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The third wave: Exploring causes and implications of Albania’s 2012-2024 massive out-migration

Growing push and pull factors are leading to a renewed emigration wave and a lot of anxiety and debate in Albania.

ANDI BALLA[1]

Abstract

Post-communist Albania is experiencing a third wave of emigration, which is exacerbating the country’s demographic decline and creating significant social, economic and political challenges. This emigration wave has resulted in the country losing at least 14 percent of its population between 2011 and 2023, and it is a product of a complex group of pull and push factors. It is also creating strong demographic anxiety in the remaining population in combination with an associated sharp fall in birth rates and societal aging. This paper explores key push and pull factors for emigration. To do so, it uses preliminary census data, expert views, media discourses and the results of a survey conducted by the Albanian Institute for International Studies in 2023 with 1,200 working-age adults across Albania. This paper looks at the economic environment and disillusionment with governance, with a focus on specific challenges such as high living costs, corruption and inadequate social services. It also examines some of the ongoing and future effects of the third out-migration wave in Albania.

Keywords: Albania, emigration, demographic anxiety.

1. Introduction

1.1 The third wave

As the sun sets over Albania’s capital on a sizzling mid-July day in 2024, Tirana’s airport comes alive with the arrival of a series of low-cost flights from Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Outside the air conditioned hall, the evening air is thick with humidity and the sounds of reunions and joyful greetings. The planes are filled with Albanian migrants — young families with children, blue collar workers and professionals — coming back to visit the families they left behind and to enjoy a brief vacation in their homeland. Children rush into the arms of waiting grandparents, while friends and relatives exchange heartfelt embraces. Among the crowd are professionals like doctors, who have found better working conditions abroad, and construction workers, who seek higher wages to support their families. Their stories and professions vary, but they all share the common experience: they are part of Albania’s more than 2.1 million citizens who no longer live in their country since the fall of communism.

Many of the travelers are also part of the 400,000 to 600,000 people, or more than 14 percent of the population, who have officially left Albania in the past decade alone.[2] This latest group is part of an emigration wave that relates to a series of factors and one that could not have easily been predicted a decade ago. Albania is in the midst of what experts[3] have dubbed “the third wave” of out-migration to differentiate it from the exodus of 1991 and another wave after the civil unrest of 1997.[4] This latest wave does not make the international news with photos of ships laden with people trying to reach Italians shores, as they did in the 1990s, but the numbers are staggering nonetheless. Up to one in five people has left the country in the past decade, by some estimates.[5] Almost no family in Albania has been left unaffected.

Many experts are puzzled by the sheer size of this wave at a time when out-migration should be ebbing. As Albania became a candidate to join the European Union, with increasing economic stability, visa-free travel to the EU and securing NATO membership in 2009, many believed that the era of mass emigration was over. However, emigration from Albania continued to increase in the 2012 to 2023 period, with one in seven to one in five Albanians leaving the country during that time.[6] This period has also seen unprecedented political stability in Albania with the Socialist Party under Prime Minister Edi Rama governing for three four-year mandates, a first in post-communist Albania. The concern in the society at large is that the wave continues with no end in sight. Opinion surveys show that Albania has one of the highest percentage of the labor force that is willing to emigrate for a better life,[7] with the most productive segment of society — the young and the educated — being the ones most likely to be making firm plans to leave the country.[8] It is natural to ask: Why?  This paper will attempt to provide some answers.

1.2 Historical background

Under communist rule, Albania tripled its population from 1945 to 1991, largely due to a complete ban on emigration, the very high fertility of a poor and traditional society and improvements in basic healthcare across the country.[9] The communist regime achieved its pro-natalist goals via extreme oppression and violation of human rights. Until 1990, people attempting to leave Albania in irregular ways were shot dead at the border or otherwise imprisoned on charges of “betraying the fatherland”.[10] The entire land border was covered in barbed wire and surveillance equipment. Albania was effectively an open-air prison controlled by what was Eastern Europe’s most oppressive communist regime. Moreover, there was an almost complete ban on abortion and any form of contraception was illegal. This was complemented by pro-natalist propaganda and policies that fostered Albanians’ traditional desire to have many children. Some also argue this was one of the causes the regime fell, having met a Malthusian end at a time when Albania’s communist regime had isolated itself from the world and adopted an official policy of self-reliance.[11] But one thing is certain: the resulting combination of a massive population growth and repressive approach to movement of people was traumatic and created a pressure cooker that exploded with the fall of communism.

As a result, since the early 1990s, Albanians have had an exceptionally high per-capita emigration rate. A first wave of emigration started with crowds of asylum seekers getting into Western embassies in Tirana in July 1990, followed in the next two years by Albanians taking over ships in Durres to reach Italian shores. Tens of thousands more walked across the mountains to Greece only to be met with an often traumatic and brutal treatment by Greek authorities. With a temporary lull in massive emigration in the mid 1990s, the Albanian state descended into anarchy in 1997 as the collapse of massive pyramid schemes led to massive social unrest, thousands of deaths and a quasi-civil war. A second wave of emigration followed the chaotic situation of 1997 as people lost hope in the viability of Albania.[12] It took the country a decade to claw itself up from where 1997 had left it, and emigration remained high until the 2008 global financial crisis, when there was a small reversal as top host countries like Greece and Italy went through economic woes, and many Albanians decided to give their country of birth another try. But the trend did not last long, and out-migration picked up again, leading to the third wave examined by this paper.

1.3 Demographic profile

The results of all this emigration are clear in the numbers: of the more than 4.5 million people holding Albanian citizenship through birth today, only 2.4 million are currently residents of Albania.[13] The reason the recent wave is being felt so strongly and creating a lot of anxiety is that Albania has lost the demographic dividend it inherited from the communist regime. With migration being the most volatile and least predictable of the three major demographic forces, the other two being fertility and mortality[14]— Albania’s demographics are now acutely sensitive to further migration. Albania’s demographic profile has also been hit hard by a related subject: declining birth rates. In 1990, Albania had a birth rate of three children per woman.[15] In 2019, it had gone down to 1.4.[16] Migration is a major contributor to the decline in birth rates, since people of reproductive age are more likely to emigrate. Albania is keenly experiencing the impact of this substantial demographic shift, with a rapidly aging society, challenges for businesses in securing a workforce and entire rural regions being depopulated. Consequently, this issue has become a prominent topic in current public and media discussions.

Moreover, Albania’s high emigration trend is not currently slowing down. The trend is instead continuing fueled by three global and local economic and social hits: a massive earthquake in 2019, the disruption of the 2020-2022 pandemic and the 2022-2023 global inflation and economic crisis. Due to continued significant migration, projections from international institutions suggest that Albania’s population could dwindle back to 1 million by the close of the century, marking a return to the population the country had in the early 20th century and a third of its peak of 3.3 million in 1990.

1.4 The 2023 Census results

The Albanians are clearly anxious about their declining demographics, with it being a top political concern.[17] Polarized politics run so deep that something as benign as the total number of people in the country measured by the census, held in late 2023, turned into a political battlefield — one of rumors and accusations. INSTAT, the body in charge of the census took months just to publish even preliminary figures, leading to accusations that it was trying to lessen the shock of finding out how many people have left in the past decade.

But even according to the official preliminary data, the loss of the resident population is huge. Albania’s population shrank by almost 14 percent in 12 years, losing about 429,000 residents, according to the country’s official 2023 census. According to INSTAT, the number of residents of Albania is now down to 2.4 million from 2.8 in 2011, with the decline largely due to emigration but also due to low fertility resulting in lower growth. According to the preliminary census results, emigration has maintained a trend of an average of 50,000 people leaving each year, totaling 600,000 Albanians over the past twelve years. However, the same data show that by 2023, about 108,000 people have returned, nearly 26,000 of them last year alone. The natural increase in population is muted, with a progressive decline in births. Preliminary data for 2023 indicate 24,000 births and 22,000 deaths. Compared to 2011, births have decreased by almost 30 percent, and over 50 percent compared to 2001.

This phenomenon, along with emigration and increased life expectancy, is leading to an aging population. The median age last year was 42.5 years, according to the census, up by seven years compared to 2011. Census data show that one in five residents is over 65 years old, whereas this ratio was 1 in 9 in the 2011 census. The census data also provided an overview of internal migratory movements, which have led to nearly one-third of the population concentrating in the Tirana region, with a 1.2 percent increase compared to twelve years ago.

Even-though the official figures themselves are staggering when compared to other European countries at peace, there are also questions about its validity, with experts suspecting the actual number of residents is even smaller. Albania’s political opposition and its demographic experts have raised questions on the numbers published by INSTAT, arguing they overestimate the resident population to soften the political blow to the government, under whose watch Albania has lost a larger portion of the population than some countries at war.  Representatives of the political opposition have for months argued that the delays in the release of the census results made them even more suspicious. But beyond political debate, statisticians have also found discrepancies between the official census number and statistics made available through the institutions of the Western countries, which register Albanians who move to live there for various reasons. [18]

2. Push factors

INSTAT and demographers both point to emigration, combined with a sharp decline in fertility, as the primary factors behind the large decline of the number of residents in Albania. But what’s behind the persistently high emigration? Studies show that the factors driving the massive and continued emigration are economic, political and social. Experts have cited a loss of hope in the speed of improvements due to “the failure of the political transition” from communism to democracy as a main push factor, referring to the negative outcomes of political polarization, the lack of meritocracy and the lack of security in basic public state-provided services: healthcare, education and justice. The lack of fair competition in practically all fields: the economy, politics and academia is also effectively fueling a departure of the people that the country can least afford to lose, experts argue.[19]

2.1 Political and economic factors

Opinion polls show that while low wages are a top factor in the desire to emigrate, bad governance is also seen as a key factor — with corruption and lack of proper social services in health care and education being key concerns. Many Albanians also say in surveys they are choosing to leave the country because they simply don’t have hope that things can improve fast enough. According to data from the 2023 AIIS Migration Survey, the top three concerns highlighted by working-age adults were unemployment (24 percent), corruption (24 percent) and poor governance (19 percent). Other concerns included the quality of education and healthcare and the lack of political alternatives. Moreover, 58 percent of respondents did not believe the country is moving in the right direction, only a minority thought so (22 percent).

On political factors, young people in particular are bitter about the fact that what should have been a vibrant democracy that gave them a voice has turned into a stabilocracy with authoritarian tendencies that has made electoral democratic rules that favor incumbent political class and make it hard for fresh voices to enter the political scene. Instead of getting better, democratic standards are deteriorating. Even the traditional guardians of democracy in Albania — the free media — are now ranked as the most oppressed[20] in the Western Balkan region — as a coalition of political and economic actors suppress any journalism that threatens their power.

The lack of enough progress to convince Albanians to stay put and some backtracking in certain areas, comes at a time of unprecedented political stability in Albania, with the ruling Socialist Party and Prime Minister Edi Rama in power since 2013, winning a third term in 2021, the first party and prime minister to do so since the fall of communism. The government has come under sustained attack by the opposition, making the Socialists responsible for much of the country’s depopulation due to policies that have failed to deliver on election promises, a series of corruption scandals and lack of progress on EU integration. In fact, Albania has very few policies in place at retaining its population or increasing birth rates, offering only very small one-time cash payments when children are born[21] and very limited financial support in the form of soft loans for poorer new families to borrow to buy homes.[22] Both of these are completely inefficient and ineffective to make a dent in powering push factors. Prime Minister Rama has advocated for a faissez-faire approach, emphasizing the benefits of Albanians’ emigration and the fact that some of those who leave come back with knowledge and capital. He has also bitterly complained Albanians are not willing to work in available manual jobs even when salaries go up. He notoriously went on the campaign trail in 2021 telling a business owner in northern Albania that his lack of workforce problem should be solved by hiring workers from south Asia instead of Albanians because they are less likely to complain, don’t gossip and don’t ask about politics or democracy.[23]

Remittances have gone up substantially with the emigration spike. They were almost 930 million euros in 2023, with an 11.3 percent increase compared to the previous year. Compared to 2013, when remittances entered a declining cycle, the flow has almost doubled. But they mostly serve as welfare support for the elderly and poor in Albania, rather than an investment avenue to increase productivity and economic growth. [24] Economically, Albania is simply not growing fast enough to catch up to EU member states. In fact, the gap in GDP per capita between the region and the EU is growing even as countries adopt painful reforms needed for EU membership. With ongoing migration, Albania also keeps losing its most productive workers to the EU labor market, in turn making those staying behind less productive. Even though the wages have increased post-pandemic, sometimes as much as 20-30 percent, most of that increase has already been eaten up by inflation, thus having no value in terms of stopping economic reasons for being a push factor for emigration.

2.2 Social factors 

It is clear children’s education and future prospects are also a push factor. In the AIIS 2023 opinion survey, only a minority of people would like their children to study in Albania (30 percent), with a majority preferring their children to study abroad (59 percent), citing perceived better opportunities, quality of education and exposure to international experiences. When asked about their preference for their children to grow up in Albania, opinions varied. A portion expressed a desire for their children to stay in Albania (34 percent), emphasizing the importance of cultural heritage, family bonds and contributing to the country’s development. However, a majority preferred their children to live elsewhere (53 percent), citing concerns about limited opportunities and a desire for a better quality of life.

Another push fact is lack of adequate housing. Albania ranks as the country with the most overcrowded housing situations in Europe, with the least amount of living space for residents[25], while nearly 40 percent of homes sit empty[26] because they are property of migrants or have been bought as wealth storage for people with cash to spare, some of it with murky sources. Tied to the same inflow of cash and high inflation, there has been a post-pandemic massive increase in home prices, especially in Tirana and key coastal cities, which is also a new factor in driving emigration. With the massive increase in property prices post pandemic and the increase in loan rates, few Albanians can afford to buy in the country’s booming market, leaving economists pondering where the money for a massive construction boom is coming from. Foreign buyers and Albanians abroad investing in second homes for themselves or as properties to rent to tourists is one explanation, but experts, including organized crime prosecutors, say part of the influx that is increasing prices is the laundering of ill-gained funds abroad by organized crime groups.[27] Albanians are culturally-tied to the idea that home ownership is a fundamental pillar of family creation. More than 90 percent of the country’s residents live in homes they own.[28] But it’s hard for a young family getting a 20 percent increase in income to pay for a family home that has doubled in price in the past five years and comes with higher mortgage rates, a situation that is familiar to many around the world. The rental market has also seen significant increase in prices in the process, becoming another push factor for emigration.

2.3 Natural disasters and global environment 

While Albania’s government could have done far more to create a better environment, it is also important not to underestimate three factors that were not under its control. This negative trifecta hit the Albanian economy and society hard and that led to a spike in migration in the past four years in particular. Chiefly, the massive disruption from the pandemic upended economic and social structures everywhere, leading to a spike in emigration to wealthier countries in general. Albania was clearly not immune. Also, the war in Ukraine combined with pandemic recovery economic measures globally, and in Europe in particular, led to high inflation in basic things such as food, to which Albanians, as a poor society, are more sensitive. One natural disaster was local, however. The massive earthquake in November 2019 hit Albania’s heartland, destroying hundreds millions of euros in property and businesses, and creating a shock for the society. All these have had their effect in making life harder in Albania, and likely served as a tipping point for many would-be emigrants. 

3. Pull factors

The decision to emigrate is never easy. Pull factors play an important role in Albania, perhaps as much as the push factors, especially in this third wave, which finds Albania in a far better position than it was in the 1990s. That sense is backed by the AIIS Migration Survey findings on Albanians’ perception of their quality of life, with only 12 percent of respondents describing life in Albania as “bad” while 52 percent viewed it as “neither good nor bad” and 24 percent considered it “good.”

3.1 Workforce needs in EU members

A change from the previous emigration waves is that the pull factor is stronger. Wealthier European countries facing demographic issues and labor shortages of their own have turned to creating a larger opening in their labor markets for Albania and the rest of the Western Balkans — an area that is geographically and culturally surrounded by the European Union, but which has been left out of the bloc, making it poorer and less developed. One such change comes in the migration policies of Germany, which has created a special category for citizens of Western Balkan states, including Albania, partially opening its labor market to most people — both skilled and unskilled — who have a concrete job offer in Germany. It also now allows Albanians to specifically go to Germany to look for a job. While bureaucratic hurdles remain, and there is a cut off number of 50,000 per year, it is now far easier for an Albanian citizen to emigrate to Germany legally than had been the case in the past.[29] And people are increasingly taking advantage of the opportunity, with the number of Albanian citizens who live in Germany more than doubling from 2018 to 2024, to nearly 120,000.[30] Similar programs exist in other EU states, and are being used by permanent and seasonal workers from Albania.  The Albanian government has expressed its concerns both publicly and privately with key European governments in the EU that are actively recruiting Albanians in important areas, healthcare in particular. But in the end it knows it can do little to stop people from leaving without first addressing and reversing push factors.[31]

3.2 Existing Albanian communities in host countries

Another pull factor is the very size of the Albanian diaspora, meaning every family has members abroad, leading to layers of migration facilitated by migrants who are already there. They offer a contact, a first place to stay and work opportunities to relatives and friends who arrive from Albania. According to AIIS Migration Survey data, a significant majority, 80 percent, reported having family members who had emigrated. Among those with emigrant family members, 56 percent reported that at least one family member had emigrated in the past two years.

Much of that migration is permanent. People born in Albania are seeking and acquiring citizenships in EU member states at a level that is higher than any other country in the continent, and ranking third globally, data from a series of EU agencies shows. In 2022 alone, about 50,000 Albanian citizens acquired the citizenship of a European Union country, according to a recent report by Eurostat, the EU’s main statistical body, and the European Migration Network.[32] For the past five years, the figure goes to more than 213,000, with Albania’s neighbors Greece and Italy, where the highest number of Albanian migrants reside, issuing the highest number of citizenships. The migration and asylum report also indicates that around 76,000 Albanians obtained new residence permits or legal status in EU countries in 2023 alone.

4. Implications

4.1 Demographic decline

All this out-migration comes at a huge cost to the country, first among which is the demographic decline it has caused. Birth numbers and emigration figures are featured daily and prominently in Albanian media as if they were currency exchange data or sport scores. The theme is the same: birth rates are hitting record lows and emigration rates are getting higher. The country is depopulating and aging rapidly. Its demographic future looks grim. In addition to the emigration factor, the Albanians left behind are not having children, in drastic contrast to earlier generations. Albania was once in the record books in the 1960s for having Europe’s and, indeed, one of the world’s highest birth rates at seven children per woman. Post-pandemic data indicate that the number in Albania could now be low as 1.21[33], competing with Italy and Spain for Europe’s lowest fertility rate. Albanians’ high anxiety about their country’s demographics is a relatively recent phenomenon, even though the country has been in demographic decline since 1991. But Albania had a huge demographic dividend coming out of communism and a traditional society that continued to have some of Europe’s highest birth rates well into the 1990s. That dividend has now run out.[34]

Unfortunately there are no easy solutions for these problems. Stopping demographic decline requires courageous political decision making — and time. Moreover, many of the trends this paper deals with are regional or even global in nature. Much of the world is experiencing a fertility decline, for example.[35] Some demographers have for decades predicted a “second demographic transition,” a global change in attitudes that make individualism primary and puts less focus on marriage and children.[36] Albania is now part of that trend.

4.2 Political effects

The media coverage highlights a general feeling in today’s Albanian society: Albanians are very anxious about the country’s demographic decline. The anxiety is so acute, it is a top political concern, with the opposition accusing the government of depopulating the country to stay in power more easily. The unhappy and critical leave, their argument goes, thus mostly opposition voters leave. That reasoning is backed by the fact that Abanians were effectively stripped of the right to vote as soon as they left the country. Only those who reside or can travel to Albania on voting day can cast a ballot. A Constitutional Court order to make it possible to vote outside the country went for a long time implemented as parties quarreled over the details, but an agreement was reached in July 2024 to have Albanians abroad vote through the mail in the 2025 elections, for the first time ever.[37]

Longer term, working in earnest on EU integration and related reforms will lower the number of Albanians who want to leave, while increasing return migration of Albanians abroad as it has done in central Europe. Doing these reforms means fighting corruption and increasing competition in the economy, which will result in more economic development and increased FDI, which would ultimately provide more funding for continued improvements in public healthcare and education.

4.3 Economic implications

Demographic decline and the departure of so many working-age people has strong negative economic implications for Albania. From doctors to plumbers — construction workers to engineers — many key areas of the economy and society are finding that people with needed skills are in short supply. Agriculture, for years the bedrock of the Albanian economy, now looks to South Asia, not the nearby empty village for workers. Migration remains a persistent force, depleting the nation of its crucial human capital. From energetic, unskilled youth to seasoned professionals, individuals ranging from recent high school graduates to middle-aged laborers are joining the exodus alongside highly skilled medical professionals, engineers and IT experts. The worrisome trend is the sharp decline in the working-age population (15-64 years old). Preliminary data from the 2023 census results indicate that the working-age population was 1.55 million people, down from 1.9 million, a decrease of 18.3 percent compared to the 2011 census data. In addition, the working-age population on the verge of retirement (60-64 years) increased by 48.8 percent, and the age group 45-59 years saw an increase of 9.6 percent. All this is leaving some to ask: “Who is going to work in the future?”[38]

The business community is particularly unhappy with the situation. Emigration is producing acute labor shortages and is sapping the country of valuable consumers. A walk around Tirana shows that almost every other business has signs on the door looking for workers. Faced with an unprecedented international tourism boom in the past couple of years, some businesses have decided to go the market way and throw money at the problem — hotel cleaners and other hospitality workers are making higher wages than government workers and engineers during the tourist season — but it has done little to prevent the same workers from being recruited for even higher wages in neighboring Greece, Italy and Croatia — if not even further afield in Western Europe. The government has also recently increased wages in the public sector hoping it will push wages up in the private sector too, but such increases have not put a dent on the labor shortage problem.

But there are a few things the government can and should attempt to do. In the short term, experts say, authorities should act to lower the cost of living and increase the safety net for local residents even at the cost of postponing flashy infrastructure projects. One in three residents of Albania live in very difficult economic conditions, according to the country’s ombudsman.[39] Lowering or eliminating taxes on basic food items, on which Albanians spend the highest share of their income, could be a first step. Increasing social welfare payments could be another. Direct financial support for young families in terms of soft loans for housing and monthly cash payments for each child that is resident of Albania would also go a long way.

Immigration efforts — to bring in workers from poorer Asian and African countries to fill shortages — have seen little success so far as businesses say many see Albania as a jumping board to move to Western Europe, where wages are higher and opportunities better. But immigration, on which Albanians are lukewarm, not hostile, can be only a small part of the solution.

5. Conclusions

Albania’s demographic and emigration challenges are profound and multifaceted, significantly impacting the country’s socio-economic and political landscape. The latest surge in emigration, marked as the “third wave” of out-migration, underscores a persistent pattern of Albanians seeking better opportunities abroad due to a complex interplay of push and pull factors. This phenomenon, coupled with a sharp decline in birth rates, has led to a rapidly aging society and a significant reduction in the working-age population. The push factors driving this emigration wave are deeply rooted in Albania’s socio-political and economic environment. High living costs, low wages, corruption, inadequate social services and a general disillusionment with governance contribute to a widespread sense of hopelessness among the population. These issues are exacerbated by local and global economic shocks, such as the 2019 earthquake, the COVID-19 pandemic and recent inflationary pressures, which have further strained the economic conditions in the country. Moreover, the pull factors from wealthier European nations, which offer better living conditions, higher wages and more stable socio-political environments, continue to attract Albanian migrants.

The demographic decline is not just a statistical concern but a tangible reality affecting every aspect of Albanian life. The loss of population, particularly the young and skilled, has resulted in labor shortages, especially in crucial sectors like healthcare. This outflow of human capital weakens the economic potential of the country and creates challenges in sustaining essential public services. The declining birth rate, dropping from three children per woman in 1990 to 1.4 in 2019, exacerbates the problem, leading to a rapidly aging population that places additional burdens on social services and healthcare systems.

Addressing these challenges requires a multi-pronged approach that includes immediate and long-term strategies. In the short term, alleviating economic pressures through measures such as lowering taxes on essential goods and increasing social welfare payments could provide some relief. Additionally, direct financial support for young families, including housing assistance and child benefits, could help stem the tide of emigration. In the long term, structural reforms aimed at improving governance, reducing corruption and enhancing the quality of education and healthcare are crucial. Strengthening the rule of law, fostering a competitive economic environment, and ensuring fair opportunities for all citizens can help restore faith in the country’s future. Moreover, efforts to integrate more closely with the European Union could provide a framework for sustainable development and create incentives for Albanians to stay and contribute to their homeland. A more sustainable solution lies in creating an environment where Albanians feel hopeful about their future in their own country. This involves not only economic development but also nurturing a political culture that values transparency, accountability and inclusiveness.

Looking forward, Albania faces limited options in addressing pull factors that attract its population to wealthier neighboring countries offering higher salaries, better quality of life and stronger social safety nets. As an open market democracy and aspiring EU member, Albania’s policymakers can do little to mitigate these pull factors. Instead, the focus should be on internal push factors that compel citizens to leave. Key issues include the high cost of living, low incomes, and inflation. Addressing these challenges requires measures like reducing VAT on essential items to lower living costs. Additionally, enhancing economic opportunities by fostering competition, investing in infrastructure, supporting SMEs and reversing tax increases can help increase local wages.  Tackling corruption and improving governance are also crucial for attracting foreign investment and instilling local confidence. A comprehensive overhaul of the social safety system, including better healthcare and education, is essential to retain citizens. Supporting young families through social housing, soft loans, and child benefits can alleviate financial pressures. Accelerating EU integration and implementing necessary reforms can create a conducive environment for citizens to remain. Political reforms to allow greater participation and support for pensioners are also vital. While immigration from other countries is unlikely to solve demographic issues, a discussion on integrating non-European migrants should be considered. At the end of the day, Albania needs an inclusive, serious and unemotional discussion on how to deal with the new demographic reality and the fact that improving the situation won’t be easy or fast. A better demographic situation will be the product of serious work for decades, with efforts starting with courageous decision-making today, knowing that tangible results will take time.

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Monitor, 3 July 2024, “Kush do tepunoje?” (“Who will work”), https://www.monitor.al/kush-do-te-punoje-popullsia-ne-moshe-pune-eshte-reduktuar-me-349-mije-persona/ (accessed 5 July 2024)

Monitor, 7 February 2021, “Nga Shqipëriajanëlarguar 600 mijë persona qënga 2011, sipastëdhënaveindirektetë INSTAT.”  (600,000 people have left Albania since 2011, according to indirect INSTAT data), https://www.monitor.al/ nga-shqiperia-jane-larguar-600-mije-persona-qe-nga-2011-sipas-te-dhenave-indirekte-te-instat/. (accessed 1 May 2024).

Panorama, 6 March 2023, “Rama: Nëprillrrisim me 50 mijëlekëpagat e mjekëvespecialistë! Shtetishqiptarnukfinanconstudimetpërsisteminshëndetësorgjerman” (Rama: In April, we will increase the salaries of specialist doctors by 50,000 lek! The Albanian state does not finance studies for the German health system). http://www.panorama.com.al/rama-ne-prill-rrisim-me-50-mije-leke-pagat-e-mjekeve-specialiste-shteti-shqiptar-nuk-financon-studimet-per-sistemin-shendetesor-gjerman/ (accessed 7 June 2024).

Politiko.al, 6 October 2023, “Women are not giving birth, Fertility Index falls to 1.21 children per woman in 2022, third lowest in Europe”, https://politiko.al/english/e-tjera/grate-nuk-po-lindin-indeksi-i-fertilitetit-bie-ne-121-femije-per-grua-me-i492868. (accessed 7 June 2024).

Reporter.al, 25 July 2024, “Njënëkatërfamilje jeton nëbanesatëvogladhetëmbipopullurara”, https://www.reporter.al/2024/07/25/nje-ne-kater-familje-jeton-ne-banesa-te-vogla-dhe-te-mbipopullurara/ (accessed: 29 July 2024).

Teitelbaum, M. S. (2014). Political demography: Powerful forces between disciplinary stools. International Area Studies Review, 17(2), 99-119. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865914534428

Tirana Times, 1 May 2023, “Albania ranks second globally for willingness to emigrate”, https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=132809 (accessed 20 July 2024).

Tirana Times, 20 March 2024, “Reflecting Renewed Emigration Wave, Remittances to Albania Reached Record High in 2023”, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154400. (accessed 31 July 2024). ‌

Tirana Times, 2018, Albania Offers Baby Bonus Hikes to Fight Sharp Decline in Birth Rates, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=138616. (accessed 31 July 2024)

Tirana Times, 24 July 2024, “Albania’s two largest parties reach deal on electoral reform, face criticism”, https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154623 (accessed: 29 July 2024).

Tirana Times, 28 June 2024, “More than 213,000 Albanians gained EU citizenship in the past five years, EU data shows”, https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154601. (accessed 27 July 2024).

Tirana Times, 29 May 2024.“Property prices on Albanian coast soar, partially driven by foreign buyers” T Available at: https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154553. (accessed 29 July 2024).

Tirana Times. 20 June 2018, “Loans for Housing Increase”, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=142267. ‌https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=142267 (accessed 31 July 2024)

TPZ, 1 July 2024, “Edith Harxhi: Censi 2023 u manipulua, janëlarguar 940 mijëshqiptarëngavendi!” (Edith Harxhi: The 2023 census was manipulated, 940,000 Albanians left the country!), https://tpz.al/aktualitet/edith-harxhi-censi-2023-u-manipulua-jane-larguar-940-mije-shqiptare-n-i255534. (accessed 5 July 2024).

World Bank, “Birth rate, crude (per 1000 people) – Albania – World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN?locations=AL.

ZëriiAmerikës, 16 June 2024, “Shkodër, përkujtohentëvrarëtnë kufi gjatëdiktaturëskomuniste.” https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/7658112.html. (accessed 29 July 2024).


[1]Andi Balla is a doctoral researcher at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) in Regensburg, Germany. He has previously conducted research at the Albanian Institute for International Studies on Albanian emigration. As a journalist, Mr. Balla has reported and written on Albanian demographics since 2013.

[2] While some experts have raised questions that the official 2023 Census overcounted the resident population, this paper, unless otherwise indicated, uses the preliminary results of the census in its figures available at: https://www.instat.gov.al/media/13626/cens-2023-census-botim.pdf

[3] Rakipi, Albert, Contribution to the AIIS Expert Roundtable on Migration held in Tirana on 2 October 2023 with several of Albania’s key migration and economy experts.

[4]Balla, Andi, Emigration, depopulation and solutions. 2023. Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2023, aiis-albania.org

[5] “Nga Shqipëriajanëlarguar 600 mijë persona qënga 2011, sipastëdhënaveindirektetë INSTAT.” (600,000 people have left Albania since 2011, according to indirect INSTAT data), Revista Monitor, 7 February 2021, https://www.monitor.al/nga-shqiperia-jane-larguar-600-mije-persona-qe-nga-2011-sipas-te-dhenave-indirekte-te-instat/. (accessed 1 May 2024.

[6]Ibid

[7] “Albania ranks second globally for willingness to emigrate”, Tirana Times, 1 May  2023, https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=132809 (accessed 20 July 2024).

[8]Balla, Andi, Emigration, depopulation and solutions. 2023. Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2023, aiis-albania.org

[9]Gjonca, Arjan (2001) Communism, health, and lifestyle: the paradox of mortality transition in Albania, 1950-1990. p. 158: Bloomsbury Academic

[10] “Shkodër, përkujtohentëvrarëtnë kufi gjatëdiktaturëskomuniste.” ZëriiAmerikës, 16 June 2024, https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/7658112.html. (accessed 29 July 2024).

[11]Erebara, Gjergj. “ElementiDemografiknëKrizënEkonomiketëViteve ’80.” Perpjekja 32–33 (2014): 110-128

[12]Gëdeshi, Ilir, “Emigrimii Elites IntelektualengaShqiperiagjatePeriudhes se Tranzicionit” (Emigration of Albania’s Intellectual Elite during the Transition Period.) 1999, 40. Luarasi.

[13] 2023 Albania Census preliminary results. “Konferencapërrezultatet e CensittëPopullsisëdheBanesave 2023.” Instat, insat.gov.al, (accessed 20 June 2024.

[14] Teitelbaum, M. S. (2014). Political demography: Powerful forces between disciplinary stools. International Area Studies Review, 17(2), 99-119. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865914534428

[15]Gjonca, Arjan. 2001. Communism, health, and lifestyle : the paradox of mortality transition in Albania, 1950-1990. p. 158: Bloomsbury Academic

[16] “Birth rate, crude (per 1000 people) – Albania – World Bank Data.” See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN?locations=AL.

[17] Balla, Andi. “Understanding Albania’s Newly-Found Demographic Anxiety.” Transforming Anxieties of Aging Blog, 14 May 2024. https://transforming-anxieties.ios-regensburg.de/understanding-albanias-newly-found-demographic-anxiety/. (accessed 27 June 2024.

[18] “Edith Harxhi: Censi 2023 u manipulua, janëlarguar 940 mijëshqiptarëngavendi!” (Edith Harxhi: The 2023 census was manipulated, 940,000 Albanians left the country!), TPZ, 1 July 2024, https://tpz.al/aktualitet/edith-harxhi-censi-2023-u-manipulua-jane-larguar-940-mije-shqiptare-n-i255534. (accessed 5 July 2024).

[19] AIIS Expert Roundtable on Migration held in Tirana on 2 October 2023 with several of Albania’s key migration and economy experts.

[20] “Reporters without Borders Publish Report; Albania Last in Region for Press Freedom”, A2News.com, 3 May 2024 https://a2news.com/shqiperia/aktualitet/reporteret-pa-kufij-publikojne-raportin-shqiperia-e-fundit–i1118678. (accessed 3 June 2024.

[21]Albania Offers Baby Bonus Hikes to Fight Sharp Decline in Birth Rates, Tirana Times, 2018, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=138616. (accessed 31 July 2024)

[22] “Loans for Housing Increase”, Tirana Times. 20 June 2018, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=142267. ‌https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=142267 (accessed 31 July 2024)

[23] “Rama KeshillonSipermarrësin: MerrPunetoreTeHuaj Nga Bangladeshi” (Rama Advises Entrepreneur: Get Foreign Workers From Bangladesh.) ABC News Albania. YouTube, 31 Mar. 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=27dhZ7uyNZ0. Accessed 31 July 2024.

[24] “Reflecting Renewed Emigration Wave, Remittances to Albania Reached Record High in 2023”, Tirana Times, 20 March 2024, www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154400. (accessed 31 July 2024). ‌

[25] “Njënëkatërfamilje jeton nëbanesatëvogladhetëmbipopullurara”, Reporter.al. https://www.reporter.al/2024/07/25/nje-ne-kater-familje-jeton-ne-banesa-te-vogla-dhe-te-mbipopullurara/ (accessed: 29 July 2024).

[26] See preliminary 2023 Census results.

[27] “Property prices on Albanian coast soar, partially driven by foreign buyers” Tirana Times, 29 May 2024. Available at: https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154553. (accessed 29 July 2024).

[28] “Albanians among largest homeowners in Europe”, Albanian Daily News, 2021, https://albaniandailynews.com/news/albanians-among-largest-homeowners-in-europe. (accessed 29 July 2024).

[29] “Gjermani: Ndryshimetnëligjin e migracionit.” (“Germany: Changes in migration law”)  Deutsche Welle, 18 November 2023,  https://www.dw.com/sq/ (accessed 29 July 2024).

[30] Albanian Stats analysis, 29 July 2024, at https://x.com/albanianstats/status/1817578985477607902 of data from https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1221/umfrage/anzahl-der-auslaender-in-deutschland-nach-herkunftsland/ based on Genesis DatenbankStatistik 12521-0002

[31] “Rama: Nëprillrrisim me 50 mijëlekëpagat e mjekëvespecialistë! Shtetishqiptarnukfinanconstudimetpërsisteminshëndetësorgjerman” (Rama: In April, we will increase the salaries of specialist doctors by 50,000 lek! The Albanian state does not finance studies for the German health system). Panorama, 6 March 2023 http://www.panorama.com.al/rama-ne-prill-rrisim-me-50-mije-leke-pagat-e-mjekeve-specialiste-shteti-shqiptar-nuk-financon-studimet-per-sistemin-shendetesor-gjerman/ (accessed 7 June 2024).

[32] “More than 213,000 Albanians gained EU citizenship in past five years, EU data shows”,

Tirana Times, 28 June 2024, https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154601. (accessed 27 July 2024).

[33] “Women are not giving birth, Fertility Index falls to 1.21 children per woman in 2022, third lowest in Europe”, Politiko.al, 6 October 2023,

https://politiko.al/english/e-tjera/grate-nuk-po-lindin-indeksi-i-fertilitetit-bie-ne-121-femije-per-grua-me-i492868. (accessed 7 June 2024).

[34] Balla, Andi, 14 May 2024, ibid.

[35] Ip, Greg, and Janet Adamy. “Suddenly There Aren’t Enough Babies. The Whole World Is Alarmed.” Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/birthrates-global-decline-cause-ddaf8be2. (accessed 13 May 2024.

[36]Lesthaeghe R, van de Kaa D (1986) Twee demografischetransities? [Two demographic transitions?]. In: van de Kaa DJ, Lesthaeghe R (eds) Bevolking: groeienkrimp [Population: growth and decline]. Van LoghumSlaterus, Deventer, pp 9–24

[37] “Albania’s two largest parties reach deal on electoral reform, face criticism”, Tirana Times, 24 July 2024). https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=154623 (accessed: 29 July 2024).

[38] “Kush do tepunoje?” (“Who will work”), Monitor, 3 July 2024, https://www.monitor.al/kush-do-te-punoje-popullsia-ne-moshe-pune-eshte-reduktuar-me-349-mije-persona/ (accessed 5 July 2024)

[39] “VarfërianëShqipëri, 1/3 e popullsisë jeton nëkushtetëvështira.” Gazeta Shqiptare, 7 May 2024, https://gazetashqiptare.al/2024/05/07/varferia-ne-shqiperi-13-e-popullsise-jeton-ne-kushte-te-veshtira/. (accessed 1 July 2024).

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