1. The White Rose of Hungary – Geraldine’s early years in the shadow of World War I

Countess Geraldine Apponyi of Nagyappony was born on 6 August 1915 in Budapest, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The beginning of her life was also an interesting one: the armed conflicts of the First World War were already in full swing and the world was watching the future of the countries with a keen eye.

Geraldine’s family background can be also a great discussion, as she is a descendant of the Hungarian noble Apponyi family. Her father, Count Gyula Rudolf Apponyi, had a military career and served in the Hussar regiment, but was also an MP for the Liberal Party in Parliament.

During World War I, Gyula held a director position in the National Office of the Army and maintained his noble activities throughout the years.[1] Gladys Virginia Stewart, Geraldine’s mother, is an American-born lady from a family of millionaire diplomats. 

Not too long after Gyula and Gladys met, some months later they got married in Geneva, Switzerland, and raised three children over the years – Geraldine, Virginia and Gyula. Both parents had the opportunity to experience growing up in an intellectual, educated environment, so they passed on the same curiosity for knowledge for their children. The family’s life was overshadowed by the aftermath of the First World War and as Hungary was defeated, it seemed difficult to emerge from the crisis.

The Apponyi family survived the turbulent years in Switzerland and returned to Hungary in the early 1920s, when they had to face further losses: most of the country’s territory was annexed to other states and the head of the family, Gyula Apponyi, died in 1924.[2] Gladys did not delay long in finding a new partner and two years later, in 1926, she married Gontran Girault, a French officer: the family moved to France and the family expanded with new children, who became half-siblings of the Apponyi children.

In the meantime, the link with the Hungarian nobility had not been completely severed and Geraldine along with her ssiter, Virginia spent summer vacations at the Apponyi estate.[3]

The village of Zebegény, near the Danube, was an important place in Geraldine’s childhood: her aunt Franciska Apponyi bought several farmhouses in the village and organised summer camps for children with the help of her family. The success of the educational endeavour made visitors refer to Franciska’s houses as “children’s republic”, where several houses were named after flowers.

The main focus was on nature-related education, but the participants were also introduced to drama plays and gardening. Geraldine’s beauty earned her the membership name ‘White Rose’ from her aunt and hence the Countess’s special nickname.[4] The two girls, Geraldine and Virginia, were sent by their mother to study at the Sacre Coeur convent school in Austria, where they lived under strict conditions in such a Catholic institution among other noble students.[5] Although she spent relatively little time in Hungary and most of her time she was travelling around Europe, Geraldine found recognition in Budapest as an amateur actor playing the character of Mimi in the play ‘Bohemian Life’ at the Opera Ball and was well received by the audience.[6]

After completing her studies, Geraldine returned to Hungary again, but faced new obstacles: the post-war crisis was still testing the country’s economy to the extent that she, unlike the average countess, had to take on work. With family help, she found her way into the National Museum’s gift shop and sold souvenirs until an invitation came for her from Albania[7].

2. A self-made man – short summary of Zog I’s a monarchy in Albania

On 8 October 1895, Ahmet Muhtar Zogolli was born, who would later be known as King Zog I in Albanian history. He has had a wide-ranging political career, having worked in the public sector from a young age and holding strong reformist views. Although he considered it important to preserve the Albanian identity, he believed that development was essential for the country’s future and wanted to orient his homeland’s development process towards Europe.[8]

In 1908 he became the leader of Mat region and at the suggestion of his mother, Sadije Toptani, he went to study at the Galatasaray Lyceum in Istanbul to stay away from clan politics. 1912 was an eventful year for him, as he took part in the struggle against the Young Turk movement and represented Mat at the proclamation of an independent Albanian state, but he also successfully fought the Serbs the following year.

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Zog supported William of Wied’s brief regency as Prince of Albania and became an even more influential figure in the country over the next decade.[9] He served as President of Albania from 1925 to 1928, and on 1 September 1928 he proclaimed himself King and defined his country’s form of government as a democratic constitutional hereditary monarchy.

Taking his royal oath on both the Quran and the Bible, Zog I, who is also a Muslim, promised at his inauguration that Albania’s independence, territorial freedom and constitution would be his top priorities under his rule.[10]

Zog took his promises for the development of Albania seriously and proclaimed Tirana as the capital, which also functioned as a cultural centre for the Albanians. A new infrastructure was built and many buildings were constructed, including institutions such as hospitals. Religious tolerance was important to the King, as he stated in his inaugural oath. He did not deviate from this principle and banned the former Ottoman law of mandatory veil-wearing for women.

Both Christianity and Islam coexisted peacefully in Albania with the spirit of religious harmony, but Zog did not turn his back on the Jews either when he gave shelter to refugees fleeing Nazi persecution in the 1930s.[11]

Although always aiming for independence, the backwardness meant that help had to be sought from other countries, so the Zogist period was one in which the king was open to foreign capital and had closer relations with Italy in particular, which would shorten the life of the Albanian monarchy in later years.[12]

One of the most important turning points during Zog’s reign was the introduction of the Civil Code in 1929, which was based on French and Swiss models, thus moving closer to European inspired developments.

The document consisted of 4 books: the first part dealt with the rights of families and individuals, and also set out the conditions for citizenship. The second part dealt with inheritance, and the third chapter set out the rules on property. Finally, the last section of the Code contained the rules of contract law.[13]

As Zog was a self-made king, in order to secure the future of the monarchy he had to find a partner, which finally brought success in the second half of the 1930s.

3. Engagement and wedding in Tirana

During Zog’s reign, he also thought about maintaining the dynasty, but he had to find himself a wife to ensure its survival. It was not easy for him, however, as he himself was not descended from a royal family and had transformed Albania into a monarchical state as a self-made man: he nevertheless tried to incorporate royal traditions into everyday life, but he still had a difficult task for the future.

As Zog led his country as a Muslim, four other religions also lived peacefully side by side – the religion of the future wife was also a key issue for the country. By the end of the 1930s his ideas had become clearer and he wanted to find himself a Catholic bride: he had no luck in Vienna, but his attempts in Budapest were not in vain.[14]

In 1937, on the 25th anniversary of Albania’s independence, a series of events were organised to commemorate the important date and Zog decided to invite Hungary to be the guest of honour because of the good historical relations between the two countries. Baron Frigyes Villani, a diplomat working as Hungarian envoy in Rome was also in charge of Albanian affairs and became a great help to the King in choosing a bride.[15]

There were Hungarian noblewomen with whom Zogu was rumoured to have tried to meet and propose marriage, but these attempts were unsuccessful and finally, Countess Geraldine Apponyi was the solution for the Albanian ruler. Zog’s sisters also intervened to find a suitable match for their brother: in 1937, they travelled to Budapest and, after spending time with Geraldine, asked the Countess to give them the medallion around her neck as a memory.

Zog was reportedly immediately attracted by the picture of Geraldine and decided to invite the Apponyi girl, who by that time was in Abkhazia, to the New Year’s Eve ball to be held soon in Tirana. After Geraldine received the long invitation letter, she phoned her guardian in Budapest and Károly Apponyi approved the travel plans, so Geraldine left for Albania the next day.[16]

The Hungarian press was also interested in the coverage of the event and it was reported that the ball went so well that Zog and Geraldine fell in love immediately and the King soon afterwards urged the engagement. The news was reportedly sensational in the Apponyi family circles and they arrived in Tirana at the end of January to celebrate the engagement.[17]

By the time of the wedding, the religious differences had been resolved, and the Catholic head of church himself gave permission for Geraldine to marry Zog, a Muslim, on condition that the wedding ceremony was held in the traditions of both religions. In addition, the king granted his future wife the rank of princess and agreed to the free practice of her religion, just like as he had also granted this right to the Albanians.[18]

The wedding on 27 April 1938 was a day of celebration in Albania, with the opening of the road between Durrës and Tirana and the new airport, a military parade and the laying of a wreath on the grave of Sadije Toptani, Zog’s mother.[19]

Another interesting fact about the event: the King also paid the wedding expenses of 100 other couples marrying on the same day, in honour of the fact that centuries ago, on this day, the Albanian national hero Gjergj Kastrioti and his wife Donika Arianiti-Muzaka got married.[20] Representatives of the world press also arrived in Tirana, but several noble families from Hungary also attended the wedding ceremony.

The civil ceremony wedding was held in the hall of the Royal Palace in Tirana, followed by a 101 gun salute and bells ringing to announce the marriage of the royal couple. One of the king’s witnesses was Count Ciano: the same Ciano who was Mussolini’s son-in-law and soon afterwards the excessive Italian influence in Albania would cause fatal problems for the monarchy.

4. Short fairytale of Geraldine

After the wedding, Geraldine became Queen of Albania and did her best to play her fair part in helping and developing the country. Queen Geraldine has always made the welfare of Albanians and helping the poor her priority: she has been involved in many initiatives that have contributed to the building of institutions such as hospitals, asylums, maternity wards and orphanages. She was involved in improving the status of women and emancipation in the country: the Queen always supported the running and development of the military hospital in Tirana and was responsible for the establishment of the first maternity hospital.[21]

In addition to Geraldine’s philanthropic work, she settled into her new country very well and quickly became fluent in Albanian: her radio speech to the Albanian nation in Burgayet on 29 August 1938 is a memorable one in local history.[22] It is also interesting to note that the royal family is credited with the establishment of the first radio in Tirana: on 28 November 1938, on Independence Day, King Zog and Queen Geraldine both addressed the Albanian people on the air and Radio Tirana began broadcasting.[23]

Soon the royal family expanded: on 5 April 1939, the heir to the throne, Leka, was born, but the family’s joy did not last long, because two days later the fascist Italian troops under Mussolini invaded Albania and the king had to go into exile with his family.[24]

5. Decades spent in exile

The excessive Italian influence was fatal in Albania, as the fascist forces invaded the country in early April 1939. Prior to this, on 25 March, Mussolini sent an ultimatum to King Zog, which included the following conditions: an Italian customs union and military troops in towns and villages, the involvement of Italian settlers in agriculture and, last but not least, the sending of an envoy to the Albanian Council of Ministers.

Zog tried to protect the pregnant Geraldine from the stress, but there was not much time to act: two days after Leka’s birth, on 7 April 1939, the Italian army invaded Albania. After a short farewell, the mother and baby set off southwards in a convoy of cars towards Korçë and crossed the Greek border after long hours in difficult conditions. In the meantime, according to news reports, Durrës had already come under Italian control and Vlorë was being bombed from the sea.

Zog joined his family five days later and in the meantime, the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III took control of Albania until the end of World War II – his rule was ended after Enver Hoxha had consolidated the communist regime in the country.[25]

Zog’s destination was France, which seemed safe, and from there he intended to organise his plan for the liberation of Albania. The royal family and their entourage travelled across Europe through countries where fascism had not yet taken root: after Greece, through Turkey, Romania, Poland, the Scandinavian countries and Belgium, they finally arrived in Versailles, France. However, they could not stay here for long, because France was soon occupied by the Nazi German forces and they were able to flee towards the United Kingdom only hours before the invasion.

The Ritz Hotel in London and later Parmoor Village was home to the family until they arrived in Alexandria, Egypt in 1946 at the invitation of King Farouk of Egypt. Zog visited the US in the early 1950s and bought the Knollwood Estate, but the royal family never moved there and a few years later the land was put up for sale. In 1952, President Nasser took power in Egypt and times were difficult both politically and family-wise: Zog felt less support in Alexandria, but at the same time his health began to deteriorate.

The long journey ahead made it impossible to move overseas and the destination was France once again. April seemed to be an eventful time for the Albanian royal family, but on 9 April 1961 tragedy struck: King Zog died in exile abroad after an illness.[26] On 15 April, Leka took the oath of allegiance before representatives of the Albanian emigration in Paris, invoking the royal constitution and trying to work under the name Leka I to return his family to their homeland.

In 1975, Leka and her Australian-born partner Susan Cullen-Ward got married and Geraldine soon moved to Spain with them. However, they did not stay there permanently, as Leka’s arsenal of arms amassed under General Franco’s rule was not looked upon favourably by the later Spanish government.

In 1979, they headed back to the African continent, eventually settling in South Africa where in 1982, Leka II, the grandson of Geraldine was born. The exiled Albanian royal family lived in the country until 2002.[27]

6. 2002: Returning to Albania – The Queen’s passing and her legacy

In 1944, the Enver Hoxha-led government decided that King Zog and his family were not allowed to enter Albanian borders, so the family lived in exile for decades. After the fall of communism, in 1993 Leka, Geraldine’s son tried to return to Albania but was turned back from Tirana to the airport within 24 hours by the authorities, claiming that there was a problem with his personal documents, but in fact, his previous gun possession issues were also a problem.

In 1997, in addition to parliamentary elections, a referendum was held among voters in the country, the main issue being to decide on Albania’s form of government – whether the country should be a monarchy or remain a republic. In the end, the results did not go in Leka’s favour and a number of royalist supporters in Skanderbeg Square, downtown Tirana rioted in protest after the referendum result.[28]

The solution finally came in 2002, when parliamentarians signed a document allowing the royal family to return to Albania. On 17 June, the decision was taken and, as a mark of respect, Geraldine and her family were allowed to return to Tirana after decades of fascist and communist regimes.

Finally, on the morning of 28 June, the royal plane arrived in Tirana from South Africa and after 63 years, Geraldine was back on Albanian land, accompanied by her son Leka and his wife Susan – and grandson Leka II, visiting his country for the first time.[29]

In the meantime, Queen Mother Geraldine had been suffering from health problems and died on 22 October 2002 at the age of 87. Although she was not able to spend much time in her beloved country, she was granted her wish to return to Albania before she passed away and was laid to rest in Tirana.

Today, Geraldine’s legacy is carried on by her grandson, Leka II, and his wife, Crown Princess Elia, who set up the Queen Geraldine Foundation in 2004 to help those in need, just like Leka II’s grandmother.[30] In 2019, Elia published an illustrated storybook in honour of Queen Geraldine called “The White Rose”[31] and a year later gave birth to a baby girl named Geraldine after her great-grandmother in Tirana, at the Queen Geraldine Maternity Hospital.[32]

[1] Katona Csaba: Geraldine Apponyi, the Sold Bride. In: Csaplár-Degovics Krisztián: Acta Balcano-Hungarica I., Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2019. pp. 204.

[2] Ibid pp. 205

[3] Ibid pp. 206

[4] https://mnm.hu/hu/cikk/feher-rozsa-geraldine (last download: 2023. 01. 16)

[5] Katona Csaba: Ibid. pp. 206

[6] Apponyi grófnő élete. In: Magyarország, 1938-01-29, Vol. 23

[7] Ibid

[8] Jeta Goxha, Lindita Licaj: The development of Albanian legislation and the codification process during the Zogist period. In: European Scientific Journal, November 2015 edition vol.11, No.31. pp. 189

[9] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/zog-i-king-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 16)

[10] Ibid

[11] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/royal-house/ (last download: 2023. 01. 16)

[12] Jeta Goxha, Lindita Licaj: Ibid. pp. 190

[13] Ibid. pp. 195

[14] Katona Csaba: ibid pp. 206

[15] Ibid pp. 207

[16] Gárdos Miklós: Magyar királyné a tiranai trónon – Századunk emlékezik. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1990. pp. 57

[17] 8 Órai Ujság, 1938. 01. 30.

[18] Gárdos Miklós: Ibid pp. 62

[19] https://mnm.hu/hu/cikk/feher-rozsa-geraldine (last download: 2023. 01. 18)

[20] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/geraldine-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 18)

[21] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/geraldine-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 18)

[22] https://mnm.hu/hu/cikk/feher-rozsa-geraldine (last download: 2023. 01. 18)

[23] https://www.qmksh.al/en/28-nentor-1938-perurimi-i-radio-tiranes-fjalim-i-mbretit-zog-ne-mikrofon/ (2023. 01. 18)

[24] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/leka-i-king-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[25] Gaál Gyula: Intermezzó. In: Krónika, 1987. 10. 01. / Vol. 10, pp. 27

[26] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/zog-i-king-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[27]  https://albanianroyalcourt.al/leka-i-king-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[28] https://memorie.al/en/how-the-return-of-the-albanian-royal-family-to-the-homeland-took-place/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[29] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/geraldine-of-the-albanians/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[30] Ibid

[31] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/crown-princess-elia/ (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

[32] https://albanianroyalcourt.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Official-Announcement-1.jpeg (last download: 2023. 01. 19)

The post From countess to the queen: the short Albanian fairytale of Geraldine Apponyi appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Shedding light through Tirana Times in a new and unique way on the life of Albania’s former dictator, Enver Hoxha, the author of the article is Kristoffer Leandoer, a Swedish writer, essayist, literary critic and poet, who has published more than 30 books. He was born in Stockholm 1962, where he worked as journalist, editor, publisher and translator from French and English. He is a former member of the Nobel Prize in Literature Selection Committee. He has two children. He has lived in Stockholm, Paris, Minsk and Hanoi. Since 2019, he lives in Tirana, being the husband of the Swedish ambassador.

Literature is catholic in the original meaning of the word, that is general and all-embracing. Books are for everyone. Literature belongs to anyone who wants a share in it, who is prepared to take it in and profit by it, no-one has the right to reserve certain works as their private property and claim to be the only one capable of understanding them. You can wake me up in the middle of night and I will hold this to be true, and to my dying day I will defend the right of freedom for everyone not only to write and print, but also to read what they want. Nevertheless, it comes as a shock to me when the title of a book with a special significance for me personally shows up on the inventory list of the library of the European dictator with the longest reign of them all. What, I ask myself, may Enver Hoxha, the man who proclaimed the world’s first and till now only atheistic state, have gotten out of reading Aurélia, the gentle French romantic poet Gérard de Nerval hallucinatory account of his travels in other realms of the mind? That book in the hands of that man; he didn’t have the right to read that book – that was my spontaneous reaction.

During 41 years, from 1944 until his death April 11th 1985, communist leader Enver Hoxha was in practice the absolute ruler over Albania. His personal whims, foibles and phobias came to dictate the life of an entire people and with time turned Albania into the third poorest country in the world, as isolated from the rest of the contemporary world as ever North Korea. The steadily growing paranoia of his world-view deprived the whole country gradually from all contact with the rest of the Eastern Bloc and kept the population fenced in.

In Hoxha’s Albania everything was either forbidden or inaccessible. Naturally, that makes it even more interesting to find out what he allowed himself. In the basement of the Albanian National Library, in the center of Tirana at Skanderbeg Square where thirty years ago an overthrown statue marked the end of dictatorship, the remains of the dictator’s immense library, which allegedly at one point amounted to 30 000 volumes, are kept. The director of the National Library, Piro Misha, was kind enough to put the inventory of this collection at my disposal – page after page of handwritten lists over the library of a dictator.

Hoxha was always reading. Unanimous witnesses portray someone who always came down to breakfast with another book than the one he went to bed with. His nocturnal reading habits found their way into his medical journals since doctors assumed they were detrimental to his digestion. His high esteem of books is also shown by his own production: Hoxha published 68 titles under his own name (with the help of ghost writers), only his memoirs in thirteen volumes stretch over 7 000 pages. He liked to be portrayed sitting at his desk with a pen in his hand, even though the pen was more likely to be used for signing death warrants than any literary creative work. In his youth, Hoxha spent a few years in Montpellier, Paris and Brussels. He was supposed to study but never took any exams, and his memoirs talk of important high-level contacts in the French communist party have proved impossible to confirm, but these years still made a remaining impression. On his return to Albania he worked as an extra teacher at the Lycée in Korça and French culture remained an ideal for the rest of his life.

His very last trip abroad took place in 1961. From that year and until his death, growing paranoia kept him imprisoned within the country borders together with his subjects, afraid of being poisoned, murdered or shot down while flying. He built his fear into the architecture of the country. Everywhere in the Albanian landscape you can see small concrete cupolas – the remains of the 170 000 or more bunkers that made up Hoxha’s line of defense against a hostile world.

In reality he was even more isolated, in reality even Albania was too big for him: a Tirana block three streets wide, called Blloku (The Block), was fenced off and reserved for the party elite. The privileged but frightful life in Blloku (almost anybody could fall from grace at almost any given moment) is described in Swedish journalist and writer Peter Kadhammar’s remarkable book Vi som var så lyckliga (“We who were so happy”), built on extensive interviews. There his world began and ended.

His wife Nexhmilje used the books to persuade him to move into a bigger house: “Finally, you may have room for your library.” Vila 31, still in place, was no luxury residence, the furniture mainly provided by prefabricated Italian low-end-to-middle-range chains. “I was so angry when I finally got to see it”, one Albanian said to me: “Was this why he kept us all oppressed? For nothing more than this – so ugly, tasteless and mediocre?” The exception to the rule was the lavish book shelves, built in situ in thirties style by the most skilled domestic artisans that could be found.

Even when isolation was at its peak and the supply of imported goods was completely cut off, there was one exception: France. Every year he ordered new suits from Paris, every year he was furnished with lists of newly published French books and sent for an extensive choice (the French government had a special allowance to keep Hoxha and three other Albanian communist leaders supplied with literature). To the very largest part, his library consists of titles in French. English, German, Russian literature – he read it all, only in French translation.

So, what does someone read who exterminated his own generation of party comrades, someone who never was able to forgive a favour or a good turn, someone who made sure that everyone who helped him on the way either were imprisoned or disappeared without a trace?

Above all, this is a library of classics. A library of world literature – Dante, Petrarca, Shakespeare, with a leaning towards the French: Racine and Molière, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu, Hugo, Balzac, Flaubert, Zola and Daudet. The great Russians. Storytellers like Walter Scott and Dickens. But the collection does not make a stop at the realism that was prescribed by orthodox Marxist literature criticism. We have the great prose innovators such as Proust, Gide, Mann and Musil. He kept up with contemporary literature to a remarkably high degree. One can’t help to wonder what he made of Romain Gary’s endless reckonings with his own ego (Hoxha and Gary shared an extreme mother fixation), or Graham Greene’s and John Le Carré’s novels from the shadows of the cold war. Here are the surrealists led by André Breton. Hoxha was fascinated by lord Byron (who travelled in Albania), but also by more esoteric poets, Keats and Mallarmé. We have a number of writers who hailed communism – Brecht, Lukàcs, Paul Nizan, Aragon, but also writers who criticized it like Arthur Koestler. A substantial part of the library consists of titles that even the possession of would have earned other Albanians a prison sentence.

This is the library of a person constrained to voyages by proxy, an armchair traveler. When Hoxha ceased venturing on travels abroad, the world outside had to come to him instead in the form of literature. This is also the library of someone who values education and general knowledge. A large part of it consists of popular biographies of artists and composers, philosophers, writers, statesmen and inventors. Religion was evidently of personal interest to him, even if he was forbidding his countrymen from the practice of it: here we find studies of Christianity and Islam, church history and the biographies of the great reformers of the church. Philosophers from Plato over Hume, Locke and Hegel up to Nietzsche and even his contemporaries Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

A person of interest seems to have been Napoleon, whose name pops up everywhere in these lists. The study of Hitler seems to have consumed a lot of time as well, as well as Nero, Charlemagne, general De Gaulle and Che Guevara. Did he feel a need to compare himself?

This is also the library of a conspiracy theorist. You find a large number of books dedicated to secret societies, the Templars, the Cathars and the Assassins, books about the “secret” power of the Jesuits, books about the ties between Nazism and occultism, an abundance of books treating the Borgia family, the Kennedy murder, as well as Francis King’s classic Ritual Magic in England from 1970: all of this reading that must have nurtured and fed his growing paranoia.

The most human feature of his library is probably the large number of detective stories, titles by Agatha Christie and Simenon (even P. D. James Death of an Expert Witness from 1977), betraying the fact that his books also served as a sleepless person’s supply of nocturnal diversion. 

Most of all, Enver Hoxha’s library is a testimony to the limited influence of literature. All those well-thumbed books on freedom and human value, Sartre, Éluard and Camus – and still we know that he sat in the sofa with Nexhmije enjoying screenings of when the secret police tortured their former best friends. Didn’t all this reading influence him at least a little bit? That is an endlessly depressing thought.

After the fall of communism, the dictator’s library was left to decay. In the year 1999 the book collection was carried down in to the basement of the National Library, now the intention is to make the collection generally accessible. 

Piro Misha, the director of the National Library, asks me to pay attention also to what is missing from the list: classic Marxist theoretical literature. Neither Marx’s nor Lenin’s books are to be found here. On the other hand, you will find radical literature of later date, such as Lukàcs and Gramsci (who had Albanian ancestry). I can only find one title by Albania’s most renowned writer Ismaïl Kadaré, and that title in French translation. Yet we know that Hoxha followed that authorship very closely, and that the freedom of Kadaré was hanging by a single thread, probably saved by his growing international reputation: you get the impression that through decades there is a kind of game played between the two of them, the dictator and the writer, a game with extremely high stakes.

Which title in the dictator’s library is the most surprising? Without doubt a jazz-lexicon, Dictionnaire du jazz. And not only because jazz was a completely banned form of music in Albania. Given the number of biographies over the great romantic composers his interest in music ought to have been genuine, and one might imagine Hoxha appreciating the grandiose, even bombastic sound of Liszt or Berlioz. But the searching intonation of jazz musicians, the probing for a mutual language for the moment? Bearing Gérard de Nerval and Aurélia in mind, one probably has to accept that even the spiritual inwards listening tone of John Coltrane’s soprano may be part of a dictator’s belongings.

What we own simply doesn’t need to reveal very much of what we do.

Note: This article was primarily published at Tirana Times Newspaper.

The post The dictator’s library: A testimony to the limited influence of literature. appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

…Weak or failing institutions, eroding legitimacy of political institutions, distrust of political parties, consolidated corruption, high degree of state capture, no clear division between what is public and what is private, a blur  and sustained political tensions can no longer be considered temporary distortions or symptoms of a transition towards democracy. It is becoming increasingly evident that these phenomena are not characteristics of a transitory period but tangible products that threaten to become permanent features of the Albanian political landscape….

The above findings stem from a comprehensive study on transition that the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) undertook ten years ago. Unfortunately this decade old study conclusions about the Albanian post communist transition are still entirely relevant for present day Albania. As in this issue Tirana Observatory is observing Post Communist Albania, 30 years after the end of communist regime, we decided  to republish the AIIS study of 2010.

Introduction 

The post-communist transformation – widely known as the transition –has been theoretically and practically thought of as an endeavour with two basic, closely-related components: replacing the totalitarian/authoritarian regimes with democratic governments and moving from a centralized socialist economy to a free market economic system. Both these components were fundamental goals of political elites that came to power following the collapse of communism in 1989 and 1991 in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe.

But while the goals were similar in most countries in transition, success in achieving them was determined primarily by the legacy of the economy and politics not only under communism, but also by the tradition of the state, the  level of economic development, the degree of industrialization and the scale of the country’s modern society.

The success stories seen mostly in Central Europe are primarily associated with the existence of somewhat industrial societies and the existence of capitalist practices before these countries fell under communist domination. Such success has also been linked to previous, relatively early experiences of a democratic tradition, including a considerable degree of modernization of societies in these countries.

Albania has experienced a transition featuring many steps forward and steps backward. It has also been a transition which after two decades cannot be with certainty defined as a completed transition. In the case of Albania, the most likely and most complete explanation behind its long and problematic transition is tied, first and foremost, to the relatively new state tradition.  Its low rate of industrialization and the agrarian economy led to a long process of state building. The entire history of the modern Albanian state is tied to events that are no older than 100 years, where capitalist and liberal experiences were sporadic and where the even rarer democratic experiences were left in an embryonic stage before being crushed by the communist domination. 

So when reviewing the Albanian transition, above all, one must take into consideration the country’s pre-communist legacy.

Second, success and the required time to get through the transition from totalitarian/ authoritarian regimes was influenced significantly by the different forms that undemocratic regimes took and developed in the former communist East. Contrary to authoritarian regimes that gradually began to allow a certain degree of liberalism in a number of Eastern countries, communist Albania remained an unparalleled Stalinist dictatorship until the last throes of the communist domination. Initially installing a one-party system, in the last two decades of the regime Albania became a dictatorship under the personal tyranny of Enver Hoxha. It was little more than sultan-like governance. 

The difference between personal dictatorship and a one-party regime is essential in terms of relations between the state and society through a social contract. While a one-party regime can allow for minimal “negotiation” of sorts on the contract between society and the state, in the case of the personal dictatorship in Albania, one could not even talk about a social contract.

The above-mentioned factors not only explain the prolonged transition of post-communist Albania, but also suggest the need for a new theoretical paradigm for understanding and explaining transition in countries like Albania. In a considerable number of countries of the former Communist East, post-communist transition meant replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes and planned socialist economies with capitalist market economies. In the case of Albania, the transition should be understood primarily as a process of genuine state-building. 

Michael Mandelbaum’s suggestion that post-communism refers to both the past and the future, may at first glance be valid for all countries in transition. This could include Albania despite its different degree of social thinking and behaviour and the political and economic transformation involved. However, it would be difficult to apply it to the degree of the state-building process. Albania’s experience in the last two decades of post-communism suggests the transition was neither an adaptation nor a social, political or economic transformation, but a genuine process of state building. 

While Mandelbaum suggests the idea of continuity – that post-communism refers at the same time to the past and the future – in Albania’s case, there are difficulties in including the country in this category if we bear in mind that Albanian post-communism was not a continuation of what was interrupted five decades ago. Many components of the state, institutions, laws and documents that led to a social contract between society and state, in the case of Albania, were not renewed and adapted, but were essentially started from scratch. This was a social contract that was to be “negotiated” for the first time. 

But what is Albania like twenty years after the collapse of the communist regime?

Executive Summary  

To anyone who visited Albania under the communist rule, there must have been a feeling of visiting another planet, and that someone must have turned back time for at least half of a century, as Karl Kaser of the University of Graz points out. And in the twenty years since the fall of communism, no country of the former East may have changed more than Albania.

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the wave of change in the Eastern Block, Albania looks remarkably different. In the main boulevard, only a few meters away from Parliament, and exactly where a huge statue of Stalin stood twenty years ago, there is now an equally large NATO flag, symbolizing Albania’s membership in the alliance.

Undoubtedly, what was once one of the most isolated countries on earth has made tremendous progress through an extraordinary political, economic and social transformation.

Twenty years later, the giant communist state that not only failed to provide basic political and public goods for its citizens, but also was a threat to freedom, property, life and future of Albanians, has gone forever. The extremely centralized economy and an indoctrinated society have gone together with the harsh communist rule.

With that giant and repressive state produced by communism gone, with the centralized Bolshevik-style economy gone, and with the society of fear and the indoctrinated individual gone, what are then the state, the economy and society today in Albania? And what is the interplay among them?

The first and immediate answer is that twenty years after the fall of the communist regime, the state, the economy and society are in transition. Frequently used to describe the first years of democratization, however, the term “transition” is by now reductionist in nature, if not irrelevant in exploring the present and useless in shedding light on the aspired future.

Many of the characteristics of Albania’s democratization can no longer be called transitional. Weak or failing institutions, eroding legitimacy of political institutions, distrust of political parties, consolidated corruption and sustained political tensions can no longer be considered temporary distortions or symptoms of a transition towards democracy. It is becoming increasingly evident that these phenomena are not characteristics of a transitory period but tangible products that threaten to become permanent features of the Albanian political landscape. The use of the word “transition” therefore obscures more than it explains, and it justifies Albania’s issues away by some sense of inevitability of this intangible force of transition- a process that cannot be controlled, managed, or directed.

From the state functionality perspective, today’s Albania resembles what some political scientists call the “neo-patrimonial monopoly state,” highly dependent on personal leadership rather than institutions, laws and procedures. The shortcomings of rule of law are among other things a consequence of the existence of a pyramidal structure of trusted collaborators that operates within the formal structure of the government apparatus. This kind of order – rule by telephone – has steadily weakened the functionality of the state.

The Albanian democracy, still formal and non-substantial, is at best detrimental to political stability and economic development and at worst, vulnerable to severe crises such as that of 1997. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Albania is a NATO member, but it has still not held free and fair elections judged by well-established international standards.

Albania is a NATO member that has also clearly expressed its aspiration to join the European family. This is primarily a political project of building a functional democracy and state. After twenty years of endeavours, the record is mixed though, and this project remains unfinished. The reasons behind this state of affairs need to be clearly understood and engaged with in order to shape the future.

Twenty years ago, two great challenges laid ahead of Albania’s economic transformation: first, moving from an entirely centralized system to a market economy, and second, accommodating globalization as the foretold international trend immediately after the end of the Cold War. From the shock therapy strategy pursued at the beginning of the nineties to the neoliberal ideas of the small state, the often controversial and chaotic economic transformation of Albania has had and continues to have tremendous impact on social mobility within the country and abroad, as well as on polarization and the unequal development of the regions.

Twenty years after the fall of communism, Albania’s social fabric has changed. However, the presence of a dynamic civil society as an ultimate outcome of societal modernization is yet to materialize. Civil society organizations have indisputably contributed to societal modernization, but they have not been immune to politicization, loss of independence and therefore, loss of their raison d’être – to serve as government watchdogs and enable democratic and societal control of the state.

The problematic and often controversial transition of Albanian politics, economy and society has been mirrored by the transition of the media to today’s rather chaotic and dysfunctional critical stage. Likewise, the opposite is true: malfunctioning within the media has mirrored itself negatively in the democratic development of the country. Twenty years after, the Albanian media can be best described as finding itself in a position where there is freedom of press, but no free press. The international community has played an irreplaceable role in Albania’s democratic   processes and transformations. The role and participation of the international community in the fabric of democracy in Albania has evolved with time. For a relatively long time, Albania was undoubtedly a negotiated democracy, dominated by external actors, slowly heading towards an exit strategy. Rather than abandonment, exit strategies seek to foster domestic capacities for democratic governance, local ownership of the democratization process, and self-rule. Despite appearances, Albania is far from that point and still cultivates a culture of dependency. The higher trust towards international actors evidenced in the Albanian public indicates the serious democracy and legitimacy crisis of governing institutions. Two decades on, and in the framework of NATO membership and EU integration, the need for debate on the role of outsiders in Albania is clear and clearly related to state functionality and democracy.

Disappointments observed, but no nostalgia for the past

Many Albanians believed that, somehow by magic, things would be transformed as soon as the communist regime collapsed. They might have been wrong, but few could have imagined that the transformation would still be an ongoing process, twenty years later. Across the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, there were expectations that democracy would act as a medicine to cure all ills in the early nineties. But in Albania expectations following the collapse of communism were even larger because of the extreme isolation, violence and terror perpetrated by the regime on the population. 

The first opposition leaders of post-communist Albania promised too much and were blatantly simplistic with their promises. They told Albanians, who were impatient for change, that democracy was a blank check through which all their needs would be fulfilled.

Twenty years later, the great enthusiasm with which Albanians embraced their first post-communism leaders has now been decimated. The majority of Albanians today believes the promises made by the politicians twenty years ago have not been implemented at all and only 33 percent think that these promises have been only partially fulfilled.

So there is no doubt that the huge expectations led to a lot of disappointment. But many realize how much their lives have changed thanks to a new system of government. Asked how involved the government is in providing good living conditions for its people, most of the respondents say the government is either very interested or interested in providing better lives for its people (27 percent and 39 respectively for a total for 66 percent). That is a big difference compared to the 62 percent who think the government under communism had no or little interest to establish normal living conditions. The majority of Albanians, 70 percent, view the communist state as the main threat to the life of its citizens’ and the main violator of human rights. Today, only seven percent think the Albanian state is a threat to life and violator of human rights. It is important to note though, that today’s threats are perceived by Albanians mostly as economic rather than physical. About 56 percent of the respondents believe that they live under some kind of threat. More than 60 percent of this particular group identify the source of this threat as either lack of money, imminent job loss or housing problems. Political violence and violence in the neighbourhood are seen as a threat by only 5.3 percent of the respondents. 

The transition’s weak state
 
Albanians’ main cause for dissatisfaction with the state in these past twenty years is the post-communist state and the fact that the two-decade-long transition produced a relatively weak state in terms of the quality of public services that a state is supposed to provide for its citizens.

The AIIS study focused specifically on the perception of the quality of two basic services – education and healthcare.

The quality of education prior to 1990 is highly valued by a large number of respondents. So, 42 percent of Albanians have a positive view of the quality of education during communism, compared to twenty percent that think the same way in 2010. Twice that number, 42 percent, regard the quality of education in 2010 as average, while 25 percent value it little and 9 percent very little. On the other hand, only 26 percent gave little or very little value to the quality of education during communism.

Albanians’ opinion on the quality of health services for the period prior to 1990 and in the two following decades differs substantially from that on education. About 30 percent of the respondents valued the quality of health services during communism highly or very highly. Another 31 percent of the respondents think the quality of health services was low or very low under communism. This picture is very different in 2010. About 52 percent of respondents think the quality of health services in 2010 is low or very low, while only 23 percent consider the quality of healthcare to be high or very high.

The fact that Albanians hold a more positive view of the quality of health services and education under communism than under the post-communist transition period must be taken with some reservations. One cannot compare the modernization that has taken place in healthcare and education services in the past twenty years with the almost primitive level of services provided in a totally isolated country like Albania under communism. 

If we look at some key indicators such as infant mortality rates or nearly European standards for education and the thousands of Albanian students who have studied and continue to study in Western universities – the comparison with the previous regime is mute and not appropriate. 

But if this is the case, why do Albanians continue to perceive a better quality of these services under communism than during the country’s post-communist period? There will certainly be a need for further studies to find a convincing answer. However, phenomena such as the widespread corruption in the healthcare and education systems have without doubt had a big impact on these negative perceptions.

In addition, if the state under communism, though modestly, was able to provide health services to the most isolated villages in Albania, the current state has been unable to keep up the network of health centres at all levels, including regional hospitals. The Albanian education system has suffered a similar fate, and according to experts the rate of illiteracy has begun to creep up.

Furthermore, the education system in Albania, particularly at the university level, faces a chaotic, almost desperate situation. A dozen or so private universities have appeared like mushrooms after rain. Largely serving as profit sources for the owners, they are undermining the underlying idea of quality private education through entrepreneurship.

Albanian democracy: a work in progress

Two decades after the fall of the communist regime, Albania appears to have been unable to produce a fully functioning democratic system. Although all institutions of a liberal democracy and the formal procedures for their operation exist, the level of their functionality is far from that of a consolidated democracy.

If after twenty years Albania has still not finished its post-communist transition, the fundamental reason is to be found in the low level of democratic functioning in the country. If we agree with the definition that first and foremost, transition has been completed when sufficient agreement has been reached on political procedures to produce an elected government, and when a government power as a direct result of a free and popular vote, then the Albania of 2010 would still not qualify as a country that has completed the transition process. Contested elections are still the norm, regardless of progress made in meeting international standards for free and fair elections. The culture of a zero sum game, permanent political conflict and lack of consensus unfortunately continue to remain the basic features of Albania’s post-communist political reality. In that sense, Albania is more similar to a liberal regime than to a fully functioning democracy.

Twenty years after the collapse of the totalitarian regime, the Albanian public believes that Albania is more democratic than undemocratic – with 56.8 percent of Albanians believing Albania in 2010 is more democratic than undemocratic, and 22.8 percent thinking that it is a fully democratic country. On the other hand, 6.5 percent of respondents think that Albania is currently completely undemocratic.

The AIIS study also confirms a different characteristic of the Albanian transition – that of cultivating a culture of dependency on the international factor when it comes to post-communist democratization and transformation of the political and economic systems. So, 48.9 percent of Albanians believe the International Community is the main factor influencing the country’s democratization. The country’s citizens are listed as the second most important factor with 28.2 percent, while the government ranks third with 9.1 percent. This data support the argument that the importance of the public in the Albanian democracy is still low, and as long as the participation rate remains in these levels, the functioning of democracy will also continue to be insufficient for a viable democratic system.

The study confirms the remarkable progress Albania has made in terms of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In 2010, only 2.1 percent of Albanians believe there is little freedom of speech, versus 70 percent who think freedom of speech and expression absolutely did not exist in Albania under communism. The communist regime banned religion by law, and even ordered the destruction of religious institutions in Albania. The youngest generation in Albania today may view this to be absurd, but 89 percent of Albanians polled agree that freedom of religion was nonexistent in communist Albania. 
The comparison of the current state of the country with communist Albania in terms of freedoms and human rights is virtually impossible, given the enormous progress made. The reason why the respondents were even asked about human rights during the communist regime as compared to the past two decades was to observe the knowledge and understanding that Albanians have about human rights.

Most Albanians, over 80 percent, believe human rights in communist Albania were brutally violated. But Albanians’ perceptions on the status of rights and freedoms during the past twenty years suggest the need for further studies and observations since 29 percent think the state continues to violate human rights. 

There is no doubt that democracy in Albania today is “the only game in town” but the quality of this “game” even twenty years after the collapse of the communist dictatorship is weak. 

The rule of law has yet to be fully established

Currently, only 38 percent of Albanians believe laws are fully implemented; 24.8 percent believe laws are not fully implemented and 37.3 percent think laws are somewhat implemented.

Initially, Albanians identified the regime and the government with its laws. In the first three or four years following the collapse of communist regime, disrespect for the state, institutions and laws was explained by the fact that some Albanians still disrespected the government and the state, and as a result, the laws, which had previously been so extreme in oppressing the people. But unfortunately, what was believed to be a transitory phenomenon has now almost become part of the general culture.

Currently, the public thinks the degree of law enforcement under communism was very high. In fact, 78 percent of citizens believe laws under the former regime were implemented to the highest degree possible. This is not a surprising finding. One needs to bear in mind that the communist state had a high degree of law enforcement through entities that used all possible methods, including extreme instruments of violence and terror.  

The AIIS study confirms the public’s concern about illegal activities in Albania. Forty-seven percent of Albanians believe illegal activities are very widespread. The level of corruption in the twenty years of transition is viewed as high. A 57 percent of respondents admit they have given bribes and nearly 70 percent think that giving bribes is important to complete a transaction or to receive a service from public institutions and agencies.  Corruption is also perceived as the main negative factor that has adversely affected the country’s economic transformation, particularly in property and wealth distribution. About 68 percent of respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Albania’s redistribution of ownership. The dominant reason for that dissatisfaction is corruption. Corruption is also seen as the main way to become rich in the last twenty years in Albania.

All are equal, but some are more equals than others

The AIIS study confirms a widespread phenomenon seen in transition countries or in unconsolidated democracies: the selective implementation of laws. All should be equal under the law, regardless of the public position they hold or the degree of wealth they possess. But in Albania’s case, this resembles a slogan one would see under communism. Currently, the general public in Albania believes there are some people who stand above the law. Asked which groups they have in mind, 89 percent selected politicians. They were followed by the police forces, criminals and the rich. These findings about rule of law in Albania are consistent with previous AIIS studies.

The economy counts

The AIIS study confirms that economic issues are the main concerns of Albanian citizens. Data reveal that respondents think Albanian living and economic conditions have improved in 2010 compared to the period before 1990. Yet, most respondents are not satisfied with the direction the Albanian economy has taken since 1991.

Data show that there is a great difference in living standards prior to 1990 and in 2010. About 71 percent of respondents describe living conditions prior to 1990 as bad or very bad. Only 2 percent of respondents think that living conditions in the same period were good or very good. Albanians regard the living conditions in 2010 to have considerably improved in comparison with the period before 1990. A little over 32 percent of respondents view their living conditions as good or very good, while 41 percent view them as moderate. Only 24 percent of the respondents said that their living conditions are bad in 2010.

Although respondents recognize that living standards and the overall economic situation in Albania have considerably improved since 1990, they are mostly dissatisfied with the direction that the economy has followed since 1991. Thus, 33.4 percent of respondents are dissatisfied, and 27 percent are very dissatisfied with that direction. Almost 30 percent of respondents view the course Albania’s economy has taken as moderately satisfying or dissatisfying.

But the fact that 60.4 percent of respondents say they are not satisfied with the economic direction taken by Albania since the fall of communism should not be interpreted as a rejection of the economic system – of the free market economy and entrepreneurship. Albanians are mainly dissatisfied with the way the free market economy has been implemented over the past twenty years in Albania rather than the system itself. The lack of competition and absence of clear rules in the economic and political realms in post-communist Albania raise serious questions about the degree of the implementation of a capitalist economy in the country.

The same argument is supported by other findings of the survey. For example, 67 percent of the respondents say they are not happy with how the distribution of ownership was done in Albania.

Religion is welcomed but not a big deal

The findings about freedom of religion mirror the findings on freedom of speech. Freedom of religion is highly or very highly enjoyed in 2010, but very little or little prior to 1990. The practice of religion was outlawed by the communist government in 1967, making Albania the world’s first officially atheist state. Almost 90 percent of the respondents said Albanians had little and/or very little freedom of religion before 1990. After the collapse of the one-party state in 1991, the ban on religion was lifted, resulting in a gradual revival of religious practice. Over 79 percent of the respondents stated that they enjoy freedom of religion in 2010.

The study’s interesting and unexpected data relates to the practice of religion in Albania. It finds 30 percent of Albanian citizens do not practice any religious rites, while 48 percent say they do so several times a year, or only on special occasions. The survey also finds 44 percent of respondents consider themselves Muslim, 30 percent Christian Orthodox and 19 percent Catholic, while nine percent say they do not belong to any faith.

Of course this data cannot be translated into the official separation of Albanians in the different religions. However a trend is certain: Albanian Muslims, who practice their faith to a degree or another, make up the majority of Albanians, but their dominance does not lie in the high percentages that are generally perceived or accepted.

Foreign policy and international relations see great achievements

There is no doubt that there have been great achievements in the twenty years of transition in post-Communist Albania’s foreign policy and international relations. Within two decades, what was one of the world’s most isolated countries has turned into a reliable partner for the West and the Euro-Atlantic community, while at the regional level Albania is currently an important stabilizing factor that cannot be ignored. 

The role of foreign policy and international relations success in Albania must not be seen as an end goal in itself. But in reality, the entire political, economic and social transition of Albania was widely based on emergence from international isolation and orientation towards cooperation. NATO membership marks a high point in Albania’s foreign policy objectives, as efforts continue to prepare the country for EU membership, which has served and continues to serve as a driving force in the state-building process.

While it is understandable that a small country like Albania can only have a modest contribution in international politics, its role and contribution at the regional level has been and continues to be critically important.  In this context, as Gabriel Partos observes, one big achievement is replacing the earlier hostility towards neighbouring countries with good and often friendly relations.

Looking into foreign policy and international relations, the AIIS study focused on two basic issues, which are important and have not been observed previously: the perception of the Albanian society on relations with neighbours and within that relationship, perceptions of policies in relation to Kosovo. Focusing the study on these two issues is very important for at least two reasons. The first is to investigate whether the official foreign policy of the country goes in harmony with citizen perceptions about relations with neighbouring countries at a time that the Balkan political map has changed after the independence of Kosovo. Secondly, it seeks to observe the society’s perceptions and expectations about the country’s relations with Kosovo and the future of this relationship in light of the idea of the existence of a Greater Albania project. 

Italy as best friend, Greece second threat after Serbia

The AIIS study affirms that the Albanian public follows Albania’s relations with neighbouring countries closely, and that a high value is in fact placed on these relations. 

Despite Tirana’s official policy attempts to strengthen relations with Serbia, Albanian citizens perceive Serbia as the biggest threat to the national security of the country. According to the AIIS survey, 51.6 percent of Albanians consider Serbia the biggest threat to Albania’s security.

The reasons behind that finding should be sought primarily in the historical conflict and hostility that has dominated the two countries’ relationship in general. The most important hurdles in the relations between the two countries and the two societies are Serbia’s traditional behaviour against Albanians in Kosovo, and currently, the new state of Kosovo. There will certainly be a need for further study to understand all the factors that have influenced and continue to influence the perceptions of Albanian society toward Serbia. For example, how much does Kosovo really affect Albania’s relations with Serbia? Or, aside from the political will of the Albanian government, are Albanians willing to support their government in strengthening relations with Serbia regardless of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo? On the other hand – maybe not so much for the public as much as for those who draft policies for decision-makers – what is the likelihood of developing strong Albanian-Serbian relations, if Serbia continues to follow the current hostile attitude toward the new state of Kosovo? Surprisingly enough, Greece is also perceived by the Albanian public as a threat to national security almost as much as Serbia. Albanians see their neighbour – an EU member – as a threat to their national security. The survey finds that 46.7 percent of Albanians who see their country as threatened by its neighbours, place Greece in second place, trailing Serbia  by few points only. This can be explained by the hostility that in some way has often been present in the historical relationship between the two countries. But perhaps beyond that historical memory, the perception is based in the conflicting relations that at times have existed between the two countries during the past two decades. In addition, notwithstanding the will of the governments of both countries to develop and strengthen bilateral relations,

a number of controversial issues have risen from time to time, including issues concerning the Greek minority in Albania, which seem to keep alive a sense of doubt in bilateral relations.

The perception of Greece as a potential threat to national security can be motivated to a considerable extent by a number of incidents and issues last year, including an agreement on the division of the Continental Shelf , the situation with the graveyards of Greek soldiers in Albania, minority concerns, or even flagrant anti-Albanian gestures such asthe marching of  regular units of the Greek army to songs filled with a language of hatred towards Albanians, Macedonians and Turks . However, the survey is surprising and suggests the need for further study to properly interpret and understand all factors that lead the Albanian society to perceive Greece to be a threat to national security.

Likewise, it is important to note that while Serbia and Greece are perceived as threats to national security, Albanian citizens do not view this as a threat from armed conflict. According to the same study, only 1.6 percent of the Albanians think a war would be the biggest threat to national security. It appears this perception is consistent with previous AIIS studies where danger of aggression from another country is almost unimaginable for Albanians.

The analysis and interpretation of findings according to which the Albanian public sees notably Serbia and Greece as threats to national security should be seen in a different but very important aspect. Relations with these countries, Greece in particular, but in the long term Serbia as well, are very important for Albania. 

This is not just a view of the Albanian political elite or the country’s government and state institutions. Even the Albanian society as a whole perceives relations between Albania and Greece, but Albania and Serbia too, to be strategic and valuable. So the fact that almost half the Albanians surveyed see Greece and Serbia as a threat does not mean that the Albanian society refuses to support a closer relationship with both these countries. On the contrary, from the strategic point of view Greece, but Serbia as well, are important countries for Albania – with which the government should develop proper relations. Thus, 79 percent of Albanians think relations with Greece are important or very important, and 49 percent of Albanians think relations with Serbia are important or very important. And only 15 percent think that these are not important at all and the government should pay them no attention.

Previous AIIS studies also confirm that the Albanian society sees Albania’s relations with its neighbours as very important.

The AIIS study reaffirms previous AIIS findings about the perception Albanian citizens have about relations with another neighbouring state, Italy, which is seen as having the most influence in Albania. More than 44 percent of Albanians view Italy as the country that has had the most influence in Albania over the last two decades. Greece is perceived as the second most important country to have influenced Albania in the last twenty years. Differently from Greece, which is viewed by 46 percent of the Albanians to constitute a threat to national security, in the case of Italy the sentiment is shared by only 0.5 percent of respondents. The perception of Italy and its role in Albania remain consistent with previous studies where Italy is viewed as a strategic partner almost uncontested in its top spot. So, 93 percent of the respondents think relations with Italy are strategically important and that the Albanian government should give them top priority.

Kosovo loved, but no unification

Relations of Albania with Kosovo and the public’s perception about the future of this relationship were important components of the AIIS survey. Previous AIIS studies have clearly shown that the Albanian society looks with great interest to the relations with the new neighbouring country of Kosovo. So, 88 percent of Albanians in Albania view relations with Kosovo as strategically important versus the 93 percent who see Italy, 94 percent who view the European Union, and 90 percent who see the United States as strategic partners. 

However, notwithstanding the fact that Italy, the European Union and the United States are seen as key partners, Albanians overwhelmingly believe their government should pay particular strategic attention to Kosovo. Despite the support the Albanian public has for strong relations between Albania and Kosovo, following Kosovo’s independence, little substance has developed to this relationship. Societies, markets, economies and political elites have functioned separately from each other. Kosovo’s markets have for a long time been part of the former Yugoslav federation and two decades after the violent break-up of that Yugoslavia, as Tim Judah of The Economist points out, a similar common market has started to resurface. But while there is no doubt about the importance of strengthening the relationship between Albania and the new state of Kosovo, the Albanian public does not seem to support the idea of unification of Kosovo and Albania. The so-called Greater Albania thesis seems to be far from the mind of the majority of the Albanian public. Thus, only nine percent of Albanians believe unification of Kosovo with Albania is positive, versus 35 percent who believe that such a union is negative, or the 37 percent who are indifferent to this issue.

These results are not unexpected, if we keep in mind that there is currently no political party or organization of any influence, including the academic world, which supports the idea of unification of Kosovo and Albania. But these results also raise serious questions about the findings of the Gallup Balkan Monitor, which in its latest survey finds that Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania support the idea of a natural Albania- a greater Albania. According to those findings, the idea has the support of 63 percent of people in Albania versus 81 percent in Kosovo and 53 percent in Macedonia.

The post Albania Twenty Years After: People on State and Democracy appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

As sometimes happens in life, you search for one thing and find another.

So, it was when, following the publication of my book Rumpalla, Rummaging Through Albania in 2002, I sought to do a book on Enver Hoxha.

But that project, for a variety of reasons, went nowhere. One main reason was that men who had served under Hoxha were reluctant to talk about him. Others who served with him said they really did not know him. I quickly found out that looking for Hoxha was like searching for a ghost.  I dropped the project.

Then, by chance, I came across the just published book Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory by Reginald Hibbert, a scholar who had served with the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) in Albania during World War II.

 In that book was a picture of Hoxha and his entourage marching into Tirana November 28, 1944  after the Germans had left. Listed along with Hoxha in the photo were Koçi Xoxe, Myslim Peza, Omer Nishani, Mehmet Shehu, Baba Faja, Spiro Moisiu, British Captain Marcus Lyon and, to my amazement was an  American soldier, Captain Tom Stefan, identified only as  “US Liaison Officer.”

That immediately piqued my interest. What was an American soldier with an Albanian sounding name doing with Hoxha in Tirana in 1944? I did not know there had been any Americans in Albania during World War II. Nobody knew.

Not only was that a surprise, but also the fact that the United States supported Hoxha and the Communist partisans in their war against the Nazi Occupation. What I  also found was that while Hoxha was battling the Germans, he was also fighting the Balli Kombetar, which was aligned with the Nazis.

To add to the confusion was the fact that the British were providing supplies to the Balli, using the Balli as a prop against Hoxha and the communists.

How did this all come about? And who was this Captain Tom Stefan?  I decided to find out.  It took some time to find him because no one knew what happened to him in the years following the war. And when I finally did find him, it was too late. He was dead. He is buried in a cemetery in Laconia, New Hampshire. Laconia  is a fine New England town set in the middle of mountains and lakes. He grew up there after his parents moved there from Boston.

Before that, though, I did find and interview four men of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) who served with him at Odriçan and Helmes and Tirana. I also found other people who had met Stefan in Albania. There were also extensive files and records of the OSS in Albania stored at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Through records and messages, I found that Tom Stefan had lived through an extraordinary time in Albania at the side of Hoxha, a man he got to know better than anyone else.   Stefan also got to know and made friends with Omer Nishani, Myslim Peza, Mehmet Shehu and all the other partisan leaders during the war.  He even got to know Koçi Xoxe, although he never trusted him, and with good reason.

Before the U.S. Army, Stefan, after graduating high school and hoping to become a lawyer, worked in an Albanian owned restaurant called the Arch Street Tavern  in Boston and attended college at night.  He wanted to become a lawyer.  The owners spoke to Tom in Albanian, which he understood, having spoken it at home. His parents, Eftim and Emma Stefan had migrated to the United States from Korca. 

Stefan’s life changed dramatically after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 which led to the  beginning of World War II for the U.S.

Stefan did not wait to be drafted but instead volunteered to join the U.S. Army April 10, 1942, four months after war was declared. He soon became an officer and attended military intelligence school. He joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was the  wartime forerunner of the CIA ( Central Intelligence Agency)  August 18, 1943. He was welcomed into the newly formed unit because he could speak Albanian.

Unlike the British, the Americans were new to the practice of intelligence gathering and espionage when World War II broke out. The OSS was established only after the disaster of December 7, 1941 when the United States was caught by surprise by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

General William Donovan, a hero of World War I, was named  head of the new intelligence agency. One of Donovan’s first initiatives was to enlist immigrants and sons of immigrants to train and send back to their countries of origin to gather intelligence and to fight with partisans behind enemy lines. These Americans would know the land and the language of their countries and would be able to blend in and be effective.

One of Stefan’s first jobs as an OSS officer was to help recruit newly arrived or established Albanian immigrants for the OSS. The agency  needed recruits who could speak foreign languages. In a war that stretched around the globe and included countries with many different cultures and languages, the OSS needed all the men who knew those cultures and languages. Albanian was one of those languages.

Thus, Greek American young men were trained and sent as OSS operatives to Greece, Italian Americans to Italy, Polish Americans to Poland, French Americans to France and Albanian Americans, like Tom Stefan and the others, to Albania.

Stefan in 1943 was sent back  to Boston, then the center of Albanian immigration to the United States, to seek out and recruit Albanian speaking candidates for the OSS. One can only speculate about the impression he made when, dressed in his army uniform, he spoke to young Albanians. When he left Boston for the army, he had been a lowly restaurant worker who washed dishes and cleaned tables. Now he was an officer on an important military assignment.

And he was successful because he was shortly promoted to 1^st lieutenant and given the assignment to go abroad. His promotion read: “This officer has assisted the chief of his section in recruiting and training of qualified enlisted civilian personnel for an overseas mission of a secret nature, and has acted in an advisory capacity to the section chief on geographical and political matters, providing valuable information relative to the mission based on knowledge and research. In an attachment, the OSS said Stefan “will be in charge of operational and intelligence activities in one of the Nazi-occupied Balkan states. He is thoroughly qualified to take charge of these field operations by linguistic and  geographical knowledge and by training in intelligence work.”

Of the thirty-five or so Americans of the OSS who served in Albania, all but three or four could speak Albanian. By contrast, the British had hardly anyone who was fluent in the language and had to rely on interpreters.

Although quite modest compared to the British effort in Albania–thirty-three British soldiers lost their lives fighting in Albania–the fact that the Americans helped Hoxha and the partisans was previously unknown.  What was also unknown is how close Captain Tom Stefan came to Hoxha.

Early on it was clear to Stefan that the combat was to be left to the British SOE and the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), while Stefan and the OSS were to gather intelligence regarding German troop movements, convoys and ammunition dumps so that Allied planes could be sent in on bombing operations. This meant bonding with Hoxha and winning his confidence, which Stefan did.

It was heady stuff. Before the war Stefan was just another young American trying to get ahead.

The next thing he knew he was in Albania, home of his ancestors, bonding with Hoxha.

That OSS mission to Albania was headed by Harry Fultz, who knew Albania well, having headed the Fultz School in Albania for ten years before being kicked out by the Italians in 1933.  Mehmet Shehu had been one of his students.  Ten years after leaving Albania Fultz was recruited by the OSS.

Fultz chose Stefan to head the OSS Albanian unit not only because of his  Albanian roots and knowledge of the language but that he also spoke the Tosk dialect, which Hoxha spoke as well. Stefan’s assignment was to get as close to Hoxha as possible in order to obtain information about German intentions.

The Allies were concerned about the possibility of the Germans sending troops from Albania to Italy as reinforcements. The fighting in Sicily and then mainland Italy was hard enough, and reinforcements would only make the fighting tougher. It was better for the Allies to keep those German forces busy in Albania.

Fultz at  one point made clear to Stefan the importance of fighting the Germans in Albania. His comments were in response to Hoxha’s asking Stefan what the Americans would do for him in exchange for his cooperation with the Allies. In a long message April 29, 1944 from Fultz in Bari to Stefan in Odrican, Fultz told Stefan to explain to Hoxha that he was not fighting an isolated war but was part of a coordinated effort to defeat the Nazis.

Fultz  said, “A good example of this coordination and of  widespread reactions caused by any given action is that of fighting in southern Italy last summer and autumn. While the Allies were fighting the Axis troops in southern Italy, LNC (National Liberation Front)  were fighting the Fascists in Albania. Any troops held in Albania to hold that country could not be used in Italy against the Americans and the British and made our job that much more easier.  As a result of those combined efforts Italy collapsed and for the most part the Fascists were cleared out of Albania.

“Who cleared them out?  Certainly not LNC and the Albanians alone. Except for American and British efforts in Italy the Fascists no doubt would still be in Albania,” Fultz said.

 “I do not think the Albanians or we get anywhere if we think in terms  of ‘what am I offered’ to do this and to do that, what am I offered for this isolated effort of for that bit of action,” Fultz said.

However, Fultz did bring up membership in the proposed United Nations as a reward. He told Stefan to tell Hoxha, “If Albania wishes to become a member of the United Nations as many Albanians claim it does then it must see what it can contribute to the united effort of fighting Germans wherever they are to be found.”

 If Hoxha took issue with anything Fultz said to him that was relayed by Stefan, there is no record of it.

Fultz often clashed with the British because he insisted that the Allies help only the partisans of the National Liberation Movement since they, unlike the Balli Kombëtar or Legaliteti, were the only resistance group fighting the Germans. Even though Hoxha was a communist, the U.S. thinking was that like the old adage,  the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

All evidence points to the fact that the Balli cooperated and fought with—not against– the Germans throughout the German occupation. The Legaliteti largely sat on the sidelines, hoping for the return of Ahmed Zog, the absentee king. The British nevertheless maintained contacts with both the Balli and Abaz Kupi of the Legaliteti. Hoxha bitterly resented this, and he was convinced the British conspired against him.

 Hoxha took great pleasure in baiting the British, often playing off the British against the Americans. There is evidence that Stefan became useful in this way. Hoxha at meetings would speak to Stefan in Albanian and, before an interpreter could translate, leave the British wondering what was said. Hoxha may have disliked the Americans, even Albanian Americans, but he hated the British.  While there was a war fought against the German occupiers, Hoxha also fought a war against the Balli, who the British supported.

Stefan met Hoxha in April 1944 after traveling inland from the Allied base at Seaview on the Karaburun Peninsula.  Seaview was the name of a cave structure along the Karaburun  the British and the U. S. used as a headquarters from which they gathered intelligence. It had a small beach beside it that was used to receive agents and supplies from Bari, Italy.  While other OSS agents were assigned to join Mehmet Shehu and Myslim Peza, Stefan was assigned to work with Hoxha. He remained at Hoxha’s side in the field at Helmes, Odrican, Permet, Berat and elsewhere for eight months, from April 1944 to November 1944, and then later in Tirana.  Indicative of how close Stefan came to Hoxha is  that Stefan was the only member of the Allies invited by Hoxha to attend the Congress of Përmet in late May 1944.

However, even before Stefan met with Hoxha he and the two men with him had to get through German lines in and around Dukat. As it was, the trio stumbled across a German and Balli attack on  Traygjas, a nearby village considered to be sympathetic to the partisans. Totally overmatched,  Stefan was forced to watch from afar as the attackers burned houses and forced residents to flee or die.

 Stefan and his two companions hid out from the German for several days before they were able to make their way to Hoxha’s headquarters in Odrican.

Hoxha may have been paranoid in his hatred for the British, but he was convinced that Stefan and the Americans could be useful even if they appeared to be led around by the nose by the British.  And he could use Stefan and the Americans to needle the British. That is one reason why he befriended Stefan and appeared to bring him into his inner circle, much to the resentment of the British.

Stefan’s presence meant that the U.S. took an interest in his fight against the Germans and that it would be generous with military supplies. While Stefan was an American, he was an Albanian American.    

This led to an American conflict with the British. Gathering intelligence was a competitive business between the Americans and the British, even though they were Allies. Although the British had been in Albania long before the Americans arrived, it became clear that  Stefan had an advantage because of his apparent closeness to Hoxha.

Hoxha did not care what the British thought.  Hardly had Stefan arrived at Odrican than Hoxha invited him to attend the  May 1944 Conference of  Permet, a conference Hoxha used to solidify his leadership position. Since none of the British officers were invited  Stefan, was the only Allied officer present, which added to British unhappiness and resentment. Being of Albanian descent and able to converse in Albanian, the delegates treated Stefan as something of a celebrity.arley

Stefan’ was at Hoxha’s side throughout the four- day conference and his reports radioed to Fultz in Bari represented the only information the Allies received about the meeting. In one report Stefan cabled that “the Communist Party is the guiding hand” behind Hoxha’s partisan movement.

Lt. Nick Kukich of the OSS, who served with Stefan throughout the campaign, said of Stefan’s relationship with Hoxha: “They seemed to get along pretty good. It seemed like Tom could go up and talk with Hoxha at any time.  Tom had a good, strong relationship with Hoxha. Very strong.”

It was so strong that in October 1944, just days before Tirana fell, Hoxha asked Stefan to address the partisans at the conference in Berat. While representatives of British and the newly arrived Russians also spoke, Stefan was able to deliver his remarks in Albanian, which had a positive effect.

It was from Berat that Stefan wrote to his superiors in Washington on November 14–three days before Tirana fell–broadly hinting that he wanted to play a role in determining America’s future policy toward Albania. It was something he no doubt discussed with Hoxha.

Stefan wrote: “It has been our good fortune to be with the leaders who will run the country. I know every one of them from Hoxha right on down through, their weaknesses, their strong points and their ideologies. There is no other group who is so close to the situation as our section.”

The march into Tirana shortly after the gathering in Berat may have been the highlight of Stefan’s career–even his life. Photos show him in the parade. Other photos show him on the platform in front of the Dajti Hotel with Hoxha and other partisan leaders.

 In an example of what was to come, Hoxha, speaking to thousands of people who had come out to hear him heaped praise on the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, neither of which had done anything to help the partisans achieve victory, but barely mentioned—let alone thanked—the Americans or the British, which had.

It was a clear sign that Hoxha had every intention of driving Albania away from the west and into the arms of Stalin and the Soviet Union, which Stefan noted.

A  “quite impressive” parade followed Hoxha speech, Stefan reported, but the people who viewed it were hardly enthusiastic. Stefan radioed Fultz:  “It looked as if the people were stunned. The cheers I heard sounded almost if forced by the occasion. There was not the wild display of enthusiasm as demonstrated in the south.”

However, any good feeling Stefan had about Hoxha and the partisans soon changed. In Tirana Stefan began to meet people, mainly Balli sympathizers, who lived in fear of the communist takeover of Albania, as well they should have. The notorious Koçi Xoxe was appointed head of the Ministry of the Interior and arrests began. Suspected members of the Balli and Balli sympathizers disappeared. Rather than seek reconciliation, Hoxha treated the Balli and Balli sympathizers as the enemy. The Balli had supported the Germans. There were trials and executions. Families were destroyed. Homes were destroyed and property confiscated. Stefan reported this to Fultz and to Washington, and Hoxha did not like it.

It was a period. Though, in which Hoxha still relied on the Allies, especially the Americans. While Hoxha was to align Albania with the Soviet Union, the Russians did little, if anything, to help Hoxha during the fighting or after.

And example of this is Stefan’s report about Hoxha’s unusual visit to the American legation February 11, 1945 seeking information about the just concluded Yalta Conference among the Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin) that had just ended. Hoxha arrived with Omer Nishani, his new foreign minister who spoke English and who was friends with Stefan.

“The General (Hoxha) appeared nervous and lacking his usual self-composure,” Stefan reported to Bari. Stefan said Hoxha was “obviously disturbed” that he had no information from Yalta about Albania’s future “Over a period of ten months I have not seen him as he appeared this evening,” Stefan reported. He added that Hoxha was also upset that the U.S. had not recognized Albania’s new government, and  why relief supplies from the U.S. had not arrived.

Stefan reported that, “The visit was an unusual one, broke all precedents.”  Stefan was shrewd enough to add: “The call certainly was not made because of Hoxha’s professed friendship for the U.S.,” but more likely it was made to play the Americans off against the British.

As the days went on Stefan became increasingly critical of Hoxha. Meanwhile, he met Lulu Vrioni in Tirana and fell in love. Lulu was  and attractive and well-educated woman from the prosperous, well known and respected Vrioni family, which had Balli connections.  Her brother in law was arrested for being a member of the Balli. Her uncle Qemal was in prison for being a war criminal. Her parents were under surveillance.  

Stefan’s duties took him from Tirana to Bari and Rome where he met with Albanian dissidents—mainly Balli or BK members or sympathizers—who had fled to Italy  following the communist takeover.  Hoxha considered them enemies who had collaborated with the Germans. Stefan also gathered intelligence by attending BK parties and social events in Tirana accompanied by Lulu. Hoxha through intermediaries complained about Stefan to Fultz. Fultz shrugged the complaints off.

Stefan secretly married Lulu in Tirana in early 1946, which further infuriated Hoxha. He then successfully smuggled her out of Tirana aboard a U.S. military plane that took them to Rome. Soon after they sailed for the United States and settled in Washington.

All of this led eventually to the publication of my book The OSS in World War II Albania. Its subtitle is: Covert Operations and Collaboration with Communist Partisans. It was translated into Albanian by Xhevdet Shehu.

It would have been fitting if the story ended there. It would have been like the closing of a romantic Hollywood movie. It would have been even better if the U.S. government recognized Stefan’s potential importance in the future relations of the two countries.

But things did not go well for Stefan after the war. The OSS was disbanded. He was discharged from the army.  He wanted a job where he could put his knowledge of Albania and Albanian politics to use helping his country and helping Albania, perhaps as a diplomat or foreign service officer.  But nobody was interested, including the State Department. The war was over. Albania was old news. Nobody cared.

The Cold War was on and Albania had chosen the wrong side. Things would have been different had Hoxha sided with the west. But he didn’t and Albania became a communist prison.

Hoxha bit the hand that had fed him. He repeatedly disparaged the U. S. and he disparaged Stefan, mocking him in his memoirs, as he was prone to do to others who had helped him come to power.

An anti-Communist wave swept over the United States during the Cold War, which helps explain why much of what the OSS did to help Hoxha and the Communist remained hidden for long time. Albania was discarded. Stefan was, too.            In the meantime, the CIA  secretary  infiltrated agents into Albania to undermine Hoxha. All attempts failed and practically all the agents were killed. One wonders how useful Stefan would have been to the success of such actions had he been consulted or involved.  After all, no American had a better read on Hoxha and his associates than Stefan. But he wasn’t.

Lulu, because of her language skills, got a job with Voice of America while Stefan settled for a lowly position at the Veterans Administration. He hated it. His marriage fell apart.  He left Washington and roamed the country, often looking up old friends from the OSS.  He found that they by and large had shed the past and had begun new lives; Stefan could not. He was stuck in the past.

He disappeared. Nobody knew where he was or what he was doing.  He fell off the map.   

He ended up in Los Angeles where  he sought out Sterling Hayden, then a famous Hollywood actor who had served with the OSS and Stefan in Albania.  Hayden, an experience seaman and an OSS officer, had piloted the boats that brought agents and supplies from Bari to Seaview. They often had talked in Albania about writing a book and making a movie out of their Albanian exploits. But that was not to be. Nobody, at the time was interested in a story about the U.S helping communists come to power in the Balkans, even if it meant fighting the Nazis. The story would have to wait.

Stefan suffered a stroke and died alone September 6, 1959. He was forty-two years old. Unlike several British officers who served in Albania, Stefan did not write a book.  

I did not expect this ending when I began my search for Tom Stefan, but it was the ending  that I got. I thought it a shame that Stefan did not live long enough to tell his story, so I told it for him.

            And I am grateful to have had that privilege.

The post WITH THE REDS: CAPTAIN TOM STEFAN AND ENVER HOXHA appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

…Comrades! The Central Committee’s report and also speeches by delegates to the Congress have referred to the erroneous position of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, who have taken the path of combating the line of our party’s 20th Congress and undermining the foundations of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The representatives of the fraternal parties have declared in their speeches that they share our alarm over the state of affairs in the Albanian Party of Labor and roundly condemn the dangerous actions of its leaders, which are prejudicing the fundamental interests of the Albanian people and the solidarity of the entire socialist commonwealth. The speeches by delegates and by representatives of the fraternal parties are convincing evidence that our party’s Central Committee was absolutely correct in reporting to the Congress, openly and as a matter of principle, on the abnormal state of Soviet-Albanian relations. 

We were obliged to do this because our repeated attempts to normalize relations with the Albanian Party of Labor have unfortunately borne no fruit. I should like to emphasize that the Central Committee of our party has shown a maximum of patience and has done everything in its power to restore good relations between our parties.

The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU have tried time and again to get together with the Albanian leaders and discuss the issues that have arisen. Back in August, 1960, we twice proposed a meeting to the Albanian leaders, but they avoided it. They were equally persistent in declining to have talks with us at the time of the Moscow conference of fraternal parties in November, 1960.

When, at the insistence of the Central Committee of the CPSU, such a meeting did take place, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu disrupted it and moved on to actions that can only be described as provocative. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor made a deliberate show of walking out on the November conference, indicating their refusal to defer to the collective opinion of the fraternal parties. To our subsequent suggestions that we meet, exchange views, and resolve our differences they again responded with a rude refusal, and they stepped up their campaign of attacks and slander against our party and its Central Committee.

There are no expedients that the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor shrink from using in their efforts to hide from their people the truth about what our party and people are doing. Albania is the only country in the socialist camp in which the draft Program of the CPSU was not published in full. The Albanian press carried only sections of the draft, deliberately creating a distorted impression of our party’s activities. This fact speaks for itself. After all, even Communism’s adversaries were unable to pass over our Program in silence.

We can understand why the Albanian leaders are concealing the CPSU Program from their party and people. They fear the truth like the plague. The Party Program is something sacred for us, our lodestar in the building of Communism.

Had they published it in full, the working people of Albania would have been able to tell truth from slander, would have seen that all our party’s activities, all its plans accord with the vital interests of the peoples, including the interests of the Albanian people, who are friendly to us. (Prolonged applause)

Our great party has more than once been subjected to bitter and filthy attacks from open and covert enemies of Communism. But it must be said outright that we do not recall an instance in which anyone shifted with such dizzying speed from protestations and vows of eternal friendship to unbridled anti-Soviet slander as the Albanian leaders have done.

Presumably they expect in this way to lay the groundwork for earning handouts from the imperialists. The imperialists are always willing to pay thirty pieces of silver to those who cause a split in the ranks of the Communists. But pieces of silver have never brought anyone anything but dishonor and shame. (Applause)

Clearly, the Central Committee of our party could not fail to tell the Congress the whole truth about the reprehensible stand taken by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. Had we not done so, they would have gone on claiming that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was afraid to let the Party know of its differences with the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. Our party and the Soviet people should know how the Albanian leaders have been acting. And let the Congress, which is empowered to speak for the whole Party, state its attitude to this matter, pronounce its authoritative opinion.

It has been emphasized at our Congress that we are prepared to normalize relations with the Albanian Party of Labor on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. How have the Albanian leaders responded to this? They have lashed out at our party and its Central Committee with a blatant, mud-slinging statement.

Comrade Chou En-lai, head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China, voiced concern in his speech over our having openly raised the issue of Albanian-Soviet relations at the Congress. As far as we can see, his statement primarily reflects alarm lest the present state of our relations with the Albanian Party of Labor affect the solidarity of the socialist camp.

We share the anxiety of our Chinese friends and appreciate their concern for the strengthening of unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to apply their efforts to normalizing the Albanian Party of Labor’s relations with the fraternal parties, it is doubtful whether there is anyone better able to facilitate accomplishment of this purpose than the Communist Party of China. This would really redound to the benefit of the Albanian Party of Labor and accord with the interests of the entire commonwealth of socialist countries. (Prolonged applause)

It is true, of course, that Communists should so frame their inter-Party relations as not to provide the enemy with the slightest opening. But unfortunately the Albanian leaders have grossly flouted this requirement. For a long time now they have been openly attacking the line of the 20th Congress, providing the bourgeois press with food for all sorts of speculation. It is they, the Albanian leaders, who have been shouting from the rooftops about having a position of their own, views of their own that differ from the views of our party and the other fraternal parties. This showed clearly at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, and has been particularly clear of late.

Why did the Albanian leaders launch a campaign against the decisions of our party’s 20th Congress? What treason do they see in them?

Above all, the resolute condemnation of the Stalin cult and its harmful consequences is not to the liking of the Albanian leaders. They are displeased we should have resolutely denounced the arbitrary rule, the abuse of power which many innocent people suffered, among them eminent representatives of the old guard who had been with Lenin in the building the world’s first proletarian state. The Albanian leaders cannot refer without vexation and rancor to the fact we have put an end for good to the situation where one man at his own pleasure arbitrarily decided all-important questions relating to the life of our party and country. (Prolonged applause)

 Stalin is no longer among the living but we have thought it necessary to denounce the disgraceful methods of leadership that flourished in the setting of the Stalin cult. Our party is doing everything possible to prevent phenomena of this sort from ever again recurring.

One would have supposed that the Leninist line of the 20th Party Congress, which was supported by the fraternal parties, would have met with support from the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor too, since the cult of the individual is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. Actually, the Albanian leaders heaped encomiums on the Stalin cult and launched a violent campaign against the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, in an effort to make the socialist countries swerve from this sound course. This, naturally, was no accident. All that was reprehensible in our country in the period of the cult of the individual is manifested in its worst form in the Albanian Party of Labor. It is now an open secret that the Albanian leaders remain in power by resorting to force and arbitrary rule.

For a long time now there has existed in the Albanian Party of Labor an abnormal, evil situation in which any person objectionable to the leadership liable to meet with cruel persecution.

Where today are the Albanian Communists who built the Party, who fought Italian and German invaders? Nearly of them are victims of the bloody misdeeds of Mehmet Shehu and Enver Hoxha.

The Central Committee of the CPSU has received more than one letter from Albanian Communists appealing to us to restrain the Albanian leaders from dealing savagely with the finest sons and daughters of the Albanian Party of Labor. The delegates to the Congress can form their own idea of the Albanian leaders’ moral complexion by having a look at some of these letters.

The Albanian leaders reproach us with meddling in the internal affairs of the Albanian Party of Labor. I should like to tell you what form this so-called meddling took.

A few years ago the Central Committee of the CPSU interceded with the Albanian leaders over the fate of Liri Gega, a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, who had been sentenced to death along with her husband. This woman had for a number of years been a member of leading bodies of the Albanian Party of Labor and had taken part in the Albanian people’s struggle for liberation. In approaching the Albanian leaders at the time, we were guided by considerations of humanity, by anxiety to prevent the shooting of a woman, and a pregnant woman at that. We felt and still feel that as a fraternal party we had a right to state our opinion in the matter. After all, even in the blackest days of rampant reaction, the tsarist satraps, who tortured revolutionaries, scrupled to execute pregnant women. And here, in a socialist country, they had sentenced to death, and they executed, a woman who was about to become a mother, they had shown altogether unwarranted cruelty. (Stir in the hall. Shouts: “Shame! Shame!”)

People of integrity today incur punishment in Albania just for daring to come out for Soviet-Albanian friendship, which the Albanian leaders are fond of talking about in such high-sounding and florid terms.

Comrades Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko, prominent figures in the Albanian Party of Labor, were not only expelled from the Party’s Central Committee but are now being called enemies of the Party and the people. And all this merely because Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko had the courage honestly and openly to voice their disagreement with the policy of the Albanian leaders and took a stand for Albanian solidarity with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

People who today advocate friendship with the Soviet Union, with the CPSU, are regarded by the Albanian leaders as enemies.

How is all this to be squared with the vows and protestations of friendly feelings for the CPSU and the Soviet Union that have been heard from Shehu and Hoxha? It is obvious that all their spouting about friendship is nothing but hypocrisy and deception.

This is the atmosphere that prevails in the Albanian Party of Labor, and this is why the Albanian leaders oppose the Leninist line of the 20th Party Congress. After all, to put an end to the cult of the individual would in effect mean that Shehu, Hoxha, and others would have to give up their key positions in the Party and government. And this they do not want to do. But we are certain the time will come when the Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and then the Albanian leaders will have to answer for the harm they have done their country, their people, and the cause of socialist construction in Albania. (Stormy, prolonged applause)

 Comrades! Our party will continue to combat revisionists of all shades as it has in the past. Steadfastly conforming to the principles of the Declaration and the Statement of the conferences of Marxist- Leninist parties, we have exposed and shall continue unremittingly to expose the revisionism that has found expression in the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. We shall also constantly combat dogmatism and all other deviations from Marxism-Leninism. (Applause)

 “New Hostile Acts of N. Khrushchev’s Group toward the Albanian People’s Republic,[1]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has been authorized, according to a recommendation made by the Soviet Government to declare the following:

The Albanian Government, by following a course of further aggravation of its relations with the Soviet Union, especially since the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, has created an intolerable situation for the Soviet Ambassador in Tirana and the other Soviet diplomats. The Soviet Ambassador has been put in a position where he cannot carry out in normal fashion the recommendations of his Government. In fact, the USSR Embassy is in an isolated position, and the most elementary norms of international law are being violated with regard to it. By way of provocation, the Albanian authorities are slanderously accusing the members of the USSR Embassy of engaging in hostile activities against Albania. In addition, in the past few days the Albanian Government has taken an unprecedented step in the reciprocal relations between socialist countries, demanding without foundation a reduction of the staff of the Soviet Embassy by nearly three times.

In view of the fact that the Albanian authorities have intentionally created conditions which deprive the Soviet Ambassador to Albania of the possibility of performing his diplomatic functions, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is compelled to make the decision to recall the USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Comrade J. V. Shikin, from Albania.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR requests that the Albanian Government be informed without delay of this decision of the USSR.

The contents of the verbal note presented On November 25, 1961, by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, N. Firyubin, to the acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Albanian People’s Republic in the Soviet Union, Gac Mazi, in connection with the departure of the Ambassador of the Albanian People’s Republic in the Soviet Union, Nesti Nase:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has heard that the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic in Moscow has lately been trying to distribute in an intensive manner all kinds of anti-Soviet material, containing zealous fabrications against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Among these are the texts of the hostile declaration of the CC of the PPSh, dated October 20, the report by Hoxha of November 7 of this year, and other material containing all manner of falsehoods and base slanders against our party, the Soviet Government, and the decisions of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Thus, the situation has reached the point where the Embassy turned over these slanderous materials to enemies of the socialist camp.

One cannot fail to draw attention as well to the fact that Albanian citizens in the Soviet Union are widely exploited for hostile designs toward the Soviet Union. While abusing the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to help train highly qualified specialists for work in the Albanian national economy, the Embassy mobilizes the Albanian students for the dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda. Thus Jukniu, a candidate of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute; Gurakuqi and Gjipali, students of the Moscow Technical Institute of Light Industry; Meçaj and Prillo of Moscow State University; Hajdar and Haxhimihali of the Institute of Chemical Technology; Reshati of the Moscow Institute of Chemical and Gas Industry and Paçma of the Leningrad Institute of Technology of Industrial Refrigeration have attempted to distribute anti-Soviet documents among Soviet and foreign students and have spoken slanderously on questions of Soviet-Albanian relations.

All these actions against the USSR cause righteous indignation among the Soviet people inasmuch as they have but one aim – to aggravate and worsen still further the relations between our countries and our parties with a view to destroying the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist camp.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic in Moscow to the fact that it is forbidden to distribute anti-Soviet material in the Soviet Union and to mobilize for this work Albanian citizens who are in the USSR. However, the Albanian side did not take any measures to end the distribution of this material. As if this were not enough, the Albanian Embassy, as the facts cited testify, has recently been trying to promote the distribution of material hostile to the CPSU and the Soviet Union, which is incompatible with the performance of the normal functions of any diplomatic mission, much less that of a country which claims to be a member of the socialist camp.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests vigorously to the Albanian Embassy in Moscow in this respect, and it no longer considers it possible for the Ambassador of the Albanian People’s Republic, Nesti Nase, to continue his stay in the USSR. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has been authorized to demand the immediate suspension of the distribution of anti-Soviet material by the Albanian Embassy in the USSR and of the dissemination of propaganda hostile to the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The contents of the verbal note of December 3, 1961, delivered by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, N. Firyubin, to the acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Albanian People’s Republic in the Soviet Union, Gac Mazi, in connection with the recall of the staff of the Embassy of the Soviet Union and the Soviet commercial representation in Tirana and the demand for the departure of the staff of the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic and the Albanian commercial counselor in the Soviet Union:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the recommendation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic states the following:

The Albanian Government, in pursuing a course of further aggravation of Albanian-Soviet relations, particularly since the 22^nd Congress of the CPSU, has unleashed in Albania a slanderous and hostile campaign against the USSR. It engages in measures deliberately designed to obstruct the normal activity of the Embassy and commercial representation of the USSR in Albania. The Soviet diplomats in the APR are isolated and even deprived of the possibility of maintaining official contacts with Albanian institutions and organizations.

By way of provocation, the Albanian authorities slanderously accuse the members of representative Soviet institutions of allegedly promoting hostile activity against Albania. The most elementary norms of international law are violated with regard to the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Albania.

The Soviet side has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Albanian Government to the impermissible actions of the Albanian authorities toward the Embassy of the USSR in Tirana. The Albanian Government, however, has not only failed to take any measures, but it is complicating conditions more and more for the personnel of the Soviet institutions in Albania.

The groundless demand of the Albanian Government for the reduction of the staff of the Soviet Embassy to almost one-third its present personnel is an unprecedented step in relations between states, especially between socialist states.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is authorized to reject emphatically the altogether impermissible demand of the Albanian Government regarding the reduction in the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana. It is known that international law does not recognize the right of a country to limit in an arbitrary and unilateral manner the size of foreign diplomatic missions accredited to it. It is appropriate to recall, in this regard, that Albania, at several international conferences not long ago, was opposed to attempts to legalize the incorrect practice by which a state accepts a diplomatic mission in its country fixes its numerical composition. Yet the Albanian Government is presently resorting to the methods of capitalist countries which use them to render difficult at any cost the diplomatic activity of the countries of the socialist camp.

Naturally, the Soviet side cannot remain indifferent to the intolerable situation created by the Albanian authorities for the members of the Embassy of the USSR and the commercial representation in Tirana. The Government of the Soviet Union, taking all this into consideration as well as the shameless allegation of the Albanian side that Soviet diplomats no longer have anything to do in Tirana, has decided to withdraw the entire personnel of the Soviet Embassy and the commercial representation from Albania. Three technical functionaries will remain to guard the buildings and other materials of the Embassy and the commercial representation of the USSR in Tirana.

 The Albanian side will be informed at a later date which state the Soviet Government will charge with the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union and its citizens in Albania.

The Soviet side considers that, in view of the fact that the Albanian Government is deliberately further aggravating relations with the Soviet Union by utilizing its diplomatic mission in the USSR for anti-Soviet objectives, the continued stay of the staff of the Albanian Embassy and the commercial counselor of Albania in Moscow is pointless.

In this connection the Soviet Government demands that the entire personnel of the Embassy and the commercial counselor of Albania in Moscow leave the territory of the Soviet Union.

Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian People’s Republic presented to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana on December 4, 1961:

To the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tirana:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian People’s Republic, by order of its Government, and in connection with the verbal communication delivered on November 25 by Deputy Minister Firyubin to the acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Albanian People’s Republic, has the honor to present to the Embassy of the USSR in Tirana the following, with the request that it be transmitted to the Soviet Government:

I. The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic received with surprise and deep regret the notification concerning the decision of the Government of the USSR to recall its Ambassador to the Albanian People’s Republic, Shikin, on the groundless and fabricated charge that conditions had been created for him which allegedly deprived him of any possibility of performing his diplomatic functions.

The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic most emphatically rejects this false accusation, which is but another slander in a long chain of slanders and unfriendly acts, undertaken in a relentless and systematic manner by the Soviet leadership against the Albanian People’s Republic, and which have but one aim – the aggravation and further deterioration of the fraternal relations between our two friendly peoples and countries.

The allegations fabricated in order to justify the recall of Ambassador Shikin are completely groundless and tendentious. The Soviet Ambassador has never been obstructed in his work. On the contrary, he has always been given every opportunity to perform his mission as an Ambassador. The truth – and the only motive in the matter – lies in the fact that the authors of this grave and extraordinary act have adopted an unfriendly policy toward the Albanian People’s Republic, and, in pursuit of this course, they are resorting to ever more reprehensible anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist actions.

It should be noted that, among other things, the history of the beginning, the duration, and the end of Ambassador Shikin’s activity in the Albanian People’s Republic makes one think that from the moment he was sent to Albania, the Soviet Government intended to recall him within a short time. He remained in Albania only five months, and one cannot but mention the fact that for the first time in the history of diplomatic relations between two countries, and precisely at a time when the sphere of normal activity of the Embassy had been considerably reduced owing to the fault of the Soviet side, an Embassy counselor with the rank of minister plenipotentiary was sent along with Ambassador Shikin. This was an act which could be understood only within the context of the predetermined recall of the Ambassador.

II. It is with surprise and the most profound indignation that the Government of the Albanian People’s Republic received the notification of the Government of the USSR that it considers impossible the further stay in the Soviet Union of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Albania, Nesti Nase, under the completely fabricated and unwarranted pretext that the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic in Moscow has recently been distributing material hostile to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic rejects with the greatest firmness this unfounded accusation and the protest of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was delivered on this occasion. The decision of the Soviet leadership concerning the departure of Ambassador Nesti Nase is an integral part of its unfriendly policy toward a socialist country, a friend, and a brother of the Soviet people, as is the Albanian People’s Republic.

The Ambassador of the Albanian People’s Republic to the Soviet Union, Comrade Nesti Nase, has always fulfilled his tasks conscientiously as a diplomat, as an Albanian, and as a Communist, respecting with the greatest rigor the laws and the rules operative the Soviet Union. He has worked vigorously to strengthen and temper further the eternal friendship between our fraternal peoples and our socialist countries.

It is appropriate to say that in the performance of his honorable mission as a socialist diplomat, not only did he not have proper assistance, but he was obstructed by the Soviet authorities by all possible means, even the most impermissible, including concealed and overt surveillance. In fact, it is known that for years the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic in the Soviet Union has been under constant surveillance by means of a special technical apparatus installed in the building at the time of its construction and that even to this day it is under obvious police control. Three members of the militia are permanently posted in front of the Embassy, and they inspect every person who enters the Embassy, thus obstructing the normal functioning and the regular performance of the diplomatic tasks of the mission and violating the most elementary norms which ought to be observed with respect to a foreign legation and, in particular, to that of a friendly and allied country.

The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic protests most vigorously this decision of the Soviet Government by which it demands, without reason, the departure of the Ambassador of the Albanian People’s Republic from the Soviet Union, a decision which is profoundly unjust and unjustifiable and in open contradiction to the fundamental principles of international law and of relations between socialist countries and which lays a heavy responsibility upon the Soviet Government for all the consequences that shall follow in relations between the Albanian People’s Republic and Soviet Union.

Tirana, December 4, 1961

Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian People’s Republic to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana, December 9, 1961:

To the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tirana:

            With the authorization of the Government of the Albanian People’s Republic, the Foreign Ministry of the Albanian People’s Republic kindly requests the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Tirana to transmit to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the following:

Since its creation, following the triumph of the national liberation war over the Nazi-fascist invaders and native traitors and the triumph of the people’s revolution, the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Albanian People’s Republic has been the indestructible and eternal friendship with the Soviet Union. This friendship was forged during World War II and further strengthened by the Albanian Party of Labor after liberation. Its roots lie in the blood shed in common by the glorious Soviet Army of Liberation and the valiant Albanian partisans in the war against the common enemy. It is based on the eternal principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Albanian people, educated by their Party of Labor, have always considered the Soviet Union their liberator and dearest friend. The Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian Government have considered it a duty of the first rank to preserve and to strengthen ever more this friendship and to nourish and strengthen ever more in the hearts of the Albanian People love and loyalty toward the great fatherland of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the years following the liberation of Albania, the relations between the Albanian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union were, for a long period, broadened and developed in all fields on the basis of the Leninist principles of equality, mutual respect, close cooperation, and fraternal mutual assistance. The Albanian people will always be grateful to the fraternal Soviet people for the internationalist aid given our country during this period, which has been an important factor in the construction of socialism in Albania.

During these years, the Albanian People’s Republic, a loyal member of the socialist camp and of the Warsaw Pact, has at all times and under all conditions strengthened its unity with the Soviet Union, stood with the greatest resolution at the side of the Soviet Union against every attack and every slander on the part of the enemies of the fatherland of the Soviets, defended without vacillation the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, and done its utmost to contribute to its triumph. The close relations of cooperation in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields and the fraternal friendship between our two countries have created truly internationalist and indestructible ties between our two peoples. And, as they have always demonstrated by their consistent attitude and actions, the Albanian Party of Labor and the Government of the Albanian People’s Republic have been and remain resolute fighters for the preservation and further strengthening of the friendship and unity between our two countries and our two parties on a correct and inviolable Marxist-Leninist foundation.

Unfortunately, of late – and definitely since the second half of 1960 – relations between the Albanian People’s Republic and the Soviet Union have not been what they once were. They have been damaged and embittered by N. Khrushchev and his group because, at the June 1960 Bucharest meeting of a number of Communist and workers parties and thereafter, the Albanian Party of Labor has not agreed with the anti-Marxist views of N. Khrushchev, has not yielded to Khrushchev’s dictates on important ideological issues, and has resolutely defended and defends Marxism-Leninism. Unable to tolerate this principled position of the Albanian Party of Labor, N. Khrushchev and his group have brutally violated the principles upon which relations between socialist states are founded as well as the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960, and because of the ideological differences with the Albanian Party of Labor, he has resorted to unilateral state measures – each of which has been more arbitrary and grave than the one preceding –  against the Albanian People’s Republic, with the aim of exerting pressure and forcing capitulation.

 During this period N. Khrushchev and his group have consciously tried all possible means to force the Albanian people, the Albanian Party of Labor, and the Albanian Government into capitulation and to aggravate Soviet-Albanian relations on the state level as well, and, in doing so, have trampled on proletarian internationalism and every norm of international law and of relations between states. Suffice it to say that N. Khrushchev, unilaterally and with the sole aim of obstructing the building of socialism in Albania, canceled the credits granted by normal agreement to the Albanian People’s Republic by the Soviet Union for the third five-year plan, 1961 to 1965, arbitrarily violated and annulled the 1961 trade agreement, unilaterally withdrew Soviet technicians, liquidated in fact the agreements on cultural cooperation, expelled on false grounds a number of Albanian students and cadets from the Soviet Union, canceled the agreement on the granting of scholarships to Albanian students and cadets studying in the Soviet Union, violated the military agreements, and organized a strict economic, political, and military blockade of the Albanian People’s Republic.

N. Khrushchev, by publicly revealing at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the disagreements existing between the Albanian Party of Labor and the present Soviet leadership, and by distorting the truth and slandering in the most banal manner a fraternal people and a Marxist-Leninist party – as are the Albanian people and the Albanian Party of Labor – has not only incited imperialism and its lackeys against Albania, but has also dared to summon the Albanian people to counterrevolution. In doing so, he acted in the same wasy as the vicious enemies of the Albanian people, the Albanian Party of Labor, the socialist camp, and the Communism. The Albanian people responded to this unprecedented provocation by consolidating their ranks around the Albanian Party of Labor and Government, by steeling their determination to build socialism, and by strengthening their vigilance for the defense of the achievements of their socialist fatherland.

On November 25, 1961, the Soviet Government, at the command of N. Khrushchev, withdrew its Ambassador, J. Shikin, from Albania under the false pretext that he “had been placed under conditions which prevented him from carrying out normally the orders of his government,” and that this situation had become “intolerable,” “especially since the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” A pretense of this kind is absurd and is used only for malicious purposes. In fact, it is well known that the most favorable conditions were always, from the very beginning, created for the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Albania and for all its personnel, from the ambassador to the simplest worker. The Soviet representatives in Albania have always been treated not only as the diplomatic representatives of the most cherished friend and ally of the Albanian people – as the Soviet Union was and remains – but also as comrades and true brothers to whom not only the doors of the offices and the work and production centers but also the hearts of the Albanian people have been opened. As has also been pointed out previously by the Albanian Government, all the conditions necessary for performing his functions were created for Ambassador Shikin. However, Ambassador Shikin, since he first came to Albania 11 months ago, has been in the country only five months in all. Even more surprising is the allegation that his position became “intolerable following the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” since it is well known that Ambassador Shikin left August 19, 1961, that is, two months before the convening of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The real reason, therefore, lies not in the so-called abnormal conditions but in N. Khrushchev’s intention further to aggravate relations between the People’s Republic of Albania and the Soviet Union. Thus, on the same date, the withdrawal of the Ambassador of the Albanian People’s Republic to the Soviet Union, Nesti Nase, was requested on the pretext that, according to the Soviet side, the Albanian Embassy was trying to distribute anti-Soviet materials by using even Albanian students in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership includes among such materials the Declaration of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor of October 20, 1961, and also the speech delivered in Tirana by Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, on November 7, 1961. This was not all. Obstructive and discriminatory measures were taken against the Albanian Embassy in Moscow. The Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union officially informed the Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic that the Albanian Embassy and the Albanian diplomats in the Soviet Union were forbidden to have direct relations or contact with Soviet institutions, with the exception of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, groups of militiamen surrounded the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, as if the two countries were in a state of war. They began to inspect every visitor to the Embassy and to prevent any Soviet citizen from entering the Albanian Embassy, including technicians sent by the Soviet office of diplomatic service. It is surprising that, while the Soviet side itself took unprecedented measures to isolate and restrict the Albanian Embassy and diplomats in Moscow, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Firyubin, in his verbal note of December 3, 1961, pretended in an openly slanderous manner that “the Soviet diplomats in the People’s Republic of Albania were isolated and even prevented from maintaining official contacts with Albanian organizations and institutions.”

The Embassy of the Albanian People’s Republic in Moscow has always respected the regulations of the Soviet Government on the distribution of propaganda materials in the Soviet Union and has never violated them. The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic rejects as a shameful and provocative offense the pretense that the Albanian Embassy ever distributed anti-Soviet materials. All the materials distributed by it – in accord with the regulations in force – have always been inspired by feelings of eternal Albanian-Soviet friendship and based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960. It is really regrettable that, on such an unfounded pretext, the withdrawal of the ambassador of a socialist country from the Soviet Union was requested while the diplomatic representatives of the capitalist states in Moscow are freely distributing many materials. Also unfounded is the accusation regarding the Albanian students in the Soviet Union, who have been educated by the Albanian Party of Labor to harbor boundless love for the Soviet Union and who have always set an example of good behavior and respect for the laws and regulations of the country. But, as shown by the facts, these imaginary accusations were needed by N. Khrushchev’s group to expel the Albanian students from the Soviet Union and to break off any contact between the Soviet people and Albanian citizens.

It is clear that the group of N. Khrushchev, in opposition to every internationalist principle and every norm of international law, unilaterally violated and annulled all agreements in force and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Albanian People’s Republic, and thus with conscious, premeditated, and hostile intent cut off all relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. In this situation, when, owing to the fault of N. Khrushchev, relations between the two countries were restricted to the utmost, it was clearly unnecessary for the Soviet Union to maintain a staff of about 80 people. For this reason, the Albanian Government rightly and on the basis of reciprocity proposed that the Soviet Embassy in Tirana maintain the same number of officials as the Albanian Embassy in Moscow.

In line with his anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist policy, N. Khrushchev went much further along the road of the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. On Sunday, December 3, 1961, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N. Firyubin, on the basis of vile and provocative slanders regarding the attitude of the Government of the Albanian People’s Republic toward the Soviet Union and toward the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, informed Gac Mazi, Chargé d’Affaires of the Albanian People’s Republic in the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Government had decided to withdraw the entire staff of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet commercial representative in Tirana and, at the same time, he requested the withdrawal from Soviet territory of the entire staff of the Embassy and commercial counselor of the Albanian People’s Republic in Moscow. At the same time, he stated that the Soviet Government would later make known to the Albanian side the country which would be charged with the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union and of Soviet citizens in Albania.

 The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic rejects with contempt and Union and indignation the revolting and unfounded slanders and fabrications presented in the verbal communication by Firyubin as evidence to justify this hostile act, unprecedented in the history of the relations between socialist states. The unilateral decision of N. Khrushchev’s group to close the Soviet Embassy and the commercial representation in Tirana, as well as the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, expresses not only his intention to cut off all relations between the Soviet Union and Albanian People’s Republic, but brutally violates the principles upon which relations between socialist countries are based as well as the glorious tradition of friendship always observed by the Soviet Union toward the other socialist countries and toward all the countries in the world. In fact, this decision is another manifestation of the pressure exerted on the Albanian People’s Republic. It is an integral part of the anti-Albanian and antisocialist policy pursued with unprecedented ferocity by N. Khrushchev against the Albanian people and the Albanian People’s Republic. This can please only the sworn enemies of the Albanian and Soviet peoples, of socialism, and of Marxism-Leninism – the imperialists and their lackeys, the Yugoslav revisionists. However, neither this new act of hostility toward Albania nor the threats and pressures of every sort used by N. Khrushchev can ever destroy Albanian-Soviet friendship. They will not be able to separate Albania from its friends, nor will they ever be able to frighten the true defenders of the unity of the socialist camp and Marxism-Leninism. All the attempts and the anti-Marxist designs of N. Khrushchev and his group will suffer complete failure.

One cannot pass over in silence the fact that N. Khrushchev decided to undertake this action to aggravate further the relations between the Soviet Union and the Albanian People’s Republic – which is an allied socialist state and permanent member of the socialist camp, a member of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and which is led by a Marxist-Leninist party, the Albanian Party of Labor – at a time when he is making all possible efforts to strengthen relations with the member states of the aggressive North Atlantic Pact and with Tito’s revisionist group, the sworn enemies of the Soviet Union and socialism.

The Albanian Government deeply regrets that a time has come when in the leadership of the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, and the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union, founded by V. I. Lenin, there are people like the N. Khrushchev group who attack the best friends of the Soviet Union and do their utmost to harm the immortal cause of the socialist camp and Communism. This new, hostile act of N. Khrushchev will not only fail to further his diabolical aims, but it will have a totally opposite effect. The Albanian people will understand even better how correct and wise the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Party of Labor has always been and remains, and they will further strengthen their unity around the party and the government. Moreover, the sympathy and solidarity with the Albanian people and the Albanian People’s Republic will grow among all the honest people of the world.

The Albanian people, regardless of these successive hostile activities of N. Khrushchev and his group, will always hold intact their love and friendship for the fraternal Soviet people and the fatherland and party of Lenin. They are convinced that all the anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist attempts and designs of N. Khrushchev and his group will fail completely, since the truth will finally emerge victorious and Marxism-Leninism will triumph. The Albanian People’s Republic will firmly continue on its correct path and will successfully build socialism and Communism.

As always, the Government of the Albanian People’s Republic will, in the future as well, defend the foreign policy of the Government of the Soviet Union on all issues which are in the interest of the preservation of peace and struggle for general and complete disarmament, as well as the efforts to settle the German problem by concluding a German peace treaty and turning West Berlin into a free, demilitarized city, and will resolutely fight to preserve and consolidate the unity of the countries of the socialist camp on the basis of the principles of Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The Government of the Albanian People’s Republic, emphatically protesting the Soviet Government’s unilateral decision to close the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana and the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, states that the entire responsibility for this grave hostile act falls on N. Khrushchev and his group. It expresses its full conviction that sooner or later the Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will condemn this criminal act and all N. Khrushchev’s hostile activity toward a fraternal, friendly, and allied country like the Albanian People’s Republic, which is building socialism and firmly fighting imperialism and modern revisionism by always holding high the banner of friendship and unity with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

Tirana, December 9, 1961

[1] This is the verbal notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR delivered to the acting Chargé d’Affaires of the APR in Moscow as well as the notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the APR, directed to the USSR Embassy in Tirana, concerning the recall of the personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana and the demand of the Soviet Government for the departure of the personnel of the Albanian Embassy in Moscow.

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The generally accepted narrative concerning Albania’s early parliamentary development has it that while the leaders responsible may have been well-intentioned, they achieved little in the way of concrete accomplishments, which allowed Albania, by the middle of the 1920s, to slip into authoritarian rule leaving no room for a functioning parliament. While there may be some basis to support this scenario – certainly Albania’s road to parliamentary democracy was less than smooth –  early parliamentary development in Albania can only be understood in the context of contemporary conditions.  It might be useful, therefore, to begin a discussion of early parliamentary development with a description of the contemporary scene in Albania at the time of independence and in the years immediately thereafter.

            When a group of intellectuals, tribal leaders, and former Ottoman officials proclaimed the independence of Albania in November 1912, they were motivated in part by fear. They were afraid that unless Albania established some separate political identity immediately, Albanian-inhabited lands would be divided among the participants of the first Balkan war. They were afraid, too, that in 1912 Albania was little more than a geographic expression with few of the prerequisites for the establishment of a unified European nation-state. Many of the necessary pre-conditions generally associated with unity were lacking. There was no centralization of any kind, no religious or linguistic unity, no leadership of a self-conscious class, no foreign intellectual stimulus and not even widespread discontent with foreign rule. Indigenous Albanian circumstances and conscious Ottoman policy had created a people divided. Regionally and to some extent linguistically, Albanians were divided between the Tosks in the south and the Gegs in the north; there were four major religious groups including Sunni and Bektashi Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox. Social and economic disunity was fostered by the co-existence of three conflicting stages of civilization, the mountain clans in the north, the feudal beys in the south and the more educated and urbanized, but generally unarmed population of the Hellenic and Catholic fringes.

            So, Albania’s founding fathers were right to worry. Although the fledgling state was saved from the belligerents fighting the Balkan wars – by the support of Italy and Austria-Hungary who hoped to block Serbian access to the Adriatic – the issue of the construction of a viable nation-state based on a parliamentary democracy was certainly in doubt prior to World War One. The war itself changed little in that regard. The Peace of Paris which ended the war left Albania truncated with fully half of its population in the newly constructed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (to be renamed Yugoslavia in October 1929). One result of the division of Albanian speakers was that the new state of Albania, with its population of just over 800,000 people, was home to very few minorities. Almost 96% were ethnic Albanians, approximately 2.4% Greek and 1.3% Macedonian. So, the nationality issue was much less serious than in the rest of the Balkans – but irredentism became a major concern and remains one today.

Other problems, however, were legion. The war saw Albania occupied by no less than six foreign armies, which did little to foster the unity which Albania required.  Arguably, when the war ended, Albania faced perhaps the most serious problems found in any European state. Apart from the issue of unity, Albanians suffered from a unique Weltanschauung, a legacy of the Ottoman Empire which included a strong distrust of government and the city, coupled with a cleverness employed to cheat the authorities, a practice which was considered not only completely normal but admirable. Five centuries of Ottoman domination had adversely affected the economy as well, creating none of the necessary bases for modern economic development. In the early 1920s over 90% of the population was engaged in either agriculture or animal husbandry, and yet only approximately 9% of the land was arable. Industry was either nonexistent or of the handicraft variety. Mineral resources were ignored, and transportation facilities were primitive. On the few roads that did exist, wheeled traffic was possible only during the summer months. Albania had entirely passed over the railroad age and would not have its first functioning train until after World War Two. The country’s entire rolling stock in the early 1920s consisted of three miserable old Fords left behind by an American relief mission.

            When Albania emerged from World War One it was occupied by the British, Italians, and French in Shkodra in the north, the Serbs in the east, and the French and Greeks in the south. The Italians, who in 1917 had unilaterally declared a protectorate over a united Albania, occupied the rest of the country. A provisional government had been set up in Durrës in 1918 led by Turhan Pasha, a prominent landowner. The primary concern of this regime was to save the country from partition, similar to the principal goal of Albania’s original government constructed in 1912. The Turhan Pasha government, however, commanded little respect, and failed to gain international recognition because it was essentially controlled by the Italians who, in exchange for their sponsorship, received valuable oil and asphalt concessions. Groups of clan leaders and landowners increasingly recognized that the provisional government was little more than a puppet, and that the Great Powers at the Paris Peace Conference could not be relied upon to follow through on promises to create Balkan boundaries based on the principle of national self-determination. In became clear to many that trusting in the Great Powers was to believe in a broken reed – Albanians must rely on themselves alone to achieve real independence and territorial integrity. Acting on these concerns, a group of Albanian clan leaders and landowners decided to convene a congress at Lushnjë to organize an independent temporary government to deal with the threat posed by foreign troops on Albanian soil. Fifty-six delegates from across the country, including some from areas outside the state, convened with the goal of replacing the provisional government in Durrës, putting together a new administration of  patriots, and then holding a general election for  a national legislative assembly which would draw up a new constitution. The Italians, who had more than their share of internal difficulties, did not intervene, but members of Durrës government ordered their prefect in Lushnjë to prevent the meeting. However,  the two companies of militia sent to disrupt the meeting refused to do so. The Congress, meeting from 28-31 January 1920 under the presidency of Syleman bey Delvina, but dominated principally by the young chief of the Mati tribe Ahmed Zogu, adopted the so-called Lushnjë Statutes. This Congress would prove to be one of the most important developments in the emergence of Albanian independence, and in the foundation of parliamentary democracy.  The ambitious goals of those who called the Congress included finding a solution to the basic question of what kind of government Albania would adopt.  A series of resolutions were passed, including a note to the powers against the partitioning of Albania, and a protest to the Italian parliament concerning the continued occupation of Albanian lands. A general besa was reaffirmed, and the contentious of issue of where a new capital would be located was addressed. Tirana was chosen for a number of reasons. The town was inland away from borders and foreign influence, there were good transport links to Durrës, but critically it was close to the territories controlled by Zogu who with his considerable armed retainer served as something of a protector for the Congress.

            The crucial question of the  type of state Albania would become, was addressed.  The Organic Constitution of 1914, which had created the principality under Prince Wilhelm of Wied was reaffirmed. Since the constitution had never been abrogated or suspended and Wied had never formally abdicated, the Congress invested limited executive power in a Supreme Council of Regency, made up of four persons, one representing each of Albania’s principal religions. Once chosen, this body saw to the appointment of a prime minister, Syleman bey Delvina,  a nine-member cabinet, as well as a 37- member senate which was to be entrusted with parliamentary powers until a general election could be held. Mehmed bey Konitza was appointed foreign minister and Zogu assumed the portfolio of minister of the interior, effectively the second spot in the cabinet. Zogu was the logical choice for the number two spot on the strength of the number of armed men he controlled, which proved to be the indispensable feature of post-war Albanian politics. As minister of the interior, Zogu took control of the police and gendarmerie and became Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian armed forces, although there was little in the way of an organized force at the time, other than his own retainers of some 2,000 men. On 20 February 1920, all those members of the Durrës government who had remained under the protection of the Italian navy deserted the town and brought the archives and treasury to Tirana, providing the new regime with additional legitimacy.

            The governmental system as it worked out in practice was a combination of the principality constructed by the Great Powers in 1912, and traditional tribal autocracy. There were of course immediate internal struggles. The political struggle within the assembly and within part of the country concerned, to a certain extent, a struggle between the old and new orders, with Bishop Fan Noli, who had arrived in Albania in 1920 from the United States, emerging as the representative of liberalism, modernization and westernization. On the surface, then, we have a battle between near-feudal landlords on the one hand  and an Albanian variant of liberalism on the other. But other issues emerged. Among the liberals, the extent of reform was an issue, as was the form of government. Supporters of monarchism and republicanism were to be found in both camps. Some forces were pro-communist, while others were merely liberal, hoping for stronger ties with Great Britain, France and the United States. Others hoped that Italy would emerge as the benefactor.

            In early 1921 at least the broad outlines of a political system were established and therefore elections were called for a new national council or parliament to replace the unelected officials put in place by the Lushnjë Congress. While Albania’s first elections were intended to be for a constituent assembly and not a parliament, voting for the former was postponed pending final delimitation of borders. The decision of the Lushnjë representatives to hold elections for a parliament was not in keeping with the Lushnjë statutes and angered many leaders, in particular those who hoped for the emergence of a democratized Albania or wanted to see the key questions facing the state settled once and for all. Complicating matters further, on 5 December 1920 the unelected parliament passed an electoral system that left power firmly in the hands of those who had designed the system, the traditional land-owning aristocracy. While perhaps the only practical system as the time, voting was to be indirect and conducted in two rounds. In the first round, based on available census data from ten prefectures, every 500 males selected one delegate; the delegates subsequently elected a 75-member parliament of deputies from a list of candidates which was usually drawn up to give the designers of the system legislative authority. There was one deputy for approximately every 10,000 citizens. This system made the voter something of a spectator in the process, and indirect voting, at least in the Albanian case was ripe for corruption. It was especially despised by the country’s emerging liberal elements for being inherently undemocratic and serving the interests of the landowners.  Under this system, the first election, held between February and March 1921, elected a chamber that opened on 5 April 1921. The new deputies were divided almost evenly between the two principal political groupings at the time, the popular and progressive parties. In reality, however, because of an easily manipulated electoral college system, the senate was made up entirely of supporters of those few tribal leaders and patriots who had called the Congress. The first prime minister, Syleman bey Delvina, served as a figurehead while the real power rested with cabinet positions, like Zogu’s, which had been divided among the major chieftains and landowners based upon the fire power each could muster. That this modified principality system was flawed and did not conform to the realities of Albanian political life seems to have escaped only the few. Indeed, most of those who supported its construction at Lushnjë considered it little more than an expedient to facilitate a temporary truce among the tribes, so that the external threat could be effectively resisted.

            Once the outside threat was gone, the principality system rapidly came apart due primarily to one of its greatest flaws – it contained no provisions for the arbitration of old tribal animosities. Ultimately, it appears that each chieftain was willing to continue paying homage to Western ideals of democracy by observing the parliamentary methods of opposition only as long as success by these means was anticipated. Once it became clear that all could not lead, political compromises designed to avert violence began to break down. Albania was shaken by coups and upheavals motivated primarily by the refusal on the part of the tribes to bend to central authority. It was in this atmosphere that Zogu was to demonstrate his remarkable talent for statecraft in the Albanian setting. Zogu used his accumulated military and political capital as early as November 1920 to engineer the fall of the Delvina government, hoping to advance his own position in the ensuing crisis. But Zogu had perhaps been too successful militarily and the frightened regents turned to Ilias bey Vrioni, a major landowner from the south. In response Zogu helped to form a vague political grouping called “the clique.”  Although it is difficult to determine who was involved in this group at any given time, since there did not seem to be any particular criteria for membership and since the kaleidoscopic combinations, unions, and disintegrations are rather difficult to follow, the purpose of the group seemed clear enough. It was basically opposed to those in power, whoever they happened to be, and its primary aim was the acquisition of power and wealth for its own members by any means available. Although the organization itself foundered on the rock of the Kosovo issue – the dispute being whether to push for irredentism immediately or wait for some stability in Albania, with Zogu supporting the latter position – Zogu managed to hold enough of the group together to destroy the Vrioni government. But Zogu, with his reduced clique, was forced to settle for the position of minister of war in a regime headed by Pandeli Evangjeli, an Orthodox Christian from Korça. Evangjeli survived a scant two months before in early December 1921 he was required to resign by one of the regents who sent a body of armed men to Evangjeli’s bedroom, awakening him with the muzzles of their guns. Zogu, who had been off campaigning against insurgent tribes in the north, marched on the capital, deposing those who had deposed Evangjeli, and established a puppet prime minister while further consolidating his own support.  Then on 16 December 1922, at the age of 27, Zogu became prime minister while retaining the crucial position of minister of the interior. With the exception of a six-month period in 1924, Zogu would remain the leading figure in Albania, in one capacity or another, until his ouster by Mussolini in 1939.

            Zogu had learned a great deal in these first two years of participation in Albanian national politics. He came to the realization that he was particularly well suited for Albanian politics. His ability at intrigue was superior, his military prowess, in terms of strategy and in terms of attracting supporters, was established. Indeed, it was clear that he was one of just a few Albanians competent enough to play a role on the national scale. The problems he faced were the same as those Albania had faced in 1920. While the various tribal groups had clawed at one another from 1920 to 1922, all of Albania’s problems had simply been obscured. Once the dust had settled, these difficulties became much more visible.

            Zogu’s motivation as the new head of government, as it was to remain until his ouster, was that of an opportunist – Zogu was principally concerned with remaining in power. But that, of course, required some unity and stability. So, not for the first time and not for the last, Zogu’s and Albania’s needs seemed to coincide. This conferred on Zogu the legitimacy of a nationalist, something of which he would become an ever more ardent proponent, as it became clear that the survival of his power base depended on it. During his tenure as prime minister, which lasted about one year – a remarkable achievement in itself under the circumstances – he hoped to continue the process of power consolidation. His strategy included financial corruption in order to enrich himself. What concerned his opponents and his allies alike, however, was that he was using his personal wealth to consolidate and increase his own prestige. To this end he began to call for a revision of the Statutes of Lushnijë. It was clear to all that Zogu’s goal here was the construction of a somewhat more authoritarian system to end the political chaos that reigned in Albania. The principality had by this point been completely overwhelmed by Albania’s Ottoman heritage. The administration was overburdened with officials who had little or nothing to do but to oversee the extensive corruption that had continued from Turkish times. Albania’s first governments had been intolerant, oppressive and violent and were accused and were most likely guilty of numerous assassinations and attempted assassinations. All of this frightened investors and international bodies without which Albania would never be able to lift itself out of its economic morass. Zogu hoped to serve his own quest for power and provide for some stability in the state by either scrapping the system entirely or at least reorganizing it along more authoritarian lines – something that might have been more appropriate for Albania in the 1920s.

            In the meantime, however, he felt obliged to conform to the guidelines established at Lushnjë. The parliament which had convened in April 1921 remained outside the political battle emerging. After all, a parliament was intended to come after a constituent assembly, not before. Legislative achievements were meager, no substantive investments was attracted and no loans were offered – as parliament remained hopelessly stalled by conflict between popular and progressive parties. In the summer of 1923 elections for a constituent assembly were finally called, after having been postponed repeatedly. Again, these elections were designed ostensibly to decide the fundamental question of the state structure. The first round of voting was to take place in September, and the second round in December. The constituent assembly would both function as a parliament and draft a new constitution to replace the Lushnjë statutes. The type of government, republic or monarchy, was a central question. After fulfilling this agenda, the assembly was expected to resign before new elections were held for a regular parliament. Seeing these rules as a substantial disadvantage, Noli and the progressives attempted to do away with indirect voting and hoped to impose a new electoral law to replace the December 1920 regulations which stipulated that voting was to be held in two rounds. Noli and the progressives felt that this might be the only way to halt what they saw as Zogu’s march to dictatorship. They argued that direct voting was more democratic and would result in a more representative assembly which could then move to do away with corruption in the second round.  The progressives also wanted to broaden the franchise to include women, and neutralize the army and the gendarmerie as political forces. But Zogu and his supporters opposed all of these democratic innovations,   no concessions were made and the proposed new electoral law was defeated in a parliamentary vote.  

            The election campaign was fierce with Zogu pushing for discipline and stability while Noli preached westernization, democratization, and modernization. There were claims of electoral fraud by the opposition, but the major problem seems have been outside funding.  Zogu probably benefitted from Greek, Yugoslav and Italian money, while Noli was funded by Vatra in the United States. But in general, the outcome of the election appeared to be an accurate representation of Albania’s political climate – neither political group secured a majority. After the second round of voting on 27 December, of the 102 seats in the assembly, the opposition took 39 seats, and Zogu took 44. But because of the fact that Zogu was able to gain the support of some of the remaining independents he was able to retain his position as prime minister. The assembly which  convened on 21 January 1924 went on to act solely as a regular parliament and neglected the mandate for a new constitutional order. Before the new assembly could take any significant steps towards stability, however,  Albania was again faced with a series of crises.

            On 24 February 1924, as he was walking up the steps of parliament, Zogu was shot several times by Beqir Walter, a supporter of one of Zogu’s political rivals. Zogu, wounded in the hand and thigh, staggered into parliament, gun in hand, and made it to the government bench. The scene in parliament was understandably tense; most of the deputies seemed to recognize the danger of an open gunfight since everyone present was armed. Shooting continued in the fore hall between Walter and the followers of Zogu. Walter then locked himself in the bathroom and commenced singing patriotic songs as he shot through the doors. After the assailant was finally subdued, Zogu from his bench announced in a loud voice, “Gentlemen, this is not the first time this sort of thing has happened. I ask my friends to leave it alone and deal with it afterwards.” Zogu had possibly prevented wholesale carnage within the assembly hall.

            Zogu was temporarily sidelined, in part because he needed to recover and in part because Albanian blood feud custom required that he not leave his house until the outrage was avenged. Under the circumstances, Zogu felt it best to relinquish his post as prime minister, after convincing the regents to appoint his ally the landowner Shevqet Verlaci to take his place. But the government was unstable and unable to address Albania’s myriad problems effectively. Discontent in both the north and the south grew. This unrest was fanned by the irredentists, who hoped to eventually replace Zogu with someone more concerned with unifying Albania and Kosovo. All of this growing opposition to Zogu was brought together by the murder of Avni Rystemi on 5 May 1924. Rystemi, whom Zogu blamed for the attempt on his life in February, was a leader of Bishop Fan Noli’s progressive grouping.

            The progressives withdrew from parliament, declaring that no opposition deputy was safe in Tirana. Military and gendarmerie commanders, as well as some of the principal northern chieftains joined Noli and the progressives and declared open revolt. The government declared general mobilization on 1 June  but soon found that there were few left to mobilize. The Prime Minister resigned and of the four members of the Council of Regency, one resigned and three fled. Most of the government fled to Italy. Zogu was the last to remain, hoping to rally the capital and the diplomatic community, but it was too late. On the afternoon of 9 June Zogu called on the citizens of Tirana for support but it soon became clear that they would not die for Zogu. As the 7,000 troops commanded by the insurgents closed in on Tirana, Zogu with his retainers withdrew. Following some light fighting between Zogu’s force and the troops of several northern chieftains, Zogu was obliged to withdraw into Yugoslavia.

            While Zogu was in Belgrade, Fan Noli, a Harvard University graduate and founder of the Albanian Orthodox church in America, organized a government. Noli produced an idealistic program for radical landreform along western lines, thereby raising the hopes of the peasantry while frightening the conservative landlords. The landlords need not have worried, however, since Noli’s reforms were never implemented. The only tangible results of Noli’s plans were the alienation of the peasants, who had their hopes raised and dashed, and the alienation of the landlords who were given an idea of what Noli would have done, had he been able to. Noli’s experience was another lesson for Zogu in what not to do in Albania. It soon became clear that those who had assisted Noli in ousting Zogu had little more than their fear of Zogu in common. Noli was faced with a cabinet crisis within a matter of weeks. Zogu, in the meantime, was not idle. He quickly put together a military force consisting of his own retainers, loyal tribes, Yugoslav troops, and a contingent of White Russians from Baron Pyotr Wrangel’s now defunct army. By late December 1924, Zogu was marching back to Albania. Because of Noli’s inability to rally the capital, Zogu captured Tirana by the end of December.

            Zogu moved quickly to liquidate those who had opposed him, and bought off those who had remained neutral. The momentary dearth of opposition afforded him the opportunity to construct a government and parliamentary structure more in line with his own plans and perhaps more in step with the realities of Albanian political life. By 1924, Zogu had significant evidence to suggest that the parliamentary principality, which the Great Powers had constructed in 1912, was ill-suited to local conditions. The failure of Fan Noli provided further evidence that not only was the system not working but Albania might actually have been worse off following its imposition. Western-oriented parliamentarianism had not only failed to create the basis for stable internal development but had added another dimension, that of politics, to the already alarming level of indigenous conflict.

            With many of his enemies dead or in exile, Zogu was presented with a unique opportunity to create an autocratic regime. While he had often declared that this is exactly what he would do if given the opportunity, once absolute power lay within his grasp he backed away and accepted qualified authority for several reasons. Zogu’s somewhat truncated education led him to believe that Europe would react with hostility to anything but a representative form of government and a parliament. He also assumed that only if he restrained his desire for unqualified authority could he attract the bureaucrats who had served in the previous regime. He correctly assumed that it would be a serious mistake to alienate anyone with administrative experience. But despite these fears, he knew that in order to survive, significant changes in the structure of the Albanian political system were necessary.

            Zogu proceeded with vigor. Aware that he needed to legitimize his position as quickly as possible, he reconvened the Constituent Assembly elected in 1923 – naturally without the troublesome opposition. Sixty-four of the original 102 deputies  assembled in Tirana in January 1925 and all but two were persuaded to construct a republic and elect Zogu as president. The assembly promulgated a new constitution in March which replaced most of the Statutes of Lushnjë and established a bicameral legislature with an eighteen-member senate (twelve elected and six appointed) and a 57 member assembly, elected on the basis of electors who were controlled by local authorities. The senate, whose members served for six years, was to serve as a high court at the discretion of the president and its approval was required for all measures passed by the assembly. The president had an unrestricted veto over laws passed by parliament and could dissolve parliament and call for new elections at any time. The president also used the senate to block the assembly if he did not want to become personally involved with an issue. The new constitution outwardly looked very much like the American version but the major difference, of course, was that the Albanian version left almost all of the power in the hands of the president, who was elected for seven years and served as both head of government and head of state. He completely controlled the cabinet and senate, which he appointed and dismissed at will. He commanded the armed forces, controlled the administration and had the sole right to initiate changes in the constitution. He also had significant control over the assembly. This left only the courts in a position of partial independence, although Zogu did control judicial appointments. The Constituent Assembly, clearly on Zogu’s initiative, also instructed the president to institute a series of measures meant to aid in the establishment of stability. The 5,000-man army, which had become a hotbed for politicians and had been a major source of opposition of Zogu, was replaced by a smaller less formal militia. This would allow Zogu, with his tribal retainer to personally be one of the most powerful military forces in Albania. The Constituent Assembly also established a decree law that officially was designed to combat treasonable propaganda. The real purpose, however, was to allow Zogu to imprison persons against whom evidence sufficient to satisfy the courts had not been found. This law, by overriding the ordinary process of justice, gave Zogu greater power than the constitution would allow.

            But Zogu was not yet fully satisfied – he eventually came to the conclusion that his power base could only be completely secured with the construction of a monarchy, with himself as king. In 1928, therefore, after consulting the Italians who had by this point become his principal benefactors, he took the final step and became King of the Albanians, supported by a new constitution. With the establishment of the monarchy, the role of parliament was further reduced. The bicameral structure was replaced by a one house – 56 member parliament. The election process continued to insure that only such candidates who were of certain loyalty, or appointed by local officials, stood a chance of winning. The fact that the head of the commune, or the local government was an official appointee made it possible for him to secure the election of the body of second electors which included only those who could be relied upon to elect to parliament the slate prepared in Tirana. Political parties were no longer legal so no other candidates stood for election. Moreover, a large sum had to be paid to the municipality by every would-be candidate before his name was listed. Few could afford to pay the fee without the help of the government. The king designated the officers of parliament, and he fixed the agenda of parliament. He had the sole right to introduce bills and could dismiss parliament at will. As a result, no political issues of any importance were decided by the elections or by parliament. Politics and a functioning parliament in Albania essentially ceased to exist, and would not return until the collapse of the communist regime.

            While these developments were perhaps disappointing to those who hoped for the rapid development of a liberal parliamentary democracy, they were not unusual. Indeed, Albania succumbed to a pattern of illiberalism which was not only experienced everywhere else in the Balkans, but blighted much of the rest of Europe as well. World War One had unleashed forces which fledgling democracies all over the continent found it difficult to overcome. Albania was in a particularly vulnerable position in this regard because its level of political, economic, and social development lagged behind not only the rest of Europe, but also the rest of the Balkans. It was perhaps unrealistic to hope that a functioning parliamentary democracy could flourish in such infertile ground. Zogu had argued that stability and unity should be the first priority and this is what he strove for with varying degrees of success. But much was sacrificed – including a functioning parliament, representing the will of the people and actively participating in the development of the nation and the state.

Indiana University

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ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN COUNTRIES

            In spite of their alleged nationalistic tendencies, the general attitude of the Albanian people and of the present regime is friendly toward all foreign peoples and yet, as stated above, distrustful.  One bit of concrete evidence of this statement is found in the fact that, while Italy took over complete control of the country and imposed its sovereignty upon the Albanian people, there was little ill treatment of Italians as a people after the Albanian authorities resumed control, although thousands of them, including soldiers, remained in the country until very recently. 

            A few Italians were shot during the first days of the regime, but such persons are generally conceded to have been particularly aggressive against the Albanians and could be held responsible for specific “crimes” in the eyes of the Albanians.  While many of the Italians, both soldiers and civilians, have had to work on Albanian public works projects under trying conditions, these individuals have not fared worse than Albanians themselves working on the same and similar projects.  Even in the cases of Germans and Austrians who still remain in the country, there seems to be no feeling of resentment in spite of anti-Nazi programs of the regime.  Only very recently have these aliens even been called upon the register.  In general, therefore, it can be said that there is no anti-foreign feeling existent in Albania. 

            While, as indicated above, the Albanian people are not generally anti-foreign, they have certain preferences with respect to foreign countries which may be divided into two main groups, viz.: the pro-western and pro-eastern. 

            The pro-western group, which is definitely the larger, looks toward Western Europe and the United States as sources of economic and cultural inspiration.  The pro-eastern group, although in the minority numerically, is quite strong and influential because of its shrewd and capable leaders and looks toward the east, i.e., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, for guidance, inspiration and protection.  Sub-divisions of these two main groups are dealt with below. 

1. Pro-Western Group:

a. Pro-American Group: The first group with western leanings is the pro-American group which is believed to be the largest group numerically, although it is not and never has been the strongest group politically.  The first explanation of the existence of this pro-American group is the fact that, according to the most conservative estimates, at least 25% of the people of Albania (around 250,000 people) have either been a continual exchange of ideas and funds up to the time the United States entered the war.  This large pro-American group lives almost entirely in the southern third of the country where there is hardly a town or village in which at least 50% to 75% of the people have been to the United States or have friends and relatives there.  Before the war almost the entire economic structure of this regions was supported by contributions from friends and relatives in the United States and by contributions from friends and relatives in the United States and returned with sufficient capital to establish themselves in business in their homeland.  This group, aside from its economic dependence upon the United States, looks to such men as Bishop Fan Noli, head of the Albanian Orthodox Church in America, and Mr. K. Cekrazi, the first Albanian Commissioner to the United States, for cultural inspiration. 

            Another important source of this pro-American feeling is the result of the activities of the Albanian Vocational School which was maintained jointly for twelve years in Albania by the American Junior Red Cross and the Albanian government under the direction of Mr. Harry T. Fultz.  More than 5,000 Albanian attended that school during its lifetime and almost one thousand graduated.  Not only in southern Albania but everywhere one goes, one is bound to meet some Albanian who speaks some English and who will speak of Mr. Fultz in glowing terms.  In fact, one hears even in official circles including the Albanian groups which are not pro-American, the statement that it was Mr. Fultz who taught the Albanians the arts and crafts and how to work.  This group has a very high opinion of the United States and entertains nothing but the friendliest of feelings toward Americans. 

            Still another smaller pro-American group consists of graduates of the Agricultural School operated and maintained for some years at Kavaja by the Near East Foundation and, finally, there is a still smaller group of officials or ex-officials who worked with the Rockefeller Foundation in public health and malarial control activities. 

            In addition, there is a general background of pro-American feeling among all Albanians because of kind remembrances of assistance rendered by the United States after the last war in bringing about the creation of an independent Albanian state.  Albanians of all ranks and classes have a feeling that without the friendly and persistent support of President Wilson, there never would have been an independent Albania. 

            There is, therefore, unquestionably a larger percentage of pro-American people in Albania than in any other Balkan country.  There may be more Greeks in Greece and even Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia with pro-American leanings for reasons similar to those that have existed in Albania but the proportion of these groups in those countries to the total population smaller than in Albania.  This pro-American feeling has, however, been largely a one-way traffic since the American people have never made any attempt to exploit this situation either for business or for cultural reasons.

b. Pro-British Group: The second most important pro-western group is pro-British, but in the sense that this group is politically strong rather than numerically.  This group consists chiefly of wealthy Bey and merchant families who, since the creation of an independent Albania, have seemed to look to Great Britain for support in their conservative and even reactionary control over every phase of Albanian activity. 

            The fact that all the British have given moral support to this group in the past and still continue to do so places the British at a decided disadvantage at the present time in as much a the present regime in control is communistic and socialistic and views with suspicion British efforts to bolster up the wealthy land-owning and industrial classes. 

            There is also a strong feeling in Albania, even down to the common people, that Great Britain is far more interested in strengthening Greece than Albania and that, therefore, Great Britain supports Greek claims to Northern Epirus.  Reuter’s press reports and BBC broadcasts add color to this suspicion. 

            As a result, British influence for any constructive purposes in Albania is not strong at the present time.  This British attitude, moreover, furnishes political capital to the pro-eastern group in its effort to reorient Albania’s political outlook eastward toward Yugoslavia and Russia.  The argument is that Great Britain is trying to restore the old conservative and reactionary ruling Fascists, that France is too weak to give any help and the United States too far away to care. 

c. Pro-Italian Group: The third most important pro-western group is the Italian.  While it may be thought that the Italian occupation antagonized all Albanians, this is by no means the truth.  The pro-western group in looking westward naturally finds Italy as its nearest neighbor.  The basis of Albania’s ability to finance its imports and find the first customer just across the Adriatic in Italy and in return Italy provides a source of needed manufactured articles. 

It naturally follows that there is a large commercial group interested in restoring friendly relations with the Italians.  This natural commercial relationship is further enhanced by the fact that thousands of Albanians of all walks of life now, as a result of the Italian occupation, speak Italian.  They can read Italian newspapers and understand the Italian radio broadcasts.  It is inevitable, therefore, that if the pro-western group has anything to say in the future destiny of Albania there will ultimately come about a closer rapprochement with Italy both politically and commercially.  There has been much intermarriage between Italians and Albanians and the Roman Catholic group about 10% of the population is strongly pro-Italian.  In addition, as indicated above, there are fairly large Albanian colonies in Calabria and Sicily. 

If the Italians forget their imperialistic designs and play their cards well, they can easily secure an economic advantage in Albania without anybody complaining except the pro-eastern group trying to orient the future destiny of the country with Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. 

d. Pro-French Group: The fourth pro-western group is probably the pro-French.  The French at one time had considerable influence in Albania, especially during the latter part of the Turkish rule.  French has been taught in Albanian schools and most Albanian officials have visited France and drawn deeply upon French culture for inspiration.  For the moment, due to French reverses, this pro-French group is not active although recently steps have been taken to resume closer relations with France.  The French government is trying to strengthen its Mission here, at present purely military, and the Albanian authorities have asked France to send some French teachers for Albanian schools. 

2. Pro-Eastern Group

            There has always been a pro-eastern group in Albania, small numerically it is true, but sometimes strong politically and influential as at the present time.  It is believed, as an attempt will be made below to show, that for deep-rooted reasons this group has had and will continue to have difficulty putting across a pro-eastern policy. 

a. Pro-Yugolsavia Group: As Yugoslavia is Albania’s nearest and biggest neighbor, it is natural that there should be close ties between the two countries.  King Zog himself at one time held to such a view and was brought back to the throne in 1924 with Yugoslav help.  He later turned his eyes toward Italy.  At the present time, the regime in control is collaborating closely with the Tito government in Yugoslavia and the first and only government to date to recognize Albania is Yugoslavia.  In addition an agreement, exact terms unknown, has been signed with respect to commercial relations under which Albania is supplying petroleum products, wool and hides to Yugoslavia and receiving foodstuffs in return. 

            As will be shown below, however, this pro-Albanian rapprochement is believed to be engineered by the present leaders and ha no real, hearty support among the people unless Yugoslavia by some bold beau geste should hand over the Kosovo area to Albania.

b. Pro-Soviet Group: The same leaders who are trying to draw Albania and Yugoslavia closer together are also attempting to draw Albania closer to the Soviet Union to which Yugoslavia is also closely bound at present.  This movement has the backing of the communist members of the regime such as Professor Malëshova, Dr. dischnica, Maj. Gen. Spahiu, Lt. Col. Gen. Xoxe and probably Col. Gen. Hoxha himself.  The ideology of the present regime is patterned closely after the Soviet model which believes in absolute control by one party, the liquidation of opposition and the training of the people along chosen lines which they must follow.  Some of this ideology fits in with Albanian customs and habits and some does not, how far these pro-Soviet leaders can carry out their program remains to be seen but it seems certain they intend to succeed even possibly at the price of a blood bath.  That part of the program which proclaims the betterment of the common people finds popular support and, as the British and possibly even the American are believed to be in sympathy with the reactionaries, lends much strength to the leaders desiring to follow a pro-Soviet and pro-eastern policy. 

c. Pro-Turkish Group: As Turkey ruled over Albania for nearly four hundred years and as 70% of the people are Muslims of the Sunni and Bektashi sects, it is natural that there should still exist today certain strong cultural ties with Turkey and with other Near eastern countries, such as Eygpt.  Fairly large colonies of Albanians, many political exiles, are living in Istanbul, Cairo, and Alexandria.  Although this group, for the time being, is politically inactive, especially as most of its adherents come from the former Bey and wealthy classes who are not strong in the present regime, it is, however, potentially strong and may later become an important factor in Albania’s political life. 

The West versus the East

As has already been indicated above, there is a struggle going on in Albania between the pro-western and pro-eastern groups.  It is believed beyond much doubt that the pro-western is numerically and strategically stronger than the pro-eastern but it is equally true that the pro-eastern  leaders are better trained and more astute and they are actually in power.  This pro-eastern group may, however, have much difficulty in reorienting Albanian policy toward the east. 

            The first difficulty which must be overcome is the fact that the Albanian peple are not pro-eastern minded.  The Albanians are a small minority in the Balkans who are not Slavs and take pleasure in declaring the fact; they are not Bulgars; they are not Macedonians and they are not Greeks. 

            As a people, they naturally look with alarm and fear upon attempts to federate them with their Balkan neighbors because they know that, as a minority, they will inevitably become submerged politically and culturally in the mass of alien elements, especially the Slavs who have for centuries tried to engulf them.

            Also, the pro-eastern group cannot get around the fact that from five hundred to seven hundred thousand Albanians are now living in Yugoslavia, largely in the Kosovo area, and their lot is not too happy.  The Albanians, see in the treatment of their fellow countrymen under Yugoslav sovereignty a situation which they do not want to happen to them.  This area, moreover, constitutes and Albanian Irredentia.  The importance of this situation can be better visualized when one learns that there are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia as there are in Albania itself and efforts of Albania to have the areas in Yugoslavia where Albanians predominate added to Albania have been frustrated. 

            Still another reason why Albanians are not pro-eastern minded is the strong pro-western influence which has been described in the preceding paragraphs.  In other words, any effort to reorient Albanian destinies eastward is bound to run counter to ingrained efforts of the Albanian people to free themselves from eastern rulers, formerly Turkish and more recently a Slavic tide that threatens to engulf them.

            Also, the pro-eastern group cannot get around the fact that from five hundred to seven hundred thousand Albanians are now living in Yugoslavia, largely in the Kosovo area, and their lot is not too happy.  The Albanians, see in the treatment of their fellow countrymen under Yugoslav sovereignty a situation which they do not want to happen to them.  This area, moreover, constitutes an Albanian Irredentia.  The importance of this situation can be better visualized when one learns that there are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia as there are in Albanian itself and efforts of Albania to have the areas in Yugoslavia where Albanians predominate added to Albania have been frustrated. 

            Still another reason why Albanians are not pro-eastern minded is the strong pro-western influence which has been described in the preceding paragraphs.  In other words, any effort to reorient Albanian destinies eastward is bound to run counter to ingrained efforts of the Albanian people to free themselves from eastern rulers, formerly Turkish and more recently a Slavic tide that threatens to engulf them.

            About the only real strength of the pro-eastern group, aside from the ability of its present leaders, is the fact, already mentioned, that the western nations, especially Great Britain, seem to be supporting the conservative and reactionary groups.  There may also be some fear of a strong, recreated Italy.  The western nations, however, definitely have more sympathizers numerically than the pro-eastern and they are in a position to assist Albania in practical ways more than the other group.  If the western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, set themselves to the task of winning over the present regime, it is believed that it can be done.  The first step in this direction is recognition and then sympathetic consideration of the needs of a new Albania which will take account of the common man more than has been done in the past. 

            A struggle is going on, however, in Albania as well as in all Balkan countries between these pro-western and pro-eastern groups, the end of which nobody can foretell with certainty.  There is a clash of ideologies which is worldwide-Albania just happens to be one of the focal points where both sides meet on common political ground-tomorrow it may be military.

SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

            Having discussed the general attitude of Albanians toward foreign powers, there will be mentioned briefly below certain matters of interest and concern between Albania and specific countries.

1. The United States and Albania:

The chief matters at issue in our relations with Albania are as follows:

a. The recognition and resumption of diplomatic and consular intercourse, which, for the moment, is the most important matter at issue between the two countries.

b. Resumption of the inculcation of our ideas and ways of life through a cultural relations program which would involve the distribution of suitable printed material, dissemination of radio broadcasts and the showing of suitable films throughout the country.

c. Possible resumption of the support of the Near East Foundation in the Kavaje Agricultural School and the resumption of the Rockefeller Foundation in anti-malarial control.

d. The lending of experts in agriculture and in the development of petroleum products which has become a state monopoly, as well as mining, road construction and bridge-building experts. 

e. The selection and sending to the United States of official, commercial and press groups to visit our cities and industrial establishments and institutions.

f. The selection of suitable students to study in the United States particularly in the agricultural pursuits, mining (petroleum, chrome, coal, iron, asphalt) and education.

g. Some financial support until Albania can become self-supporting.  This assistance, however, should not be attempted by the United States alone and might best be handled either jointly with Great Britain, France, and Italy or it might be turned over to the United Nations Organization.

2. Great Britain and Albania:

            The biggest problem for the British in Albania is to convince the Albanian officials and people that Great Britain really desires to see an independent Albania.  Next in importance, would be an attempt to disabuse the Albanians by and large of the idea now prevalent that Great Britain supports the reactionary Albanian cliques and is therefore opposed to social and cultural innovations looking toward the better distribution of wealthier among all Albanian classes.  The third British problem is to disabuse the minds of the Albanians of the idea that Great Britain supports the Greeks in their demands for territorial adjustments in favor of Greece.  On the constructive side, Great Britain could join with the United States in various activities which were listed above in connection with United States-Albanian relations. 

3. Italy and Albania:

            As has already been indicated, Italy can also play an important part in the future of Albania and probably will become Albania’s best customer and largest supplier of manufactured goods.  Every encouragement should be given to Italy not only to strengthen the pro-western position but also to help Italy herself to get on her feet and assume a position in the modern world to which she is entitled.  Italian engineers and advisers, like the French, would probably be better suited for service in Albania than the British and Americans.  They know the country and the language of the people and are by nature tolerant. 

            There are certain special problems outstanding in Italian-Albanian relations which will need consideration through direct negotiations between Italy and the Albanian authorities, such as, the status of Italians still remaining in Albania, a more just settlement of the problems of Italian investments and property in Albania, and certain special problems due to the close proximity of Italy to Albania, such as the status of the isaldn of Sazanit which was formerly Albanian and taken over by Italy as a naval base.  None of these problems should, however, constitute any serious difficulty in future Italian-Albanian relations. 

4. France and Albania:

            The French can play an important part in holding and developing Albania as an oasis of western ideas and democracy.  As was indicated above, French influence has been strong in the past and that influence can be redeveloped for the good of all.  France is not viewed with suspicion as is Great Britain and the French government should be encouraged to take a more active part in Albanian affairs possibly by sending teachers and advisers, as the Albanian government seems to wish this.  In fact, French advisers and engineers might be satisfactorily employed in Albania than American or British because the Frenchmen temperamentally are more inclined to be indulgent to the shortcomings of other people among whom they live. 

5. Yugoslavia and Albania:

Future Yugoslav-Albanian relations are probably the most important group of relations confronting the Albanian people because of latent danger involved in them.  As has already been indicated, due to Yugoslavia-Soviet influence, the present regime is dominated by a few strong personalities, strongly favoring Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, all out of proportion to the real desires and needs of the Albanian people, as Yugoslav national destiny, as interpreted not only by their present rulers but also by their former rulers, contemplates the eventual absorption or federation of Albania into Yugoslavia.  There are already over 500,000 Albanians (conservative estimate) living under Yugoslav rule in the Kosova region. 

            The Yugoslavs desire to control or to absorb Albania in order to seek a port on the lower Adriatic, possibly at Durazzo, which port the Yugoslavs long desired to link up by rail to their railhead at Pec.  This desire on the part of Yugoslavia seems to have the backing of the Soviet Union which, according to all outward signs, wishes to exercise a dominating influence in the Balkans and on the eastern shore of the Adriatic.  It is probably this aspect which provokes the British attitude-the criticism of the British in this respect being that they are handling the matter in the wrong way.

            Whatever group, therefore, may be in control in Albania, whether pro-eastern or pro-western, there is always going to be an Albanian-Yugoslav minority and boundary question as long as more than one half million Albanians are living just across the present boundaries in Yugoslav territory unless and until some adjustment of the frontier can be made in favor of Albania so that the majority of this large Albanian minority in Yugoslavia can be incorporated in their homeland. 

            Such a practical settlement is, however, most difficult because of the expansionist policy of Yugoslavia which seeks to control all of Albania, at least the northern part, and by reason of the fact that at least part of the Kosova region which is inhabited by the Albanian minority is as historically revered by the Serbians as by the Albanians because of historic battles fought there against the Turks. 

            The Yugoslav policy in this matter bears watching always because both Yugoslavia and Greece are stronger powers than Albania and both are seeking Albanian territory.  The result, therefore, may well be that some day the two powers will agree to divide the country between them, Yugoslavia taking the northern portion and Greece the southern.

            There are even rumors in Albania that there is a certain segment of British opinion, particularly among the military, which favors such a division of Albania.  The argument of this British group is that with Greece controlling the southern portion and, particularly the ports of Valona and Saranda, Great Britain would be in a better position, through its control of Greek activities, to dominate the outlet of the Adriatic and thus, through the maintenance of another Gibraltar at one of these ports, checkmate Yugoslavia’s expansion through the Adriatic.  The same British group believes that Great Britain will for some time to come dominate in Italy and direct Italian foreign policy and with such control on the western side of the Adriatic and control on the eastern side through Greek sovereignty over southern Albania, Great Britain would control over the outlet to that sea for checking Yugoslavia and possible Soviet expansion.

            Strictly speaking, this sort of British policy is of no concern to the United States except that if pursued in and brought to its logical conclusion, it constitutes just another step toward the next war in which the United States will probably be drawn as it was in the last and present war.

            Tot this extent it behooves the United States to try to bolster up an independent and free Albania as far as a better policy for all interests concerned instead of permitting the country to be absorbed by Yugoslavia and Greece. 

            Another impediment to real Albanian-Yugoslav relations is the fact that the products of each country are about the same and could never be developed between them beneficial trade, or at least not nearly so mutually beneficial, as the trade that could be developed with the western powers, especially Italy supplying manufactured products and Albanian raw materials such as oil, chrome, coal, wool, olive oil and asphalt. 

            In brief, therefore, although there is at present considerable effort being made by Yugoslavia and the pro-Yugoslav elements in the FNC regime to develop closer relations between the two countries, such an alliance is an unnatural one and cannot be developed on stable lines.  About the only alliance that could be reached which would be mutually beneficial to the two countries would be some sort of non-aggression pact signed generally by all Balkan powers in which they would agree to pool resources in the event that any of them were attacked by an outside aggressor.  Had such a pact existed prior to 1939, it is highly unlikely that Italy would ever have attacked Albania and risked at the time a war with all Balkan states.  Likewise, Germany would have hesitated longer before invading Rumania had she felt certain that all Balkan states would have united to repel her.  This leads to the question of a Balkan Federation to be discussed below. 

6. The Soviet Union and Albania

There is really nothing logical or natural in any close relationship between Albania and the Soviet Union.  Certainly the Soviet Union needs none of the products of Albania and is unable at the present time and possibly for some time to come to supply Albania with any of the manufactured articles which she needs to rehabilitate herself.  The Albanian people have been mountaineers and individualists for centuries as evidenced by their history and there is certainly nothing in their makeup which naturally draws them to the Soviet communist ideology.

            The only two ties that can be said to exist at the present time are as follows: Albanian land, mines and other sources of wealth hitherto have been controlled by the so-called Beys and industrial classes.  According to Soviet ideas such control would be broken up and a strict state control substituted. 

            The Albanian peasants and white collar classes desire to see the strange hold of the industrialists and Beys broken but they have no desire to see strict Soviet control would be broken up and a strict state control substituted therefore as their objective is to participate in this wealth themselves.  As this underprivileged class, however, is receiving no support from the British and Americans and in facts finds the British supporting the privileged classes, it naturally listens to the pronouncements of the pro-Soviet group which keeps telling the people over the radio and in the press that the Soviet and Soviet-dominated Yugoslavia and their friends in bringing about social reforms.

            It is believed, therefore, that the Soviet influence in Albania is really non-existent except for the type that is drummed up by a small clique in the government controlled by very astute and Soviet-minded individuals.  They may go a long way with their propaganda.  If they are to be successful, they will have to inaugurate a stern and drastic regime or eliminate by executions and murders a large proportion of the intelligentsia of Albania.  If the western powers do not watch this movement and handle the situation properly, especially the British, this is what could and might happen.  The Soviet Union need not appear openly in the picture; it need only support Yugoslavia’s policy.

            Whether Russia really desires to extend its control, even remote control, over Albania as indicated above, is not definitely known.  Everyone knows that it has been historic Russian policy, even from the days of the Czars, to extend its control over the Balkans.  There is a reason to believe, therefore, that the Soviet Union would like to see Albania along with all Balkan powers under its domination even though the controls were exercised through governments established in the various countries friendly towards the Soviet Union and doing the Soviets’ bidding.  The question of desire is, however, one thing and the question of how far the Soviet Union, particularly at this time, is willing to risk antagonizing and provoking active opposition by the western powers is another.  It might be that she prefers to go slow, hoping that gradually her control will be extended and consolidated while the Western Allies, tired and weary of war, go to sleep.

            In this connection, it is interesting to note that, although Molotov in December 1942, as did Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden, came out for Albanian independence, since that date the Soviet Union has taken no action or spoken no word publicly that would indicate any sincerity in that statement.  On the other hand she has not attempted to meddle openly in Albanian affairs as she has done at Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest. 

7. Greece and Albania:

            In some ways Albania and Greece should be the best of friends as they are the two people of the Balkans who do not like the Slavs, Bulgars and Macedonians. 

            However, instead of being friendly the Greeks are forever making claims to the southern portion of Albania, the maximum extent of which are absolutely preposterous. 

            Although the Greek government, whatever its character, except possibly the ELAS group which definitely has Soviet connections, goes merrily on demanding incorporation into Greece of a large portion of Albania in which there are no Greeks at all or in which the Greeks are definitely a small minority, taking over of this area would leave a truncated Albania without enough territory to support itself and drive that portion completely into the arms of the Yugoslavs and other Balkan people toward the Greeks.  This would only mean struggles and bloodshed in which the powers would have to intervene as Greece, without outside help, could not with stand an Albanian-Yugoslav-Bulgar combination. 

            Between Greece and Albania there is little opportunity for extensive commercial intercourse because the products of the two countries are too much alike.  Greece, of course, could use Albanian oil but she has no exports of the type desired by the Albanian with which to pay for such oil.  The trade, therefore, would have to be three-cornered, balanced by Greek exports to some other country which would purchase Albanian products. 

            Next, therefore, to the problems between Albania and Yugoslavia, the Greek-Albanian problems are the most dangerous and most inflammable in Albanian foreign relations.  If the Greek government cannot be persuaded to desist from its provocative demands broadcast almost daily over the radio and in the Greek press, some explosion is likely to happen. 

8. Turkey and Albania:

            At the present time, relations between Albania and Turkey are practically non-existent but culturally there is much in common between the two countries and, as a counter-balance to the intrigues between the pro-western and pro-eastern groups, it might be well for Albania to attempt to renew its contacts with Turkey.  As stated above, there are considerable numbers of Albanians in Istanbul, Cairo, and Alexandria which are centers of Muslim culture.  This could easily be done by re-establishing closer contacts between Sunni and Muslim elements in Albania and their religious brothers in Turkey and Egypt.  The 400 year rule by Turkey over Albania has left indelible impressions and the new Turkey might be able to assist Albanians without evoking political repercussions.

9. Relations with Other Countries:

ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN COUNTRIES

            In spite of their alleged nationalistic tendencies, the general attitude of the Albanian people and of the present regime is friendly toward all foreign peoples and yet, as stated above, distrustful.  One bit of concrete evidence of this statement is found in the fact that, while Italy took over complete control of the country and imposed its sovereignty upon the Albanian people, there was little ill treatment of Italians as a people after the Albanian authorities resumed control, although thousands of them, including soldiers, remained in the country until very recently. 

            A few Italians were shot during the first days of the regime, but such persons are generally conceded to have been particularly aggressive against the Albanians and could be held responsible for specific “crimes” in the eyes of the Albanians.  While many of the Italians, both soldiers and civilians, have had to work on Albanian public works projects under trying conditions, these individuals have not fared worse than Albanians themselves working on the same and similar projects.  Even in the cases of Germans and Austrians who still remain in the country, there seems to be no feeling of resentment in spite of anti-Nazi programs of the regime.  Only very recently have these aliens even been called upon the register.  In general, therefore, it can be said that there is no anti-foreign feeling existent in Albania. 

            While, as indicated above, the Albanian people are not generally anti-foreign, they have certain preferences with respect to foreign countries which may be divided into two main groups, viz.: the pro-western and pro-eastern. 

            The pro-western group, which is definitely the larger, looks toward Western Europe and the United States as sources of economic and cultural inspiration.  The pro-eastern group, although in the minority numerically, is quite strong and influential because of its shrewd and capable leaders and looks toward the east, i.e., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, for guidance, inspiration and protection.  Sub-divisions of these two main groups are dealt with below. 

1. Pro-Western Group:

a. Pro-American Group: The first group with western leanings is the pro-American group which is believed to be the largest group numerically, although it is not and never has been the strongest group politically.  The first explanation of the existence of this pro-American group is the fact that, according to the most conservative estimates, at least 25% of the people of Albania (around 250,000 people) have either been a continual exchange of ideas and funds up to the time the United States entered the war.  This large pro-American group lives almost entirely in the southern third of the country where there is hardly a town or village in which at least 50% to 75% of the people have been to the United States or have friends and relatives there.  Before the war almost the entire economic structure of this regions was supported by contributions from friends and relatives in the United States and by contributions from friends and relatives in the United States and returned with sufficient capital to establish themselves in business in their homeland.  This group, aside from its economic dependence upon the United States, looks to such men as Bishop Fan Noli, head of the Albanian Orthodox Church in America, and Mr. K. Cekrazi, the first Albanian Commissioner to the United States, for cultural inspiration. 

            Another important source of this pro-American feeling is the result of the activities of the Albanian Vocational School which was maintained jointly for twelve years in Albania by the American Junior Red Cross and the Albanian government under the direction of Mr. Harry T. Fultz.  More than 5,000 Albanian attended that school during its lifetime and almost one thousand graduated.  Not only in southern Albania but everywhere one goes, one is bound to meet some Albanian who speaks some English and who will speak of Mr. Fultz in glowing terms.  In fact, one hears even in official circles including the Albanian groups which are not pro-American, the statement that it was Mr. Fultz who taught the Albanians the arts and crafts and how to work.  This group has a very high opinion of the United States and entertains nothing but the friendliest of feelings toward Americans. 

            Still another smaller pro-American group consists of graduates of the Agricultural School operated and maintained for some years at Kavaja by the Near East Foundation and, finally, there is a still smaller group of officials or ex-officials who worked with the Rockefeller Foundation in public health and malarial control activities. 

            In addition, there is a general background of pro-American feeling among all Albanians because of kind remembrances of assistance rendered by the United States after the last war in bringing about the creation of an independent Albanian state.  Albanians of all ranks and classes have a feeling that without the friendly and persistent support of President Wilson, there never would have been an independent Albania. 

            There is, therefore, unquestionably a larger percentage of pro-American people in Albania than in any other Balkan country.  There may be more Greeks in Greece and even Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia with pro-American leanings for reasons similar to those that have existed in Albania but the proportion of these groups in those countries to the total population smaller than in Albania.  This pro-American feeling has, however, been largely a one-way traffic since the American people have never made any attempt to exploit this situation either for business or for cultural reasons.

b. Pro-British Group: The second most important pro-western group is pro-British, but in the sense that this group is politically strong rather than numerically.  This group consists chiefly of wealthy Bey and merchant families who, since the creation of an independent Albania, have seemed to look to Great Britain for support in their conservative and even reactionary control over every phase of Albanian activity. 

            The fact that all the British have given moral support to this group in the past and still continue to do so places the British at a decided disadvantage at the present time in as much a the present regime in control is communistic and socialistic and views with suspicion British efforts to bolster up the wealthy land-owning and industrial classes. 

            There is also a strong feeling in Albania, even down to the common people, that Great Britain is far more interested in strengthening Greece than Albania and that, therefore, Great Britain supports Greek claims to Northern Epirus.  Reuter’s press reports and BBC broadcasts add color to this suspicion. 

            As a result, British influence for any constructive purposes in Albania is not strong at the present time.  This British attitude, moreover, furnishes political capital to the pro-eastern group in its effort to reorient Albania’s political outlook eastward toward Yugoslavia and Russia.  The argument is that Great Britain is trying to restore the old conservative and reactionary ruling Fascists, that France is too weak to give any help and the United States too far away to care. 

c. Pro-Italian Group: The third most important pro-western group is the Italian.  While it may be thought that the Italian occupation antagonized all Albanians, this is by no means the truth.  The pro-western group in looking westward naturally finds Italy as its nearest neighbor.  The basis of Albania’s ability to finance its imports and find the first customer just across the Adriatic in Italy and in return Italy provides a source of needed manufactured articles. 

It naturally follows that there is a large commercial group interested in restoring friendly relations with the Italians.  This natural commercial relationship is further enhanced by the fact that thousands of Albanians of all walks of life now, as a result of the Italian occupation, speak Italian.  They can read Italian newspapers and understand the Italian radio broadcasts.  It is inevitable, therefore, that if the pro-western group has anything to say in the future destiny of Albania there will ultimately come about a closer rapprochement with Italy both politically and commercially.  There has been much intermarriage between Italians and Albanians and the Roman Catholic group about 10% of the population is strongly pro-Italian.  In addition, as indicated above, there are fairly large Albanian colonies in Calabria and Sicily. 

If the Italians forget their imperialistic designs and play their cards well, they can easily secure an economic advantage in Albania without anybody complaining except the pro-eastern group trying to orient the future destiny of the country with Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. 

d. Pro-French Group: The fourth pro-western group is probably the pro-French.  The French at one time had considerable influence in Albania, especially during the latter part of the Turkish rule.  French has been taught in Albanian schools and most Albanian officials have visited France and drawn deeply upon French culture for inspiration.  For the moment, due to French reverses, this pro-French group is not active although recently steps have been taken to resume closer relations with France.  The French government is trying to strengthen its Mission here, at present purely military, and the Albanian authorities have asked France to send some French teachers for Albanian schools. 

2. Pro-Eastern Group

            There has always been a pro-eastern group in Albania, small numerically it is true, but sometimes strong politically and influential as at the present time.  It is believed, as an attempt will be made below to show, that for deep-rooted reasons this group has had and will continue to have difficulty putting across a pro-eastern policy. 

a. Pro-Yugolsavia Group: As Yugoslavia is Albania’s nearest and biggest neighbor, it is natural that there should be close ties between the two countries.  King Zog himself at one time held to such a view and was brought back to the throne in 1924 with Yugoslav help.  He later turned his eyes toward Italy.  At the present time, the regime in control is collaborating closely with the Tito government in Yugoslavia and the first and only government to date to recognize Albania is Yugoslavia.  In addition an agreement, exact terms unknown, has been signed with respect to commercial relations under which Albania is supplying petroleum products, wool and hides to Yugoslavia and receiving foodstuffs in return. 

            As will be shown below, however, this pro-Albanian rapprochement is believed to be engineered by the present leaders and ha no real, hearty support among the people unless Yugoslavia by some bold beau geste should hand over the Kosovo area to Albania.

b. Pro-Soviet Group: The same leaders who are trying to draw Albania and Yugoslavia closer together are also attempting to draw Albania closer to the Soviet Union to which Yugoslavia is also closely bound at present.  This movement has the backing of the communist members of the regime such as Professor Malëshova, Dr. dischnica, Maj. Gen. Spahiu, Lt. Col. Gen. Xoxe and probably Col. Gen. Hoxha himself.  The ideology of the present regime is patterned closely after the Soviet model which believes in absolute control by one party, the liquidation of opposition and the training of the people along chosen lines which they must follow.  Some of this ideology fits in with Albanian customs and habits and some does not, how far these pro-Soviet leaders can carry out their program remains to be seen but it seems certain they intend to succeed even possibly at the price of a blood bath.  That part of the program which proclaims the betterment of the common people finds popular support and, as the British and possibly even the American are believed to be in sympathy with the reactionaries, lends much strength to the leaders desiring to follow a pro-Soviet and pro-eastern policy. 

c. Pro-Turkish Group: As Turkey ruled over Albania for nearly four hundred years and as 70% of the people are Muslims of the Sunni and Bektashi sects, it is natural that there should still exist today certain strong cultural ties with Turkey and with other Near eastern countries, such as Eygpt.  Fairly large colonies of Albanians, many political exiles, are living in Istanbul, Cairo, and Alexandria.  Although this group, for the time being, is politically inactive, especially as most of its adherents come from the former Bey and wealthy classes who are not strong in the present regime, it is, however, potentially strong and may later become an important factor in Albania’s political life. 

The West versus the East

As has already been indicated above, there is a struggle going on in Albania between the pro-western and pro-eastern groups.  It is believed beyond much doubt that the pro-western is numerically and strategically stronger than the pro-eastern but it is equally true that the pro-eastern  leaders are better trained and more astute and they are actually in power.  This pro-eastern group may, however, have much difficulty in reorienting Albanian policy toward the east. 

            The first difficulty which must be overcome is the fact that the Albanian peple are not pro-eastern minded.  The Albanians are a small minority in the Balkans who are not Slavs and take pleasure in declaring the fact; they are not Bulgars; they are not Macedonians and they are not Greeks. 

            As a people, they naturally look with alarm and fear upon attempts to federate them with their Balkan neighbors because they know that, as a minority, they will inevitably become submerged politically and culturally in the mass of alien elements, especially the Slavs who have for centuries tried to engulf them.

            Also, the pro-eastern group cannot get around the fact that from five hundred to seven hundred thousand Albanians are now living in Yugoslavia, largely in the Kosovo area, and their lot is not too happy.  The Albanians, see in the treatment of their fellow countrymen under Yugoslav sovereignty a situation which they do not want to happen to them.  This area, moreover, constitutes and Albanian Irredentia.  The importance of this situation can be better visualized when one learns that there are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia as there are in Albania itself and efforts of Albania to have the areas in Yugoslavia where Albanians predominate added to Albania have been frustrated. 

            Still another reason why Albanians are not pro-eastern minded is the strong pro-western influence which has been described in the preceding paragraphs.  In other words, any effort to reorient Albanian destinies eastward is bound to run counter to ingrained efforts of the Albanian people to free themselves from eastern rulers, formerly Turkish and more recently a Slavic tide that threatens to engulf them.

            Also, the pro-eastern group cannot get around the fact that from five hundred to seven hundred thousand Albanians are now living in Yugoslavia, largely in the Kosovo area, and their lot is not too happy.  The Albanians, see in the treatment of their fellow countrymen under Yugoslav sovereignty a situation which they do not want to happen to them.  This area, moreover, constitutes an Albanian Irredentia.  The importance of this situation can be better visualized when one learns that there are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia as there are in Albanian itself and efforts of Albania to have the areas in Yugoslavia where Albanians predominate added to Albania have been frustrated. 

            Still another reason why Albanians are not pro-eastern minded is the strong pro-western influence which has been described in the preceding paragraphs.  In other words, any effort to reorient Albanian destinies eastward is bound to run counter to ingrained efforts of the Albanian people to free themselves from eastern rulers, formerly Turkish and more recently a Slavic tide that threatens to engulf them.

            About the only real strength of the pro-eastern group, aside from the ability of its present leaders, is the fact, already mentioned, that the western nations, especially Great Britain, seem to be supporting the conservative and reactionary groups.  There may also be some fear of a strong, recreated Italy.  The western nations, however, definitely have more sympathizers numerically than the pro-eastern and they are in a position to assist Albania in practical ways more than the other group.  If the western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, set themselves to the task of winning over the present regime, it is believed that it can be done.  The first step in this direction is recognition and then sympathetic consideration of the needs of a new Albania which will take account of the common man more than has been done in the past. 

            A struggle is going on, however, in Albania as well as in all Balkan countries between these pro-western and pro-eastern groups, the end of which nobody can foretell with certainty.  There is a clash of ideologies which is worldwide-Albania just happens to be one of the focal points where both sides meet on common political ground-tomorrow it may be military.

SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

            Having discussed the general attitude of Albanians toward foreign powers, there will be mentioned briefly below certain matters of interest and concern between Albania and specific countries.

1. The United States and Albania:

The chief matters at issue in our relations with Albania are as follows:

a. The recognition and resumption of diplomatic and consular intercourse, which, for the moment, is the most important matter at issue between the two countries.

b. Resumption of the inculcation of our ideas and ways of life through a cultural relations program which would involve the distribution of suitable printed material, dissemination of radio broadcasts and the showing of suitable films throughout the country.

c. Possible resumption of the support of the Near East Foundation in the Kavaje Agricultural School and the resumption of the Rockefeller Foundation in anti-malarial control.

d. The lending of experts in agriculture and in the development of petroleum products which has become a state monopoly, as well as mining, road construction and bridge-building experts. 

e. The selection and sending to the United States of official, commercial and press groups to visit our cities and industrial establishments and institutions.

f. The selection of suitable students to study in the United States particularly in the agricultural pursuits, mining (petroleum, chrome, coal, iron, asphalt) and education.

g. Some financial support until Albania can become self-supporting.  This assistance, however, should not be attempted by the United States alone and might best be handled either jointly with Great Britain, France, and Italy or it might be turned over to the United Nations Organization.

2. Great Britain and Albania:

            The biggest problem for the British in Albania is to convince the Albanian officials and people that Great Britain really desires to see an independent Albania.  Next in importance, would be an attempt to disabuse the Albanians by and large of the idea now prevalent that Great Britain supports the reactionary Albanian cliques and is therefore opposed to social and cultural innovations looking toward the better distribution of wealthier among all Albanian classes.  The third British problem is to disabuse the minds of the Albanians of the idea that Great Britain supports the Greeks in their demands for territorial adjustments in favor of Greece.  On the constructive side, Great Britain could join with the United States in various activities which were listed above in connection with United States-Albanian relations. 

3. Italy and Albania:

            As has already been indicated, Italy can also play an important part in the future of Albania and probably will become Albania’s best customer and largest supplier of manufactured goods.  Every encouragement should be given to Italy not only to strengthen the pro-western position but also to help Italy herself to get on her feet and assume a position in the modern world to which she is entitled.  Italian engineers and advisers, like the French, would probably be better suited for service in Albania than the British and Americans.  They know the country and the language of the people and are by nature tolerant. 

            There are certain special problems outstanding in Italian-Albanian relations which will need consideration through direct negotiations between Italy and the Albanian authorities, such as, the status of Italians still remaining in Albania, a more just settlement of the problems of Italian investments and property in Albania, and certain special problems due to the close proximity of Italy to Albania, such as the status of the isaldn of Sazanit which was formerly Albanian and taken over by Italy as a naval base.  None of these problems should, however, constitute any serious difficulty in future Italian-Albanian relations. 

4. France and Albania:

            The French can play an important part in holding and developing Albania as an oasis of western ideas and democracy.  As was indicated above, French influence has been strong in the past and that influence can be redeveloped for the good of all.  France is not viewed with suspicion as is Great Britain and the French government should be encouraged to take a more active part in Albanian affairs possibly by sending teachers and advisers, as the Albanian government seems to wish this.  In fact, French advisers and engineers might be satisfactorily employed in Albania than American or British because the Frenchmen temperamentally are more inclined to be indulgent to the shortcomings of other people among whom they live. 

5. Yugoslavia and Albania:

Future Yugoslav-Albanian relations are probably the most important group of relations confronting the Albanian people because of latent danger involved in them.  As has already been indicated, due to Yugoslavia-Soviet influence, the present regime is dominated by a few strong personalities, strongly favoring Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, all out of proportion to the real desires and needs of the Albanian people, as Yugoslav national destiny, as interpreted not only by their present rulers but also by their former rulers, contemplates the eventual absorption or federation of Albania into Yugoslavia.  There are already over 500,000 Albanians (conservative estimate) living under Yugoslav rule in the Kosova region. 

            The Yugoslavs desire to control or to absorb Albania in order to seek a port on the lower Adriatic, possibly at Durazzo, which port the Yugoslavs long desired to link up by rail to their railhead at Pec.  This desire on the part of Yugoslavia seems to have the backing of the Soviet Union which, according to all outward signs, wishes to exercise a dominating influence in the Balkans and on the eastern shore of the Adriatic.  It is probably this aspect which provokes the British attitude-the criticism of the British in this respect being that they are handling the matter in the wrong way.

            Whatever group, therefore, may be in control in Albania, whether pro-eastern or pro-western, there is always going to be an Albanian-Yugoslav minority and boundary question as long as more than one half million Albanians are living just across the present boundaries in Yugoslav territory unless and until some adjustment of the frontier can be made in favor of Albania so that the majority of this large Albanian minority in Yugoslavia can be incorporated in their homeland. 

            Such a practical settlement is, however, most difficult because of the expansionist policy of Yugoslavia which seeks to control all of Albania, at least the northern part, and by reason of the fact that at least part of the Kosova region which is inhabited by the Albanian minority is as historically revered by the Serbians as by the Albanians because of historic battles fought there against the Turks. 

            The Yugoslav policy in this matter bears watching always because both Yugoslavia and Greece are stronger powers than Albania and both are seeking Albanian territory.  The result, therefore, may well be that some day the two powers will agree to divide the country between them, Yugoslavia taking the northern portion and Greece the southern.

            There are even rumors in Albania that there is a certain segment of British opinion, particularly among the military, which favors such a division of Albania.  The argument of this British group is that with Greece controlling the southern portion and, particularly the ports of Valona and Saranda, Great Britain would be in a better position, through its control of Greek activities, to dominate the outlet of the Adriatic and thus, through the maintenance of another Gibraltar at one of these ports, checkmate Yugoslavia’s expansion through the Adriatic.  The same British group believes that Great Britain will for some time to come dominate in Italy and direct Italian foreign policy and with such control on the western side of the Adriatic and control on the eastern side through Greek sovereignty over southern Albania, Great Britain would control over the outlet to that sea for checking Yugoslavia and possible Soviet expansion.

            Strictly speaking, this sort of British policy is of no concern to the United States except that if pursued in and brought to its logical conclusion, it constitutes just another step toward the next war in which the United States will probably be drawn as it was in the last and present war.

            Tot this extent it behooves the United States to try to bolster up an independent and free Albania as far as a better policy for all interests concerned instead of permitting the country to be absorbed by Yugoslavia and Greece. 

            Another impediment to real Albanian-Yugoslav relations is the fact that the products of each country are about the same and could never be developed between them beneficial trade, or at least not nearly so mutually beneficial, as the trade that could be developed with the western powers, especially Italy supplying manufactured products and Albanian raw materials such as oil, chrome, coal, wool, olive oil and asphalt. 

            In brief, therefore, although there is at present considerable effort being made by Yugoslavia and the pro-Yugoslav elements in the FNC regime to develop closer relations between the two countries, such an alliance is an unnatural one and cannot be developed on stable lines.  About the only alliance that could be reached which would be mutually beneficial to the two countries would be some sort of non-aggression pact signed generally by all Balkan powers in which they would agree to pool resources in the event that any of them were attacked by an outside aggressor.  Had such a pact existed prior to 1939, it is highly unlikely that Italy would ever have attacked Albania and risked at the time a war with all Balkan states.  Likewise, Germany would have hesitated longer before invading Rumania had she felt certain that all Balkan states would have united to repel her.  This leads to the question of a Balkan Federation to be discussed below. 

6. The Soviet Union and Albania

There is really nothing logical or natural in any close relationship between Albania and the Soviet Union.  Certainly the Soviet Union needs none of the products of Albania and is unable at the present time and possibly for some time to come to supply Albania with any of the manufactured articles which she needs to rehabilitate herself.  The Albanian people have been mountaineers and individualists for centuries as evidenced by their history and there is certainly nothing in their makeup which naturally draws them to the Soviet communist ideology.

            The only two ties that can be said to exist at the present time are as follows: Albanian land, mines and other sources of wealth hitherto have been controlled by the so-called Beys and industrial classes.  According to Soviet ideas such control would be broken up and a strict state control substituted. 

            The Albanian peasants and white collar classes desire to see the strange hold of the industrialists and Beys broken but they have no desire to see strict Soviet control would be broken up and a strict state control substituted therefore as their objective is to participate in this wealth themselves.  As this underprivileged class, however, is receiving no support from the British and Americans and in facts finds the British supporting the privileged classes, it naturally listens to the pronouncements of the pro-Soviet group which keeps telling the people over the radio and in the press that the Soviet and Soviet-dominated Yugoslavia and their friends in bringing about social reforms.

            It is believed, therefore, that the Soviet influence in Albania is really non-existent except for the type that is drummed up by a small clique in the government controlled by very astute and Soviet-minded individuals.  They may go a long way with their propaganda.  If they are to be successful, they will have to inaugurate a stern and drastic regime or eliminate by executions and murders a large proportion of the intelligentsia of Albania.  If the western powers do not watch this movement and handle the situation properly, especially the British, this is what could and might happen.  The Soviet Union need not appear openly in the picture; it need only support Yugoslavia’s policy.

            Whether Russia really desires to extend its control, even remote control, over Albania as indicated above, is not definitely known.  Everyone knows that it has been historic Russian policy, even from the days of the Czars, to extend its control over the Balkans.  There is a reason to believe, therefore, that the Soviet Union would like to see Albania along with all Balkan powers under its domination even though the controls were exercised through governments established in the various countries friendly towards the Soviet Union and doing the Soviets’ bidding.  The question of desire is, however, one thing and the question of how far the Soviet Union, particularly at this time, is willing to risk antagonizing and provoking active opposition by the western powers is another.  It might be that she prefers to go slow, hoping that gradually her control will be extended and consolidated while the Western Allies, tired and weary of war, go to sleep.

            In this connection, it is interesting to note that, although Molotov in December 1942, as did Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden, came out for Albanian independence, since that date the Soviet Union has taken no action or spoken no word publicly that would indicate any sincerity in that statement.  On the other hand she has not attempted to meddle openly in Albanian affairs as she has done at Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest. 

7. Greece and Albania:

            In some ways Albania and Greece should be the best of friends as they are the two people of the Balkans who do not like the Slavs, Bulgars and Macedonians. 

            However, instead of being friendly the Greeks are forever making claims to the southern portion of Albania, the maximum extent of which are absolutely preposterous. 

            Although the Greek government, whatever its character, except possibly the ELAS group which definitely has Soviet connections, goes merrily on demanding incorporation into Greece of a large portion of Albania in which there are no Greeks at all or in which the Greeks are definitely a small minority, taking over of this area would leave a truncated Albania without enough territory to support itself and drive that portion completely into the arms of the Yugoslavs and other Balkan people toward the Greeks.  This would only mean struggles and bloodshed in which the powers would have to intervene as Greece, without outside help, could not with stand an Albanian-Yugoslav-Bulgar combination. 

            Between Greece and Albania there is little opportunity for extensive commercial intercourse because the products of the two countries are too much alike.  Greece, of course, could use Albanian oil but she has no exports of the type desired by the Albanian with which to pay for such oil.  The trade, therefore, would have to be three-cornered, balanced by Greek exports to some other country which would purchase Albanian products. 

            Next, therefore, to the problems between Albania and Yugoslavia, the Greek-Albanian problems are the most dangerous and most inflammable in Albanian foreign relations.  If the Greek government cannot be persuaded to desist from its provocative demands broadcast almost daily over the radio and in the Greek press, some explosion is likely to happen. 

8. Turkey and Albania:

            At the present time, relations between Albania and Turkey are practically non-existent but culturally there is much in common between the two countries and, as a counter-balance to the intrigues between the pro-western and pro-eastern groups, it might be well for Albania to attempt to renew its contacts with Turkey.  As stated above, there are considerable numbers of Albanians in Istanbul, Cairo, and Alexandria which are centers of Muslim culture.  This could easily be done by re-establishing closer contacts between Sunni and Muslim elements in Albania and their religious brothers in Turkey and Egypt.  The 400 year rule by Turkey over Albania has left indelible impressions and the new Turkey might be able to assist Albanians without evoking political repercussions.

9. Relations with Other Countries:

            Albania has no particular relations with any other foreign countries.  The Czechoslovak merchants before the war had a considerable interest in the retail trade of the country and it is possible that there may be a renewal of that interest especially as the Czech government has already sent a representative here who spent a few weeks looking over the ground and returned to Prague.  It is rumored that Czechoslovakia will soon recognize Albania and that this representative, Major Dalibor Koreja, will return here as the Czech Minister.  There is also a certain amount of cultural, sentimental and commercial connection with German-speaking Europe, particularly Austria, as a number of Albanian doctors and engineers have studied in Austria and a few in Germany.  There was, however, little commercial connection between the two countries prior to the German period of occupation when considerable German goods were sent in by the German military to pay for their military expenditures.  In view of the prostrate condition of Germany and Austria, it is highly unlikely that there will be any renewal at an early date of relations with those countries. 

            Albania has no particular relations with any other foreign countries.  The Czechoslovak merchants before the war had a considerable interest in the retail trade of the country and it is possible that there may be a renewal of that interest especially as the Czech government has already sent a representative here who spent a few weeks looking over the ground and returned to Prague.  It is rumored that Czechoslovakia will soon recognize Albania and that this representative, Major Dalibor Koreja, will return here as the Czech Minister.  There is also a certain amount of cultural, sentimental and commercial connection with German-speaking Europe, particularly Austria, as a number of Albanian doctors and engineers have studied in Austria and a few in Germany.  There was, however, little commercial connection between the two countries prior to the German period of occupation when considerable German goods were sent in by the German military to pay for their military expenditures.  In view of the prostrate condition of Germany and Austria, it is highly unlikely that there will be any renewal at an early date of relations with those countries. 

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