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Slovenia established its statehood in the period of the immense structural changes that accompanied the end of the Cold War. It proclaimed independence on June 25, 1991, and half a year later, on January 15, 1992, received international recognition from several states, including those of the European Community.

In the second part of the nineties, after starting institutional activities, aimed at the membership in the EU and NATO, Slovenia also announced its ambition for the nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council (SC). It achieved this goal, being elected in autumn of 1997 at the 52 second session of the General Assembly, for the period of 1998-1999. It means that Slovenia achieved this major foreign policy goal less than six years after its international recognition. Still today, this echoes as a huge diplomatic success, unimaginable a decade before.

Almost a quarter of century later the major significance and most of the experiences are still current for Slovenia and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as well as for comparable small states, with rather small diplomatic service and network of diplomatic missions abroad. This is firstly, due to the fact that, theoretically speaking, the SC is in a constant session and functions as a de facto world government, and secondly, it is one of the most important global opportunities to cement a policy image of the state in question. Nothing spreads the image of a state within world’s diplomatic community so strongly as being one of the decision-making actors in the UN SC.

There are two groups of consequences for the small non-permanent member from this point of view: firstly, highly increased foreign-policy and diplomatic visibility, and secondly, increased workload for its diplomatic service. Albania has from the first point of view already important advantages, since it is already member of NATO and the candidate for the EU membership as well exercised the OSCE Chairmanship, among others. These and similar achievements already strengthen the visibility and image of the state. The nonpermanent membership in the UN SC adds significantly to this and strengthens the trend, but also raises expectation.

Not less important are influences on the diplomatic organization. They are twofold: positive (encouraging) and negative (burdening). Some of the most important consequences comprise of the following (usually both aspects, positive and negative, are intertwined):

a) Diplomacy is being faced on a daily basis with a huge workload of practically all of the important global political and diplomatic topics. A significant part of them has been previously of the scope, like overseas, African and similar topics.
b) The direct consequence of this is an upgraded and constant need for daily provision of information about those topics (diplomacy is an information-gathering machinery). This is a structural shock for a small diplomacy with small number of missions around the world. Slovenia had at that time approximately 42 missions altogether, only Cairo in Africa.
c) However, dealing with new topics broadens highly the policy horizon of diplomacy, deepens understanding of world affairs and decision-making on these issues brings the state in question firmly in the active part of global diplomatic community. It also develops foreign policy decision-making within the country.
d) From organizational point of view, this project should be settled with an ad hoc Task Force, dealing only with the membership activities. It should consist of career diplomats and be subordinated directly to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with direct links to the Prime Minister’s and Presidential Offices for this purpose in particular.
e) Two aspects of this flexible and substance-oriented approach are important. There should be a constant communication with all the diplomatic missions abroad. Instructing and reporting for this purpose have to be top priority. Daily communication with the team in New York is a must, also close coordination with Embassies in the states, members of the SC (this author had almost daily consultations in the Swedish MFA, when in 1998 both states were members). The same goes for cooperation with Embassies of states-members of the SC, accredited to Albania. Some of the most important SC members tend to exercise persuasion, sometimes also pressure to accept their view in the voting process.
f) Permanent Representation – mission to the UN in New York must function as a well-oiled machinery. Horizontal and vertical communication and cooperation present a huge management challenge and illustrates the importance of introducing management expertise in diplomatic business. At the same time, this serves as the best diplomatic school for all diplomats.
g) From the very beginning of the membership, special preparations should focus on those two months, one in each membership year, when the member state is presiding the SC.
h) It is highly important to maintain some of the upgraded efficiency of the MFA also at later stage, when the membership is over. This overdrive manner of diplomatic work should not be lost later on.
i) In spite of this immense daily dynamics, related to the membership activities, the so called usual daily foreign-policy and diplomatic business should not stop. This is one of the most demanding challenges. It is a test of a self-assured and professional diplomacy.

The SC nonpermanent membership is a kind of postdoctoral study of diplomatic practice. Diplomatic learn to grasp the moment, establish deep understanding and knowledge of world affairs. Coordination, nonstop briefing, debriefing, following sessions, on – off the record, being active around the clock, this is diplomatic business. This assembly line does never stop.

Accumulation of expertise and knowledge is an enormous benefit for the diplomatic service and its professionalism, the best possible investment. Nowadays, topics that dominate, are still classical maintenance of peace and conflict prevention, but they take a postmodern shape: climate crisis, pandemics, energy supplies, global food chain maintenance, poverty, shortage of water supplies, drought, famine, to name but few. Democracy, rule of law and free individual, remain in the focus, with increasing ethical aspect. This all is diplomacy.

Dr. Milan Jazbec is a Slovene diplomat, professor of diplomacy, poet and writer, employed at the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and member of the first generation of Slovene diplomats. He was Ambassador to North Macedonia (2016-2020) and to Turkey (2010-2015, accredited also to Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria). He published over sixty books and is the author of more than 130 articles on diplomacy and related topics, all in fourteen languages. From 2009 he is the founding editor of the international scientific journal European Perspectives. Views, presented in this article, are solely of his own and do not represent those of his employer.   

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Both the creation of the Albanian state and its various experiments with political structure in the twentieth century were born of political, social, and economic upheava*l. In a sense, Albania was an accidental state – hurriedly constructed in November 1912 by a group of Albanian intellectuals and local leaders to avoid the partition of Albanian lands among the victorious belligerents during the Balkan Wars. Because independence was declared during a crisis, the political structure that the Great Powers assigned to the new state also lacked the preparation and careful implementation that might have given it a greater chance for survival. This somewhat haphazard construction seemed to have provided an unfortunate model that was followed by indigenous Albanian power brokers during much of the twentieth century, who constructed personal regimes, often based upon significant personal limitations and specific world views. What we see in Albania then is the imposition of cobbled together political systems generally imported from the outside that are eventually over­ whelmed by the weaknesses of the Albanian political leadership and domestic political realities – often including the Ottoman-period heritage of inefficient bureaucracy, nepotism, regionalism, corruption, and a ready resort to violence. These factors conspired together to inhibit the construction of the stability and unity required for the creation of a viable traditional nation-state – something that has eluded the Albanians to this day.

The Principality

Albania’s first form of government, as provided by the Great Powers led by Austria -Hungary and Italy, was officially, an autonomous principality sovereign and hereditary by order of primogeniture under the guarantee of the six pow­ers.” 1 Applying a pattern used in most of the other Balkan states, the Great Powers were determined to choose a prince and construct what at least would appear to be a democratic regime. Neither was done with much care and Albania began its difficult transition from a geographical expression to a modern state under the leadership of the unfortunate Prince William of Wied. The Prince, a thirty- five years old German protestant, was primarily a soldier, with a high sense of honor and duty but whose knowledge and experience of the out­ side world, particularly the Balkans, was at best limited. Wied was deposited in Durres with a loan of 500 ,000 pounds and supposedly protected by a small personal contingent plus a small English force at Shkoder and then simply abandoned2 Albania was provided with no constitution- Wied did begin to form a cabinet of sorts, although some of the Albanian notables who were included had anything but his best interests in mind. The most dangerous was Essad Pasha, his minister of war and interior who Wied was finally able to remove but only by placing a battery of guns in the garden of the palace and training them on Essad Pasha’s villa, which happened to be next door. When it became clear that the minister was preparing to resist, three shells were fired, one exploding in the bedroom, at which point Essad Pasha’s wife appeared at the window waving a white sheet3. Essad Pasha was escorted out of the country on an Italian warship.

Despite the use of such direct tactics, the Prince had little influence outside or even inside Durres. Six months after his arrival, he left Albania never to re­ turn. The astute British traveler Mary Edith Durham commented, we may blame Wied for incompetence but only a man of unusual force of character and intimate knowledge of the land could have made headway against the powers combined against him”. She counted among this group the Great Powers who she accused of conspiring to weaken him so that he could be controlled. It is perhaps more reasonable to suggest that they did not care what happened to Albania as long as it created no trouble. Still, the Great Powers must be held responsible for the inappropriate political system with which they saddled Wied.

During the course of the First World War Albania was invaded by no less than six foreign armies that, apart from devastating much of the country, also thoroughly disrupted the institutions of the principality. Once the war came to an end, Albanian leaders- mostly chieftains from the north as well as large landowners from the south- met in Lushnje in 1920 to reform a national government. The most important outcome of this meeting was the Statutes of Lushnje, which reconstructed the principality, although adapting it somewhat to domestic conditions. Since the Prince had fought for the Germans during the war, his authority was transferred to a four-man council of regency, one from each of Albania ‘s four major religions. Once chosen, this body saw to the appointment of a prime minister, a cabinet, and a seventy-five-member chamber of deputies that technically controlled the government.  In reality, however, because of an easily manipulated electoral-college system, the chamber was made up entirely of creatures of those few tribal leaders and landowners who had convened the congress. The first prime minister, Suleiman Bey Delvina, served as a figurehead while the real power rested with the cabinet positions which had been divided among the major chieftains based upon the fire power each could muster. That the principality system was flawed, and despite the adjustments made at Lushnje still did not conform to the realities of Albanian political life, seems to have escaped only the few. Indeed, most of those who supported its construction at Lushnje considered it little more than an expedient to facilitate a temporary truce among the tribes so that Albanians could concern themselves with dealing with the foreign troops that remained in Albania after the war.

Once the outside threat was gone, the principality system rapidly came apart due primarily to one of its greatest flaws – it contained no provisions for the arbitration of old regional and local animosities. Ultimately, it appears that local leaders were willing to continue paying homage to western ideals of democracy by observing the parliamentary methods of opposition only as long as success by these means was anticipated. Once it became clear that all could not lead, political compromises designed to avert violence began to break down. Albania was shaken by coups and upheavals motivated primarily by the refusal on the part of the tribes to bend to central authority – the same issue that had at least contributed to continued instability in Albania during much of the long Ottoman period.

In 1922 Ahmet Zogu, who was to dominate Albanian politics for most of the rest of the first half of the twentieth century, became prime minister. He was the young energetic head of a medium sized tribe endowed with a large retainer of armed men, without which participation in Albanian politics in the 1920s would have been very difficult. He was also endowed with natural intelligence, an intimate knowledge of the Albanian people and his outstanding quality and the force that drove him on – a relentless opportunistic ambition. The direction in which he was driven was determined by his somewhat truncated education – mostly in Ottoman schools in Istanbul, in addition to some experience with the West, having spent much of the war years in Vienna as an unwilling guest of the Austrian government. These experiences produced in Zogu a certain duality that he applied to politics and the state structure in Albania.

Zogu’s goal was to remain in power. But that of course required some unity and stability. So, not for the first time and not for the last, Zogu’s and Albania’s needs seemed to coincide. This conferred upon Zogu the legitimacy of a nationalist, something of which he would become an ever more ardent supporter, as it became clear that the survival of his power base depended on it. For political support he had organized a political party of sorts- the Popular Party- while his opponents had meanwhile combined in the Progressive Party. Both, however, presented essentially identical vague programs supporting reform, education and the material development of the country. Initially they could not even be told apart by the makeup of the membership since elements of all facets of Albanian life could be found in both. Support for one or the other was based almost entirely on personalities. 4

During his tenure as prime minister, which lasted one year- a remarkable achievement in itself under the circumstances Zogu hoped to continue the process of power consolidation. To this end he began planning for a revision of the Statutes of Lushnja in a somewhat more authoritarian direction. The principality had by this point been completely overwhelmed by Albania’s Ottoman heritage. The administration was overburdened with officials who had little or nothing to do but to oversee the massive corruption that had continued from late Turkish times. The post- war Albanian governments that technically controlled this structure were intolerant, oppressive and violent and were accused and were likely guilty of numerous assassinations and attempted assassinations of citizens and foreigners. All of this, as it does today, frightened investors and international aid agencies without which Albania would never be able to lift itself out of its economic morass. Zogu hoped to serve his quest for increased power and provide some unity and stability for Albania by either scraping the system entirely or at least reorganizing it along more authoritarian lines- something that certainly was more appropriate for Albania in the 1920s.

Zogu’s goal of political centralization had the effect of centralizing and galvanizing an opposition- nothing more easily united Albanians in opposition than an attempt to remove regional or personal independence and prerogatives. Those who actively opposed Zogu included the Kosovars who did not appreciate his lack of enthusiasm for aggressive irredentism, and a growing number of former allies. Local army commanders and police officials turned against Zogu creating a cabinet crisis. In the midst of Zogu’s desperate attempts to form a new government, he narrowly escaped assassination- wounded in the hand and the thigh. Zogu was temporarily sidelined, in part because he needed to recover and in part because Albanian blood feud custom required that he not leave his house until the outrage had been avenged. He resigned as prime minister and hoped to play the power behind the throne but the new government was unstable and unable to address any of Albania’s myriad problems effectively. Discontent in both the North and the South grew, fanned by irredentists. Zogu’s opponents withdrew from parliament and along with some renegade military and police officials – supported by some of the principal northern chieftains – declared open revolt. The government declared general mobilization only to discover that there were few left to mobilize – after which it fled. Zogu remained and called on the citizens of Tirana [Tirane] for support but it soon became clear that they would not die for Zogu. Zogu, with his 600 retainers was forced to abandon Tirana and following light fighting with troops of several northern chieftains, Zogu withdrew into Yugoslavia.

Albania’s second major experiment with western democratic forms followed Zogu’s ouster. It was implemented by the leader of the anti- Zoguist forces, Fan Noli, a Harvard graduate who spent much of his life in the United States. He returned to Albania in 1920 as representative of the Albanian- American community fully imbued with American democratic ideas, hoping to replace the old order and its corruption, backwardness and exploitation, with westernization and modernization. He was generally considered to be a man of principle and patriotism but politically, although he led a broad coalition to oust Zogu, he was somewhat out of touch, unable to work well in the strange political environment of Albania. This was demonstrated both in his program and in his actions.

True to his principles, as soon as Noli had formed a new provisional government, with himself as prime minister, he promulgated an ambitious program that indicated the depths of both his liberalism and his naivety. It included among other points: 1) the general disarmament of the population without exception; 2) to exalt the authority of the state over any personal and extra-legal power; 3) to uproot feudalism, free the people and establish democracy definitely in Albania; 4) to introduce radical reform in both the civil and military administration; 5) to balance the budget by radical economies; 6) to ameliorate the conditions of the farmers so as to insure their economic independence; 7) to facilitate the introduction of foreign capital, protect and organize the wealth of the country; and 8) to organize the department of education on modern and practical lines so that the schools produce capable citizens, good patriots and able workers 5 . For the most part, these noble goals remained on paper. The agrarian reform that accompanied Noli’s call for the uprooting of feudalism made no progress at all. In terms of education, the most Noli could do was call a conference. The Catholics proposed the abolition of the system of nondenominational schools, a suggestion that the Moslems vehemently opposed on nationalist grounds urging that it was most undesirable in the interests of unity to emphasize religious differences among children. Mutual recriminations were interchanged and feelings ran so high that after a few days the conference was dispersed by the police. 6

Fan Noli’s lack of experience drove him to compound his mistakes. He al­ lowed his virulence against his former opponents to carry him away to the extent that he instituted a political court to exact punishment. More significantly, he failed to legalize his regime with elections. These mistakes helped to deprive him of the two elements without which the institution of such a radical program was impossible, foreign recognition and financial aid, and of course domestic political support. While some European states viewed Noli as a left- wing revolutionary, the rest were just annoyed with his critical almost badgering speeches at the League of Nations, where he unsuccessfully attempted to procure foreign aid. This failure, and the fact that he spent some months aboard in his quest, made his already difficult domestic situation even more precarious. It became clear very quickly that those who had participated in his coup had nothing but their shared dislike and envy of Zogu in common. Noli was likely the only confirmed republican in his government and his policies were far too radical for most. His agrarian reform program, for example, quickly alienated the conservative landowners, and then, because he was unable to raise the money to carry it out, he alienated the peasantry. Continuing economic hardship turned Albanians against the government as it had turned them against the previous government. In the midst of all of this Noli spent his evenings with his first love, his books and music. Noli was soon faced with defections from his government and armed revolt in the countryside. While Zogu had been able to slowly reduce random violence and the blood feud, under Noli both returned with a vengeance. Press reports indicated almost daily cases of highway robbery or murder. Kidnapping of officials for ransom be­ came common. Albania had essentially returned to conditions that had existed during the last decades of the Turkish administration.

Zogu, in the meantime, had not been idle. From his base in the Bristol hotel in Belgrade with the help of Yugoslav and British money, he recruited a small army of White Russian mercenaries and Yugoslav troops disguised as Albanians. Adding these forces to his own retainer, Zogu invaded Albania in December 1924 7. There was little fighting as Noli’s regime collapsed quickly with the prime minister himself fleeing to Italy with a group of some 500 supporters 8. His effort was perhaps noble but accomplished little of a positive nature. The obstacles he faced were certainly as formidable as those faced by William of Wied. Like Wied, Noli must essentially be viewed as a foreigner attempting to institute a foreign program. As with Wied Noli provided an important service to his successors by making it clear what they should not do.

The Republic

Once back in Tirana, Zogu began to implement what would become Albania’s next political experiment, a republic. Zogu moved quickly to liquidate those who had opposed him and had not fled and he bought off those who had remained neutral. The momentary dearth of opposition afforded him the opportunity to construct a government more in line with his own political preferences and more in step with the realities of Albanian political life. By now Zogu had significant evidence to suggest that the democratic parliamentary principality, which the Great Powers had constructed in 1912, was ill suited to local conditions. This political system had not only failed to create the basis for stable internal development but had added another dimension, that of a modified form of party politics, to the already alarming level of indigenous violence.

Now that many of his enemies were dead or in exile, Zogu was presented with a unique opportunity to create an autocratic regime. While he had often declared that this is exactly what he would do if given the opportunity, once this level of power lay within his grasp he backed away and accepted qualified authority for several reasons. Zogu’s somewhat limited education led him to believe that Europe would react with hostility to anything but an outwardly representative form of government. He also assumed that only if he restrained his desire for unqualified authority could he attract the bureaucrats who had served the previous regime. 9 But despite these fears, he knew that in order to survive and in order for Albania to progress, significant changes in the structure of the Albanian political system were necessary.

Zogu proceeded with his usual vigor. Aware that he needed to legitimize his position- something that Noli failed to do- he quickly convened a constituent assembly- naturally without the troublesome opposition. Meeting at the end of January 1925, this body replaced most of the Statutes of Lushnje with a republican constitution that, at least on the surface, looked very much like the American version. Zogu was elected president for a seven- year term and was to preside over a bicameral legislature. The major difference was that the Albanian version left almost all of the power in the hands of the president. He completely controlled the cabinet and the senate, which he appointed and dis­ missed at will. He commanded the armed forces, controlled the administration and had the sole right to initiate changes in the constitution. He also had significant control over the assembly with an unrestricted veto and the right to dis­ solve the assembly and call for fresh elections, which he could and would influence if necessary. This left only the courts in a position of partial independence, although Zogu did control judicial appointments 10.

The constituent assembly, clearly on Zogu’s initiative, also instructed the president to institute a further series of measures meant to aid in the establishment of stability. The 5.000- man army, which had become a hotbed for politicians and had been a major source of opposition to Zogu, was replaced by a smaller less formal militia. This would allow Zogu, with his enlarged personal retainer of 2,000, to personally control one of the most powerful military forces in Albania 11.

Although politics had essentially come to an end, occasional serious revolts, often motivated by a combination of agitation by Zogu’s exiled enemies funded by foreign powers and the refusal of northern elements to bend to central authority, continued to create serious problems for Zogu. These revolts also helped to convince him that the republic, despite its authoritarian nature, required adjustment. Further stability was needed and in Zogu’s mind only a monarchy with himself as king could provide it. Monarchy was something that had intrigued Zogu since childhood. In an interview with a German newspaper he tells us that as a young man he developed a special interest in the careers of Julius Caesar and Napoleon, who he admired in part because of the political changes for which they were responsible 12. One need only admires Zogu’s presidential uniform, white with gold epaulettes and a hat out of a Groucho Marx movie, to understand that his desires had changed little since his youth. In attempting to justify the change to foreigners – he was less concerned with what average Albanians thought- Zogu argued that what Albania chiefly needed and had been lacking in the past was a stable government that would encourage the people to set to work and build up a state on a firm foundation. Only the crown, which would be a permanent authority and would rise above the conflicts of personal interests and political groups, could represent the idea of continuity and create the general stability that Albania needed 13. Zogu’s principal concern was to convince the Italians to support the change, since it was Italian money that supported Zogu’s opponents. A deal was struck. Zogu agreed to sign a series of military, political and economic pacts that required him to relinquish much of his economic independence and some of his political independence. But Zogu was willing to do this based upon the assumption that the Italians could always be outwitted later. In exchange, the Italians committed themselves to supporting the construction of a monarchy, further loans to Zogu, withdrawal of support from Zogu’s enemies and- this being particularly important to Zogu- the Italians committed themselves to guaranteeing the political status quo in Albania. Zogu went on to canvas other interested states as well, still convinced that the outside world was intimately interested in internal Albanian developments. The change was greeted with a few smiles and benevolent disinterest in Europe14. Only Mustafa Kemal of Turkey objected, apparently commenting: What’s going on in Albania? Are you performing an operetta?” 15

As with his constant worry about foreign opinions, Zogu was also continually concerned about superficial legality. He therefore took great pains to insure that the change was constitutionally correct. Since parliament could not alter the republican constitution, Zogu convinced its members in June 1928 to pass an organic law providing for their own dissolution and the election of a special constituent assembly. Albanian electoral politics during the republican period was of course much less likely than it had been during the principality and in this case Zogu’s plan was carried out in a few simple steps. First several dozen possible opposition candidates were arrested and general political meetings banned. By virtue of the indirect nature of the election process, only the 1,200 members of the electoral-college actually voted and since they were all chosen by the government and paid, not a single member of the new constituent assembly was returned whose vote was not safe for Zogu 16.

Zogu also required some local enthusiasm to convince skeptics of the unanimity of his people. His first move in this direction was his acceptance in December 1927 of the title: “Savior of the Nation”17. Next Zogu decided that the unquestioning support of the cabinet was necessary. Although it is unlikely that any of the members of the government would have opposed Zogu, thereby jeopardizing their positions and perhaps their lives, since the dismissal and re­ organization of the government could be done with ease, Zogu manufactured a cabinet crisis resulting in the resignation of the entire cabinet. Within twenty­ four hours a new cabinet was formed which was quickly christened the: Marionette Cabinet” because its members appeared to be merely a collection of tools in the hands of Zogu 18.

Having taken these steps, Zogu and most of his advisors assumed that their job was done, intending simply to wave the crown in the face of the pea pie. But cooler heads prevailed and Zogu was finally convinced that the people as least needed to be informed. Konstantin Chekrezi, the editor of the Telegraph, was instructed to write a series of editorials supporting the monarchy, which, since Albania still suffered from nearly ninety percent illiteracy, probably only had limited impact. This was followed by a series of carefully stages “spontaneous demonstrations” which by the end of August had reached feverish proportions. The assembly was inundated with telegrams stimulating it to the suppression of a form of government alien to the traditions of the Albanian people.  Zogu was satisfied, although as the American minister noted wryly any reasoned observer of Albanian affairs would know at once that the people of the country, if consulted, never had any knowledge of having been approached19. The constituent assembly duly met in late August 1928 and as expected unanimously resolved that, the illustrious crown of the historical Albanian throne is offered to the Savior of the Nation under the title Zogu I, King of the Albanians 20.

Once again Zogu’s personal ambitions seem to have corresponded with the best interests of the country. In becoming king, Zogu proved himself strong enough to put through a project over the heads of an apathetic people and wise enough to wait for a moment when the internal situation was propitious and no complications with neighbors were likely to ensue. He must be given credit for the change itself, as it was basically a wise move. Certainly an Albanian republic was an anomaly whereas a monarchy with its pomp and ceremony could be better understood by people who were accustomed to owe allegiance to a chieftain or a pasha. The argument that a throne conveys the idea of permanence and continuity and that these attributes were particularly desirable in the government of a country that had been torn by internal feuds and external jealousy, as had Albania, cannot be ruled out. While it is true that tribal allegiance to Zogu was strikingly personal, the creation of the monarchy allowed the king time to either change the attitude of the chieftains or decrease their influence. The creation of the monarchy was a step in the direction of general stability.

The Monarchy

The 1928 monarchical constitution 21 corrected what Zogu saw as the flaws of the presidential constitution and left all of the power, not just most of it, in the hands of the chief executive. Although, as with Zogu’s previous political structures, this one again seemed outwardly democratic, Zogu in fact assumed virtually unrestricted legislative, judicial, and executive power. While indirect elections continued to be held, political parties were declared illegal and parliaments as a result were made up of placemen who occupied themselves in voluminous debates on issues about which Zogu was indifferent. Zogu’s judicial powers were also enhanced. Under the presidency Zogu had been able to control the judiciary only through appointments and intimidation. Now, judicial decisions were pronounced and executed in his name, doing away with what little independence the courts might have had. The primary source of his power, however, came by virtue of his executive prerogatives that he shared with no one. What Zogu created was essentially a western-oriented monarchy where the forms were western but the rule was essentially Ottoman. It was a reasonably stable, traditional, non-ideological, authoritarian dictatorship in which Zogu even allowed limited political reform provided that his own position was not threatened in the process.

This political structure gave Zogu an opportunity to achieve his subsidiary goals of modernization and westernization. Unfortunately for the country, Zogu was not up to it. Once Zogu became king a certain complacency set in and he lost the gift of energy that characterized his earlier years. He seemed to be­ come mentally sloppy, still capable of determined and obstinate action but no longer capable of thoughtful consideration of ways and means to deal with resulting difficulties. This was a particular problem because the system he constructed made him constitutionally unable to delegate authority in most cases. The entire weight of the administration, therefore, rested on his shoulders, a burden that he often found too heavy- having neither the constructive ability nor the knowledge required to deal with every situation 22. At the worst of times he resembled a small- sized, extravagant, indolent, Oriental potentate surrounded by a group of hangers- on, and members of his clan who lived upon him and whom he was unable to shake off. But still, the state he constructed provided Zogu with the centralization necessary to forcibly reduce the chaotic lawlessness of the highlands and to begin to bring the divergent elements of the country together. By the 1930s the central government was recognized in most parts of the country, allowing Zogu’s administration to collect taxes and draft recruits for the army, something that would have been considered impossible immediately following the First World War.

Zogu’s most important contribution, however, was less tangible. He created an environment that was conducive to the growth of an Albanian national consciousness, a process that is still ongoing. His resistance to the Italians, who continued their encroachment on Albania’s sovereignty, provided a focus, albeit a negative one, for growing national sentiment. While Zogu did not create a nation, he certainly facilitated steps in that direction. Those who succeeded him as leaders and resumed the effort of nation-state construction had their task made somewhat simpler as a result of the steps towards the development of Albanian nationalism for which Zogu was responsible.

When Mussolini was finally convinced that Italy would never achieve its goal of complete dominance over Albania while Zogu remained in power, he swept him away in April of 1939. Albania’s experience with war and resistance swept away the political system that Zogu had created. In 1944 the Albanians were forced to begin their state construction again under the leadership of the victor of the wartime resistance struggle, the newly created Albanian Communist Party led by Enver Hoxha. Hoxha came from a middle class Moslem family from the South who, like Zogu, spend some time studying abroad where he learned an appreciation for western literature and Marxist politics which would help shape his own version of Zogu’s political dualism. Once back in Albania he joined a small communist cell and with the formation of the party in 1941, was chosen as the secretary of the central committee. He was not the obvious choice but as a well-educated, well-spoken, dedicated, affable young man, he appeared to be the ideal compromise candidate. His political acumen, ambition and drive, seconded by a studied ruthlessness would allow Hoxha to transform his fledgling party of 130 into the principal contender for power in Albania in a matter of several years.

Hoxha’s goals were similar to Zogu’s and included securing his own position as a first priority, building the party into the principal resistance force, and constructing the foundations of a new government while the war was still in progress. As he consolidated his power Hoxha removed “liquidatory elements” by dissolving entire district committees and removing personal enemies by simply having them shot 23. In a bold stroke, Hoxha initiated a popular front strategy at the Peze conference where the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was founded that thrust him personally into the limelight. But he was also careful not to cast his net too broadly and refused to accept most of Albania’s diverse liberal elements gambling that other strong resistance organizations outside of his control would not form. Rival organizations led by Zoguists, liberals and independent chieftains did appear, and became the principal focal point of his military efforts. But Hoxha fought the Italian and German occupiers as well gaining extensive western military aid for his efforts. His rivals, who constituted the ruling class of pre-war Albanian society, participated in very little resistance. They felt that they could only pursue military operations as long as they could provide adequate protection for their society from enemy reprisals. Failure to insure this protection would lead to the rejection of these leaders by their own society 24. Hoxha, on the other hand, had nothing to lose by resistance since enemy reprisals only gained for him new recruits. The dis­ united anti-partisan groups, in an effort to protect themselves from Hoxha were ultimately driven to cooperate with the Germans, effectively removing them­ selves as contenders for power in postwar Albania.

Postwar Albania was of course one of Hoxha’s principal preoccupations. Hoxha’s seemingly innate political acumen encouraged him to carefully prepare his dictatorship while the fighting was still underway. There are a series of milestones in this somewhat tortuous process beginning with the Peza conference where the NLM was founded. This meeting began the process of constructing regional and local administrations in the form of councils that did much to spread Hoxha’s influence. Parallel to the NLM meetings, Hoxha convened meetings of the party to strengthen his own internal position. After receiving Comintern approval, Hoxha called the first national conference of the Albanian Communist Party in March 1943 that elected a permanent central with Hoxha continuing as first secretary. The conference also called for the creation of a regular army of national liberation to be controlled by the communists 25. The general council of the NLM naturally agreed and Hoxha became the principal political commissar. With each meeting Albania comes closer to becoming a state, and Hoxha further solidifies his position.

The next major step in September 1943, was the second conference of the NLM at Labinot that strengthened and expanded the local and regional councils that in some areas began to govern towns and entire districts being proclaimed the “only people’s power” 26. In 1944 with the outcome of the war no longer in doubt, Hoxha stepped up his political activity. At the end of May 1944 Hoxha called an NLM congress at Permet which chose a standing committee, and several months later in Berat the second session of this congress transformed the committee into a provisional government with Hoxha acting as prime minister. At the second plenum of the party, also in Berat, Hoxha survived the first dangerous challenge to his leadership mounted by Yugoslavs, who developed the view that Hoxha was a bourgeois nationalist, and their allies on the Albanian politburo. In defense Hoxha moved further to the left and perpetuated the mentality of struggle emphasizing the notion of enemies everywhere, externally and internally. This state of siege mentality became a critical feature of his ideology and characterized Hoxha’s regime until his death in 1985.

The People’s Republic

The command socialist form of Hoxha’s state was soon established. Building on the many wartime conferences and plenums, once the Germans had gone Hoxha quickly constructed a system with intelligence and brutality. The initial steps included Special People’s Tribunals for the physical removal or silencing of the remaining elements of the pre-war elite, and the construction of a particularly large security service 27. With the enhanced personal security these measures provided, Hoxha moved to the creation of a permanent government. While democracy and free elections had constituted an important part of Hoxha’s propaganda, once he assumed power these promises became considerably less important 28. Hoxha created a democratic front out of the wartime NLM dominated by communists. Unlike much of the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, however, Albania did not experience a post-war coalition government, principally because no government in exile had ever been recognized. In the first election in 1945, because only front candidates could stand for office, the front swept to power with 93 % of the vote. When the new national constituent assembly met in early 1946, it formally abolished the monarchy, proclaimed Albania to be a people’s republic within the prewar frontiers and approved a new constitution along Stalinist lines. Hoxha held the posts of general secretary of the party, president of the Democratic Front, prime minister, foreign minister, defense minister, and commander-in-chief. A compliant People’s Assembly was created, supplemented by compliant local People’s Councils. While the major players shifted or disappeared on occasion during the Hoxha years, and two new constitutions were introduced, the Stalinist political structure changed little until Hoxha’s death.

The Yugoslavs were correct in assuming that Hoxha was a nationalist – something that he could not abandon even if he had wanted to. When Hoxha came to power, he was faced with the task of rebuilding Albania on the foundation, or what was left of it, laid by Zogu. Like Zogu, his main goal was essentially predetermined. In its simplest sense Hoxha’s principal task, aside from staying in power, was the creation of a viable independent nation-state and what he colorfully described as the monolithic unity […) of the Albanian people” 29. What Hoxha created then, as a German historian has commented, is a reversal of the Leninist idea of national form and socialist content – Hoxha established a state with a socialist form and a nationalist content 30.

Despite the violent Stalinist state of siege rhetoric Hoxha adopted, he essentially had little choice but to become as ardent a nationalist as Zogu had been, not particularly difficult for Hoxha since he had strong nationalist tendencies in any case. As with Zogu, Hoxha looked to outside forms, this time from the West in terms of some of his intellectual stimulation and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in terms of forms, both of which were adapted to local conditions and Hoxha’s unique personality, and in a way eventually overwhelmed by them.

While the structure was therefore rapidly put in place, actual consolidation of the dictatorship took somewhat longer. During the 1940s and early 1950s Koci Xoxe, the minister of the interior, and Xoxe’s Yugoslav protectors, repeatedly attacked Hoxha. Hoxha survived as a result of the Soviet- Yugoslav split and quickly eliminated all of those associated with Xoxe . Hoxha was also subjected to a series of bungled CIA/SIS plots that parachuted Albanian emigres into Albania. Moscow, which likely got its information from master- spy Kim Philby, informed Hoxha allowing him to arrest and execute hundreds. In 1956 he survived the de- Stalinization purges that decimated the ranks of Eastern European leaders. By 1957 Hoxha had removed most of his dangerous rivals and was able to consolidate his dictatorship, but at the cost of increasing paranoia resulting in what one writer has called “cultish craziness” 31. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands of concrete bunkers that Hoxha built in the 1970s to deter his ever- increasing enemies list. While there were further threats to his leadership, none were as significant as those he had already survived.

Hoxha consolidated his position with bloodshed- less perhaps than Tito but the principal difference here is that Tito eventually mellowed while Hoxha’s paranoia and extremism increased 32. Ultimately Hoxha, too, began to look something like an Oriental despot, served loyally only by his relatives and ex­ tended family. By the late 1950s more than half of the fifty- three members of the central committee of the party were related. The party leadership, which was increasingly bound together by common complicity in murderous purges, had become Hoxha’s clan- Hoxha had essentially adapted Stalinism to local conditions 33. Despite Hoxha’s western education, the nepotism, clannishness, and violence of the late Ottoman period characterized Hoxha’s regime as well- and it is perhaps no accident that some of his biographers have chosen such colorful titles as “the Red Sultan” or “the Pharaoh of Socialism” to emphasize this connection.

Many observers have suggested that the Hoxha years witnessed important achievements in terms of political structure and stability. He is credited with the reduction of the impact of divisive factors on Albanian society, such as regional loyalties, the traditional North-South division, and religious differences. These achievements were in part accomplished, it has been suggested, through the completion of the process of nation-state construction, building on the achievements of King Zogu 34. Hoxha is also credited with the development of a strong sense of nationalism fostered in part by his successful maintenance of Albania ‘s territorial integrity 35.

While more study is needed on this question, from the perspective of nearly twenty years after Hoxha’s death, it would seem that most, if not all, of these achievements were offset by Hoxha’s rigid ideological conformity, extreme isolation, as well as horrific legacy of terror. With the collapse of communism in 1991, Albania was convulsed by a violent rejection of everything associated with Hoxha making Albania ‘s transition to its next political phase much more difficult than that experienced by other Eastern European states. Albanians have violently rejected the various aspects of Hoxha’s ideology and the symbols thereof- beginning with the basic authority of the central government. The mass exodus of the best and the brightest- some twenty percent of the population has fled since 1990- will make this transition all the more difficult. Albanians, in a way, have found it necessary to reinvent themselves once again. Unlike in the other Balkan states where significant rebuilding was necessary, Albania has had to build from the ground up, a task made more difficult by the weak level of civic nationalism. In rejecting Hoxha’s violent, ruthless nationalism, Albanians seem to have replaced it with a return to regionalism and even a certain anti- nationalism that is inhibiting the construction of an Albanian version of civil society. Perhaps this process can best be described as a re­ Ottomanization of Albania. It seems clear that of the various Albanian political configurations discussed here, Hoxha’s regime did the most damage to long­ term Albanian unity and political stability.

The various political experiments that Albania endured during the course of the twentieth century offer lessons for newly developing states in the twenty first century. Some are obvious – including the dangers of importing foreign political concepts wholesale, without carefully adapting them to domestic conditions. Other lessons are perhaps more subtle including the managing of domestic world views which adversely affect the search for stability. The Albanian political experience also points to the dangers of acting upon a people as twentieth century Albanian political leaders tended to do. In the meantime Albania’s difficult transition, now in its second decade, continues. There is some irony in the fact that Albania is still attempting to construct a basic, traditional nation-state as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many of its neighbors meanwhile, seem to be moving beyond that structure. Perhaps Albania’s future lies in following that lead.

References:

1.Stavro Skendi, The Political Evolution of Albania (New York: Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Mimeographed Series, March 8, 1954) 3.

2.Miranda Vickers, The Albanians. A Modern History (London 1995) 83.

3.Joseph Swire, Albania. The Rise of a Kingdom (London 1929) 215.

4.Bernd Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania (New York 1984) 27.

5.Swire, Albania 434 and Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office (here­ after FO) 371/9639 (C10882/48/43): Durres, 30 June 1924.

6.Bernd Fischer, Fan Noli and the Albanian Revolutions of 1924, East European Quarterly 22 (June 1988) 2, 12.

7.Swire, Albania 445.

8.FO 371/10654 (C808/52/90): Tirana, 29 December 1924.

9.FO 371/11209 (C929/929/90) Durres, 16 January 1926 and FO 371/10656 (C1865/1062/90) Durres, 27 January 1925 and Ekrem Viera, Lebenserinnerungen (Munchen 1973) 213.

10.Skendi, Political Evolution 9.

11.FO 371.11209 (C929/929/90): Durres, 16 January 1926 and Auswartiges Amt (hereafter AA) Politische Abteilung II B, lnnere Verwaltung 2, Bd. 1: Tirana, 2 March 1925.

12.National-Zeitung (Berlin) 14. September 1928.

13.FO 371/12845 (C6346/1019/90): Durres, 20 April 1928.

14.Richard Busch- Zantner, Albanien. Neues Land im lmperium (Leipzig 1939) 151.

15.FO 371/12846 (C8052/1090/90): Durres, 23 October 1928 and FO 371/12846(C8371/1090/90): Constantinople, 1 November 1928 and FO 371/12846 (C8804/1090/90): Durres, 20 November 1928 and James Tomes, The Throne of Zog. In: History Today, September 2001, 47.

16.Joseph Roucek, Characteristics of Albanian Politics, Social Science (January 1935) 73 and The Times (London) 14 December 1928.          .

17.AA Politische Abteilung II, Pol. 2, Bd. 1: Tirana, 14 December 1927.

18.FO 371/12847 (C4051/1355/90): Durres, 18 May 1928.

19.United States Department of State 875 .88/260: Tirana, (No. 491), 15 August 1928.

20.FO 371/12846 (C7017/1090/90): Durres, 8 September 1928.

21.Leka, the current pretender to the throne, declared this constitution to be in effect following the referendum on the monarchy held in 1997, which he claims the Socialists stole from him.

22.FO 371/15148 (C1412/1412/90): Durres, 24 February 1931 and FO 371/15149 (C6736/6736/90): Durres, 25 August 1931.

23.Institute of Marxist- Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, History of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirana: Naim Frasheri, 1971) 99 and Bernd Fischer, Albania at War. 1939-1945 (London 1999) 230.

24.Captured German Records, National Archives, Washington D. C., roll T120 340 AA Nr. 1607, 27 May 1944 and FO 371/48079 (R399/101/5): 5 November 1944.

25.Nicolas Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania (Baltimore 1968) 50 f.

26.Luan Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power (Tirana 1986) 63.

27.Eventually involving 3.5 % of the population at a cost of 10 to 11 % of the GNP (see Ramadan Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians [London 1975] 70.)

28.FO 371/4356 R1471/1471/90 PWE, 24 November 1944.

29.Enver Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New State (Tirana 1984) 5.

30.Bernhard Tonnes, Sonderfall Albanien (MCmchen 1980) 500.

31.Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 1804-1999 (London 1999) 559.

32.Lyman H. Legters, Eastern Europe: Transformations and Revolution, 1945-1991 (Toronto 1992) 526.

33.Vickers, The Albanians 181.

34.Nicholas Pano, Albania. In: The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, ed. Joseph Held (New York 1992) 52.

35.James O’Donnell, A Coming of Age: Albania under Enver Hoxha (New York 1999) 239.

The post Albania as Political Laboratory – the Development of the Albanian State during the 20th Century appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Countries of the western Balkans have faced during the years a long list of problems from corruption, illegal immigration, trafficking, unemployment, and building a state of rule of law. With the outbreak of war in Syria, it seems that another problem was added to the above list, the challenge from jihadists and radical Islam. Albania declared its independence in 1912, as the first country in Europe to secede from the Ottoman Empire with a majority Muslim population. In 2015, Albania ranked third or foreign fighters joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq per capita among the European countries. Only Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Belgium had more fighter per capita joining ISIS. In cases of Bosnia and Kosovo researchers and experts put the reasons of radicalization on the outcomes of 1990s wars, due to the number of foreign fighters that appeared in the region, while some left to proceed on other parts of the world their holy war, few of them settled, however Albania in contrary did not have any war neither a complete state bankruptcy. Moreover, in Bosnia during the war foreign fighters with a Salafist and jihadist background even went on to establish a fighting unit of their own “El-Mudzahid”.

 What happened? After more than 100 years as an independent state, Albania tried to reform Islam and cut every tie from the rest of the world, but became source of foreign fighters joining a terrorist organization? What are the reasons?

Since its independence, Albanian tried in any way to reduce the power of Islam either in state businesses and private life of its citizens. More or less as tentative sometimes to modernise or to convince the West that Albanian Muslims are followers of a moderate practice of Islam. In 1929, King Zog in order to reduce the power of powerful Sunni Community want further by legitimizing officially Bektashi Sufi Order as an independent religious authority without any link or dependence from Sunni Community. In the aftermath of WWII, the new communist regime reduces even further more reaching the minimum level of any religious presence in daily life of Albanian citizens, through different approaches they reached an unprecedented moment in 1967 when they declared Albanian an atheist state, prohibiting any sort of religious life and demolishing a number of religious temples.

1991-A new Chapter and A New Challenge

After the end of World War II Albania introduced the most Stalinist form of communist regime in the Central Eastern Europe. Since coming to power in 1944, the communists have made great efforts to minimize the presence of the clergy in public. This campaign culminated in 1967, when the communists simply declared religion illegal, closed almost 95% of the worshipping places, around 2300 mosques, churches, tekes, and monasteries were destroyed or reconstructed as shops or culture houses. Albania thus returned until 1990 was the only atheist country in the world, were to believe in God often resulted in long prison terms or the death penalty. In 1990, with the end of the communist regime, the return of religion was allowed. Religious communities begin to rebuild damaged monuments, building new ones and prepare and training the new clergy. As the Orthodox Church turned its eyes towards the Greek sister Church or the Patriarchate of Istanbul, Catholics were supported by the Vatican. Albanian Muslims headed towards Middle Eastern countries. Although Albanian Islam is close to the Turkish model, also due to the fact that Albania was once part of the Ottoman Empire, which would have been more logical a rapprochement with Turkey.

But until the current President Erdogan came to power, Turkey maintained a distance from religious issues, as part of the Ataturk long tradition of the 1920s and 1930s. Until 2003, Middle Eastern country’s foundations and associations had to some extent a monopoly on the construction of mosques, charitable activities, or granting of scholarships for young Muslim believers. One of the most classic forms of growth of the influences of Islam of Arab nature is the sending students for studies in the religious schools of Saudi Arabia which practices Wahhabism, a form unknown to the inhabitants of Albania and the Balkans in general. Recently, Peace Tv, a media channel founded by a Indian Muslim Salafi follower had been broadcasting programs, often inviting preachers and Imams, among them Genc Plumbi a former student from Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University a leading Saudi Arabia religious higher education institute. This increased the presence of associations funded by the Gulf countries but with a religious nature caused new forms of practicing Islam as Salafism, Takfirism, and Wahhabism to infiltrate Albania and then intertwined it with elements of jihadism. While a number of foundations were closed by the Albanian state after the September 11 attacks, the emergence of social media seems to have played an even greater role in the radicalisation of certain parts of the population.  

Endorsing Salafism

Salafism is a predominant branch of Islam in the Middle East in particular promoted by Saudi Arabia. Through tremendous amounts of monetary sources from selling oil and gas, Saudi Arabia has promoted this version of Islam among every corner where Muslims exist. Since 1990 a long list of young people studying in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, or Malaysia religious schools and universities where they got in contact with Salafism. After concluding their studies, they started to implement Salafism among local population. However, though debate and tension among Albanians on Islamic issues are numerous and various, three are the top ones:

1) Secular state;

2) Nations, nationalism, and the state itself.

3) Militantism that emerges in the jihadism in foreign lands especially during the Syrian conflict years.

While the first two are very rarely preached publicly or are only discuss in a closed environment with a small audience. In general Salafist followers do not accept a secular state based on their dogma is un-Islamic, and everyone who follows the state law is an apostate. Their divide the world into two camps: Dar al-Islam and Dar al- Harb. Even though this division of the world is more part of historical study to the earliest days of Islam in the VII and VIII centuries, and does not find any place anymore in modern days. The only state they recognize is an Islamic state entirely based on the course of law and regulation of the earliest form of Islam that of Prophet Mohammed and the first four rightly guided caliphs. When it comes to nation and the existence of the state they see both concepts as against Islam and harmful to Muslims. For them the nation has not any meaning or sense, the world is only shared among Muslims and non-Muslims while the state is in their eyes another evil form that they not only do not recognize but pledge to fight until the end.  

The Influence of Islamic countries

One of the successful penetrations to introduce a radical and unfamiliar Islam was through the work of charitable foundations. Although neither the Albanian state nor other independent institutions have ever made transparency on the role of NGO on radicalisation and extremism among the population. Some of the earliest NGOs with an Islamic background started operating since the end of the communist regime in the early 1990s and in particular after the 11 September attacks some of them were later linked of supporting Islamic radicalism or terrorism were: Islamic Relief Organization, Al-Haramain Foundation, Taibah International, Revival of Islamic malic society and Global Relief Fund. Even though except from the Al Haramain foundation, Albanian authorities had never published any audit of other NGO-s activities. Their office was closed by General Prosecutor Office in 2005 on charges of having links with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and AQ mostly based on information shared by US intelligence services institutions.  In 1997 US State Department reported that more than 95 Islamic foundations were operating in Albania. One of the first foundations closer to Al Qaida with offices in Tirana, Al Haramani and its director Abdul Latif Saleh were expelled from Albania in 1999 on suspicion of planning to attack the US Embassy in Tirana. Mr. Saleh’s properties were later confiscated from the UN Security Council for supporting Al Qaeda (AQ), a decision that was overturned in 2011. The focus of this foundation seems to have been on the suburbs and periphery often using economic aid programs, scholarships, or the construction of mosques and other places of worship to penetrate. One of the elements that proved that many foundations and organizations were influencing on changing elements of local Islam tradition were displayed at keeping a long beard by men, the wearing of short pants, or the use of the burqa and headscarf by women. These were innovations because not only during the years of communism but also during the period between the two world wars, the state had pursued a policy that women should not use the headscarf or burqa or what they called then modernising the Albanian society with modern western values. Featuring a long beard by men during the communist years was an act that was punished with years in prison.

In the aftermath of 11/09, Albania state authorities sacked several offices of this organization. This approach was undertaken following US reports or requests. BBC reported that some well-known name launch their terrorist career by visiting Balkan, in case of Bosnia were Khalid Al-Hajj (later the head of AQ in Saudi Arabia, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdar, two of the hijackers of the 11 September attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shid, that murdered American journalist Daniel Pearl, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who pitch the 9/11 idea personally to Bin Laden).

Further south, in Albania even so prominent VIP terrorist name, did not appear, seems to have operated, they seem to have founded organizations with ties to Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Algerian Islamic Front. During 1992-2000 they were able to found a branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Tirana. Probably the most notorious name among operates on Albanian soil is Muhammed al-Zawahiri, the brother of the current AQ lead Ayman Al-Zawahiri, he was convinced as part of the so-called Returnees from Albania trial for participation in President Sadat assassination in 1981. He was reported on being active in Albania and Bosnia during 1992-2000, even though this report comes from those who were detained during the so-called Returnees from Albania trial with persons as El-Sayed Abdel-Maqsud, Ahmad Isma’il ‘Uthman, Muhammad Hassan Mahmud Tita, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-Naggar and Shawqi Salama Mustafa Atiya. The operation concluded with arrestment and later extradition of the aforementioned was one of the earliest arrests conducted by the CIA prior to the 2001 War on Terror declaration. Although for the so-called Tirana cell, most of the information on how this cell operated comes from al-Naggar itself. They were accused of links to terrorist organizations, for plotting to attack the Egyptian busiest market of Khan al-Khalili in 1994 and for the assassination of Egyptian Speaker of Parliament in 1990. Al Naggar’s arrestment and his subsequent execution in Egypt were criticized by Amnesty International as an unfair trial conducted in the absence of the suspect. Turkey has also played an important role in the establishment of many religious and cultural institutions of an Islamic nature. Although until 2005 Ankara did not seem to use Islam as soft power diplomacy, with the coming to power of current President Erdogan many elements in foreign policy changed. Turkey launched a campaign known as neo-ottomanism proposed by Ahmet Davutoğlu the architect of the Turkish foreign current policy line. The Balkans in this regard was an important part of Turkey to revive its influence in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. Albania with a majority population of a moderate Islamic faith, and part of one of the regions that had the highest integration in the Ottoman Empire has seen during the last decade’s colossal investments by various Turkish state institutions. In addition to establishing higher education institutions and a large number of schools, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) built many religious monuments. Among them is the renovation of the oldest mosques in Tirana, Ethem Bey Mosque or the historic neighborhood of Berat, or the mosque in Preza castle. In 2015, the Turkish President himself would inaugurate the Namazgja Mosque in Tirana, an investment of $ 34 million with an area of ​​20,000 m² enough to accommodate 4500 believers. Although Turkey features a much more moderate Islam than that of the Arab countries or Southeast Asia and Central Asia, since the Muslim community’s dependence on Istanbul in the 1920s and 1930s many elements are no longer common.

The influence of the Syrian conflict

The Syrian conflict started in 2011 and reached a boiling point in 2015 when more than half of Syria and Iraq were put under the control of a terrorist organization known as ISIS. The threat of ISIS was way more dangerous than any other Islamic terrorist organization has ever possessed. Al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate in 2015 in Mosul and was immediately followed by ruthless recruitment of foreign fighters among them, considerable fighters from Albanians. Albania was ranked as number 4 out of the list of countries sending jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq with 32 fighters per 1 million inhabitants. At the top of the list was Kosovo followed by Bosnia and Belgium. In September 2014, then Foreign Minister Ditmir Bushati, publicly confirm that in Albania training camps exist for persons willing to join terrorist organizations operating in Iraq or Syria. While most of those fighters from West European countries were descendants of immigrant families, seen by many as not being integrated into their society, the case of Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania were different. All those who left to join ranks with ISIS were locals.  This was a shred of evidence that jihadism had gained a place among the local population in the West Balkan by using two methods of recruitment: firstly through the internet or different social media and secondly, through NGOs and radical preachers supported by different wealthy Middle East generous donors.

Implications and Motivation of Albanians to join ISIS

Albania did never experience a large scale conflict as Bosnia or Kosovo did. In particular, Bosnia saw a large number of foreign fighters coming in order to conduct jihad in 1993. What are the reasons that pushed Albanians joining a foreign war or asking for a radical form of interpretation of Islam unfamiliar with local customs? Authority presence and inspection are probably the top reasons. Albania suffered from endemic corruption leaving a large part of society disappointed from the outcome of democracy. Followed by the lack of success toward economic and social reform, a huge part of society was unemployed, leaving a fertile ground for radicalism and extremism. Several foundations began operating out of state control or Muslim Community. This organisation’s presence was especially in the periphery where the state had little presence, and the NGOs turned up later to become the only reliable authority for the local population. They did not only support the local population, but they also built schools, health care centers, and mosques. Recently the number of mosques mushroomed, only in the area of Bovill, north-east of Tirana more than 20 mosques seem to have been built in an area where no more than 3000 residents live. Islamic Community had continued to promote a peaceful co-existence between faiths and believers, keeping a distance from being involved in governing issues and maintaining a good relationship with other three communities (Bektashi, Christian Catholic, and Orthodox catholic) however their weakness consist of not being able to control all the preaching houses and often it is even challenged by preachers who seems to be out of their control.

In 2015 KMSH report that around 200 mosque out of 725 were out of her control, representing around 30% of the worship places. KMSH is the only institution recognized as legal and spiritual representative of Sunni Muslims in the country. Financial and economic sources of some foreign foundations are incomparable to the sources of KMSH. Reasons for recruiting such a high number of citizens vary. One of the main reasons is the lack of state in some remote areas in the periphery, intertwined with poverty oftentimes extreme levels. The gap was filled by third actors, sometimes radical preachers. Although a special case was that of the 4 soldiers of the Zall Herri base in Tirana, two of them would lose their lives in the fighting in Syria. This was a case that for many experts mercenarism was why these soldiers joined with ISIS. However, one of the main reasons for recruitment is indoctrination through brainwashing. Until 2005, brainwashing was done mostly through the influence in mosques or by radical preachers, even though in the last 7 years, the emergence of ISIS brainwashing goal was amplified by social networks. It seems that in the case of foundations or preachers it is easy for state authorities to act and close their offices and arrest a number of suspects. The opposite is the case with social networks, which to some extent can be counted a global problem.

Diaspora collaboration

Since the end of the communist regime more than 500.000 Albanian immigrated to Western Europe in particular Italy, Germany, Austria, and Belgium. During the year their income had been an outstanding support for their families and government. Furthermore, recently diaspora had moved on exporting something else, a radical form of Islam. In 2017 Italian state arrested several indications who were involved in recruiting Albanian to fight in the Syrian war. The list of fighters from Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia has been much more concerning due to the fact that several of them were promoted at the highest rank of ISIS. For instance, Lavderim Muhaxheri was chosen as the head of the Albanian jihadist brigade part of ISIS, thus having a direct report with Al Baghdadi. Another name is Abdul Jashari the head of the special force of Xhemati Alban part of the Al-Nusra front and later rank as one of the leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. It seems that the fact that they speak the same language and grow up in a similar environment has often led to collaboration between the radical elements and the Albanian origin.

Conclusion

This article focuses on the Political Islam that has been introduced in Albania during the last 20 years. Since its independence in 1912, the founding fathers of the Albanian modern state pushed an agenda to clearly promote a non-Arabic Islam by introducing local tradition and emphasizing the national identity of being Albanian over any religious background. An important role in reshaping Islam in Albania has played the latter’s relations with Turkey, Arab countries, and a number of associations and charities who arrived in Albania with an agenda to promote foreign non-local Islam interpretations in particular Takfirism, Salafist or Jihadism. Albania, a country that for a period of 45 years had one of the hardest forms of communist atheism, was seen in the 1990s as a golden opportunity for many Islamic majority countries and Islamic associations to spread their version of Islam, which often is at odds with the local or even Ottoman tradition the one which Albanian and Balkan Islam belong.

The article focuses on the role that political Islam is having in Albania. This study focuses on the penetration of the elements of a radical Islamic, through offering scholarships for studying abroad, the construction of a large number of mosques, donations, or helping to reappear social problems. Albanians topped the list of nationals that joined ISIS per capita and the third in Europe, proving a major role of a dogma which is preached among Albanian Muslims, although it does not find support from Albanian Islamic Community officials, they have created a parallel “state” of Islam by simply using funds from the third parties.

References

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Rigels Lenja, is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of South And South East historical studies at the University of Ludwig Maximilian Munich, Germany and member of Graduate School for East and South East European Studies

The post Introducing Political Islam among the Albanian Muslims appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Since its start as an independent sovereign state Albania has tried several different models of how to organize the state. With the Declaration of Independence in 1912 the Great Powers had established Prince Wilhelm zu Wied as first sovereign, but  he had to leave the country in 1914 due to the outbreak of the first World War, so that only in 1920 the build up of the state could in fact start. However, the Democracy experiment was not able to develop in the 1920s, the “democratic revolution” of Bishop Fan Noli in 1924 was soon swept away by a conservative counter movement. King Ahmed Zogu tried to stabilize the country, to organize the judiciary after the French and Italian role models. However, the attempts to build up an infrastructure, a functioning administration and to start economic development remained unfinished. The overdue agrarian reform was torpedoed again and again and in April 1939 Albania was taken over by Mussolini’s Italy. After a short German occupation the Communists seized power in November 1944 and installed a centralized dictatorial regime. Economically the Hoxha-Regime undertook a savagely collectivization of agriculture and a one-sided promotion of heavy industry. In addition, from the beginning until the mid-1980s the country remained completely cut off from the rest of the world.

After Enver Hoxha´s death on11 April 1985 the new Head of Party and State Ramiz Alia started first cautious mini reforms  in the economy reacting to an increasing reform pressure due to economic shortcomings: partial autonomy for enterprises, premia for workers, allowance of few small shops and handicrafts as well as small plots for private agriculture. A first draft of a new constitution of end 1990 which foresaw a controlled market economy and a mix of private and socialized ownership forms, but still within the framework of a socialist People’s Republic, did not find consensus. The economic circumstances remained alarming, and more and more Albanians just wanted to leave the country, mainly to Italy and Greece.

On 11 June 1991 a broad coalition of Socialists (the former communist Albanian Workers Party) and the Democratic Party started a new round of reforms pushed mainly by the Democratic Party, but the Socialists agreed only on “small privatization”, but the widespread shortage of commodities had already brought about the extension of street and black-market in addition to the farmers markets which already existed since the mid-1980s. However, the dissolution of the agricultural cooperatives together with unclear former ownership relations resulted in insufficient use of agricultural land and therefore in a severe supply crisis which lasted over the winter 1991/92 with hunger revolts and plunderings. Only the European Community-operation “Pelikan”, which started in September 1991 and was surveyed by Italian soldiers, guaranteed the survival of many Albanians. By the end of the year the economy came practically  to a standstill, most large enterprises received no raw materials and the rate of unemployment reached 40% accompanied by an accelerating inflation. Severe deficiencies characterized the health system and the supply with freshwater and energy. When in 1990 the GDP per capita calculated in Purchasing Power Parity still was 4,929 USD, one year later it was down to 3,569 USD reaching a record low in 1992 with 3,333 USD (in comparison 2019 13,961 USD)! A change of power and authority took place with the elections of 22/29 March, 1992. The new Prime Minister Meksi announced liberalization of prices, a rapid privatization and stimulation of industrial production and tourism with foreign aid. In fact, Albania received funds from the IMF, the World Bank and the European Development Bank, the USA signalized an immediate support program lifting the trade restrictions. As first high-ranking representative of the European Community the German Foreign Minister Genscher came in April 1992, he promised support for the political and economic reconstruction and signed two bilateral agreements . In the following months Albania not only could sign a cooperation agreement with the European Community but also received substantial financial and food aid from various Western countries.

Comprehensive structural reforms took place in the first half of the 1990s.  Most agriculture, state housing, as well as transport, services, and small and medium-sized enterprises were privatised. In 1995, the government began privatising large state enterprises. Beginning with 1993 rapid GDP growth unfolded until 1995 with two-digit annual growth rates, but slowing down in 1996 and contracting even in 1997 when the financial pyramid schemes collapsed. In the following years growth resumed but it lasted until 1999 that the 1989 level was reached again. Steady growth then took place until 2008, a slight setback  happened during the international financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, but Albania was together with Poland, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Kosovo the only country not experiencing negative growth. The 2010s saw uneven developments with a setback in 2015, but at the end GDP displayed an absolute high in 2019 with 15.280 bn USD. This must be compared with the absolute low of 0.650 bn USD in 1992! Unemployment which in 1993 numbered 22.3%, and still in 2015 17.3%, went down to 11.6%  until 2020, public debt in relation to GDP is at an upper middle European level of 66%. What over the years remained negative is the trade balance were imports constantly are 3 to 4 times higher than exports. This is a strong indicator  of the weak competitiveness of the Albanian economy

Over the past 30 years Albania experienced ups and downs in its economic development, but the overall trend finally was positive. Macroeconomic restructuring was and still is supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank bolstered by high inflows of remittances from Albanians working in Italy, Greece, Switzerland and Germany, estimated up to 15% of GDP until the great financial crisis, it is now down to 5.8% (2015).  Although Albania´s economic growth has been remarkable – The World Bank calls it now an upper-middle-income country -, but the country still remains  at the very end of Europe’s wealth scala, only the Republic of Moldova is ranked worse. Agriculture which is characterized by lack of modern equipment, unclear property rights, and the prevalence of small insufficient plots of land today still contributes one fifth to GDP, but employs 40% of the total labor force. Industry contributes just one fourth to GDP, services some 55%. GDP per capita calculated in purchasing power was 13,961 USD in 2019 which places Albania at rank 93 in the world, and at 31.3 % of EU average (44,539 USD)! In absolute figures the GDP per capita was 4,735 € in 2019 (5,435  USD).

Albania is often treated as a “most difficult case” of regime change or an outlier compared to the other post-communist cases in Central and Eastern Europe. Its long, difficult, interrupted, at times chaotic and certainly ambiguous path to democracy and market economy defied any enthusiastic expectations for smooth democratic and economic progress. Two antagonistic camps – conservative former communists (Socialist Party)  and fierce anti-communists (Democratic Party) tried to block politics/reforms whenever the other party was in rule bringing the country at the verge of collapse several times. Under these circumstances it is surprising that the country managed to proceed in economic development, but still a high ratio of poverty and inequality remained in the country. Although HDI has improved over the last years the country still remains below the average of the neighboring countries not to speak of the EU. Positive must be seen that the openness of the economic development has resulted in a rather good position in the Doing Business 2019 Report which ranks the country 63 out of 190 countries. In 2006 Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU which entered into force in April 2009. As a candidate country since 2014, Albania profits since then from EU funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). During the last EU household period, 2014-2020, Albania received 639.5 Mio. € for 7 priority sectors (IPA II): 342.5 Mio.€ for democracy and rule of law and  297 Mio.€ for compettitiveness and grwoth.

The clear orientation towards EU membership has forced Albania not only to open up its economy internally and externally, but also to undertake structural reforms with regard to competition policy, banking privatization and enforcement of contracts by amending the code of civil procedure and imposing time standards for legal court events. However, smuggling and widespread corruption remain major issues of concern which add to non-tariff barriers and hamper the process of free movement of goods.

After having been accepted as a candidate for EU membership Albania is now waiting for starting the respective negotiations on the 35 chapters of the acquis, but on 1 December 2020 the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), the EU-Ambassadors of the member states, agreed in their draft conclusions that Albania is not yet ready to hold the first intergovernmental conference with the EU, as they  praised Albania’s work on reforms, but stressed it should show more progress in meeting the conditions set since March 2020 when the principal decision was taken to open negotiations with both countries.  Issues mentioned in that context are the political dialogue in the country which needs to be improved, in particular on electoral reform and its implementation, tackling money laundering more effectively and further implementing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan, low financial intermediation, and further efforts in investigating, prosecuting and trying corruption cases as well as the continued fight against organised crime. A possible positive EU decision concerning the start of chapter negotiations is now expected for March 2021.

But in this context it should also be mentioned that Albania is linked to North Macedonia like a twin in so far as Brussels wants to decide for both countries at once, but this decision at the moment is also blocked by Bulgaria’s veto vis-à-vis North Macedonia´s progress in accession due to different interpretations of history! If only one member country vetoes a step during the membership rapprochement process of a specific country the entire move is stopped! However , that also means conversely that if Albania does not sufficiently comply with fulfillment of the conditions set in March 2020, then also Macedonia very probably will be on hold as long as this  inofficial twin principle exists!

Not only the devastating earthquake of 26 November, 2019, with the respective reconstruction needs, but also the present Covid-19 pandemic are putting enormous pressure on the Albanian economy. Some support should come from the donors conference, held in February 2020 in Brussels, where single countries and international financial institutions have pledged roughly 1 bn €, but it  remains uncertain how much damage the ongoing pandemic will cause for the catch up  attempts of the Albanian economy.

Reference

1. See in more detail in: Hans-Joachim Hoppe, “Albanien – Mühsame Demokratisierung im Land der Skipetaren”. In: Franz-Lothar Altmann, Reformen und Reformer in Osteuropa, Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg 1994, pp. 99 ff.

2. Ibidem, p. 111. [1]Tradingeconomics.com. The World Bank. Albania GDP per capita PPP | 1990-2019 Data | 2020-2022 Forecast | Historical | Chart (tradingeconomics.com) retrieved  23 Nov. 2020.

3. Albania Overview (worldbank.org) , retrieved 4 Dec. 2020.

4. European Union GDP Per Capita Ppp | 1990-2019 Data | 2020-2022 Forecast | Historical (tradingeconomics.com)

5. Bertelsmann Transformation Index BTI 2020, Albania country report [1]BTI 2020, Albania country report, p. 19.

6. EU Commission: Revised Indicative Strategy Paper for Albania (2014-2020119 adopted on 3 Aug. 2018.

7. Ibidem, p. 20

8. European Western Balkans, 1 December 2020: EU Ambassadors agree to delay EU-talks with Albania and North Macedonia.

9. For the conditions see: ENLARGEMENT AND STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS  the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania , Brussels 25 March 2020.

10. See: 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 6.10.2020 COM(2020) 660 final. Chapter 13 Albania

The post Albania´s Economy 30 Years After appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Albania experienced one of the harshest communist regimes in the world after communist party came to power at the end of World War II. Its rule lasted half of a century and it is estimated that 20% of the Albanian population was subject to interrogation, arrest, imprisonment, torture, or exile – while over 6,000 people were executed, many of whom were secretly buried in mass graves and whose bodies were never recovered. These crimes were perpetrated by an oppressive apparatus in the hands of the communist political leadership who built it to sow fear and obedience among the population. According to Austin and Ellison, Sigurimi, the communist’s regime secret service, employed some 10,000 full-time agents and a quarter of the adult population as part time informers (2008). This repressive security mechanism is estimated to have affected the lives of as much as one-quarter of the country’s total population.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and particularly the anti-communist revolution in Romania triggered student’s anti-communist movements in Albania at the beginning of the 1990-s which overthrew Enver Hoxha’s lasting communist dictatorship. Admittedly this raised Albanians’ hopes for socio-political change, addressing the past state’s human rights abuses and thus redressing country’s communist historical narrative. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the regime change fell short of these aspirations as the ‘new’ elite showed lack of political will and consensus to sincerely deal with the past and prosecute perpetrators of human rights. Though initially Albania undertook some ambitious transitional justice measures such as criminal trails, lustration and reparatory legislation, it soon emerged a big gap between formal provisions and their implementation. This was due to the combination of politics of the past with the politics of the present where communist legacy in politics, judiciary and public administration, politicisation of the process and ill-faming of de-communisation laws played a significant role in hindering Albania to make e bold break with its communist past. This rendered transitional justice a futile enterprise which in turn has affected Albania’s direction of transition after the 90s.

In this paper I am particularly interested to look at a possible correlation between collective memory building and political discourse in post-totalitarian Albania. In this regard, in the first section I will dwell on how Albania failed to build a shared understanding over its communist’s regime human rights abuses and then in the second part I will analyse the implications this brought about to the political discourse of the political elite during the democratic transition.

Failing collective memory building in post-communist Albania

Teitel’s understanding of collective memory building contends that it is the process of reconstructing the representation of the past in light of the present through varying legal measures, such as the trials of the ancient regimes, or bureaucratic bodies convened for these purposes. In this respect, it is said that law can take a crucial role during transitions in shaping collective historical account by establishing facts about the past. For instance, facts brought to light by transitional justice practices facilitate the creation of a counter narrative to the totalising one and in turn establish a shared collective truth of past state’s wrongs. The inability Albania to deal with its totalitarian past has impeded the uncovering of the past state’s human rights abuses. This has undermined the establishment of a shared understanding and memory of its totalitarian past, which is misused by post-communist political elite to construct an anti-political narrative.

Surprisingly, grave human rights abuses of the communist regime are entirely absent in school textbooks today. According to a recent survey more than 60% of teachers were not aware about the number of victims of the communist regime because the country’s criminal past is not reflected in school curricula. In the same vein the head of the Federal Foundation for the Communist Legacy in Germany, Dr. Anna Kaminsky, contends that the Albania’s communist past it continues to be treated in school textbooks as a glorious period where big reforms in education, electrification and woman emancipation took place, while its substance was repression and victims. This has left manipulated totalitarian historical account in place, which as Aguilar maintains, becomes integrated into social institutions that act as collective memory archives. The negligence of post-communist Albania to deal with communist state’s human rights violations has basically left the youth who did not experience first-hand Hoxha’s regime without clear references to the past. According to Ignatieff public education in every post-conflict or post-authoritarian rule is important in order “to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in the public discourse”. In the absence of an official history regarding the communist regime’s abuses, youth has rested upon confusing information coming mainly from family members, media and communist period films produced by Kinostudio e Re which was part and parcel of its propaganda. This has created a conflicting assemblage of communist historical account among the youth, which in turn has neither helped the acknowledgment of victims’ sufferings, nor the reconstruction of a shared understanding about the communist regime’s wrongs.

In this regard, communist’s regime crimes have remained disputed, denied and recently its violent and degraded architecture has even been rehabilitated in the public life. For instance, three years ago a heated public discussion exploded over the Tepelena concentration camp where hundreds of thousands of people including children and elderly were interned from 1949 to 1953 and it is estimated that roughly 1000 people lost their lives due to physical torture and malnutrition (Kola, 2019; Kujto.al, no year). These wrongdoings were downplayed on grounds that conditions at the Tepelena camp were not that bad, thus relativizing past regime criminal legacy. The public discourse on the Tepelena concentration camp showed that if we rest merely on witnesses’ memory and fail to hold accountable the perpetrators, the state’s past wrongs will be denied and distorted by elites that served the official history of the old regime. Moreover, the successors of the Labour Party, the Socialist Party in power has gone beyond the common sense in attempting to redress the communist’s regime criminal memory.  On the one hand Prime Minsters’ Rama government has downplayed Hoxha’s regime victims’ sufferings, demolished the National Theatre, left in shadow and forgetfulness the notorious communist era prisons Spac, Qafe Bari and Burrel, and on the other hand it has lavished communist’s regime violence symbols such as BunkArt, House of Leaves and most recently the Pyramid, a mausoleum built to incarnate Enver Hoxha’s cult in the centre of Tirana. Thereby, the failure of Albania to draw a thick line with its communist past has not even hindered but has whitewashed and rehabilitated people’s understanding of its communist regime criminal account. Another survey conducted by the OSCE Presence in Tirana, revealed that 62% of the respondents did not see the communist past as a problem. The most controversial figure was that when asked about the role of the former dictator Enver Hoxha in the history of the country, more than half of the respondents had a positive perception (OSCE, 2016). These concerning results show that Albanian’s society is not sufficiently informed about the dictatorship and has been unable to reckon with its communist past. This has strained truth revelation and a shared understanding of the communist past which in turn has dragged down Albania’s transition towards a functioning democracy where people are offered genuine political alternatives not empty signifiers such as the long-lasting dichotomy, communist versus anti-communist. This should have already been settled.

The emergence of the politics of anti-politics 

It is widely believed that historical accountability sets off transition’s dynamics, is transformative and plays a forward-looking role in a country’s liberalisation process. No viable democracy can afford to accept amnesia, forgetfulness and the loss of memory. “An authentic democratic community cannot be built on the denial of past crimes, abuses, and atrocities”. Therefore, it is assumed that holding individuals accountable for crimes committed under the previous regime lays the foundation for a democracy committed to the rule of law and prevents future abuses under the new system. Thus, transitional justice is envisioned as a way to create a new foundation for state and societal rebuilding by making a break with the past and setting the directionality of transition. The failure of Albania to bring to justice wrongdoers of the communist regime has nurtured old elite continuation. This has constantly plunged the country into political crisis and undermined citizens’ political choices. In this vein, Krasniqi points out that “the new system continued to function as an appendix of the old system, and the main bearers of this were political parties and institutions they created”. This turned Albania into a fertile ground for political polarisation and the emergence of the unpolitical.

The political discourse in post-communist Albania is not framed around politics, by which democratic politics theorist Chantal Mouffe understands “the wide range of practices, discourses and institutions which aim to establish a peaceful co-existence of different conceptions over what constitutes a good or moral life”. To the contrary, the unsettled historical account of the communist past is misused to construct a divisive political narrative for electoral benefits into two antagonist camps, the anti-communists and the successor of the communists. This has not served the needs of citizens and democracy building but rather has hardened political polarisation. As Mouffe suggests if a political unit cannot transform antagonism into agonism it risks tearing apart the very social fabric of the society and dismantling democracy in the first place.  Moreover, by emphasising the threat of ‘Communism’ versus ‘Berishizëm’, the latter referring to the former DP leader and anti-communist movement Sali Berisha, who became the main political player in Albania from 1991 to 2013, the unpolitical discourse deemphasised other internal social divisions and subsumed political alternatives what has in turn perverted democratic representation and political choice.

This April Albania held its 10^th general elections since the fall of the communist regime. However, most electoral campaigns have not addressed peoples’ concerns and needs, but instead they have been dominated by anti-politics which merely intend degrading political opponents. Political articulation of different social strata’s problems is substituted by an empty narrative which portrays the opponent as the biggest evil who should be ostracised from the country. In 2009 elections the then SP leader Edi Rama declared that he is not a politician at all and denounced his opponent the then Prime Minister Sali Berisha as the symbol of the backwardness. Nevertheless, Rama’s party did not deliver any political manifesto where formers, labourers, teachers or other social groups’ needs were addressed rather he declared a total war against the ‘old politics’ without offering any alternative. On the other hand the Democratic Party has played the anticommunism card during the 90s and continues to use and reuse it for electoral benefits without genuinely addressing social groups’ needs. This has brought to the surface a deep crisis of representation in Albania, expressed in increasing public’s distrust towards political parties and public institutions in general.

These failures, coupled with the economic stagnation of Albania during these years and EU integration stalemate have nurtured popular disillusionment towards democratic system’s much proclaimed benefits. As post-communist Albania struggled to make progress and deliver tangible results for its population, the letter started feeling nostalgic for the past. This mass dissatisfaction has been politically harnessed by communist era politicians and ancient regime’s successors in politics to cling to power and thus protract Albania’s path towards a functioning democracy. The 2020 Freedom House report defines Albanian as a partly free country and a hybrid democracy, while in the same vein Transparency International ranks Albania as a highly corrupt country. What is more troubling is the fact that Albania is persistently sliding back as far as democratic practices are concerned which indicate that its already prolonged transition to a full-fledged democracy will continue.

Conclusion

After the fall of the communist regime, Albania had most historical credentials to undertake stringent transitional justice measures and thus bring to light its communist dictatorship gross human rights abuses. Nevertheless, as we have seen in this paper, though Albania initially introduced ambitious transitional justice legislation it failed at implementation stages altogether. As a result, the distorted communist’s regime narrative of the past remains untouched and its crimes aren’t uncovered and punished. To the contrary, paradoxically the communist past continues being portrayed in the public sphere as glorious period in education, women’s emancipation and public works. Its criminal account is relativised, and at some point denied and rehabilitated. Presumably this has hindered the establishment of a collective memory and understanding of the communist’s regime criminal account.

In turn, the inability of Albania to punish communist’s regime perpetrators and build a shared truth on its communist past has polarised the society, facilitated communist elite continuation and ultimately give birth the unpolitical discourse. The post-communist Albania’s political leadership kept misusing the uncovered and distorted past as an empty signifier for electoral benefits. The political discourse was dominated by an empty rhetoric and accusations with the reference to the past. As a consequence, social groups’ real needs and concerns were not addressed. This brought about an increasing popular dissatisfaction towards institutions, politics and democracy in general, and what is more troubling it has led to an increasing of nostalgic feelings towards the communist regime. These assemblages of failures, denials of communist’s regime abuses, the emergence of a crisis of representation and disillusionments towards democracy risk tearing apart the very social fabric of the society – and lastly hampering further Albania’s transition toward a functioning democracy.

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Altin Gjeta holds a Master of Arts in International Relations and Politics from University of Westminster, London. He is an independent researcher, columnist and visiting lecture in politics at University of Aleksander Moisiu, Durres.

The post Collective memory building and the emergence of the politics of anti-politics in post-totalitarian Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

With the regime change in Albania one of the main concerns was the upcoming constitutional and institutional design of the post-communist and a democratic-state-to-be. The transition in itself reflected over the thirty years since the replacement of the regime, the very contested and deviated path towards democracy and sustainability of political, social and economic development. This article seeks to bring at the forefront the inadequate approach, the lack of a proper model that would generate conceptions of political and moral responsibility, legitimacy and collective forces for state building – the ones that were missed throughout transitional politics in Albania.

The first part will examine the two well-known models of state-building, the Weberian approach under the ‘institutional approach’ and the ‘legitimacy approach’ to better understand the challenges, failures and transitional conception of Albanian politics in designing the post-communist state.  The second part will identify and analyze the milestones of Albanian transitional state-building and seek to relate on the dynamics of its choices with the state of democracy since the replacement of the regime. On the other hand, there is to be recognized the very important role of party system and its transitional operating mode in dominating the scene of institutional and societal reforms over the years. The party system framework followed by its political culture legacy of the last, have contributed in hindering the process of building accordingly to the norms of democracy, the state institutions and legitimacy of the whole political process. The third part will conclude the argument and provide general remarks on the relationship between state-building and progress of democratic measures in Albania.

Models of state-building and state failure in Albania

Albania remains one of the less researched post-communist countries in the Eastern Europe and in the Western Balkans region. The difference of Albania and post-former Federation of Yugoslavia countries is still persistent in the regional politics and /or in international “intervention” in state-building projects. In contrast to other countries in the region, Albania is the one and the only that did not have the “pressure” of nation-building instead of that of a state-building. Even though Albanian leadership political discourse and the tendency to protagonist-size have been more dominant in the last 10 years, Albania had to deal only with the state-building process. The very real homework to be done by Albanian political actors was to create the environment where in the state would lie and build economic, social, political infrastructure where in the whole society would express and represent its common interests.

Durkheim (1957) argued that the state as a “special organ whose responsibility it is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity” elevates its role through consciousness and reflection. In other words, the approach that Durkheim attach to the State is that of the very responsibility and the distinguished feature to deliberate in order to make citizens part of the process. The legitimacy approach of Durkheim considers democracy as a system of reflection, where in the key point does not rest upon the quantity of institutions rather on their ability to act on just terms and develop the individuality of each man. Apart of approaching institutions, deliberations and representation, Buzan (1983) bolds the idea that the state is not merely a set of institutions, but a logic that completes the totality of it. He further adds that “organizing ideologies are perhaps the most obvious type of higher idea of the state”. In this context, the state might identify with the varieties of ideologies and take their form of institutional structure. This logic brings us at the analyzing of what type of state have Albanians chosen to build after the 1989, as we take it as a world political event. It is a well-known fact that the political regime inherited in Albania was product of myths and propaganda, hence even the strength of the communist state was part of the mythology that dictatorship created to save its authority and legitimacy. We would not give a proper diagnosis on the state-building process after 1989, if we do not take into deep analysis the shape of state during communism; its power and authority; whether it had legitimacy and how is this an indicator to prove that Albanians were part or not of the dictatorship; and the most notably, the legacy of communism in political system.  Two main schools of thought related to the State are the ‘institutional’ and ‘legitimacy’ approaches, represented by Weber and Durkheim. The clash of perspectives between their conceptions on State, leave us with the ‘duty’ to better contextualize and define our State as a matter of both set of institutions and of ‘social thought’. These two scholars complement each other in what a State should accomplish and deliver. It is not in the object of this article to extend the analysis on the two main schools of thought, rather than taking them as units of theoretical analysis to track the state building process in Albania. In order to provide basis for understanding the nature of state building in Albania – that differs essentially from other countries in the Balkans, I will mention two key areas in which Durkheim highlights characteristics of democracy, legitimacy and transparency. Durkheim does not refer implicitly to the transparency element of the State towards citizens, but he states that “because there is a constant flow of communication between themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them”(1957, 91). This way of perceiving the sate uplifts the democracy in a ‘moral superiority’. For the sake of this article, I will put more efforts on the implications of the two schools of thought in order to contextualize state building in Albania. By evaluating the points of implications, therefore we reach to the points of failure/success of the process. Did the Albanian leadership follow one or the other model of the Statebuidling? Is legitimacy yet a myth and part of broader propaganda to save authority in a post-communist country? Where differentiate the model of Weber from that of Durkheim? How is the debate on State influenced by these two scholars? Weber is considered the starting point, while I would consider Durkheim a turning point in regard of State as a social thought, largely perceived as an ideal form of stateness and its relationship with the citizens. A form that even democracy as an ideological project has not been developed as much as to grant to the State the environment to reconstruct public authority.

Other scholars as Grimm (2019) emphasizes the importance and impact of consolidation of formal political institutions through legitimate political system, the one that requires much more effort than democratic elections or a new constitution. According to her perspective, the main focus in a state building process should rest upon ‘the understandings of socio-political order” as pre-condition for successful ‘installation’ of the so-called hegemonic model of intervention and state building. Once again, the case of Albania differs from other countries of region, and precisely for this uniqueness, the state building in post-communist countries represent different features of those in post-conflict settings. This Western approach mostly follows the Weberian model, thus, implications for a “one size-fits all” statehood paradigm no longer explains in depth the roots of post-communist state building projects. In other words, the idea of state is taken for granted, which does not allow for the legitimacy to be taken as a crucial symbol of the relationship of State and its citizens, or put differently, the dialogically approach of intra-connection between agencies.

What has gone wrong with the Albanian transition may be the main question that arises today at most of the segments of population, experts and transition scholars. One of the prominent scholars in Albania, Kalemaj (2020) has screened the early moments of Albanian transition in terms of rapid economic reforms, lack of political consensus for major national issues, legacy of lack of political culture and among many other concerns, the way politics operated and still operates ‘behind the wings. Moreover, what was to be done first and foremost in the early stages after the fall of the communism as to conduct a prompt process of breaking with the past and its institutional legacy. Of importance to shed light in this kind of analysis is to figure out the nature of State during communism and what did it mark in terms of institutions? Under what political and social conditions would the new institutions be built in order to fulfill the duty? Kalemaj highlights the fact that the lack of a consolidated civil society and the social withdrawing of the public from key issues, have turned transition in a ‘natural’ or normal way of operating and living (2020, 23).

Another concern is the continuing legalization of politics (the executive branch holds the largest number of law-proposals in the Parliament) rather than increasing participation of political community in the public topics, and the nature of technocracy that domestic issues have been interpreted and advanced. This has led to the decrease of trust of public in government and stagnation of legitimacy of political leadership. Among other post-communism scholars, Uvalic (2012) pays attention to the context of the Western Balkan countries after the 1989, reflecting on the wounds of dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and all the consequences that followed after that. Albania is considered as one of the early reform-oriented countries due to the fast speed of economic reforms taken in the name of ‘shock therapy’. The question that should be raised here is whether the fast speed of those early reforms hindered the process of state building and prolonged the state of democracy in a post-communist country which was fully isolated for four decades. Moreover, the rapid economic programmes, in concert with the political and institutional infrastructure of dictatorship, combined with the lack of elite competition, massive immigration, lack of dissidence and grass-roots movements, have motivated the highly political divisiveness among social groups and contributing to a lack of cohesion and reconciliation after the civil war history in 1943, followed by the class struggle during communism.

Following the end of 1945, international actors were more preoccupied for the State in its sovereignty and authority that would not be threaten by external forces, while on the other hand, the State approach today is more attached to the ‘good governance’ (Chandler, 76). As Chandler puts it, ‘good governance’ diminishes the linkage between social forces and the State, leaving in the shadow the importance of the process that state institutions strengthen their bonds with the people. It is stated that Albania did not undertake processes of nation-building as elsewhere in the region (Kalemaj 2009, 233), thus having more prospects for the democratization process to have success.

The fact is that after thirty years of the fall of communism, democratization and transitology are like those straight lines that do not intersect with each other. Both concepts are transformed into senses that public do not have the ability to differentiate. Debating our deficient democracy through the lenses of a transition that is still under-researched and highly politicized, an aim that was dreamt a lot after 1989 and still a myth because of inability and unwillingness of political leadership to conceive accountability, transparency, authority. For the sake of empirical research, I have collected here data from 3 Indexes, but what is to be pointed out is the necessity to pay more tribute to the processes rather than on static measurements. Hereby, both models of democratization and state building should be analyzed in depth for their focus on elements such as culture, behavior, attitude and elite competition. These dynamic measurements, often excluded by studies, represent the most defining nature of development in post-communist countries.

Another point to be raised in here is the legacy of the state-party model and the relationship of today’s political parties with the State structures and that of between political parties and citizens. The social contract of political leadership with its citizens is that of patronage and clientelism, in other words a rent-seeking behavior. Even though scholars of post-communist studies have concentrated their analyses on three pillars known as ‘triple transition’, they have ignored as a crucial element “the need to reconstruct public authority, or state building” (Grzymala 2002, 530).What scholars assumed was that the post-communist State should be reduced in size and scope due to its overwhelmed mode of operating and administrative structures. Part of the legacy and of continuity from prior regime style, is still the State as the largest employer within the system.  Right after the entry into force in 2009 of the Association-Stabilization Agreement, the Albanian Government adopted the inter-sectorial Strategy 2009-2013. Governments afterwards continued to adopt Strategies of 2013-2015 and of 2015-2020.

Reports and assessments on Public Administration Reform are conducted from national and international non-governmental organizations. In 2014, a study-report on public administration in Albania and on relationship between politics and citizens, reflected some key interesting findings. Participants of the survey were asked to share their perception on the role of public administration. More than a half of respondents (56%) believe that their role is to “serve to the people”. Others (21%) believe that their role is to address citizen’s needs, or that is their duty to act as mediators and problem-solvers (19%). But what is the most striking evidence by this survey is the 2% of participants that believe their role is to serve to their personal interests. (Dhembo 2014, 31)

Author of this report, Mrs.Dhembo states that: “In general, during the last decades, the capacity to implement reforms has been weak and political interferences still remain a threat for the successful implementation. (2014,14)

Public administration reform is attached to the main areas of assessment in the EU’s enlargement policy, such as rule of law, economic governance and the functioning of democratic institutions. Thus, public administration reform contains aspects of institutionalization and legitimacy as we refer to the state building process. Its performance in delivering services, level of political interference, degree of public trust in the state apparatus, are part of the analysis to what extent the State legacy of communism transmissed its features to the post-communist state in Albania. 

The rapid economic transformation shocked literally the whole part of the society, wherein people would jump from a certain image of the state to another that was rapidly dismantling everything that was part of the prior regime. People had no time to think of democratization as a process, nor had they any idea what would be the journey of their state. They were claiming democracy while elites were in a competition of ‘who catches the first the profits of institutions available’; that is why I still refer to democracy as a myth. The role that elites have had in the prolonged transition of Albania is their impact at the same time in the state building process. The post-communist political elite which emerged as an appendix of the ancient regime exploited the regime change in the beginning of the 90s set the course of Albania’s transition. Vicious circle of transition reproducing the same discourse, the same political ‘problems’, the same modus operandi for the political parties to reach agreements and profit their ‘dividends’ of shares. According to Grzymala (2002, 537) “two institutional legacies in particular, whether society is voluntarily organized and whether a central state apparatus exists shape elite competition”. This is evident in the Albanian case where society’s power to self-mobilize for change is very weak.

To have a state building process, primarily we should understand what kind of state are we inheriting and what are we supposed to put efforts on building? In the Albanian case, the inheritance was the harsh communist legacy with personalistic dictatorship leadership style. Grzymala defines Albania as a “personalistic state-building process” (2002, 546) where people are not able to break through the system “without some level of compliance”. Thus, the process of state building is hindered by the existing ties of patronage and clientelism which were enhanced through the rapid economic transformations since the early days of the regime change and managed by the elites that had the opportunities to utilize the existing resources.

Figure2. A typology of state building processes. Following this background of analysis of post-communist countries, Albania does not make any exception in terms of how the past guide the extent of reforms, to what extent elites compete for possession of goods and resources and last, how the international ‘intervention’ is shaped during early phases of transition. Albania has adopted the most of international conventions and fulfilled international formal requirements as part of the conditionality for the sake of European Union membership and other international arrangements. Still, the ‘triple transition’ model lacks the most important element of post-communist states analysis, that of elite constraints mechanisms.

When it comes at debating on transitional mechanisms to come to terms with the past, otherwise known as transitional justice, one should not underestimate the value and the weight of political parties in the public domain. Due to the legacy of the state-party model and the penetration of Hoxha’s regime in every aspect of life of the society, political parties in Albania have strongly and persistently demonstrated unwillingness to create stability, reach broader consensus for national issues, and to build a national strategy to reconcile divided groups of the society. In other words, political parties as dominant actors and factors in Albania have utilized this domain for their personal profit through two main characteristics: under the Democratic Party rule there was a tendency to use the discourse of communists/anti-communists by highly politicizing processes especially within the judiciary branch. While under the Socialist Party rule there have always been tendencies and data on corruption and state capture. The latest trends in this matter will be analyzed in the following sections. While defining the characteristics of each state building model, the Weberian and Durkheim’s ones, it is notable the necessity to add the ‘locals’ into this process. In Albania, many reforms and grand processes/ institutional or political projects have been initiated and supported by the international community, leaving no room for local ownership. In this context, it should be built a new relationship between international-local in order to foster legitimacy and provide ground for the development of capacities. ‘The more is better’ approach is not enough for the political community to foster legitimacy or save authority, thus the democracy promotion paradigm should be advanced with the inclusiveness of public. The more is better should increase channels of communications and representation between state-society, in order to set democracy into the proper tracks. After all, democracy is all about people and their relationship with the state. In Albania there is a say that liberalization and not democratization shapes the contours of national transition. The relationship between State and society, the one of State and political parties, indicate the degree of ‘rent-seeking’ behavior which exclusively rest upon the patronage and clientelism bonds within the formal and informal networks.

Krastev (2002,50) puts it like this:

                                   “As regards the Balkans today, there are at least three different ways to conceptualize state weakness. The strength of the state can be measured in terms of capabilities. A second measure is how its ‘consumers’ rate it and the third approach to state weakness defines the weak state as captured by particular interests that dominate policy …”Due to the changes of post-Cold War, the perception of state building was rather simplified (Robinson 2007). In brief, the concept of State has been theorized in two main approaches, taken as a guide to the state building. Secondly, world historic periods have identified different sort of States in terms of their strength and weaknesses. Thirdly, responses/ interventions to emerging States after World War I, States that emerged after the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia, and States after the events of 1989 as post-communist countries, have been given as a static stance towards democratization and state building, without taking into consideration the contextualization of each State. This is more evident in the approach followed to the post-communist countries, not encountered for their past legacy and past power still in charge within institutional structures, economic resources and elites. The same ‘therapies’ were followed in different countries, without the local agency. Thus, the triple transition known for the post- Soviet States lacks a fundamental element, that of contextualization through people’s participation in the processes. The two preconditions that Grzymala (2002,546) set as crucial components for the democratization in the modern era are “formal institutions and organized societies that constrain elites”. Obviously, elite constraining is the Achilles heel in post-communist countries, in view of the legacy that previous regime has left as a ‘toolbox’ to retain power and control state resources. Most of the post-communist countries and societies have not fully dealt with their past, thus mechanisms that were thought to be as facilitators for societies towards democratization, were in some part absent or in other parts unfinished and with no success at all. All these elements combined define the post-communist context which is left unknown and kept regardless in designation of reforms and ‘interventions’ to state building.

Other scholars like Kopecky (2006,251) point the finger to the political parties as “representative agencies, giving voice to well-established constituencies, and deriving legitimacy from their capacity to articulate their voter’s interests and to aggregate their demands”. Apparently, through the floating space of state building analysis, various scholars focus on elites, political parties, civil society and international-local nexus. Their common denominator is legitimacy of political system, democratization in the modern era. Other factors within the whole spectrum of state building process are accountability, transparency, rule of law. Even in this regard, post-communist political parties differ from those in the Western democracies. One of the harshest characteristics of Hoxha dictatorship was the killing and disappearance of all opposition and pro-democratic elites. The lack of dissident movements is another distinguished feature of dictatorship, which facilitated the ongoing regime for forty years. No matter the years, rather than the behavior, attitude and the concept of constitutionalism that let behind. Pluralism of political parties in Albania eventually did not impact democracy, rather than created a multi-polar spectrum of narrow political interests, that in continuity contributed to a highly divided society but with no difference in party ideology or agendas. Political parties in Albania are dominant; they take the public space through intense discourse via visual and social media. Following the legacy of One Party-state, still political parties tend to keep the close connection within the state apparatus and utilize institutional structures in favor of their interests. Kopecky (2006, 253) identifies two main reasons why the political parties in Eastern Europe utilize state resources to their profits, that are: “most parties in the region originated and continue to originate even at present as elite groups within parliaments and governments rather than as social movements; secondly, the principal task of post- communist parties and elites has been to rebuild the institutions of the state” That suffices to say that the political parties and their rules have served as the “only game in town”.

What is even more ‘beneficial’ for the sake of this analysis, has to do with the nature of communist State, in terms of it was strong or weak. Literally saying, a dictatorship regime embodied in a highly controlled State with no separation of powers, might be considered as strong, in terms of having capacities and capabilities to keep under harsh control all the segments of the society and of politics. People ‘viewed’ and ‘accepted’ this kind of State as strong and as the only agency able to provide goods and services. They were submitted to this tutelage and lived within the boundaries of the myth of State and of common good. What people perceived as strong, was in fact a weak State that couldn’t provide basic goods and that human rights were denied and mass violated. After the 1989 events, people claimed to be ‘submitted’ to another form of political system, the democracy that they had never experienced before. This myth covered the political discourse and deep reforms for over thirty years. The history of State building in Albania starts in 1944, thus every unit of analysis before and after the 1989’s events reflect the lenses of State-party, surveillance, state apparatus closed to the party network, personalistic dictatorship and patronage. The transition that Albania had to transcend with the fall of communism, cannot be let aside of these precise features of the Albanian history, that is the very first format of State under the communist regime.

Linz and Stepan (1996) differentiated liberalization and democratization. Mentioned above in the case of Albania, often is misinterpreted the process of democratization by being interfered with a political narrative used during elections or weak moments of governance. Democracy has always been banged in the face of people to show them that the reforms, constitutional changes, political agreements before and after elections, even the sabotage of the parliament in 2017 by the opposition, are all considered as part of the big puzzle of democratization. In this sense, democratization process is simplified, diverged and considered mostly as a formal procedure that can be measured through fair elections and/or good governance. As Linz and Stepan (1996,4) would name as “electoralist fallacy” they would argue that precisely this basic requirement of democracy is transformed and narrated as a “sufficient condition of democracy”.

To return to Linz and Stepan discussion on the consolidation of democracy, it is worth mentioning that their three combined principles of behavior, attitude and constitutional dimension favor a narrower concept of democracy, respectively the one that goes beyond fair and free elections. This minimalist form of democratization is used by Albanian political leadership as the main discourse to shape what we should expect by democracy. Fukuyama (2004,5) as one of the leading scholars on state building, states that “the state building approach, which was at least as important as the state-reducing one, was not given nearly as much thought or emphasis” He explicitly contributes in the field by putting the emphasis on four aspects of stateness in order to “distinguish between the scope of state activities and the strength of state power”. These four parts of a package include: organizational design and management, political system design which is much related to the institutional design at the society as a whole, basis of legitimization that is the necessity to be perceived as legitimate to the society and the last is about cultural and structural factors.

BTI Index (The Transformation Index) provides us with the data on political, economic and governance transformation. For the sake of this article, I will detach results from 2006 (there is no data prior to this year) until 2020 on the rule of law, political participation, stability of democratic institutions, stateness and consensus-building.

“Albania has shown progress in institutional reshuffling and amending its legal codes in key EU priority areas, but there is still a large gap between quick and frequent institutional changes and slow and uncertain implementation.” (BTI:2020).

In a timeframe of a decade, from 2010 to 2020, BTI Index shows that Albania’s Governance Index score has increased by 0.10 points, the same increase level as the Governance Performance Index score.

Democracy status from 2010 to 2020 has declined by 0.40 points and the Status Index score has declined by 0.33 points. Criterias such as political participation, rule of law and stability of democratic institutions have shown decrease points, while two criterias such as stateness and political and social integration have showed little change. In its annual country Report for Albania, BTI has highlighted the term “long-neglected state building reforms” as a mark to the unwillingness and inability of political leadership to advance state-building more accurately and in a more sustainable way.

Another key Index on monitoring and evaluating the democracy on global basis is the Nations in Transit through the annual reports of Freedom House. The Country report for 2020 indicates that: “National Democratic Governance rating declined from 3.50 to 3.25; Electoral Process rating declined from 4.50 to 4.25. As a result, Albania’s Democracy Score declined from 3.89 to 3.82“(Freedom House 2020). Not surprisingly, huge reforms, specifically that on the judicial branch neither transformed political behavior, nor contributed to the effectiveness and accountability of national governance. Holding a democracy score of 3.75/100, Albania is yet a transitional/hybrid regime, and a partly free country when it comes at freedom scores. Rule of Law Index estimates the overall Albanian score of 0.49, which reflects a decline of 0.01 points from 2020 and 0.03 points from 2015. In this Index, I would detach ‘Constraints on Government Powers’ scoring 0.43, reflecting a slight decline year by year. From 0.55 points in 2015 to 0.43 in 2021. As for ‘Fundamental Rights’ in Albania, there is shown a decline of 0.01 points from 2015 to 2021. What is interesting in light of ‘Order and Security’ section, civil conflict is effectively limited scores the highest point of 1.00, while people do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances scores lower than even the regional average, 0.46.

In order to understand state building in Albania, it is a must to understand the state capture approach as a one-way ticket to authoritarianism and not merely a deficient democracy. Based on the latest report on state capture published by the Transparency International “In governments where corruption and state capture are systemic, the institutional system can progressively take on certain characteristics that enable its manipulation” (2020, 25). The case of tailor-made laws is present in circumstances that “can be instrumental for the capture of law making”. The dominance in number of law-proposals from the Executive to the parliament represent one of the key characteristics of the tendency of politics to dominate the space of public domain, who is quite inexistent when it comes at proposing law amendments or law-proposals. In this regard, the State as in times of dictatorship, ‘knows’ better where and how to amend legislation. The extended legalization of politics and vice versa the politics that legalize their narrow interests of clientelism provide grounds for the “prevalence and consolidation of state capture through legal mechanisms”. That is not suffice to say that a box of paradoxes is the case of Albania, where in discourse, volatility of institutions, impunity, tendencies of authoritarianism, oligarchy concerns, go in the same direction with efforts to fight corruption, emerged institutions as a product of judicial reform, electoral reform and ongoing constitutional changes. This is not a TRANSITIONAL phase. It goes beyond efforts of a society to break with the past and build its own institutions in line with democratic system and the rule of law. This is transformed into a normal phase of politics, economic and social way of living. High rates of immigration do not show other than ‘submission’ to the system installed.

Conclusion

To conclude, international institutions that evaluate governance, rule of law, democracy, and accountability, reflect on some common issues when it comes at state building in Albania. Keywords of these insights and reports indicate low rates of transparency, lack of accountability, and no separation of powers. These measurements are parts of the whole picture of analysis when reflecting after thirty years of pluralism in Albania. It might be useful to use these Indexes and their methodology to describe what is happening in Albania, but there still lacks integrated research under topics of post-communism, regional studies and transitional justice. State building is not just a matter of institutions, because we have been witnesses of the increasing number of institutions in a decade and rates of transparency are still low. Theoretical part has its own paths of improvements in order to give more focus on contexts, national and societal characteristics. Scholars of state theories and those of state-building should converge more with each other in order to view state building not merely in the light of approving new institutions but to attach to it the impact of legitimacy and public authority. In thirty years, Albania has demonstrated that its form of state is still hostage to the past practices. The public is still far from active participation and consultation for key national issues. It is not sufficed to stop and stare to the decades of post 1989 events, but to track elements of the state in the past and drag the analysis of state building into the framework of history, narrative, network ties, community and class struggle.

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Grimm, Sonja. 2019. “Democracy promotion and statebuilding.” In Handbook on Intervention and Statebuilding , by Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, 93-104. Edward Elgar.

House, Freedom. n.d. Freedom House . Accessed October 27, 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/.

Ilir Kalemaj, Dorian Jano. 2009. “AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MAKING? The Role of Political Culture and Institutions in the Albanian Context.” CEU Political Science Journal 4 (2): 232-251.

Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation . The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kalemaj, Ilir. 2020. “Albania: A Taxing Journey Toward Democratic Consolidation and European Integration .” In Political History of the Balkans ( 1989-2018), by József Dúró – Zoltán Egeresi, 23-35. Dialóg Campus.

Kopecký, Petr. 2006. “Political parties and the state.” Journal of Communist Studies 22 (3): 251-273. doi:DOI: 10.1080/13523270600855654.

Krastev, Ivan. 2002. “The Balkans: Democracy without Choices.” Journal of Democracy 13 (3): 39-53. doi:DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0046.

Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2009. “Statebuilding without Nation-building?Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach .” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3 (1): 21-45. doi:DOI: 10.1080/17502970802608159.

Marshall, Monty. 2010. “The measurement of Democracy and the Means of History.” Springer 48: 24-35.

Project, World Justice. n.d. World Justice Project . Accessed November 1, 2021. https://worldjusticeproject.org/.

Robinson, Neil. 2007. “State-building and International Politics.” In State Building , by Aidan Hehir & Neil Robinson, 1-28. Routledge.

Stiftung, Bertlesmann. n.d. Transformation Index. Accessed October 20, 2021. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard/ALB.

Uvalic, Milica. 2012. “Transition in Southeast Europe: Understanding Economic Development and Institutional Change.” In Economies in Transition. Studies in Development Economics and Policy, by Gerard Roland, 364-399. London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230361836_15.

Zuniga, Nieves. 2020. Examining State Capture: Undue Influence on Law Making and the Judiciary in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Transparency International .

Ines Stasa is a PhD candidate in International Relations at University of EPOKA, Albania. Her research interests revolve around transitional justice, democratisation, statebuilding and security.

The post Statebuilding and democracy in post-communist Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

By Andi Hoxhaj

Introduction

The EU enlargement policy for the Western Balkans was at a standstill between 2003-2018, largely, in part, due to various crisis within the EU, including, global financial crises, the Eurozone, Brexit and the migration crisis. Hence, the EU enlargement policy was seen to be running out of steam, and, during this time, it had allowed other powers, such as Russia, Turkey, and China, to invest – both economically and politically – in the Western Balkans. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014 made the EU re-valuate its enlargement policy approach to the Western Balkans, largely in response to the fear of further expansion of Russian influence in some of the Western Balkans countries.

In 2014, Germany took the initiative to invite the leaders of the Western Balkans to a “EU-Western Balkans Summit” in Berlin in order to explore new ways of co-operation that could go beyond the technical and legal process of the EU accession framework – focusing on increasing EU investments and establishing a new type of forum to increase political and economic co-operation. The foreign policy objective of Germany is to bring the Western Balkans closer to the EU orbit, and, at the same time, to offer these countries more assistance in undertaking key structural reforms that are in line with EU law and policies – under the “Berlin Process“ framework.

As the next section explains the “Berlin Process” laid the foundation for the new EU-Western Balkans enlargement strategy that was adopted by the Commission in February 2018, and the idea to establish the Western Balkans Regional Common Market based upon the EU Single Market adopted in November 2020

The Berlin Process

The Berlin Process was introduced to inject new momentum into the EU enlargement policy agenda, to improve political co-operation, and to promote market integration within the Western Balkans. Moreover, it was a direct response to the growing political and economic investments by Russia, China, and Turkey, which were exploiting the EU disengagement with the Western Balkans between 2003-2018 – which later late to the EU adopted the EU-Western Balkans Enlargement Strategy 2018 and re-orientating its EU enlargement agenda.

The Berlin Process is structured to be complementary to the overall EU enlargement process, focusing on market integration, and mapping out some of the issues that are holding back the Western Balkans’ economies from becoming more competitive. It can be characterised as an ad hoc and flexible EU enlargement instrument that is based more upon a soft law approach to allow the Western Balkans to make more collaborative and joint commitments towards EU integration without the pressure of the hard law approach which comes from the technical and legal process under the EU accession framework. However, it is in full synergy with the EU accession conditions. Unlike the EU accession framework, the first objective of the Berlin Process is to improve the dialogue between the six Western Balkans countries by bringing together the leaders of the Western Balkans annually. In particular, to address the ethnic disputes resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia, especially by supporting the talks for the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The second objective is to provide political and financial support for strategic infrastructure investments in the Western Balkans and increase the connectivity between these countries and the EU, thereby also breaking up some of the market monopolies captured by small networks of companies close to the policy-makers. The third objective is to promote more market integration and to create a Western Balkans regional common market based upon the EU Single Market rules. Fourth, it aims to include civil society organisations as part of the policy design for the Berlin Process summits.

This article identifies the three underlying objectives of the Berlin Process and why establishing a common market based upon the EU Single Market rules is central to the new EU engagement with the Western Balkans. First, to counter the investments from China, Russia, and Turkey, and to ensure that any future investments in the Western Balkans are assessed under EU rules like those of the EU Single Market. Second, to break up the monopolies and anti-competitive practices in crucial sectors, such as energy and telecommunication, and to ensure that antitrust rules are applied accordingly in line with the EU Single Market rules. Third, to provide a new pool of cheap labour and a safe region for EU companies to invest in, which can be protected under the EU Single Market rules.

In conceptualising the Berlin Process, it can be observed that Germany, which is the main drivers of the new EU engagement with the Western Balkans, believes that regional market integration is the best avenue to overcome bilateral and ethnic disputes. This is based upon the Plutarchian idea that countries which are more economically and socially integrated are less likely to go to war and it has shaped some of the EU policy-makers thoughts about the new EU engagement with the Western Balkans. As a result, the leaders of Western Balkans endorsed a proposal at the 2017 Berlin Process summit to start adopting new policies to create the conditions for establishing “The Western Balkans Regional Economic Area” based upon the EU four freedoms. Thereafter, the Commission allocated 1 billion euro in grants, conditional to its being spent on key infrastructure and connectivity projects in support of the proposal.

The idea to increase market integration and regional co-operation with the Western Balkans has framed a lot of the thinking around the new EU-Western Balkans enlargement strategy adopted in February 2018. Furthermore, setting up a Regional Common Market based upon the EU Single Market rules is suggested as the best avenue for successful integration into the EU. This notion is based upon Kant’s thinking that open markets, which some have suggested played an important role in the justification of post-war European integration and sustaining peace in the EU. This way of thinking influenced the succession of Berlin Process summits between 2014-2018, and laid the grounds for the EU-Western Balkans enlargement strategy of 2018, with a view to promoting socio-economic integration within the Western Balkan countries in order to overcome the legacies of the break-up of Yugoslavia, akin to what post-war Europe achieved through the European Union.

The Western Balkans Common Market 2020

During her State of the Union speech in September 2020, the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that the “Western Balkans are of great strategic importance to the European Union” and that the EU planned to introduce a long-term economic and connectivity plan to link “the Western Balkans as closely as possible to EU”. Thereafter, the Commission presented an economic and sustainable development package called the “Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans” in October 2020, which is a 10-year plan to support socio-economic development. Furthermore, it has re-oriented the “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance” funding by assigning 9 billion euro to support economic convergence with the Western Balkans for the period 2021-2027. This is directly aimed at promoting the establishment of the “Regional Common Market” for the Western Balkans.

According to the Commission, the “Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans” objectives aim to bring the Western Balkans infrastructure and good governance in line with the EU Single Market standards. A particular focus is paid to improving the interconnection between the Western Balkans and the EU by building new motorway and high-speed railway infrastructure, investment in renewable and sustainable energy, to start a full transition from coal, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and improving waste and wastewater management. Furthermore, the economic and investment plan suggests that, in order to raise investments of up to 20 billion euro from private investors, the EU will provide guarantees to help reduce the cost of financing for public-private investments and to reduce the risks for EU investors in the Western Balkans.

As a result, a four-year action plan to create the “Western Balkans Regional Common Market” by the end of 2024 was adopted by the Western Balkans leaders at the Berlin Process Summit held in November 2020. The Commission, as well as the main EU leaders behind the Berlin Process, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France, welcomed this decision and reiterated that, if the “Regional Common Market” was successfully implemented, based upon the four freedoms, and followed the rules of the EU Single Market, then the Western Balkans could participate in the EU Single Market in the future.

In other words, the Western Balkans “Regional Common Market” can be viewed as a springboard for the Western Balkans to harmonise their laws, policies, and the institutions with those of the EU Single Market rules, and, should their economies become more competitive and they are able to show a good track record of upholding the rules of the EU Single Market, the award is participating in the EU Single Market. The Regional Common Market action plan gives more in-depth guidelines about the laws and policies that must adopt by the end of 2024 – in particular, there is a more concrete timeframe for implementation, as national laws and policies must be aligned with those of the EU Single Market rules required for the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital by the end of 2024. The action plan is divided into four policy blocks and offers guidelines on the legal and policy areas that must be aligned with the EU Single Market rules by 2024, which can be summarised as follows:

1. Regional trade area: free movement of goods, services, capital, and people;
2. Regional investment area: aligning investment laws and policies with the EU Single Market standards and promoting the region to foreign investors;
3. Regional digital area: integrating the Western Balkans into the pan-European digital market and following the EU rules; and
4. Regional industrial and innovation area: developing a joint EU-Western Balkans strategy to transform the industrial sectors and following the EU Single Market rules.

The novelty of the “Regional Common Market” action plan of 2020 is that now there is a clear timetable about the laws and policies that must be implemented by 2024, which also benefits the countries in their endeavours to meet the EU accession criteria. However, it remains to be seen whether the Western Balkans will be able to launch the Western Balkans Regional Common Market by the year 2024.

Barriers to the Common Market

In the EU-Western Balkans enlargement strategy of 2018, it was suggested that “the Western Balkans countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with organised crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well as a strong entanglement of public and private interests”. However, the action plan for the Regional Common Market has overlooked the issue of state capture, which could become a major barrier to its successful functioning.

This article argues that the action plan for the Regional Common Market and the EU accession framework must pay more attention to the issue of state capture in the Western Balkans. In particular, it must conduct an impact assessment on the effect that “anti-competitive laws” and “tailor-made laws” could have on the functioning of the Regional Common Market, which are also understudied as issues by researchers. A new study published by Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) on “anti-competitive laws” in October 2020, and one by Transparency International (TI) on “tailor-made laws” in December 2020, present alarming findings on the complex nature of state capture in the Western Balkans, which must be taken into account by EU policy-makers during the implementation phase of the Regional Common Market.

In its report entitled “State Capture Assessment Diagnostics in the Western Balkans”, SELDI finds that there is a high degree of monopolisation in key sectors of the economy, such as in energy, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and construction, and it is concentrated closely to companies that have close ties with the government. Furthermore, these sectors are also prone to external pressure through foreign investments, such as Russia in energy, or Turkey. For example, in Serbia, Russia controls revenues of close to 5 billion euro or 13 per cent of the total revenues generated by the national economy in the energy sector, as Gazprom and Lukoil dominate the oil and fuels markets. Serbia is almost fully dependent on gas imports from Russia and the two companies have a total monopoly of its energy market. According to Prelec, it is through intermediaries in the central government that local political leaders are facilitating the monopoly in exchange for a stake in the company or bribery. Similar trends can also be observed in Albania where Turkish foreign direct investments have strong stakes in the banking sector, in which it owns 60 per cent of the biggest Albanian commercial bank (Banka Kombetare Tregtare (BKT)). Furthermore, Turkey also has a large stake in the telecommunication sector, as the Albanian government sold 76 per cent of its shares in the biggest-state owned company, known as Albanian Telecom (Telekomi Shqiptar) to two Turkish companies in 2007.

Thus, what the Regional Common Market action plan and the EU policy-makers must understand is that the Western Balkans have legal barriers in place for entering their market and administrative requirements to obtain service licences. These barriers are often skewed in favour of a privileged company close to the government, and, due to the weak judicial system, antitrust laws are ineffective. In addition to the high degree of monopolisation and anti-competitive practices, state capture is also utilised by the governments in the passing of “tailor made laws” for individual companies, which, in a way, legalises the state capture and monopolisation of the market, and makes any corrupt practice impossible to prosecute. The Transparency International report entitled “Examining State Capture: Undue Influence on Law-Making and the Judiciary in the Western Balkans and Turkey” has analysed the laws from 2005 to 2020 that were adopted by the governments and parliaments only to support the monopoly for several companies close to them in specific sectors of the economy.

The research on tailor-made laws is rather new as a field, but the two examples should be taken into account by the EU policy-makers for monitoring the implementation of the Regional Common Market, especially since the EU plans to support public-private partnership projects to achieve its goals of attaining up to 20 million euro in investments by 2030 in the Western Balkans. The tailor-made laws are possibly the highest expression of state capture, because the laws enable monopolisation and, at the same time, make it difficult for the judicial and law enforcement institutions to investigate and prosecute any of the cases. Furthermore, the lack of enforcement of the anti-monopoly laws reduces the monitoring capacity of auditing agencies and thereby prevents accountability and scrutiny, and weakens the credibility of the media and civil society organisations in reporting such cases. Although more research is required to grasp fully the scope and impact of undue influence in law-making and the phenomenon of tailor-made laws, this article argues that, in the absence of an independent judiciary, the Regional Common Market action plan and the EU enlargement framework must pay more attention to these anti-competitive practices as the EU initiative on strengthening the rule of law fosters more success.

Conclusions

The introduction of the Berlin Process, the EU-Western Balkans enlargement strategy of 2018, and the Regional Common Market in 2020, suggest that, in its re-engagement with the Western Balkans, the EU wants to pursue closer political and economic co-operation based upon the EU Single Market rules with a view to the future expansion of the Union into the Western Balkans. At the same time, supporting the socio-economic and socio-legal development of the Western Balkans by targeting areas of common interest, as well as providing the EU investors with a new market and economic areas based upon the EU Single Market rules – thereby ensuring that the supply chain and the automotive industry in particular can move back closer to the European continent post-COVID-19, rather than China, and operate in country preferably under the EU Single Market rules.

The EU common market initiative for the Western Balkans, if applied in an orderly manner, and if there is a track record by the Western Balkans in upholding the rules of the EU Single Market, may accelerate their chances for future accession to the EU. At the same time, it also offers a unique opportunity to participate in the EU Single Market should the Western Balkans manage to make the Regional Common Market a success. However, for the Regional Common Market to be functional, the rule of law must be strengthened. Although there are, to date, some encouraging EU-led reforms as part of the accession process, as the case of Albania shows, it is not sufficient, given that the judicial systems throughout the Western Balkans are prone to corruption and to state capture.

Thus, in the absence of independent institutions, the inclusion of members of civil society and the business community to monitor and provide oversight in the implementation phase is critical for launching the Western Balkans Regional Common Market in line with EU Single Market legislative framework. However, the EU and the Western Balkans should consider making arrangements to allow the Court of Justice of the European Union to be involved in the future, when the Regional Common Market is functional, so that the national courts of the Western Balkans can make references and ask for opinions in the event that a country or business is not abiding by the EU Single Market rules. This would also help in strengthening the rule of law in the Western Balkans and would also increase the EU legal integration in these countries, which would gradually help the national courts to adjust their legal formworks in a timely manner, before the Western Balkans are allowed to take part in the EU Single Market.

The post The EU-Western Balkans Market Integration appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

In his recently published book Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty, Norman Naimark, one of the world’s foremost historians of Communism, looks comparatively at the imposition (or not) of Communist regimes in various European settings.[1] These range from the Danish island of Bornholm and the Soviet involvement in Finland to internal conflicts in Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria, and Albania. In some of these places, Soviet troops were on the ground already at the end of the war and so the question becomes why they left when they did. In others, however, Moscow was a distant actor. Post-Second World War Albania falls into this latter category. This diversity of conditions and outcomes is important because it demonstrates the limits of viewing Soviet power in Europe after the Second World War as a purely external imposition. It also reminds us of the value of thinking comparatively when assessing postwar geopolitics and the early stages of the Cold War.

Seen from the Albanian perspective, Naimark’s study is also an invitation to consider the cast of actors involved in each case, and assessing the pressures they faced with an open mind. What seemed possible and to whom? How open-ended was the situation, say, in mid-1945 or the first half of 1946? To put it another way, how long did it take for the firmness of postwar politics to take shape in each of these cases? Although timelines might be different from place to place, patterns nevertheless emerge. Beyond the issue of the origins of the Cold War, looking at the postwar moment with fresh eyes can also help rescue Albanian national historiography from provincialization.

When analyzing Albania in the immediate years after the Second World War, the range of geopolitical constraints becomes evident, as does the fallibility of individual actors when confronted with these constraints. Specifically, when it comes to Albanian-American relations between 1945-1946, it becomes necessary to disentangle the ground-level view of the postwar period from later official Communist-era myths. This is the focus of this essay.

The Problem

For the Albanian Communist leaders in the early years, Yugoslav backing seemed essential, although Belgrade would later exaggerate its role and the Albanian party leadership – embarrassed by its Yugoslav ties once bilateral relations had soured – would vehemently deny it. After the country’s liberation in late 1944, some Yugoslav advisers did help shaping the party’s structure and they also become involved with economic planning. Belgrade agreed to supply aid in return for Albanian goods. A number of joint companies were set up to cover the construction of railroads, oil, mining, electricity, navigation, and trade. Belgrade also urged closer coordination in currency policy. The path to economic and political integration between the two countries seemed open. Yugoslavia’s leader Josip Broz Tito clearly had the upper hand.

Heading Albania’s party was Enver Hoxha (1908–1985), a teacher-turned-activist who spent his student years in France and Belgium, later joining the Communist ranks at home. Hoxha lacked the revolutionary credentials of someone like Mehmet Shehu, an experienced military man who had participated in the Spanish Civil War. His wartime contributions were no match for Shehu’s. Neither was Hoxha widely known in the early 1940s. Still, he lacked neither cunning nor charisma and above all he had political instinct. At delicate moments, he was particularly adept at presenting himself as an arbiter among competing sides. In this way he quickly came to dominate the party’s inner circle, which included members who were intellectually more impressive.

After the war, Hoxha was party secretary but also served as Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief. (He would be forced to relinquish government posts after Stalin’s death, when high-ranking officials in Moscow demanded changes.) The higher echelon of the Central Committee consisted of other former fighters, tested in battle and trusted for their personal loyalty rather than their level of education or ideological literacy. Indeed, the ideological training came after the Communist seizure of power. The party’s upper tier was largely unschooled, as was most of the country’s populace. The figures surrounding Hoxha were relatively young and inexperienced in government. They believed that a world-defining war had placed them on the right side of history. But like Hoxha, they cut their teeth in the ups and downs of the relations with more powerful foreigners in the 1940s.

How Hoxha maneuvered with more powerful foreigners in 1945-1946—not only the immediate neighbor Yugoslavia, but also the Soviet Union and the United States—is highly instructive. Understanding the importance of Belgrade’s support, he had agreed to postpone settling the thorny issue of Kosovë/Kosovo and its Albanian majority population. The idea was that the region’s future would be settled within a postwar international arrangement. Careful not to alienate his Yugoslav counterparts, Hoxha was nevertheless hardly blind to the unequal nature of this relationship, and so he desperately sought direct ties to Moscow in 1946. In the meantime, the fledging regime kept up the anti-American line through the press and popular organizations.

Stalin initially approved of Yugoslavia’s “handling” of its smaller and poorer neighbor. Albania’s rulers simply had to go along with this arrangement. “Stalin demonstrated little interest in Albania,” explains Naimark in his book, and the idea of a reconstituted independent Albania was not a Soviet priority. Some of Stalin’s inferiors in fact considered the possibility that chunks of Albania might become part of Yugoslavia, while other parts might be attached to Greece.

Naimark cites a February 1945 Soviet foreign ministry report, authored by Maxim Litvinov, who was deputy minister for foreign affairs, speculating that either the British (along with Greece) would insist to have Albania on their camp, or the Yugoslavs and the Greeks “would partition the country between them.” Stalin’s objective at this point was to avoid complications with the Western Allies; going along with Belgrade’s efforts in Albania would serve this purpose in the short term.[2] Of course, how one perceived Moscow’s tactical neglect depended on one’s specific geopolitical circumstances.

The recognition

In this context, Soviet recognition of Albania’s regime in November 1945 was critical for the Albanian leader and his comrades. As far as the Americans and the British were concerned, the guidance was to wait and see how the situation unfolded on the ground. The American representatives in Tirana noted how the local press prominently covered the Soviet recognition of the government, including Hoxha’s grateful reply to Moscow. They also noted how carefully the Albanian regime was handling the publication of the Soviet notes compared to the British and American ones. “General feeling of population seems one of relief,” noted one such message to Washington, “that uncertainty has been removed and independent status of Albania as a country.”[3]

Joseph E. Jacobs, the US representative to Albania, had arrived in the country on Victory in Europe Day. He quickly took stock of the local scene. “I wish to add that I am laboring under no illusions,” he wrote to Washington in reference to the local Communist officials, shortly after his arrival. “They are as I have described in my telegrams a sincere, patriotic group of individuals who are going to be difficult to deal with. They are ignorant of the science of government, know little of international relations, and are highly sensitive over the fact that, after fighting a common enemy, they have as yet failed to receive any recognition except from Yugoslavia and possibly secret sympathy from the Soviet Union.” The relations between these three countries, Jacobs admitted, “are as yet an enigma to me.”[4]

Would American recognition be forthcoming? Aware of the importance of this move, the Americans insisted on a number of conditions. These were relayed to the Albanian side—“conditioned on assurance that genuinely free elections will be held, all democratic groups and candidates fully safeguarded and that foreign correspondents may enter Albania and report freely on elections.”[5] In addition to the important issue of free elections, problems related to freedom of assembly and press would come up repeatedly in the cables sent to Washington, especially as the internal situation in Albania evolved over the early months of 1946.

In the elections of December 1945, Communist candidates and sympathizers ran as part of the Democratic Front organization, a successor to the National Liberation Movement, which they were at pains to present as a broad-based organization. Almost all the candidates on the ballot were members of the Democratic Front, and they campaigned in the name of that organization rather than the Communist Party. The idea was not to scare off voters, who may have balked at talk of radical action.

Still, party officials worked hard to denigrate alternatives to the Front. They did not seek merely votes but verbal commitment and identification with a new social order, casting promises of support for the Front as votes for the “democrats” and hints of wavering as helping the “Fascists” and “foreign-inspired” forces. Desperate for currency, the government nevertheless mobilized anti-Fascist women and youth groups to do canvassing. The chiefs of the various religious communities urged their followers to vote for the Front. The party apparatus carefully screened candidates, engaged local informants, collected rumors, and insisted on door-to-door agitation. The result—a decisive Front victory—does not appear all that surprising given this context.

There is irony to the fact that Hoxha would later make villains out of the Americans present in Albania at this time. In fact, Jacobs, who observed the elections, reported favorably on them to Washington. His opinion was that the country had fulfilled this particular obligation: “Election was conducted by secret methods without evidence of threats or intimidation and, although opposition presented no candidates, it could have done so. Moreover in absence of opposition candidates regime in order to give opposition opportunity to register dissent provided special ballot box for that purpose at every polling booth similar to box for Front candidates. Of 603,000 registered voters 543,000 or 90% cast ballots 93% for and 7% against Front candidates. Assumes that all 10% abstaining voters were against regime, Front would still have 84% of all registered voters.”[6]

As we now know thanks to the availability of archival records and the work of a younger cohort of Albanian historians, the reality of the elections in 1945 was a lot messier than Jacobs relayed at the time. What might have seemed like “choice” from the outside was a kind of choreography. Much of the groundwork had been laid well before people showed up at the polls.

The stalling

Then there was the outstanding issue of the prewar treaties, which Edward J. Sheehy has rightly called an “imbroglio.”[7] The US had set an additional condition that Albania honor the treaties that had been effective on the last day of Albanian independence in 1939. Hoxha appeared both offended and puzzled. He initially reported that treaties prior to 1939 could not be located, and that he therefore was unable to reply to the American note. The problem then dragged on for months, as the Albanian side stalled and the Americans grew more and more exasperated with the local treatment.

Hoxha saw himself as a winner in a crucial historical moment—his country having been on the right side of a reordering of Europe. Why were the Americans expecting more than the Soviets? (Of course, the Soviets did not have prewar treaties with Albania, so that point was irrelevant.) For his part, Jacobs correctly understood, from conversations held with Hoxha in late 1945, that this issue might well lead to a deadlock—a kind of convenient stalling technique that allowed Hoxha some room to navigate possible alliances and air out his grievances vis-à-vis the West.

In fact, by the end of January 1946, the American envoy detected “growing unfriendliness of regime here toward US and possible fundamental changes going on in Govt itself.”[8] In the meantime, Soviet presence seemed to be expanding in Tirana. There was a lot of back-and-forth over the treaty problem in 1946, but these exchanges merely concealed ever-deepening distrust between the two sides. “Said we should trust his Government,” noted Jacobs on the occasion of one such exchange, “but I replied it was not matter of trust as in view recent developments here most-favored-nation agreement and naturalization treaty were more important to us than ever.”[9] 

By the end of February 1946, Jacobs was cabling Washington that if Albania would not be favorably treated at the international level, it might well be looking at incorporation into Yugoslavia. “Is clear Albania has become nothing more than satellite state Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,” he wrote, “with probability only interest those two countries have in maintenance independent Albania is hope it may eventually be admitted UNO and thus add another vote Soviet bloc. If at next session UNO Albania not admitted, Albania may become unit Yugoslav federation.”[10] Indeed, later that summer, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Hoxha paid a visit to Belgrade and the pro-Yugoslav propaganda went into full force domestically.

By spring, Jacobs wrote about a regime that “has now gone all out for one party system which ruthlessly crushes all opposition” and asked the State Department to ask for “strong guarantees” for freedom of speech and of the press.[11] Relations with the British also significantly deteriorated between the spring and autumn of 1946, as the so-called Corfu Channel incident—in fact, a series of incidents—took place.[12]

Albania was vulnerable. Though Jacobs fretted that it was a “satellite state” of the Soviet Union, in reality Hoxha struggled to get Moscow interested in a small country located in a volatile region. Obsessed as the Cold War literature is with captivity and takeovers, it has missed this particular condition of vulnerability—which Naimark captures so well in his book—and the urgency of seeking out an external defender. The Albanian party boss tried to get such Soviet commitments, but they were not forthcoming. Caught between Yugoslav interests, Soviet neglect, and American suspicion and confusion about the internal state of affairs, the Communist party boss was faced with a balancing act. When he met with Molotov in Paris in September 1946, as Naimark notes, he was told that it would be best for Albania to reach agreements with the United States and Britain first, before any visit to Moscow.[13] (The first visit to Moscow would come the following year, in July, and it was a major feat for the Communist regime.)

By then, however, the resentment directed at the American representatives had reached a high point. Working conditions for the American envoys in Tirana also had become increasingly tough. The local press took aim at Western powers refusing to acknowledge its regime, and the radio station blasted warnings about territorial dangers emanating from Greece. Finally, after repeated complaints about harassment from the envoys in Tirana, Washington decided to withdraw the mission, in a dramatic evacuation-at-sea episode—worthy of a Netflix movie—in November 1946.

The myths

In later accounts, Hoxha fantastically presented the Anglo-American involvement in Albania during the Second World War as seamlessly connected to the “plotting” of American representatives in 1945-1946. In fact, Albania had confounded both the Brits and the Americans, but there was no place for confusion in Hoxha’s mythology. The conspiratorial mindset necessitated a blurring of the different personalities who had come to Albania. The wartime envoys, Hoxha explained, were replaced by “the missions of the British General Hodgson and the Americans Jacobs and Fultz, Anglo-American missions which had as their objective to organize the political opposition, economic interference through UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] and sabotage of the reconstruction of our country.”[14]

The mention of Harry Fultz is key here. Fultz had been involved in Albania before the Second World War, had fallen in love with the struggling and poor country, and had become a mentor to a group of local youths who had studied under him at the technical school set up in Tirana. In the official party narrative, this link became a nefarious one: The American civilian mission had included Fultz who was said to be “the old American agent in Albania.”[15] In fact, Fultz had been deeply committed and optimistic about Albania’s prospects, more so than some of his American colleagues. But the fact that he had been present in Albania before the war became a convenient tool for a conspiracy.

Thus, later in 1946, authorities launched a witch-hunt to “unmask” local plotters and collaborators who had supposedly worked with the Americans—Fultz in particular—against the Communist regime. Authorities arrested a number of engineers and technical staff, put them on trial, accusing them of sabotage in a land reclamation project in Maliq, in southern Albania. The sabotage story was concocted in parallel with the diplomatic debacle with the American representatives in Tirana. Fultz was said to have conspired with these contacts against the Albanian regime. This tale of sabotage was absurd and tragic. If UNRRA and the Americans had wanted to sabotage work in Albania, surely they could have just cut off supplies to the country? Why go through all the trouble of secret meetings and espionage?

No matter. “The mask was torn from Fultz, that ‘authority’ on Albania, who was defeated along with them,” boasted one of Hoxha’s later volumes. “Several of his former ‘pupils,’ who, on his instructions, had long been carrying out sabotage,” he wrote, “were uncovered.” The public trial, in this fictionalized telling of 1946, “was a great blow to the American mission and especially to Fultz. Jacobs and Fultz were terrified and they left Albania before the trial of the saboteurs at the Maliq swamp began. Some members of the American mission remained to follow the events.”[16]

The problem of the American recognition of the Communist government became retroactive evidence, in this later narrative, of a pre-existing anti-Communist conspiracy.  “These were allegedly peaceful, allied missions, which were ‘to inform’ their governments ‘about the development of the situation in Albania,’ ‘about the level of democracy’ which would be established in this country, and about the character of the reforms which the new Albanian government would carry out, in order to ‘prepare’ its recognition by the British and American governments.”[17]

Hoxha’s fantastical account of 1946 was also made possible by the fact that there were Anglo-American efforts in the 1950s to overthrow the regime. These ill-fated covert operations included parachuting agents trained abroad so that they could foment a rebellion, dropping leaflets urging resistance, and broadcasting clandestine radio programs. They failed miserably, and the infiltrators ended up being put on trial and humiliated in public. One British observer, who had served as a liaison during the war, wrote that these missions merely boosted Hoxha’s “long-standing propaganda line about the hostility of the capitalist powers and their nefarious intentions.”[18] But it remains important to carefully disentangle the timeline of retroactive projections and the actual events and perceptions on the ground in 1946.

There were non-Communists and anti-Communists in Albania in 1946. There were small (and poorly organized) efforts to envision a different future for the country. But by the end of the year, those had been methodically eliminated, and the vision of the future had drastically narrowed. Some locals had looked to the Americans with hope, just as there were plenty who looked to the Soviet Union with hope, while Western recognition was not forthcoming.

However, the regime that had emerged out of the 1945 elections, and which brutally solidified its hold throughout 1946, was not the kind that was interested in having any opponents. Not everyone understood this crucial element of this regime right away, but it became impossible to miss by the end of the year.

Albanian-American Relations – Past, Present and Future

Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the re-establishment of official relations between the United States and Albania

June 2021

Elidor Mëhilli is Associate Professor City University of New York.

[1] Norman M. Naimark. Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019).

[2] Naimark, Stalin and the Fate of Europe, p. 55, citing Litvinov to Molotov, “Al’banskaia Problema,” 8 February 1945, AVPRF, F. 06, Op. 7, D. 173, Ll. 110-111.

[3] Fultz to Secretary of State, 15 November 1945, 875.01/11–1545, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. IV, Doc. 52.

[4] Jacobs to Secretary of State, 26 May 1945, 875.00/5–2645, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. IV, Doc. 24.

[5] Fultz to the Secretary of State, 10 November 1945, 875.01/11–1045, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. IV, Doc. 50.

[6] Jacobs to Secretary of State, 11 December 1945, 875.00/12–1145, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. IV, Doc. 60.

[7] Edward J. Sheehy, “Albanian-American Relations in the Fall of 1946: A Stormy End,” Tirana Observatory, 9 April 2019.

[8] Jacobs to the Secretary of State, 29 January 1946, 711.75/1–2946, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1946, Vol. VI, Doc. 1.

[9] Jacobs to Secretary of State, 28 February 1946, 711.75/2–2846, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1946, Vol. VI, Doc. 8.

[10] Jacobs to Secretary of State, 28 February 1946, 711.75/2–2846, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1946, Vol. VI, Doc. 8.

[11] Jacobs to Secretary of State, 20 April 1946, 875.00/4–2046, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1946, Vol. VI, Doc. 11.

[12] On 15 May 1946, two Royal Navy cruisers travelling through the channel between Corfu and Albania were fired upon by artillery in Albania. Then, on 22 October 1946, British ships struck mines while passing through the Channel. There were forty-four casualties in this incident. British ships later returned to the channel to investigate and clear mines in Albanian waters, a third incident that led to an important ruling by the International Court of Justice on sovereignty and territorial waters.     

[13] Naimark, Stalin and the Fate of Europe, p. 62, citing Molotov diary entry for 16 September 1946.

[14] Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania: Memoirs of the National Liberation War (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1982), p. 352.

[15] Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 359.

[16] Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 407.

[17] Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 403.

[18] Reginald Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, p. 235. See also Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81ff.

The post Postwar: Albanian-American Relations after 1945 appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

An Albanian legation in Washington

On July 11, 1926, a sturdy, handsome man by the name of Faik Bey Konitza arrived from Boston in Washington, D.C. where he was to serve as the diplomatic envoy of Ahmet Zogu’s Albania. His appointment as the first Albanian Minister to the U.S. had been several months in the making.

In April of that year, the office of President Calvin Coolidge received a letter signed by the Secretary of State Frank Kellogg. The letter stated that President Zogu wanted to open a legation in Washington and appoint Faik Bey Konitza as Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States.

“According to the information in the Department – the letter said – Mr. Konitza is distinctly friendly to this country where he has resided for a number of years. He is said to have received part of his education at Harvard University and to hold a degree from that institution. Our legation reports that he enjoys considerable influence in Albania where he is widely known, although he has held aloof from personal politics and has not identified himself with any political party. He has, however, represented his country at a number of international conferences and was prominent in the movements which led to the independence of Albania. I know of no reason Mr. Konitza should not be received by this Government and if you so desire I will instruct our Minister to inform the Albanian Government that the appointment will be acceptable.”[1]

On the opposite side of the ocean, Zogu was impatiently waiting for an answer. Thanks to Everett Sanders, Coolidge’s private secretary, things moved rather swiftly and the U.S. President gave his consent by writing “Done! Let him come!” at the upper left corner of Kellogg’s letter.  

Konitza came to Washington’s diplomatic world from an Albanian environment, after five years as chairman of the Pan Albanian Federation Vatra in Boston. Vatra’s leaders held him in great esteem and revered him immensely. That veneration came mostly from the reputation as a scholar that he projected on Vatra, the largest and the most stable organization of the Albanians in America. None of Vatra’s leaders were as learned as he was. The only one who came close was Bishop Theophan Noli, who had his adherents among the Albanians of Boston. But Noli had left for Europe several years before, and was regularly being attacked as a “bolshevik” by Vatra’s newspaper Dielli, which until June 1926 was led personally by Konitza.

Faik Konitza’s appointment was viewed with suspicion by some Albanians. Those who harbored doubt said that he was seduced by Zogu’s money, something he denied categorically. “The salary of a Minister Plenipotentiary is very low” said a Dielli editorial that appeared to be written either by Konitza or with his instructions. “Therefore it cannot be said that he accepted the appointment because of material interest. Since 1914 various governments had offered him to serve as a diplomatic representative in Washington, London and Italy. He always rejected.” Then the editorial explains the reasons why he accepted Zog’s offer: “Mr. Faik Konitza believes the government (in Albania) must have the support of all good willing individuals to ensure stability within the nation and to preserve its honor without. He undertook the burden with the intention of helping in this patriotic endeavor. We believe that once the state is fully strengthened and the opposition has calmed down,  Mr. Faik Konitza will ask the government to step aside in order to pursue a literary career.”

According to Konitza, Zogu’s Albania being too weak and surrounded by enemies, needed peace and disipline, unity inside and respect abroad. And he said Ahmet Zogu was the leader “capable of uniting and governing this divided and disobedient people.”[2]

The chief American diplomat in Tirana, Charles Hart, believed that patriotism, not money, was the main reason Faik Konitza accepted Zogu’s offer. In December 1925, when word had spread on the nomination Zog was about to make, Hart wrote to the State Department the following: “He (Konitza) has held aloof from personal politics, commiting himself at no time in favor of any Albanian administration. Instead of politician he is credited even among those he has opposed as preferring the novel position of patriot, a specimen which some observers vehemently declare is almost extinct among the so-called upper class Albanians.”[3]

Those who hated Konitza had their arguments ready. They criticized him for trying to disunite the Christian and Muslim Albanians of America. They claimed he believed in the violent overthrow of government, as he had publicly stated in Dielli when he expressed support for Noli’s revolution in June 1924. And this, they believed, ran contrary to the U.S. Constitution. They also claimed that when he first came to the U.S. and was asked by Immigration officials whether in the future he intended to become a U.S. citizen, he had replied “no.” They alleged he had tried to evade personal income taxes and had paid his dues only after being forced to do so.[4]

Just one week before leaving Boston, in an obvious attempt to reassure himself and put criticism to rest, Konitza explained in Dielli that every individual has inside oneself the yardstick with which to measure one’s own actions. “Measured against conscience, I know what others may not know, that my actions were both sincere and reasonable,” he wrote.[5]

Despite all the envy and the suspicions that the new appointment had generated, Konitza would not break his ties with Vatra and this was part of a gentleman agreement with President Zogu. From now on, he would be the honorary chairman of the organization.

It was clearly in the interest of the President of Albania to have Vatra on his side. Zogu did not want any propaganda against himself among the Albanians of America and this could be made possible by having Konitza in control of the Albanian immigrant community. The Department of State thought the same. A note by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs said that all political factions in Albania desire the support and approval of Vatra which indirectly enjoys great influence in the mother country. Therefore, it said, “the wish of the Albanian President to appoint Konitza as minister to the United States is very likely an attempt to ensure the political support of the Vatra Society.”[6]

On July 13, 1926, the Foreign Ministry in Tirana received a telegram in which Konitza informed his superiors that he had arrived in Washington and had left copies of the credentials at the State Department. He first settled at the Willard, a hotel where Mark Twain was said to have written two books and where the term lobbying was born.”[7] The Willard was located on the Pensylvannia Avenue and was a short walk away from the White House.

Since Albania had never had a legation in Washington, Konitza’s arrival was greeted with curiousity in the press. The Washington Post, The Sun, and a number of less important dailies reported on the new envoy, who was called Frank by his American friends. Some newspapers also printed his official photograph which showed a man with hair split in the middle and with expressive, piercing eyes. There was certainly no lack of interest in the capital’s social circles, especially among the young women who were just starting a career; Konitza happened to be unmarried and the demand for bachelor diplomats was great among hostesses. This Albanian minister “ought to be extremely appealing. He is dark, suave and in the interesting fourties,” a newswire report claimed. In fact, Konitza had just passed fifty but looked much younger in the photo.

The reporters would soon learn that Albania, an extremely poor country with practically no influence in international affairs, would be represented in the American capital by an erudite individual whose interests spanned from music and literature to ancient and modern history, fashion, painting, cooking, and so on. After having completed elementary school in Turkey and later being educated in France, he had received a degree from Harvard, one of America’s premier universities. His French was perfect but his ability to phrase in English was also superb. His speech was flavorful and had the distinct accent that prompts one to guess the interlocutor’s country of origin.

On August 19, 1926 Konitza settled in The Mayflower, a hotel that was dedicated the year before. A suite of rooms would serve both as a legation and as living quarters for the new Albanian minister. The Mayflower had begun to be referred to as The Grande Dame of Washington. Everyone agreed that the nickname fit it perfectly, for this was the most luxurious hotel in America and the second best address in town after the White House.

The Albanian government would pay Konitza a monthly salary of 120 dollars, almost as much as he was paid as chairman of Vatra. However, the government would cover for him the costly hotel suite as well as all other expenses, including the entertainment of guests, travel, and a secretary.[8]

For Konitza, The Mayflower was the ideal place to stay. The hotel, a short walk from both the White House and the State Department, was a meeting place for some of the most prominent people of America, high ranking politicians, rich businessmen and famous artists.[9] President Coolidge often went there for official meetings or to see old friends. Some renowned individuals had rented apartments in the hotel. Among them were Everett Sanders, the President’s secretary, William Jardine, Secretary of Agriculture, Senators Rice Means of Colorado and Samuel Shortridge of California and Fleming Newbold, president of The Evening Star, rival of The Washington Post.[10]

Konitza brought hundreds of books to the Mayflower. A talking-machine with a meter-long master’s-voice horn was visible by the fireplace in the drawing room. His collection of clocks, big and small, was displayed near the book shelves. A bit further was a saxophone he had brought from England. A portrait of President Zogu alongside a picture of a little girl with flowers in her hands greeted the guests from a small table facing the door.

Opening a legation in Washington by Ahmet Zogu was undoubtedly a costly diplomatic move for Albania, the distant country little known by the Americans.

The history of Albania’s diplomatic representation in the U.S. capital had begun in March 1920, before the country won recognition by America. On that month, Constantine C. Chekrezi, a 27-year old youth from the Albanian village of Ziçisht, presented the credentials signed by Prime Minister Sulejman Delvina and Foreign Minister Mehmet Konitza, Faik Konitza’s brother.[11] Chekrezi, a Harvard graduated historian and a former Dielli editor, acted as “Commissioner of Albania in the United States” and maintained contacts with the Department of State. His salary was paid by Vatra. He was a semi-official representative and his name was not included in the diplomatic list contained in the Blue Book of the State Department. Like Chekrezi, there were more than 20 other representatives from countries with which the United States had no diplomatic ties. They tried to win the attention of the State Department in the hope that their country could one day be recognized by official Washington.[12]

On October 23, 1920, the Albanian government, through a letter to President Woodrow Wilson, appointed Charles Telford Erickson, a U.S. citizen, as “extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister,” as always, in a semi-official capacity. Erickson, a Christian missionary, knew Albania better than any other American and regarded it as his second homeland. Mehmet Konitza believed that Erickson, who in the Paris Peace Conference had helped a great deal on the question of Albania’s borders and mandate, could give the small nation a strong voice in Washington, which in turn could result in its recognition by the United States. A week after his arrival in Washington, Erickson received a telegram informing him that Albania had changed government, the opposition had come to power with a cabinet headed by Iljas Vrioni and that in the new circumstances he should not expect any funds. Erickson had not been paid anyway because the expectation was that Chekrezi would hand him over the account and the office. That had not happened, and Erickson was faced with a dilemma.[13] In any case, he remained in Washington and continued to represent Albania in his capacity as a private citizen. Erickson did not even have enough money to pay the apartment rent, but the generous landlord helped him with with a little room in the attic.[14] Chekrezi did not like Erickson’s appointment and complained that this episode had delayed the recognition of Albania by the U.S. He boasted that he had brought the issue of recognition almost to a conclusion and that the arrival of Erickson had caused an interruption in his communications with the Department of State. Soon, Erickson left for Europe and Chekrezi remained “commissioner”. During his brief stay in Washington, Erickson insisted in his reports for the State Department that it was time for the United States to recognize Albania. “There are thousands of American Albanians to whom America is almost as dear as their motherland and upon whom no other country has  such a hold on their imagination and affection,” he wrote.[15]

There were numerous other calls for recognition. Among the most impressive was that of a 28-year-old officer in Tirana. He was the Interior Minister Ahmed Bej Zogu from the Zogolli clan of Mat. When approached by an Associated Press reporter, the handsome young man who stood above the crowd and was routinely called “the hero of Albania” told him: “If America recognizes us and sends a diplomatic representative to Albania, it will be the biggest boost Albania can have.  It would be the greatest encouragement this country would receive. America, whose pages of history gleam with glorious deeds in the cause of human liberty, should recognize Albania, for it is a country which has suffered long centuries of serfdom and now, born again as a nation, wants to retain the liberty so long withheld.”[16]

On August 28, 1922, after many hesitations, the United States granted de jure recognition to Albania. This came after the State Department was beginning to realize that the monopoly of the Albanian oil was ending up in Italian and British hands, leaving the American companies behind. However, the recognition was not simply a result of cold calculations by the bureaucrats in Washington and it appears that the lure of oil was only one reason. Another important reason was to give “moral encouragement to the Albanian people in a critical phase of their struggle for independence.”[17] Maxwell Blake, the Commissioner in Albania, in a letter to the Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, stated that “the Albanians, in spite of grave difficulties, have given sufficient evidence of political stability.”[18]

In Boston, Faik Konitza, as chairman of Vatra, immediately thanked the Secretary of State. His telegram was sent “in the name of the Albanians residing in America, some of whom fought and shed their blood in the ranks of the American army.”[19]

Although the office of Chekrezi in the capital had been closed on April 1922,[20] he continued to act occasionally as a commissioner while teaching modern history at Washington’s National University.[21]

After that, for four full years, Albania held no representation in the U. S. capital. The country was going through difficult times. According to an American newspaper, “cabinets passed in and out of the government house like trains through a tunnel. Any man with a sufficient following of rifle bearers and a desire to be prime minister would quietly organize his forces, wait for a night of full moon, which to all Albanians is an omen of good fortune, and then proceed to unseat the prevailing cabinet.”[22]

An attempt to open diplomatic representation in Washington was made in 1922, after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U. S. At the end of August of that year Mithat Frashëri was proposed for plenipotentiary minister.[23] Konitza reacted immediately from Boston. In a confidential letter to the State Department, he pleaded with the Americans in the name of Vatra not to accept the appointment. “France and Italy have both rejected him, when the Albanian government tried to appoint Mr. Mithat Frasheri first to Paris, and then to Rome,” insisted Konitza in the handwritten letter in Autumn 1922.[24] In a memo accompanying his letter, a State Department official wrote: “It is possible that Mr. Faik Konitza is disappointed at not being selected for the Washington post.”[25] In the end, Konitza had his way. In January 1923, Albania’s Foreign Ministry decided to indefinitely postpone Frasheri’s appoinment. The U.S. Minister in Tirana, Ulysses Grant-Smith wrote to the State Departament that for the peace of the Albanian Colony in the United States “it would seem just as well that Mr. Frashëri should definitely renounce his intention of representing his country in Washington since it appears that Faik Konitza, President of the Albanian Federation Vatra is openly opposed to him.”[26]

In July 1924, when a government led by Fan Noli was in power, Albania’s consul in New York, Abdul Sula, visited the State Department and inquired whether it would be difficult to get the American approval were the Albanian government to open a legation in Washington. He was told that such a request would be examined immediately and that the State Department would be pleased to see an Albanian legation on the American soil.[27] However Noli had no time for legation. In December 1924, a brief uprising that brought the Bishop to premiership came to an end and Ahmed Zogu returned to power with the help of the Yugoslavs.

It was financially impossible for the new government to maintain many legations abroad. But Zogu, who regarded the United States as a future ally that could help him establish order and consolidate power, decided that opening a diplomatic representation in Washington should come without delay. The candidate for the new position had to be a learned Albanian, possibly a good speaker of English and a person who had strong ties with the Albanian community in America.

In January 1925, when he had just become prime minister, Zogu asked the acting Albanian consul in New York, Koço Tashko, to travel to Washington and contact the State Department to see what the U. S. Administration thought of the new Albanian government. Tashko told the officials that the Albanians had preferred the mountain man (Zogu) to the Harvard man (Noli), adding that it would be rather difficult for Zogu to find anyone to represent him in the U. S. since “the Vatra Society had in the past been hostile to the Ahmed Zogu faction and that such a powerful Albanian as Faik Konitza had also been in the opposition.”[28] However, things evolved rapidly. In a little more than a year, it was no other than Faik Konitza, formerly a bitter enemy of Zogu who was installed as plenipotentiary minister.

On July 16, 1926 the new Albanian Minister was received at the State Department by Secretary Kellogg, a small man with grey, glassy eyes. This was mostly a get acquainted session without much substance. They spoke about things that lay ahead, mainly a number of treaties to be signed between the two countries. The State Department had detailed information about Albania, thanks to the long cables it received from Charles Hart, the head of the Albanian mission in Tirana. In April of that year, Hart related that in Albania, there was nothing left from the republican atmosphere and that the regime was becoming monarchic.[29] In foreign relations, the pressure of the Italians on Zogu had substantially increased to the point that they had demanded Albania to become a protectorate, based on a decision of the Ambassadors Conference on November 9, 1921.[30] Obviously, the United States was too far away and uninterested in those developments.

On October 8, 1926, Konitza presented his credentials to President Coolidge in the White House. The ceremony took place in the blue room, an oval shaped space where the Presidents received their guests. “I consider myself fortunate in having the distinction of being the first Envoy of Albania to the great American Nation, a Nation I have long ago learned to love and to respect, and whose glorious history and wonderful achievements are sincerely admired by the Albanian people,” Konitza told the President.[31]

Coolidge, who had a reputation as a timid and modest president, replied that he appreciated the comment on the American nation and on the feelings cherished by the Albanian people for America. At the end, he wished Konitza a pleasant stay in Washington and the two men shook hands. For the President, the brief ceremony was nothing more than a routine required by the protocol. For Konitza however, it was a rare occasion in which a U. S. president was meeting face to face with a diplomatic representative of Albania, a nation whose very existence had been in question for a long time.

After the Credentials, one important act of Konitza in Washington was to visit the grave of the late President Woodrow Wilson, who was regarded as a hero by the Albanians. Wilson had died in 1924, four years after the Paris Peace Conference, where some of his actions had been critical in staving off the dismemberment of Albania among its neighbors.  In Albania he was highly regarded by those who knew history. Among the common Albanians, his actions were not totally unknown either. The name Vilson or its version Yllson, had started to become popular in the Albanian towns.[32] In 1921, professor Elmer Jones from Evanston, Illinois, had discovered a song the Albanians had dedicated to Wilson. It was rare for people in a foreign country to sing the praises of an American president. Therefore professor Jones translated the lyrics and sent them to President Wilson who thanked him for the pleasant surprise.[33]

Konitza placed a wreath on the late President’s sarcophagus located in the lower part of the National Cathedral. The wreath, about three feet in diameter, was formed of pink and white roses and bore the simple inscription “From the Republic of Albania”.[34] Cathedral officials described it as one of the largest and most impressive floral tributes ever brought to the chapel.[35]

At last, Albania was being represented with some dignity in Washington. An Albanian flag was placed at the legation’s door, the telephone number 6288 was registered in the Blue Book of the State Department and the man inside that hotel office was liked by the U. S. hosts. In mid September, Konitza asked his foreign minister, Hysen Vrioni, to be more generous with the budget for the new legation. “It may be a good idea for a poor country to keep its expenses at a minimum and I am happy with what I am paid although sometimes I had to cope with money shortages,”he wrote the foreign minister Hysen Vrioni. “The only thing I am asking, if at all possible, is: I settled in a decent place for legation at a monthly rent of 250 dollars (instead of the estimated 200) for here all the services are included, meaning whenever I have guests, there are servants who can cater for them. This place called The Mayflower is a sort of hotel with a separate section of apartments where a number of senators and diplomats reside.”[36] Vrioni assured the Minister that everything would be taken care of. He promised he would find the money to pay for the expensive rent.

But soon thereafter it became clear that the government was short of money. The funds for the legation routinely arrived late. In November, the Ministry received an ultimatum from Konitza, who complained that he was not being paid. “The logical conclusion is that this legation should be eliminated,” his telegram said.[37] This was his first direct encounter with the Ministry in Tirana. It must have beeen a unique case in which a diplomatic representative asked the Albanian government to close his position. The Ministry tried to calm the situation. Obviously, the funds for the Albanian legation were not a priority for Zogu who was faced with other troubles. On November 20^th, a rebellion that shook the regime erupted in the North. Its origin was unclear. It could have been a work of the Yugoslavs, who like the Italians had proposed to Zogu a treaty of friendship and security. The President sounded the alarm and several thousand troops and gendarmes were sent to the North. On November 23^rd, Konitza went to the State Department and reported that the uprising was put down and that the actions of the Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia against the Albanian government were funded by Moscow.[38] Konitza was referring to Fan Noli and his followers, who were being labeled as “reds” by Dielli.

After this, the image of the Albanian President abroad needed a boost. In an interview that was printed in many U. S. newspapers, Konitza told  the Associated Press: “Albania has one of the most remarkable state executives now in office any where in the world… a man peculiarly fitted to lead his nation towards independence after more than 500 years of Turkish domination. An hereditary bey – a title he has discarded – he is one of the few who has survived the ravages of malaria and other deseases and retained the energy which, in classic times was attributed to Albanians generally.” Konitza went on to describe the meteoric rise in power of Ahmet Zogu, who became interior minister at 26 and prime minister at 28, and his other qualities. “Zogu forced the aristocratic class to pay taxes. Although he works 14 hours a day he takes great pleasure in social functions, is a patron of the arts and recognized as the best dressed man in Albania and a most desirable dancing partner by the young women who know him,” Konitza said in an obvious attempt to lure newspapers that had an appetite for sensational news from exotic lands. He illustrated the energy of his boss with an example from the uprising in the North: “News of a revolution reached Zogu late one night at a large formal dinner. Leaving immediately, he assembled a handful of loyal troops, led them into the mountain stronghold of the rebels, and quelled the disturbance in short order.”[39]

Two American diplomats

In the second half of 1929, after more than four years of diplomatic service in Albania, Charles Hart was appointed by President Herbert Hoover as plenipotentiary minister to Persia. Hart had started his career as a Washington correspondent for several newspapers based in Portland, Spokane and Minneapolis and one could easily spot in him the curiosity and the spirit of an explorer. He had a special link with Albania and played a remarkable role in helping the country in a number of aspects he considered of vital importance, such as education and the fight against malaria. Konitza had a great appreciation for all this.

However, in the summer of 1929, when Hart came to Washington, D.C., for a brief stay, Konitza was away, vacationing on the ocean shore in Swamscott, Massachusetts. Zog’s closest confidant, Abdurahman Krosi, became irritated and called Konitza’s behaviour an affront to the American friend.[40] He told the American Minister on his return to Tirana that if Konitza had a sense of duty, he should have accompanied the Minister during his entire stay in Washington.[41] Hart did not make a big deal of it but later, it turned out that Konitza had been advised by his personal doctor, Robert Oden, to take a vacation as a cure for his hypertension.[42] It is not clear whether Konitza learned of Krosi’s complaint but in October, when Hart returned to the U.S., Konitza invited him to Boston and visit Vatra’s office. He put up a large dinner in The Bellevue hotel and both he and Hart made speeches. Konitza urged Hart not to interrupt his links with Albania. He said: “Your many friends in Albania wish that in the future, you return there every year to spend part of your vacation among the people who know and love you.”[43] Hart said, in Albania he witnessed the “stabilisation of government, and the implementation of a great program of improvements, such as the construction of roads, bridges and power stations and more importantly of a general expansion of the public school system.”[44] “I would not exchange my four and a half years in Albania with any other period of my life,” the American Minister said.

In fact, Hart’s service in Albania  had all the elements of an adventure. He had closely followed the strengthening of the new state under King Zog. He had witnessed the arduous efforts of the poverty stricken society to learn from the outside world and rid the blood feuds. He had also witnessed the increase of the Italian influence in Albania. Personally, Hart didn’t appear to have great sympathy for the King, and on one occasion he even reported to Washington that Zog “has done nothing for his own people”.[45] However, he maintained close relations with the King, whose respect for America was indisputable. Those relations were such that in one case, when the Minister was about to travel back home, Zog asked him if he could find him an American wife provided that she was both attractive and rich. As the Associated Press reported later, Minister Hart searched and returned to Albania with a long list. However, the condition that the girls had one million dollars disqualified them all.[46]

In 1929, Presidenti Hoover appointed another journalist to replace Hart as Minister to Albania. This was a prominent Jew named Herman Bernstein. He was born in Russia and had come to the U.S. when he was 17. Bernstein had made quite a career with the interviews that, as a New York Times correspondent in Europe, he had done with some of the world’s best known personalities, such as Pope Benedict XV, Woodrow Wilson, Henry Ford, Leo Tolstoi, Leo Trotzki, Albert Einstein, Hans Delbrück, Henri Bergson, Bernard Show and Auguste Rodin.[47] Bernstein had authored the book Herbert Hoover, the Man who Broght America to the World. His impressive resume also included novels and literary translations from  the Russian language.

Bernstein was nominated to serve in Albania in unusual circumstances. In 1920, the sensational newspaper The Dearborn Independent, controlled by Henry Ford, the automobile magnate and the richest man in America, began publishing a series of antisemitic articles. A year later, asked about the articles, Ford said that a prominent Jew had stated to him that the Jews were responsible for the World War and that they controlled the world through the control of gold.[48] Later, when pressed, Ford disclosed that this man was no other than journalist Herman Bernstein. In 1923 Bernstein sued Ford for defamation, demanding that he pay him 200 thousand dollars in damages. Four years latter, the case was settled in Bernstein’s favor.[49] Ford apologised and retracted the writings. The two men remained friends. According to press reports, Bernstein believed that Ford had intervened with President Hoover to make him America’s diplomatic representative to Albania.[50]

At the end of March 1930 a great dinner was put up in New York’s Astor hotel on the eve of Bernstein’s departure to Albania. Konitza, who was among the guests, held a speech. “Bernstein – he said – incoporates in his persona two things that rarely stay together: the dream and the action. He is both a man of letters and of action, both a dreamer and a fighter.”As usual, here too Konitza used his sarcastic style harping on his beloved theme, the image of Albania: “There is something that Bernstein will notice immediately – he said – and that is the big difference between Albania as it is and Albania as it has been described by the journalists. There are two kinds of journalists: the historian journalists, who follow carefully and with conscience the present history as it unfolds before our eyes, and the poet journalists, who get their news not from the outside sources but only from their phantasy. So far, most of the journalists that have dealt with Albania are of the second kind.”[51] Konitza had harsh words especially against those who “invented news about the King of the Albanians”: “Sometimes they describe him as a small and fat man dressed without taste, sometimes they portray him as a merciless person, other times as a scared man that goes out of his way to protect himself and other nonsense. In fact, King Zog is a young man of 35 years, civilized and with a fine taste. He dresses in style and without glitter. He is not only the most handsome but also the ablest of all the living kings today… The value of a person, especially a man of that stature is not measured through phantasy but through a patient and thorough study of the facts.”

Bernstein presented his credentials to Zog on April 29, 1930. Since then, this untiring man never ceased sending detailed reports on Albania to the State Department. The National Archive near Washington, D.C. contains his long letters on the reality of King Zog’s Albania, with which a whole history of that period could be written. Faik Konitza’s brother, Mehmed, was an important source for those reports. Between 1930 and 1933, Mehmed, this fragile man, was one of closest advisors to the King and Bernstein could not expect more confidential and accurate information than what he got from his pro-American friend, whom he described as a patriotic, humanitarian and wise human being.

As a professional journalist and writer, Bernstein was extremely interested in learning the internal workings of the Albanian Kingdom. He wanted to be informed on the sympathies of the cabinet ministers, how corrupt they were and which foreign country they served. On one instance, the diplomatic representative of Yugoslavia in Tirana, Nastasijevic, had implied to him that he saw nothing wrong in the fact that the Interior Minister, Musa Juka, the most powerful man in the cabinet, had been in his pay. Nastasijevic was simply irritated that Mr. Juka was now receiving money from the Italians.[52] Bernstein believed that corruption among Zog’s ministers had become routine. This was reinforced by what Mehmed confessed to him about the ministers. “They take money from both sides, sometimes from three,” Mehmed had told Bernstein on one occasion. “But as a rule they give nothing back to those who pay. In most cases they do what is best for Albania.”[53]

By an interesting coincidence, both Herman Bernstein and his counterpart in Washington, Faik Konitza, were ministers of high learning; they were both prominent writers and historians each in his own merit. But while Konitza did not bother to write reports to his Foreign Ministry, Bernstein could not resist the temptation of describing in minute details to his superiors everything interesting he saw and heard in Albania. He was intrigued by King Zog’s Court, in which conspiracies and dirty little schemes thrived.

The friendship with Mehmed may have helped the American Minister form a positive impression of Albania and Faik Konitza highly appreciated that. In 1932, when Bernstein returned to the U.S. for a short vacation, Konitza went to New York to meet him and invite him to dinner as if he was an old friend.[54] During his stay in the U.S. Bernstein said a lot of good things about Albania. In a romantic portrait of the country and its customs, Bernstein wrote: “In Albania, the Orient and the Occident rub shoulders as in few other lands. The Albanian women are held in high esteem by the men. A woman traveling alone is safe anywhere in Albania. And no man need fear the ancient vengeance of a foe if accompanied by one of his women-folk.”[55] On Zog he said: “He is a tall, intelligent young man of 36 who bears himself with simple but impressive dignity and poise.”[56]

His relations with the King became very close. Zog had asked Bernstein several times to help him find an American bride, just as he had done with Hart before. Zog approached the Minister through his confidant, Abdurahman Krosi. “A refined, energetic and democratic American woman would be a fine example to our people…and if such a match could not be arranged, Zog would rather remain a bachelor,” Krosi told Bernstein. The American Minister declined to help in this delicate matter.[57] In one instance, Zog noticed Bernstein’s mechanical refrigerator in the Minister’s residence and asked him to order one for himself. In no time, the refrigerator arrived, the third such machine ever imported in Albania after the first two in the American legation.[58] In 1933, in a case that can be seen as rare for a U.S. chief of diplomatic mission, Berstein undertook to write a detailed story of King Zog’s life on the basis of many questions he had presented to him through Mehmed. The result was a long biography of the Albanian monarch narrated in the third person by the American Minister.[59]

When President Hoover lost his reelection bid in 1932, Konitza wrote to  Bernstein: “The result of the elections might, I fear, curtail your diplomatic mission to Albania; and I know that Albania would thereby lose a good and sincere friend. Howeever I hope that your connection with the country will never cease.”[60] Bernstein left Tirana in September 1933. A few months later, King Zog honored him with the Grand Cross of the Order of Skanderbeg, the highest award conferred to a foreigner by Albania. Konitza brought the medal and the diploma to a ceremony organized on March 23, 1934 at the New York’s Ritz Carlton. Bernstein could not hold back the emotions. Turning to Konitza and others he said: “America and the Americans are extremely popular in your country. They remember how President Wilson helped Albania at the Peace Conference to regain her independence, and they also remember what the Albanians in the United States have done to save and make secure your independence.  Albania is one of the few countries in Europe that owe the United States only moral obligations and debts. That has added to America’s popularity in Albania.”[61]

About a year later, when Bernstein published his book entitled Can We Abolish War? with opinions from dozens of world celebrities on war and peace issues, Konitza was among the first to congratulate his friend.[62] This was his last letter to him, because shortly afterward, on August 31, 1935 Bernstein died of a heart attack. Konitza learned the sad news a few weeks later from the press when he returned to Washington from his vacation in Swamscott.

[1] Frank Kellogg to President Coolidge, April 5, 1926, Calvin Coolidge Papers 1915-1932, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Microform 178/3456.

[2] Faik Konitza, “Lamtumir”, Dielli, July 3, 1926.

[3] C. C. Hart to Secretary of State, December 10, 1925, National Archives at College Park, Maryland [NACP] 701.7511/12.

[4] Athanas T. Body (Boston), Letter to the Department of State, June 27, 1926, NACP 701.7511/16.

[5] Faik Konitza, “Lamtumir”, Dielli, July 3, 1926.

[6] Division of Near Eastern Affairs, “Memorandum”, April 1, 1926, NACP 701.7511/13.

[7] Telegram of Faik Konitza to the Foreign Ministry, July 13, 1926. Archive of Foreign Ministry of Albania, Tirana, 1926.

[8] “Mbi kompetencat: Korrik, Gusht e Shtator”, Foreign Ministry letter to Konitza, July 11, 1926. Foreign Ministry Archive.

[9] Diana L. Bailey, The Mayflower, Washington’s Second Best Address (Virginia Beach: The Donning Company Publishers, 2001).

[10] The Mayflower Log, July, August, September 1926 issues, Martin Luther King Library, Washington, DC.

[11] Haris Silajxhic, Shqipëria dhe SHBA në arkivat e Washingtonit (Tiranë: Dituria, 1999), translated by Xh. Fejza, p. 127.

[12] W. S. Mann: “Diplomats Many Lands Crowding Nat’l Capital”, Fayetteville Democrat (Arkansas), May 12, 1920.

[13] Phyllis Cole Braunlich, Stone Pillows, (Xlibris Corporation, 2003), p. 221.

[14] Ibid.

[15] “Ambassador to Italy (Child) to Secretary of State”, April 3, 1922. Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), V. I, pp. 594-596.

[16] “Albania Desires U.S. Recognition”, Reno Evening Gazette, (By Associated Press Mail). June 17, 1922.

[17] “Commissioner in Albania (Blake) to Secretary of State”, June 28, 1922. FRUS V. I, pp. 602-603.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jup Kastrati, Faik Konitza (Monografi) (New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Company, 1995), p. 171.

[20] H. Silajxhiç, Shqipëria dhe SHBA në arkivat e Washingtonit, p. 127.

[21] Today Georgetown University. Chekrezi returned to Albania in 1925.

[22] “Royal Mate Sought By Zog”, The San Antonio Light, (Universal Service) December 6, 1931, p. 11.

[23] Uran Butka, Gjeniu i Kombit (Tiranë: Drier, 2000), p. 221.

[24] F. Konitza to Secretary of State, undated letter, received on September 19, 1922, NACP 701.7511/3.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ulysses Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, Tirana, January 6, 1923, NACP 701.7511/6.

[27] “Memorandum of Conversation with the Consul of Albania, Mr. Sula”, July 16, 1924, NACP 701.7511/11.

[28] “Conversation with Mr. Tashko, Acting Consul of Albania in New York City”, January 25, 1925, NACP 875.01/262.

[29] C. C. Hart to Secretary of State, November 23, 1926, NACP 875.00/215.

[30] Owen Pearson, Albania and King Zog, (London: Centre for Albanian Studies, I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), p. 285.

[31] F. Konitza, Letter to Secretary F. Kellogg, October 1, 1926, NACP 701.7511/22. Also see Dielli October 15, 1926: “Z. Konitza çmon përkrahjen amerikane për indipendencën e Shqipërisë pas Luftës së Madhe”.

[32] The tradition continues today. In the 2010 electoral lists in Tirana, there were 218 voters named Vilson and 47 Yllson.

[33] “An Ode to Wilson and America”, 02.28.1921, NACP Microfilm Publications, M1211, Roll 15. Also see Wilson’s letter to Prof. Elmer E. Jones.

[34] Wilson’s tomb was later placed in another part of the Cathedral.

[35] “Albanian Minister At Tomb of Wilson”, The Washington Post, October 26, 1926, p. 24.

[36] F. Konitza, Letter to Minister Vrioni, September 17, 1926. Foreign Ministry Archive.

[37] F. Konitza, Telegram to the Foreign Ministry, November 8, 1926. Foreign Ministry Archive.

[38] Maynard B. Barnes. “Department of State. Conversation with Albanian Minister, Mr. Konitza”, November 24, 1926. NACP 875.00/214.

[39] “Strenous and youthful, Zogu leads Albania towards freedom”, The Havre Daily News-Promoter, March 14, 1927.

[40] After proclaiming himself King in the fall of 1928, Zogu changed his last name to Zog.

[41] C. C. Hart to Secretary of State, August 1, 1929, NACP 875.00/273.

[42] “Mr. Faik Konitza”, Dielli, June 7, 1929.

[43] “Ministri i Amerikës Charles C. Hart vizitor i Vatrës”, Dielli, October 25, 1929.

[44] “Një intervistë me ekselencën e tij Ministrin Charles C. Hart”, Dielli, November 22, 1929.

[45] C. C. Hart to Secretary of State, November 23, 1926, NACP 875.00/214.

[46] Associated Press, “King Zog Wants American Spouse”, The Kingsport Times (Tennessee), January 21, 1935, pp. 1, 6. Hart denied the newspaper reports.

[47] H. Bernstein, Celebrities of Our Time, (New York: Joseph Lawren Publisher, 1924).

[48] Neil Baldwin, Henry Ford and the Jews, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 164.

[49] Ibid, p. 241.

[50] UP, “Man Who Sued Ford Appointed Minister”, The Charleston Daily Mail, February 9, 1930.

[51] “Një darkë nderi për Ministrin e ri t’Amerikës”, Dielli, April 4, 1930.

[52] H. Bernstein to Secretary of State, March 12, 1931. NACP, M1211, Roll 8.

[53] Ibid.

[54] “Një darkë për nder të Ministrit t’Amerikës në Shqipëri”, Dielli, May 20, 1932.

[55] Harold T. Horan: “The Land of the Eagle People”, The Washington Post, March 6, 1932. p. 7

[56] Ibid.

[57] H. Bernstein to Secretary of State, December 5, 1930, NACP 875.001-ZOG/35.

[58] “Introduced Mechanical Refrigeration In Albania”, Hamilton Evening Journal, May 9, 1932.

[59] The origjinal of the biography is in The Papers of Herman Bernstein, Box 31. Also see R. Elsie, “King Zog Tells His Story”, www.albanianhistory.net.

[60] F. Konitza to H. Bernstein, November 15, 1932, The Papers of Herman Bernstein, Folder 758.

[61] Speech by H. Bernstein, March 23, 1934. Ibid, Folder 751.

[62] F. Konitza to H. Bernstein, The Papers of Herman Bernstein, Folder 758.

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