by Kornely Kakachia, Georgian Institute of Politics
Introduction
The European Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies toward Eastern Europe have undergone significant transformation over the past decade, shaped by shifting geopolitical realities, internal EU debates, and divergent domestic political trajectories among partner states. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have long been regarded as the most advanced reformers within the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), sharing a declared strategic objective of EU membership and a commitment to political association and economic integration with the Union[1]. Their cooperation with the EU was formalised through Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), which were designed to anchor long-term reform and gradual integration into the EU’s internal market.
This shared trajectory was further institutionalised through the launch of the Associated Trio format in May 2021. Established by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as a coordination mechanism, the Associated Trio aimed to strengthen cooperation on EU integration, align reform priorities, and jointly advocate for clearer membership perspectives within the EU framework[2]. The format emerged in response to dissatisfaction with the Eastern Partnership’s increasingly heterogeneous nature and its inability to differentiate sufficiently between countries with explicit accession ambitions and those pursuing more limited forms of cooperation[3].
By promoting coordinated diplomacy and joint reform messaging, the Associated Trio sought to increase its collective leverage vis-à-vis EU institutions and Member States. In this sense, the Trio represented an attempt to shift the EU’s eastern policy from a neighbourhood management logic toward a more explicitly enlargement-oriented approach, grounded in differentiation and merit-based progress[4]. However, the political and strategic relevance of the Associated Trio has progressively faded since 2022.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally reshaped the EU’s enlargement policy, prompting an unprecedented geopolitical re-evaluation of accession priorities. The EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 and to open accession negotiations with both countries in 2024 marked a decisive move away from regional formats toward individualised accession tracks[5]. At the same time, Georgia’s domestic political trajectory—characterised by democratic backsliding, restrictions on civil society, and deteriorating relations with EU institutions—has undermined the premise of a shared reform path that underpinned the Associated Trio[6].
As a result, the EU has increasingly adopted a bilateral and differentiated approach, prioritising country-specific conditionality over collective regional coordination. While the Associated Trio continues to exist formally, it no longer functions as a meaningful driver of EU integration, reflecting broader tensions within enlargement policy between geopolitical urgency and normative conditionality, and between regional cooperation and differentiated accession pathways[7].
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the current state of EU enlargement, integration, and regional cooperation in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia; identifies the root causes of stagnation and declining credibility in the process; and assesses the most viable pathways forward. Drawing on desk research, analysis of EU progress reports and strategic documents, media monitoring, and expert assessments, the paper situates the decline of the Associated Trio within the broader crisis—and potential renewal—of EU enlargement policy in the Eastern neighbourhood.
The Current State of EU Integration for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
The EU integration trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have diverged significantly since 2022, despite their shared institutional and political starting point within the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio framework. While all three countries pursued Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) as pathways toward eventual EU membership, the post-2022 period has been marked by increasing differentiation, driven by geopolitical shocks, domestic political developments, and the EU’s recalibrated enlargement strategy.
Ukraine: Accelerated Integration under Exceptional Circumstances
Ukraine’s EU integration has progressed at an unprecedented political speed, largely as a consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The war transformed Ukraine from a neighbourhood partner into a strategic frontline state, prompting the EU to grant candidate status within months of Kyiv’s application and to open accession negotiations in 2024[8]. This acceleration reflects a broader geopoliticisation of enlargement, in which security considerations increasingly complement—and at times compete with—traditional merit-based conditionality.
At the same time, Ukraine’s progress is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand, the European Commission’s enlargement reports acknowledge substantial legislative alignment with the EU acquis, particularly in anti-corruption policy, judicial governance, public administration reform, and alignment with EU foreign and security policy positions (European Commission 2023; 2024). On the other hand, implementation gaps remain pronounced. Wartime conditions strain administrative capacity, weaken oversight mechanisms, and complicate the enforcement of newly adopted legislation. This reinforces a long-observed pattern in EU enlargement whereby formal compliance outpaces substantive institutional transformation[9]
Moreover, Ukraine’s integration path has become increasingly exceptionalised. The scale of EU financial assistance, the creation of the Ukraine Facility, and the linkage between reconstruction and accession distinguish Ukraine from other candidates and undermine the original logic of regional coordination embodied in the Associated Trio. While this exceptionalism strengthens Ukraine’s short-term integration prospects, it may raise longer-term questions about the consistency and credibility of EU conditionality.
Moldova: Reform Momentum amid Structural Vulnerability
Moldova’s EU integration trajectory represents a case of comparatively strong reform commitment combined with acute structural vulnerability. Like Ukraine, Moldova applied for EU membership in 2022 and was granted candidate status shortly thereafter. Accession negotiations formally began in 2024, reflecting Brussels’ assessment that Chişinău had met the initial political conditions related to judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, and public administration capacity[10].
Moldova’s progress has been driven by a relatively cohesive pro-European political leadership and sustained cooperation with EU institutions. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova operates in a non-war environment, allowing for more consistent reform implementation. However, its integration path is constrained by state fragility, economic dependence, and external leverage—most notably Russia’s influence through energy supply disruptions and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict[11].
Moldova thus illustrates a key tension in EU enlargement policy: while formal reform benchmarks may be met, external vulnerability and domestic polarisation threaten the sustainability of integration. The EU’s approach toward Moldova increasingly combines accession conditionality with resilience-building measures, including energy diversification, macro-financial assistance, and support for strategic communication. This hybrid model reflects an implicit recognition that classical enlargement tools alone are insufficient in highly exposed states.
Georgia: Candidate Status without Credible Accession Momentum
Georgia presents the most analytically significant contrast. Despite long being considered a frontrunner in the Eastern Partnership, Georgia’s EU integration has stagnated and, in some areas, reversed drastically. Although Georgia was granted candidate status in late 2023 with conditions, the European Commission has repeatedly underlined serious democratic backsliding, including the erosion of judicial independence, restrictions on civil society, and confrontational rhetoric toward EU institutions[12].
Moreover, Georgias case demonstrates the limits of EU leverage in contexts where ruling elites instrumentalise European integration rhetorically while undermining its normative foundations in practice. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia’s stagnation cannot be explained by war or institutional weakness alone, but rather by deliberate political choices by ruling elite. This has led the EU to effectively freeze meaningful accession engagement, reinforcing a de facto bilateral differentiation that excludes Georgia from the accelerated enlargement track.
Georgia’s case also highlights the collapse of the Associated Trio as a functional framework. The Trio presupposed parallel reform trajectories and shared strategic orientation; Georgia’s democratic regression has invalidated this assumption and reinforced the EU’s preference for country-specific conditionality over regional formats. Echoing this trend, one expert described the process as “pretty much frozen… with some progress being reversed.”[13]
Comparative Assessment and Implications
Taken together, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia exemplify a shift in EU enlargement policy from a regionally coordinated, neighbourhood-based approach toward highly differentiated, geopolitically informed accession pathways. Ukraine’s integration is driven by security imperatives and exceptional support; Moldova’s by reformist leadership tempered by vulnerability; and Georgia’s by political backsliding that has eroded trust and momentum.
This differentiation has improved the EU’s capacity to tailor engagement, but it has also contributed to perceptions of inconsistency and declining credibility. The fading relevance of the Associated Trio underscores a broader structural challenge: the EU has yet to reconcile its normative enlargement framework with the geopolitical realities of its eastern neighbourhood. As a result, current integration trajectories remain uneven, fragile, and highly contingent on both domestic political will and external security dynamics. This fragmentation is widely acknowledged, with experts noting that “the Associated Trio doesn’t really exist anymore.”[14] .”
Root Causes of Stagnation and obstacles in the EU Integration Process
Despite renewed geopolitical momentum since 2022, the EU integration processes of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia continue to suffer from persistent stagnation and in case of Georgia declining credibility. This stagnation is not the result of a single factor but rather a combination of domestic structural weaknesses, political agency, external interference, and limitations inherent in the EU’s enlargement methodology itself. While these factors manifest differently across the three countries, their cumulative effect has undermined both reform sustainability and trust in the enlargement process.
Structural Governance Weaknesses and Implementation Gaps
A primary cause of stagnation lies in the enduring gap between formal legal alignment and effective implementation of reforms. Across Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, EU-driven reforms have often prioritized the adoption of legislation over deeper institutional transformation. This pattern reflects a broader limitation of EU conditionality, which is more effective in promoting rule adoption than rule enforcement.[15]
In Ukraine, wartime conditions exacerbate these structural weaknesses. While legislative output has accelerated, oversight mechanisms and judicial independence remain constrained, raising concerns about long-term institutional resilience. Moldova faces similar implementation challenges, albeit in a non-war context, where limited administrative capacity and politicised institutions hinder consistent reform execution. Georgia, by contrast, demonstrates how implementation gaps can become politically intentional, with reforms selectively reversed or undermined by governing elites. As one expert noted, “it’s not even frozen—it’s backtracking… going back rather than moving forward.”[16]
Domestic Political Dynamics and Elite Incentives
Political will remains a decisive factor shaping reform trajectories. In Ukraine and Moldova, reform momentum has been driven by relatively strong pro-European leadership; however, this commitment is uneven and vulnerable to electoral cycles, elite capture, and public fatigue. In Georgia, stagnation is best explained not by incapacity but by political choice. The ruling elite has increasingly framed EU conditionality as external interference, while instrumentalising European integration rhetoric for domestic legitimacy[17].
This divergence highlights a critical weakness in the enlargement process: EU leverage is contingent on domestic elite incentives. Where elites perceive EU integration as politically or economically costly, compliance diminishes. The EU’s inability to effectively sanction democratic regression short of suspending the entire accession process further weakens its influence. This aligns with expert assessments that “the authorities effectively placed Georgia outside the EU accession process… accepting democratic deterioration as the price they are willing to pay.”[18]
Reform Fatigue and Diminishing Societal Trust
Reform fatigue among both political elites and societies has contributed significantly to credibility loss. In all three countries, citizens have been exposed to prolonged reform demands without clear, tangible rewards. Prior to 2022, the absence of a credible membership perspective fostered scepticism about whether reforms would ever lead to accession[19]. Although candidate status has partially restored optimism in Ukraine and Moldova, delays and vague timelines risk reigniting disillusionment.
In Georgia, declining public trust in the EU integration process has been actively fueled by Governing elites polarising narratives that portray the EU as inconsistent and politically biased. This erosion of societal consensus undermines one of the EU’s key sources of normative power: domestic demand for reform. As reflected in societal perceptions, “even if we changed our European policy today, restoring trust would take considerable time.”[20]
External Interference and Geopolitical Pressure
Russian influence remains a central external factor contributing to stagnation. Through military aggression, energy leverage, disinformation campaigns, and political interference, Russia has actively sought to disrupt EU integration efforts in all three states on the EU’s periphery.[21] Moldova’s energy vulnerability and unresolved Transnistrian conflict exemplify how external leverage constrains reform autonomy. In Georgia, demise of democratic institutions, indirect Russian influence and ideological convergence with Moscow[22] intersects with domestic elite interests, amplifying anti-EU narratives without overt military pressure.
For Ukraine, the war has paradoxically strengthened EU commitment while simultaneously straining state capacity. This dual effect illustrates how geopolitical urgency can accelerate political decisions while undermining reform quality and sustainability. This is compounded by regional dynamics where “the region could become an arena of confrontation… in terms of influence and interests.”[23]
EU-Level Constraints and Methodological Inconsistencies
Finally, stagnation and credibility loss are partly rooted within the EU itself. Internal divisions among Member States regarding enlargement, concerns over absorption capacity, and enlargement fatigue have produced ambiguous signals to candidate countries .[24] While the EU insists on merit-based conditionality, geopolitical exceptions—particularly in Ukraine’s case—create perceptions of inconsistency.
Moreover, the shift toward differentiated, bilateral accession tracks has effectively sidelined regional frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio. While differentiation allows for tailored engagement, it also weakens collective incentives and reinforces perceptions that enlargement outcomes depend more on geopolitical utility than on reform performance. Indeed, external observers highlight that “there is really not a strategy… no clear vision on how to deal with Georgia”.⁵
Comparative Assessment
Comparatively, Ukraine’s stagnation is primarily structural and war-induced, Moldova’s is rooted in vulnerability and capacity constraints, and Georgia’s stems from authoritarianism and political backsliding. Yet all three cases expose a shared credibility problem: the EU’s enlargement policy struggles to balance geopolitical necessity with normative conditionality. Without addressing this imbalance, reform backsliding and scepticism toward EU integration are likely to persist.
Conclusion
The trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia illustrate not only the opportunities inherent in EU enlargement but also the significant costs of stagnation or non-enlargement. For the aspirant countries themselves, failure to secure full membership or a credible accession pathway threatens to undermine both political stability and economic development. In Ukraine, the absence of a tangible EU membership horizon risks eroding reform momentum achieved during the wartime period. While legislative alignment has accelerated under the extraordinary pressures of war, long-term institutional resilience remains fragile. If accession remains indeterminate, the domestic political elite may deprioritize reforms once immediate survival pressures subside, potentially reopening vulnerabilities to corruption, oligarchic influence, and inefficiencies in governance.¹ Similarly, public trust in European integration—already strained by the slow pace of EU decision-making and complex negotiation procedures—may weaken, undermining the social legitimacy of pro-European policies and stoking internal political polarization.²
In Moldova, non-enlargement carries comparable structural and security risks. The country’s institutional fragility, energy dependence, and ongoing geopolitical vulnerability make EU membership a critical anchor for sustainable governance and resilience against external pressures. Failure to progress credibly toward accession could embolden pro-Russian political actors, reverse recent reform gains, and increase the likelihood of political instability or policy oscillation, particularly in energy, trade, and security policy.[25] Georgia’s situation is even more acute: democratic backsliding and elite instrumentalization of EU rhetoric indicate that the absence of credible conditionality or membership prospects exacerbates the risk of authoritarian consolidation. Non-enlargement may reinforce elite incentives to resist reform, diminish civic space further, and weaken the broader societal consensus on European integration.[26] As participants emphasized, “we are losing the advantages we were proud of… restoring them will take a great deal of time.”⁸
From the EU’s perspective, non-enlargement carries tangible strategic, economic, and normative costs. Strategically, it risks leaving a geopolitical vacuum in the Eastern neighbourhood, one which Russia has repeatedly sought to exploit. Allowing stagnation or regression in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia could increase regional instability, disrupt energy and trade networks, and prolong security risks on the EU’s eastern flank.[27] Economically, delaying enlargement limits the potential for integration of new markets and investment flows, including in sectors critical to energy security, agriculture, and digital infrastructure. This is particularly significant for the EU as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and strengthen supply chain resilience post-2022.[28]
Normatively, non-enlargement undermines the credibility of the EU’s political and institutional model. The perception that the EU can reward compliance with formal legal alignment while failing to deliver meaningful accession signals weakens the Union’s transformative power. This risk is compounded by the selective application of conditionality, such as the accelerated negotiation track for Ukraine compared to the stagnation of Georgia. Inconsistent messaging risks creating a “credibility deficit,” reducing the EU’s ability to shape governance outcomes in other partner countries, and diminishing its normative appeal globally.[29] From a strategic perspective, this risks that “the EU would lose a reliable partner in the region and access to key connectivity routes”.[30]
Finally, the costs of non-enlargement are mutually reinforcing. For the aspirant states, the erosion of reform momentum and societal trust makes them more vulnerable to external influence. For the EU, failure to act decisively diminishes geopolitical leverage, economic opportunity, and normative authority. In this context, the strategic imperative is clear: sustained, credible enlargement pathways—combined with targeted support for governance, civil society, and resilience—are not only normative obligations but essential for the EU’s own security and influence. A coherent approach would reconcile geopolitical urgency with merit-based conditionality, ensuring that enlargement continues to serve as a transformative instrument rather than a symbolic gesture. Only by addressing the risks of stagnation and reinforcing incentives for reform can the EU, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia avoid the compounded costs of non-enlargement, securing long-term stability, prosperity, and democratic consolidation in the Eastern neighbourhood.
References:
Blockmans, Steven. The EU’s Geopolitical Turn: Enlargement as a Strategic Imperative. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2023.
Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.
Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.
Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140.
Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.
Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.
Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics(February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.
European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020.
European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023.
European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.
European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.
European Comission. European Council Conclusions on Ukraine. Brussels, 2022.
European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025.
Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024.
Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023.
Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).
Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638.
Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.
Lehne, Stefan. A Reluctant Magnet: Navigating the EU’s Absorption Capacity. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023.
Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021.
Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023.
Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679.
Footnotes (Chicago style)
1. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.
2. Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.
3. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.
4. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.
5. Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026.
6. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.
7. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.
8. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.
9. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.
[1] European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020; Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021
[3] Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.
[4] European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.
[5] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024
[6] Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024
[7] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.
[8] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024
[9] Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140
[10] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.
[11] Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.
[12] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024; Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024
[13] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026
[14] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026
[15] Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679
[16] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026
[17] Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics (February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.
[18] Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026
[19] Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.
[20] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026
[21] Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638
[22] Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).
[23] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026
[24] Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026
[25] Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023
[26] Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023
[27] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022
[28] European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025
[29] Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026
[30] Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025
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The paper authored by Kornely Kakachia on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).
