On behalf of Spain, I earnestly welcome the new phase in Albania’s EU integration process, of strategic importance for Albania and for the EU as a whole. We live in an age of spectacular strides for humanity, but also of grave crises and looming threats to our security and well-being; as well as exacerbated great power competition.

The EU – along with an increasingly European NATO –are our main frameworks for effectively defending our security, upholding our interests and values, and jointly addressing the challenges of our time. I am firmly convinced that EU integration will contribute decisively to making Albania’s society more prosperous, its economy more competitive, and its institutions more resilient. I am also convinced of the strategic added value that Albania brings to the European Union.

Albania’s key geostrategic position as a Mediterranean gateway to the Western Balkans, its active role in NATO, its leadership within the UN Security Council, the vibrant energy of its society, the dynamism of its youth portrayed in Tirana as European Youth Capital, the constructive regional approach of its foreign policy, its interconfessional harmony … these and other factors underline the strategic benefits that Albania will provide to the EU as a whole, as I see it, at a crucial point in history.

As we look towards the future and roll up our sleeves for the hard work ahead, I would
like to express Spain’s encouragement and support to Albania for giving momentum to her reform process –the main driving force of EU enlargement.

As Spanish poet Antonio Machado once wrote, “Se hace camino al andar” (We make our path by walking).

The Prime Minister of Spain, during his historic visit to Tirana in August, stated that Albania can count on Spain as its friend, as we walk, together, down our shared path of European integration. Spain will hold, for the fifth time, the Presidency of the Council of the EU throughout the second semester of 2023.

We will work tirelessly to further the works within the EU Council and live up to the mammoth challenges we face, in the age of the greatest interdependence and globalisation in history.

An age which began, arguably, on the specific date which we are commemorating today: October 12th, when Christopher Columbus, at the behest of the Catholic monarchs of Spain, Fernando and Isabel discovered America and ushered in an unprecedented era of global exchanges.

This milestone for humanity coincided with the process of national unification in Spain. The unification enabled the Spanish monarchy to become, from the late 15th century, one of the most extensive and complex political constructs in history.

For centuries, Spain marked decisively the course of history, uniting continents and oceans, building bridges between civilizations; and thus contributing, to no small degree, to the emergence of globalisation. The silver peso, transported across the Atlantic and the Pacific, became the first global currency, facilitating the development of an international economic system.
The introduction of agricultural technologies and new crops from both sides of the Atlantic
helped to feed the world. Cultures came closer to each other: For example, it was a Spanish friar who finished, in the city of Fu-Zhou, the first Chinese grammatical study written by a westerner.

All the while, a group of Spanish scholars known as the school of Salamanca laid the foundations of public international law and human rights. Cervantes showed us in Don Quijote de la Mancha that, sometimes, dreams deemed impossible, are nonetheless worth pursuing.

Velazquez inspired entire generations of painters across the world with las meninas and other masterpieces. Goya depicted the lights and shadows of the European enlightenment. And the Spanish language forged an everlasting link between peoples and cultures in different hemispheres.

As a Spaniard and a European, as the ambassador of Spain to Albania, I feel that these timeless contributions to shaping global history remain today ever compelling. 500 million people across the world are currently native Spanish speakers. Spanish culture is truly global, as our language is the second most spoken mother tongue in the world, after mandarin, and the third most used language on the internet.

As the fourth largest economy in the EU, we contribute resolutely to the deepening of European integration; to a strengthened and enlarged NATO, in the wake of the Madrid Summit; and to effective multilateral diplomacy through the UN and its specialised organisations, the G20, NATO, CELAC, OSCE, OECD, the Council of Europe, and, more recently, the European political community, among others.

Spain is a world leader in tourism, having received pre-Covid 85 million visits per year – a figure that comes close to doubling Spain’s population. Spain has notable global projection also in sports: records set by Rafael Nadal, Real Madrid, Barcelona, and this year’s Eurobasket gold medal are just a few examples; although, it must be said that Albania’s impressive national football team put up a seriously good fight when Spain last played them in march.

Last but not least, Spanish gastronomy is also known throughout the world, and, in a similar way to Albania’s extraordinary cuisine, it reflects the different cultures and traditions that make Spain the unique nation it is today.

In sum, Spain is a European and Mediterranean country, a member of the Latin American community, a bridge between Europe and America, and a nation with a global outlook. The daunting challenges international society faces today require concerted action on a global scale. Spain will pursue, responsibly and relentlessly, in the light of our history and our culture, such concerted action, more necessary than ever.

As we honour the national day of Spain, I thank wholeheartedly Albania and all of the friends here today, for your support in contributing to this common purpose of paramount importance for humanity.

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Opposition to NATO enlargement has been a constant in Russian foreign policy, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and up to the present day. This concept, defined in 2008, advocates opposition to further NATO expansion, in particular to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. In its Military Doctrine, approved in 2010, Russia identified NATO expansion as the main “external military danger“, i.e. threat to its national security.

After the consolidation of Putin’s power, and especially after Russia’s military aggression against Georgia in 2008, it has become apparent that Russia is attempting to undermine democracies in the West and encourage anti-NATO and anti-EU attitudes.

Although the Western Balkan region is less important to Russia than the post-Soviet space or its “near abroad“, Russia has been waging a “hybrid war“ in the Western Balkans for two decades. In this “war“, Russia managed to achieve significant success (primarily in Serbia, and through Serbia in Republika Srpska, one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina), but also faced defeats (in North Macedonia and Montenegro). The culmination of Russian success is its domination in the fuel and gas sector of Serbia and Republika Srpska. These days, in the circumstances of energy crisis and Russia’s military aggression, and the US and EU sanctions imposed against Russia, the Serbian public has learned that oil company Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) and gas company Srbijagas are majority owned by Russian state controlled energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft. Given that a state-owned electric utility power company Elektroprivreda Srbije is facing huge losses, the energy system of Serbia is threatened with collapse. The Serbian leadership drove Serbia into this state by linking the country closely to Russian energy supplies. Serbia has become a state of energy insecurity, whereas it is well known that energy security is critically important to overall security and stability in each country.

The issue of Kosovo is used as a smokescreen to disguise strategic mistakes, such as handing over Serbia’s energy security to Moscow. For its part, Moscow uses its influence over the issue of Kosovo’s status as leverage to win over the Serbian public and to spread pro-Russian sentiments and policies. This is evidenced by the following mantra of Russian officials: by joining NATO, Serbia would lose Kosovo, part of its national sovereignty, and mutual understanding with a friendly brotherly country – Russia!

As a member of the Balkan Contact Group established by the UN, Russia was active in managing the war in BiH and still is in the process for determining Kosovo’s future status. At the same time, Russia is an advocate of the “status quo“, with the aim to prevent (with the support of China) the completion of the negotiations on the future status process led by UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari. After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Russia started using the Kosovo case to justify its actions. It set Kosovo as a “precedent” and relied on it for actions in its “near abroad“ (in Georgia, where Russia formed two entities – South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and in Ukraine, where it annexed Crimea and formed two secessionist entities – Donetsk and Luhansk). At the same time, Moscow encourages Serbia to not recognize Kosovo and to seek “compensation“through secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russian influence and Serbia’s overall policies have somewhat isolated the country from its neighbors. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Serbia’s neighbors are NATO members, whereas Kosovo is under the NATO umbrella. The fact that Serbia pursues a policy of “military neutrality”, which can be interpreted as poorly concealed anti-NATO policy, poses a risk of taking sides in the war and spilling over tensions into this part of Europe, most critically in Bosnia and Herzegovina (through Republic Srpska) and Montenegro, and the northern part of Kosovo.

Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine forced the EU to build a unified response. The EU countries have so far agreed on five packages of sanctions against Russia, and the alignment efforts with those of its US and UK counterparts have been intensified. This narrows the space for Serbia to avoid the alignment of its foreign policy with EU foreign policy. The grim reality of the war in Ukraine and possible spill over into some EU countries and NATO, including Russia itself, confronts Serbia’s leadership with the fact that they have no opportunity to choose. The only way for Serbia to exist and rapidly develop is by pursuing reforms and membership in the EU and NATO. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo facilitates and accelerates Serbia’s path to joining the EU and NATO. In this regard, a “Strategic Compass” for the European Union adopted by the EU ministers of foreign affairs and defense on March 21, 2022, is another invitation and opportunity for all Western Balkan countries, including Serbia, to join the making of the EU common strategy, and take part in setting the priorities of security and defense policy, with the aim to enhance and coordinate the EU military and strategic autonomy.

The post Russia’s “hybrid war” in the Western Balkans appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

When Albania joined the United Nations in 1955, the communist dictatorship had already consolidated and Enver Hoxha’s hands were already bloody with the political murder of his rivals and his imagined potential enemies.  The foundations of a policy of extreme isolation were being laid, an isolation that reached an absurd peak around the 80s. Today’s North Korea even seems a bit more tuned in with the rest of the world that Albania was during the entire Cold War period.

Fast forward 65 years later, in a meeting of the General Assembly in the summer of last year Albania was chosen with an overwhelming majority as a non-permanent member of the UN security council, the most important decision making body when it comes to matters of security and world order. The spot that was to be filled win with a country form the Southeastern European region will be filled by our country until the end of 2023.

The symbolic of this important development should not be lost on anyone: this truly represents a unique opportunity for Albania to leave a small but significant mark in the international relation arena. As such it is simultaneously an enormous challenge. It is one in a generation occurrence.

Albania’s previous opportunity to do the same through the chairmanship of OSCE in 2020 was largely dismantled by the Covid-19 pandemics.

The only event of a similar magnitude and impact was accession into NATO, which was even more symbolic given that the Alliance was the perceived devil in the eyes of the world behind the iron curtain.

Albania has a chance now to escape once and for all the iron grip of long years of isolation and what they do to nation’s psyche with a little help from propaganda, how they ironically makes people feel like they are at the center of the world. This opportunity of being seen, of being heard, of contributing to this unique institution is at the same time quite importantly an opportunity to be humble, to recognize one’s potential within the realistic limitations.

Often times the Albanian foreign policy rhetoric has shown the flaws of this heritage of isolation, it has tried to present Albania as a giant in the international relations arena. The non-permanent member of the UNSC cannot and should not be more of the same.

Therefore this opportunity is a good time to let that go. When one looks at the agenda, Albania priorities in this period will include: Women rights and the role of women in peace and security; International law and multilateralism; Countering CVE; Climate change and security; Cooperation for global health. These areas of intervention present at the same time fields in which Albania needs to increase its own capacities alongside general invest in an overall better diplomacy.

Albania has one amazing card under the sleeve to showcase in these two years, its precious tradition of religious harmony and coexistence and how that can be a solid dimension and pillar of peace.   

This engagement can also be a chance to involve the best experts and try to keep them even afterwards, to learn about topics which usually are under looked and understudied in the western Balkans

That said, Albania’s timing is difficult. The deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and the imminent if not occurring Russian invasion is a formidable challenge to the entire security infrastructure of the West. The constellation of western countries with which Albania has wisely and consistently aligned itself is scrambling to find the best response, between economic sanctions, empowering Ukraine in the military front and strengthening the coordination between the constellations of NATO partners.

This situation of war has once again revived questions and skepticism over the real clout of the UN and it is a well-known fact that many experts have highlighted the fact that it needs to reform with an aim to address the current emerging challenges. Officially Albania supports the reform of the United Nations and its main bodies.  

However institutional change is hard to come by on a time of such extreme upheaval. Hence for these two years the best strategy is to make use of the existing platforms and events to advocate for issues which are pertinent to Albania and can help its way forward.

Finally on a last note Albania is in a position to raise and advocate for issues which are common to the entire region of the Western Balkans. This would be an added value to its membership and an excellent way to show ownership and even stewardship of regional cooperation.

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If the Kremlin decides on another military assault against Ukraine to cower the government in Kyiv into submission, it will also engineer distractions elsewhere. And the Western Balkans are a primary target for diversionary crises. Russian officials and their internationally active security services have been preparing the ground for conflict for several years and have reliable allies in Belgrade and Banja Luka to launch new offensives and undermine the NATO presence.

The long-standing debate on whether the US can fight two simultaneous major wars continues to rage. But a much more immediate question is whether Washington and Brussels can handle several concurrent crises incited by Russia any of which could trigger armed conflict and necessitate a NATO military response. And such crises would include the Western Balkans.

Moscow is well-versed in tactical deception and disguising its near-term goals, and can prepare several concurrent conflictswhether directly, through proxies, or with willing accomplices. Russia’s mounting military threat against Ukraine has focused NATO’s attention on the eastern pilar of European security, as Moscow’s assemblage of army, naval, and air power has surrounded Ukraine, but other potential battlefields are also being prepared.

To bolster his threat against Ukraine, Putin has issued demands on NATO that he knows will be rejected, but he is testing to see whether they will divide Western governments and neutralize European societies. And indeed, several US and European policy analysts have fallen into the trap of believing that if NATO stops including new members and Ukraine is sacrificed to Russia’s imperialism then the West will be able to coexist peacefully with Moscow. Short-sighted appeasement has never worked with expansionist dictators, let alone with Tsarist imitators like Putin who view neighboring countries as part of their divine-given heritage.

If the Kremlin decides on another military assault against Ukraine to cower the government in Kyiv into submission, it will also engineer distractions elsewhere. And the Western Balkans are a primary target for diversionary crises. Russian officials and their internationally active security services have been preparing the ground for conflict for several years and have reliable allies in Belgrade and Banja Luka to launch new offensives and undermine the NATO presence.

Two simultaneous crises are coming to a head in the region – inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and inside Montenegro, and they can coincide with another Russian invasion of Ukraine. The government of Republika Srpska is Moscow’s primary instrument, whose calls for separation from Bosnia-Herzegovina will light the fuse for armed conflict. Bosnian Serb leaders have blocked decision-making in national institutions and launched a process to withdraw from the armed forces, tax system, and judiciary. They have also voted to establish separate state bodies for the Serb entity in preparation for a referendum on secession. As new laws are drafted and the RS constitution is amended the entity looks set to abandon all Bosnian state institutions, in which case the administrative structure will collapse.

This push toward partition will be resisted by the Bosniak population whose lands were seized by Serbian nationalist forces during a campaign of genocide in the 1990s. Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik has been encouraged in his moves toward secession by a weak Western response through limited sanctions and verbal warnings by US and EU officials. The US sanctions,applied as punishment for corruption and endangering Bosnia’s stability and territorial integrity, are well intentioned but ultimately weak. Dodik can simply turn to Putin to replenish any embezzled assets in return for the pursuit of secession.

Moscow has also been preparing the ground to regionally buttress the new Serbian state once it declares independence. It has constructed a Moscow axis in the region encompassing the corrupted political leadership in Hungary and Slovenia who will be encouraged to oppose Bosnia’s integrity. The uncertain role of the Bosnian Croat leadership and of Zagreb itself is also a cause for concern and whether they will side with Sarajevo to maintain the state or conspire with Banja Luka, Belgrade, and Moscow to carve it up.

And above all, Moscow has cultivated the Vučić government in Belgrade. It is both openly and covertly supporting its mini-imperialist project in the Western Balkans through weapons supplies, security assistance, propaganda, disinformation, and other tools of influence to subvert and weaken Serbia’s neighbors. Indeed, a second Western Balkan front has already opened for Moscow in Montenegro. The government crisis in Podgorica is escalating, in which pro-Western forces inside and outside the current coalition are pitted against the Serb nationalist parties backed by Belgrade and Moscow.

Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić, widely viewed as a tool of the pro-Muscovite Serbian Orthodox Church, has fueled the crisis by trying to prevent the formation of a more representative government, preparing a coup to dismiss elected officials, and seekingunconstitutional control over the police. If the pro-Western parties, representing the majority of Montenegro’s citizens, are blocked from holding new elections while the Serbianization process intensifies then Montenegro faces the violent conflict that it managed to avoid during the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Political violence and state fragmentation in Bosnia and Montenegro will be welcomed in the Kremlin. It would demonstrate that even NATO intervention or Alliance membership cannot hold a country together and that both the US and EU are powerless in stopping pro-Russian forces from advancing in the region. Russian intelligence services can also capitalize on other Balkan disputes. The creation of an autonomous Serbian municipal association in Kosova would provide Moscow with an additional inroad of subversion.

Moscow has spent the first year of the Biden administration probing and testing potential US weaknesses and it now sees a period of strategic opportunity. Washington must be prepared to confront several international crises that will not only require intensive diplomacy but the prospect of dispatching military forces to prevent or terminate local wars. At the same time, Germany and France are proving to be unreliable allies, fearful of “provoking” Putin and hesitant in using military force. Once again, the United States will be required to avert a wider war. The EU security project so loudly trumpeted in Paris and Berlin should then be added to the collection of Hans Christian Anderson’s Fairy Tales.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His new book, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, will be published this Spring.

The post Biden’s Russian Roulette appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

President Putin has committed Russia not only to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine but also to replacing its democratically elected government. He wants a vassal state with a puppet government in Kyiv, like Lukashenko’s in Minsk. Donald Trump is expressing his admiration. China’s President Xi is helping finance the enterprise, which has ended a long peace in central Europe.

Putin is winning

I was wrong in thinking Russian objectives would be limited to the south and east. I wasn’t alone. Ukrainian President Zelensky did not anticipate the assault on the capital, which aims to replace him. Russian forces are already in Kyiv, which is suffering bombardment with missiles as well as a ground assault. Appeals to citizens to take up arms at this point aren’t likely to change the situation. Unless something dramatic happens soon, Ukraine will soon be captured, except perhaps for a rump territory around Lviv in the west.

The Western response

The Western reaction has been vigorous. Pre-emptive release of intelligence on Russian plans ruined Putin’s effort to blame the invasion on its Ukrainian victims. Sanctions are making it difficult for Russian banks to survive while the stock market crashes and the ruble tanks. More sanctions are on the way. Banks and individuals will be cut out of world financial markets. Russia will soon find it difficult to obtain Western technology.

But sanctions won’t change Putin’s mind. You get what you want from them only when an opponent negotiates for relief, not when they are imposed.

NATO has beefed up its forces on Russia’s periphery, the opposite of what Putin wanted. Any move against a NATO country now will bring a far wider and more dangerous war.

The conflict will continue

The war may end soon, but the conflict will continue. the Russian government has earned the enmity of all Ukrainian patriots. Unfortunately, some of those are extreme nationalists, but so too are lots of Putin’s supporters in Russia.

It is arguable that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is in the tradition of Hitler’s Anschluss into Austria. The invasion has certainly been justified on similar grounds. Even if the war ends in a Russian victory, the conflict will continue until Ukraine is again an independent state. I doubt however that it will accept the neutral status Austria lives with, and RAND colleagues have proposed. Ukrainians are going to want NATO membership more than ever before.

Impact in Russia

The impact of this war on Russia is difficult to predict. Pre-invasion views of Russians on Ukraine issues were more nuanced than might be assumed. Even views in Donbas were equivocal on remaining in Ukraine. Putin and his circle are diehard Russian nationalists, but he regards Ukrainians as “brothers.” That view is common in Russia. But unlike Putin, most Russians don’t think it appropriate for Cain to kill Abel.

War polarizes. Putin’s propaganda machine is working overtime. His repressive forces are too. Russian police have arrested thousands of anti-war protesters all over the country. The question is whether the economic pain from sanctions will strengthen Putin’s hold on power or loosen it.

Worse in Ukraine

The repression in Ukraine will be far worse than in Russia. Moscow’s forces will attempt to capture or kill the officials of its democratically elected government and parliament. They will install a puppet government that will need to impose its will. Ukraine’s army and police forces will be subjagated and purged. Its educational system will be vetted for hints of anti-Russian or Ukrainian nationalist sentiment. Moscow will take control of the media and install Russia Today and Sputnik, or clones of them, as major outlets.

Implications  for Europe and the  Balkans

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has interrupted the long peace in north central Europe and ends hope for a “Europe whole and free.” Instead Europe will be divided between autocracy and democracy. NATO will have renewed significance and a greater presence near Russia’s borders. Moscow will need to depend on Beijing for whatever limited access to global financial markets China is willing to provide. The stock market and the ruble have already registered their lack of confidence in this arrangement by dropping precipitously. But sanctions will not force Putin to capitulate.

A lot still depends on the course of the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are putting up a courageous resistance. But Russia’s superior technology, training, and organization is likely to prevail. Kyiv is in play. If it falls, the main question will be about western Ukraine. Will the Russians leave a rump there as an escape route for dissidents, or will Moscow try to take Lviv?

For the Balkans the consequences are frightening. There too division is in the future. Serbia is maintaining its official neutrality, but its government-controlled media are aligned with Russia. If the invasion of Ukraine is successful, Presidents Vucic and Dodik might conclude that the time has come to create the “Serbian world” they want. The EU is correct to beef up its forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. KFOR should be enhanced as well. Russia’s friends in the Balkans can’t be relied on to show self-restraint while Russia gobbles up Europe’s second largest country. The new division of Europe will run through the Balkans as well.

One outstanding question

It is not clear yet whether Russia will try to take all of Ukraine, or leave a rump territory in the west near Lviv as an escape valve for opponents. That might make repression in Kyiv easier, but it would also given Ukrainians a territory from which to mount an insurgency. Best bet is that Moscow will try for all of Ukraine. Putin will only stop when resistance forces him to do so.

The post Only Resistance can stop Putin appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

It’s time for Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence, not only because it does not have the power and the means by which it can reverse what over 100 countries have recognized, but because Kosovo will make any sacrifice to preserve what it has gained in sweat and blood. President Vucic should put himself in the shoes of Albanian Kosovars and ask:

Why would they ever surrender their independence and freedom to a country that has systematically discriminated, abused, and treated them as second-class citizens not worthy of equality before the law?

Why would they subjugate themselves to the whims of a country that has waged merciless war and rained havoc and destruction on them from which they have yet to recover?

Why would they forfeit their independence to a country that has committed horrifying war crimes—summarily executing more than 10,000 innocent boys and men, raping over 20,000 girls and women, and inflicting untold pain, agony, and shame on their families—from which they still suffer?

Why would they abandon their independence to a country that still refuses to reveal the burial sites of nearly 2,000 missing men, women, and children; a country that lacks the moral courage to admit to committing war crimes which were blatant and clear for everyone else to see?

Why would a people with a different religion, cultural heritage, history, and language agree to subordinate itself to a country with which it has little—values and aspirations—in common?

These painful feelings toward Serbia and the indelible psychological scars the war left on every Kosovar only deepened their rejection of Belgrade. Neither Vucic nor any of his successors will ever be in a position to mitigate these deep-seated impediments unless Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s independence and understands that it cannot change what has become an irreversible reality.

The failure to withdraw recognition

Over the years, successive Serbian governments embarked on a campaign to persuade many countries to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo. This has been a dismal failure. While Serbia’s Foreign Ministry last March claimed that 18 countries had either fully withdrawn recognition or were redefining their positions on Kosovo, several of those derecognitions are disputed, according to Balkan Insight, and those who did are mostly small African and Pacific states who enjoy little or no sway on the international scene, including Suriname, Burundi, and Papua New Guinea. Currently, Kosovo is recognized by 115 countries, the latest of which is Israel.

There is no military option

President Vucic knows only too well that there is no military option to force Kosovo to forsake its independence. Although every Albanian Kosovar will fight to their last breath to deny Serbia such a victory, NATO would immediately step in and conduct an aerial onslaught as it did in the 1998-1999 war, which ended after a 78-day bombing campaign. The war also ended President Slobodan Milosevic’s horrifyingly repressive rule over the then-Yugoslav province. NATO continues to guarantee Kosovo’s national security, and Vucic is not about to test NATO’s commitment.

Inability to exert economic pressure

Kosovo does not depend economically on Serbia and hence no Serbian government can now or at any time in the future exert economic pressure to force Kosovo’s hand. Kosovo can import any products from other countries, including the EU, Turkey, China, and many others. This being the case, Kosovo can even impose tariffs on goods imported from Serbia, as it has done in the past. Therefore, the lack of Serbian economic leverage allows Kosovo to play hard ball without risking weakening its economy, as we have seen previously.

Depriving Kosovo of EU integration

It is true that Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo prevents the latter from joining the EU, as integration is contingent upon ending the conflict and reaching mutual recognition—but that also prevents Serbia from joining the EU. As a result, Russia’s President Putin is seizing the opportunity to lure Serbia into the Russian orbit by selling arms, which of necessity requires Russian military trainers on Serbian soil. Ironically, though Vucic knows that Serbia’s future growth and prosperity rests with the EU, he is still risking his country’s national interest by refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile he is trapping himself in Putin’s web, who is determined to weaken the EU and prevent Serbia from ever becoming a member state in the alliance.

Vucic should look at himself in the mirror and ask if there is any prospect now or at any time in the future to restore Kosovo as a Serbian province. If he is true to himself, he would know that there is no such prospect. It is time for him to muster the moral courage and demonstrate statesmanship by charting a new path that would advance the causes of both his country as well as Kosovo.

There are several measures Vucic can take before recognizing Kosovo to prepare the public to accept the inevitable:

a. End the public narrative that promotes the idea that Kosovo is a Serbian province;

b. Formally terminate the campaign to persuade countries that have recognized Kosovo to withdraw their recognition;

c. Begin a normalization process with Kosovo in many fields, including trade, cultural exchange, free movement of goods and services, academic exchanges, and religious discussions between Serbian Orthodox priests and imams, among other measures;

d. Cooperate in the search for missing persons to bring closure to the thousands of families who are still agonizing over the loss of their loved ones;

e. Initiate and maintain regular contact between Serbian and Kosovar officials, beginning with inviting Kosovo’s Prime Minister Kurti to Belgrade for discussions.

Following a period of two to three years of reconciliation, Vucic or his successor should follow the German example and admit to war crimes to allow for a national healing of both peoples. Only then can both sides tackle other conflicting issues, mainly the state of affairs of Serbians living in Kosovo, water distribution, and borders, as long as it is all done in the context of an independent Kosovo that Serbia will come to recognize.

Many will say that regardless of how cogent this argument may be, Serbia will never embrace it. Well, this may well be so for now. But I challenge any Serbian to show me how the dynamic of the conflict will change to advance a new realistic alternative that Kosovo can accept, short of recognition of its independence?

It is time to end this agonizing conflict that does nothing but needlessly deepen the schism between the two countries. Instead, they should live, grow, and prosper as good neighbors in peace, allowing the next generation of Serbians and Kosovars to blossom together and leave the ugly chapter of their parents’ experience behind.

Alon Ben-Meir, expert on Middle East and West Balkan affairs, international negotiations, and conflict resolution.

The post Righting the Wrong appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The upcoming local by-elections in six municipalities to pick mayors for a short mandate would have been routine and without any special political significance in different circumstances. But because of the dramatic developments within the Democratic Party, Albania’s main opposition party, the March 6 elections will have serious political implications for the future of the DP and Albania’s opposition in general — meaning these elections will be a marker of the country’s democratic standards.

On March 6, 2022, Albania’s ruling and opposition parties will compete in mayoral races for municipalities that include three of the country’s most important cities — Shkoder Durres and Lushnje. The vacancies are a result mainly of the decriminalization law, which meant winning candidates in the 2019 elections in Shkoder and three other municipalities were forced to resign due to having hidden past criminal activities or due to abuse of power and corruption, as was the case of the mayor of Lushnjë, who was arrested while in office.

Holding on to these mayoral seats is not too important for the ruling Socialist Party, nonetheless serves as a test of its popularity after gaining an unprecedented third term in the general elections of April 2021. But the by-elections do present serious implications for the political future of the Democratic Party and the Albanian opposition in general.

The DP is one of the two political parties that has dominated the Albanian political landscape since communism fell in 1990. It enters these by-elections divided. Racing against the ruling SP candidates, on March 6, two separate DP factions are fielding candidates. One is the grouping led by Lulzim Basha, the official  chairman of the Democratic Party and the other, larger in number, is led by the DP’s historic leader, former President and two-time Prime Minister Sali Berisha. The DP division started right after Mr. Basha publicly announced on Sept. 9, 2021, that he was expelling Sali Berisha from the DP parliamentary group, after the latter was publicly designated on alleged corruption by the U.S. State Department as someone who is not allowed to enter the United States.

Mr. Berisha’s designation by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was completely unexpected and created a lot of confusion not only in the Democratic Party due to the fact that Mr. Berisha has been out of power since 2013 after he lost the general elections and resigned as party chair.

While announcing he was suing Secretary Blinken for slander, Mr. Berisha suddenly felt betrayed by Mr. Basha, who was in fact a hand-picked successor by Mr. Berisha and made a career in the party thanks to Mr. Berisha’s support.

Mr. Berisha brought Mr. Basha to the DP in 2005, entrusted him with senior positions, including as minister of interior and foreign affairs, and supported him as a candidate for mayor of Tirana by personally leading the campaign for Mr. Basha’s election. When Mr. Berisha resigned in 2013, he threw his support behind Mr. Basha as heir apparent in DP’s leadership.

Under pressure from U.S. Ambassador to Tirana Yuri Kim to remove Mr. Berisha from the DP parliamentary group, Mr. Basha and others could not anticipate the reaction to the decision of the real support that Mr. Berisha has in the party base. As chairman, Mr. Basha appears to have taken a personal decision, without consulting the party’s governing bodies and announced the expulsion of Mr. Berisha from the parliamentary group just hours before the start of the parliamentary session on Sept. 10 last year.

Since then, Mr. Berisha founded a new political movement within the Democratic Party, organized very popular meetings throughout Albania, organized a party congress on Dec. 11, 2021, where a new statute was approved, in addition to dismissing Mr. Basha and others from party leadership. A considerable number of DP MPs joined Mr. Berisha and the clash between the two groups in the party deepened, making coexistence impossible when on Jan. 8 Mr. Berisha’s movement, officially known as the Re-establishment Commission, asked Mr. Basha to hand over the party headquarters and the respective documents — an effort that ended in ugly violence.

Since then, the division of DP has continued, and it looms large in the upcoming March 6 elections, which will be the first electoral confrontation between two political factions within the Democratic Party.

Independent observers and public opinion polls so far clearly show that there is a large advantage among opposition voters for the Mr. Berisha-supported candidates of the House of Freedom, a political coalition formally formed by two opposition parties — the Socialist Movement for Integration and the Christian Democratic Party — but which will get most of its support from the DP faction headed by Mr. Berisha. The ruling SP candidates benefit overall from the divided opposition vote, but it is not impossible for Mr. Berisha’s candidates to win one or two seats. House of Freedom says it will win not only in Shkoder, where polls show it to have the highest support, but also in Durres and Lushnje.

As strange as it may sound this may be the case of elections when there may be two parties that may lose the election, and as paradoxical as it may seem, there could be two parties to win this election when there are in fact three political groups in the race — the ruling SP and an opposition DP split in two groups. So, regardless of the official winners, the parties will be taking note of how the opposition votes go, to see who actually wins the contest inside the opposition.

The greatest importance and political implications are in fact related to the results that will be achieved by the two rival groups within the Democratic Party. These elections will clearly undermine the position Mr. Basha and some of his associates have in what is currently the official Democratic Party. The legitimacy and support of DP members for Mr. Basha was seriously questioned when Mr. Basha and his supporters convened an extraordinary party assembly on Dec. 18 and claimed to have 5,004 assembly delegates in one hall that has no more than 1,800 chairs. “The DP national assembly has 7,000 members and holding an assembly is not legal if not more than 50 percent participate,” according to party regulations.

The results that Mr. Basha’s faction DP candidates show in the elections will make public the real support and legitimacy he enjoys — if there is any. The real race for the mayor of the six municipalities is in fact between the ruling SP candidates and the ones from Mr. Berisha’s movement, as the polls show and as independent experts believe. But the first importance of these elections is the result between the two factions within the DP. The loss of Mr. Basha in this internal race, as polls and independent observers indicate, could help end the debates within the currently divided opposition party.

On the other hand, the March 6 elections will be an opportunity to prove the support and popularity of the historic leader of the Democratic Party, the former chairman and prime minister, Mr. Berisha, not only within the supporters of the Democratic Party — a race he is likely to win — but voters in general. Any success over government candidates projects a way for a return to power through Mr. Berisha’s movement.

Thus, these elections decide the future of the Democratic Party and the fate of the opposition in Albania. A balanced result of the two rival groups within DP would in fact prolong the agony of the DP and the opposition in general.

In the March 6 elections, there is another important third actor — the international community. And this is not about the monitoring teams of the Council of Europe or the OSCE-ODIHR that in fact during the 30 years since the fall of communism have been monitoring the ever lower standards of the Albanian elections, whether parliamentary or administrative. In addition to international watchdog groups monitoring the level of implementation of standards, in an unprecedented way, another actor has entered the field of play.

Just two weeks before the local elections, U.S. Ambassador to Tirana Yuri Kim entered the discussion through Twitter — with the only clear message, according to local observers, being the discouragement of potential voters for the six candidates fielded for the Mr. Berisha-supported House of Freedom coalition.

“Questions for candidates: If your main sponsor is someone designated by the U.S. for significant corruption, what exactly are you promising voters? Who will own you if you win and what will you owe them? What should Albanians expect? What should the U.S .expect?,” Ambassador Kim’s tweet noted.

The DP Re-Establishment Commission reacted harshly to the tweet, saying in a statement it was “a flagrant violation of law and Constitution and a one-sided and unacceptable intervention in the electoral process in favor of the most corrupt government in Europe and in complete contradiction with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols, signed in 1961, to which Albania is a party.”

The commission demanded that the ambassador “withdraw the statement, which is contrary to the Constitution of Albania and the Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, for the observance of which the political parties in Albania are committed.”

A day after the tweet, the U.S. The Embassy issued a statement clarifying that the U.S. Government has designated four persons for corruption in Albania.

However, according to analysts and independent observers, Ambassador Kim’s message was aimed at candidates supported by Mr. Berisha and at tilting the municipal elections, which are serving as an unofficial primary race for DP.

There were also numerous reactions on social networks, as well as among local observers and analysts who saw Ms. Kim’s intervention as  support for Mr. Basha, but which will ultimately end up helping the government’s candidates. The more votes that can be steered toward Mr. Basha’s candidates, the more likely the SP will win, the argument went.

The dice have been rolled. The March 6 mayoral by-elections, which would normally have been a trivial political development, have turned into a tough political game with deep and important political implications.

The post Place your bets appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, had warned that the license plate agreement had not been fulfilled by Belgrade and that the Serbian leadership was not offering a solution after the settled deadline. On the other hand, for years, Belgrade enforced a removal policy for every license plate from Kosovo with the inscription “RKS” and actively replaced them with “Proba” license plates designed with Serbian state inscriptions and symbols. As a result, the Government of Kosovo was compelled in adopting a similar stance against vehicles with Serbian license plates entering Kosovo borders.  Although these actions were in line with the agreement reached in Brussels between Pristina and Belgrade in 2011, it prompted a theatrical reaction of the Serbian authorities. As has occurred often throughout the past decade, Belgrade assumed a defensive approach.  It again used local Serbs in northern Kosovo to set up barricades and organize “spontaneous protests” by “frightened” citizens to hinder the implementation of the license plate agreement. It was a typical spectacle we have seen in the former Yugoslavia dating from 1988, when Milosevic launched the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”, which resulted in the violent dissolution of a multinational Yugoslavia.

Brussels reacted powerlessly, repeatedly calling for de-escalation of the situation in the north, but did not explicitly request that Belgrade respect the agreement signed in 2016. Therefore, despite the “spontaneous protests” of “frightened” Serbian citizens, the Kosovo police (ROSU) had not intervened in any populated area, but rather stayed at the border crossings in Bernjak and Jarinje to enforce the agreement. It was the “frightened” Serbs who were obstructing the movement between Kosovo and Belgrade, blocking the roads leading to these two border crossing points with the neighboring state by using heavy vehicles. Belgrade contended that Kosovo was aggravating the situation, while members of the Serbian opposition openly stated that Kosovo’s initiative was in line with the Brussels agreement of 2011, which stated that “all car owners residing in Kosovo will use RKS or KS license plates, issued by the responsible authorities in Kosovo” (Point 7 of the  Brussels agreement).

When Kosovo’s leadership agreed to extend the validity of KS license plates for another five years, until September 14, 2021, it was clear that the government was acting in accordance with the Brussels Agreement, which was finalized on September 14, 2016. Kosovo had announced the imposition of a reciprocity measure on license plates with Belgrade. “I wrote a letter to all European governments listing the 11 violations that Serbia is committing with the imposition of systematic and periodic barriers. I am expecting differently and reciprocity shall be imposed as the only way . There is no equality without reciprocity”, declared the Prime Minister Albin Kurti, after the last meeting in Tirana with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the significance of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Gabriel Escobar’s statement that upheld Kosovo’s right to impose reciprocity. However, his statement indicated that Washington was surprised by the way this decision was implemented.

Consequently, the measure of reciprocity against Serbian license plates arose because the citizens of Kosovo, who would cross the border with vehicles bearing RKS license plates, were forced to remove the latter and replace them with the Serbian “Proba” plates. As these measures were becoming a burden for both countries, Kurti had stated that Kosovo was “willing to remove the measure of reciprocity with Serbia concerning license plates, if Belgrade will do the same for license plates of vehicles from Kosovo”. The response of the Serbian President was aggressive and theatrical.  Police, military troops, aircraft carriers and helicopters were sent to the border with Kosovo in an effort to test NATO’s resolve. Unlike Vucic, Milosevic never took such a confrontational step, let alone make the blunder made by the current Serbian government – issuing threats through inspections of military troops at the border by the Russian ambassador in Belgrade. Is becomes evident that the safety of the “people” was at stake by the Serbian military measures and not by the application of reciprocity on license plates. During the last EU-Western Balkans summit, held on October 6 in Brdo, Slovenia, Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti called on EU leaders to condemn “the engagement of the Serbian army on the Kosovo border.”

Opposition reaction

Regarding events in northern Kosovo, all parliamentary political parties in Kosovo supported Kurti in applying the reciprocity measure for license plates, with very few opposing the decision. Moreover, they called on Pristina to continue with other measures of reciprocity. At the same time, the behavior of the Serb List MPs was criticized, who supported the criminal structures and violent groups in the north which had blocked roads and constantly provoked the Kosovo police. It was clear that the Government of Kosovo had the full support of the entire political spectrum, although in the meantime there were accusations that this measure of reciprocity was being used by the ruling party for electoral purposes.

Agreement  of September 30

At this point, the priority for the international community was to reduce tensions among the two and reach an agreement. Vucic’s threats for war forced the EU and the U.S. to respond. The arrival of KFOR was the moment it became clear that there would be no conflict and that everything had to be resolved through active negotiations. Despite setting conditions in advance, Belgrade was forced to go to Brussels. After two days of intensive negotiations in Brussels, Pristina and Belgrade reached an agreement that would de-escalate the situation in the north, which provided for the simultaneous removal “of the special unit of the Kosovo Police located in Jarinje and Brnjak, and the roadblocks until October 2 ”. Meanwhile, working groups will be formed between Kosovo, Brussels and Belgrade in order to reach “a permanent solution to the issue of license plates based on EU standards and practices”.

Point 2 of the agreement stipulated that as of October 4, stickers would effectively be placed on the license plates of vehicles entering from Serbia to Kosovo and vice versa, to cover state symbols. Looking back, the license plate agreement demonstrates that the current dialogue in Brussels between Kosovo and Belgrade, which began in the spring of 2011, has not led to the normalization of neighborly relations and that the EU has proven to be unsuccessful in reaching a comprehensive agreement. Consequently, after ten years of negotiations it is not appeasing to see how EU continues to deal with the issue of license plates, electricity bills and other technical issues.

Certain points under this agreement sound ambiguous; for example, the deployment of KFOR troops at multiple border points, which implies a step backwards and risk that this presence of only 12 days, will prove be longer. This, as result of Belgrade’s obstruction, which can again mobilize the “frightened people” in case ROSU units are dispatched to this part of Kosovo. In this regard, the wording of point 1 of the agreement was seen as problematic, according to which a sort of equalization is made between the police and the demonstrators, among whom there were also leaders with criminal precedents. This first point stipulates that there should be a simultaneous withdrawal of “Special forces and barricades set up by Serb protesters”. At the same time, the EU should not fall into Belgrade’s trap, claiming that there is an agreement not to send ROSU units to the north of the country. This intention of Belgrade is targeted at the legalization of the factual annexation of the country before reaching a comprehensive agreement. Even more problematic and slightly unclear is the issue of license plates issued by Belgrade containing sticker designs that pertain to cities in Kosovo, such as PR (Pristina), GL (Gjilan) KM (Mitrovica), which will be valid until April 2022. It remains to be seen whether Belgrade will try to prolong the temporary solution with such license plates, as occurred when Kosovo was under Belgrade’s interim administration or whether both sides will come to a more effective solution.

Soon after the announcement of the agreement, Prime Minister Kurti stated that Belgrade should get accustomed to reciprocity, while the Serbian president stated that the stickers were their idea. If this was the case, why were they not applied before? Apparently, Belgrade seems to be happy about the conclusion of agreement which avoids carrying of RKS license plates by Serbs entering Kosovo and by local Serbs. At the same time, the extent of this agreement’s implementation by the Serbian side, remains to be seen. From day one, there were information that a number of cars in the north of the country were seen in traffic with Serbian license plates uncovered with stickers, as required by the second point of the license plate agreement.

The Government of Kosovo must be cautious and not allow the prolongation and persistence of these illegal license plates with the inscriptions of the cities of Kosovo, because they are beyond any national, or international norms.  It would be inconceivable for license plates issued by the Czech Republic to apply to the cities of Slovakia or those of France, or any other country. On the other hand, Belgrade has made it very clear that it intends to paralyze the functionality of the state of Kosovo through the creation of an autonomous Serbian entity with state powers. If in 1999, the West engaged in a military intervention against Belgrade to prevent the recurrence of another Bosnia, it is just as immediate now that a Second Bosnia is not experimented in Kosovo. In such a situation, perhaps the ones most affected would be the local Serbs in Kosovo, who are exploited by Belgrade for political purposes, and even blackmailed by criminal groups. Consequently, both in Belgrade and in the EU, it was confirmed that Belgrade was the main player in setting and removing the blockades in the north. It is a typical situation in both Croatia and Bosnia, when the West negotiated with Milosevic to end the Serbian armed rebellion in these new states. Also, the license plate event showcased that regional cooperation, pompously promoted through the so-called “Open Balkan” initiative, cannot be strengthened without treating Kosovo as an equal regional player and without the normalization of Kosovo-Serbian relations. In this sense, it is clear that all avenues of regional cooperation pass through Kosovo. Despite this, the Serbian leadership in Belgrade has so far shown no serious effort to reach an agreement. The Serbian side also refused to sign the proposal of the Kosovo side to sign the Declaration of Peace for non-aggression.

International response

Finally, the EU, U.S., and NATO last week reacted with a sense of urgency to avoid the escalation of conflict. KFOR also sent troops on the ground in response to Serbian military provocations. This engagement and especially, the U.S.-EU cooperation led to the finalization of the license plate agreement. In a speech to MEPs, The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, highlighted the role of U.S. diplomat Gabriel Escobar in resolving the impasse in north of Kosovo. As is the diplomatic custom for the agreements reached between the parties to be supported by the decision-making centers, the license plate agreement has been described as a great success in Brussels, Berlin, Washington and NATO. In this sense, there is a great emphasis on the fact that the continuation of the dialogue remains the only way forward.

The need to accelerate dialogue

Belgrade’s strategy is clear – namely to negotiate indefinitely, make agreements, but not to implement them, in order to then renegotiate in order to reach new concessions on old agreements. Instead of making progress on the license plates, Belgrade will try to foster the issue of forming the association of Serbian municipalities until the end of this year, with the aim of obtaining new concessions for the Serbian Orthodox Church and other sectors in the final agreement. Therefore, substantial progress on the issue of a comprehensive agreement is not expected until the Serbian parliamentary elections in April 2022. Meanwhile, the EU will have to deal with the issue of the energy agreement, which has not yet been fulfilled by the Serbian government. Consequently, The Government of Kosovo, even after 22 years from the war, continues to pay for the electricity consumed by local Serbs. Obviously, the U.S. and Germany had the main say in this regard, with Brussels taking a step back.

So far, the developments have made it clear that the results of the dialogue during these ten years have been modest. The latest agreement on the plates, which once again revealed the crucial role of the U.S., made the substantial involvement of the U.S. inevitable. Especially in light of the fact that the EU special envoy, former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak, failed in achieving any sense of comprehensive normalization. In this context, we also ought to see the letter of U.S. Congressmen Torres and others to President Biden and Secretary Blinken in October, in which they demand that “the American focus on resolving Kosovo-Serbia tensions be doubled”, calling on the U.S. to stand by Kosovo as an American ally “,

This tense situation among Kosovo and Serbia is an outcome of Belgrade’s efforts to carry out their idea of a “Serbian World”. This political propaganda has been proclaimed by the Serbian state leadership for some time now, takes the region back to the horrendous violence of the past century. It is precisely this approach that has hindered the progress of the Brussels dialogue and the normalization of Kosovo-Serbian relations. Moreover, the tension ignited over the reciprocity of the license plates demonstrated the minimal amount of progress in political relations since the Brussels dialogue began in 2011. The Brussels dialogue has shown that it has reached its limits. Therefore, now is the right time for a new approach, for a dialogue reset, which would imply that the EU would give up its “status-neutral stance” and do more for the recognition of Kosovo by the five EU countries that yet to recognize it, and at the same time, the stronger involvement of the US in reaching a final agreement on comprehensive normalization.

In this line the EU should be more concerned with the five EU member states—Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece—that still have not recognized Kosovo’s independence. These European countries stated their respect for international law as their reasons for this lack of recognition. Considering their respect for international law, these countries should also accept the International Court of Justice’s 2010 decision proclaiming Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence legal and sui generis.

At the same time, in the context of the European integration of the Western Balkan region, the EU should build a symmetrical approach and refer to them as the Western Balkans Six, because we are dealing with six independent states. Otherwise, the longer this dialogue continues as is, the more counterproductive it will become in nature, and every aspect of the talks will be reduced to separate and endless agreements, which would propel the normalization of interstate relations between Kosovo and Belgrade farther into the distant future.       

PhD. Sylë Ukshini is a diplomat, historian, scholar of international studies and international law.

The post Limits of the Brussels dialogue appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Demographic decline has been the elephant in the room in Albania for decades. But it is now so big, the government simply can no longer ignore it. As the third-term government of Socialist Prime Minister Edi Rama takes office, in addition to the usual promises of increases in quality of life and services, the new government program spells out large future increases in public sector wages and monetary assistance for families to buy first homes — measures clearly aimed at making the country more attractive to those tempted to look for opportunities abroad. The problem is that even in the unlikely scenario that the government fully delivers on these promises, they won’t be enough if they are not part of a well-defined and much stronger strategy to address the issue.

There are no easy solutions for Albania’s demographic decline. In fact, it might no longer be fixable, but the government can do more to adjust policies to soften the blow. 

Understanding the downward demographic spiral

To start with, let’s be clear: This is not a problem unique to Albania. The 10 fastest shrinking countries in the world are in Eastern Europe – and all Western Balkans countries face the same problem. The reasons are the same too: out-migration to where wages are higher and public services are better combined with a rapid decline in birthrates.

Like the rest of the wider region, all the trends show Albania will experience rapid population decline over the next few decades. The country’s per woman birth rate in 2018 fell to 1.3, the “lowest rate in history.” The pandemic has made things even worse. For the first time in recent history, more males died than were born in Albania in 2020.

Albanian politicians, journalists and statisticians disagree about the hard numbers of people leaving the country in any given year, but no one can deny that tens of thousands are permanently leaving the country on an annual basis. The result of that is clear. Several projections by the UN and other sources show Albania will close this century with a population of, at worst, 1 million and, at best, 2 million. Today the country has 2.7 million residents and about 4.5 million citizens. The difference of 1.8 million is due to the country’s already record-holding per-capita out-migration rate in the past 30 years.

A rapidly declining population spells major trouble down the road — economically and socially. Typically it is the most productive part of the population that leaves — the young and the skilled. An alarming September 2021 report by Albania’s official statistics institute, INSTAT, showed that about half of university-educated Albanians had left the country. The economy and society they leave behind faces a negative spiral as a result. There are fewer people to start businesses, fewer people to fill skilled positions and fewer taxpayers to keep the state and pension systems afloat. For businesses, large and small, there are fewer customers to serve, thus less capital. 

Why are they leaving?

For many years, some erroneously believed that migration was good in that many of those who study and work abroad would eventually return and contribute to the country of origin. This is not the case, the latest INSTAT survey shows, even though Albania has the highest number of students abroad compared to the region. There are sporadic cases of success in migrants returning, but the general trend has been that most of those who leave do not return. And among those who do return, many re-emigrate because of lack of opportunities in Albania as efforts to find good jobs or start successful businesses are hampered by the size of the market, a bad business environment and competition by those already in the country, many of whom might be less qualified, less skilled and less productive — but, crucially, better politically or otherwise connected.

Opposition and civil society activists bluster about government failures, and they are partially correct. Government action or inaction has an effect on the rate of departures. Failing to increase quality of life and public services fast enough plays a hand. Moreover, a general decline in the state of democracy has left many young people disillusioned that they can have a say in the future of their country. The twin natural disasters of the earthquake and pandemic have shocked the system even further.

But the largest driving factors are lack of economic competitiveness and worse services that come with less economic wealth. Top that with the blight of corruption and general gloom of a post-communist Balkan society, and you have an unsavory concoction. As long as someone can hop on a two-hour plane ride to places like Germany and triple or quadruple their purchasing power while working the same hours — and have better schools for their children and safer and more affordable healthcare and live under a set of rules that are not arbitrarily enforced — the out-flow of people will continue.

Steps that can soften the blow

So what can the third-term Socialist government do? There are several steps it can take to soften demographic decline. The first step would be to adjust policies to maximise economic gains in a country where the workforce is shrinking and the population is ageing. For a country like Albania, a good move would be to capitalize on its strengths — climate, geographic location and lower cost of living.

It should invest, for example, in niche areas where Albanian businesses can be truly competitive and that provide incomes high enough to help people stay put. These could range from the technology sector to premium agricultural and food products. These sectors should be given every tax incentive possible to set root in the country. The government should also diversify its efforts by helping small and medium enterprises that can compete globally in a digital economy.

While increased tourism, especially high-end tourism, is good, investments need to be managed so the locals see a net benefit and the jobs produced are paid well enough so the worker is not tempted to hop on a ferry and work in Italy or Croatia the next season.

In what is a massive capital net gain, the country can also work to attract retirees from wealthier European countries, for example, in addition to Albanians who have retirement income from other countries after working there for many years. This can be helped through incentives in taxation and healthcare.

On the other side of the equation, another step could be to provide generous benefits to young couples to make it more favourable to have children and to stay in Albania. The $10,000 cash bonus or soft loans to purchase a first home for young couples, as the current government program proposes, is a good start if it is implemented. But it is not enough, as home prices have seen massive price increases, while salaries have barely grown in the private sector. Apartment prices in places like the capital, Tirana, for example, have increased by 50 percent since the Socialists took power in 2013.

It is also very important that the government changes the narrative it has borrowed from some quarters of the business community which has started to feel the acute labor shortages stemming from the demographic decline. The problem is not “lazy” Albanians that don’t want to work at home where there are low paid jobs available. The problem is that Albania is not competitive in the wider labor market. Wealthier countries have softened demographic decline through importing workers. That will not work in Albania, at least not for a few decades. Albania is too poor to be an attractive destination for would-be migrants, who would just see it as a jumping point toward Western Europe. Moreover, even though Albania seems welcoming to refugees from outside Europe today, history shows that any population, no matter how welcoming and well-meaning, can become hostile to large numbers of migrants that are significantly different from the native population.

Ultimately, while there are options to soften the blow, they won’t reverse demographic decline, but they could put on the brakes so that the worst scenarios don’t materialize.

Andi Balla is a journalist and author who has been writing for international audiences about Albania and Albanians since 2005.

The post Surviving the democalypse appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Albin Kurti’s Vetevendosje landslide victory on February 14 elections this year came as blow to the old elite of post-war Kosovo. He was elected Prime Minister after years of struggling in the streets of Kosovo against almost everyone. The Self-Determination Movement (Vetevendojse in Albanian) was founded as a protest grassroots movement while Kosovo was under the administration of the international community in the 2000s and then was transformed into a political party after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008.

Unlike most parties in the Balkans, Vetevendojse was inspired by leftist anti-colonial movements of the modern era mixed with a fervent nationalist rhetoric. In the 2000s Albin Kurti focused his movement’s target against international community’s policies in Kosovo. He opposed every single proposal of the internationals on the final status question of Kosovo, including Marti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status (Ahtisaari Plan) which ultimately granted Kosovo independence from Serbia. Kurti insisted Kosovo should unite with Albania through a national referendum. This way, Kosovo’s final status would be solved in line with the principle of self-determination of nations. Though Pristina declared its independence from Serbia according to the Ahtisaari Plan which prohibits the unification of Kosovo with any other country, Albin Kurti continued flying the banner of unification with Albania what rightly gave him a nationalist outlook.

Nevertheless, while Kosovo entered the post-independence era, Vetevendosje’s nationalist rhetoric waned. Kurti’s public discourse twisted more towards anti-corruption, employment and fight for justice spectres as Kosovo exhibited major flaws in these areas. The unemployment rate among the youth was reported to a high record of more than 40%, whereas corruption became a wide spread phenomenon and inequality increased. This brought about massive dissatisfaction among Kosovo citizens which was harnessed politically by Vetevendosje. Kurti stepped into the shoes of modern politicians and pressed the right buttons of the electorate. During the last electoral campaign Vetevendosje put forward a highly ambitious political manifesto on employment, economic equality and social justice. The leader of Vetevendosje deliberately downplayed the importance of one of the most pressing issues Kosovo’s statehood faces internally and externally, the dialogue with Serbia.

Being aware of unrealistic pledges Kurti made to the people of Kosovo on the road to the post of Premiership, he is now trying to deflect public’s attention from the acute challenges Kosovo faces both domestically and internationally by playing out with Albanians’ national sentiments. Kurti appeals to the idea of portraying himself as a leader that speaks to all Albanians in the region.

 On April 25, Kurti became the first incumbent Prime Minister of Kosovo to go and cast the ballot in Albania’s general elections. Two weeks ahead of elections, he appeared by the side of Vetevendosje’s (a separate branch of his party in Albania in opposition with Prime Minister Rama) candidate for MP in the historic city of Lezha. He openly called on Albanian citizens to vote for change. This interference in domestic affairs of Albania may not only lead to unnecessary tensions of Kosovo’s relations with the incumbent Albanian government, but also send wrong signals to the region and Western powers. Viola von Cramon, the rapporteur for Kosovo at the European Parliament, considered unacceptable that Albin Kurti voted for the elections in Albania. The same reaction came from Richard Grenell, former special envoy of President Trump for Pristina-Belgrade dialogue. At the end of the day why on earth should the international community work to strengthen Kosovo’s statehood while the incumbent Prime Minister does not fully believe in this project?

Kurti must know that Western powers are terrified of nationalist projects like Great Serbia and Great Albania. They have invested billions of dollars and massive human resources to secure peace and stability in the Balkans by cooling down ethnic divisions and preventing hyper nationalist projects. Therefore, instead of feeding international media outlets and Western powers with empty nationalist rhetoric, Kurti would better take tangible actions to foster Kosovo’s economic and cultural ties with Albania and other counties in the region. Both Albania and Kosovo can also align their foreign policies on national interests without ringing the bell of old-fashioned nationalism.

In the same vein, Prime Minister Kurti doesn’t seem ready to cope with the heavy burden of the EU mediated dialogue on normalisation of relations with Serbia. While in opposition, he has attacked every single agreement Kosovo has signed with Serbia. This has left him little room for manoeuvre now that he sits in the office of the Prime Minister and has to take tough decisions. That’s why his approach to the dialogue seems to be more tactical than genuinely concerned with a realist outcome. Whilst the international pressure is mounting on him to resume the EU mediated dialogue with Serbia, Kurti vowed to sue Serbia for genocide in the International Court of Justice. This may be right from a historical and justice perspective, but it does not really address the biggest problem Kosovo faces in international arena, striking a final comprehensive agreement with Serbia based on mutual recognition which would open the door of UN and other international organisations membership. Though, the EU mediated dialogue with Serbia has produces no sweet fruits for Kosovo, the incumbent Prime Minister in Pristina should not hinder it by misusing national and war legacy sentiments. He better engages smartly with the dialogue to flip the side of the international community to Kosovo when US-EU relations seem to have gained their pace after Joe Biden entered the White House this year.

In this regard, somebody close to Albin Kurti should shake him up and remind that now is the Prime Minister of Kosovo not the snobby rebellious of his early days. He should act like a Prime Minister and take decisions that benefit Kosovo and its citizens. A significant first step in this direction is to drop nationalist rhetoric and live up to the promises he made to the people.

 *Altin Gjeta holds a Master of Arts in International Relations and Politics from University of Westminster, London. He wrote his MA thesis on “Multiethnic Statebuilding in Kosovo”. Currently Altin is a visiting lecturer in politics at University of “Aleksander Moisiu” in Durres, Albania.

The post Kurti’s gambling with nationalist sentiments must end appeared first on Tirana Observatory.