The strategic geography of extremism is shifting. The next global shock may come not from the capture of a capital, but from the insecurity of a maritime chokepoint..

By Dr. Arben Ramkaj

On the morning of September 11, 2001, when hijacked aircraft struck the Twin Towers in New York and the world watched their collapse almost in real time, international terrorism entered a new era. Al-Qaeda did not seek to occupy American territory; it struck symbols of the economic and political power of the United States and, through them, the confidence of the free world. Within hours, it became clear that an organization without a state, a conventional army, or sovereign territory could turn the very infrastructure of the modern world against it.

Twenty-five years later, as we remember the victims of that morning, the question is no longer simply whether the world is better protected against another 9/11, but what terrorism itself has learned over the past quarter-century. Al-Qaeda demonstrated that a network could strike at the heart of a superpower; ISIS showed that terrorism could seize territory, control populations, and attempt to construct a state; while what is emerging today between Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and Bab el-Mandeb points to another transformation: extremist organizations may no longer need to strike a tower or capture a capital if they can threaten the corridors through which the global economy moves.

When ISIS transformed Raqqa into its de facto capital, thousands of militants from dozens of countries converged on Syria and Iraq and seized cities, oil fields, border crossings, and strategic corridors. When the territorial “caliphate” collapsed, it created the impression that a chapter in the history of international terrorism had come to an end. Today, there are reasons to believe that only one of its forms had ended.

History also teaches us that doctrine is not always stronger than interest. The Thirty Years’ War in Europe began with a powerful religious dimension but gradually evolved into a struggle over territory and the balance of power, culminating in the paradox of Catholic France under Richelieu supporting Protestant powers against the Catholic Habsburgs. The comparison with contemporary conflicts is not direct, but the lesson remains relevant: strategic interest can overcome even profound religious divisions.

This makes what is emerging between Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab particularly significant. The two originate from opposing ideological universes: the Houthis from a Zaydi environment and with an important strategic and military relationship with Iran; Al-Shabaab from radical Sunni jihadism and the Al-Qaeda network. Yet United Nations experts have identified a transactional and opportunistic relationship, alongside reports of transfers of weapons and expertise from Yemen to Al-Shabaab. This does not prove the existence of a political alliance or a unified command structure. But that is precisely where the concern lies: operational cooperation does not necessarily require ideological reconciliation.

The Houthis have accumulated experience in missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare against maritime targets—capabilities developed in part through Iranian technological and military support—while Al-Shabaab possesses networks, financing, and territorial reach in the Horn of Africa, with annual revenues estimated by UN-related sources at approximately $100–200 million. If technological expertise moves from one ecosystem to another, the nature of the threat changes. Weapons can be seized and missiles can be destroyed, but knowledge, once transferred, can be reproduced.

THIS IS WHERE WE ARRIVE FROM RAQQA TO BAB EL-MANDEB.

The “Gate of Tears,” between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. In the second quarter of 2026, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, an average of approximately 8.1 million barrels per day of petroleum and other liquid fuels passed through this corridor.

ISIS had to capture Mosul and Raqqa to demonstrate its power. To destabilize Bab el-Mandeb, however, it is not necessary to occupy territory. It is enough for risk to raise insurance premiums, alter shipping routes, and force carriers to choose longer alternatives. In the modern economy, an artery does not have to be physically closed to become a weapon; it merely has to lose its security.

The danger becomes even greater when Bab el-Mandeb is placed on the same strategic map as the Strait of Hormuz. If both waterways were simultaneously subjected to sustained pressure, they would not have to be completely closed to trigger a global crisis. It would be enough for markets to lose confidence in the security of navigation.

Risk becomes insurance; insurance becomes transportation cost; transportation cost becomes price. And ultimately, that price is paid by an ordinary citizen thousands of kilometres away from the conflict.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, this is the emerging challenge for the free world. It learned how to pursue Al-Qaeda’s networks and how to fight the territorial state created by ISIS. It must now confront a threat that may require neither a capital nor borders, but merely the capacity to endanger a maritime strait, a port, or an energy corridor.

On September 11, 2001, terrorism struck two towers that symbolized the power of the global economy. A quarter-century later, it may no longer require such a monumental target.

From the Twin Towers to Raqqa, and from Raqqa to Bab el-Mandeb, extremism has changed its method: first it attacked the symbol, then it sought the territory, and today it may seek to disrupt circulation itself.

And the danger is not that the Houthis will become Al-Shabaab, or that Al-Shabaab will embrace the Houthis’ doctrine. The danger is that they may discover that they do not need to agree on doctrine in order to agree on using terror against the free world.

______________________

About the author

Dr. Arben Ramkaj is a researcher and expert in interfaith dialogue, international relations, and religious diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Middle East and the Western Balkans. He serves as Chairman of the Interfaith Cooperation Center (QBNF) and Director of the Program for the Middle East and Arab World at the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS). He is also Vice-President of the European Muslims League (EML) and a member of the General Council of the Muslim Community of Albania. His work focuses on interfaith dialogue, the prevention of extremism, religious diplomacy, peaceful coexistence, and the geopolitical dynamics connecting the Western Balkans with the Middle East.

The post From Raqqa to Bab el-Mandeb appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

There are moments in history when a country’s future is shaped by a single document. Such agreements are rare, but their impact can endure for generations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement is one such example. On Aug. 13, 2001, 25 years ago, North Macedonia’s political leaders, backed by the European Union and the United States, signed an agreement that would have a defining historical impact on the country and shape its trajectory for decades to come.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement remains one of the region’s most important political and diplomatic achievements in modern history. It showed that ethnic conflicts in the Balkans could be addressed not through force, but through dialogue, political compromise, respect for rights and the creation of institutions that ensure all citizens have an equal place in the state.With the region still bearing the scars of the Yugoslav wars, the Ohrid Agreement offered an alternative based on coexistence rather than division, compromise rather than victory for one side, and inclusion rather than exclusion, helping redefine how the state should function for all its citizens. The Ohrid Agreement represented, and continues to represent, a strategic commitment to peace, coexistence and the creation of a multi-ethnic state where differences are no longer a source of conflict, but part of a shared political and social framework. It gave North Macedonia the opportunity to break free from the legacy of conflict and build a more democratic, inclusive and stable state with a clear European path. 

Twenty-five years later, this remains Ohrid’s most important legacy and the greatest responsibility of the current generation: to safeguard its achievements, carry its principles forward and ensure that peace, coexistence and the country’s European orientation become irreversible. Albania has never viewed North Macedonia’s stability and prosperity simply as the concern of another country. For us, they have always been directly linked to the stability and security of the Western Balkans.

Good relations between communities, equality, respect for identity and language, fair representation and ensuring that every citizen feels fully part of the state are not merely matters of principle and fundamental rights. They are also essential to peace, security, stability and the region’s European future. This was precisely the understanding that was reached and put into practice in Ohrid a quarter of a century ago. This is the most important lesson the Ohrid Agreement offers the region today. Peace is not secured simply by bringing a conflict to an end; it becomes sustainable when it is anchored in institutions, rights, equal opportunities and mutual trust. A peace agreement fulfils its purpose not merely when the guns fall silent, but when future generations no longer have reasons to turn back to conflict. By safeguarding the rights of communities, ensuring fairer representation in public administration and recognising the country’s multi-ethnic character, the agreement established a new political and social balance. For this reason, the Ohrid Agreement should not be treated as something set in stone. It should instead be viewed as an enduring political commitment that requires constant attention, given its importance to North Macedonia’s future and its role in shaping a democratic, multi-ethnic, inclusive and European state. 

Preserving the spirit of Ohrid does not mean dwelling on the memory of conflict, but ensuring that the grievances and conditions that fuelled it never again become a source of division. In this context, North Macedonia’s NATO membership, genuine regional cooperation, good-neighbourly relations and European path are both a realisation and a natural continuation of the spirit of Ohrid. Europe does not seek to erase differences; rather, it calls for them to coexist within strong institutions, the rule of law and a democracy that guarantees equality and dignity for all.

In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, the Ohrid Agreement recognised a fundamental reality that was already clear in 2001: Albanians are an essential part of North Macedonia’s society and a constituent community of the state.Their rights are not concessions bestowed by the majority, nor privileges that can be reconsidered according to the political climate of the day. They form part of the country’s political compact and are among the foundations of a democratic and multi-ethnic state.

Europe’s strongest examples, along with the most positive experiences in our region, have shown that a state is stronger when it protects and guarantees the identity, language, culture and rights of its communities, both in law and in practice, in letter and in spirit. Similarly, communities that feel equal and properly represented are more likely to see the state as their own, contribute to its strength and invest in its future. In this sense, Ohrid did more than secure rights for Albanians. It reshaped the understanding of the state itself — not as a temporary balance between communities, but as a system where equality and state strength reinforce each other; where diversity is seen as part of a shared identity rather than a threat; and where ethnicity does not determine the rights or status of citizenship. On this anniversary, one lesson remains particularly relevant. The Ohrid Agreement reminds us that peace cannot be taken for granted. It must be preserved and nurtured through democratic institutions, respect for diversity and a shared vision for the future. For Albania, the stability, security and prosperity of North Macedonia are inseparable from the development and resilience of the region as a whole. Our two countries share not only a border, strategic interests and a path towards the European Union, but also the conviction that inter-ethnic relations based on respect and equality are the foundation on which modern European societies are built. 

Albania remains firmly convinced that lasting peace in the Balkans can be built by bringing people closer together, strengthening democratic institutions and bilateral and multilateral relations, respecting human rights, and giving all members of society, without distinction, a reason to see their future as part of the same shared project. Ohrid forged this path 25 years ago. It is the responsibility of today’s generation to carry it forward.The anniversary is also a moment to take stock of the agreement’s implementation, assess its effectiveness and consider what remains unfinished. Upholding the spirit of Ohrid is still an ongoing task: this year’s debate over the use of Albanian in the justice system highlights that the rights secured in 2001 require continuous institutional attention and protection, rather than being confined to formal commemorations. 

North Macedonia today is not the same country it was 25 years ago. Its society has evolved, as have the region and Europe. The very concepts of security, sovereignty and cooperation have also undergone significant change. For this reason, Ohrid must also be understood in the context of this future. Preserving the Ohrid Agreement means continuing to build a state in which a return to confrontation and division becomes impossible. This requires responsibility from everyone, both social groups and political elites. As is expected of all countries in our region, we must recognise that the stability of one cannot be built on the insecurity of another. For Albania, its relationship with North Macedonia carries particular importance. We are neighbours, friends, NATO allies, partners in the European integration process and part of the same Balkan space, which knows the high cost of past conflicts but also the value of genuinely investing in a shared future. Albania will continue to support the rights of Albanians wherever they live, while also strongly supporting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic functioning of the states in which they live.These two positions are not contradictory. On the contrary, they reflect the same principle: the rights of communities and the strength of the state are not mutually exclusive. Each reinforces the other. This is one of Ohrid’s important lessons. 

Twenty-five years after it was signed, the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains foundational because it answered a fundamental question: can a common state be built in the Western Balkans while respecting different identities and making them part of its strength? The answer provided by the past 25 years of history is undoubtedly yes. That answer must be reaffirmed every day through trust and genuine investment in a future that moves the country forward. A quarter of a century later, perhaps the best way to honour the decision made on Aug. 13, 2001, and celebrate its achievements is not to view Ohrid simply as the agreement that ended conflict and division, but as the agreement that taught us all how to build lasting peace.

The post A Quarter Century Since Ohrid: The Agreement That Gave North Macedonia Its Future appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By Albert Rakipi, PhD, Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS)

The latest dispute over the Ibar River shows how quickly a real security issue in the Western Balkans can be transformed into a contest of nationalist narratives.

When Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that experts were examining possible changes to the flow of the Ibar, linking the idea to the treatment of Serbs in Kosova, the issue immediately went beyond water management. The Ibar and the Ujman reservoir are vital to Kosova’s water supply, agriculture, industry and energy system. Any serious interference with this system would therefore have implications for national security, not simply hydrology.

This is why Belgrade’s statement deserved a firm response. Water cannot become an instrument of political punishment.

Yet the debate quickly moved elsewhere. What began as a question of water became a discussion about “Kosova and Metohija,” “Greater Albania,” Resolution 1244 and competing versions of history and sovereignty.

This shift is politically convenient for Serbia because it obscures the central question: can an upstream intervention be treated as a purely domestic matter if it creates significant consequences downstream in Kosova?

The answer is clearly no.

International water principles rest on the recognition that rivers do not respect political narratives. Their management requires cooperation, consultation and prevention of significant cross border harm. Serbia is correct that Albania is not a riparian state on the Ibar. But this does not make a measure affecting Kosova a purely internal Serbian matter.

Kosova’s initial response was therefore strategically sound. Pristina treated the issue primarily as one of water security, critical infrastructure, energy security and international norms rather than immediately entering a historical confrontation with Serbia. Facts, law and technical evidence provide a stronger case than nationalist rhetoric.

The same lesson deserves attention in Tirana.

Albania has every legitimate reason to support Kosova. Its security, international position and successful statehood are strategic interests for Albania and the region. But support should strengthen Kosova’s voice, not replace it.

The rapid escalation of the Ibar dispute into a direct political exchange between Tirana and Belgrade created precisely the terrain on which Serbian diplomacy is most comfortable. The discussion moved from water security to “Greater Albania,” territorial claims and historical grievances. That shift did not necessarily serve Kosova.

There is a broader problem. Albanian foreign policy has periodically displayed what might be called a proxy foreign policy toward Kosova, using issues that fundamentally belong to Kosova and its institutions to project regional leadership, demonstrate usefulness to Western capitals and potentially convert that visibility into short term political capital at home.

The problem begins when supporting Kosova becomes using Kosova.

This tendency is not new. Tirana has sometimes behaved as though reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs were principally a matter between Albania and Serbia, when the real peace equation is between Kosova and Serbia. This has produced a paternalistic tendency to speak for Kosova, represent it or position Tirana as an intermediary in matters that belong first and foremost to Pristina.

The episode of 2023 remains a striking example. At a sensitive moment in relations between Pristina and Belgrade, Prime Minister Edi Rama announced that he had sent French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz a draft statute for the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosova. Kosova’s own authorities had not seen the document before it was presented to the two European leaders.

Whatever the merits of the proposal, advancing internationally a document touching Kosova’s constitutional order without prior consultation with Pristina illustrated precisely the problem.

At times, Albania’s political establishment appears to forget a fundamental reality and behaves as though Kosova were an autonomous province of Albania rather than an independent state.

It is not.

The exceptionally close ties between Albania and Kosova make cooperation natural and indispensable. They do not give Tirana the right to substitute itself for Pristina. Indeed, a policy presented as support can, when taken too far, diminish Kosova’s own agency and create the impression that it requires representation from Albania.

That runs against one of the most important political achievements of the past two decades: the consolidation of Kosova as an independent political subject, not as an appendage of Albania and not as an unresolved Albanian national question.

The relationship between Tirana and Pristina is therefore strongest when it is understood as a relationship between two independent states with exceptionally close ties, not between a political center and a dependent periphery.

The international response to the Ibar dispute was notably more restrained. The European Union returned the issue to the framework of normalization between Kosova and Serbia, Washington stressed that normalization is indispensable to peace and stability in the Western Balkans, and Germany likewise warned that statements about changing the Ibar’s course do not contribute to that objective.

There is little evidence that the dispute itself points toward imminent conflict. It is instead another example of how unresolved relations between Kosova and Serbia can transform even technical questions into disputes over history, identity and sovereignty.

The Ibar is a genuine issue of Kosova’s water and energy security. But the political confrontation surrounding it shows once again how easily nationalist narratives can overwhelm facts, law and political reality.

The region has spent too much of its history turning geography into mythology.

This time, the river should simply be allowed to carry water.

The post The Ibar River Should Carry Water, Not Nationalist Politics appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Executive Summary

The European Union’s enlargement policy has historically been its most successful foreign policy instrument, driving democratic transformation, economic convergence, and regional stability. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has acted as a geopolitical catalyst, ending a decade of “enlargement fatigue.” However, this newfound momentum creates a dangerous rift between the “lightning pace” of Ukraine/Moldova’s path and the “decade-long stagnation” of the Western Balkans. However, the current stagnation of the enlargement process—particularly in the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood—poses significant and multidimensional risks for the Union itself.

The European Union increasingly acknowledges enlargement as a geopolitical necessity, yet it remains deeply divided over how and when it should happen. While candidate countries are expected to undertake difficult reforms, member states continue to postpone strategic decisions about the future of enlargement, institutional reform, and the EU’s long-term geopolitical role. The result is a dangerous status quo: accession fatigue in candidate states, declining trust in the EU, growing influence of external actors, and a widening gap between political rhetoric and actual progress.

This policy paper argues that non-enlargement is not a neutral outcome but a strategically damaging scenario. This paper argues that the costs of non-enlargement are already visible and will continue to increase if the EU fails to act. A failure to enlarge would weaken the EU’s credibility, reduce its geopolitical leverage, undermine security in its neighbourhood, fuel anti-European narratives, and deepen internal fragmentation within the Union itself It contributes to geopolitical vacuum formation, increases susceptibility to external influence (notably from Russia and China), weakens EU credibility, exacerbates internal divisions, and undermines regional security architecture. Furthermore, it accelerates democratic backsliding in candidate countries, producing long-term instability that ultimately spills over into the EU.

At the same time, enlargement without strict conditionality would be equally damaging. Admitting countries that have not completed reforms—especially in the rule of law, judiciary independence, public administration, and anti-corruption—would risk importing new veto players and illiberal actors into the Union.

The paper identifies key consequences across geopolitical, security, economic, and societal domains and proposes a set of actionable policy recommendations. These include restoring credibility through a clear accession roadmap, deepening gradual integration, strengthening support for civil society, enhancing security cooperation, and maintaining strict rule-of-law conditionality. Without a renewed commitment to enlargement, the EU risks losing both its neighbourhood and its strategic relevance in an increasingly competitive global order

This paper is based on interviews conducted with 12 experts from EU member states in March and April 2026. The interviews explored the political, security, economic, and institutional implications of a failure to enlarge the EU. Experts were also asked to propose recommendations for avoiding such a scenario. The discussion focused both on the consequences for the EU as a whole and on the specific implications for the member states from which the experts originated.

1. Introduction

EU enlargement has long functioned as a cornerstone of European integration and external action. From Southern Europe in the 1980s to Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s, enlargement has facilitated democratic consolidation, economic modernization, and the stabilization of post-conflict societies (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005).

Today, however, the enlargement process faces unprecedented stagnation. Despite formal commitments to the Western Balkans and the granting of candidate status to countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, progress remains slow, fragmented, and politically contested. The gap between rhetorical commitment and practical delivery has widened significantly.

This disconnect risks transforming enlargement from a credible policy into a symbolic framework devoid of transformative capacity. As candidate countries lose faith in accession prospects, the EU’s ability to shape political and economic developments in its neighbourhood diminishes. The prolonged stagnation of the enlargement process is not a neutral state of “waiting”; it is a regressive process that generates systemic costs for both the candidate countries and the European Union. When the path to membership transforms into an “endless labyrinth” of procedural hurdles, the resulting vacuum is rapidly filled by instability and anti-democratic forces.

This paper explores the consequences of such a scenario. It argues that abandoning or indefinitely postponing enlargement will not only destabilize neighbouring regions but also generate direct and indirect costs for the EU. These costs manifest in weakened geopolitical influence, increased security vulnerabilities, economic inefficiencies, and internal fragmentation.

2. The Geopolitical Consequences of Non-Enlargement

2.1. Emergence of a Strategic Vacuum

A stalled enlargement process creates a geopolitical vacuum in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. Historically, the prospect of EU membership has acted as a powerful anchor, aligning candidate countries with European norms and policies. Without this anchor, regions such as the Western Balkans and parts of the Eastern neighbourhood risk drifting into a “grey zone” of competing influences.

External actors—particularly Russia and China—are well-positioned to exploit this vacuum. Russia leverages historical, cultural, and energy ties to maintain political influence, while China expands its economic footprint through infrastructure investments and strategic projects under initiatives such as the Belt and Road (Hillman 2020).

This dynamic reflects what Farrell and Newman (2019) describe as “weaponized interdependence,” where economic networks are used for geopolitical leverage. In the absence of EU integration, candidate countries become more vulnerable to such practices, undermining both their sovereignty and the EU’s strategic interests.

2.2. Intensification of Great Power Competition

Non-enlargement transforms the EU’s neighbourhood into an arena of intensified geopolitical competition. Infrastructure development, energy supply, and digital networks increasingly become battlegrounds for influence.

For instance, large-scale projects such as railway corridors or energy pipelines are no longer purely economic ventures but strategic tools. Control over these assets allows external actors to shape political decisions, regulatory standards, and long-term dependencies.

Moreover, the EU’s reduced presence weakens its ability to set standards in areas such as environmental protection, labour rights, and digital governance. This creates regulatory fragmentation that benefits external powers while undermining the EU’s normative agenda.

2.3. Declining Global Credibility of the EU

The failure to deliver on enlargement commitments damages the EU’s credibility as a global actor. Enlargement has historically demonstrated the EU’s capacity to transform neighbouring countries through conditionality and incentives (Grabbe 2006).

When accession promises remain unfulfilled, this model loses legitimacy. Candidate countries begin to perceive the EU as unreliable, while external partners—including the United States—question its strategic coherence and capacity to act.

This credibility gap has broader implications. It signals internal divisions within the EU and suggests a lack of consensus on long-term strategic objectives. As a result, the EU’s influence in global governance frameworks and regional conflicts diminishes.

If the EU cannot stabilize and integrate its immediate geographical backyard, its claims to being a “global player” lose all credibility. This perceived weakness encourages external actors (Russia/China) to test the Union’s resolve more aggressively, not just in the neighborhood, but within Member States themselves.

The EU is a project built on values. When the Union fails to deliver on its promises to societies that have made enormous sacrifices for a “European future” (like Ukraine or North Macedonia), its soft power evaporates.

• Redundancy of the “European Model”: If the EU model is seen as “closed” or “exclusive,” it loses its appeal as a beacon for democratic reforms worldwide. This emboldens illiberal regimes within the EU to argue that democratic standards are optional, leading to a further erosion of the rule of law across the entire continent

2.4. The Cost of “Transactional Diplomacy”

As the EU’s transformative power diminishes, its relationship with the neighborhood becomes purely transactional. This forces the Union to constantly “outbid” rivals like Russia or the Gulf States to maintain basic stability, leading to an inefficient and expensive foreign policy that lacks long-term structural benefits. The shift toward transactionalism has transformed the enlargement process into a high-stakes financial negotiation. Instead of a merit-based proces, the relationship has evolved into a model where the EU must effectively “buy” the alignment of Balkan elites with its strategic initiatives. 

In a transactional framework, Balkan leaders act as strategic brokers. They leverage their control over key issues—such as migration routes, energy transit, or regional stability—to extract financial concessions from the EU. The concept of weaponized interdependence (as defined by Farrell and Newman) is central to understanding this dynamic. The Western Balkan migration route is a prime example of weaponized interdependence. Local leaders understand that the EU’s internal stability depends on their border management. This creates a “reverse leverage” where the EU pays a high “protection fee” to avoid a political crisis at home, often turning a blind eye to domestic corruption in the region. While the EU uses its financial power to influence the Balkans, Balkan elites have learned to weaponize their own fragility. They signal that without continuous EU “investments,” their states might collapse, export instability, or fall entirely under the influence of rivals (China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” or Russia’s energy leverage).

3. Security Implications

3.1. Fragmented Security Architecture

The Western Balkans and Eastern neighbourhood are integral components of European security. However, without full integration, cooperation remains partial and insufficient.

Although candidate countries collaborate with EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol, this cooperation is limited by institutional constraints and lack of trust. Information sharing, joint operations, and strategic alignment remain incomplete, creating gaps in the EU’s security architecture.

In crisis situations—such as a sudden increase in migration flows—these gaps can become critical. Member states may resort to unilateral measures, undermining collective responses and exacerbating instability.

• The Trust Deficit: Law enforcement agencies do not share goals fully because there is no perception of a “shared future.”
• The “Every Man for Himself” Risk: In a future migrant crisis, without integration, the current architecture will collapse as each country relies solely on protecting its own territory, leading to regional deterioration.

3.2. Migration and Border Management Risks

Migration management illustrates the limitations of partial integration. While candidate countries play a key role in controlling migration routes, they do not fully share the EU’s objectives or capabilities. 

Without full integration into the EU’s security architecture, the Western Balkan route remains a permanent vulnerability. Current cooperation with Frontex is transactional and fragile. In the event of a new major migration crisis, the lack of shared goals and trust would lead to a “save yourself” approach. Member states would likely reinstate internal borders (Schengen collapse), leading to the disintegration of one of the EU’s greatest achievements.

This creates a structural vulnerability: the EU depends on external partners for border control without having full oversight or alignment. In the event of a major migration crisis, this arrangement is likely to break down, leading to fragmented responses and increased pressure on EU borders.

3.3. Persistence of Hard Security Commitments

The EU continues to maintain security missions in regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. These missions require significant resources and limit the EU’s ability to respond to other global challenges.

Without enlargement, these commitments risk becoming permanent. Integration, by contrast, would allow for the internalization of security responsibilities and more efficient allocation of EU resources.

3.4. Hybrid Threats and Cybersecurity

The EU and its neighbourhood share a common security space, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and disinformation. Non-enlargement weakens collective resilience against these threats.

External actors exploit governance weaknesses, media capture, and societal divisions to spread disinformation and undermine democratic institutions. Without deeper integration, the EU cannot effectively counter these threats at their source.

3.5. External Interference in Security:

 External Interference in Security: A stagnant enlargement process allows strategic rivals to establish military and intelligence footprints in the region. This turns a potential “zone of peace and prosperity” into a “theatre of rivalry,” forcing the EU to spend significantly more on border defense and hybrid threat mitigation than it would have spent on the pre-accession process.

3.6. Importing Instability

A security vacuum in the neighborhood inevitably exports organized crime, human smuggling, and cyber threats into the heart of the Union. The cost of “policing” a hostile or unstable neighborhood far exceeds the cost of integrating it into a common law enforcement framework.

4. Economic and Environmental Costs

4.1. Missed Economic Opportunities

The Western Balkans and Eastern neighbourhood offer significant economic potential, particularly in the context of nearshoring and supply chain diversification.

Non-enlargement prevents the full integration of these markets into the EU economy, limiting growth opportunities and reducing economic resilience. It also increases the cost of maintaining stability through external funding mechanisms.

Lost Markets and Resources: While the EU hesitates, strategic rivals—primarily China—are securing long-term concessions in critical sectors such as rare earth minerals, energy infrastructure, and digital networks in the Balkans and the East. This creates a “leak” in the European Single Market’s influence, making the EU more dependent on supply chains controlled by revisionist powers.

Similarly, Enrico Letta’s report on the Future of the Single Market underscores that a larger EU remains the most effective tool to protect European interests and prosperity, uphold the rule of law, and defend EU citizens from external threats

4.2. Strategic Autonomy and Supply Chains

Enlargement is closely linked to the EU’s goal of strategic autonomy. Integrating neighbouring economies would strengthen supply chains and reduce dependence on external actors.

While the EU hesitates, strategic rivals—primarily China—are securing long-term concessions in critical sectors such as rare earth minerals, energy infrastructure, and digital networks in the Balkans and the East. This creates a “leak” in the European Single Market’s influence, making the EU more dependent on supply chains controlled by revisionist powers. Without enlargement, these regions may become integrated into alternative economic networks dominated by China or other powers, further weakening the EU’s position.

4.3. Environmental Externalities

Regulatory divergence in environmental standards creates cross-border risks. Peripheral regions may attract pollution-intensive industries, effectively becoming environmental “buffer zones.”

Issues such as water management, energy production, and pollution in shared ecosystems (e.g., the Adriatic Sea) require coordinated governance that is difficult to achieve without integration.

5. Internal EU Dynamics and Institutional Challenges

5.1. Deepening Internal Divisions

Enlargement debates increasingly reflect broader divisions within the EU. Member states differ on priorities, timelines, and conditionality, leading to policy paralysis. These divisions undermine the EU’s ability to act strategically and weaken its external credibility.

• Internal Political Cleavages: The “enlargement vs. treaty change” deadlock creates a paralyzing North-South and East-West divide. This internal friction prevents the EU from reaching consensus on other critical issues, such as defense spending or energy transition, as enlargement becomes a “hostage” to broader institutional disputes.

5.2. Enlargement Fatigue and Lack of Strategic Vision

The current approach to enlargement is characterized by short-term crisis management rather than long-term strategic planning. There is limited reflection on potential failure scenarios and their consequences.

This lack of strategic vision increases the risk of repeating past mistakes and failing to adapt to changing geopolitical realities.

Policy Recommendations             

Non-enlargement is not a neutral scenario—it is a strategic risk with far-reaching consequences. A stalled enlargement process weakens the EU’s geopolitical position, undermines its security, and accelerates fragmentation both internally and externally.

A renewed commitment to enlargement—grounded in credibility, conditionality, and strategic vision—is essential for safeguarding the future of the European Union as a global actor.

Restore Credibility through a Structured Accession Process

The EU must provide clear, transparent, and time-bound accession pathways. This includes:

• Defining intermediate milestones 
• Linking reforms to tangible benefits, Ensure consistent application of conditionality  
• Improving communication with citizens in both member and candidate states

Credibility is the cornerstone of effective conditionality.

Strengthen Rule of Law Conditionality

Geopolitical urgency must not undermine core principles. The EU should:

• Maintain strict accession criteria Avoid political shortcuts 
• Strengthen monitoring mechanisms, Ensure reforms are substantive and sustainable  
• Ensure reversibility of benefits in case of backsliding 
• This prevents the emergence of internal veto players that could weaken the Union from within, Prevent internal destabilization through premature accessio

Use Financial Leverage Strategically

• Expand pre-accession funding 
• Link financial support to concrete reform outcomes 
• Invest in infrastructure and green transition 

Strategic Communication 

For enlargement to succeed, EU leaders must move beyond technocratic language and engage in a sincere, transparent dialogue with their own societies. The lack of a clear narrative has allowed skepticism to grow, particularly regarding the perceived competition between the “new” candidates (Ukraine and Moldova) and the Western Balkans. EU leaders must communicate that the enlargement process is not a “zero-sum game.” Strategic communication cannot be limited to Brussels summits. It must reach the ” citizens in both the current Member States and candidate countries.

The EU must be clear that while the opportunity is geopolitical, the entry remains strictly merit-based. This “tough love” narrative helps reassure EU citizens that standards of rule of law and corruption-fighting will not be lowered for the sake of speed.

Strengthen Democratic Resilience

• Increase funding for civil society and independent media 
• Build transnational democratic networks 
• Counter disinformation and foreign interference 

Enhance Security Integration

Deepen cooperation in border management and law enforcement 

• Integrate candidate countries into cybersecurity frameworks 
• Develop joint responses to hybrid threats 

Invest in Youth and Future Leadership

• Expand educational and mobility programmes 
• Support emerging pro-European leaders 
• Encourage youth participation in governance 

_________________

The paper authored by Szpala on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post The Strategic Costs of Non-Enlargement: Why EU Inaction in the Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood Undermines European Security and Global Influence appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

The European Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies toward Eastern Europe have undergone significant transformation over the past decade, shaped by shifting geopolitical realities, internal EU debates, and divergent domestic political trajectories among partner states. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have long been regarded as the most advanced reformers within the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), sharing a declared strategic objective of EU membership and a commitment to political association and economic integration with the Union^[1]. Their cooperation with the EU was formalised through Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), which were designed to anchor long-term reform and gradual integration into the EU’s internal market.

This shared trajectory was further institutionalised through the launch of the Associated Trio format in May 2021. Established by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as a coordination mechanism, the Associated Trio aimed to strengthen cooperation on EU integration, align reform priorities, and jointly advocate for clearer membership perspectives within the EU framework^[2]. The format emerged in response to dissatisfaction with the Eastern Partnership’s increasingly heterogeneous nature and its inability to differentiate sufficiently between countries with explicit accession ambitions and those pursuing more limited forms of cooperation^[3].

By promoting coordinated diplomacy and joint reform messaging, the Associated Trio sought to increase its collective leverage vis-à-vis EU institutions and Member States. In this sense, the Trio represented an attempt to shift the EU’s eastern policy from a neighbourhood management logic toward a more explicitly enlargement-oriented approach, grounded in differentiation and merit-based progress^[4]. However, the political and strategic relevance of the Associated Trio has progressively faded since 2022.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally reshaped the EU’s enlargement policy, prompting an unprecedented geopolitical re-evaluation of accession priorities. The EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 and to open accession negotiations with both countries in 2024 marked a decisive move away from regional formats toward individualised accession tracks^[5]. At the same time, Georgia’s domestic political trajectory—characterised by democratic backsliding, restrictions on civil society, and deteriorating relations with EU institutions—has undermined the premise of a shared reform path that underpinned the Associated Trio^[6].

As a result, the EU has increasingly adopted a bilateral and differentiated approach, prioritising country-specific conditionality over collective regional coordination. While the Associated Trio continues to exist formally, it no longer functions as a meaningful driver of EU integration, reflecting broader tensions within enlargement policy between geopolitical urgency and normative conditionality, and between regional cooperation and differentiated accession pathways^[7].

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the current state of EU enlargement, integration, and regional cooperation in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia; identifies the root causes of stagnation and declining credibility in the process; and assesses the most viable pathways forward. Drawing on desk research, analysis of EU progress reports and strategic documents, media monitoring, and expert assessments, the paper situates the decline of the Associated Trio within the broader crisis—and potential renewal—of EU enlargement policy in the Eastern neighbourhood.

The Current State of EU Integration for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

The EU integration trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have diverged significantly since 2022, despite their shared institutional and political starting point within the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio framework. While all three countries pursued Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) as pathways toward eventual EU membership, the post-2022 period has been marked by increasing differentiation, driven by geopolitical shocks, domestic political developments, and the EU’s recalibrated enlargement strategy.

 Ukraine: Accelerated Integration under Exceptional Circumstances

Ukraine’s EU integration has progressed at an unprecedented political speed, largely as a consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The war transformed Ukraine from a neighbourhood partner into a strategic frontline state, prompting the EU to grant candidate status within months of Kyiv’s application and to open accession negotiations in 2024^[8]. This acceleration reflects a broader geopoliticisation of enlargement, in which security considerations increasingly complement—and at times compete with—traditional merit-based conditionality.

At the same time, Ukraine’s progress is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand, the European Commission’s enlargement reports acknowledge substantial legislative alignment with the EU acquis, particularly in anti-corruption policy, judicial governance, public administration reform, and alignment with EU foreign and security policy positions (European Commission 2023; 2024). On the other hand, implementation gaps remain pronounced. Wartime conditions strain administrative capacity, weaken oversight mechanisms, and complicate the enforcement of newly adopted legislation. This reinforces a long-observed pattern in EU enlargement whereby formal compliance outpaces substantive institutional transformation^[9]

Moreover, Ukraine’s integration path has become increasingly exceptionalised. The scale of EU financial assistance, the creation of the Ukraine Facility, and the linkage between reconstruction and accession distinguish Ukraine from other candidates and undermine the original logic of regional coordination embodied in the Associated Trio. While this exceptionalism strengthens Ukraine’s short-term integration prospects, it may raise longer-term questions about the consistency and credibility of EU conditionality.

 Moldova: Reform Momentum amid Structural Vulnerability

Moldova’s EU integration trajectory represents a case of comparatively strong reform commitment combined with acute structural vulnerability. Like Ukraine, Moldova applied for EU membership in 2022 and was granted candidate status shortly thereafter. Accession negotiations formally began in 2024, reflecting Brussels’ assessment that Chişinău had met the initial political conditions related to judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, and public administration capacity^[10].

Moldova’s progress has been driven by a relatively cohesive pro-European political leadership and sustained cooperation with EU institutions. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova operates in a non-war environment, allowing for more consistent reform implementation. However, its integration path is constrained by state fragility, economic dependence, and external leverage—most notably Russia’s influence through energy supply disruptions and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict^[11].

Moldova thus illustrates a key tension in EU enlargement policy: while formal reform benchmarks may be met, external vulnerability and domestic polarisation threaten the sustainability of integration. The EU’s approach toward Moldova increasingly combines accession conditionality with resilience-building measures, including energy diversification, macro-financial assistance, and support for strategic communication. This hybrid model reflects an implicit recognition that classical enlargement tools alone are insufficient in highly exposed states.

 Georgia: Candidate Status without Credible Accession Momentum

Georgia presents the most analytically significant contrast. Despite long being considered a frontrunner in the Eastern Partnership, Georgia’s EU integration has stagnated and, in some areas, reversed drastically. Although Georgia was granted candidate status in late 2023 with conditions, the European Commission has repeatedly underlined serious democratic backsliding, including the erosion of judicial independence, restrictions on civil society, and confrontational rhetoric toward EU institutions^[12].

Moreover, Georgias case demonstrates the limits of EU leverage in contexts where ruling elites instrumentalise European integration rhetorically while undermining its normative foundations in practice. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia’s stagnation cannot be explained by war or institutional weakness alone, but rather by deliberate political choices by ruling elite. This has led the EU to effectively freeze meaningful accession engagement, reinforcing a de facto bilateral differentiation that excludes Georgia from the accelerated enlargement track.

Georgia’s case also highlights the collapse of the Associated Trio as a functional framework. The Trio presupposed parallel reform trajectories and shared strategic orientation; Georgia’s democratic regression has invalidated this assumption and reinforced the EU’s preference for country-specific conditionality over regional formats. Echoing this trend, one expert described the process as “pretty much frozen… with some progress being reversed.”^[13]

Comparative Assessment and Implications

Taken together, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia exemplify a shift in EU enlargement policy from a regionally coordinated, neighbourhood-based approach toward highly differentiated, geopolitically informed accession pathways. Ukraine’s integration is driven by security imperatives and exceptional support; Moldova’s by reformist leadership tempered by vulnerability; and Georgia’s by political backsliding that has eroded trust and momentum.

This differentiation has improved the EU’s capacity to tailor engagement, but it has also contributed to perceptions of inconsistency and declining credibility. The fading relevance of the Associated Trio underscores a broader structural challenge: the EU has yet to reconcile its normative enlargement framework with the geopolitical realities of its eastern neighbourhood. As a result, current integration trajectories remain uneven, fragile, and highly contingent on both domestic political will and external security dynamics. This fragmentation is widely acknowledged, with experts noting that “the Associated Trio doesn’t really exist anymore.”^[14] .”

Root Causes of Stagnation and obstacles in the EU Integration Process

Despite renewed geopolitical momentum since 2022, the EU integration processes of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia continue to suffer from persistent stagnation and in case of Georgia declining credibility. This stagnation is not the result of a single factor but rather a combination of domestic structural weaknesses, political agency, external interference, and limitations inherent in the EU’s enlargement methodology itself. While these factors manifest differently across the three countries, their cumulative effect has undermined both reform sustainability and trust in the enlargement process.

 Structural Governance Weaknesses and Implementation Gaps

A primary cause of stagnation lies in the enduring gap between formal legal alignment and effective implementation of reforms. Across Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, EU-driven reforms have often prioritized the adoption of legislation over deeper institutional transformation. This pattern reflects a broader limitation of EU conditionality, which is more effective in promoting rule adoption than rule enforcement.^[15]

In Ukraine, wartime conditions exacerbate these structural weaknesses. While legislative output has accelerated, oversight mechanisms and judicial independence remain constrained, raising concerns about long-term institutional resilience. Moldova faces similar implementation challenges, albeit in a non-war context, where limited administrative capacity and politicised institutions hinder consistent reform execution. Georgia, by contrast, demonstrates how implementation gaps can become politically intentional, with reforms selectively reversed or undermined by governing elites. As one expert noted, “it’s not even frozen—it’s backtracking… going back rather than moving forward.”^[16]

Domestic Political Dynamics and Elite Incentives

Political will remains a decisive factor shaping reform trajectories. In Ukraine and Moldova, reform momentum has been driven by relatively strong pro-European leadership; however, this commitment is uneven and vulnerable to electoral cycles, elite capture, and public fatigue. In Georgia, stagnation is best explained not by incapacity but by political choice. The ruling elite has increasingly framed EU conditionality as external interference, while instrumentalising European integration rhetoric for domestic legitimacy^[17].

This divergence highlights a critical weakness in the enlargement process: EU leverage is contingent on domestic elite incentives. Where elites perceive EU integration as politically or economically costly, compliance diminishes. The EU’s inability to effectively sanction democratic regression short of suspending the entire accession process further weakens its influence. This aligns with expert assessments that “the authorities effectively placed Georgia outside the EU accession process… accepting democratic deterioration as the price they are willing to pay.”^[18]

Reform Fatigue and Diminishing Societal Trust

Reform fatigue among both political elites and societies has contributed significantly to credibility loss. In all three countries, citizens have been exposed to prolonged reform demands without clear, tangible rewards. Prior to 2022, the absence of a credible membership perspective fostered scepticism about whether reforms would ever lead to accession^[19]. Although candidate status has partially restored optimism in Ukraine and Moldova, delays and vague timelines risk reigniting disillusionment.

In Georgia, declining public trust in the EU integration process has been actively fueled by Governing elites polarising narratives that portray the EU as inconsistent and politically biased. This erosion of societal consensus undermines one of the EU’s key sources of normative power: domestic demand for reform. As reflected in societal perceptions, “even if we changed our European policy today, restoring trust would take considerable time.”^[20]

 External Interference and Geopolitical Pressure

Russian influence remains a central external factor contributing to stagnation. Through military aggression, energy leverage, disinformation campaigns, and political interference, Russia has actively sought to disrupt EU integration efforts in all three states on the EU’s periphery.^[21]  Moldova’s energy vulnerability and unresolved Transnistrian conflict exemplify how external leverage constrains reform autonomy. In Georgia, demise of democratic institutions, indirect Russian influence and ideological convergence with Moscow^[22] intersects with domestic elite interests, amplifying anti-EU narratives without overt military pressure.

For Ukraine, the war has paradoxically strengthened EU commitment while simultaneously straining state capacity. This dual effect illustrates how geopolitical urgency can accelerate political decisions while undermining reform quality and sustainability. This is compounded by regional dynamics where “the region could become an arena of confrontation… in terms of influence and interests.”^[23]

 EU-Level Constraints and Methodological Inconsistencies

Finally, stagnation and credibility loss are partly rooted within the EU itself. Internal divisions among Member States regarding enlargement, concerns over absorption capacity, and enlargement fatigue have produced ambiguous signals to candidate countries .^[24] While the EU insists on merit-based conditionality, geopolitical exceptions—particularly in Ukraine’s case—create perceptions of inconsistency.

Moreover, the shift toward differentiated, bilateral accession tracks has effectively sidelined regional frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio. While differentiation allows for tailored engagement, it also weakens collective incentives and reinforces perceptions that enlargement outcomes depend more on geopolitical utility than on reform performance. Indeed, external observers highlight that “there is really not a strategy… no clear vision on how to deal with Georgia”.⁵

 Comparative Assessment

Comparatively, Ukraine’s stagnation is primarily structural and war-induced, Moldova’s is rooted in vulnerability and capacity constraints, and Georgia’s stems from authoritarianism and political backsliding. Yet all three cases expose a shared credibility problem: the EU’s enlargement policy struggles to balance geopolitical necessity with normative conditionality. Without addressing this imbalance, reform backsliding and scepticism toward EU integration are likely to persist.

Conclusion

The trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia illustrate not only the opportunities inherent in EU enlargement but also the significant costs of stagnation or non-enlargement. For the aspirant countries themselves, failure to secure full membership or a credible accession pathway threatens to undermine both political stability and economic development. In Ukraine, the absence of a tangible EU membership horizon risks eroding reform momentum achieved during the wartime period. While legislative alignment has accelerated under the extraordinary pressures of war, long-term institutional resilience remains fragile. If accession remains indeterminate, the domestic political elite may deprioritize reforms once immediate survival pressures subside, potentially reopening vulnerabilities to corruption, oligarchic influence, and inefficiencies in governance.¹ Similarly, public trust in European integration—already strained by the slow pace of EU decision-making and complex negotiation procedures—may weaken, undermining the social legitimacy of pro-European policies and stoking internal political polarization.²

In Moldova, non-enlargement carries comparable structural and security risks. The country’s institutional fragility, energy dependence, and ongoing geopolitical vulnerability make EU membership a critical anchor for sustainable governance and resilience against external pressures. Failure to progress credibly toward accession could embolden pro-Russian political actors, reverse recent reform gains, and increase the likelihood of political instability or policy oscillation, particularly in energy, trade, and security policy.^[25] Georgia’s situation is even more acute: democratic backsliding and elite instrumentalization of EU rhetoric indicate that the absence of credible conditionality or membership prospects exacerbates the risk of authoritarian consolidation. Non-enlargement may reinforce elite incentives to resist reform, diminish civic space further, and weaken the broader societal consensus on European integration.^[26] As participants emphasized, “we are losing the advantages we were proud of… restoring them will take a great deal of time.”⁸

From the EU’s perspective, non-enlargement carries tangible strategic, economic, and normative costs. Strategically, it risks leaving a geopolitical vacuum in the Eastern neighbourhood, one which Russia has repeatedly sought to exploit. Allowing stagnation or regression in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia could increase regional instability, disrupt energy and trade networks, and prolong security risks on the EU’s eastern flank.^[27] Economically, delaying enlargement limits the potential for integration of new markets and investment flows, including in sectors critical to energy security, agriculture, and digital infrastructure. This is particularly significant for the EU as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and strengthen supply chain resilience post-2022.^[28]

Normatively, non-enlargement undermines the credibility of the EU’s political and institutional model. The perception that the EU can reward compliance with formal legal alignment while failing to deliver meaningful accession signals weakens the Union’s transformative power. This risk is compounded by the selective application of conditionality, such as the accelerated negotiation track for Ukraine compared to the stagnation of Georgia. Inconsistent messaging risks creating a “credibility deficit,” reducing the EU’s ability to shape governance outcomes in other partner countries, and diminishing its normative appeal globally.^[29] From a strategic perspective, this risks that “the EU would lose a reliable partner in the region and access to key connectivity routes”.^[30]

Finally, the costs of non-enlargement are mutually reinforcing. For the aspirant states, the erosion of reform momentum and societal trust makes them more vulnerable to external influence. For the EU, failure to act decisively diminishes geopolitical leverage, economic opportunity, and normative authority. In this context, the strategic imperative is clear: sustained, credible enlargement pathways—combined with targeted support for governance, civil society, and resilience—are not only normative obligations but essential for the EU’s own security and influence. A coherent approach would reconcile geopolitical urgency with merit-based conditionality, ensuring that enlargement continues to serve as a transformative instrument rather than a symbolic gesture. Only by addressing the risks of stagnation and reinforcing incentives for reform can the EU, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia avoid the compounded costs of non-enlargement, securing long-term stability, prosperity, and democratic consolidation in the Eastern neighbourhood.

References:

Blockmans, Steven. The EU’s Geopolitical Turn: Enlargement as a Strategic Imperative. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2023.

Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.

Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.

Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140.

Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.

Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.

Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics(February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.

European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020.

European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023.

European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.

European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.

European Comission. European Council Conclusions on Ukraine. Brussels, 2022.

European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025.

Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024.

Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023.

Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).

Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638.

Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.

Lehne, Stefan. A Reluctant Magnet: Navigating the EU’s Absorption Capacity. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023.

Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021.

Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023.

Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679.

Footnotes (Chicago style)

1. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

2. Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

3. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

4. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

5. Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026.

6. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

7. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

8. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

9. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

^[1] European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020; Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.

^[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021

^[3] Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.

^[4] European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.

^[5] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024

^[6] Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024

^[7] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.

^[8] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024

^[9] Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140

^[10] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.

^[11] Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.

^[12] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024; Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024

^[13] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[14] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[15] Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679

^[16] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[17] Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics (February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.

^[18] Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[19] Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.

^[20] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026

^[21] Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638

^[22] Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).

^[23] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026

^[24] Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026

^[25] Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023

^[26] Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023

^[27] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022

^[28] European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025

^[29] Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026

^[30] Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025

________________________

The paper authored by Kornely Kakachia on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post The Costs of Non-Enlargement and the Imperative for Strategic EU Engagement in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Executive Summary

The recent reinvigoration of the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkan region should be understood as an exogenous effect of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which entails a consistent and intricate interaction between the geopolitical reasons in favor of the EU enlargement and the transformative power of the European Union. Analyzing the costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans requires acknowledgment of the unique features of the EU polity, which relate to the EU integration as a peace project, an efficient single market, and a political system based on liberal democracy. From this perspective, the geopolitical drive and the transformative role of the EU are two sides of the same coin. In the absence of full membership of the Western Balkans in the European Union, the transformative role of the EU will erode, and the leverage of non-Western external powers will increase, causing the Western Balkan region to drift away from the European Union. The socioeconomic convergence of the Westen Balkan region with the EU will not be sufficient if it is not accompanied by an externally induced political accountability. Furthermore, Western Balkan societies risk becoming more polarized, and the gap between the citizens and the ruling elite may widen. 

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) has been, on the one hand, an affirmation of its identity, and on the other hand, a policy instrument for reinforcing and projecting the EU’s role as a normative power within and beyond its institutional boundaries. To a large extent, the EU’s enlargement policy is described as being central to its foreign policy (Armakolas et al., 2024; Koval & Vachudova, 2024), which enables the EU to sustain the stability and continuity of its peace project, as the most significant feature of EU integration. The central dilemma that the EU faces when addressing the prospective accession of the candidate states of the Western Balkans revolves around the assumed dichotomy between the transformative power of the EU to in shaping the domestic political system of the candidate states in the Western Balkans and the geopolitical momentum of the enlargement after following the Russian aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. 

The process of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, and the enlargement policy itself, with its regulatory, centralized, asymmetric, and rule-based practices, is usually construed as a self-contained and insular process (Džihić & Rauch, 2026; Morina, 2025; Shahini, 2024). The gap between the normative underpinings of the EU enlargement policy and the actual “ways of ruling” of the candidate countries in the Western Balkans is quite apparent. In other words, the presence of politicized public administrations, weak enforcement of rule-of-law norms, inconsistent practices of political accountability, and pervasive political corruption in the Western Balkans, which is conventionally referred to as “state capture” (Džankić, 2025; Vachudova, 2019, p. 64), bring to the fore the actual relevant scope and effect of the transformative power of the EU on the political systems of the Western Balkans. This particular perspective separates the transformative power of the EU from the existing geopolitical context. The geopolitical momentum is defined as leading to a suboptimal outcome of the EU enlargement, particularly if security and geopolitical reasons prevail over “strict norm enforcement” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 8) regarding the rule of law, media freedom, and accountable political institutions, transforming the EU enlargement policy into an instrument that rewards political membership (Nić et al., 2026, p. 8) of selected candidate countries in the Western Balkans. 

However, when the EU is primarily understood as a sustained peace project, with its unique post-national and post-sovereigntist institutionalized identity that combines liberal democracy with a single market, the geopolitical context becomes consistently interlinked with the transformative power of the EU, as it has always been in the previous rounds of EU enlargement to post-authoritarian countries, despite the different degrees of geopolitical challenges. Henceforth, this policy paper argues that to analyze the costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans and the efficiency of the current enlargement policy itself, it is important to consider the externalization effect (Hooghe & Marks, 2005), as suggested by the neofunctionalist approach, in conjunction with institutional reforms and political transformations in the candidate states. As Hooghe and Marks state, according to the neofunctionalist approach, the externalization effect is manifested as “solidarity induced by conflict with a foreign power – [that] can be a powerful source of integration” (2005, p. 215). 

This perspective is of utmost relevance to the Western Balkans, whose trajectory towards EU accession has experienced inconsistent credibility of the EU’s commitments, as characterized by its strategic ambiguity (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 6) when the European continent was not yet facing increasing geopolitical challenges from competing external powers (Morina, 2025). At the same time, it is important to highlight the fact that political representatives of the candidate states in the region, which are primarily incumbent governing elites, have not been consistently committed to the transformative political and institutional reforms (Džankić, Keil, & Kmezić et al., 2019; Kmezić, 2019, p. 93) demanded by the EU. The Russian war against Ukraine led to the phasing out of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. This previous EU policy had emphasized the increased linkage of the EU – and hence its leverage – to the eastern flank of the its institutional border. The overhaul of this policy and its replacement with an encompassing, vigorous, and renewed EU enlargement policy for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and for the Western Balkans, is a strong indication of this externalization. As a consequence, Zelenskyy’s response to Chancellor Merz’s policy proposal for an “associate membership” of Ukraine to the EU that “[w]e are defending Europe – fully, not partially, and not with half measures”(Hayden, 2026) underlines the pervasive and constant feature of this round of EU enlargement, indicating the external threat to the European peace project and security. The question posed by Hooghe and Marks (2005) two decades ago as to whether “external conflict with a foreign power” (p. 215) will shape the process of EU integration should be heeded and answered in the affirmative. 

 The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the role of external third parties involved in geopolitical competition with the EU in exerting influence in the semi-periphery of the EU by promoting alternative developmental and political trajectories that fall short of stable and consolidated liberal democracies, and which may stall the EU accession of the Western Balkan region, set the bounds for the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio. As the prevailing official narrative of the EU integration project evokes the resilience of its peace project through crises, the ability of the EU to forestall being downgraded or facing disintegration has been dependent on constant cycles of institutional and policy innovations, including its enlargement policy. Policy derogations and differentiated horizontal or vertical integration of the existing EU member states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2023), after successful rounds of EU enlargement, attest to David Mitrany’s functionalist idea of the EU polity as “a network of jurisdictions with variable membership, variable decision rules and of variable durability, depending on the need and acceptability” (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 208). Similarly, the establishment of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, “to financially support gradual integration” (Morina, 2025, p. 14) and “to integrate the region more closely into the single market” (2025, p. 14) prior to full membership, as well as the revision of the EU enlargement methodology highlighting the reversibility and close monitoring of the rule of law and democratic political institutions, through pre- and post-accession mechanisms such as the Rule of Law Report, demonstrate the important role of institutional innovations of the EU enlargement policy that reduce the costs of credible commitments of the ruling elites of the candidate states to the EU enlargement path. The process of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkan region involves, albeit to different degrees, practices of member state building (Keil, 2013; Keil & Arkan, 2014) and externally induced political accountability of political institutions, and of normative “alignment with the EU’s values, laws, standards, policies” (Shahini, 2024, p. 11). Therefore, the real and consequential costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkan region, as discussed in this policy paper, will affect, to a larger extent, the sustainability of the transformative reforms rather than merely the socioeconomic convergence (Shahini, 2024, p. 11). 

Exogeneous Spillover as the Geopolitical Driver of the EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans 

The actorness and normative power of the EU in “an increasingly rogue and illiberal international environment” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 8) is predicated upon the EU’s response to “competing geopolitical actors” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 9), and to conflicts or wars in the near abroad of the European Union. Phasing out the EU Eastern Partnership policy for the Eastern Trio and the opening of accession negotiations with Albania, as well as progressing with the accession negotiations with Montenegro, in the last few years are strong indicators that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has acted as a catalyst for provoking an exogeneous spillover (Binici, 2020, p. 12) to the EU enlargement policy and process. On the other hand, had the EU institutions been reluctant to exploit their policy innovation skills in the policy area of EU enlargement, such as the gradual integration as an example of policy innovation, the Western Balkans Growth Plan and other overlapping mechanisms of conditionality and benchmarking, which according to some experts do not help in resolving the inconsistency of the EU’s credibility (Emerson & Blockmans, 2025), the mutual interdependence between the exogeneous spillover of the continuous geopolitical challenge and the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans would not have been obvious. It should be noted that this concrete exogeneous spillover, in combination with the actual institutional and policy innovations of the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkans, has enabled the EU to break the cycle of “inconsistency and incremental transactionalism” (Džankić, 2025, p.75) and constrain the executive aggrandizement of the incumbent governments in the candidate states. 

The understanding that the geopolitical drive of the EU enlargement and its transformative power concerning the Western Balkans work at cross-purposes obfuscates the consistent interaction, if not interdependence, between security and geopolitical reasons for the EU to enlarge to post-authoritarian countries and political and institutional reforms, even in the previous round of EU enlargement. The historical context of the EU accession path of post-communist central European countries was marked with initial doubts and incertitudes on the part of key representatives of EU member states, which “tried to keep the new democratizing member states at bay” (Koval & Vachudova, 2024, p. 2) and initially provided European agreements that were short of full membership of the EU. However, the “membership perspective came after…missteps by the EU” (Koval & Vachudova, 2024, p. 2). As Koval and Vachudova argue, drawing parallels between the reinvigoration of the EU accession pathway of the central East European and the EU accession pathway of the Western Balkans: “In 1999 and 2022, the EU reached for enlargement in response to the war in its neighborhood” (2024). Although seemingly a less complex EU enlargement, the 1980s enlargement to the post-authoritarian states of the southern European region had still been motivated by an exogenous spillover effect due to the daunting task of safeguarding the emerging democracies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Nić et al., 2026). Ultimately, despite the different degrees of external challenges to the EU political system and regional integration, the geopolitical context has been a consistent structural feature of the reinvigorated EU enlargement policies and processes to regions that cannot simply be relegated to the external bounds of the EU as a “ring of friends”. For these reasons, this opportune critical momentum of the EU enlargement that emerges as a consequence of the exogenous shocks or due to “significant change[s] in [the] regional or international system” (Binici, 2020, p. 81) undermining the EU peace project and the single market (Anghel & Jones, 2024) compels the EU to be innovative in the EU enlargement process. Henceforth, the costs of not enlarging to the Western Balkans are higher. 

Socioeconomic Convergence without Political Accountability 

Although it may sound preposterous to claim that the Western Balkan region will attain a sustainable socioeconomic convergence, in the short term, with the EU, this particular EU policy goal with regard to the Western Balkans has been central to supporting the integration of regional economies into the EU single market for quite some time. The Common Regional Market (CRM) framework that was established for the Western Balkans 6, within the framework of the Berlin Process, predates the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, a roadmap and financial instrument for economic integration formulated in 2023. This particular economic policy of the EU towards the Western Balkans reflects a certain path dependency (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 115) of previous similar policies and is predicated on the institutional and policy practice of functional spillover. Furthermore, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is expected to have political effects as well, linking the financial support to “Reform Agendas, which in part concern the political and the rule of law fundamentals, plus some issues not subject to the EU acquis” (Emerson & Blockmans, 2025, p. 2). Just recently, the European Commission “made available €49 million to Albania, € 44.2 million to Montenegro, and € 65.7 million to North Macedonia under the Reform and Growth Facility” (European Commission, 2026). These funds are allocated primarily to research and innovation, digital technology, and educational policy and to foster a more competitive business environment. 

Notwithstanding the partial implications of this economic and financial policy, which may galvanize norm adoption (Kmezić, 2019, p. 89) concerning the rule of law and democratic institutions in the Western Balkans, without full membership as a final outcome (Morina, 2025, p. 2) of the EU enlargement policy, the socioeconomic convergence will not be sufficient to sustain politically accountable democratic institutions in the long run. One could argue that “…[the] gradual, incremental and horizontal expansion of regional institutionalization, …and regulatory capacity” (Binici, 2020, p. 84) of the EU policies, related to the EU single market, in the Western Balkan region may incentivize domestic interest groups to demand a more efficient and professional public administration, basic rule-of-law practices, and legal predictability without being able to make the incumbent governments and the executive power politically accountable. To a certain extent, if the EU and its institutions and representatives, through the EU enlargement policy, were to desist from interacting primarily with government elites, referred to commonly as “gatekeepers” (Kmezić, 2019, p. 89; Richter & Wunsch, 2020; Vachudova, 2019, p. 66), and involve instead more inclusive political institutions, such as the parliament, and state bureaucratic agencies that exercise horizontal accountability, socioeconomic convergence would be embedded into stable, democratic, and accountable political institutions. The experience of the erosion of democracy during the 16-year rule of Fidesz in Hungary, which was discontinued as a consequence of the societal mobilization and the appeal of restoring the affinity and identification of Hungary with Europe, as well as the short-lived but detrimental rule of the Law and Justice Party in Poland, indicate that such governments “…comply with the rules of the single market while backsliding on liberal democracy” (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1125). Ultimately, non-enlargement to the Western Balkans constitutes a high cost for the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in this region. 

Drifting Away from the EU: Authoritarian Leverage of External Powers 

In the absence of a successful enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkan region, due to the EU’s “strategic ambiguity,” and when the full membership of the Western Balkans is not perceived as the utmost end goal of the EU enlargement policy (Nić et.al, 2026, p. 3), the geopolitical competition between the EU and external powers such as Russia and China, among others, may radically tilt in favor of the latter. When the process of gradual integration is not sufficient to achieve the “political integration” (Risse, 2005, p. 292) of the Western Balkan countries into the EU—a process that implies, among other factors, a considerable political pressure exerted by pro-EU interest groups, civil society, and citizens compelling the political elite to “shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center” (Haas, 1958, p. 16, as quoted in Risse, 2005, p. 292)—the Western Balkan countries will drift away from the EU and develop or reinforce economic, political, and cultural linkages with the external powers, whose leverage will be enhanced. These kinds of arguments, which have been articulated by other experts before (Armakolas et al., 2024; Emerson & Blockmans, 2025; Morina, 2025), rest on the historical experience of the Western Balkans as a region in which “democracy – both as an ideology and as a political regime – has never become socially or institutionally embedded” (Vachudova, 2020 quoted in Džankić, 2025, p. 74; see also Mishkova, 2014). It has been proven that the trade-off between stability and democracy, which for years had been the EU’s informal, yet influential, policy stance on the Western Balkans, at times fomenting the illusion that stability and democracy are “inextricably linked” (Džankić, 2025, p. 75), undermines the transformative power of the EU. 

Taking advantage of the financial crisis of 2008, and of enlargement fatigue, external powers aimed to provide an alternative route to economic growth, modernization, and cultural and foreign policy affinities to the Western Balkan countries. The economic diplomacy of China in the Western Balkan region, as part of the global Belt and Road Initiative, has materialized into Chinese investments and developmental projects in infrastructure, energy, and transport (Chrzová et al., 2019; Rrustemi et al., 2019). On the other hand, Russia, exploiting the cultural, religious, and historical ties with the South Slavic states in the Balkans, has meddled in the region not only as an economic actor, investing in the oil industry, power plants, and tourism, but also as an ideological “disrupter” (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 107) of the societal consensus and support for the EU accession trajectory of the Western Balkan societies. Disseminating disinformation, supporting ethnonationalist leaders such as Dodik of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the 2018 constitutional referendum in North Macedonia, and fomenting skepticism if not distrust towards Euro–Atlantic institutions in Montenegro, Russia has intended to exercise its authoritarian leverage to forestall progress towards the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries and entrench authoritarian leaders in power, acting as a hindrance to the “return to Europe” of the Western Balkan region. It should be reiterated that the economic investments of the external powers in the Western Balkans are characterized as “corrosive capital” (Ben, 2023; Prelec, 2020), as exemplified by the Železara Smederevo steel manufacturing privatization in Serbia (Ben, 2023). In short, political elites and incumbent governments, acting as gatekeepers, allow corrosive capital investments that ultimately weaken political accountability, undermine sustainable economic growth, disregard wider public interests, and challenge rule-of-law practices. In the long run, if the overall goal of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans dissipates, the region will be mired in a constant and yet uncertain geopolitical competition between the EU and non-Western external powers. 

EU candidate countries that are characterized by contested statehood or bilateral disputes, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, are potentially more vulnerable to stagnation in terms of EU accession prospects and non-Western authoritarian leverage. The existing EU enlargement policy does not seem to have a clear strategy aimed at overcoming the structural invariants (Bechev, 2004) of ethnonationalism and intraethnic divides in the Western Balkans. As Koneska et al. argue, “these countries have been failing to balance between the predominant pro-EU discourse and popular support on the one hand, and challenges posed by the…unstable nation-state constellations and the latter’s incompatibility with the process of EU integration, on the other” (2023, p. 187). Predicated on regional cooperation and reconciliation norms, the policy goals of the Berlin Process, which sought to forge a post-sovereigntist and post-national state identity (Sako & Lleshi, 2025) of the Western Balkan countries, has had a limited effect across the region. The very fact that candidate countries such as Serbia, and to some extent Bosnia and Herzegovina, do not align their foreign policy with the EU Foreign and Security Policy shows that the ideological, cultural, and political influence of external powers is equally powerful and an impediment to a European identification and belongingness of these countries. In the end, besides other relevant factors, it should not come as a surprise that Montenegro and Albania, countries that have consistently aligned their foreign policy with the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, are primed as the frontrunners of the EU enlargement to the region. 

Elite–Citizen Divisions and Erosion of the EU Transformative Power 

Although there is considerable criticism of the policy of gradual integration and the overlapping and competing mechanisms of assessing the compliance of the candidate countries with the EU acquis, as well as democratic practices and rule-of-law norms, the EU institutions, through these innovative policy mechanisms of the EU enlargement policy such as gradual integration, “safeguard clauses” (Nić et al., 2026, p. 2), and “post-accession conditionality” (Nić et al., 2026, p. 5), and “transitional arrangements” (Lippert et al., 2026) can bring about a sustainable process of member state building. This particular goal entails accountable democratic institutions, good governance, and rule-of-law practices (Kmezić, 2019). However, if the EU institutions negotiate and interact primarily with the political elite and incumbent governments, without “widen[ing] genuine public participation in the decision-making” (Morina, 2025, p. 9) and without transforming the national parliaments of the candidate countries into pivotal arenas of policymaking, democratic accountability, and bipartisan cooperation, the transformative power of the EU will erode over time. The EU institutions in cooperation with national parliaments, without sidelining the incumbent governments, and civil society organizations need to formulate, sustain, and disseminate a communicative action process that enables societal dialogue and deliberation related to the member state building practices in the candidate countries. As a consequence, instead of demanding that candidate countries’ governments pursue a more inclusive and cooperative society-wide strategy (Morina, 2025), the actual process of benchmark mechanisms, monitoring, and communicative action processes could succeed in responding to the “right to democracy” and not just a “right of accession” (O’Brennan, 2001) of the Western Balkan societies by enforcing an externally induced political accountability in this region. 

According to the Balkan Barometer of December 2025 (Balkan Barometer 2025, 2025), 64 percent of Western Balkan citizens on average support EU membership, a much higher percentage than in previous years or decades. If the EU enlargement policy continues to be characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, and a lack of credible commitments to full membership of the Western Balkan countries, the gap between citizens and the ruling elites will widen. Such a persistent elite divide will potentially undermine the prospects of EU membership of Western Balkan countries and provoke another cycle of competitive authoritarian rule and democratic backsliding or further entrench the existing competitive authoritarian regimes in the region. At best, the EU will be compelled to respond to political and social mobilization in the Western Balkans in favor of restoring the EU prospect of the region, provided that the citizens themselves have not already succumbed to desolation. 

Policy Recommendations 

• The EU institutions and representatives need to constrain the exclusive influence of the executive and transform the legislature in each of the candidate countries as the focal point of political accountability and cooperation. 
• An efficient and sustainable process of member state building should be predicated on effective state bureaucracy and institutional mechanisms of horizontal accountability, as well as an autonomous and professionalized judiciary. 
• Socioeconomic convergence is not sufficient if not supported by externally induced political accountability, which recognizes the pivotal role of pro-EU constituencies and civil society. 
• The process of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans needs to be framed as a barrier to geopolitical competition with other external powers, which undermines the European integration as a unique peace project and as a post-national political system. 
• The EU, by upholding its commitment to full membership of the candidate countries as the end goal of the enlargement policy, will avoid a further divide between citizens and the political elite, which may instigate a deepening of democratic backsliding and authoritarian rule in the Western Balkans. 

References 

Anghel, V., & Jones, E. (2024). The geopolitics of EU enlargement: From club to commons. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 66(4), 101 – 114. 

Armakolas, I. Dimitrov, N., Ioannides, I., Nechev, Z., Popescu-Zamfir, O., & Zeneli, V. (2024). EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where there is a will, there is a way. (Policy Paper). Europe’s Futures. 

Balkan Barometer 2025: Record high support for EU membership in the region. (2025, December 23). European Western Balkans. https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/12/23/balkan-barometer-2025-record-high-support-for-eu-membership-in-the-region/

Bechev, D. (2004). Contested borders, contested identity: The case of regionalism in Southeast Europe. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 4 (1), 77–95. 

Ben, R. (2023). Achilles steel? Investigating corrosive capital in Smederevo Zelezara privatization. Journal of Regional Security, 18(2), 187–216. 

Binici, O. (2020). Expanding European integration towards the Western Balkans in times of crisis: A neo-functionalist examination. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 14(4), 75–98. 

Chrzová, B., Grabovac, A., Hála, M., & Lalić, J. (2019). Western Balkans at the crossroads: Assessing influences of non-Western external actors. (Policy Paper). The Prague Security Studies Institute. 

Džankić, J. (2025). The geopolitics of democracy in the Western Balkans. In J. Džankić, B. Kotevska, L. Mokrá (Eds.), The geo(politics) of democracy in wider Europe. (pp. 73–84). European University Institute.

Džankić, J., Keil., S., & Kmezić, M. (2019). Introduction: The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. In J. Džankić, S. Keil, & M. Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanization of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? (pp. 1–14). Palgrave Macmillan.

Džihić, V., & Rauch, T. (2026). From fatigue to fragile momentum: EU enlargement in the Western Balkans under geopolitical pressure. (Report). Austrian Institute for International Affairs.https://www.oiip.ac.at/en/publications/from-fatigue-to-fragile-momentum-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-balkans-under-geopolitical-pressure/

Emerson, M., & Blockmans, S. (2025). How to radically simplify and streamline the EU enlargement process. (Policy Brief). CEPS. 

European Commission. (2026, May 20). Commission releases €158.9 million to Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia under EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1106

Hayden, J. (2026, May 24). Zelenskyy rejects Merz proposal for associate EU membership. Politico.https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-rejects-friedrich-merz-proposal-associate-eu-membership/

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2019). Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1113–1133. 

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005). The neofunctionalists (were) almost right: Politicization and European integration. The Constitutionalism Web Papers. University of Hamburg, Institute of Political Science. 

Keil, S. (2013). Europeanization, state-building and democratization in the Western Balkans. Nationalities Papers,41(3), 343–353.

Keil, S., & Arkan, Z. (2014). The EU and member state building: European foreign policy in the Western Balkans. Routledge. 

Kmezić, M. (2019). EU rule of law conditionality: Democracy or ‘stabilocracy’ promotion in the Western Balkans? In J. Džankić, S. Keil, & M. Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanization of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? (pp. 87–109). Palgrave Macmillan. 

Koneska, C., Huskić. A., & Krasniqi, G. (2023). Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo: Contested statehood and the EU. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 17(2), 173–191. 

Koval, N., & Vachudova, A. M. (2024). European Union enlargement and geopolitical power in the face of war. Journal of Common Market Studies, 62(1), 135–146. 

Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Seebas, F. (2026). EU enlargement: Ukraine as a special case – the Western Balkans as the norm. (Policy Brief). German Institute for International Security Affairs.

Mishkova, D. (2014). Balkan liberalisms: historical routes of a modern ideology. In R. Daskalov & D. Mishkova (Eds.), Entangled histories of the Balkans: Transfers of political ideologies and institutions. (pp. 99–198). Brill. 

Morina, E. (2025). Accelerate the accessions: Why faster is better in EU enlargement policy. (Policy Brief). European Council on Foreign Relations. 

Nić, M., Maillard, S., Zweers, W., Bechev, D., & Xaviereff, N. (2026). Europe’s next enlargement: What Berlin, Paris, and the Hague really think. (Policy Brief). German Council on Foreign Relations. 

O’Brennan, J. (2001). Reconceptualizing Europe: Social constructivism and EU enlargement. In P. Willa & N. Levrat (Eds.), Actors and models: Assessing the European Union’s external capability and influence. (pp. 173–199). Euryopa Études. 

Prelec, T. (2020). The vicious circle of corrosive capital, authoritarian tendencies, and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of Regional Security, 15(2), 167–198. 

Richter, S., & Wunsch, N. (2020). Money, power, glory: The linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(1), 41–62. 

Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291–309. 

Rrustemi, A., de Wijk, R., Dunlop, C., Perovska, J., & Palushi, L. (2019). Geopolitical influences of external powers in the Western Balkans. (Policy Paper). The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. 

Sako, M., & Lleshi, S. (2025). Explaining change in the Albanian state identity: Discourses of regionalisation and foreign policy of local elites. Southeastern Europe, 48(2–3), 414–439. 

Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & De Vries, C. (2023). Differentiated integration in the European Union: Institutional effects, public opinion, and alternative flexibility arrangements. European Union Politics, 24(1), 3–20.

Shahini, B. (2024). Towards enlargement: How to rebuild trust in the EU accession process. (Policy Paper). Hertie School: Jacques Delors Center. 

Vachudova, M. A. (2019). EU enlargement and state capture in the Western Balkans. In J. Džankić, S. Keil, & M. Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanization of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? (pp. 63–86). Palgrave Macmillan. 

_________________

The paper authored by Prof. Lleshi on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post Costs of Non-Enlargement to the Western Balkans: State Building, Externally Induced Political Accountability, and EU Policy Innovation appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

One year after Prime Minister Edi Rama swept to a fourth consecutive term, Albania finds itself in a profoundly different place than the triumphant narrative he projected. The government that claimed unrivaled authority now faces the most sustained civic uprising in decades. What began as modest demonstrations over foreign investment projects in Zvërnec and Sazan has grown into a nationwide reckoning with a system many Albanians see as unaccountable, extractive, and fundamentally exhausted.

The protests were triggered by concerns over the opaque terms of high‑profile investments linked to Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. But the demonstrations are not a referendum on the Trump family, nor a rejection of foreign capital. Albanians have long welcomed investment that respects the country’s laws, environment, and public interest. What they reject is the way these projects were pushed through: without transparency, without consultation, and without regard for environmental or property rights. The protests are not anti-Trump or anti‑American; they are anti‑kleptocracy.

For years, Rama governed as if political competition were an inconvenience rather than a democratic necessity. Power became increasingly centralized. Parliament functioned as a formality. Cabinet reshuffles were announced theatrically, with ministers learning of their appointments during public speeches. The ruling party’s internal life narrowed to loyalty and conformity. The opposition, fragmented and demonized, was treated as a nuisance rather than a counterweight.

This concentration of authority created the illusion of stability. But it also produced a brittle system – one that could operate efficiently only as long as citizens remained passive. The protests have shattered that assumption. They have exposed the limits of a governing model built on control and corruption rather than consent and accountability.

The controversy over the Zvërnec and Sazan projects exposed deeper frustrations. Albanians have watched for years as public tenders, infrastructure contracts, and strategic assets were steered toward politically connected networks. High‑profile corruption cases, such as the Balluku affair and the enrichment of ministers, senior officials and their families, reinforced the perception of a governing elite insulated from accountability. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens faced stagnant wages, rising costs, and declining public services. Nearly one million Albanians have emigrated in the past two decades, a staggering outflow that reflects both economic hardship and a loss of faith in the country’s direction. The protests are, in part, a response to this long‑accumulated erosion of trust.

Rather than engage with the protesters’ concerns, Rama has chosen a strategy of dismissal and derision. He has portrayed the demonstrations as anti‑investment or manipulated by foreign agents. He has mocked protesters with theatrics – pelican jokes, staged ridicule, and insinuations that they are misinformed or unpatriotic. He has revived the spectacle of mass rallies celebrating his party’s anniversary, echoing the performative mobilizations of the late communist era. This reaction reveals more than political defensiveness. It reflects a governing style that has grown accustomed to impunity and struggles to comprehend dissent as anything other than sabotage. It is a response that deepens, rather than resolves, the crisis of legitimacy.

What makes this civic uprising remarkable is its composition. It is not orchestrated by a political party. It is not driven by a single ideology. It is a coalition of students, environmental activists, property owners, workers, pensioners, and young professionals. Many had long disengaged from politics, convinced that participation carried little weight. Now they are in the streets, united by a shared conviction that Albania cannot continue on its current path. Their demands are clear and coherent: Rama’s resignation; a technical government to restore trust; reversal of laws adopted to accommodate investors without public consultation; accountability for corruption, including high‑level cases; and a governing model grounded in transparency and rule of law.

These are not radical demands. They are the basic expectations of a democratic society.

For years, Albania’s political life has been marked by resignation. Citizens watched institutions weaken, corruption deepen, and public debate narrow. Many concluded that nothing could change. The protests have reversed that psychological trajectory. They have restored a sense of agency to a society long told that power is immovable. Even without a single leader or formal structure, the movement has already achieved something profound: it has broken the spell of invincibility that surrounded Rama’s rule.

Rama’s landslide in 2025 was meant to cement his dominance. Instead, it accelerated the overreach that has now provoked widespread resistance. His mandate, once portrayed as historic, increasingly resembles a Pyrrhic victory – one that delivered short‑term control at the cost of long‑term legitimacy. Even if he survives the immediate crisis, the political landscape has changed irreversibly. The government can no longer rely on public apathy. The opposition, though still fragmented, is no longer the only channel for dissent. Civil society, long marginalized, has reentered the national stage. And the younger generation, so often dismissed as disengaged, has shown that it is willing to act.

At this juncture, the international community also faces a choice: whether to remain a distant observer or to take a principled stand in support of democratic norms, institutional integrity, and genuine accountability.

The protests have opened a door, but they have not yet defined the path forward. Albania needs more than catharsis. It needs a comprehensive strategy for democratic renewal: rebuilding institutions capable of resisting political pressure; restoring checks and balances; ensuring judicial independence; protecting media freedom; creating space for new political actors; and investing in education and opportunity so young Albanians see a future at home.

These are long‑term tasks, but they are now part of the national conversation in a way they have not been for years.

Whether the protests force immediate political change is not the only measure of their significance. Albania has already crossed a threshold. A society that had grown cynical has rediscovered its voice. A government that believed itself invincible has been confronted with its limits. A nation that felt humiliated by corruption has reclaimed its dignity.

This is a civic awakening, not a passing episode.

Albania has endured difficult chapters and emerged stronger. It can do so again. The courage displayed in the streets of Tirana is not merely a rejection of the present; it is an affirmation of the future. The protesters have reminded the country and the world that Albania’s democratic aspirations remain alive, resilient, and deeply rooted.

A people who rediscover their dignity do not return to silence. Albania has entered a new chapter, and its citizens are writing it with clarity, courage, and hope.

* Elez Biberaj holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University and retired from the Voice of America in December 2023 after a 43‑year career.

The post Albania’s Civic Awakening: A Year After Rama’s Landslide, the Illusion of Invincibility Breaks appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

by Albert Rakipi, PhD

In April 2026, Fincantieri, one of Italy’s foremost industrial and defense champions, signed an agreement with the Albanian company KAYO to produce vessels at the Pashaliman shipyard. Prime Minister Rama presented the project as part of a strategic partnership, noting that the new company would produce ships not only for Albania’s Armed Forces but for allied militaries as well. Fincantieri is no ordinary investor. In strategic weight it is comparable to Leonardo in defense or ENI in energy, and its presence in Albania therefore carries a significance that far exceeds a single business deal: it inserts Albania into a new industrial and security geography.

If developed seriously, Pashaliman can become far more than a shipyard. It can become the symbol of a new Italian approach to Albania: from crisis management to industrial partnership; from border control to maritime production; from migration anxiety to defense cooperation; from Albania as a fragile neighbor to Albania as a capable ally on NATO’s southeastern flank. This is why Fincantieri’s arrival should be read as a strategic question: can Italy finally see Albania not merely as a country to be stabilized, but as a platform with which to build influence, security and industrial capacity in the Adriatic and the wider Mediterranean?

For more than three decades after the fall of communism, Albanian-Italian relations have carried a striking paradox. No other European country has been closer to Albania in geography, culture, migration, trade, security and political imagination. Yet no other relationship has so consistently remained below its strategic potential. Italy was Albania’s first window to the West. During the long decades of communist isolation, Italian television, language, music, culture and lifestyle shaped the Albanian idea of Europe more than any official doctrine could. For many Albanians, Italy was not simply a neighboring country across the Adriatic; it was the visible West, the accessible Europe, the natural partner for Albania’s post-communist rebirth.

This explains why expectations after 1990 were so high, and why their partial disappointment carried a deeper moral weight. Ismail Kadare argued in the early 1990s that Italy had remained silent for too long about Albania’s suffering under one of Europe’s harshest communist regime. Through Italy, Kadare was in fact addressing the whole West, because for Albanians Italy had been its most immediate image. The hope was that, after decades of silence, Italy would now care for Albania almost as an elder brother.

Italy did respond generously in the early years, providing assistance, supporting institutional reconstruction and backing Albania’s Euro-Atlantic path. But Italy’s view of Albania was always more ambiguous than Albania’s view of Italy. After the collapse of communism, Albania was not primarily seen in Rome as an economic opportunity or a future strategic partner. It was seen above all as a possible source of instability. The first migration waves, weak state institutions, organized crime, trafficking networks and the political fragility of the 1990s turned Albania into a security concern. The neighbor across the Adriatic became less a country with which to build long-term projects and more a country whose risks had to be contained. This perception reached its peak in 1997, when the Albanian state nearly collapsed after the pyramid scheme crisis. Italy led Operation Alba, the multinational mission that helped restore order. It was a decisive and necessary intervention, and it demonstrated that Italy could play a major role in Albania when it chose to do so. But it also reinforced a doctrine that would shape the relationship for years: Albania was to be treated as a volatile neighbor to be stabilized, not yet as a serious partner to be developed.

The problem is that this logic persisted even after Albania changed. Albania stabilized. It joined NATO. It became a reliable partner in regional security and aligned itself with the Euro-Atlantic agenda. It no longer represented the kind of emergency that had haunted Italian policymaking in the 1990s. Yet the mental map in Rome changed more slowly than the reality on the ground. The relationship remained close, friendly and useful, but too often reactive, cautious and modest. The central question today is whether Italy has truly moved beyond the old doctrine of threat management toward a doctrine of strategic opportunity. The answer is not yet clear.

Politically, Albania and Italy enjoy excellent relations. There is no bilateral dispute. They share broad positions on foreign policy and security. Italy has consistently backed Albania’s NATO membership and its European integration, and Albania regards Italy as one of its principal advocates inside the European Union. The human relationship runs even deeper: more than half a million Albanians live and work in Italy, creating one of the strongest social bridges between the two countries. Albania has also shown exceptional trust toward Italy, the most recent and politically sensitive example being Tirana’s acceptance of the controversial agreement on Italian migrant processing centers in Albania, an arrangement offered to no other European country. Whatever one thinks of that agreement, it demonstrates the degree to which Albania is willing to accommodate Italy’s strategic and domestic concerns.

Yet the economic and industrial dimension tells a more complicated story. Italy remains one of Albania’s most important trade partners, and cultural, commercial and human ties are dense. But for a relationship so often described as strategic, Italy’s investment profile in Albania has been surprisingly limited, concentrated largely in trade, services, small and medium enterprises, fashion production, restaurants and other low- or medium-value activities. These are important, but they do not constitute a strategic partnership. A strategic relationship requires investment in strategic sectors: defense industry, energy, ports, infrastructure, maritime economy, logistics, transport corridors, advanced manufacturing, technology, education and professional training. At present, in the hierarchy of strategic FDI in Albania, Italy does not rank among the top five, where Hungary, Turkey, the Netherlands/Switzerland, and even distant Canada now stand out. Rebuilding a strategic relationship in education would, in a sense, mean going back to the future. It is enough to recall the Albanian scientists and professionals of the 1930s who were educated in Rome and Turin, among them Prof. Selaudin Toto, a distinguished scientist educated in Italy and founder of Albania’s Institute of Sciences. He was not the only one. Education, like industry and security, should return to the center of an Italian strategic policy toward Albania. It requires not only exchange, but transformation; not only proximity, but vision.

This is precisely why the Fincantieri project matters. It offers a possible departure from the old pattern. Instead of another chapter of symbolic friendship or routine economic presence, it can become the first pillar of a qualitatively different relationship: industrial, maritime, technological and strategic. Such a shift would also serve Italy’s own interests.

For years, Italy has struggled with the question of its role in the Balkans and the wider Adriatic space. At times Rome viewed the region through a fragmented lens, focusing heavily on Serbia as the Schwerpunkt of Balkan stability. For economic and strategic reasons this approach was understandable, but it often leaned toward preserving unsustainable arrangements, including support for the continuity of the Yugoslav Federation and later a cautious approach toward the Milosevic regime. In the long run, this weakened Italy’s capacity to act as a driver of regional change. Italy has also acted through EU mechanisms and intervened in moments of crisis, but it has rarely articulated a sustained regional vision. Yet Italy’s geography demands precisely such a vision. A country that wants to be strategically relevant in the Mediterranean cannot treat the Adriatic and the Western Balkans as peripheral spaces. On the map of strategic investments in the Balkans, Albania is not the only country where Italy does not appear as a strategic actor. The same is true of Serbia, the largest investment market in the Balkans, where Italy, although it remains an important and well-established investor, ranks roughly fourth or fifth, behind more aggressive actors such as China, Russia and others. From a geopolitical perspective, the vacuum created in part by the absence of a stronger Italian presence is being rapidly filled by third powers.

A truly strategic Italy needs a serious Balkan policy, and any serious Italian Balkan policy must place Albania near its center. Albania offers Italy something few countries in the region can provide simultaneously: geographic proximity, deep cultural affinity, a strong diaspora in Italy, political goodwill, NATO membership, a pro-European orientation, a long coastline, ports, maritime infrastructure and a consistent readiness to cooperate with Rome. It is difficult to imagine a more natural platform for an Italian strategy in the southeastern Adriatic.

This is where the idea of a new Italian Ostpolitik becomes relevant. Italy needs a policy that does not merely react to crises in the Western Balkans but projects long-term influence through integration, investment, industrial cooperation, security partnerships and support for EU enlargement. Such a policy would not be nostalgic geopolitics. It would be modern geo-economics and strategic statecraft.The Western Balkans are no longer simply a zone of instability to be managed. They are part of Europe’s security architecture, the EU’s enlargement debate and NATO’s southeastern space. They are also part of the wider contest over infrastructure, energy, ports, digital networks, supply chains and foreign influence. In this environment, Italy cannot afford a small Albania policy.

Nor can Albania afford a passive Italy policy. For too long, Albania has relied on the assumption that geography, history and affection would naturally produce a strategic relationship with Italy. They have not. Affinity is not strategy. Migration is not strategy. Trade alone is not strategy. Even friendship is not strategy unless it is translated into projects, institutions and long-term commitments. Albania must therefore define more clearly what it wants from Italy. It should not approach Rome only through the language of gratitude, cultural closeness or political support for EU integration. It should offer concrete strategic platforms: maritime industry, defense production, port development, energy cooperation, vocational education, university partnerships, infrastructure corridors and joint regional initiatives.

The Fincantieri project could become the foundation for such a platform, but only if Albania builds around it the necessary ecosystem: technical schools, engineering capacity, maritime training, defense procurement planning, port modernization, transparent regulation and protection from clientelist or short-term political interference. If Albania wants to be treated as a strategic partner, it must behave as a strategic state. The old formula of Albanian-Italian relations was built on proximity, emotion and emergency. The new formula must be built on industry, security, technology and shared geopolitical purpose. For decades, Italy asked what risks might come from Albania: migration, instability, crime, weak borders. These were legitimate concerns, especially in the 1990s. But they were defensive concerns. They answered the question of what Italy feared from Albania, not what Italy could build with Albania.

Now the question must be reversed: what can Italy and Albania build together? They can build a maritime industrial hub in the Adriatic. They can build a defense cooperation model within NATO. They can build a stronger southern axis for European integration. They can connect Italian industrial capacity with Albanian geography and human capital. They can turn Albania from a peripheral neighbor into a strategic platform for Italy’s role in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. But this requires political imagination on both sides. Italy must stop seeing Albania mainly through the old categories of migration, borders and risk. Albania must stop waiting for Italy’s attention as if historical closeness alone were enough. Strategic partnerships are not inherited. They are constructed.

For the moment, the Fincantieri project remains part of a strategic political imagination shared by both sides. The same was true of the Italy-Albania-United Arab Emirates agreement on renewable energy and the Vlora-Puglia submarine interconnector, worth around €1 billion, signed a year earlier, in 2025, with the involvement of Italy’s Terna and the UAE’s TAQA. But political imagination alone is not enough. As an Albanian proverb says, there is a whole sea between saying and doing.

King Zog once wrote that he did not fear a strong Italy; he feared a weak one. A strong Italy, he argued, was an Italy that wanted a stable, organized and independent Albania. That idea remains remarkably relevant. But today it should be taken further: a truly strategic Italy is one that sees Albania not only as stable and independent, but as useful, capable and necessary. And a truly strategic Albania is one that knows how to make itself indispensable.

__________________________________

Albert Rakipi is Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania.

The post Strategic Italy: Where Is Albania? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Your Excellency, it has been just over a year since you assumed your diplomatic post in Albania. Do you feel that you have found a second home here?

Partly, yes. Diplomats are professional nomads, with many “homes.” They come and go, always ready to leave. Yet, it’s not true that diplomats become less attached to a country because they know they’ll have to leave. On the contrary, they feel more affection, since they recognize that in every country, and in any experience, there’s something enriching. 

Over this intensive year, which key milestones would you highlight in the development of bilateral relations between Italy and Albania?

I’ve said it often, because I truly believe it: the common challenge for Italy and Albania is transforming their friendship into a strategic partnership. Our bilateral relationship reflects a multitude of new perspectives and can flourish across an array of promising pathways. Choosing what to do—and what not to do—is the basic definition of strategy. When I came here last year, I asked myself: “What is the core here?” I answered, first of all, that an intergovernmental Summit was needed, to consolidate our relations and to accompany Albania in the EU accession negotiations: the Summit was held in Rome in November, at the highest institutional level. We didn’t have a G2G agreement: it was signed, along with 16 other agreements in strategic fields. An Albanian Development Bank was needed: it now exists, created with the support of CDP too. In economic terms, compared to the past, Italy needed to move from a “labor-intensive” presence to a more “capital-intensive” and “innovation-oriented” one. This is the new approach we have been working towards.

You have been a strong advocate of the economic pillar of diplomacy, and much of your engagement in Albania has focused on strengthening economic ties. How would you assess the progress achieved so far?

When I took my office in 2025, I was given statistics saying that there were 2,600 Italian companies operated in Albania. However, I realized they were all small or very small. On the one hand, we have continued to support their internationalization in Albania, because these are a key driver of development. On the other hand, the new face of Italian corporate Italy in this country had also to encompass heavy industry, energy transition, digital technology, and high-value-added services. This is why we worked to bring a bunch of large Italian companies to Albania, global players active in these key sectors. Some have already arrived others will be landing soon. Their presence, in terms of economic diplomacy, is a win-win-win game: it will strengthen the internationalization of companies at a time of geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainty; it will make Italy’s positioning in Albania more solid, strategic and effective; it will help Albania raise its profile (including internationally) in such high-value-added fields. The recently signed Fincantieri-Kayo Joint venture, for example, will help modernize a yard ship and the maritime defense capacity of Albania, in the NATO framework. At the same time, it will create hundreds of new jobs, helping retain talent in Albania. Lastly, this JV will provide Fincantieri with additional shipbuilding capacity, to fulfill orders from around the world. This is a step aligned with a new work strategy: not just “Italy in Albania”, but “Italy with Albania”. The road is long, but we are happy with the results achieved in this year’s work. 

The two Prime Ministers, Edi Rama and Giorgia Meloni, have cultivated a friendly and highly cooperative relationship, marked by a positive personal rapport. How has this dynamic influenced institutional relations between the two countries?

Leaderships’ friendship boosts bilateral relations and make them easier. Diplomacy works to channel friendship towards joint projects, strengthening both the bond and the projects.

Bilateral relations are also deeply rooted in strong people-to-people connections, reflected in cultural exchange, education, and ongoing interactions between our societies. How does this dimension shape and inspire your daily diplomatic work?

The human factor is at the very heart of the Italy-Albania relationship. Our ties are not built only on geographical proximity or strategic interests, but on decades of daily interaction between people, which are still alive. We have hundreds of young Italians studying in Albania, and thousands of Albanian students in Italy. We have archaeological missions, artist residencies and cultural exchanges of all kinds. Furthermore, I guess Italians are the most, or one of the most, numerous tourists in Albania. All of this help strengthening institutional relations. The Embassy believes in this aspect of diplomacy. For this reason, on our social media we share the catchy stories of Albanians with ties to Italy, or who lived in Italy and then returned here: entrepreneurs, artists, chefs, scientists.

Finally, to the extent that you can share, what are your priorities for the coming years? What areas of cooperation should we expect to see further developed between Italy and Albania?

First, accompanying Albania on its path towards the EU accession: we are here to support the reforms required. Second: implementing the deals struck in Rome last November, which is a pragmatic way to help Albania accelerate its modernization. Third: in the next five years, 2025-2030, I would like to triple the Italian foreign investments made in Albania in the previous twenty-five years, that is 2000-2025. A big Italy-Albania business forum is under preparation with AIDA (to be hopefully held in fall 2026). Fourth: working to advance Corridor VIII: this is a geopolitical game changer able to generate stability and long-term economic value in the Balkans, offering many business opportunities. Italy is committed to boosting the implementation of the Corridor and the projects along this axis. 

The post Transforming friendship into a strategic partnership: the common challenge for Italy and Albania  appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

by Marco Alberti, Ambassador of Italy to Albania 

Digitalization is reshaping the Public Administration in both policy-making and service delivery. Data revolution helps governments meet public expectations and become more efficient and resilient, improving their performance. Yet, while accelerating the innovation of public sector, the deployment of digital technologies brings another key-challenge: speed. 

Speed is the new currency 

Speed has become a strategic factor, because it is linked to innovation, which is the driving force of digital society. Ensuring speed and agility leads to superior performance. “Speed ​​is the new currency,” says Marc Benioff, founder and CEO of Salesforce. Sycamore, Google’s quantum processor, takes a few minutes to process as many as calculations that a common laptop would do in 10,000 years. In the international relations domain, the ability to respond quickly to volatile, unpredictable circumstances has become a critical factor for defining the new balance of power, and perhaps for defining the same concepts of influence and power. 

Unlike in the past, diplomacy and international affairs can no longer afford to slowly adapt to changes, as their pace demands almost business-like agility to stay abreast and relevant. Data technologies, and especially generative AI, are changing the mechanisms that regulate international relations, bringing continuous innovation and growing speed. Consequently, they will affect all diplomatic activities: from geopolitical analysis to negotiation; from support to export and internationalization of companies to consular services. The need to adopt data-driven models in order to manage political, institutional and economic pressures raises the bar and stretches diplomacy. On one hand, technology is expanding the sphere of diplomatic competence, with multiple and diverse calls for action; on the other hand, increasingly shorter action/reaction time is requested to face circumstances and perform well. In such digitized context, the main challenge for diplomacy consists in combining two kinds of “intelligence”: the contextual one, i.e. the ability to understand the context, leveraging on-the-ground presence and powerful multi-stakeholder networks of diplomats, with the artificial one, i.e. the ability to exploit and optimize the increasing power of data and algorithms.

Key factors to be fast: throughput and latency 

The primary objective for diplomacy is to unlock public value through greater efficiency and improved performance. In digital contexts, reaching out to such goals mostly depends on speed, which, in turn, is the result of multiple variables. Two of them, similarly to what happens in IT systems, are essential to work faster and increase productivity: throughput and latency.

Throughput 

The throughput indicates the maximum capacity of a system to support the workload in a due unit of time. In information technology, this variable is measured in queries or bytes per second. By analogy, the throughput of diplomacy consists of the ability of central and peripheral structures to absorb the requests received, and carry out the various tasks, in a given time. Speed includes the ability to deliver new or highly appropriate content, with no delay. When a system is overloaded, that is, it receives more “queries” than it can handle, it becomes slow and loses efficiency. If it is not possible, to reduce loads or, alternatively, to increase resources, a viable solution to restore speed is a load balancing among servers. The same concept applies to organizations. Overloading people or teams, even if they can handle it, reduces efficiency and is detrimental to the organization outcome. Dividing tasks maximizes skills and knowledge of each individual, with positive impact on the working capacity (and speed) of the whole organization. Another solution is diversifying peoples’ professional experience. Being skilled to do something, helps do it better and faster. Innovation communities and cross-functional teams, as well as “off-career” job experiences, make the diplomats’ expertise multidisciplinary, and diversify the spectrum of their skills, with positive effects on workload capacity, executive speed and quality of performance. 

Latency

Latency indicates how quickly a system responds to stimuli. More precisely, in the IT field, latency measures the interval between the moment the input is sent and the moment the output is available. When a server is so much loaded that its latency exceeds the so-called “user timeout”, i.e. the maximum time the user is willing to wait before reacting, requests begin to fail, with negative impact on efficiency and reputation. According to a recent survey, 47% of online consumers demand that a web page replies in less than 4 seconds before abandoning it^[1]. In computer systems, latency is improved by increasing the bandwidth, i.e. the support infrastructure. To provide quality services, the bandwidth must be broad, which means able to allow transmission and reception of data at a connection speed faster than 2Mbit/s. The same for diplomacy. The widespread presence of embassies and consulates throughout the world grants public diplomacy the geographical proximity essential to collect, transmit and manage big data, minimizing the action/reaction time of its structures. However, to be efficient, diplomacy 5.0 must have its “broadband”, which consists of technological architecture and human resources skilled enough to manage digitalized processes, leveraging on data to design and execute strategies. The challenge posed by data-driven models, hence, does not only concern updating certain tools and infrastructures, but also (and maybe above all) designing advanced skilling, upskilling and re-skilling processes.

The correlation between speed and leadership 

Speed is the combination of doing things fast and right. Effective leaders are able to plan and execute with speed, because they are quick without being sloppy. A study carried out by Zenger and Folkman finds that in 95% of cases the quality of leadership refers to the speed shown by leaders in spotting problems, learning, anticipating scenarios, pro-acting or re-acting to circumstances^[2]. Digitalization, and especially AI, can empower people, but only if leaders take a broad view of their capabilities and deeply consider the implications of applying technologies to the organization. To promote innovation in public and private organizations (including diplomacy) is a foremost accountability of leaders; it should push them to reflect not only on the potential factors that make innovation work, but also on the organizational and contextual factors that prevent innovation from achieving its outcomes. In such perspective, the correlation between (transformational) leadership and speed relies on three main nexus. The first nexus is speed/style of leadership. A rigid pyramid-like top-down management attitude is too slow to keep the quick pace of digitalization, while a shift to an open, more flexible leadership style can bring performance from average to excellence. Today, rather than control, leaders should provide ability of designing and redesigning creative and collaborative relationships within teams, useful for creating value. The second nexus is speed/competence. As skills grow and improve in quality, the speed of planning and executing strategies increases, while mistakes and inefficiencies reduce. The answer to an increasingly complex, multidisciplinary and dynamic international environment, therefore, relies on an increasingly agile, fast and competent leadership. This rule applies to every kind of profession, and diplomacy is no exception. The last nexus refers to trust. Within an organization, be it public or private, low levels of trust inevitably slow down processes and generate high operating costs. Conversely, a work environment based on mutual trust encourages the devolution of power and accountability, speeding up processes and reducing costs. Building trust is functional to creating value, and, therefore, it is a leadership imperative. 

Big vision, small steps: speeding-up a data-driven diplomacy

Digital and data technologies accelerate the shift towards a data-driven paradigm. Even foreign policy strategies depend every day more on the (systematic) collection and (analytical) reading of massive amounts of data. While digital diplomacy is how diplomats use some digital tools to perform their activity, data-driven diplomacy refers to “turning bytes into insights”, which means understanding how data is challenging (and changing) the traditional way to conduct diplomacy. The UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, for example, created the FCDO Labs, to develop the skills required for consolidating data-driven models in foreign policy. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established internal “Big Data Units”, made up of professionals specialized in the analysis and systematization of data, to make it accessible to diplomats and policy-makers. The U.S. Department of State launched the first-ever Enterprise Data Strategy (EDS), to empower its global workforce with the tools and skills to use data as a critical instrument of diplomacy. 

McKinsey latest research estimates that generative AI has the potential to create value equivalent to $2.6 trillion to $4.4 trillion in global corporate profits annually^[3]. Almost every Government, large company and organization in the world is working to outline an AI strategy, because it enables to harness the power of data and to unlock new possibilities. In just a short time, indeed, the focus has shifted from digital technologies to data and from data to the technologies capable of creating and processing it, i.e. generative artificial intelligence. Such automated systems help simulate scenarios and predict the evolution of trends, but, in so doing, they also contribute to accelerate the operational speed. In the first round of Iranian nuclear negotiations, the US Department of Energy used AI applications to build the replica of an Iranian nuclear site, foreseeing evolutions of uranium enrichment. According to trustworthy sources^[4], within five years the AI systems will be able to manage 100 trillion parameters, with deep transformative impacts on any domain of human action. 

To keep the pace and stay relevant, diplomacy should integrate the value-laden judgment of diplomats with data-driven insights, combining contextual and artificial intelligence. The former allows diplomats to acquire deeper knowledge and tacit wisdom, which often remain beyond the reach of algorithms, and adapt that knowledge to real world scenarios. The latter augments the output of diplomacy, including ability to predict, pro-act or re-act in real time to various circumstances. Excessive faith in data would lead diplomacy to serious mistakes, but keeping diplomacy completely away from data would risk to limit, or even to disrupt, it. 

Adapting a data-driven model, built for flexibility and high speed, to public diplomacy is a complex process. Some steps to mitigate it are the following: a) defining a data-driven vision for diplomacy, based on a measurable, target-oriented and time-bound action plan; b) outlining a tech-forward strategy, which consists not simply of updating some software and tools, but building a strong foundational “digital core” for diplomacy, able to integrate data, AI and other technologies. Such evolution would allow creating large-scale information systems and interoperability both among diplomatic structures and between them and other Ministries or Institutions. For example, between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense, that are quickly progressing in the application of AI to the national security and the warfare, or even between public and private sector; c) breaking the “big vision into small steps”^[5]. If conceived in a bigger vision, realistic shorter-term goals and manageable subtasks help build momentum, overcome procrastination and get faster to the desired goal.

Conclusions

For Milan Kundera, speed is the ecstasy offered to human kind by the technological revolution. Human inclination is to go faster and faster. This fact has boosted progress, but it has also generated concerns. Besides ethical questions, for example, the rise of generative AI has a deep (and still partially unknown) impact on security, on both physical and cyber sides. Furthermore, speed overstresses the structural weaknesses of people, organizations and even of national States, enhancing social paradoxes and environmental costs. The ICT sector, for example, already generates the same quantity of CO2 emissions as aviation. Continuing on this way, by 2025 it will constitute 5.5% of global emissions^[6]. 

Key insight #1: Combine conventional approaches with a data-driven model. Humans assisted by AI could outperform both human-alone and AI-alone. In a tech-driven, faster-paced international environment, diplomacy could rely on a tech-forward strategy to augment its professional output and its value generation. Endowing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs with scalable IT architectures, and with competent data analysts, is key to provide diplomats, as well as policy makers, with qualified information and future-proof knowledge. 

Key insight #2: Embrace technology to close up the “tech-fluency” gap. Technology is exponentially increasing the number of hard choices, and simultaneously reducing the time available to make decisions. Data-driven models improve the throughput of diplomacy and reduce its latency time, with positive impact on its operational speed and efficiency. Yet, such models require massive investments to support infrastructures and workers, as they need new skills. Lifelong learning and practice in adapting to change are increasingly more important. From this point of view, a public-private cooperation is key for both parties.  

Key insight #3: Incorporate AI as an enabler to scale value. Artificial intelligence is pervasive; it will change everything, including the mechanisms that regulate international relations and how diplomacy creates value. As AI grows more sophisticated and widespread, it offers diplomacy unprecedented opportunities to accelerate strategy cycle times and be more responsive. On the other hand, AI will subject diplomacy to (stronger) pressures, (unpredictable) risks and (relevant) concerns. Rethinking diplomacy in a data-driven fashion implies to modernize its operational code, while preventing it from downsides. 

The question is not “if” we need diplomacy, but “what” diplomacy we need to face the digital transformation. Even though big data and technologies boost tremendous advancements in diplomacy, the human factor will remain fundamental. No matter how powerful technology becomes, diplomats are here to stay, as their contextual intelligence will continue to bring a unique set of skills and perspectives to the table. Speed is inextricably linked with digital innovation and becomes a critical factor of success for diplomacy too. Yet, instead of rushing into new technologies and processes, a progressive and methodical approach can ultimately accelerate the adoption of data-driven models. Focusing on the core capabilities and the organizational enablers that support those capabilities can build a strong foundation for sustainable innovation and tech modernization of diplomacy. The key is staying committed to a long-term vision, while remaining flexible and adaptable to the frequent changes in the digital landscape. Big vision and small steps is the best way to get there. 

The opinions are expressed in a personal capacity and are not attributable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 

^[1]https://www.hobo-web.co.uk/your-website-design-should-load-in-4-seconds/#:~:text=following%20key%20findings%3A-,47%20percent%20of%20consumers%20expect%20a%20web%20page%20to%20load,render%20before%20abandoning%20the%20site.

^[2] https://www.leadershipnow.com/leadershop/9781259837388.html

^[3] https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/in-the-news/ai-could-increase-corporate-profits-by-4-trillion-a-year-according-to-new-research

^[4] Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, quoted by Amb. Stefano Ronca in: “Lettera diplomatica n. 1360”, Rome, 20.09.23

^[5]https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/small-steps-big-vision-scaling-a-purpose-driven-business-at-coachhub

^[6] https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/12/11/tsunami-data-consume-one-fifth-global-electricity-2025/

The post Diplomacy 5.0: Speed As A Strategic Factor appeared first on Tirana Observatory.