Twenty-Five Years After 9/11, Terrorism Has Changed Its Form: From Striking Symbols and Seizing Territory to Threatening the Arteries of the Global Economy.
The strategic geography of extremism is shifting. The next global shock may come not from the capture of a capital, but from the insecurity of a maritime chokepoint..
By Dr. Arben Ramkaj
On the morning of September 11, 2001, when hijacked aircraft struck the Twin Towers in New York and the world watched their collapse almost in real time, international terrorism entered a new era. Al-Qaeda did not seek to occupy American territory; it struck symbols of the economic and political power of the United States and, through them, the confidence of the free world. Within hours, it became clear that an organization without a state, a conventional army, or sovereign territory could turn the very infrastructure of the modern world against it.
Twenty-five years later, as we remember the victims of that morning, the question is no longer simply whether the world is better protected against another 9/11, but what terrorism itself has learned over the past quarter-century. Al-Qaeda demonstrated that a network could strike at the heart of a superpower; ISIS showed that terrorism could seize territory, control populations, and attempt to construct a state; while what is emerging today between Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and Bab el-Mandeb points to another transformation: extremist organizations may no longer need to strike a tower or capture a capital if they can threaten the corridors through which the global economy moves.
When ISIS transformed Raqqa into its de facto capital, thousands of militants from dozens of countries converged on Syria and Iraq and seized cities, oil fields, border crossings, and strategic corridors. When the territorial “caliphate” collapsed, it created the impression that a chapter in the history of international terrorism had come to an end. Today, there are reasons to believe that only one of its forms had ended.
History also teaches us that doctrine is not always stronger than interest. The Thirty Years’ War in Europe began with a powerful religious dimension but gradually evolved into a struggle over territory and the balance of power, culminating in the paradox of Catholic France under Richelieu supporting Protestant powers against the Catholic Habsburgs. The comparison with contemporary conflicts is not direct, but the lesson remains relevant: strategic interest can overcome even profound religious divisions.
This makes what is emerging between Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab particularly significant. The two originate from opposing ideological universes: the Houthis from a Zaydi environment and with an important strategic and military relationship with Iran; Al-Shabaab from radical Sunni jihadism and the Al-Qaeda network. Yet United Nations experts have identified a transactional and opportunistic relationship, alongside reports of transfers of weapons and expertise from Yemen to Al-Shabaab. This does not prove the existence of a political alliance or a unified command structure. But that is precisely where the concern lies: operational cooperation does not necessarily require ideological reconciliation.
The Houthis have accumulated experience in missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare against maritime targets—capabilities developed in part through Iranian technological and military support—while Al-Shabaab possesses networks, financing, and territorial reach in the Horn of Africa, with annual revenues estimated by UN-related sources at approximately $100–200 million. If technological expertise moves from one ecosystem to another, the nature of the threat changes. Weapons can be seized and missiles can be destroyed, but knowledge, once transferred, can be reproduced.
THIS IS WHERE WE ARRIVE FROM RAQQA TO BAB EL-MANDEB.
The “Gate of Tears,” between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean. In the second quarter of 2026, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, an average of approximately 8.1 million barrels per day of petroleum and other liquid fuels passed through this corridor.
ISIS had to capture Mosul and Raqqa to demonstrate its power. To destabilize Bab el-Mandeb, however, it is not necessary to occupy territory. It is enough for risk to raise insurance premiums, alter shipping routes, and force carriers to choose longer alternatives. In the modern economy, an artery does not have to be physically closed to become a weapon; it merely has to lose its security.
The danger becomes even greater when Bab el-Mandeb is placed on the same strategic map as the Strait of Hormuz. If both waterways were simultaneously subjected to sustained pressure, they would not have to be completely closed to trigger a global crisis. It would be enough for markets to lose confidence in the security of navigation.
Risk becomes insurance; insurance becomes transportation cost; transportation cost becomes price. And ultimately, that price is paid by an ordinary citizen thousands of kilometres away from the conflict.
Twenty-five years after 9/11, this is the emerging challenge for the free world. It learned how to pursue Al-Qaeda’s networks and how to fight the territorial state created by ISIS. It must now confront a threat that may require neither a capital nor borders, but merely the capacity to endanger a maritime strait, a port, or an energy corridor.
On September 11, 2001, terrorism struck two towers that symbolized the power of the global economy. A quarter-century later, it may no longer require such a monumental target.
From the Twin Towers to Raqqa, and from Raqqa to Bab el-Mandeb, extremism has changed its method: first it attacked the symbol, then it sought the territory, and today it may seek to disrupt circulation itself.
And the danger is not that the Houthis will become Al-Shabaab, or that Al-Shabaab will embrace the Houthis’ doctrine. The danger is that they may discover that they do not need to agree on doctrine in order to agree on using terror against the free world.
______________________
About the author
Dr. Arben Ramkaj is a researcher and expert in interfaith dialogue, international relations, and religious diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Middle East and the Western Balkans. He serves as Chairman of the Interfaith Cooperation Center (QBNF) and Director of the Program for the Middle East and Arab World at the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS). He is also Vice-President of the European Muslims League (EML) and a member of the General Council of the Muslim Community of Albania. His work focuses on interfaith dialogue, the prevention of extremism, religious diplomacy, peaceful coexistence, and the geopolitical dynamics connecting the Western Balkans with the Middle East.
