the structure of labor immigration to show that it cannot compensate for the high emigration rates. More importantly, we point to many violations of the rights of immigrant laborers. Throughout the paper, we present the challenges in relation to the legislation and its implementation, resulting in low attractiveness of the national labor market for labor immigration.

Labor Legislation – Between Innovation and Implementation Trap

In Serbia, labor relations are regulated through a series of laws, with the Labor Law of 2005 as a general law in this domain. The Law introduced the flexibilization of employment at the expense of labor security and adaptability and its subsequent amendments have been contributing to this trend irreversibly. For the last two decades, some of the most critical challenges in relation to the Labor Law and its implementation have been reflected in high rates of informal employment and undeclared work, with low capacities of the Labor Inspectorate to counteract illegal labor practices. Additionally, there is a recurring process of extremely aggravated transitions of informal laborers into official contractual employment, followed by increased numbers of fatalities and severe injuries with fatal consequences in certain industry sectors.Widely occurring phenomena of prolonging fixed-term contracts for an indefinite period of time has become a common practice, with almost absent social dialogue and involvement of laborers due to disempowered labor unions, and underdeveloped measures aiming to ensure a work-life balance for laborers (Perisic 2023).

In its country reports for Serbia, the European Commission has been continuously pointing to the deficiencies in relation to Chapter 19, which encompasses employment, including the last one for 2024 (European Commission 2024). The Labor Law is only partially in compliance with the EU acquis, and in combination with weak mechanisms for its implementation, its result has been an inefficient effectuation of the rights of both national and immigrant laborers in multiple ways. Clearly, Serbia performs below the EU average in the domain of labor relations, and especially fair working conditions indicators, but in comparison with other Western Balkan economies (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro and North Macedonia), its performance was above average (Ymeri 2023; Sarajlic 2023; Zylfijaj 2023; Mirkovic 2023; Nikoloski 2023; Perisic 2023). Contrary to this, the Law on Entrepreneurship of 2022, with its focus of social economy, vulnerable groups and social innovation, according to the first informal evaluations conducted, is harmonized with the EU regulations and especially with the Action Plan for the Social Economy (Perisic 2023), albeit missing important sublegal legislative to be implemented in full. It does not have special references to immigrant laborers, but the vulnerable groups are defined in extenso (article 6), so that vulnerable migrants can o be included.

Regarding the legislation regulating exclusively the labor migration, the Law on Employment of Foreigners of 2014 was adopted to encompass multiple categories of immigrant laborers, both EU^[1] and non-EU nationals, as well as asylum seekers. It stipulates the equal rights and obligations of immigrants and Serbian nationals in the domains of labor and employment (article 5), but its norms are not fully in compliance with the principle of equality, as it will be elaborated further. The introduction of the latest amendments to the Law in 2023 was motivated by the harmonization of national legislation with the EU acquis and the necessity to facilitate highly complex procedures for the employment of immigrants that were previously in existence.

Novelties to the Law include the provision of a single permit for temporary stay and work for an immigrant (article 9), as well as the activity of the National Employment Service, such as assessment of an immigrant’s eligibility for employment (article 10), as a necessary precondition for employment. The assessment of an immigrant’s eligibility is prescribed to present a precondition for obtaining an employment-based visa for a longer stay (which is to enable an immigrant to enter Serbia, travel throughout the country, stay and work there). The Law also authorized the National Employment Service to issue a consent enabling an immigrant to change his/her employment (article 11).

The introduction of a single permit superseded the norms that differentiated as many as seven types of work permits. The new legislation digitalized the process of requesting and obtaining a single permit for stay and work with a view to lowering the administrative barriers, reducing costs and time consumed in the process. However, the implementation of the legal stipulation that an immigrant can apply only electronically for the permit was postponed already at the occasion of the Law enactment until February 1^st, 2024, due to the inability to build an operational portal (Beogradskicentar za ljudskaprava 2024). Based on reports from January 2025, the portal was still not operational in full, the information for prospective immigrants was incomplete or lacking, sometimes outdated and not tailored to any of their specific circumstances. Two versions of the relevant website (the official and the trial one) were running in parallel and even the link for the application for the single permit was not functioning from the official website but could only be found by googling it (Daffini 2025). The amended Law also made the authorities liable to process the requests within 10 days (article 11). Finally, it is prescribed that a single permit does not necessarily have to encompass only one, but it can encompass more immigrants, and it can be issued, i.e., prolonged for three years, instead of one year as per the previous regulation (Urdarević, Misailović 2025).

And while the introduction of a single permit is in compliance with the EU regulations, more specifically the Directive 2011/98/EU, the difficulties in its implementation call for special precautions and the novelty regarding the legal provision of the so-called labor market test to be performed by the National Employment Service clearly interferes with this compliance. Namely, the National Employment Service is authorized to act as “an interregional mediator in employment by means of establishing whether there are already eligible persons that can be employed by a requesting employer” (article 16a). This norm serves as a protective measure against immigrant laborers and in favour of Serbia’s nationals. Still, certain categories of immigrants with deficitary occupations and professions can be omitted from the labor market test, based on the governmental decision, depending on the labor market situation (article 16a). Finally, the government is entitled to limit the number of immigrants to be employed, i.e. to introduce quotas, when there are labor market disturbances, in compliance with the migration policy and labor market trends (article 24).

The Law also enabled asylum seekers, persons authorized with asylum and temporary protection to effectuate their right to an employment 6 months after applying for an asylum, instead of previously prescribed 9 months. This novelty to the Law brings Serbian legislation more into compliance with the EU standards. The intended consequence is to facilitate their integration via employment. Still, this requires more specific active labor market measures to be deployed by the National Employment Service as well as more cultural sensitivity by the employers.

The Law on Employment of Foreigners made progress only in certain aspects, and in relation to Chapter 2 which encompasses freedom of movement for workers, the European Commission evaluated it as partially aligned with the EU acquis in its latest country report for Serbia (European Commission 2024).

Even before the latest amendments to the Law on Employment of Foreigners, the Regulation on Criteria for Incentives to Employers Employing Newly Inhabited Persons was enacted in June 2022 and amended in 2023. It is targeted towards deficitary occupations and professions and entitles employers who employ newly inhabited persons “the need for which cannot be easily satisfied on the national labor market” (article 2) to certain benefits. Newly inhabited are considered those who did not stay in Serbia for a longer period than 180 days in the period of 24 months prior to the open-ended employment contract signing for a wage of at least RSD 300,000 (around EUR 2,550), four times higher than the average wage in Serbia. Such employers are entitled to a return of 70% of paid taxes and to a full reimbursement of contributions paid for old-age and disability insurance (article 2). The purpose of the Regulation is to encourage talents to immigrate to Serbia by offering them special opportunities for being exempted from paying taxes and social contributions.

Labor Immigration in Statistics and Reality

International migration patterns have had a pronounced impact on the national labor market dynamics. The country has long exhibited complex migratory flows, with outward labor migration prevailing as the dominant form. Emigration has functioned as a socio-economic outlet for persons unable to secure employment aligned with their qualifications and skills within the national labor market. However, the continued outflow of working-age populations has contributed to a contraction of the labor supply, effectively reducing not only the number of job seekers but also the broader potential of the labor force (Medić et al. 2022). At the same time, consistent with the theory of Ernst Georg Ravenstein that “every migration flow generates a counterflow” (Langović et al. 2024, 2), Serbia found itself in a situation of the lack of labor force, which, along with other international complexities (the 2015 migration “crisis”, COVID-19 crisis, Russian invasion on Ukraine, etc.) influenced the numbers of immigrants in Serbia. The “door“ forlabor migration was opened already in the 1990s, mainly for the Chinese laborers, but their immigration remained on a rather small scale. It was the Law on Employment and Insurance in Case of Unemployment of 2009, which attracted foreign employers to the country by offering them extremely generous subsidies for starting their businesses in Serbia. This was frequently followed by the employment of their nationals (especially in the case of employers from Asia).

In Serbia nowadays, the immigrant population can be broadly divided into three groups (Republičkizavod za statistiku 2025):

1. Persons granted temporary residence for a minimum duration of one year;
2. Persons initially granted temporary residence for a period of less than one year, but who, through consecutive extensions, have maintained uninterrupted legal stay exceeding one year;
3. Persons who have been granted permanent residence.

Asylum seekers, persons authorised with asylum and temporary protection, have a specific position, since the effectuation of their rights is dependent on the asylum procedure and the regulation of their legal status in the country. The challenges for asylum seekers stem from long-lasting asylum procedures, difficulties in applying for asylum, lack of support in the process and complicated procedures. Additionally, the vast majority of asylum seekers do not apply for asylum immediately upon arrival to Serbia, as they often plan to move to another country, most frequently in the EU, and rarely consider Serbia as their country of destination (IDEAS 2024). This influences their integration in society, including the integration into the labor market. The numbers of asylum seekers and people granted with refugee or subsidiary protection vary since 2015, but they are extremely low; the latest data show that 196 persons applied for asylum whereasnine of them got their asylum claims approved (Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije 2024).

When compared to the preceding decade, 2023 recorded the highest number of foreign nationals residing in Serbia to date. The most prominent among these were those residing on the basis of employment, with a particular concentration in the information technology sector, as well as foreign nationals engaged in large-scale infrastructure development projects (Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije 2024).

Citizens of the Russian Federation represented the largest group of immigrants (41,644), followed by citizens of the People’s Republic of China (12,157), Turkey and India. Notably, the total number of immigrants to Serbia in 2023 was approximately 9.5 times higher than in 2012. Citizens of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, Turkey, and India together accounted for 83.5% of all immigrants to Serbia in 2023. The number of Russian immigrants increased nearly 47 times compared to 2012, while the number of Chinese and Turkish immigrants rose approximately eight and thirty-three times, respectively, over the same period (see graph 1). Demographically, nearly two-thirds of all immigrants who arrived between 2012 and 2023 were male, while one-third were female. The average age of immigrants was on average lower than the national average (32.6 years), with the most significant difference observed in the Belgrade region, where the average immigrant age stood at 30.2 years (Republičkizavod za statistiku 2025).

Graph 1. Numbers of largest immigrant groups in Serbia, 2012-2023

Source: Adapted according to the Republicki zavod za statistiku (2025).

Employment remained the most common legal basis for granting temporary residence in 2023, accounting for 58.9% of all cases – mirroring the trend observed in the previous year (Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije 2024). This development reflects both the continued arrival of foreign investors and the ongoing implementation of major infrastructure projects, as well as a structural shortage of labor within Serbia’s national labor market. Whereas family reunification was the predominant basis for residence at the beginning of the decade, recent years have seen a clear shift toward employment-based immigration. However, the increase in the number of residence permits issued based on family reunification can be attributed to the growing trend of entire families relocating to Serbia, particularly in cases where the primary residence permit holder was granted status on the basis of employment.

At the end of 2023, a total of 46,073 immigrants held valid temporary residence permits in Serbia based on employment. This figure represents a 29% increase compared to 2022, and a striking 121% increase compared to 2021, when 20,828 foreign nationals resided in Serbia on the same legal basis. Furthermore, the number recorded in 2023 is nearly 3.5 times higher than in 2020, when only 13,669 individuals held employment-based residence. Between January 1 and December 31, 2023, the National Employment Service issued a total of 52,178 work permits to foreign nationals, of which 9,875 were issued to women. The number of work permits issued to foreign nationals holding valid temporary residence in Serbia in 2023 amounted to 51,631, which reflects a notable increase compared to 2022, when 34,573 such permits were issued (Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije 2024) (See table 1).

Table 1. Number of issued work permits and immigrants found without work permits during labor inspection

Note: For years 2019 and 2020, the Labor Inspectorate did not include a special chapter on foreign workers’ rights. The data in the table are derived from the reports of the Labor Inspectorate, calculated and recorded in different parts of the reports, so that they should be taken with caution.

Source: Labor Inspectorate, different years, and Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia, different years

As per the above Table, the highest share of immigrant laborers found by the Labor Inspectorate in undeclared work was as low as 5% in 2021. In the rest of the listed years, it accounted for less than 2%. On the one hand, it seems that the number of cases of malpractices to which immigrant laborers are exposed on the labor market is underestimated. On the other hand, the Labor Inspectorate reports that in all those cases in which immigrant laborers were found in undeclared work, employers did not translate them into formal employment (which is frequently the case with Serbia’s nationals), but employed new immigrant laborers (Perisic 2023), pointing to stubborn malpractices in cases of employing immigrants.

Between January and December 2024, labor inspectors in Serbia conducted 289 inspections related to the employment of foreign nationals. During these inspections, 7,482 labor immigrants were identified as being engaged in work activities, of whom 611 were found to be working without valid work permits. The majority of the undocumented workers originated from Turkey (425), followed by India (30), Tajikistan (24), Uzbekistan (19), and other countries, including Kyrgyzstan, China, Indonesia, Russia, etc. Among those found in breach of employment regulations, 338 immigrants were working informally, either without formal employment contracts or without registration for mandatory social insurance. The largest groups among them were citizens of Turkey (200), India (30), and Tajikistan (17), followed by workers from Russia, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, China, Indonesia, etc. Turkish citizens have been the largest group identified in the past five years, whose labor rights are being violated through different forms of informal work (Inspektorat za rad 2025).

In addition, inspectors established that 668 of the detected foreign workers (approximately 9% of the total) were employed by foreign companies abroad and seconded to Serbia to perform contracted tasks for locally registered employers. The remaining 91% (6,814 workers) were directly employed by Serbian-based companies. These findings underscore persistent challenges in the regulation and oversight of foreign labor, particularly concerning legal employment status, social protection, and workplace safety standards. They also highlight the need for improved inter-institutional coordination between labor authorities and migration services, as well as stricter enforcement of employer obligations (Inspektorat za rad 2025).

Reports of the Labor Inspectorate show that the procedure for accessing the labor market in Serbia for asylum seekers dissuaded foreigners from pursuing asylum procedures in Serbia or forced them into the informal labor sector, thus heightening their vulnerability to further human rights violations (Inspektorat za rad, 2025). Additionally, there is strong evidence of child labor, especially among the unaccompanied children asylum seekers and migrants in Serbia, who are often involved in hazardous labor and the worst forms of child labor (Marković 2024).

There are several anecdotal reports compiled by the civil sector and reports of investigative journalists of violations of labor rights of immigrants. Even though these reports raise very serious allegations and concerns of exploitation and even trafficking of migrants from Turkey, India, China and Vietnam who came to Serbia for employment in the industry and construction sectors in recent years, there are no official reports on these alleged developments, with the Labor Inspectorate remaining silent. One of the most exemplary cases of labor malpractices, which included immigrant laborers, was based on anecdotal evidence and without further court proceedings. It was 2021 when immigrant laborers from Vietnam came to Zrenjanin, Serbia, to construct a factory “Linglong”, led by Chinese in Serbia. The living conditions they were provided with by their employers, which were obligated to do this, were rather bad: accommodation, in barracks next to the construction site, was extremely poor, without warm water and the food they were given was low in calories. Laborers claimed to be satisfied with the salaries, but were unable to send any remittances because their passports were taken away from them. They were not aware that their labor rights were violated, among other reasons, due to the fact that the labor contracts were not written in a language they were able to understand. Elements of the labor contracts, as provided by the national regulations, such as the records on the date of the employment beginning, daily and weekly working hours and holidays, were omitted. They were prohibited from organizing into unions, etc. (A11 & Astra 2022).

Contrary to such malpractices, there are anecdotal records of examples of asylum seekers, especially young and female, employed with the social enterprises, primarily in the sectors of food processing and catering, as well as restaurants. They are frequently included in different types of training in order to be able to perform their activities.

Further considerations

The characteristic of the national labor market is precarious employment, characterized by low salaries, open-ended contracts and low security of jobs. In terms of the attractiveness of the national labor market, therefore, there are low incentives for the immigrants to employ and to stay longer in Serbia. Rather, they will be prone to be employed for certain shorter periods, before being able to transit and to immigrate further, to higher income countries throughout Europe.

These circumstances make the national migration landscape extremely complex and dynamic. Even though 2023 data on immigration reports the highest numbers of immigrants ever in Serbia, the emigration is far more dramatic than the immigration, even looking into national sources, which traditionally tend to underestimate the numbers of emigrants. The immigration is still in the shadow of emigration that is traditionally framed under “brain drain” and recently increasingly more and additionally under “care drain”. This calls for more sophisticated statistics, policies, strategies and measures to be taken by the Government compared to those currently being in place.

Along with the situation on the labor market, the national legislation regarding the immigrant laborers is not empowering for them. Sadly, data on labor immigration in 2024 are currently not available (until July) and any preliminary estimations of the impact of the regulations which came into force in February 2024 can not be made. Concerns come from the fact that simplified procedures, as provided for by the amended regulations, are not operational and actually serve as distracting immigrants to get employment. Its protective clause ruling that the national laborers will be given priority clearly leaves room for the employment of immigrant laborers only in those occupations and sectors that are absent from the national labor market, due to emigration.

The majority of employed immigrants from Russia, concentrated in the information sector, however positive development for the national economy does not seem promising. Namely, the past experiences when the foreign citizens were granted tax and contribution evasions and other benefits, tell us the same: the moment the evasions and benefits were lifted, the immigrants left the country. Chinese immigrants, as the second major ethnic group on the labor market, are still within their ethnic labor market, even though there are new arrivals of Chinese immigrants employed by Chinese companies operating in Serbia. On top of that, labor immigrants are more visible on the national labor market, since they work as bus drivers, construction workers, cleaning ladies, etc. With a view to that, it seems that more extensive measures of supporting immigrants to integrate into society are absent and should be taken into due consideration. Labor integration is surely one of the most important aspects of integration, but some other aspects are also important. Building a society which would welcome migrants requires much more cultural sensitivity, changed media and public discourses and more friendly environments for immigrant families.

Bibliography

A11 i ASTRA. 2022. Izveštaj – UsloviživotairadavijetnamskihradnikanagradilištufabrikeLinglong. A11 i ASTRA.

Arandarenko, Mihail, EliraJorgonii Paul Stubbs. 2009. “SocijalniuticajiglobalneekonomskekrizenaZapadni Balkan.” U Socijalnapolitikaikriza, urednikaDrenkeVukovićiMihailaArandarenka. Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultetpolitičkihnauka.

Beogradskicentar za ljudskaprava. 2024. Ljudskaprava u Srbiji 2023 – pravo, praksaimeđunarodnistandardiljudskihprava. Beogradskicentar za ljudskaprava.

Daffini, Ludovica. 2025. A Place to Call Home? Addressing Foreign Nationals’ Challenges to Entering, Residing and Working in Serbia, Available from: https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/A-Place-to-Call-Home.pdf, Accessed on May 19, 2025

European Commission. 2024. Serbia 2024 Report. Available from: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3c8c2d7f-bff7-44eb-b868-414730cc5902_en?filename=Serbia%20Report%202024.pdf, Accessed on May 19, 2025

https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/uredba-o-kriterijumima-za-dodelu-podsticaja-poslodavcima-koji-zaposljavaju-novonastanjena-lica-u.html, Accessed on May 19, 2025

https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_zaposljavanju_stranaca.html, Accessed on May 19, 2025

IDEAS. 2024. Improving Access to the Labor Market for Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Key Amendments to the Law on employment of Foreigners. https://ideje.rs/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/clank_1_ENG-3.pdf

Inspektorat za rad. 2020. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2019. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračkaisocijalnapitanja.

Inspektorat za rad. 2021. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2020. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalnapitanja.

Inspektorat za rad. 2022. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2021. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračkaisocijalnapitanja.

Inspektorat za rad. 2023. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2022. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračkaisocijalnapitanja.

Inspektorat za rad. 2024. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2023. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračkaisocijalnapitanja.

Inspektorat za rad. 2025. Izveštaj o raduInspektorata za rad za 2024. godinu. Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračkaisocijalnapitanja.

Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije. 2020. MigracioniprofilRepublikeSrbije za 2019. godinu. https://kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Migracije/Publikacije/Migracioni_profil_Republike_Srbi.%20godinu.pdf

Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije. 2021. MigracioniprofilRepublikeSrbije za 2020. godinu. https://kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Migracioni%20profil%20Republike%20Srbije%202020%20FINAL%20(1).pdf

Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije. 2022. MigracioniprofilRepublikeSrbije za 2021. godinu. https://kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Migracije/Publikacije/Migracioni%20profil%20Republike%20Srbije%20za%202021-%20godinu.pdf

Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije. 2023. MigracioniprofilRepublikeSrbije za 2022. godinu. https://kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Миграциони%20профил%20Републике%20Србије%20за%202022-годину.pdf

Komesarijat za izbegliceimigracije. 2024. MigracioniprofilRepublikeSrbije za 2023. godinu. https://kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/1Migracioni%20profil.pdf

Langović, Milica, Danica Djurkin, Filip Krstić et al. 2024. “Return Migration and Reintegration in Serbia: Are All Returnees the Same?”. Sustainability 16 (12): 5118.

Marković, Violeta, “Karakteristikedečjegradakodnepraćeneirazdvojenedece u Srbiji,” PhD diss., (Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2024).

Medić, Pavle, Dragan Aleksić and Vladimir Petronijević. 2022. Analizapotrebatržištaradairadnesnage u kontekstuupravljanjamigracijama. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. https://ceves.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Analiza-potreba-trzista-rada-i-radne-snage-u-kontekstu-upravljanja-migracijama_SR.pdf

Mirkovic, Milika. 2023.Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON MONTENEGRO. Regional Cooperation Council.

Nikoloski, Dimitar. 2023. Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON NORTH MACEDONIA. Regional Cooperation Council.

Perisic Natalija. 2023. Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON SERBIA .Regional Cooperation Council.

Perišić, Natalija. 2016. Socijalnasigurnost – pojmoviiprogrami. Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultetpolitičkihnauka.

Republičkizavod za statistiku. 2015. Anketa o radnojsnazi – IV kvartal 2015. Republičkizavod za statistiku.

Republičkizavod za statistiku. 2025. Anketa o radnojsnazi – IV kvartal 2024. Republičkizavod za statistiku.

Republičkizavod za statistiku. 2025. Imigracijastranaca u RepubliciSrbiji. IOM. Srbija. https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2025/Pdf/G202522001.pdf

Sarajlic, Amir. 2023. Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. Regional Cooperation Council.

The LaborLaw,  Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, numbers 24/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 75/2014, 13/2017 – decision of the CC, 113/2017 and 95/2018 – authentic interpretation, Available from: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_radu.html, Accessed on May 19, 2025

The Law on Employment of Foreigners, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, numbers 128/2014, 113/2017, 50/2018, 31/2019 and 62/2023, Available from:

The Law on Social Entrepreneurship, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, number 14/2022, Available from: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon-o-socijalnom-preduzetnistvu.html, Accessed on May 19, 2025

The Regulation on Criteria for Incentives to Employers Employing Newly Inhabited Persons, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, numbers 67/2022 and 71/2023, Available from:

Urdarević, Bojan, Jovana Misailović. 2025. Izveštaj o stanjuradnihprava u RepubliciSrbiji u 2024. FondacijaCentar za demokratiju.

Vuković, Drenka, Natalija Perišić. 2011. “Social Security Transition in Serbia – Twenty Years Later” In Welfare States in Transition – 20 Years after the Yugoslav Welfare Model edited by Maria Stambolieva and Stephan Dehnert. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Ymeri, Sabina. 2023. Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON ALBANIA. Regional Cooperation Council.

Zylfijaj, Kujtim. 2023. Performance of Western Balkan economies regarding the European Pillar of Social Rights 2022 REVIEW ON KOSOVO*. Regional Cooperation Council.

Short biographies of the authors

Natalija Perišić is a Full Professor of Social Policy at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science, Department of Social Policy and Social Work where she lectures on the national and European social policy, ageing and migration at the under-graduate, master and PhD studies. She is a Visiting Professor at the University of Tuzla – Faculty of Philosophy, B&H. Her scientific and research interests in the migration field are within the nexus between migration and welfare state, services for migrants provided by the public and civil sectors, migrants’ integration policies, etc. She has been particularly interested in the mechanisms for social inclusion of migrants. Natalija has been very active in making connections among the academia, civil sector organizations and public services, regarding the support to migrants. She has published about 50 papers in national and international journal. She leads the MIGREC – Migration, Integration and Governance Research Centre at the Faculty of Political Science (www.migrec.fpn.bg.ac.rs).

Violeta Markovic is an Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Science, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, where she teaches in the field of theory and methodology of social work, with a focus on child protection, people in migration, social work with families,and elderly care. She has5 years in conducting national and international research and participation in national and international projects, with a special focus on developing and conducting qualitative research, from methodology development to data collection and data analysis. She has spent7 years in direct work with people with disabilities, women victims of abuse, and people in migration (5 years). She has extensive knowledge in the area of migration, child protection, family support, Roma people, and social work in crisis. She has published 15 papers in international and national journals and co-authored a book on the protection of children in migration.

^[1] The effectuation of the regulations regarding the employment of the EU nationals is postponed and conditioned by Serbia’s membership in the EU.

The post In Search of Labor Market Opportunities for Immigrants in Serbia: Migration Policy Ambitions and Labor Market Realities appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

For more than a century, the Serbian state and Church have mythologized the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 as a defining moment of Serbian identity—a narrative culminating each year in the celebration of Vidovdan, Serbia’s national and religious holiday observed on June 28. Originally linked to the feast day of Saint Vitus, Vidovdan has since been transformed into a potent symbol of Serbian martyrdom and nationalist pride. But this myth, far from being a benign cultural tradition, is in fact a calculated ideological construction. It has served to justify territorial claims against Kosovo and to propagate a hegemonic vision of Serbian exclusivity in the Balkans.

In historical terms, the Battle of Kosovo was a relatively minor confrontation. Some historians have even questioned its factual veracity. What is indisputable, however, is that the event has been deliberately transformed into a foundational myth—an origin story for the Serbian national project. Beginning in the 19th century, with the emergence of the modern Serbian state, this myth was carefully cultivated by the Serbian Academy and the Orthodox Church to serve political purposes. Kosovo, in this narrative, was cast as the “cradle of the Serbian nation,” a sacred land eternally tied to Serbian destiny.

But this version of history is not only factually distorted—it is dangerous.

The battle itself was part of a broader Christian coalition, one that included not only Serbs but also Hungarians, Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians, who at the time were predominantly Christian. Yet, in the nationalist retelling, all others are erased. The myth excludes non-Serbs from Kosovo’s past and present, creating a fabricated sense of historical entitlement. It is a hegemonic tale that positions Serbs as the sole inheritors of the land, disregarding centuries of multiethnic coexistence.

More importantly, this myth has not remained confined to folklore or liturgy. It has deeply shaped Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy. In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the battle, Slobodan Milošević delivered his infamous speech at Gazimestan, transforming Vidovdan into a rallying cry for nationalist mobilization. Since then, the holiday has been celebrated not as a cultural event, but as a chauvinistic display of exclusivism and dominance. This has had devastating consequences for the region—fueling ethnic tensions, legitimizing war crimes, and obstructing reconciliation.

In the diplomatic arena, the myth of Vidovdan has also been instrumentalized. The Serbian Church and state have produced countless publications invoking this narrative, embedding it not only in their own institutional documents but also influencing international academic and diplomatic discourse. In the early 20th century, Serbia capitalized on favorable geopolitical alignments—presenting itself as anti-German, anti-Austrian, and aligning with French and British interests. Through active propaganda, the myth found sympathetic ears in Western diplomatic and scholarly circles, particularly during and after the First World War.

But the logic of ancient entitlement is a flawed and perilous one. If historical claims were to dictate modern statehood, then much of the Balkans could belong to Rome, Byzantium, or the Ottomans. States cannot be built on myths or memory alone—especially when such memory is weaponized against others.

It is time to confront the myth of Vidovdan for what it is: not a sacred memory of national martyrdom, but a political instrument of exclusion and domination. The Balkans deserve a future grounded in truth, coexistence, and mutual respect—not in the ghosts of a selectively remembered past.

The post Vidovdan: A Dangerous Myth Turned Political Weapon appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Abstract

This paper examines the multifaceted and complex phenomenon of globalization, structured into six distinct sections. The introduction elucidates the concept of globalization, defining it as a complex network of interconnectedness, interaction, and interdependence among individuals, societies, and economies. The subsequent section traces the historical development of globalization through its various ‘waves’, arguing that while globalization has existed since antiquity in the form of international trade, it gained momentum through the voyages of discovery, colonialism and imperialism. However, it was not until the late 20th century that globalization accelerated on an unprecedented scale.The paper identifies two key drivers behind the increased rate of contemporary globalization: technological advancements in transportation and, more significantly, in communication and information. The invention of the internet, followed by the rise of 21st-century social media and digital networking, has propelled globalization to new heights. The thirdpartanalyses the types of globalization, categorising it into four distinct ones: economic, political, cultural, and social, addressing their respective characteristics and manifestations.The following section explores the implications of globalization, emphasizing its profound and far-reaching consequences. While globalization has yielded significant economic, cultural and social benefits, it has also generated considerable challenges and inequalities. The fifth part examines the phases of globalization, delineating four key periods: pre-World War I, post-World War II, the late 20th century, and the era of hyper-globalization. Each phase is analysed in terms of its defining features and impact on global dynamics. The final section engages with scholarly debates surrounding the concepts of ‘slowbalization’ and‘ deglobalization’,about certain developments such as the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted global interconnectedness and raised questions about the future trajectory of globalization. The paper concludes that, despite growing discussions on its slowdown or potential reversal, globalization remains an enduring reality that has brought substantial benefits to humanity.

Key words

Globalisation, international trade, transportation, communication, information technology, political & economic & cultural globalisation, deglobalisation, slowbalization.

I. Introduction: Meaning of Globalisation

Scholars have debated the phenomenon of globalization for several decades, although there has not always been agreement on what it means and some even doubting whether it exists (Held and McGrew, 2003; Scholte, 2005).Most scholars, however, accept that globalization is a reality, although there still questions as to when it began and whether the current phase is something that is really new. Furthermore, the phenomenon also has a normative dimension: is it a good or bad thing? There are strong arguments for and against. More recently, the debate has shifted to whether globalization has come to a halt or even reversed, if this is the case, why is this happening today? This topic, known as ‘deglobalization’, has also been hotly debated (Paul, 2021). This paper accepts the majority position that globalization is a reality and has brought many positive benefits but argues that we are today in a new phase.

First and foremost, what is globalization? It can be defined as the process through which goods, services, capital, technology, knowledge, and ideas are disseminated rapidly across the world. In other words, globalization constitutes a complex network of interconnectedness, interaction, and interdependence of everything and everyone, wherein distance of time and space between people have become increasingly insignificant. It facilitates the swift and seamless global mobility of people, capital, technology, goods, and services. Essentially, globalization can be understood as the emergence of a ‘borderless world’, in which national and state boundaries have become increasingly permeable.

II. History of Globalisation

The term itself appeared in social science discussions as early as the 1940s and then became more frequent in the 1960s and 1970s (Scholte, 2005), but it became widespread in the 1980s and 1990s reflecting global geopolitical and economic changes during this period. Some authors at that time argued that globalization wasnot new,buthad existed in phenomena such as the Great Silk Road which connected China with the Mediterranean world from the 1^stcentury BC to the 5th century AD and again during 14^th and 15^th centuries AD. Other examples of early globalization were the voyages of discovery in the 15^th and 16^th centuries when Spanish, Portuguese, and English explorers such as Christopher Columbus, Ferdinand Magellan, and Sir Francis Drake discovered lands then unknown to Europeans and opened the way to a more global understanding of the world (indeed the awareness that the world was a globe and not flat as had earlier been thought), as well opening up trade routes across the oceans (Scholte, 2005).

This was also the beginning of the first phase of Empire-building by European powers,Spain, Portugal, England, and the Netherlands, whose domains would eventually cover almost the entire planet. Imperialism has been seen as a form of globalisation (Hardt & Negri, 2003) and the 19^th century saw a new wave of empire-building as France, Germany, and Italy occupied territories in Africa and elsewhere.

Despite these claims that globalization is not new but quite ancient, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (2024) distinguishes two waves of globalisation. It argues that it was not until the 19th century did global integration take off. Following centuries of European colonization and trade activity, that first ‘wave’ of globalization was facilitated by steamships, railroads, the telegraph, and other breakthroughs, and by increasing economic cooperation among countries. The globalization trend eventually waned and crashed in the catastrophe of World War I, followed by postwar protectionism, the Great Depression, and World War II. After World War II in the mid-1940s, the United States led efforts to revive international trade and investment under negotiated ground rules, starting a second wave of globalization.

Although globalization has historical roots dating back to early regional and international trade networks, it accelerated dramatically by the late twentieth century, driven primarily by two transformative forces.The first key driver was advances in transportation. This was already present in 19^th century with the introduction of steamships and railways. The motor car and air flight arrived at the beginning of the 20^th century and horse-drawn transport gave way to the use of cars, buses and lorries, and the construction of huge highway networks. In addition, developments in aviation made possible that large numbers of passengers and big amounts of goods could be moved over long distances very quickly. The two World Wars, besides causing widespread destruction and loss of life, were also seedbeds of innovation and technological development with further developments in motor transport, more sophisticated airplanes, helicopters, and rockets, the invention of radar and sophisticated communications system. Science was applied to warfare, but had many spinoffs that would enter into everyday economic and social life. All of this accelerated after the Second World War with the invention of atomic energy, space travel, satellites, and increasingly swift transport systems.

However, it was not until the 1980s that the term ‘globalization’ gained popularity and in particular in the early 1990s. Why was that?

Globalization, encompassing not only the trade of goods and services or the movement of people,but also the spread of capital, technology, knowledge, culture and ideas,very rapidly on a global scale, began to accelerate in the 1980s. But why during this period? This surge was largely driven by the high-tech revolution and advancements in innovation, including the development of computers, cable networks, satellites, and information technology. Thus, the second driver responsible for shaping globalization was the communication&information technology (technologies revolutionthat began in Silicon Valley in California). At the beginning of the 1990s, another significant technological breakthrough entered the scene creating a truly global world of communication and interaction – the invention of the Internet, allowing people and businesses to communicate instantly. The 21st century has seen huge leaps in communication technology.Personal computers and especially the mobile phones, enabled people to communicate and to access the internet wherever they are. In the last decade, communication went to next level with social media, bringing people from all around the world in contact with one another.

When scholars began to debate the globalization of the 1990s, they were divided into three principal groups: a)those who argued that this was nothing new but, as has been described above, is actually a very old phenomenon; b) those who argued that the globalization of the 1990s was a specifically new phenomenon compared to previous globalization (Held, Scholte and others); c) and, finally, some who argued that in fact there was no globalization (Hirst and Thompson, 2003, 98-105). This last group rejected globalization because, according to them, nation-statesare still the key actors in international relations and politics, while the advocates of a ‘new’ globalization argued that this was undermining nation-states.

Most social scientists today agree with Held and Scholtethat there has indeed been a new globalization. However, the problem remains of defining what the term means as different definitions of the term may explain the lack of agreement referred to above.Here we distinguish different types of globalization, which are distinct, but also interact with each other.

III. Types of Globalization

Economic globalization.

This represents one of the earliest forms of globalization, historically evident through international trade. In contemporary terms, economic globalization refers to the increasing interdependence of national economies, driven by the expanding scale of cross-border trade in goods and services, the flow of international capital, and the rapid dissemination of technology. As a result, national economies are becoming increasingly integrated into a highly interconnected global economic system.

Economic globalization manifests in three key forms:

1. Transnational Companies (TNCs) or Multinational Corporations (MNCs):They have become the main carriers of economic globalization (Shangquan: 2000). TNCs relocate manufacturing operations overseas, often to regions where labor regulations are less stringent, wages are lower, labor costs are more competitive, andlabor force is cheaper.
2. Internationally Mobile Labor Force: Individuals with in-demand skills can access employment opportunities and find work across the world fast and easily.
3. Global Financial Markets: The growth and increasing integration of financial markets enables capital to move freely across borders, influencing global economic trends.

Figure 1: An example of MNC – Toyota, which operates manufacturing and sales facilities across the globe.

When scholars speak of globalization, they often refer to the economic dimension. The advocates of the new globalization relate this to transformations which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s which saw the end of the dominant Keynesian model of economic policy with the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, when President Nixon announced that the United States would no longer convert dollars to gold at a fixed value (Eichenberg, 2019, p. 124-7). This eventually led in the 1980s to neo-liberalism, promoted by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which replaced the Keynesian model and shifted the focus in economic policy from a state-based approach to a market-based one. This became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (see below for an outline of the main tenets of this). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the institutions of global economic governance established in the 1950s, now shifted from an approach informed by Keynesianism to one underpinned by the ‘Washington Consensus’. Economic production has been primarily associated by the economies of nation-states. With the new globalization, there emerges for the first time truly global economies in specific fields, such as banking, and in certain sectors of production although it remains true that all economic production is located somewhere geographically (Dicken, 2003). Economic globalization is primarily measured by trade flows, reflecting the increasing interconnectedness of national economies through the exchange of goods, services, and capital. This economic integration has promoted global business and investment, fostering economic growth and development across borders.

An important feature of this aspect of globalization is that it has permitted countries such as Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa (known as the BRICS) to join the economic system of Western countries dominated by the USA and Europe, while previously they had been excluded or excluded themselves, from this. The collapse of the USSR and its communist satellites in the 1990s accelerated this type of globalization. For various reasons, the former communist states such as the Balkans, such as those that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, failed to capitalise on the opportunities that the new globalization presented in the way that the states of the Far East and Latin America did.

It is important to distinguish between the financial and the economic dimensions of globalization.  Economies are still today largely nationally based. Economics as a discipline calculates economic processes by referring primarily to national economies. As mentioned earlier, there have been some truly global economic processes in some markets such as services. But the bulk are still nationally based. Even MNCs have their headquarters in particular countries although their diversification across several countries allows them sometimes to escape government regulation and taxation. The global financial markets are rather different and from the 1990s these took on a life of their own with banks developing new financial instruments and derivatives which really did escape government regulation. This was one of the factors that led to the 2007/8 Financial Crisis which subsequently began to affect national economies.

A key implication of economic globalization is the diminishing ability of national governments to regulate their economies independently, to manage their own economies, and to resist neoliberal market policies. Consequently, many scholars argue that globalization aligns closely with neoliberalism for two primary reasons:

1. Shared Principles: Both emphasize competition, efficiency, productivity, and flexibility.
2. Economic Policies: Both advocate for open markets, free trade, capital market liberalization, and flexible exchange rates.

By the end of the 1990s, neoliberalism had emerged as the dominant and largely unchallenged ideology of the new world economy.

Political globalization.

Political globalization refers to the increasing degree of political cooperation among nations. It is reflected in the establishment and growing influence of international organizations, which exercise jurisdiction not only within individual states, but also across multiple countries or entire regions. The underlying rationale for these “umbrella” organizations is that they are better equipped than individual governments to address and resolve global challenges and conflicts.

However, political globalization has also led to a decline in national sovereignty, as states increasingly cede authority to supranational institutions. This has raised concerns about the erosion of the traditional nation-state and its ability to independently govern its affairs.

The most significant types of international organizations include:

1. Political and Security Organizations: United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), Council of Europe (CoE).
2. Economic Organizations: World Bank (WB), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
3. Cultural Organizations: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

One of the most important transformations that occurred with the arrival of the new globalization was a reconfiguration of the place and role of the nation-state and national governments in the international Westphalian system of international relations. The old Keynesian model had placed central governments as the key actors in economic policy and management even if this varied according to distinctive state traditions. The underlying rationale of Keynesianism remained the same: the state should dominate both markets and society. Neo-liberal globalization did not abolish nation-states as some of the more extreme analyses claimed (Ohmae, 1995),but it did undermine its central position and permitted other actors such as international organizations, most notably the IMF and WB, and in Europe the European Union (EU), and even subnational authorities to rival its sovereign status. This has been described as a system of ‘Multilevel Governance’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2001).This led to a new development of global governance institutions and structures (Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002). The new global governance encompasses the formation and operation of international organizations, and the treatiesand agreements that shape global policies and regulations.

The advocates of strengthened global governance argue that this aspect of globalization facilitates cooperation and coordination among nations to address global challenges such as climate change, security, and human rights. On the other hand, critical perspectives point to the declining role of national governments and particularly the deregulation that accompanied neo-liberal globalization. One of the longer-term consequences of this deregulation was the financial crisis of 2007/8 which led to the Great Recession of that period. It was clear that globalized banking processes had largely escaped governmental regulation and failed to prevent the melt-down. Subsequently, central governments and organizations such as the EU began to tighten up their fiscal procedures and even to re-centralize their economic and financial control mechanisms (Callanan and Loughlin, 2021).

Cultural globalization.

Cultural globalization refers to the process by which information, goods, and images produced in one region of the world circulate globally, leading to a diminishing of cultural differences between nations and societies. As a result, people dress, eat, speak, and think similarly everywhere. This trend promotes cultural homogeneity and uniformity, often at the expense of national traditions and identities, withlocal cultures fading away.

This refers to the spread of values and ideas across the globe. In practice, this means Western values and ideas. Therefore, this phenomenon is frequently describedas ‘Americanization’ or ‘McDonaldization’, highlighting the dominance of Western, particularly American, cultural influences. Cultural globalization has been significantly accelerated by advancements in transportation, making international travel more affordable, and by the rapid development of information technology (IT), including the internet, satellite communication, and telecommunications.This has been helped by the extraordinary development of communicationstechnologies mostly in Silicon Valley in California, but in the UK and France as well.

In the contemporary era, social media has further intensified this process, amplifying the reach and impact of global cultural influences. From the early successes of the internet and email, these have expanded to platformssuch as Facebook, X/Twitter, and TikTok (McChesney, 2003). The use of new social media by political actors such as Obama on the Left and Trump on the Right show how effective they can be (Hendricks and Denton, 2010; Francia, 2017). Although these technologies originated in the West, countries such as China have adopted and developed them and now use them as means of influencing Western societies. Russia, for example, has been heavily involved in cyber-attacks on Western states to undermine Western democracy (Greenberg, 2020). Cyberwarfare has thus become a new theatre of warfare which is perhaps even more dangerous than conventional warfare especially with the most recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (Clark, 2003).

Social globalization.

This is most clear in patterns of cross-border migration. Cross-border migration has always been a feature of human settlement, and in the 1950s and 1960s the post-war economic recovery in Western Europe attracted many economic migrants to bolster the labour forces of these countries. Since the 1980s, however, and particularly since the 1990s, with the collapse of the communism in USSR and Eastern Europe and the enlargement of the European Union, there has been an even more massive influx of economic migrants from east to west. In 2010, the Arab Spring and Western intervention led to further intensive migration into surrounding countries especially Turkey and Europe as a result of the conflicts and wars and the rise of groups such as Islamic State.

It is sometimes argued that these movements of people across countries and continents contributes to the creation of multicultural societies, where individuals and communities interact and coexist. This has been the case when the migration flows have been carefully managed such as in the United States and, even there, the integration of early migrants such as the Irish, Italians, and Germans in the 19^th century at times led to conflict. Overall, however, the US did prove to be a ‘melting pot’ in which the different groups in the end became loyal Americans while retaining some of their original identities.

In contrast, the more recent waves of migration in Europe have been less carefully managed,giving rise to a range of new challenges, which Bogdani (2009) categorises as below:

• The complexities of multiculturalism
• Issues of integration of immigrants into hosting societies.
• The threatto national security.
• The rise of nationalist political movements and right-wing parties.

Multiculturalism initially meant the co-existence of different cultures andthe recognition of cultural diversity of communities living in harmony together.However, in contemporary discourse, it increasingly denotes not only tolerance of cultural diversity but also demands for legal recognition of ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural rights. As Francis Fukuyama (2006) argues, “The hosting societies could get along with it as long as it does not challenge the liberal social order and is not a threat to liberal-democracy”.However, some immigrant communities have advanced demands or engaged in actions that are incompatible with liberal democratic principles, in some cases even challenging the secular order. This has led to growing hostility among European populations, who argue that multiculturalism has weakened national identities, disrupted traditional ways of life, and diminished the role of religion in public life. This has led, not to vibrant multicultural societies, but to societies divided into different communities and marked by high levels of social conflict.

Integration, on the other hand, refers to the process by which ethnic communities adopt the cultural identity of their host country. In Europe, this primarily applies to Muslim and other immigrant groups. However, a lack of successful integration has often resulted in the formation of segregated communities, where immigrants live parallel lives in enclaves among their compatriots. As Robert S. Leiken (2005) observes, “they are European citizens in name only, but not culturally or socially”. Francis Fukuyama (2006) considers the integration of immigrant minorities (particularly those from Muslim countries) as citizens of pluralistic societies, the most serious longer-term challenge facing liberal democracies today.

The growing dissatisfaction among Europeans with the failure of immigrant integration, the perceived excesses of multiculturalism, and the pervasivePC (political correctness), have contributed to the rise of right-wing and far-right populist parties (Bogdani, 2009). This resurgence of nationalist movements is evident not only in political discourse, but also present in mainstream politics, in national parliaments and governments.The electoral success of some of these parties in various national elections, as well as victory in the last 2024 European elections, where nationalist, populist, and far-right parties gained substantial support, showed that these parties are popular and loveable, particularly among native populations. The reason for this is because they advocate for the preservation of European heritage and European national identities,the protection of traditional cultural values, and the reinforcement of Christian-secularist principles against the perceived threat of Islamization.Their victories reflect widespread concerns among European populations over immigration, cultural change, and national identity, prompting calls for stricter immigration policies and renewed emphasis on safeguarding Europe’s historical and cultural legacy.

This in turn has placed the democratic systems of the EU under strain. The prospects of joining the EU for those candidate countries which are seeking membership have become so much more difficult as the elites of the EU and the current member states are wary of causing further backlashes such as occurred in the UK with the Brexit vote to leave the EU in 2016 (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018).

IV. Implications of Globalisation

Globalization has far-reaching consequences, bringing both positive and negative implications for societies worldwide.

Positive Implications

Globalization offers numerous benefits and advantages, which can be categorised into economic, cultural and social dimensions, as outlined below.

Effects of globalization on economic development (Research FDI: 2023) include:

Increased trade and investment opportunities: This has led to higher levels of economic growth and development.

• Access to new markets and customers: This has helped to boost sales and profits. 
• Greater efficiency and productivity:  Globalization has increased competition among businesses, which has driven innovation and efficiency.
• Increased competition: This has led to lower prices and higher quality products for consumers.  
• Spread of new technologies and knowledge:  Globalization has facilitated the spread of new technologies and knowledge across borders, allowing countries to learn from one another and adopt best practices.
• Transnational companies in lower income countries:This can help to improve the local economy and provide new jobs and skills.

Effects of globalization on cultural dimension:

• Greater tolerance and understanding: Exposure to diverse cultures fosters mutual respect and global awareness.
• Cultural coexistence: Different cultures interact and influence one another, promoting multiculturalism.
• People can experience new countries and cultures around the world due to the media and better transport.
• Access to new cultural products: Globalization enhances exposure to cultural elements such as art (greater access to diverse artistic works and expressions) and entertainment (wider availability of global media, films, and music).

Effects of globalization on social dimension:

• Increased convenience: It simplifies daily life through technological advancements and global integration.
• Easier communication: The widespread use of the English language facilitates global connections.
• Access on education: Expansion of international academic exchange and learning opportunities.

Negative implications

Despite its advantages, globalization also presents several challenges. Alongside the positive impacts, globalization has also brought about a range of negative impacts on economic development (Research FDI: 2023), as well as on culture and social life.

Economic dimension:

·

• Loss of jobs and industries in some regions: because of the relocation of industries and jobs to countries with lower labor costs.
• Widening income inequality: between and within countries, with some countries and individuals benefiting more than others.
• Vulnerability to global economic downturns: Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of economies, making them more vulnerable to global economic downturns and crises.  
• Small businesses are forced to close, due to the competition from global chain stores.

Cultural dimension:

• Cultural homogenization: Globalization has led to the spread of Western culture and values, which has resulted in the homogenization of cultures and the loss of traditional cultures. 
• Often referred to as the “global monoculture,” globalization diminishes cultural, social, economic, and political diversity. People worldwide watch the same TV programs and films, buy the same things, wear the same clothes, eat the same food, and adopt uniform lifestyles.
• Loss of national identities: The increasing influence of global norms and institutions can weaken the sense of national belonging.
• Erosion of local cultures: Traditional customs, languages, and cultural practices risk being overshadowed by dominant global influences.

Social dimension:

• Environmental degradation: Increased trade and economic activity has led to higher levels of pollution, deforestation, and climate change. 
• Global risks: The interconnected nature of globalization exacerbates various transnational threats, including:
• Pandemics – The rapid movement of people and goods accelerates the spread of infectious diseases.Diseases such as Covid-19 can spread from one country to another far easier with so many people and goods moving around the world.
• Terrorism – Global networks facilitate the organization and execution of transnational terrorist activities. As Bogdani (2009) argues, globalisation, driven by the Internet and the tremendous modern mobility, has blurred the boundaries between the developed world and traditional Muslim societies. The proximity brought by globalisation is inherently dangerous when cultures are different. It is not an accident that so many terrorists were either European Muslims or came from privileged sectors of Muslim societies with opportunities for contact with the West.
• Drug and Human Trafficking – International criminal networks exploit globalization to expand illicit trade and exploitation.

Therefore, wide-ranging effects of globalization are complex and controversial. As with major technological advances, globalization has delivered benefits to the world’s societies, but has been the target of criticism for allegedly harming certain groups and aggravating inflation, supply chain disruptions, trade disputes, and national security concerns (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2024).

V. Phases of Globalization

It is useful to sketch out the changing historical context in which different phases of globalization occurred and to analyse the different features of each phase.

Figure 1: Globalization through recent history.

Source: World Economic Forum.

What is striking in this history of globalization is the accelerating pace of change. This can be seen in the diagram in Figure 1 which distinguishes distinct periods:

Globalization 1.0 (pre-World War I).

This period of globalization was driven by two principal factors: first, the expansion of new phase of imperialism by Western countries such as England, France, and Germany; and second, by the dynamism of the Industrial Revolution with the US, Europe, Argentina, and Australia as the principal forces. The resulting global trade exchange was facilitated by the gold standard and lower transportation costs.

Globalization 2.0 (post-World War II).

Phase 1.0 ended with the outbreak of the WWI and the interwar period was marked by economic nationalism and retrenchment, the Great Depression and the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Soviet Communism, all leading to WWII. Following WWII, however, we enter the phase of post-war economic reconstruction, with the United States emerging as the new superpower while the European empires begin to unravel. This is a period internal state and economic expansion in the Western powers, as the combination of Keynesian economic policies and the founding of Welfare States led to the emergence of strong states. The founding of the European Economic Community in the early 1950s, far from undermining the nation-state, served in fact to strengthen it (Milward, 2000). Although Western countries dominated by the US created the conditions of global trade, the Cold War divisions of international politics prevented true globalization, as major powers such as the USSR and China remained outside the emerging global system.

Globalization 3.0 (late 20^th century).

The crises of the 1970s which saw the collapse of the Bretton-Woods Agreement as outlined above and the arrival of a dominant neo-liberalism known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Marangos, 2020), whose key tenets typically include:

• Fiscal discipline to avoid large fiscal deficits.
• Reorientation of public spending from subsidies toward broader social services like health and education.
• Tax reform, aimed at broadening the tax base and ensuring moderate marginal tax rates
• Interest rate liberalization to ensure market-determined interest rates.
• Competitive exchange rates to facilitate export growth.
• Trade liberalization, reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
• Openness to foreign direct investment (FDI).
• Privatization of state-owned enterprises.
• Deregulation to remove barriers to entry and competition.
• Secure property rights to ensure legal ownership and usage.

This period was marked by the creation of truly global markets in certain services and goods and, not least, in banking, where new financial tools such as derivatives were traded in global markets away from the regulation by national governments and banks (Castells, 2003). The foundations were thus being laid for the subsequent financial crisis.

Globalization 4.0 (hyper-globalization).

The collapse of communism in the USSR and its former satellite states in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as Yugoslavia and Albania, ushered in a new phase of globalization which was dubbed ‘hyper’-globalization.China and other states such as North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba did not give up communism, but China decided to join the global capitalist system and, as a result, became one of the leading players in world politics (McGrew, 2011). Although digital technologies had been present throughout the rise of the new globalization, their development accelerated at an even greater pace than previously and their application to real life economic processes and social interactions intensified. This enabled remote work and international telecommuting which transformed the service sector thus creating new opportunities and challenges. Productions processes and supply chains became highly integrated across borders and led to significant economic interdependence (Castells, 2003).

VI. Slowbalization, Deglobalization, and Regionalization

The period of ‘hyperglobalization’ ended with the Great Recession of 2007/8 and then with the Covid-19 pandemic, which brought the world almost to a standstill and from which we are now recovering. There is a debate as to whether this has led to ‘deglobalization’,with some contesting the idea (e.g. Altman et al. 2024), and with other prominent economists accepting that it is occurring (e.g. James, 2017).

At the very least, we can say that globalization is slowing down even if it not reversing. The term ‘slowbalization’ was coined by Teyvan Pettinger in a blogin 2017 (Pettinger, 2017).The advocates of slowbalization and deglobalization highlight the following features of the change:

• Reduced global trade.
• Reshoring, onshoring, and friendshoring: governments and companies are bringing production and supply chains closer to home to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers (for the West, especially dependency on China).
• Regionalization of trade: there has been a trend towards regional trade agreements and partnerships.
• Technological decoupling: countries are investing in their own high-tech industries which is especially evident in US-China (even US-Taiwan) relations.
• Focus on resilience and security: countries emphasize strengthening their own security chains.
• National governments are trying to regain control over their own economic and financial systems: this is a reaction to the loss of control that had led to the financial and economic crises of 2007/8.

These developments pose challenges to world and regional political systems. Aspects of globalization, as we have seen, contributed to the rise of populist movements of both left and right in the EU member states and, in the UK at least, led to Brexit and the departure of the UK from EU membership. Similar political movements can today be found in several of the Member States including the longest serving members such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. The EU’s response to these challenges has been to attempt to strengthen its democratic credentials, both atmember-states level and at the EU level. But they have also led to a rethinking of the EU’s future and particularly its appetite for further enlargement toward the Balkans and Turkey, both of which are candidates for membership. It remains to be seen whether there will be ‘slowbalization’ of the enlargement procedure. Many EU member states, particularly France and the Netherlands, have expressed skepticism about further enlargement due to concerns over governance, corruption, and economic disparities in candidate countries. This reluctance has resulted in stalled accession talks, as seen with North Macedonia and Albania. President Macron has repeatedly emphasized that the EU must deepen integration before expanding further. His 2019 veto of North Macedonia’s and Albania’s accession talks illustrates how domestic political priorities in France shape EU policy. Germany has traditionally been a pro-enlargement advocate.It sees Balkan stability as crucial for European security. However, domestic concerns about migration and economic disparities have tempered enthusiasm for rapid expansion. On the other hand, some member states from the former East European bloc like Hungary and Poland often support Balkan enlargement, partly to strengthen the influence of conservative and Eurosceptic voices within the EU (Bogdani & Loughlin, 2007).

Conclusions

Globalization is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon, commonly defined as a network of interconnectedness, interaction, and interdependence. It has enabled the rapid transnational movement of goods, services, people, capital, technology and culture, rendering traditional notions of time and space increasingly irrelevant. Although globalization has historical roots dating back to early regional and international trade networks, its scope and intensity expanded dramatically by the late twentieth century, driven primarily by two transformative forces: advancements in transportation, and more significantly, innovations in communication and information technology.The early 1990s marked a turning point with the advent of the Internet, followed by the widespread use of personal computers and mobile phones, all of which revolutionized global communication. The emergence of social media in the past decade has further accelerated the pace and depth of globalization.Globalization manifests in four primary dimensions: economic, political, cultural, and social, each characterized by distinct features and expressions. Its influence has generated profound implications for states, governments, societies and individuals alike. While globalization has delivered significant economic growth, cultural exchange, and social transformation, it has also given rise to notable challenges and deepening global inequalities. Globalization has evolved through several distinct phases: the pre-World War I era, the post-World War II period, the late twentieth century, and the current phase often referred to as ‘hyper-globalization.’ Each of these periods is marked by unique characteristics and has exerted a significant impact on global dynamics.The era of hyper-globalization has, in recent years, led to growing discourse on ‘deglobalization,’ with scholars divided between those who challenge its occurrence and those who assert that it is already underway. A related concept gaining traction in academic debate is that of ‘slowbalization,’ which refers to a deceleration of global integration, as exemplified by critical events such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. These disruptions have raised fundamental questions about the future trajectory of globalization.Nevertheless, despite increasing discussions about its potential stagnation or reversal, globalization persists as a defining and enduring feature of contemporary global society, one that continues to deliver considerable benefits to humanity.

REFERENCES

Altman, Steven A., Caroline R. Bastian, and Davis Fattedad (2024), “Challenging the Deglobalization Narrative: Global Flows Have Remained Resilient through Successive Shocks.” Journal of International Business Policy, Vol. 7, no. 4 (2024): 416–439.

Bogdani, M. & Loughlin, J. (2007), Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession.I.B.Tauris: London – NY.

Bogdani, M. (2009), Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession: When Religion meets Politics.I.B.Tauris: London – NY.

Callahan, Mark and Loughlin, John (2021), (eds.), A Research Agenda for Regional and Local Government, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Castells, Manuel (2003), “Global Informational Capitalism”, in Held and McGrew, op. cit., pp. 311-334.

Clark, Ian (2003), “The Security State”, in Held and McGrew, op. cit., pp. 177-8.

Dicken, Peter (2003), “A new eco-economy”, in Held and McGrew, op. cit.,pp. 303-310.Eichenberg, Barry, Globalizing Capital: a History of the International Monetary System, 3rd edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Francia, Peter L. (2017), “Free Media and Twitter in the 2016 Presidential Election: The Unconventional Campaign of Donald Trump”, Social Science Computer Review,Vol.36, no. 4, August 2018, pp. 440-455.

Fukuyama, F. (2006), “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal-democracy”. Journal of Democracy 17/2. pp. 5-20.

Greenberg, Andy (2020), Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwarfare and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s most dangerous hackers, London, Penguin Random House.

A NEW ERA OF CYBERWAR AND THE HUNT FOR THE KREMLIN’S MOST DANGEROUS HACKERS

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2003), “Globalization as Empire”, in Held and McGrew, op. cit., pp. 116-9).

Held, David andAnthony McGrew(2003), (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2^nd edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

Hendricks, John Allen& Denton, Robert E. Jr. (2010). Communicator-in-Chief: How Barack Obama Used New Media Technology to Win the White House. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Hirst, Paul and Graeme Thompson (2003), “Globalization – a Necessary Myth”, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2^nd edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (2001),Multi-Level Governance and European Integration Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield.

James, Harold (2017), “Deglobalization as a Global Challenge”, CIGI Papers no. 135, Waterloo, Canada:Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Leiken, R. (2005), “Europe’s Angry Muslims”. Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.4, pp.120-35.

Marangos, John (2020), International development and the Washington Consensus / John Marangos.London : Routledge.

McChesney, Robert W. (2003), “The New Global Media”, in Held and MCrew, op.cit. pp.260-277.

McGrew, Anthony (2011), “Globalization and Global Politics”, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 14-31.

Millard, Alan S. (2000), Routledge,London & New York, 2000.

Mudde, Cas and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwaser(2018), “Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda”, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 51, No. 13, pp. 1667-1693.

Ohmae, Ken’chi (1995), The End of the Nation-State: the Rise of Regional Economies, The Free Press, New York.

Paul, T. V. (2021), “Globalization, deglobalization andreglobalization: adapting liberalinternational order”, International Affairs, Vol. 97, no. 5, pp. 1599–1620.

Pettinger, Teyvan (2017), Economics Help.

https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/166776/economics/slowbalisation-is-globalisation slowing-down/

Peterson Institute for International Economics (2024), “What is Globalisation?”, 16 August.

Bottom of Form

Research FDI (2023), “The effects of globalization on economic development”, 11 April.

Scholte, Jan Aart (2005), Globalization: A critical introduction.2^ndedition revised and updated, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, UK.

Shangquan, Gao (2000), “Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention”, Economic and Social Affairs. CDP Background Paper No.1.

Wilkinson, Rorden and Hughes, Steve (2002), (eds.), Global Governance: Critical Perspectives, Abingdon, Routledge.

[1]University of New York Tirana, Department of Politics & IR. Albania. mirelabogdani@unyt.edu.al

[2]University of Cambridge & Cardiff University, United Kingdom. jl602@cam.ac.uk

The post Globalization, Deglobalization, and Slowbalization appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

In 1919, Vatra, a pan-Albanian association functioning as something of a shadow Albanian government in the United States, made an unprecedented request to Secretary of State Robert Lansing: Albania should become an American protectorate. Just three months later, at the Paris Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson rejected the Secret Treaty of London, which would have effectively erased Albania from the map as an independent state. Thereafter, in the  autumn of 1946, Albania issued an ultimatum to the US to withdraw its diplomatic mission, forcing its members to flee under the protection of American warships. For the next 50 years, the US was branded Albania’s greatest and most dangerous enemy by the communist regime. Yet, through it all, two generations of Albanians held onto the hope that one day ‘the Americans would come to liberate the country from communism’. In 1991, Albania and the United States re-established diplomatic ties and today Albania is perhaps the most pro-American country in the world, as well as being the only aspiring EU member with near-unanimous support for membership.

Throughout modern Albanian history, relations with the US have either been exclusive and privileged or non-existent. To understand and explain contemporary Albanian-American relations, it is essential to deconstruct myths and explain paradoxes as a necessity for encouraging democratisation of the asymmetric relations between a great power and a small state so as to protect and develop these relations in the years ahead.

‘Myths are lies that tell the truth’

On June 5, 2007, President George W. Bush was greeted in Prague by two thousand protesters opposing US plans to install a missile defence system in Europe. Five days later, tens of thousands gathered to welcome him in Tirana’s main square, decorated as if for a grand celebration with portraits, Albanian and American flags together with slogans for the occasion. For the older generation, this might have evoked memories of similar receptions during communist times when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev or Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania in 1959 and 1965 respectively. This resemblance, along with Albania’s history of asymmetric relationships with great powers, leads some scholars to categorise Albania-US relations as ‘client-patron’. As with many small states, over the past one hundred years Albania has sought various alliances, first with the Soviet Union, then China and finally the United States.

However, careful observation of Albania’s foreign relations does not necessarily support this pattern, with Albanians’ love for the US at first glance seeming irrational. Looking back over one hundred years of relations, this love has certainly been grounded in rationality – even as it was becoming a myth. As the ancient thinker Aphthonius noted, “Myths are lies that tell the truth”. However, where does the rationality lie in Albanians’ love for America and what are some of the truths behind the myth? Regardless of their asymmetry, Albania’s ties with the US have always revolved around crucial issues vital to the Albanian state and nation. For instance, in 1919 President Wilson became a national hero for Albanians when he intervened to save the country from partition. Relations with the US, in Albania’s case, have defined its relations with the West. After the Second World War, Albania’s society was split: pro-Western Albanians, which were in the majority, looked to the US for economic and cultural guidance, while pro-Eastern factions turned to the Soviet Union. It is important to note that at this time, when the country had less than one million inhabitants, more than a quarter of a million Albanians had either emigrated to the US or had family there.

As mentioned earlier, in modern Albanian history, relations with the US have been either exclusive and privileged or non-existent. When they have existed, they have been deeply rooted in principles of freedom and democracy. Hence, in 1945 the US refused to recognise rigged elections and the communist regime of Enver Hoxha, with the result that less than twelve months later Albania’s new communist government forced the US to withdraw its diplomatic mission. In 1991, restoration of relations hinged on America’s demand for the existence of a democratic opposition in Albania. Hence, from 1992 Albania embraced democratic reforms and strengthened ties with the West. In 2008, Washington championed Albania’s NATO membership, the greatest achievement of modern Albania since the fall of communism, thereby firmly linking Albania’s present and future with the West and as such becoming the United States’ most reliable Balkan ally.

As a sign of its gratitude, all Albania’s governments over the past thirty years have supported US foreign policy and moreover have become actively involved, for example in Afghanistan and by joining the coalition against ISIS led by the US. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, America spearheaded NATO’s intervention and supported Kosovo’s subsequent independence in 2008. Albania’s strategic partnership with the US was formalised in 2013, when Tirana and Washington signed a strategic partnership agreement. In popular sentiment too, the US is perceived by Albanians as their country’s most important strategic ally, a relationship more valued than that with the European powers, including the European Union, with which Tirana claims strategic relations.

According to annual surveys conducted by the Albanian Institute of International Studies, both the US and the EU enjoy strong public support in Albania, with approval ratings of 90 % and 91 %, respectively. They are regarded as the most important strategic partners in Albania’s international relations. 

“It’s (not) the economy, stupid!”

For decades, Albanians believed that the US would one day liberate them from communism. This hope endured for 50 years, until it finally happened in 1991, when Secretary of State James Baker was welcomed in Tirana with much popular fanfare. Since then, Albania has built a solid relationship with the US, a relationship which is contributing to Albania’s democratic transformation. Yet, one key area remains underdeveloped: the economy.

Despite various economic agreements, trade between the two countries remains minimal, and US investments in Albania continue to be small. The reasons can be attributed to Albania’s unattractive investment environment, weak rule of law and high corruption levels. Moreover, Albania’s small market size makes it of peripheral interest for American companies and other FDI. Western countries dominate in foreign investments in Albania. These include Italy, Switzerland, Canada, the Netherlands, Greece and Austria, with Hungary also emerging as a player in the last three years. Within this group, the majority of investments come from EU member states in strategic sectors like banking, energy and construction, with Switzerland accounting for 16% and Canada 12%. Turkey is another significant foreign investor, contributing 7.6%. Regarding trade, China currently holds the third position after the EU and Turkey, although Chinese investments have been inconsistent.

Moreover, other Balkan states have much stronger economic ties to the US than Albania. In 2023, US investments amounted to a modest figure of 32 million euros, just four million more than investments from Kosovo. Countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, Turkey and Greece all have a larger presence. Over the past 20 years, US investments in Albania amounted to 232 million dollars, while US investments in Serbia were 4 billion dollars for the same period. On the other hand, trade and economic investments from the EU are vastly larger, confirming that the EU is the strategic ally for Albania when it comes to the economy. The volume of trade for 2022 alone between Albania and the EU was 7.1 billion euros, while investments reached 382 million euros. Since 2020, through the European Investment Plan, the EU has already mobilized 1.4 billion euros in investments, of which 470 million are grants.

Back to the future

More than 30 years after re-establishing ties, Albania-US relations are in transition. What does the future hold at a time when foreign policy is becoming increasingly transactional, raising concerns that a strategic partnership can become a ‘client-patron’ relationship. A century ago, Albanian leaders lobbied in Washington for the independence and existence of Albania as an independent sovereign state. In April 1939, just 48 hours before fascist Italy invaded Albania, King Zog tearfully summoned the American ambassador for an urgent and special audience, asking for help, saying that “only the US can save Albania and its independence”. Against this historical legacy and in sharp contrast to how foreign democratic powers such as Germany or Norway gain influence in Washington, contemporary Albanian leaders, caught in an extreme zero-sum game for power, try to buy support in Washington to gain advantages over their political opponents at home.

How will this strategic partnership develop? Will Albania continue to say ‘yes’ to every US request, as it did when it sheltered MEK, a former terrorist group, and Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban regime? Will Albania continue to favour the US over Western Europe, as it did in 2003 when it chose an alliance with ‘New Europe’ against ‘Old Europe’? Moreover, how will this affect Albania’s EU ambitions, when the US itself supports Albania’s future in the EU? This readiness to agree to every request risks transformation into a client-patron relationship, thereby making it harder to maintain a strategic partnership.

Besides being the ‘guardian angel’ of Albania’s independence and statehood, the US has known since the rigged 1945 elections that only a democratic Albania can be a partner to the US and the West. Moreover, only a democratic Albania can join the EU. Sliding into autocracy and the failure to build a democratic and functional state undermines the strategic partnership. Albania’s economic relations with the US shone brightly 75 years ago, but today must be regarded as poor. The reasons can be found in Albania’s market economy not functioning properly as the rule of law is not being strictly enforced.

Finally, with a culture of total dependency, Albania behaves as if it were a protectorate or as if it has just emerged from a colonial regime. Every group or individual with a grievance – students, unions, prisoners, LGBT groups, minorities, journalists, women’s organisations, veterans, political parties and their leaders, the mayor, the chief justice, the opposition leader – even the head of parliament and the president – pen letters of complaint or clarification to the international community. This starts with the US ambassador, who is at the centre of media attention as if he or she were the country’s viceroy.

A potential turning point in US-Albanian relations might emerge with the new US  administration. It is difficult to believe that President Trump would give significant attention to the Western Balkans, given the more pressing preoccupation with Russian aggression against Ukraine and a worsening crisis in the Middle East. However, geopolitically, the Balkans are significant in light of Russia’s proxy policies in its confrontation with the US and the West. As such, it is not impossible for the Trump administration to mediate a resolution to the frozen conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, thereby neutralising the main source of tensions in the region and Russia’s proxy policies. In 2020, Trump personally engaged in an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, while over the past four years Washington and the EU have encouraged dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on vehicle licence plates and other peripheral issues, hoping that a bottom-up approach would end the frozen conflict between the two states. It is not impossible that, with a top-down approach typical of Trump’s style, the two states could move toward mutual recognition as two independent states during his second term.

Changes are also expected in terms of intrastate relations. In recent years, we have seen a growing trend toward a more transactional approach in US foreign policy. Washington and the West, in general, have turned a blind eye to the increasingly autocratic regimes in the Western Balkans, including Albania.  Although such a trend may strengthen,  moving forward, a reflection and a more neutral role for Washington in Albania’s internal politics is needed.

After the Cold War, Albania managed to establish a privileged and exclusive relationship with the United States, mainly due to the unparalleled influence and role it played in an unstable Balkan region. Unfortunately, over the last ten years, this role has gradually diminished. So the future of Albania’s relations with the United States will depend on Albania’s ability to regain the key role it once held in the Balkans, at a time when Serbia has almost restored its relations with the US and the West.

Recommendations

Albania is a key country, alongside Serbia, for the stability and security of the Western Balkans. Surrounded by EU nations, the region directly impacts the European and Euro-Atlantic security environment. Since the end of the Cold War, US intervention was crucial in ending violent conflicts in the Balkans. Now, three decades later, only the continued engagement of the US and the EU can resolve the frozen conflict between Albanians and Serbs through the mutual recognition of Kosovo and Serbia as sovereign states.

Democratic backsliding, authoritarian tendencies and lingering totalitarian culture among Albania’s current political leaders could lead the country toward a one-party system, undermining relations with the US. Given the special relationship Albania shares with the US and the EU, both are in the best position to prevent the rise of a stabilocracy and the drift toward one-party rule.

Short-term transactional approaches and interests may entrench stabilocracies in the Western Balkans and will not foster democratic, responsible and uncorrupted governance. The new generation of Albanian political leaders — the ones who will take over from those who have dominated the political scene for three decades, whether in power or opposition — must move away from the dependency on the international community. They should offer fresh ideas to maintain US and EU support, ending the practice of purchasing influence for personal political gain in Washington or Brussels.

At the diplomatic level, US and EU envoys can assist in strengthening Albanian democracy by not acting as, or being perceived as, being external rulers of the country.

The essay ”From Staunch Enemy to Strategic Partner: Albanian-American Relations in Transition “ by Albert Rakipi is part of the book : “The United States and the Future of Europe,”  recently published (May 2025) by Springer.

Albert Rakipi currently serves as Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) a think tank based in Tirana, Albania. He has PhD in International Relations from Bilkent University. Before assuming this position, he had previously served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania. Representative of AIIS to the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) .Albert Rakipi has played a key role  in establishing  the Tirana  Campus of the College of Europe  in 2022- 2024  through a special inception proposal and dedicated advocacy Dr. Rakipi is the Founder and Editor of the Albanian Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy issues “Tirana Observatory”. Co-founder and co-editor of Tirana Times a weekly English Newspaper published in Tirana . His latest books are: “The Perils of Change” Albania’s Foreign Policy in transition”Albanian -Turkey Relations Continuity and Change,’ “Albania and Kosovo, Is Unification the Common Future “

The post From staunch enemy to strategic partner: Albanian-American relations in transition appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Free. Coming of Age at the End of History

Manuel Montobbio

Ideas are written and formulated with words, theories and concepts; and they are written and formulated with life and in life. With the reason, and with the soul. Freedom does need of both scriptures; since it has no meaning if it is not for life and by life. Perhaps this is why, during the confined time of the COVID-19 pandemic, Lea Ypi, Professor of Political Theory at the London School of Economics, decided to write an essay on the idea of freedom in the socialist and liberal traditions, ended up by writing the story of her life.

Of the presence in it of freedom in her progressive awareness in Enver Hoxha’s Albania and her experience of the communist regime created by him and its fall and transformation to democracy and the market Economy under the “shock therapy” that ends up leading to the collapse of the State in the crisis of the financial pyramids in 1997, and the stabilizing foreign military intervention of Operation Alba, a moment that coincides with her completion of high school and departure to Italy to pursue her University studies.

            Experience of the collective epic of the Albania of Enver Hoxha’s regime and that of its fall and pendulum transition towards the free market, a limit case of the embodiment in History of the idea of freedom in the tradition of really existing socialism and in the liberal tradition and their respective legitimizing discourses, ideas-force and words-talisman; be them the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, collectivization and the planned economy, anti-imperialism and the leadership of the Party; be them the magic hand of the market, structural reforms, transparency and human rights, the International Community and civil society.

Ideas whose application involves tragedies, such as the imprisonment of relatives – presented to the girl Lea as their absence due to her studies in “universities” which were actually prisons -, or the great escape and collective exodus after the fall of communism, or the collapse and evaporation of family economies in the faith in the multiplying capacity of the money of the financial pyramids.

            This lived History of Albania undoubtedly offers us material for reflection on freedom, and with it on power and its meaning in both systems; and Lea Ypi offers it to us in her book through the protagonists of her personal story – from her family and outside it, from their actions and their words – and the ideas and experiences that they embody and transmit, from their activities. Like, in her most immediate environment, the conception of freedom of her mother, Noli, as the absence of prohibition to do what one wants, and the confidence that the exercise of that freedom will lead to the better functioning and satisfaction of society.

Or his father, Zafo, who considers it contrary to freedom to be told what to do, whether in the coercion of communism, or in the ineluctable need for the structural reforms that are wanted to be imposed when he is the administrator of the port of Dürres after its fall, that imply the dismissal of the majority of its workers, as if they were numbers and not people; and something in his conscience tells him that freedom is not only that of thought and consciousness, but also that of the conditions that society provides us to realize our agency and potentiality as persons, in line with what Amartya Sen tells us in Development and freedom. Or that of her grandmother, Nini, who, after her childhood and early youth as the daughter of a Pasha in Ottoman Thessaloniki, settles for love in Albania, where she will experience so much adversity and lose everything, except her dignity, in that conception of freedom as an affirmation of the self, of the person we are and want to be above and beyond the circumstances and vicissitudes that we have to live through.

Or as – as a theorizing counterpoint to each system – Nora, the teacher who teaches them about communism at school; or the Crocodile, the World Bank official nicknamed after the one he always wears on his shirt, an expert in country transitions towards market economies and Western homologation and in promoting the reforms they entail. Professor Ypi tells us in the epilogue that freedom is not sacrificed only when others tell us what to say, where to go or how to behave; that a society that claims to allow its members to realize their potential, but fails to change the structures that prevent them from flourishing, is also oppressive; and that, despite all the limitations, we never lose our inner freedom, that of doing what we consider fair and appropriate.

            Lea Ypi intended to write, reflect and make us reflect on freedom and the ideas and theories about it in the socialist and liberal traditions, and undoubtedly, she succeeds in a way that a theorizing essay on them could have not. Since the first freedom is, somehow, that of reflecting on freedom itself, and at the same time accepting the freedom of the other to do so too, to seek it and always exercise and build it.

To understand and assume that all these conceptions have their meaning and necessity. To understand, especially and above all, as she tells us at the end, that freedom is a desire always to be realized, that her world, our world, is as far from freedom as that which her parents – our parents, we could say in Spain and so many other latitudes – tried to leave behind; but that, without understanding the failures and challenges they faced, we will remain divided and unreconciled, and will hardly be able to make of ours time to fight for and accomplish freedom.

            She intended that, and that she has achieved; but not only: also – and I would say so fundamentally – to give voice to the voice of Albania, that it tells us, through her story, the epic of its contemporary History, invites us to live it in first person, and meanwhile show us the ability to ask and wonder about what happens and what happens to us, somehow breaking a silence, banishing amnesia and oblivion, calling other voices, perhaps through other first images which may open the floodgate from which the story may flow, and the ink on the blank paper.

As in her case, “I never asked myself about the meaning of freedom until the day I hugged Stalin” that day in December 1990 when the eleven-year-old girl she was then hugged the legs of Stalin’s statue in search of refuge, and when she looked up, she discovered with surprise that Stalin’s head was not on his shoulders, torn off by those who were protesting outside shouting for freedom and democracy. That emptiness on the shoulders and that outcry triggers her writing. In my case, it evokes the image of the first Ambassador of Spain in Tirana who I was, and who, close to finalizing his posting, at the end of two thousand ten managed to visit the warehouse where were kept the statues of Stalin and other icons of communism, on which pigeons and oblivion perched. Oblivion of the time when Lea Ypi hugged it.

Oblivion of the time when the statue of Enver Hoxha was demolished at Skanderbeg Square and the other statues were taken to the warehouse of oblivion. In my case, it evokes that image, as well as that of the Colonel Engineer who emerges alive from the bombing of the bunker that Enver Hoxha had commissioned him to build, and then he was ordered to bunkerize all of Albania, as Kujtim Casku so well depicts in his film Colonel Bunker. Since it is through the construction of the bunkers that populate Albania on the outside and those that imprison our souls on the inside and their subsequent deconstruction, that I have undertaken in my book Búnkeres – a dialogue with the poem of the same title, part of my Guía poética del Albania (Poetical Guide of Albania) – the reflection on power, freedom and soul inspired by the collective epic of Albania’s contemporary History, from the experience of having lived alongside the Albanians a part of their journey.

To liberate oneself is to debunkerize oneself: for this we need of prose and Philosophy; but also of Poetry, that which tells us that to deconstruct the bunkers we turn our eyes and look inside our soul, we ask ourselves who we are, who we want to be, which book we want to write with our life in the world and in life, and that invites us to learn to look with the heart and to write poems with life.

_________________________

 Manuel Montobbio, diplomat, writer and Doctor in Political Science, was the first resident Ambassador of Spain in Albania (July 2006-January 2011) and is the author of Guía poética de Albania (Albanian edition Udhërrëfuesi poetic i Shqipërisë, Tirana, Botimet Poeteka, 2012), Búnkeres and other publications on Albania and the Western Balkans, as well as on European construction on peace processes, international and intercultural relations, political transitions and compared politics. His book Salir del Callejón del Gato. La deconstrucción de Oriente y Occidente y la gobernanza global is published in Albanian by the Albanian Institute of International Studies as Te dalësh nga rrugica e maces. Dekonstrusioni I Lindjes dhe I Perëndemit dhe qeverijsa globale. An approach to his academic and literary work can be found at his webpage www.manuelmontobbio.net

The post Albania: freedom, thought and life appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

After letting go of its dictatorial past, Albania has embarked on a transformative journey, transitioning into a democratic society supported by a growing open market economy. This period of transition has been marked by significant strides in social, economic, and institutional arenas, culminating in improved productivity across a significant number of sectors. The resulting uptick in employment (although there is a lot of room for improvement), incomes, and standards of living paints a picture of a nation on the rise. However, as Albania looks towards 2025 and beyond, it is imperative to craft a long-term vision that not only acknowledges past achievements but also addresses the development constraints that may hinder a path of durable, sustainable, and inclusive growth.

The strategic priorities for Albania, as it evolves towards the future, must be rooted in a clear vision that seeks to enhance the quality of life for all citizens, support higher education and skills’ development, bring forth new growth sources that expand the revenue base, augment local government capabilities, mitigate environmental issues, and uphold diversity. This vision needs a deep dive into Albania’s developmental performance, particularly in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, to identify strategic opportunities that can propel the nation forward.

Albania faces a plethora of challenges that threaten to overturn its development trajectory, most of them with deep roots in the country’s past. Beyond key topics such as poverty reduction, mass migration, corruption, and a sizable informal economy, issues such as gender disparities, discrimination, and other societal troubles pose significant hurdles. These systemic issues necessitate comprehensive strategies that not only address the symptoms but tackle the root causes to foster a more equitable society.

The EU Integration Process: A Strategic Asset

The European Union integration process stands as a beacon of hope and a strategic opportunity for many Balkan countries’ continued and sustained development. For Albania, this process has catalysed reforms and institution-building efforts, leading to Albania gaining more and essential financial and technical support, and market access. The strategic importance of EU accession, underscored in key policy documents, serves as a cornerstone for Albania’s future strategy. The recent progression towards EU membership negotiations highlights Albania’s reform achievements and sets the stage for deeper integration into the European framework.

Post-COVID

The COVID-19 pandemic has undeniably impacted Albania, like many of its regional and global counterparts. Despite these challenges, Albania’s management of the health crisis and the subsequent economic downturn presents an opportunity for strategic recalibration. The post-pandemic recovery phase offers a unique moment to focus on strategic priorities that can address existing constraints and leverage new growth opportunities.

Strategic Priorities: Education, Economic Diversification, and Quality of Life

The strategic priorities for Albania are varied, focusing on enhancing education and skills, creating dynamic drivers of growth, and improving the overall quality of life and environment, for the benefit of its citizens. Addressing these areas is crucial for Albania to realise its potential, stimulate economic opportunities, and ensure a sustainable future.

Supporting the education system’s needs for evolution and addressing the skills gap stand as critical components for Albania’s future success. A robust education system not only fuels personal development but also drives economic growth by equipping citizens with the necessary skills to thrive in a dynamic global economy. A focused approach to the skills of the future will position Albania in the leading pack of countries with a clear vision of what work will mean in the next decades.

Identifying and nurturing new sources of economic growth through digitalization, green growth, and broadening the manufacturing and services sectors are also vital. This diversification will create the need for quality jobs, generate essential revenue, and ensure Albania’s competitiveness on the global stage. And, if backed by a supportive and “productive” education system, that provides the economy with employees with the specific skills needed, the circle will be closed in a positive way.

Ensuring that Albania is an attractive place to live and invest in is essential for its future prosperity. This entails significant investments in healthcare, social protection, environmental conservation, and regional development to ensure balanced growth and improved living conditions across the country. Studies show that people don’t necessarily leave a country due to lack of finances, they do so mostly because of overall quality of life problems. These can be solved with a strategic citizen-first approach to policymaking. This also ensures that better-educated workers decide to stay in the country and boost Albania’s economy, rather than Germany’s.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

¹Global Analyst and Consultant, Former Prime Ministerial Adviser in Romania and Moldova

The post Albanian Statecraft for 2025+: Sustainable Development and Regional Leadership appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By GENC POLLO[1]

Ten days ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, standing on the side of visiting Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told the media that he was against the bilateralization of the European Union enlargement process. 

The chancellor was apparently referring to the non-signing by the ambassador of Greece to the EU of a circular letter authorizing the European Commission to open negotiations with Albania for some clusters and chapters of the membership draft/treaty. Since this step requires unanimity from all the member states, the Commission cannot act. As it is known, the Beleri case has triggered Athens to harden its stance. 

1-Identity vetoes

Chancellor Scholz is right. The EU member states have often abused their veto in Brussels as they dealt with issues with neighbouring countries. Greece started this game in the early 90s when an adventurous foreign minister declared Macedonia an “enemy” that was stealing the Greek name, history and culture. Although in private conversations politicians and friends of mine admitted this approach was useless, the Greek public opinion was enthralled making it difficult to compromise and reach an agreement (it happened only in 2018). So with this issue, for a quarter of a century, Greece blocked the path of membership of (North) Macedonia into NATO and the EU.

Bulgaria, in various intervals, did the same to Macedonia. Sometimes with the claim that the Macedonians denied that they were Bulgarians and later with the contradictory claim that they didn’t recognise the Bulgarian minority. A few years ago, this issue was resurrected by a populist-nationalist president incensing public opinion and most parliamentary parties had to follow willy-nilly. 

Wise personalities who considered this extremism absurd were not listened to anymore. Also Skopje did not remain idle, provoking Greece by erecting neo-Hellenistic statues and Bulgaria by rebroadcasting the films of the Yugoslav era that shows Bulgarians as barbaric Mongols.

But, at the end of the day, there remains a veto with negative consequences for the region and Europe and motivated by identity and historical-cultural issues that are incomprehensible outside the region.

 2- Material vetoes

But the bilateral veto is a European sport for other EU countries as well. Except state motives are more concrete and material. For example, Slovenia blocked Croatia’s membership for several years because they wanted a favorable agreement on the maritime border in the Piran Bay. Slovenia relented when Croatia accepted international arbitration on the matter.

Likewise, the Czech Republic in 2014 threatened to veto Albania’s candidate status if Tirana didn’t withdraw from the international arbitration on the dispute with CEZ (a Czech state-owned power distribution operator that bought the Albanian counterpart and had issues) and did not accept their terms. Although in the arbitration the chances of winning were high, the Rama government caved in. 

A year later, the Supreme State Audit Office found that this agreement was illegal, it cost the state 479 million euro in damages and filed a criminal complaint against the minister in charge (of course nothing happened). A bizarre aspect of this agreement was the obligation of the Albanian side to under no circumstances file criminal charges against the Czech personnel of CEZ Albania: neither for corruption nor for anything else. This type of amnesty is not only immoral but also clearly unconstitutional. For the sake of the “European cause”, the Rama government did not mind the tax money wasted or the constitutionality.  

The reasons for the veto in the above and other similar cases can be fair or unfair, reasonable or exaggerated, ethical or selfish. Be that as it may, the use of the European veto for issues unrelated to the EU membership integration process is unfair, exaggerated and selfish. Therefore Mr. Scholz and many like him are right when they speak out against “bilateralization”

 3-Is the Beleri case a genuine Albanian-Greek bilateral issue?

If we refer to the typology of the above cases Athens’ motivations seem different 

– it is not claiming that Albania is appropriating its history (in fact, the mother of Alexander the Great of Macedonia was a princess from the Molossian tribe, cousins with the Illyrians, but we have not officially claimed that great conqueror was (half) Albanian);

– it is not pretending that we are Greeks and that Albanian is a dialect of Greek (we live in the time of a Facebook infatuation about the Pelasgians a common linguistic roof, but fortunately this has not yet become an argument for diplomacy);

– it is not claiming to make the issue of the maritime border with Albania a precondition in the European Union process (this has been a strictly bilateral process that for 15 years has gone through agreements, their cancellations, fruitless negotiations and agreement on international arbitration);

– is not insisting that our state pay compensation for such a Greek company (it would not be surprising, but this is not the case).

Beyond these typical bilateral cases, one should be noted that Athens is not using its veto with regard to the Greek minority, which theoretically would have a legal basis (the Copenhagen criteria, which must be met by the candidate states for the EU, speak expressly about the rights of minorities) while for instance Budapest signals that it may vote against the opening of Ukraine’s EU membership negotiations precisely because of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

As I have argued in previous articles, Beleri is a clear case of violation of the rule of law, of democracy and of civil/political rights; Fredi Beleri himself is a political prisoner, the first political prisoner in the 21st century in Albania and therefore a dangerous precedent (looking at the developments of the last month, it should be noted with sadness that he is no longer the only political prisoner).

Beleri’s only formal connection with Greece is his double Albanian and Greek citizenship. But Beleri’s opponent in the municipal race was also a dual citizen of the two countries.

4-Rehabilitation of the veto 

By raising the Beleri issue in Brussels, Athens has not raised a bilateral Greek-Albanian issue but an absolutely internal, serious and important issue of the Albanian state. Greece is a small country in the EU where the influence is seen in proportion to the size of each member state. The Greek veto, due to the past experience with Skopje, can be seen with suspicion in Brussels as the shepherd who falsely cried wolf. But Greece’s intervention seems to fill the vacuum created by the inertia, silence and even blindness of the European Commission. Precisely the Commission, this primary body of the European Union with the functional task of verifying the Copenhagen Criteria in candidate countries such as Albania, was silent until November about Beleri while condemning arbitrary arrests in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. The Commission’s “Albania 2023” report, published this month, presents the Beleri case briefly and formally correctly, but surprisingly not in the chapter on democracy and fundamental rights, but in the one on relations with neighbours (for the sake of truth, we need to say that for the first time in this decade the report has two or three timid paragraphs describing the violation of the parliamentary rights of the opposition; this is a welcome development, although ten years late). 

This attitude of the European Commission may have several reasons. But the most obvious is the need to present as a success story the justice reform in Albania where the Commission invested considerable political and financial capital; with the best intention of course. Although various diplomats privately admit that the reform turned out to be very problematic, the bureaucrats of the Commission don’t have the institutional interest and moral courage to assert that the post-reform judicial bodies produce political prisoners; which the old justice, despite its sins and weaknesses, did not do since 2000. In order to complete the EU framework with positive notes, it is necessary to say that the European Parliament and the main political party there have taken a clear and proper stance on the Beleri case.

We can also talk about the silence of two European organizations with a focus on fundamental rights and which have offices in Tirana: the Council of Europe and the OSCE have not expressed themselves and this raises questions and invites a debate about their usefulness. It should be added here that the Congress of Local Authorities (within CoE)  has denounced Beleri’s arrest and ODIHR (within OSCE) mentions his case in the May 2023 local elections report. 

In this context, it is worth considering what could happen in the hypothetical scenario where the Greek government would have taken no interest in Fredi Beleri’s case. The burden of denouncing and fighting this neo-precedent of political imprisonment would remain mainly with the opposition, which is currently like a lone fireman in front of fires in every neighborhood of the city.

The EU and the US, in addition to the above inhibitions, are absorbed by crises, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as other challenges. As a result, they see the Balkans more in the geopolitical prism and less in the democratic one. Therefore it seems to me, even though I am allergic to bilateral vetoes, that the Greek intervention in Brussels on the Beleri issue could have positive consequences as it could force cynical bureaucrats to open their eyes. 

And to close with a non-ironic contextualization of an evolution: the prime minister, who in 2014 sacrificed hundreds of million euro of tax money and breached the constitution to get the EU candidate status, was not surprised by the loss of hundreds of millions of euros from the state budget and the violation of the constitution, ten years later he says to hell with EU membership if I can’t grab Himara’ coastal land plots for my “businesspeople”.

This article was written on November 27, 2023.

[1] Genc Pollo is an Albanian former cabinet minister and MP.

The post The dilemma over the criticism of the Greek veto appeared first on Tirana Observatory.