In November last year (2022) Albert Rakipi, a prominent figure in Albania’s international relations and think tank circles, contemplated a pressing question. With the European Union membership process losing momentum and leaving many disillusioned, he sought a way to ensure Albania’s enduring connection to the EU. His solution: bringing the College of Europe to Albania. 

The last time the College of Europe expanded, it was more than three decades ago to Warsaw’s Nanolin suburb, with its second campus opening before Poland’s EU membership. It was an anchor in the process. It was also a story that could be replicated in Albania, Rakipi believed.  

He then first shared the idea with trusted colleagues, including at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania’s top-rated think tank where Rakipi serves as chairman and where he has been a civil society leader for nearly 30 years. There was some disbelief, but not easily discouraged, Rakipi prepared a concrete project proposal and was looking for an opening. 

It came in early December 2022, at the massive EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Tirana, shortly before which Rakipi had secured a private meeting with Prime Minister Edi Rama to seek his support in making College of Europe’s campus in Tirana a reality. 

“It’s the type of thing that can happen only once in a 1000 years — or never,” Rakipi says as he recalls how his idea drew the support of the Albanian prime minister who immediately moved to include Rakipi’s project proposal in the folders of the EU leaders attending the meeting. By the summit’s end, the idea had received “in principle” support from the EU’s top leaders. 

Rakipi says it would not have become a reality without the support of Prime Minister Rama, who understood the project’s importance for Albania. Rama’s extensive connections with EU member state leaders and at times unorthodox lobbying efforts also played a significant role. “I am very grateful to Prime Minister Edi Rama for enthusiastically supporting the project. Having the College of Europe in Albania would have never been possible without Edi Rama as Prime Minister,” Rakipi says.  

Rama has spoken highly of the EU’s reaction, calling it a “great gift” and something “exceptionally important and significant for us.” 

The proposal had come at a strategic moment during the EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana, which was an ideal opportunity to signal the importance of the enlargement policy in the Balkans. 

Rakipi firmly believes that Tirana was the perfect location for the College’s third campus in the Balkans.

Apart from the geopolitical dynamics and the prime minister’s personal involvement, Rakipi emphasizes the role of the College of Europe’s Rector, Federica Mogherini, an Italian and a friend of Albania, was also invaluable. He suggests that the educational institution might not have come to Albania without her involvement. 

“I am grateful to Federica Mogherini, a friend of Albania, who said ‘yes’ without hesitation and with special dedication and passion,” Rakipi says.  “The College probably would not have come to Albania if the Rector had not been Mogherini.”

With the official ceremony, Tirana is ready for the College of Europe

For her part, Mogherini was clear-eyed and full of smiles as she delivered her speech at the official opening ceremony at the Tirana Pyramid, which will host the College and its first 31 students.

“We are inaugurating today in the beautiful Tirana, the first office of the College of Europe here in Tirana, which will lead the way for the establishment of our campus, which will start activities next September 2024-2025. It’s really an honor for me, I’m very proud, you see my smile, it’s a real smile, ” Mogherini said. “I would first like to thank all those who made such a thing possible.”

Of course, beyond Mogherini, it took the support of EU’s top leaders, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who viewed the establishment of the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision for the Balkans.

“This is fantastic. First and foremost, it is fantastic because adding a College of Europe in pursuit of higher education and excellence can only contribute to Albania’s and the region’s development and prosperity. But also, because the College of Europe will also reinforce all the efforts being made to bring Albania and the region into the European Union,” President von der Leyen said in a statement.

At the ceremony on Oct. 16, Von der Leyen described the college as a gift that Europe gives to Albania, but also a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe.

“Here we will have students from Albania, from all over the Western Balkans from the EU. They will lay the foundations as leaders of the future. This college will be the third campus because we have the first in Belgium, the second in Poland and the third here. This college came before Poland became a member country and I am convinced that the same will happen with Albania. Yesterday they opened the application process. Now students from all over Europe can apply. You can do these fantastic studies while exploring the fantastic Europe. This campus is a great gift from Europe to Albania. But not only this, but a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe,” von der Leyen said.

Prime Minister Edi Rama, during his speech at the inauguration ceremony, said that this project is something wonderful and that it happened faster than he thought it would happen.

“Who would have thought that this would happen so quickly? Yesterday the president of the Commission announced the opening of applications, today the doors of the representative office are opened and next year people will start studying at the College of Europe in Tirana. Something is happening and it is so amazing. This is a path full of lessons, and the European Union is a blessing for all our countries, it is a great blessing because it is the deepest source of how to build institutions.

“In the end, it is the institutions that matter,” Rama said. “Our past has been characterized by many bad things that are the result of the lack of institutions, even when some institutions were built from scratch, so the building of democratic institutions cannot be done unless you have the European Union to learn these. Knowledge is the most extraordinary gift that the European Union can give us.” 

Tying Albania permanently to the West

The EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana back in December 2022 was an ideal moment because of the state of EU’s relations with the Western Balkans. The European Union opened the campus in Natolin in 1992. “It was a very symbolic action to integrate the former East. In a way, the time had come to give a signal for the enlargement policy in the Balkans, after almost a ‘freezing’ of the enlargement process in the Balkans. And the idea of the College of Europe project in Tirana was right. And there is no doubt,” Rakipi says, “that Tirana was the capital where the third campus of the college of Europe in the Balkans should be located.”

“President Ursula or President Michel and anyone else in Brussels or Tirana can now see the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision in the Balkans. But the idea and the project was born in Tirana at the Institute of International Studies, a leading reputable think tank that has been contributing to Albania’s bilateral relations during the last two decades. It’s all like a dream,” says Rakipi. “Since December of last year, nine months have passed and the College of Europe is like a baby that has just been born. I am very proud to have helped the country with a beautiful, useful and unrepeatable idea and project.” 

For Rakipi, this is ultimately “extraordinary and historic” because it is another step in tying Albania permanently to the West, said Albert Rakipi, the chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the College of Europe to Tirana means bringing the first truly Western post-university educational institution since the creation of Albania’s modern state. It is the biggest development of its kind in education in 100 years, and will have the same impact in Albanian history as the pre-WWII French Lyceum in Korca and Harry Fultz’s American school in Tirana,” Rakipi said.

The College of Europe is the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training in European affairs. It was founded in 1949 by leading European figures in the wake of the Hague Congress, which led to the creation of the European Movement. Its original campus is in Bruges, Belgium. A second Natolin (Warsaw), Poland campus of the college was established in 1992 ahead of Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU. 

“It is first and foremost a signal of hope, a symbol of the serious commitment that the EU has towards the region despite all the doubts cast by the delays and stagnation of certain milestones,” Rakipi says “It will also bring forward academic, social and cultural cooperation between the countries in the region, with their peers in the EU as well as naturally foster the process of reconciliation.” 

The think tank where the project was written

AIIS, the think tank where the project was written by Rakipi, is a non-governmental, non-profit research and policy institute created in recognition of the need for independent, in-depth analysis of the complex issues surrounding Albania’s security. AIIS was founded by a group of academics and analysts with extensive experience in foreign policy and policy-making issues. Over the three decades since its establishment, AIIS has sharpened its technical capacities to become a leading think-tank trusted by Albanian policy-makers and international partners in the fields of security studies, democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation.

To promote discussion and debate among the policy community, AIIS engages Albanian and international scholars as well as provides its products free of charge on its website. These services are made possible by the contributions of national and international donor communities to fund its activities. As a results-oriented, methodologically interdisciplinary team, AIIS aims to produce timely advice as well as analysis of the challenges facing Albania’s policy-makers. 

As of March 2023, AIIS is a member of the College of Security and Defense of the European Union. AIIS is also internationally ranked as Albania’s top and among the region’s top think tanks by the University of Pensylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index.

In the words of Daniel P. Serwer, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Albania has made tremendous progress in the last thirty years and is moving smartly towards its European home. AIIS is both a cause and a consequence. Its sharp analytical focus on the world beyond Tirana has helped what was once one of the most isolated countries on earth, become an active contributor to the international order. These have been marvelously productive years for both Albania and its leading institute!”

The post Albert Rakipi and The College of Europe: The Bold Idea that Brought EU’s Venerable Institution to Albania. appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

                  Abstract

The paper, which analyses Albania’s long and tumultuous journey to the EU, is structured into four distinctive sections: the first focuses on the democratisation road that Albania embarked after the collapse of communism and the impact of legacies on this process. The evolutionary path from an isolated authoritarian political system towards a liberal democracy went through a “dual transformation” process, combining political democratisation and economic transformation. However, the democratic transition in Albania, as the paper argues, proved to be quite challenging and painful, mainly as a result of certain historic, political, cultural and socio-economic legacies. These legacies from the past, as well as the setbacks of 1997-98, were responsible for hindering Albania’s successful transition to a modern liberal democracy, in particular in the first decade. The paper points out, however, that the main factor that has prevented Albania achieving good results in democratic reforms, has been the poor, incompetent and irresponsible political leadership.

The subsequent section analyses Albania’s path to Europe. On its road of democratisation, Albania was immediately oriented towards integration into the EU and North-Atlantic structures. “Return to Europe” became the most important ideological orientation for masses, intelligencia, youth and even political parties. The paper highlights the main milestones of Albania’s journey to the EU, starting with her inclusion in 2001 in the regional framework of the Western Balkans, known as the SAP, the efforts to fulfil the EU conditionality and criteria, the completion of SAA and the bumpy road of the visa liberalisation and candidate status.

The third part focuses on the domestic obstacles of Albania in the journey to the EU. The next milestone was the start of accession negotiations, but the EU was reluctant for many years to give the green light for that, due to not completion of key priorities in five areas, namely: the rule of law, judicial system, organised crime, corruption and public administration. This section of the paper analyses two of them, the judicial system and the organized crime.

The last section of the paper describes the efforts for launching the EU membership negotiations, which finally happened in 2022. The paper then identifies three factors upon which the pace of the negotiations is depending, including the speed of the domestic reforms and alignment of the country with EU laws; the political will, both the domestic and the European; and the EU absorption capacity and geo-political situation concerning the Ukrainian war. The paper concludes that lots of work still needs to be done to tackle all the current political, economic and social problems, including the further reform of the judiciary and the other stumbling blocks: the rule of law still weak, the corruption remains pervasive in many areas, the organized crime has become even more problematic (most notably in the areas of drugs and money laundering), public administration continues to be plagued by lack of professionalism and high levels of corruption and politization. Hence, Albania seems a long way off to join the club.

Collapse of communism and impact of legacies on the first decade of democratic transition

Albania is considered one of the weakest of the former communist states and one that has been amongst the least successful in negotiating the transition to democracy. In Albania the communist regime collapsed in 1990, providing the opportune conditions for the process of democratisation and transformation. Change came as a result of a “velvet revolution”, as in most of the other countries of the Eastern communist block, avoiding, in this way, the bloodshed of similar scenarios such as Tienanmen Square or Romania.[2] Because of the determination of the Albanian old communist caste not to follow the other Central Eastern European countries in their path towards democratic reforms and to open up, and because of terrible isolation and lack of information about what was going on in the rest of Europe (most Albanians did not even know that the Berlin Wall had fallen), the wind of change started to blow late in Albania. It started with the “invasions” of foreign embassies in the summer of 1990, followed by the students’ movement (their protests and hunger strikes),[3] street demonstrations and protests by the masses (mainly in Tirana) and in 1991 with a nation-wide strike of workers. Finally, the last bastion of Stalinism fell in 1991 (officially on the 4^th of June with the resignation of the last communist government), bringing to an end forty- seven years of communist rule in Albania.

According to Pridham[4] democratisation is the whole process of regime change from totalitarian rule to the setting up of a new liberal democracy. It is a multi-stage and multi-dimensional process, which involves the following stages: authoritarian regime collapse, pre-transition liberalisation, democratic transition, democratic consolidation and, finally, the entrenchment of liberal democracy. Since 1991, Albania started the evolutionary path from an isolated authoritarian political system towards a liberal democracy. However, the democratic transition has been long, painful and tumultuous. This has been, mainly, as a result of certain historic, political, cultural and socio-economic legacies.

Political legacy is related with the fact that Albania endured one of the toughest dictatorships in the communist bloc, being considered Europe’s most Stalinist country. There was an extreme degree of totalitarianism, which attempted to control every aspect of life. Albania was considered a ‘special case’ and an ‘exception’, even within the communist bloc. Political and civic pluralism and democratic institutions were forbidden, freedom of expression and independence of thought were completely crushed and ‘class struggle’ was invoked in a paranoid manner. It was also the country’s infamous self-imposed international isolation. The lonely ‘fortress Albania’ with its sealed borders, was even more isolated than its communist sister-states, which made it perhaps the most isolated country in the world, never mind Europe. Isolation thus became the keynote of Albania’s foreign policy. This meant that for decades the country was cut off from any kind of economic, political and cultural links with the outside world, being turned into a “gigantic prison”, with its people “locked” inside barbed wire fences.[5] This pathological isolation imposed by a xenophobic communist dictatorship prohibited the free movement of people and information (media, literature and art) and did not allow the existence of any international organisations in the country until 1991.

In terms of the economic legacy, Albania had a very low socio-economic starting point in the ‘90s with a background as the poorest country in Europe. Albania came out from communism as a very backward country, where feudal-medieval features were combined with those of a tough communist regime. The extreme poverty was a consequence of the communist regime’s centrally planned and collectivist economy, the full collectivization of agriculture, state ownership over everything and regulation of business, paranoid adoption of the principle of national self-reliance, and the worse of all, the abolishment of private property. The economy and society in general depended on a Spartan egalitarianism and on the Marxist-Leninist dogmatic ideology, the highlight of which was the creation of the ‘new socialist man’, indoctrinated with the communist ideology. A socialist society ‘blessed with social and economic equality’, forbade all religious institutions and beliefs, following the model of Chinese Cultural Revolution, and proclaiming Albania ‘the only atheist country in the world’.

Besides short-term legacy of the communist period, there was, however, an important longer-term historical dimension. Albania was, for 500 years, part of the Ottoman Empire, with its sultanate imperial system and legacy of patrimonial and personalistic rule. From this, it inherited an agrarian and largely feudal country with a great mass of peasantry, an under-developed state-society relationships, weak institutional capacity and a fragmented civil society. Albania, unlike Visegrad countries, who had been under Prussian and Hapsburg empires, did not share some of the history of Western Europe and experiences such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and 19^th century urbanisation.

Albania, therefore, did not have a strong tradition of capitalism and democracy, unlike some of the other Central and Eastern European former communist countries which embarked on the ‘era of changes’ with varying potential levels of these traditions.[6] Albania was experiencing democracy for the first time in its history and was clearly the country with the longest journey to travel from a rigid Stalinism to democracy.[7] Albania’s task of overcoming this legacy and ‘catching up’ with the West was therefore, challenging, even compared to other former communist states.

Subsequently, the first decade of democratic transition was turbulent and with some serious political setbacks, where the most notable were the unrest of 1997, caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes which brought the country on the brick of a civil war, as well as the Kosovo crisis in 1999 which provoked a huge flow of refugees into Albania.

These legacies from the past, as well as the setbacks, were responsible for hindering Albania’s successful transition to a modern liberal democracy, in particular in its first decade. However, the main factor that has prevented Albania achieving good results in democratic reforms, has been the poor, incompetent and irresponsible political leadership.

On the other hand, compared to other Western Balkan states, Albania has had some advantages on its road to democratisation. There is, for example, the fact that it has been a state (for more than 100 years), unlike other former entities of the Russian and Yugoslav Federations, which, after 1990, had to create new states as a result of the disintegration of their federations. Furthermore, in the Balkans, some of its neighbouring states managed, only recently, to sort out their constitutional and territorial status as well as their borders. Albania, on the contrary, has a strong advantage of having been, for a century, an independent state.Secondly, Albania, despite its location in a region of Europe that is a mosaic of overlapping ethnic and religious communities, has itself no major domestic inter-ethnic problems. The reason for this is that it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous. Thirdly, Albania is also remarkable in that it has experienced little if any of the religious conflict between its three religious groups, Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims,[8] which has been an important factor in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Albania remains a country of a good religious tolerance where the three main religious communities have lived in peace and harmony for centuries and still do. The mutual harmony of the religions in Albania is thus a factor of stability in an ethnically and religiously divided region. Albania can give a good example to Europe as a country with one of the most moderate Muslim populations in the world and a country of inter-religious understanding and tolerance, within a secular state. Unlike elsewhere in the Balkan countries and societies, where politics, religion and ethnicity are three key elements, in Albania and for Albanians only the first one has a big importance.[9]

In the beginning of the 1990s, Albania found itself having to build a system of democratic governance from scratch, starting the so-called “dual transformation”, which according to Pridham combines political democratisation and economic transformation.[10] Despite its dreadful history of paranoid self-imposed international isolation and dictatorship, Albania got off to a good start in the early years of the transition. Albania committed itself to political pluralism and on the 31^st of January 1991 the first multi-party elections were held. The initial phase of transition saw speedy and surprising progress, which won Albania a place among the most advanced former communist countries in terms of the rate and intensity of the reforms. Within a few years democratic institutions were set up and a democratic legal framework was introduced. Albania was accepted as a member of international political and financial institutions such as CoE, IMF, WB, and EBRD. Good results were also seen in the economy over a three-year period, about 70% of the economy was privatised, prices and trade were almost entirely liberalised and tight monetary and fiscal policies led to an admirable micro-economic stability. The newly emerging private sector proved to be highly dynamic, making the greatest contribution to overall economic growth. During 1993-1996, Albania experienced an annual growth rate of 9.5%. The analysis made by foreign experts and institutions during this period considered Albania a special case of successful transition and it had been seen by many mainstream commentators in the West as a model for post-Communist economic development.[11]

The path to Europe

In terms of foreign policy, Albania was immediately oriented towards integration into the EU and North-Atlantic structures. ‘Return to Europe’ became the most important ideological orientation for masses, intelligencia, youth and even political parties. It was synonymous with the rejection of communism and ‘Europe signified ‘democracy’. The ‘Land of the Eagles’, about which everyone knew so little, re-appeared on the European political map. The EU as the most important foreign policy goal was not only a priority of domestic politics, but also a matter of national interest, because it was perceived by all as might will offer tremenduous political, economic and socio-cultural benefits. Therefore, successive Albanian governments placed European integration as a priority on their political agendas. Relations between Albania and the (then) European Community (as the European Union was called before the Maastricht Treaty) started in 1991. In 1992 a “Cooperation and Trade Agreement” was signed between Albania and the EU. Albania was the first South-Eastern European country to conclude such an agreement. This agreement was established mainly to encourage trade and democratization with Albania, but it was also a response to the humanitarian crisis of 1991. Right after signing the agreement, Albania became eligible for funding under the EU Phare programme.

At the beginning of 1995, Albania officially asked for the opening of negotiations for an accession agreement with the EU. An evaluation undertaken by the Commission on the possibilities of free marketing of goods, services and capital in Albania, concluded that a ‘classic’ agreement like those that most countries have with the EU about their membership would be a premature step for Albania.[12] In January 1996, the EU Council of Ministers asked the Commission to compile a proposal for a new agreement that would strengthen Albania-EU relations (even though this was not on the level of a “European Agreement”). Unfortunately, the events that followed that year with the disastrous parliamentary elections in May and a year later after the collapse of pyramid schemes put a serious question-mark over Albanian democracy and the readiness of the country to progress towards integration, leaving this issue in stagnation. 

Three years later, in 1999, a very important step was undertaken by the EU: the European Commission proposed a “Stabilisation and Association Process” (SAP) for five Balkans countries, named the Western Balkans (WB) including Albania.[13] This was endorsed by the Fiera Council in 2000, which confirmed that the EU’s goal was the fullest possible integration of all WB countries into the economic and political mainstream of Europe, as well as recognized them as potential candidates for EU membership. The 2000 Zagreb Summit was also an important step in the commitment of the EU to the WB. It confirmed all of them as ‘potential candidates for EU membership. The Summit also established the SAP and its two components: a tailor-made contractual relationship called the “Stabilisation and Association Agreement” (SAA) and a new economic aid, called CARDS programme, both specifically designed for the SAP countries.

The SAP represented a historical turning point for Albania, because, for the first time, a concrete path was offered to Albania in its rapprochement with the EU. The SAA offered stronger incentives for pushing ahead with the reform process and also created more demanding political and economic conditions for the country. But, rather than pressures, they had to be considered more as opportunities that Albania could take or leave.

After the Zagreb Summit, Albania made considerable progress in fulfilling the commitments for opening negotiations. At the European Council Meeting in Gothenburg in June 2001, the European Commission concluded that it was appropriate to proceed with the negotiation of a SAA with Albania. In November 2001, the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, declared in Tirana that the opening of negotiations would be in March 2002, but the political stability of the country was made a condition for these to start. This, unfortunately, did not happen, because of a severe internal crisis within the Socialist Party in power during the second half of the year, which had negative implications for the reform process and the country’s political stability.[14] Nevertheless, the Council adopted the directives for opening the negotiation of a SAA with Albania at its meeting in Luxembourg in October 2002. The negotiations were officially launched on 31 January 2003.[15]

This was followed by three years of negotiations and finally the SAA was signed in June 2006 in Luxembourg. The next step to be taken was the ratification by all the Member States. However, it took three years for the ratification process to be completed and on 1 April 2009 the SAA entered into force.

The signing of the SAA and its ratification lasted long, respectively six and three years, longer than the other WB countries. Albania had a tough time also for reaching two other important milestones in its rapprochement with the EU. One was visa liberalization. The other was its acceptance as a ‘candidate country’.

Albania and Bosnia were the only countries in the WB to be rejected the visa liberalization request, which was granted only the second time. In November 2006 the European Commission decided to start visa facilitation negotiations with Albania, which was the first step toward a full abolishment of the visa requirements. In April 2007 the visa facilitation agreement was signed in Zagreb and on 1 January 2008 it entered into force.  In March 2008 EU Commissioner Franco Frattini opened in Tirana the dialogue toward the liberalisation of the visa regime between Albania and EU, which would enable citizens of Albania to travel to Schengen countries without needing a short term visa. On 27 May 2010 The European Commission proposed visa free travel for Albania and on 8 November 2010 the Council of the European Union approved visa-free travel to Schengen Area for Albanian citizens. After 4 years since the process started, on 15 December 2010 visa-free access to the Schengen Area entered into force, making it possible that the long dream of Albanians for the free movement in the EU to finally come true.

The ‘candidacy status’ had an even more complicated journey. Albania was the only applicant country in the whole history of the EC/EU to be rejected the candidacy’ three times ,[16] in December 2010, in October 2012, and in 2013. The EU countries, most notably Holland, decided not to grant the status to Albania due to not completion of 12 key priorities in five areas, which were conditions to be met in order to achieve official candidate status and start accession negotiations. On 24 June 2014, under the Greek EU Presidency, after 5 years, Albania was finally granted the ‘candidate status’.

The persistent obstacles in the journey to the EU

On 28 April 2009 Albania formally applied for membership in the EU. In November 2009 the Council of the EU asked the European Commission to prepare an assessment on Albania’s readiness to start accession negotiations. Five months later, in April 2010 Albania submitted answers to the European Commission’s questionnaire. Five years later, in March 2015, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement notified Albania the setting of a start date for accession negotiations to begin. It still required two conditions to be met, firstly, the government needed to reopen political dialogue with the parliamentary opposition, and secondly Albania must deliver quality reforms for all the five key areas, namely: the rule of law, judicial system, strengthening the fight against organised crime, developing a solid track record in the fight against corruption, and depolitisation of public administration. I have focused my analysis on two of them, the judicial system and the organized crime.

Judicial system

The most imperative reform was the one on judiciary. Many reports by international organizations (European Commission, Transparency International, Council of Europe, Freedom House, British Foreign Office, US State Department, Amnesty International etc.) have repeatedly pointed out that the judicial system in Albania is weak and continuous to be plagued by three problems: corruption, unprofessionalism and not independent (from politics and organized crime). Apart from lack of efficiency, the political influence on the institutions of the criminal justice system, as well as corruption in the judiciary, continued to be major causes for concern. The European Commission has constantly identified corruption in the judiciary as the No.1 obstacle of the progress of Albania towards the European Union, “the new legislation tackles many shortcomings related to the justice system’s lack of independence, efficiency and professionalism. However, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern”.[17] The justice system has been considered as the sector with the highest level of corruption in Albania. According to the 2018 annual study of the Freedom House “Nations in Transit”, Albania’s judicial framework and independence rating remained unchanged at 4.75,[18] with no progress made, since 2012. The report states, “High levels of corruption, combined with low levels of efficiency, characterized the Albanian judiciary”.[19] The problems in the judicial system were also identified in the US Department of State “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Albania”, which noted that “Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, political pressure, intimidation, widespread corruption, and limited resources sometimes prevented the judiciary from functioning independently and efficiently”.[20]

Therefore, one of the concerns of the Socialist government after coming to power in 2013 was the reform of the judicial system. However, the genuine call for the reform has not been led by Albanian political party leaders, but by diplomats in Tirana, most notably the then US Ambassador Donald Lu. Mr. Lu has been the most outspoken person for the judicial reform. In an interview to BIRN, Lu described it as “the most important reform in the 25 years since the fall of communism…It has the possibility of ridding the Albanian judicial system of corrupt judges and prosecutors who steal the money of ordinary citizens and allow organized crime figures, murderers and corrupt politicians to buy justice”.[21]

The justice reform process launched in July 2015 with a set of amendments that changed one third of the Albania’s Constitution. The reform aimed to tackle existing shortcomings in the sector, including weaknesses linked to independence and accountability of judges and prosecutors, lack of efficiency and professionalism.[22] The justice reform is being implemented ever since and its main features have included measures to fight corruption, by establishing a new Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure (SPAK); measures to reduce the influence by the parliament and the executive on the judiciary; measures to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, measures to increase justice efficiency and access to justice.[23]

In addition to the institutional restructuring of the judiciary and as part of measures to fight corruption and re-establish public trust in the judiciary, the reform process foresaw the launch of a generalized re-evaluation of all currently serving judges, prosecutors and legal advisers, called the ‘Vetting’. The vetting started in October 2017, firstly with the establishment of the first-instance vetting body, the ‘Independent Qualification Commission’ (IQC), as well as the International Monitoring Operation (IMO), deployed under the aegis of the European Commission, which is supervising the Vetting process and exercising independent oversight. Since the Vetting started, over 800 professionals have been undergoing scrutiny. At the very start of the process a number of high-ranking judges and prosecutors resigned, refusing their assets to be verified, and some asked to retire.[24] By 2020, more than 286 dossiers have been processed, resulting in 62% dismissals, mostly for issues related to unjustified assets, or resignations.[25]

Even though the justice reform had the cross-party support, the Opposition has contested the follow-up process as being biased and controlled by the Socialist Party in power, starting with the individuals selected and appointed as the members and heads of the Vetting bodies, such as the IQC, the High Judicial Council (KLGJ) and the High Prosecutorial Council (KLP). They are the main self-governing bodies of the judiciary that are supposed to be independent from the government. The Opposition pretended that the dismissal of judges and prosecutors from the part of Independent Qualification Commission has been selective and biased, favoring the ones who have the support of the Socialists. As the opposition paper Exit.al points out, “It is becoming increasingly clear that the Independent Qualification Commission is not, in fact, completely independent. Now that nearly a hundred judges and prosecutors have passed through its ‘filter’, it seems that certain figures fulfilling ‘key roles’ in the recent capture of the judiciary are able to slip through the cracks”.[26] All this have put into question the credibility of the current “reform of the Albanian judiciary”. The vetting process and its results remain crucial to restore public trust in the judiciary and law enforcement bodies of the State.[27]

The other step in the judicial reform has been the “Law on Decriminalization”, which consists on barring people with criminal records from holding public office or most civil service jobs. The law, approved by the Albania’s parliament in December 2015, was in fact proposed by the Opposition, in response to a series of political scandals in which MPs with criminal convictions or facing serious charges (the so-called “law-breakers turned into law-makers”) have been exposed by journalists and political opponents. However, the “decriminalization law” has had only minor results in removing incriminated officials from public office and has not yet made a dent in the problem of state infiltration by organized crime.[28] Law breakers continue to be / become law-makers.

The then EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, while on a visit to Tirana, warned that Albania cannot be considered for EU membership until it thoroughly cleanses the justice system, “A deep reform of the judicial system will open the way to the beginning of negotiations for Albania to become part of the EU.” [29]

Organised crime

Organized crime gangs in Albania and abroad operate mostly in the areas of drugs, money laundering, human trafficking and smuggling. I will be focused on the first one, the drugs, which has been quite problematic during the last decades of transition and for which Albania has been heavily critisised by the EU and international organisations.

After coming to power in 2013, the Socialist government started a huge police operation in the village of Lazarat,[30] known as Europe’s “marijuana mountain”, the home base of gangs that produced marijuana with an estimated street value of $5.9 billion in 2013, equivalent to roughly half of Albania’s gross domestic product.

However, as the Freedom House “Nations in Transit” 2017 report pointed out “Two and a half years after the start of a government crackdown, drug dealers managed to plant at least 2.4 million cannabis seeds across the country, and to traffic across Albania’s borders tons of marijuana worth billions of dollars. The opposition accused the Prime Minister and Interior Minister of protecting drug lords in exchange for illicit proceeds and support”.[31] The report continues saying that “Albania still has a poor track record in investigating, identifying, prosecuting, and convicting key figures in drug trafficking and other organized crime activities. Despite police raids and crackdowns, financiers and traffickers managed to extend their cannabis plantations across the country, taking advantage of poor farmers and corrupt state officials”.[32]

The opposition called this ‘Cannabization of Albania’ and accused the ruling Socialist Party for turning Albania into a ‘Columbia of Europe’. According to an article of Independent Balkan News Agency, “During 2017, at least 2.5 million roots of cannabis were cultivated in Albania, according to official sources. This quantity was four times higher than in 2015. Furthermore, this reported quantity is based on police information which are believed to be several times lower than the real cultivated amount”.[33] The State Police and Interior Ministry leaders were consistently targeted by the opposition Democratic Party, which accused them of implications and involvement in this criminal activity, spreading cannabis enclaving or co-operation with organized crime. What was worse, the opposition has made repetitive allegations that the huge revenues from cannabis were used to buy the votes in the June 2017 parliamentary elections, which according to them explained the unexpected big victory of the Socialist Party in these elections. Over the last two years, large amounts of narcotic substances of cannabis, worth of billions of euros, were seized by Greek authorities while crossing Albanian-Greek border, or caught by Italian “Guardia di Finanzia” in the Adriatic waters, or while transported by small helicopters. This “historical record in cannabisation of the country”, has been reported almost every day in the media. According to the above article, “Recently, many quantities of processed drugs are being attempted to be trafficked to EU member countries. In different operations conducted in the recent days, Albanian, Italian and Greek police have seized several tons of marijuana. Many people believe that this is a small part of the quantity that is being taken out of Albania”.[34] 

The prestigious British newspaper “Independent” in an investigative article also describes Albania as a ‘Columbia of Europe’ and the country the HQ of drugs in Europe.[35] Both US and European law enforcement officials, says the article, have described Albania as the largest provider of cannabis to the EU, as well as an important transit point for heroin and cocaine. Based on the value of drug seizures, some estimate that the marijuana alone generates up to $4bn (£3bn) a year, half of Albania’s GDP. Cocaine comes in shipments of bananas and palm oil from Colombia. On 28 February 2018, authorities intercepted 613kg of cocaine disguised as a banana shipment from Colombia. Heroin is smuggled into Albania via clothing and shoe imports brought in from Turkey, one of the world’s largest textile exporters.[36] The article notes that “the traffickers now use the same networks they established to move vast amounts of bulky cannabis to distribute cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Central Asia via Italy to the rest of Europe. Albanian gangs are considered among the world’s top heroin, cocaine and cannabis traffickers. The drugs are loaded on high-speed zodiac inflatable boats bound for the Italian coast from Albanian ports. Also shipped back to Turkey, along the same networks used to bring heroin into the country. Traffickers have also taken to the air, with what some officials estimate as between five and 10 small planes”.[37] What more disturbing is, as the article points out, that “it’s quite clear that all these gangs operate with a certain level of political and police protection and support. Many fear the money has thoroughly infected the political elite. While the government denies it, experts say the traffickers have thoroughly infected politics and commerce, at the deepest levels. Scores of high-level Albanian officials – from mayors to ministers – have been implicated in the drug trade, and perhaps enable it”.[38] Not only politicians, but also “police are directly involved in the growing, cultivating, packaging, transport and selling of drugs” and the cannabis plantations have become like “so-called ‘no-go’ areas, taken over by armed drug traffickers bound together by clan ties”. “Albanian officials concede that they only intercept 10 per cent of drug shipments in and out of the country. One Western diplomat said the number was more like 5 per cent, leaving traffickers with enough wealth to buy up port authorities from Rotterdam to Izmir. The sophisticated trafficking groups have gotten so powerful that they have networks all over the world”. The drug industry is influencing everything – all strata of society, says the article, that includes money laundering, and party financing. “Albania is no longer a hub of cultivation,” said one EU official. “It’s become a center of investment, distribution, and recruitment”. The article, quoting some Western diplomats, concludes that, “Albania, the drug producer and distributor of Europe has become a narco-state and they’d lose too much money getting out of trafficking to get into the EU”.[39] 

The Italian television RAI 3 broadcasted a long documentary about the widespread of cannabis cultivation and production in Albania, titled “Narcotics”.[40] Despite the Albanian government and the State Police declarations that cannabis cultivation dropped drastically in 2017 and 2018 and the plantations had been almost wiped out, as a result of government anti-cannabis strategy and successful police operations, the RAI documentary revealed the shocking news that “This year the cannabis plantations have extended to one third of the country territory”.[41] Guardia di Finanza officers declared that massive cultivation and production of marijuana have re-started again this year, five times more than last year and using more refined genetic modified varieties of cannabis.[42] The Italian prosecutors noted that in addition to cannabis, Albania has become one of the most important suppliers for cocaine to Italy from Columbia and Ecuador, competing with the notorious Italian mafia organization Ndrangheta.[43] Albania also has become an important route for the Afghan opium, which is brought through Balkan networks and is processed at the heroin laboratories, found in several places in Albania and Kosovo and managed by Albanian mafia.[44]

Efforts for launching the EU membership negotiations

Albania hoped to open membership negotiations by December 2016. The Commission recommended the launch of negotiations on 9 November that year, but Germany announced that it would veto the opening accession talks until 2018. In early 2017, the European Parliament warned the government leaders that the parliamentary elections in June must be ‘free and fair’, before negotiations started, to admit the country into the Union. However, the situation before elections was complicated with the discovery of million roots of cannabis being cultivated everywhere and Albania, as mentioned above. A few months after the elections, the shocking scandal of the alleged links between an Albanian–Italian mafia group (which had trafficked huge amounts of cannabis and guns) with the then Interior Minister, shattered the politics and public opinion, and shed lights in the gravity of the link of Albanian government with organized crime.[45]

Three years later, in March 2020, the Council of the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Albania. But France blocked the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia until a new methodology for future enlargement was agreed at EU level. Even when that was sorted out, Albania could still not start accession negotiations because its candidacy was linked to that of North Macedonia, which was vetoed by Bulgaria. In June 2022, Bulgaria’s parliament approved lifting the veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia and subsequently the two countries received the green light to start accession talks that could ultimately lead to EU membership.[46] Finally, 11 years after the application, Albania managed to start the accession negotiations, officially launched on 19 July 2022.

The EU held its first intergovernmental conference with Albania in July 2022. The screening process is underway and no chapters have been opened thus far. Since the change of the enlargement methodology in 2020, the 35 negotiating chapters of the acquis Communautaire are now grouped into six clusters. In terms of the level of preparation, Albania is somewhat behind the rest of the candidates with active negotiation processes, at least according to the European Commission reports.[47]

The pace of the negotiations seems to depend on three factors: Firstly, the speed of the domestic reforms and alignment of the country with EU laws. A lot of work still needs to be done to tackle all the current political, economic and social problems and the five priorities set by the EU. Apart from the reform of the judiciary (which has produced some results), the four other priorities remain stumbling blocks: the rule of law still weak, the corruption remains pervasive in many areas, the organized crime has become even more problematic (most notably in the areas of drugs and money laundering), public administration continues to be plagued by lack of professionalism and high levels of corruption and politization. Secondly, the pace of the process will mostly depend on political will, both the domestic and the European. Thirdly, the EU absorption capacity: after the last enlargement – the ‘Big Ben’, when 10 countries joined at once, there has been a certain degree of reluctance for further enlargements. However, the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with fears over Moscow’s influence in the region, has increased the strategic importance of the Western Balkans to the EU. Therefore, an early decision to accept Albania and the other WB countries might be more for geo-political reasons, rather than fulfillment of the criteria and completion of reforms.

However, the prospect of EU membership and the whole process of integration and Europeanisation has proved to be very useful for Albania. Albanian democratization could have had a different trajectory without the presence of the EU pushing for and directing reforms. If it were not for the role of the EU and international community, Albania would continue to be a “Balkan Banana Republic”, left in the hands of irresponsible, incapable and egocentric politicians and governments, where corruption and organized crime would flourish, with the mafia, criminals and politicians, the country’s ‘nouveaux riches’, enjoying privileges, wealthy and luxurious lifestyles on the one hand, and the majority of the population living in poverty on the other.[48] 

Therefore, the EU remains the primary locus of Albania’s efforts in managing the difficult period of transition and its goal for the future, mostly because the prospect of EU membership is a credible prospect in its political horizon, a strong incentive and a powerful driving force for carrying out domestic reforms.

It is a positive fact that the EU is the only element of consensus that unites all political parties and all social groups. This leads us to believe that the two types of pressure:  the external one from the EU and from other international organizations on one hand, and internal pressure from the various domestic actors and the public who are interested in progress and EU membership on the other, will probably help Albania eventually to achieve the goal of accession. The help and support of external actors is important and necessary, but the reforms and all the steps of a successful integration process should, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the domestic actors, in particular the politicians. Putnam argues that “the quality of democracy depends on the quality of its citizens, so that every people gets the government they deserve”,[49] so hopefully Albanians will not continue to be labelled as ‘a people undone’ and be the last ‘catching the train to Europe’.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Balkan Insight “US Diplomat urges Albania to end judicial corruption”, 6 January 2016.

• Bogdani, M. “Contributing actors to the regime change in Albania: The first phase of transition and the role of the Student Movement” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, NY & London. 2020.

• Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris. London – NY, 2007. 

• Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Dajti 2000. Tirana, 2004.

• Biberaj, E. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Westview Press, 1998.
• Brzozovski, A. “Next steps for Albania and North Macedonia, as the EU agrees to start accession talks”. Euractiv. 19 July 2022.

• European Commission, “The Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_341.htm

• European Commission, “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2003”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_339.htm.

• European Commission, “Albania 2016 Progress Report”. Brussels, 9 November 2016.   https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_albania.pdf

• European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018.   https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-albania-report.pdf  

• European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. Brussels, 6 October 2020.

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/albania_report_2020.pdf

• Exit.al, “Prokuroret italiane per RAI 3: Ne Shqiperi lulezon trafiku i droges, ka rifilluar kultivimi masiv i marijuanes”. 8 August 2019.

• Exit.al, “Vetting Commission again confirms Government favorite”, 5 February 2019.

https://exit.al/en/2019/02/05/vetting-commission-again-confirms-government-favorite/

• Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2017 Report Albania. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/albania

• Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2018 Report Albania.https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/albania

• Ivkovic, A. “What is the EU perspective of North Macedonia and Albania a year after opening negotiations?”. European Western Balkans,14 August 2023.

• Independent, “Colombia of Europe’: How tiny Albania became the continent’s drug trafficking headquarters”, London. 27 January 2019.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/albania-drug-cannabis-trafficking-hub-europe-adriatic-sea-a8747036.html?fbclid=IwAR1DNZH4xJ1jjIgj-AuT8oCkIau3GKYCkFgF9rdE2mwzYTaxa6aEuxFPJIw

• Independent Balkan News Agency, “One and a half tons of drugs goes through Albanian customs, Greek customs officials discover it”, 17 February 2017.

http://old.balkaneu.com/one-and-a-half-tons-of-drugs-goes-through-albanian-customs-greek-customs-officials-discover-it/

• Meksi, E. “The Albanian dimension of integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS, 2003.

• Milo, P. Bashkimi Europian“. pp.277-99. Tirana:Albpaper, 2002.

• Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000.

• Putnam, R.D. et al. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 

• Rama, Sh. “Who slew the dragon? The collapse of communism, political change and the student movement in Albania” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, NY & London. 2020.

• Transitions Online “Albania urged to reform Judiciary”, 4 March 2016.

• Zeneli, F. “Sektorët prioritarë të ekonomisë dhe investimet e huaja”. Shekulli, Tirana, 4 October 2003.

• US Department of State “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Albania”. April 2018.https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper

[1] Author and Scholar of EU Politics & European integration, Prof. Assoc. Mirela Bogdani , currently teaching at University of New York Tirana

[2] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris, London – NY. 2007. 

[3] Rama, Sh. “Who slew the dragon? The collapse of communism, political change and the student movement in Albania” in Rama. Sh (eds). The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, Ny & London. 2020.

[4] Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000, pp.16.

[5] Bogdani, M. “Contributing actors to the regime change in Albania: The first phase of transition and the role of the Student Movement” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, Ny & London. 2020.

[6] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Dajti 2000. Tirana, 2004.

[7] Biberaj, E. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Westview Press, 1998.

[8] According to a poll conducted in the time of Monarchy the religious composition in Albania was: 70 per cent Muslim, 20 per cent Greek Orthodox and 10 percent Roman Catholics. However, these figures are not only out-dated, but also inaccurate and unreal, given a history of 30 years of imposed atheism during communism, when two generations grew up without any religious faith whatsoever, and then the religious’ revival after 1990 when lots of people have been embracing various religions sometimes totally different from that of their roots.

[9] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris. London – NY, 2007. 

[10] Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000.

[11] Zeneli, F. “Sektorët prioritarë të ekonomisë dhe investimet e huaja”. Shekulli, Tirana, 4 October 2003.

[12] Meksi, E. “The Albanian dimension of integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS, 2003.

[13] European Commission, “The Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

[14] Milo, P. Bashkimi Europian“. Tirana:Albpaper, 2002.

[15] European Commission, “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2003”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

[16] Only Turkey was rejected once, in 1997.  

[17] European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018.

[18] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. Albania 2018 Report.

[19] Ibid.

[20] US Department of State “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Albania”. April 2018.

[21] Balkan Insight “US Diplomat urges Albania to end judicial corruption”, 6 January 2016.

[22] European Commission, “Albania 2016 Progress Report”. Brussels, 9 November 2016.

[23] Ibid, pg.3.

[24] European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018. pg.3.

[25] European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. Brussels, 6 October 2020, pg.5.

[26] Exit.al, “Vetting Commission again confirms Government favorite”, 5 February 2019.

[27] European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. 6 October 2020, pg. 24.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Transitions Online “Albania urged to reform Judiciary”. 4 March 2016.

[30] Lazarat, a village in the south of Albania, had been effectively off-limits to local police for over a decade, becoming synonymous with uncontrolled crime.

[31] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2017 Report Albania.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Independent Balkan News Agency, “One and a half tons of drugs goes through Albanian customs, Greek customs officials discover it”, 17 February 2017.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Independent, “Colombia of Europe’: How tiny Albania became the continent’s drug trafficking headquarters”, London. 27 January 2019.

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Exit.al, “Prokuroret italiane per RAI 3: Ne Shqiperi lulezon trafiku i droges, ka rifilluar kultivimi masiv i marijuanes”. 8 August 2019.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Balkan Insight, “Albania ex-Minister accused in drug-smuggling scandal”, 17 October 2017.

[46] Brzozovski, A. “Next steps for Albania and North Macedonia, as the EU agrees to start accession talks”. Euractiv. 19 July 2022.

[47] Ivkovic, A. “What is the EU perspective of North Macedonia and Albania a year after opening negotiations?”. European Western Balkans,14 August 2023.

[48] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I.B.Tauris: London – NY, February 2007. 

[49] Putnam, R.D. et al. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1993. pg.3.

The post Albania’s rocky road to the European Union: How far from joining the club? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Rule of law issues have increased in prominence in the European integration process during these last years. Allegations of violation of the principles of rule of law by some member states and calls for the activation of article 7 of the Treaty of European Union which allows to take measures against a member state which violates or threatens to violate the values on which the EU is founded have multiplied, regarding, especially, relations between the EU and Poland and Hungary. Problems with systemic corruption and connections between politics and organized crime are also present in EU’s relations with other EU member states, among them Bulgaria and Malta. This deterioration of rule of law in some EU countries – and the problems this creates for the EU – has brought to the forefront the significance of a solid set of rule of law principles as a prerequisite for any future accession to the EU, in particular, regarding the countries of the Western Balkans.

Although rule of law is included in the Copenhagen criteria and constitutes a prerequisite for candidate countries, its effective application and measurement of fulfillment varied in previous accession negotiations; accession was often determined more by political expediency rather than through an objective, means-based fulfillment of specific scoreboards. The recent developments inside the EU regarding rule of law violations have also affected the importance of rule of law in new accessions and led to making these criteria more measurable across the board.

This article examines the implications of rule of law in the negotiations and discussions between the EU and candidate states. It analyses how rule of law issues were treated in the previous enlargements, how these issues obtained prime significance as of lately and looks to the extent that rule of law is dealt with in the current accession context towards the countries of the Western Balkans. It examines how these considerations are introduced by the EU during the negotiations and its efforts to maintain relevant pressure even after formal negotiations end. Finally, it examines the effective significance of rule of law in the relations between the applicant states and the EU and the reaction of the latter but also candidate states in the way these matters are treated in the current negotiations. In addition, it examines weather the Russian invasion on Ukraine and the European perspective of Ukraine which opened in 2023 might influence the  possible changes on

Rule of law in the European Union

The European integration process contained from the start an implicit prerequisite of liberal and democratic values for its member states. Though the Treaty of Rome did not include any explicit reference to the democratic credentials of its own as well as applicant states, it was manifest that only countries which respected democratic  principles could be or become members of the EEC.[2] Following the 1967 military coup in Greece, the association agreement between the EEC and Greece was frozen. In a relevant resolution adopted on 2 June 1967 the European Parliament insisted that “the association agreement cannot be applied in its various facets unless the democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored in Greece” (European Parliament, 1967, 1).[3]

The Declaration on European Identity adopted by the heads of state of the EEC in Copenhagen (December 1973) specified that member states shared “the same attitudes to life [and were] determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights”, all of these being fundamental elements of the European Identity (Council of Ministers, 1973). In its opinion on the Greek application, in 1976, the Commission reiterated that “given […] Greece’s return to a democratic form of government, there can be no doubt, in the view of the Commission that the Community must now give a clear positive answer to the Greek request” and concluded that “the consolidation of Greece’s democracy which is a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece’s relationship with the Community”. (European Commission, 1976). The military coup in Turkey in 1980 also led, albeit belatedly and with reluctance, to the freezing of the country’s association agreement with the EEC.

Rule of law, as one of the fundaments of European integration, appeared in the considerations of the (then) European Court of Justice in its Opinion 1/91 on the EEA agreement, in 1991, which admitted that the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.

This requirement become clearer with the Treaty of Maastricht. Article F provided in paragraph 2 that “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] as general principles of Community law”. Almost in parallel, the newly-founded EU set up the so-called Copenhagen criteria to clarify the conditions for accession, in particular for countries of Central and Eastern Europe: the 1993 Copenhagen European Council while agreeing that these countries “that so desire shall become members of the European Union” added a number of conditions, among them that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Council, 1993).

Through successive EU treaty amendments, primary EU law also became clearer and more compelling. Attachment to the principles of rule of law is underlined in the preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon and became one of the foundational values of the EU in Article 2. In addition, adherence to, and commitment to promote the values or Article 2 were elevated into a formal condition for membership, as prescribed in Article 49 TEU.[4] In a parallel development and in recognition that rule of law should not only apply to candidates but also to member states, sanctions for its violation by member states were gradually introduced. The EU was enabled, albeit through a cumbersome and difficult procedure, to suspend the membership rights of member states whenever the values of article 2 TEU were being violated or, after the Treaty of Nice, there was a serious threat of them being violated. What is now Article 7 TEU introduces a permanent mechanism to monitor, among others, respect by member states of rule of law.

Political developments in some EU Member States which put at risk important rule of law elements at national level, increased the significance of rule of law in the EU legal order: the Union started looking at states’ performance that challenged its governance and good administration requirements. Thus, the concept, which originally was not clearly defined, gradually acquired more concrete features. Although the term continues to be understood in a slightly different manner by the various national legal orders, EU law, CJEU caselaw and doctrine have identified certain common qualities: among others the limitation of government by the law, changes of law following prescribed procedures, laid down in advance and publicly, the existence of legal remedies before an unbiased and independent judiciary, proportionality, and constitutionalism (EPRS, 2019). In various cases, starting with Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16), and in particular the two Commission cases v Poland (C- 619/18 and C-192/18), CJEU confirmed, as settled caselaw, that the Union is founded on the rule of law principle and in the last case underlined that the independence of courts is 

of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (paragraph 106).

Thus, during recent years, especially, after 2018, the “existential threat to the functioning and long-term survival of the EU legal order” obliged the CJEU to deal more extensively with the values of Article 2 TEU and “to mobilise [these fundamental values and principles] to progressively articulate a more comprehensive, coherent, and effective system of rule of law protection” (Pech-Cochenov, 2021, 14). In this process, the Court reshaped the meaning and scope of the rule of law principle which now can be much better applied both internally and in accession negotiations. In one of its latest cases regarding rule of law, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru (C-896/19), the Court further stressed that

compliance by a Member State with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to that Member State. A Member State cannot therefore amend its legislation in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law’ (paragraph 63).

Rule of law in accession negotiations

The centrality of rule of law requirements for the countries that aspired to join the European Union was clear from the start: the Copenhagen criteria were introduced specifically to provide more specific conditions to the very general at the time accession provisions of the Treaty and to assuage, to some extent, fears that states with weak or unstable democratic foundations could join the EU. In practice, the political criteria, in particular the state of democracy in the accession countries, gradually took precedence over the other criteria, at least in the EU prerequisites (Kochenov, 2004). The 1997 Luxembourg European Council (12-13 December 1997) set up the European Conference which opened negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, in its conclusions, it went further and specified more clearly that “compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations” (European Council, 1997,25).

The first enlargement negotiations following the adoption of these criteria (to the Scandinavian countries and to Austria) did not raise any major issue regarding rule of law, and relevant discussions went relatively smooth.[5] The following wave of accession negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was more complicated for the EU, both because of the size of the enlargement envisaged and due to the weaker democratic institutions and failings in rule of law among several of these countries. In this context, two specific negotiating chapters were shaped with the aim to assist enlargement countries to establish a society based on rule of law and to measure their progress in that area: chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) covered a wide variety of issues, in the fields of justice, internal security, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption and organized crime.

Rule of law turned even more problematic during the subsequent accession negotiations, with Bulgaria and Romania, which were considered to suffer from widespread systemic corruption and to lack sufficient breadth in their national constitutional systems to guarantee steady and permanent adherence to these principles. Croatia’s accession was also marred by issues relating to the rule of law, mostly due to its unsatisfactory cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and general corruption allegations – and border issues with Slovenia (Szpala, 2011).

In a recognition that rule of law was an absolute prerequisite for accession and, to a large extent, to alleviate fears that the EU would accept states which could later turn rogue or fall victims to corruption and maladministration, the EU introduced the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania. The Mechanism, although conceived as a transitional measure to assist the two countries to remedy these shortcomings, was a testimony to the fact that these two countries had not achieved sufficient progress in the fields of judicial reform and corruption, as well as the fight against organized crime for Bulgaria. Still the outcome demonstrated that political considerations were, in the event, more decisive and conclusive to the acceptance of their membership, sidestepping the rule of law criteria set by the very EU.

Nevertheless, the accession negotiations with these two countries demonstrated that, in fact, there was little direct relationship between improvements in rule of law and the progress in these negotiations: the EU was caught in a “Rule of Law dilemma” (Nicolaidis -Kleinfeld, 2012, 15). A clear end-based approach might be considered as aiming to stall enlargement as no state could sufficiently prove its rule-of-law credentials. A means-based reading of the Copenhagen criteria would bypass benchmarks and obligations in favour of a longer-term perception of these conditions. In either case, it proved difficult to use in an objective manner the criteria in the context of 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Political considerations eroded the mere enunciation of the principles, and it was, in both cases, more the avowed declarations of governments rather than objective developments that finally led the way.

The EU enlargement to the Western Balkans

Discussions on EU enlargement to the Balkan countries which were not members of the EU, generally called Western Balkans[6], date back to 1999. To establish a cooperation framework with the Balkans, the EU adopted the Stabilisation and Association Process to govern its relations with the countries of the region. Later, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe became a broader initiative involving all key international players of the region aiming to provide an economic and political perspective for the Balkans. At the first EU-Western Balkans summit meeting, in Thessaloniki in June 2003, the two sides confirmed their attachment to “the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights”. The final declaration endorsed the EU’s “unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” and next day’s European Council confirmed “its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria” (European Council, 2003, point 40).

Despite this commitment, the region’s European perspective remains quite illusory even today.  The “established criteria” are still far from being considered to have been “met”. It took a long time for the Western Balkans to apply for membership and even longer for formal negotiations to start. Twenty years after Thessaloniki, only two countries, Serbia and Montenegro, have officially opened accession negotiations and even with these two countries, discussions have stalled. In July 2022, the first intergovernmental conferences on accession negotiations took place with North Macedonia and Albania, following the resolution of Bulgaria’s veto over the former country’ s accession.

Montenegro, which became independent in 2006, applied for EU membership in December 2008, was granted candidate status in December 2010 but was the first to open accession negotiations in June 2012. Serbia submitted its application in December 2009, was granted candidate status in March 2012 and accession negotiations opened in January 2014. North Macedonia was the first Balkan country to apply for membership (as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2004) and was granted EU candidate status in December 2005. For many years, though, it was unable to open accession negotiations due to the dispute with Greece over the country’s use of the name ‘Macedonia’. Even after the resolution of this issue, in 2018, the Council failed to authorize the effective start of these negotiations mainly, but not exclusively, due to the opposition of Bulgaria which was only raised in June 2022. Albania applied for EU membership in April 2009 and was granted candidate status in June 2014. Although the Commission had recommended to open accession negotiations with the country already in 2016 (and again later), the Council did not authorize this till March 2020. Again, and despite the Commission’s draft negotiating framework, the opening of the talks was delayed due to the obstruction of the negotiations with North Macedonia.

Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo are further behind.  Today they qualify as potential candidate countries. Both have established a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and BiH submitted its membership application in February 2016. The case of Kosovo is complicated because of the dispute with Serbia and the fact that five EU member states have not recognized Kosovo’s independence and Kosovo has not been included in the EU visa liberalization regime.

The delays are due to inherent problems with the countries of the region – notably rule of law issues- and to the EU’s less than wholehearted embrace of further enlargement. The EU’s “enlargement fatigue”, following the 2004 accessions, has a persistent impact on accession discussions of the Western Balkans. This fatigue is strengthened by retrospective assessments of Bulgaria and Romania’s governance capacity which conclude “that ‘they were not ready’ to join in 2007 and that the EU should not have admitted them as members” (O Brennan, 2014, 225). The botched efforts to bring these two countries into the EU while their economies and state structure were insufficiently prepared and adapted to the EU norms, reverberate in accession negotiations both among the member states and, increasingly, among their citizens.

In addition, the various crises that the EU faced after the last enlargement (the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the refugee emergency, and the pandemic) weakened, in general, the EU’s appetite – and capacity- for expansion. The crises also modified the power relations within the EU, weakening the role of the Commission in favour of intergovernmental institutions (both the Council and, especially, the European Council). In enlargement politics this change meant that national politics, and even more domestic considerations, took more prominence in accession talks. This was already viewed with the Slovenian veto to Croatia’s accession on the grounds of their border dispute and, till recently, in Greece’s (till 2018) and Bulgaria’s more recently blocking the start of negotiations with North Macedonia over issues of the country’s name in the former case and identity, language and history in the latter (among others, the latter country’s failure to recognize an ethnic Bulgarian minority and disputes over the origins of the Macedonian language).

In parallel, European public opinion grew significantly cooler over enlargement. Replies to the standard Eurobarometer question whether “Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” gave increasingly negative answers. In autumn 2016 39% of EU28 citizens were in favour of further enlargement, as opposed to 51%. Only 28% among French and 25% among Germans supported enlargement. (Eurobarometer 86, 2016). In 2003, those supporting enlargement were 47% and those against 32% (Eurobarometer, 61, 2003). Although this erosion of support did not particularly refer to the Western Balkans but rather to Turkey – and, before the Russian invasion, Ukraine – it echoed in political positions at national and European levels. France introduced, in 2008, a constitutional provision that would allow the president to submit to a popular referendum any accession of a new country to the EU. In 2019, the same country blocked accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia and suggested a renewed approach to the accession process (which led to the Commission’s new methodology).

Reflecting this erosion, in his statement in the European Parliament plenary session ahead of the vote on the College of Commissioners newly-elected Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker put an official hold on the accession and stated that “there will be no new members during this Commission’s term of office: it is totally unfeasible” and stressed that the EU “must not let those waiting at the door think that it might open in the next five years” (Juncker, 2014). He qualified this negative since “enlargement negotiations will continue with the same vigour, the same drive, the same commitment as in the past”. In his 2017 State of the Union address, he  re-affirmed that “If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must also maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans” (Juncker, 2017). But the message that went through to the Balkan countries was that despite their efforts, accession would be a very long and distant goal.

Rule of law in the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans

Already then, Juncker had underlined that candidates should “give the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.” Concerns over the rule of law violations among member states who had joined after the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement, turned rule of law issues into one of the most central elements of the accession talks with the Western Balkans. Already in 2011, the EU identified strengthening the rule of law “as a continuing major challenge and a crucial condition for countries moving towards EU membership” (European Commission, 2011, 5). The issue has been given greater attention and the rule of law chapters – Chapter 23 on judicial reform and fundamental rights and Chapter 24 on freedom, security, and justice – were opened at an early stage in the negotiations both for Montenegro and for Serbia.

In the 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans, the Commission set an indicative date for the accession of Serbia and Montenegro which could “potentially be ready for membership in a 2025 perspective” (European Commission, 2018, 2).  In 2020, the European Commission adopted a revised methodology on accession negotiations. The aim is to enhance the accession process based on four principles: “credibility, predictability, dynamism and stronger political steer”. In practice the new methodology groups the accession chapters into six groups of issues (“clusters”), making negotiations more overarching and comprehensive and is supposed to act as an incentive on the side of the accession countries to accelerate their reforms and allow to move negotiations faster if they deliver faster (European Commission, 2020).

The policy of “fundamentals first” means that that political, economic, and institutional fundamentals are indivisible and mutually reinforcing. Thus, the Commission gives emphasis on the effective implementation of rule of law rather than mere legislative reforms and in mainstreaming rule of law. The revised accession methodology adopted in 2021 renders rule of law even more central in the accession negotiations, for example through the mainstreaming of anti-corruption measures. As the Commission text stipulates “negotiations on the fundamentals will be opened first and closed last and progress on these will determine the overall pace of negotiations” (European Commission, 2020, 3). In addition, these negotiations will include a “roadmap for the rule of law chapters equivalent to the previous action plans” which will be considered as “the opening benchmark”, as well as interim benchmarks. The conditionality is reinforced by the assertion that no other chapter will be provisionally closed before these benchmarks are met (European Commission, 2020).

The ongoing negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro were adapted to cater for the requirements of the new methodology although the content of the negotiations did not fundamentally change. The intergovernmental conference on the accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia which opened in July 2022 adopted fully the new methodology.

It is true that in the years after the 2004 accession, the content and the contours of rule of law have become clearer; relevant discussions are currently more evidence-based than in the past. Since the 2000s an increasing number of indices on rule of law, democracy, human rights, and good governance have been compiled and represent useful tools in assessing rule of law. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index[7], the Bertelsmann Transformation Index[8], the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators[9] and Freedom in the World[10], among others,allow to measure better and more accurately the level of rule of law achievements of countries and to assess the Commission’s own assessment of countries, allowing for better accountability.

One lesson of the previous enlargements was that rule of law reforms focused on legislative or even constitutional changes, usually with outside technical assistance, rather than in changing the state’s legal philosophy.  Thus, reforms remain often in paper only and lack effective implementation. This is often because they are adopted under EU pressure with little effective “reform ownership” from the part of the state. Thus, laws are either ignored or there is simply no capacity enforce them. For laws to be effective they must “be supported by a strong State that enforces laws across the whole of its territory—an assumption that is rarely justified” (Nicolaidis – Kleinfeld, 2012,18).

As a result, the emphasis in the negotiations with the Western Balkans was to establish an ongoing “rule of law dialogue with the countries of the Western Balkans […in order to…] strengthen preparations at earlier stages of the pre-accession process, based on in-depth analyses of the justice and home affairs sectors” (European Commission, 2011, 6)

In a wider context, adopting and adapting to the EU acquis has become one of the main problems in accession countries, because of the sheer size of the acquis and the proliferation of the required new legislation. As a result, legislation is often adopted by candidate countries indiscriminately by merely copying EU legislation which does not necessarily fit their specific needs and frequently requires subsequent legal adaptation. Paradoxically, this increases legal uncertainty among citizens and businesses as to the actual legal framework. This is true for economic reforms and for rule of law and one main contentious issue in the case with the Western Balkans.

The regular European Commission enlargement reports point out to substantive deficiencies in the Balkan states regarding rule of law. Despite the courageous efforts and the technocratic language of these reports, these deficiencies largely remain the same through these years: “an increasingly hostile environment for civil society, freedom of expression and freedom of the media, and attempts to exercise undue influence and political interference on the judiciary”, a “sound enforcement of anti-corruption frameworks” and the mainstreaming of corruption measures, “coherent and consistent efforts to contain and effectively address elements of state capture”  (European Commission, 2022A, 8). These statements are not particularly different from previous years. The Commission’s 2019 regular enlargement communication stressed the region’s “shortcomings” related to “a lack of political will, institutional resistance and an increasingly hostile environment for civil society”, “the existence of certain elements of state capture”, “instances of widespread corruption”, “the ineffectiveness of criminal procedures, giv[ing] strong signals of impunity, and contribut[ing] to the risk of criminal infiltration of the political and economic systems” (European Commission, 2019, 4). Issues such as the need for an independent and impartial judiciary, the reduction of ruling by decrees, timely delivery of justice and enforcement of judicial decisions are also often mentioned in EU reports regarding Western Balkans.

Despite some improvement in some of these areas, most of the shortcomings identified are always present in the Balkans and have marred negotiations. Of course, it is not only rule of law that is an obstacle to accession: neighborly disputes, inter-ethnic tensions and the unstable economy are all contributing to the difficult road of the Western Balkans towards the EU. The unfulfilled promises of EU accession weaken the attractiveness of reforms. On the Western Balkans, there is no discernable trace of the virtuous circle that allowed the adoption and permanence of reforms in rule of law and in the economy because of the accession perspective. In fact, what can be seen in the countries of the region is “democratic stagnation” (Bieber, 2019) or even “backsliding”, for instance in the case of Serbia. The accession paradigm does not seem to work in these countries’ case, either because the level of state capture is higher or because the accession perspective is perceived to be unreal or unrealistic. As Bechev puts it “the region does not generate sufficient levels of instability to disrupt or threaten the EU” and the latter prefers the, albeit imperfect, status quo to a bold move (Bechev, 2022).

But status quo does not seem to be a lasting one. The Balkans are increasingly attracted by populist rulers with an authoritarian streak, a practice that has led to the establishment of a new type of illiberal political system “that formally commits to EU integration […] but continues to govern through informal rules and clientelism” (Kmezić, 2020, 56).

Rule of law after the Russian invasion to Ukraine

The Russian war of aggression to Ukraine, besides its devastating effect on the country itself and international relations, changed considerably the EU – and the West’s – security priorities. Ukraine (together with Moldova and Georgia) applied for membership to the EU and the widespread support for the country’s resistance led to a speedy recognition of Ukraine’s (and Moldova’s) candidate status by the European Council of June 2022 which invited the European Commission “to report to the Council on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion on the membership application as part of its regular enlargement package” (European Council, 2022, point 12). The European Council emphasized that “The progress of each country towards the European Union will depend on its own merit in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, taking into consideration the EU’s capacity to absorb new members” (point 14). Rule of law was not specifically mentioned in what admittedly was a general, quite political, commitment – although immediately below in its conclusions regarding the Western Balkans, the Council reiterated the “the importance of reforms, notably in the area of rule of law and in particular those related to the independence and functioning of the judiciary and the fight against corruption” (point 17). The Commission’s opinion on Ukraine’s application although it concluded that “Ukraine is well advanced in reaching the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” and recommended that “Ukraine be granted candidate status” stated that this would be “on the understanding” that a number of steps would be taken. Almost all referred to rule of law issues, such as the implementation of legislation on the selection procedure for judges of the Constitutional Court, strengthening the fight against corruption, ensuring the implementation of anti-money laundering legislation, implementing the Anti-Oligarch law (European Commission, 2022B, 20).

The same June 2022 European Summit conclusions on the Western Balkans did not modify officially the EU’s stance on rule of law for the Balkan countries: the Council confirmed its “full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans” but referred to the revised methodology and the “importance of reforms, notably in the area of rule of Law” for the countries.

Ukraine has altered the EU’s (and Europeans’) view of the world. The conviction that Europe must be “geopolitical” was already a mantra for the Von Den Leien Commission but, the Russian aggression made clearer to European leaders and to Europeans that politics, rather than the economy and trade relations, should drive EU policy-making. A clear expression of this approach was the establishment of the European Political Community, an intergovernmental forum conceived to foster political dialogue and cooperation, to address issues of common interest and to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent.

 The crisis also made clear to Europeans that what Bieber (2018) called “stabilitocracy”, i.e. the European support to Balkan regimes that claimed to provide stability domestically and to espouse the European values while maintaining strong authoritarian trends and a dubious rule of law record was not viable in the long and even medium term: although tacit support for Russia, a traditional ally, was stronger in Serbia,  few politicians throughout the Balkans took a strong stance against the Russian aggression. The geopolitical developments became another puzzle for the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and for rule of law requirements, in particular. On the one hand, it became urgent to provide a viable path to accession that might deter the Russian and Chinese influence on the region. The unblocking of accession negotiations with North Macedonia was a tangible step towards the first direction. But a geopolitical emphasis also comes with discounts in other areas: to what extent should the EU tone down its rule of law requirements to address the security concerns over its southeast flank? The argument – an easy one to explain but much harder to implement – should be that the EU is stronger and therefore more attractive to candidates when it defends democratic values and rule of law within and outside its border. But this is not argument that would appeal to many leaders in Western Balkans and would seem ironic to many citizens of the region.

Conclusions

As rule of law becomes challenged within its borders, the EU tries to be more demanding from those states that request to join the EU. The Commission (2014, 1) underlined that “the rule of law is the backbone of any modern constitutional democracy” and “one of the main values upon which the Union is based”. This development renders rule of law prerequisites of paramount value for accession to the EU. In assessing observance of rule of law for Western Balkans countries, the EU tries to implement a multi-fold strategy which does not always sound coherent. It must mollify public unease over further enlargement, protect the EU from potentially illiberal or merely institutionally weak regimes trying to join the EU, provide a push for sustainability in institutional reforms and serve wider political objectives, in particular anchoring the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU enterprise. This strategy, up till now did not succeed.

Of course, rule of law requirements from candidate countries are not new: they equally applied to previous enlargements, too. But the outcome of those negotiations was not coherent. Although the EU had fleshed out specific conditions for democracy and rule of law, political considerations, especially at the time of the 2004 enlargement, took precedence. In the run-up to the accession, politics sidestepped substantive application of the democracy and rule of law criteria. During the 2004 negotiations, the EU put the rule of law threshold so low that, ultimately, the criterion was disregarded. To a large extent, “in the end the requirement to have the institutions guaranteeing democracy and rule of law in place was very similar to a formal condition applied in the previous enlargement rounds” (Kochenov, 2004). Political considerations prevailed even more during the 2007 and 2013 accession negotiations. The establishment of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was the proof that the Copenhagen requirements could be bent if sufficient political will was exercised upon the EU institutions.

The negotiations with the Western Balkan countries take place on these contradictory foundations. Enlargement fatigue and Euroscepticism means that rule of law is seen (and sometimes used) as a means to postpone (indefinitely) enlargement. This mentality defeats the purpose of the accession negotiations – to strengthen in a steadfast manner democratic resilience in these countries. Although the EU, in particular the European Commission, provide extensive analysis of the rule of law failings in these countries, the reluctance to enlargement is less linked to these specific failings but rather to a wider “enlargement fatigue” and to national considerations among member states. There is certainly a widespread apprehension over other “Hungaries” joining the EU but the opposition – and support – for accession is not linked to the progress or delay observed in each country regarding the Copenhagen criteria but to an, often prejudiced, view over these states.

Thus, Balkan countries and governments see the goalposts being moved during the game and become disillusioned. In fact, the erratic manner by which the EU applies the Copenhagen political criteria weakens domestic pressure in favour of necessary reforms. Reforms are perceived as a ritualized process rather than as a required change of the mentality of states and societies who realize that other paths, support from member states, successful diplomatic initiatives or even the international context, might be more useful for their accession efforts.

In fact, rule of law has deteriorated in almost all Western Balkans during recent years. Looking at the overall Rule of Law score over time of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index[11], in five out of the six states of the region there has been a deterioration of rule of law indicators with only Kosovo remaining stable. This does not bode well for the consolidation of rule of law before (or even after) EU accession.

As Kmezić (2020, 59) puts it “conditionality works well if membership criteria are clear, if the same criteria are applied to all applicants, if they are strictly but fairly monitored, if the findings are transparently communicated and if there is no doubt that the reward will come once conditions are met”. Evidence shows that this is not the case with the Western Balkans, increasing mutual mistrust.

The consequence of this is that Western Balkan countries turn to other alternatives which provide easy funding, do not ask many questions, and allow for the governing nomenklatura to continue ruling in a state capture context. Russia, but also Turkey and the Gulf states, and, increasingly, China provide various forms of financial and political support that compete and oppose the European approach. In the EU the anti-enlargement mood further complicates relevant discussions, and it is partly responsible for democratic backsliding in the Balkans, thus creating a vicious circle (Walldén, 2017).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine reminded the EU – and, more importantly some of its more reluctant member states – of the geopolitical value of the Western Balkans and the need to “anchor” the region more decisively in the EU, limiting the scope for third powers (such as Russia) to foment tensions in the region. The immediate outcome was the reinvigoration of accession talks with the return of a more dynamic European diplomacy towards the region. The unblocking of the accession path of North Macedonia and Albania was the most visible example of this change of mentality.

In the end, enlargement is eminently a political decision, both for the EU and for the candidate state. If the EU considers that there are superior interests at stake, economic, geopolitical or political, it may – and did – interpret widely the rule of law criterion in the hope that participation in the EU will enhance and solidify the fragile democratic institutions. It worked in most cases of the 2004 enlargement. It did not work fully in 2007. The case of the Western Balkans seems to lead towards the latter rather than the former scenario. But geopolitical considerations are impending, perhaps more urgently now than before. And the EU – and its member states – are more uncertain today than in the past as to where they want to head το.

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[1] Ioannis Papageorgiou  is Professor  School of Political Sciences Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

[2] It should be noted that the failed Treaty setting up a European Political Community of 1952 (which was drafted as a follow-up to the European Defence Community) stated in its preamble that member states were “determined to invite other European Peoples, inspired with the same ideal, to join with [them] in [their] endeavor” and in article 116(1) it provided that “accession to the Community shall be open to the Member States of the Council of Europe and to any other European State which guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms…”.

[3] According to point 1 of the resolution (in French) the EP « constate que l’accord d’association entre la Communauté européenne et la Grèce, qui prévoit l’adhésion ultérieure de ce pays à la Communauté, ne pourra être appliqué dans ses différentes phases que si les structures démocratiques et les libertés politique et syndicale sont rétablies en Grèce ».

[4] The first paragraph of article 49 TEU stipulates that “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union”.

[5] The only reference to rule of law in the Commission’s opinion on the accession of Sweden (31 July 1992) was the sentence “Sweden’s democratic traditions and human rights record are as valid as her important place in European history and culture”.

[6] The term, in this paper, comprises the six Balkan states which are not yet part of the EU: Albania, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. It is not, as the adjective denotes, include a geographical connotation; rather, it was coined by the EU to collectively qualify those countries in the Balkan peninsula which were not (yet) members of the European Union. As such, it is a political term: the group tends to shrink as countries will join the EU. For instance, Croatia, probably the westernmost Balkan country, ceased to be included in the group after its accession to the EU in 2013.

[7] https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022

[8] https://bti-project.org/en/?&cb=00000

[9] https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents

[10] https://freedomhouse.org/issues

[11] World Justice Project, rule of law rankings in  https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022

The post Rule of Law in the Context of the EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The post The Open Balkans: Tangled Up in Disbelief and Aspirations appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

An EU-Western Balkans summit will take place today in the picturesque estate of Brdo, hosted by the Slovenian Presidency of the EU. This is the fourth such summit, with the first one organised by the Greek Presidency in Thessaloniki in 2003. It was there that all countries of the region were promised an EU membership path and were told that their place is in the European Union.

That place has never seemed more insecure than now. To be sure, the process of achieving EU membership was always going to be hard, long and a moving target for the candidate countries. But the prospect was still within reach. That changed with the declaration of the former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 that there would be no further enlargement until 2019.

At the time, this sounded like an overly cautious assessment. Today, committing to the accession of any of the Western Balkans states by the end of the decade would cause deep division among member states. For Albania, 12 years after the submission of the country’s application for membership and almost two years after the EU Council’s decision to open accession negotiations in March 2020, no formal date for the start of negotiations has yet been given. The reasoning for this is linked to the grouping of Albania with North Macedonia, whose bilateral issue with neighbouring Bulgaria has blocked the way forward.

The problem is not only the length and unpredictability of the process. It is rather the fading of its substance. The process of EU integration has failed to capture and correct the backsliding of those countries misleadingly named as front-runners, while the negotiation process has become a bureaucratic exercise shrouded in the incomprehensible language of benchmarks. This has neither translated into progress nor wellbeing for the citizens of these states.

The hollowing of the substance of the accession process has come with a lowering of ambitions in relation to regional cooperation, too. Regional cooperation among the Western Balkan Six, as launched under the framework of the Berlin Process, has been built on four objectives: enhancing cooperation with the aim of fostering economic convergence; improving connectivity between the region and the EU; encouraging reforms related to the EU accession agenda, particularly those related to rule of law and anti-corruption; and finally, creating a conducive environment for solving bilateral issues and disputes.

Over the years, the process has come to be associated primarily with the implementation of the Common Regional Market, an objective agreed upon by the leaders of the region at the Sofia Summit last November. The political framework which linked regional cooperation to the EU accession process on the one hand, and solving bilateral issues on the other, has largely slipped to one side.

Today, at the EU-Western Balkans Summit, the EU member states have a chance to recover some of the leverage the EU has lost in the past few years in the region. There are at least four ways in which the EU and the Western Balkans can engage in more meaningful ways.

First, they must keep their promises. The accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia should open within a year. Kosovo must be granted visa liberalisation. Kosovars, a people of over two million, are now the only people in Europe prevented from entering the Schengen area without a visa, despite fulfilling all technical criteria since 2018. The process of accession negotiations will be long, tedious, and reversible, and the accession process may not look like any of the accession processes so far. But it will recover trust, the credibility of the EU, and still sustain the pressure – thin as it is – needed to implement a reform agenda. And it would certainly help to balance the role of Russia and China in the region.

Second, it is necessary to prepare for the long term. As accession negotiations continue, the EU will need to create and revamp its package of incentives for cooperation and help deliver on reforms for the Western Balkan Six. To be clear, the EU remains the main trade partner for the region. In the past two years, the EU has provided no less than 3.3. billion euros, together with the European Investment Bank, for tackling the Covid-19 health crisis and for helping the post-pandemic socio-economic recovery, out of which over 761 million euros have gone to support the recovery from the social and economic impact of the crisis. This investment must be secured and sustained through the preparation of the region to gradually integrate into the single market.

This might be done only gradually, within a plausible time frame and under conditions which do not burden the already weak post-pandemic economies of the region with extraordinary structural costs. This includes engagement with the private sector. Supporting companies from the region with the aim to integrate them into European supply and value chains might be one way. Helping small and medium enterprises to become more financially and technologically apt is another.

The full implementation of the Common Regional Market must go in tandem with the implementation of the EU Economic and Investment Package of 9 billion euros approved last year, which is dedicated primarily to the improvement of infrastructure, rail and road connectivity, and energy and digitalisation in the region. The focus must be on the frontloading of funding for the key infrastructure projects which connect the region to the rest of the EU, and on improving the competitiveness and investment climate in the region so that the package succeeds in mobilising up to 20 billion euros in investment within this decade.

Third, the region must be helped to ‘build back better’. This does not only mean in relation to infrastructure and the economy but also, critically, the human resources and human capital of the region. The Western Balkans has experienced a profound brain drain with much of the labour force migrating over the past few years. The EU must engage with the Western Balkans for the gradual integration of the region into the European Education Area and EU initiatives to foster research and innovation. It will need to create specifically tailored programmes for the strengthening of capacities in these policy areas for the region. Admittedly, the only way to approximate legislation in the areas above is through actual negotiations of the related chapters of the acquis.

Fourth, the EU must engage politically with the region. There is only so much that trade and economic relations can do. If there is no political framework through which the EU can engage with the Western Balkans, trade is unlikely to work miracles and bring disputing parties together. It would have cost little to the EU’s member states to include the Western Balkans in the consultation process for the Brdo Summit Declaration, but this would have signalled real political will to engage with and listen to the countries of the region.

In the area of bilateral disputes, political coordination with the United States remains critically important, given the specific features of state building in the region. In this respect, the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo must continue and it should be built on clear expectations and a roadmap, as well as real pressure from both partners on the parties to cooperate genuinely. This would include being bold enough to denounce any breaches and reinforce commitments.

The EU holds a degree of attraction not only because it is financially and economically useful, but because it has built its assistance to the region within a normative framework of values, norms and political identities. In other words, it has woven its financial mechanisms within a narrative of peace and security, of rule of law and good governance, and guaranteed rights and liberties. It is as much a mechanism for crafting meaning as it is for providing support.

But in the absence of this normative framework, money alone will never be enough to keep the Western Balkans at peace, democratically governed and secure. And if there is one region in the world where the EU can still rediscover its own meaning and confidence, it is the Western Balkans.

Odeta Barbullushi is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Albania. She received her doctorate in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham in 2010.

The post Without an enhanced engagement strategy, the EU risks losing relevance in the Western Balkans appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Acknowledgements: This project is co-financed by the Government of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.

This project No. 22020042 was made possible through Visegrad+ Grant from the International Visegrad Fund.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in this research paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of International Visegrad Fund.

Impressum

Title: The new EU accession methodology. Is it enough to pull the Western Balkans in?

Publisher: Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” – Skopje

Authors: Zoran Nechev, Dragan Tilev, Jovana Marović and Alba Çela

Design: Dejan Kuzmanovski

This publication is available at:

http://www.idscs.org.mk

Introduction 

In times when the European Union is struggling to grow stronger from the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, its efforts in the area of enlargement are seemingly put on hold. For some time already, the Council remains frozen in a situation where the negotiations with both North Macedonia and Albania cannot be started; whereas Montenegro and Serbia are neither moving ahead nor have received their guidelines yet on how they will be integrated in the new Methodology for accession negotiations, initially designed for newcomers in the negotiations.

In light of this, this policy brief will try to shed new light on the new Methodology and elaborate in detail how the negotiation process will look like under these new circumstances for those that wait to start the process and those that are already negotiating. Based on this, the brief seeks to locate the challenges that the Commission, the Council and negotiating countries will face under the new methodology and formulate recommendations how to sufficiently address them in order to return the transformative power of the negotiation process and to avoid complete politization (bilateralisation) of the accession negotiation process.   

1. How did North Macedonia and Albania get to this point?

After signing the Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations with Bulgaria (2017) and the Prespa Agreement with Greece (2018), the Council of the EU accepted to put the decision on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia on the agenda for the first time in 2018. After several additional postponements in 2018 and 2019, the decision to open accession negotiations was finally adopted in March 2020, after the methodology for negotiations had been changed. This decision was  confirmed by the European Council. Thereby, all member states (27) made it clear that they want to see North Macedonia as a future EU member state and are ready to set the accession requirements without any preconditions (i.e. to define a General EU Position and a Negotiating Framework).

When it comes to Albania, the decision to give a green light to the opening of accession negotiation was accompanied by a list of 15 preconditions^[1] to be fulfilled before the first intergovernmental conference. Albania has adopted an Action Plan^[2] to fulfill these preconditions and has since managed to fulfill some of them. Among those, the electoral reform package (to be tested in the April 25 elections), it managed to complete the composition of new justice system institutions, most importantly the Constitutional Court, the National Bureau of Investigation (BKH) and Special Prosecutors for Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK). The problematic draft for a new media law has been returned for revisions by the Venice Commission and its adoption is still pending. The European Commission has evaluated the overall progress made on the preconditions sufficient for opening of the negotiations.

The general elections of 25^th of April are the stress test that has been mentioned several times by key high-level politicians from EU member states as well as Commission officials. Free and fair elections which will accepted by all sides on the political spectrum are necessary to move forward on the European agenda.

• New Methodology, new opportunities and new challenges

On February 5th 2020, based on Non-paper suggested by France, the European Commission launched a Communication with a proposal for “Enhancing the accession process – a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans”, endorsed by the Council on 25^th of March 2020,with the aim to drive forward the EU accession process, by making it more credible, more dynamic and predictable. The new methodology aims to balance a political vision with strict administrative requirements of the accession negotiations process. This changed approach intends to make the process of enlargement possible and realistic. As stated in the Communication, enlargement “remains more than ever a geopolitical investment into stable, strong and united Europe”.

Despite the fact that many of the elements and the wording of the proposed methodology sound the same as before, careful analyses bring us to the conclusion that changes are deep and that novelties are substantial. The proposed methodology can be seen as a new political framework for a technical “accession driven” gradual process, fully respecting merit-based principles.

Four key points characterize the proposed new Methodology: political commitment, dynamism, capacities, and reversibility.

The first of the key points, clear political commitment, is at the epicenter of the proposed methodology that should make the process of accession more credible, more accountable, more predictable, and more concrete. During the last decade, it has been noticed quite often that political statements and promises do not correspond with their implementation. This goes equally for the EU as for the accession countries. The new methodology seems to address this weakness through a proposed closer enhanced political steer. The main logic behind this is that once politicians agree on concrete roadmaps and action plans (rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, and stronger links with the Economic reform programme), they first have to give clear public political statements/orientations, and then will have to keep promises and to deliver expected reforms through professional and depoliticized administration in democratic and all-inclusive procedures, all the way during the negotiations.

Dynamism is the second key element that this methodology is bringing forward, as a potential for accelerated accession negotiations. The main novelty here is a grouping of all 33 acquis chapters into six clusters, offering a chance to accelerate the process, for example, with the opening of up to 9 chapters at once. Preconditions for this to happen are good preparation, strategic organization when planning the process, putting the right priorities in good order and making available all necessary resources to be able to implement expected obligations. Benchmarks, as introduced in 2005 and enhanced in 2011, remain, but now with opening benchmarks per cluster, plus interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and (24 Justice, Freedom, and Security) as a precondition for any advancement in all other clusters. In the end, closing benchmarks will be set for all chapters. “Fundamentals” (chapters 23, 24, 5, 18 and 32, as well as Economic criteria, functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform) is the most complex and certainly the most difficult cluster to negotiate. This cluster should lay down mutual trust and ensure a credible negotiation process. It will be the first cluster to be opened at the star and will remain open until the very end of the accession process.

Capacity is the third key point of the new methodologycan be considered as essential for successful negotiations and timely reforms. This more complex and more demanding process has to be matched with appropriate institutional capacities on both sides. If there is a political will on both sides, then the dynamism of the process will depend on the capacities and resources available, also on both sides. No one wants to end with a good document and strong will, but without sufficient capacity to implement.

The fourth key element in the new methodology is reversibility, or positive and negative conditionality. Countries that are progressing with their reforms and advancing in accession negotiations (closer integration and increased funds) will be awarded. On the other hand, they will be be sanctioned if stagnating, dragging behind, slowing down or even backsliding. Complying with the required criteria, and full harmonization with the acquis is a serious challenge. In principle, there is no objection to the positive and negative conditionality, but what raises serious concerns is the newly introduced decision-making model for initiating corrective measures, which is quite different from the one applied so far for Montenegro and Serbia, in which case, proposal can be placed by the Commission or 1/3 of the member states and must be adopted by the Council with Qualified Majority Voting-QMV. According to the new methodology, in the case of North Macedonia and Albania, proposals can be placed by the Commission or a single member state and adopted in simplified procedures, through the reverse QMV. In the case of North Macedonia, and to some extent to Albania, this mechanism can put the country under substantial pressure on very sensitive national issues, not necessarily connected with the acquis, including possible differences in interpretation of some aspects of our bilateral agreements.

• Negotiation Frameworks for North Macedonia and Albania. What we know?  

Together with the Decision of the Council of the EU to open accession negotiations (March 2020), the European Commission received the mandate to prepare the General EU Position, including the Negotiating Framework on the conditions under which the European Union will accept North Macedonia as its member state (the same procedure is under way for Albania as well). The European Commission has prepared draft General EU Position (GEUP) and Negotiation Framework (NF), and handed over to the German Presidency of the Council (COREPER and COELA) at the beginning of July 2020, with the aim to be adopted by the General Affairs Council (GAC), as well as confirmed by the European Council until end of 2020.

The negotiating framework is considered to be the most important document in which EU member states determine their main negotiation positions, obliging the European Commission as the institution leading the technical negotiations on behalf of the member states, to adhere to them, with the obligation to regularly provide feedback and to inform member states on the course and results of the negotiations. The NF defines the scope and structure and key requirements to be accepted and procedures and structures of negotiations.

Taking into consideration the complexity and specificity of the NF for North Macedonia (applying the new rules in line with the new revised Methodology) and the announced demands by Bulgaria (and by Greece in line with Prespa Agreement), the draft text, as expected, caused serious inconclusive discussions within COELA and COREPER, in the period between July to December. Due to unreasonable requirements by Bulgaria, the text of the draft NF could not be agreed upon, it did not reach the GAC and is still under consideration of the Council bodies and its Presidency. Therefore, the text of these documents is still not public.

The NF for Albania is also unknown for the time being, however, from what we know the resolution of the ongoing unresolved maritime issue with Greece through the International Court of Justice in the Hague will find its way into the document.^[3]

Furthermore, the GEUP prepared by the Commission and refined by the COELA and COREPER Council bodies, to be presented on the (First) Ministerial meeting opening the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of the Republic of North Macedonia to the European Union, will supposedly consist of:

• EU Opening Statement for Accession Negotiations, setting the legal frame and political stage and tone of the negotiations within the intergovernmental conference, that will remain open until the end of negotiations, finalized with initialing of the text of Accession Treaty by all sides allowing to North Macedonia becoming a full-fledged member of the European Union in line with Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, Copenhagen criteria, including regional cooperation and good neighborly relations, 

• Negotiation Framework, defines the 1) principles governing the negotiations, through the enhanced enlargement methodology with the pace based on our own merits and on the other side, depending on the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, and full respect of all required criteria, including political and economic, as well as harmonized legislation and ability to take on the obligations of membership; 2) frames substance of the negotiations, namely adoption and translation in Macedonian language all the acquis and ability to implement it correctly. Derogations are almost impossible, but transitional measures, if well elaborated can be negotiated. As for our participation into EMU and Schengen area, separate procedures will apply, after entry into the EU; 3) sets clear negotiating procedures, starting with formal process of screening, opening negotiations by clusters (6 clusters), starting from the Fundamentals, using opening benchmarks, interim benchmarks for rule of law chapters (23 and 24) and closing benchmarks per chapter (33 chapters). All decisions on opening and closing of clusters and chapters will be taken by unanimity; 4) sets procedure and organization (technical) details for smooth negotiation process, and 5) defines the grouping of the chapters and contents of the clusters.

• Application of the new Enlargement Methodology to Montenegro and Serbia: Much Ado About Nothing?

Montenegro is currently trying to meet 83 interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 (45 for Chapter 23 and 38 for Chapter 24), while Serbia has a total of 98 for these two chapters (48 for Chapter 23 and 50 for Chapter 24).[4] In order to meet these interim benchmarks, both Serbia and Montenegro have prepared action plans approved by the European Commission. The Commission also has the balance clause at its disposal which allows to block a country from opening new negotiating chapters until satisfactory progress on reforms under chapters 23 and 24 has been achieved. Negotiations so far have shown that regardless of the logic of the approach and the corresponding principles, success in these countries in implementing reforms and strengthening the rule of law is limited.It thus requires concretization of instruments and a more committed approach and effective monitoring. Is this possible to achieve with the new methodology? What do we know so far about its application to Montenegro and Serbia?[5] Although Montenegro and Serbia accepted a new methodology in May[6] and July 2020,[7] respectively (though in the case of Serbia it was done informally by the announcement of the President), the European Commission came only out in March 2021 with certain announcements on how the methodology could be adapted to these two countries already negotiating membership, while the presentation of a non-paper on the application of the new methodology is not expected before June. Such a delay, especially in the case of Montenegro, which has opened all chapters and thus gained the opportunity to open all six clusters at once (while Serbia has opened a total of 18 chapters so far), is not justified, and may be an indicator of the lack of adequate strategy within the European Commission in relation to the application of methodology. Having in mind what we know so far about the guidelines for the application of the revised enlargement methodology to Montenegro and Serbia the negotiating framework will not change significantly while the most important remarks are as follows:

The focus remains on the interim benchmarks as key instruments for improving the rule of law: These benchmarks were defined at the very beginning of the negotiations; they are not specific (concrete) enough to help the negotiating country to better respond to the demands.

The (same) action plans are still central elements for meeting the interim benchmarks: Once adopted and prepared, these action plans have been comprehensive, but in the meantime have become outdated and cannot help countries meet the interim benchmarks without adapting or rethinking indicators and new activities.

No other chapter will be closed until the interim benchmarks are met: Seen as a particularly important instrument and rule in disciplining and motivating a candidate country,[8]  it is not really a novelty since there has so far been the possibility of activating the balance clause while the chapter could not be closed permanently (only temporary) until Chapters 23 and 24 are closed.

Corrective measures will be taken only if there is a problem in meeting the interim benchmarks: Problems in meeting the interim benchmarks already exist, hence a different approach and more precise instruments are required.

Existing chapters will be grouped into six clusters: For Montenegro, this is no longer relevant since the country opened the last negotiating chapter in June 2020. Serbia  has opened a total of 18 negotiating chapters so far, and the other chapters are in different clusters. This potentially means that the procedure for meeting the opening benchmarks will only apply to individual parts of the cluster, when the time comes, and about which, as before, the EU member states will have the final say based on results in the rule of law.

Regular political international conferences between the EU member states and the candidate countries at least once a year: This novelty is good for sending strong political messages and committing candidate countries, but without overcoming the political decision-making in the Union that now takes precedence over merit-based will not have a special role in the process.

Incentives still unknown: Although the new methodology introduced in February last year predicted that candidate countries would be rewarded in line with the results achieved, it is still unclear what this will look like in practice, which is particularly problematic given that insisting on sanctions alone may not be particularly encouraging for the reforms.

• Comparison between SRB/MNE and ALB/MKD

It has to be noted that the EU enlargement policy and accession negotiations process with it, has evolved substantially since its beginnings. The goal remains the same, full flagged EU membership, the paths toward that goal, means, and dynamism are constantly changing however. Over time, the changing political environment within the EU is causes substantially strengthened and stricter rules and criteria. Since the “big bang” expansion of the EU (10 plus in 2004), every new enlargement was followed with more rigid criteria and stricter rules, like at the time of accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2007), Croatia (2013), and further on with opening of the negotiations for Montenegro (2012) and Serbia (2014). Inefficiency of the last two has provoked first France, and then the EU as a whole, to change yet again the accession negotiation process and to introduce new unique rules.

The intention was to make the process more political, more dynamic and more just for all, based on countries individual merits, but at the same time creating an equal playing field for all the countries from the Western Balkans region. In order to achieve this goal, initially the Commission, and consequently the Council bodies and MS’s representatives (COELA and COREPER), are trying to transpose in practice all elements from the New Methodology into the Draft Negotiation Frameworks designed for North Macedonia and Albania, as well as Document on the application of the revised Enlargement Methodology to the accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia.

The position, so far, of most of the EU member states is that the new generation of negotiation Frameworks with all elements from the new methodology will apply to North Macedonia and Albania (latter to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), while at the same time negotiation frameworks for Montenegro and Serbia will remain as they are (in legal terms), but these two countries will have to accept the new Methodology and to comply with it, as described in that additional explanatory document, except in the cases when it does not contradict with their negotiation frameworks.

If this position of the Council sustains, the principle of “equal playing field” is seriously in question, since different set of rules will apply to different groups of countries (MN and SR against MK and AL), which at the end instead bringing the region closer together, will cause further divisions and potential bitterness. Further on, differences in the scope and procedure of proposing corrective measures can have strong negative unpredictable impact on the process as a whole.

• Conclusion

The proposed new Methodology is more complex, more political and demanding (lessons learned) than any other before, but if both sides are persuaded and dedicated, it offers a chance to lay down a credible, dynamic and sustainable political process.

There are many unknowns in how the process will look like under the new methodology, however, the main one will be how the increased politicization will impact the accession negotiations of both North Macedonia and Albania. We still need to see how the countries already negotiating will be integrated in the new methodology. And finally, there is a need for better elaboration of the differences among negotiation frameworks and potential consequences caused by different decision-making procedures when initiating corrective measures, for the two groups of countries (those waiting to start negotiations and those already negotiating). The risks to create further gaps are substantial. Success of the new methodology may depend on correct understanding of the consequences.

Information about the International Visegrad Fund –

The Visegrad Fund is an international donor organization, established in 2000 by the governments of the Visegrad Group countries—Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia

to promote regional cooperation in the Visegrad region (V4) as well as between the V4 region and other countries, especially in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership regions. The Fund does so by awarding €8 million through grants, scholarships and artist residencies provided annually by equal contributions of all the V4 countries. Other donor countries (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States) have provided another €10 million through various grant schemes run by the Fund since 2012.

Address:

Hviezdoslavovo námestie

9 811 02 Bratislava Slovakia

[1] “The Opening of Accession Negotiations: A New Hope for Albania”, TOBIAS RUETTERSHOF, Tirana Observatory https://tiranaobservatory.com/2020/05/08/the-opening-of-accession-negotiations-a-new-hope-for-albania/

[2] The Action Plan makes the distinction between the measures that should be fulfilled prior to the first and second intergovernmental conference however interestingly uses the term “priority” instead of condition or precondition.” Action Plan to fulfill priorities set by the European Council , 21.09.2020 (PLANI I MASAVE PËR PËRMBUSHJEN E PËRPARËSIVE TË PËRCAKTUARA NGA KËSHILLI I BASHKIMIT EVROPIAN) https://www.parlament.al/Files/Integrimi/plani%20i%20veprimit%20FINAL.pdf

[2] IMO definition: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/20144/most-frequently-asked-questions-international-monitoring-operation_en

[3] “Albania and Greece seek joint maritime border resolution from The Hague”,

[4] Jovana Marović, Tena Prelec, Marko Kmezić „Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: Call for a Revolution against Particularism“, BiEPAG, January 2019, http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Strengthening-the-Rule-of-Law.pdf

[5] “EU’ s Várhelyi warns Serbia & Montenegro about rule of law in closing chapters“, N1, 17 March 2021, https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/eu-s-varhelyi-warns-serbia-montenegro-about-rule-of-law-in-closing-chapters/

[6] „Montenegro accepts new methodology, good platform for intensifying reforms”, the Government of Montenegro, 15 May 2021, https://www.gov.me/en/News/224514/Montenegro-accepts-new-methodology-good-platform-for-intensifying-reforms.html

[7] “Serbia accepts new methodology in EU accession talks – President Vucic”, SeeNews, 10 July 2020, https://seenews.com/news/serbia-accepts-new-methodology-in-eu-accession-talks-president-vucic-705971

[8] Aleksandar Ivković “Application of the new methodology to Montenegro and Serbia: Principles remain the same, more emphasis on interim benchmarks”, European Western Balkans, 24 March 2021, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/03/24/application-of-the-new-methodology-to-montenegro-and-serbia-principles-remain-the-same-more-ephasis-on-interim-benchmarks/

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The report on Albania showed once again “moderate progress” in most fields and despite giving the positive recommendation for holding the first intergovernmental conference, it failed to account for most of the recent dramatic events in Albanian politics.

The report acknowledged the polarization of the country to the extreme yet somehow fails to recognize that the consensus reached by the Political Council, under such extreme international meddling on June 5th, was all but blown apart this week with the unilateral change in the electoral rules. The report says that there is no progress in the issue of free speech and fundamental liberties without specifically criticizing the de-facto regress: that of the stubbornness of the majority to let go of the controversial media law draft. This censorship-inducing draconian new media regulatory framework was deemed inappropriate by the Venice Commission and returned for revision. To drive the dagger right through the heart of this Progress Report’s relevance, Prime Minister Rama in a news conference, on the same day of the report issue, reiterated his determination to push through with the very same law.

Other events which witness the increasing authoritarianism such as the demolition of the National Theater during the worst months of the pandemics quarantine and the ensuing political force exerted on the protesters, are washed away from the text altogether.

Faced with such blunt unawareness or indifference (or both) for the country’s developments on the ground, citizens might be justified to feel gaslighted by the reports attitude and overall tone.

This lack of connection is at best far-sighted and at worst outright involuntary gaslighting. And Albania seems to be not the only example. Similar criticism was made by EMPs themselves during the relevant discussion for the failure to mention Serbia’s deteriorating political climate or Turkey’s human rights calamity.

It does not serve even the mediocre objective of preserving stability often commented as the key goal of the Union vis-à-vis the region, let alone aid the democratic consolidating of our countries.

Gaslighting is a form of psychological manipulation in which a person or a group covertly sows seeds of doubt in a targeted individual or group, making them question their own memory, perception, or judgment, often evoking in them cognitive dissonance.

The post Gas-lighting by mistake: the EU progress report fails to account for reality appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Enlargement in pandemic times

The COVID-19 pandemic crisis is likely to accelerate geopolitical changes at all levels, and the EU enlargement is going on. On March 25, the Council of the European Union gave the green light to the opening of the access negotiations for Albania after four consecutive refusals. The decision was taken by the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs at a meeting by videoconference. Although long-awaited, the decision was a surprise in the midst of a serious global pandemic crisis, while its management is calling into question the raison d’être of the European project for its citizens, and exposing its essential weakness on forging solidarity and coordinating a common action among member states.

In view of the past, this enlargement is not business as usual. European officials in a hurry explained that the decision was strategic, a “loud and clear message not only to the two countries, but to the Western Balkans as a whole,” confirming the geostrategic “importance of the Western Balkans” and “the European Union’s geostrategic interest” (European Commission 2020, 25 March).[1] Yet, the decision is only the first step in re-engaging in the region more actively. This sounds as an old cliché. In fact, since early 2016, with the acceleration of the refugee crisis, and pronounced ‘fatigue’ of EU-enlargement, a window of opportunity has been opened to China, Russia and Turkey in the Western Balkans to advance their interests, making evident a ‘return’ of great power politics in the Balkans.[2] The geopolitical importance of the Western Balkans Six was recognized explicitly by the EU recent strategy of the European Commission[3], which feared that the Balkans can easily “become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played”.[4]

Despite the concern, EU has failed to provide a comprehensive common strategy towards the region, which is most uncomfortably felt in the frequent definition/redefinition of the region from Balkans in the broad sense, to “de-balkanize” the South-East Europe, and then to Western Balkans which designates all the countries currently awaiting accession to the EU in the region, to the last label Western Balkans Six representing the countries left outside the Union. All regional names coexisting without having any real ascendancy in different EU documents and discourses.[5] Ironically, they hide different political projects that in the past different Member States gatekeepers have labelled to mark their intentions and interests[6]^,[7]. The Confusion about the definition of the region, reveals both EU’s interest in the region and its ambiguity on how to pursue it. The conflict of interests between EU member states has turned around enlargement or containment, involving contentious and incompatible positions[8]. In this sense, the last enlargement decision is a long overdue step, which offers no surprises.

In view of the present, the COVID-19 crisis and its handling, more than anything else, is highlighting and reinforcing the basic features of new geopolitics in all levels, Western Balkans are no exception. The new rising powers are inserting themselves in the region in place of the EU by assisting distressed national governments with much needed humanitarian aid. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was the first to prize China’s aid while disparaging the European approach on the same remark. For him: “European solidarity does not exist… that was a fairy tale on paper. The only country that can help us in this hard situation is the People’s Republic of China. To the rest of them, thanks for nothing.”[9]. At the same time, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, declared that Albania’s plan C “if the world is upside down” is Turkey, which is committed to meeting the critical health needs of the country[10]. Next in the line of thanksgivings was President of Montenegro Milo Đukanović, showing gratitude to the President of Turkey, Erdogan for the health aid[11]. Russia, too, looks set to help the Balkan states. Like China and Turkey it is stepping in to replace the faltering EU, flying in among other aids doctors and equipment to Serbia by 11 military planes.[12]

In the view of the future, EU enlargement to which European leaders tether their hopes for preserving the existing balance of interests in the region, is undermined by the fact that politics nowadays is exposed to a severe anarchy of the global order. From a realist point of view, this is a period in which the uncertain workings of the multipolar balancing process may bring important geopolitical shifts in world leadership and distribution of the zones of influences. The situation looks even more complex and brews with instability, considering that the reconfiguration of power is in the making and the redistribution of power may have a bearing upon states’ choices of allies. In these circumstances, EU is ambiguous about moving towards a deep mode of integration and developing mechanisms to anticipate and alleviate negative consequences of geopolitical developments. It is not the first time that the politics of enlargement, old and new, find EU squeezed in a twisted dilemma of either opening negotiation before standards or standards before negotiations. Keeping standards first would mean christening countries fatigue, haunted by the Copenhagen criteria, add-ons, Europeanization and ambiguity in the definition and redefinition of a region which have variated since the 1990s according to pragmatic political criteria and recently by the COVID-19 crisis. Favoring negotiations seems to be a precondition to keep WB6 from turning their backs on Europe and moving towards authoritarian powers that do not currently uphold EU values. Until now, both sides seem falling for the prisoner’s dilemma, the notorious paradox in game theory in which two parties act out of individual self-interests and both lose out in the process.

The rise of the others[13] is real and EU knew

At least since 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, in Europe the order of things has changed with the return of Russian rivalry and competition to Europe. With the immigrant crisis accelerating the same year, Turkey also took the opportunity to gain leverage over the EU because it holds some of the keys to managing the refugee flows. The pressure becomes more relevant particularly in areas where interests and influence overlap. One such area is the Western Balkans, where historically Russia and Turkey are longtime actors with their own interests and agendas, that have been reasserting their interests in the region for some time. Unlike Russia and Turkey, China’s plans for the region are more ambitious. China is claiming a global leadership role by increasing investment in the types of assets that established EU as a normative power and set US leadership and authority for the second part of the last century, like foreign aid, humanitarian interventions, contributing to UN peacekeeping forces, and joining international initiatives to address global problems such as terrorism, piracy, nuclear proliferation[14] and recently COVID-19 crisis. In the framework of integrating the 16+1 initiative into the platform of the Belt and Road Initiative, China is working full steam on institutionalizing cooperation with each of the Balkan countries. The other issue raising concerns is the question of whether Russian, Turkish and Chinese activities in the region will lead them to buy influence at the political level, which may challenge seriously the EU investment and maybe its cohesion. In fact, the other powers have been quietly gaining ground for years in the WB6. More details will be provided later taking the case of Albania.

To simplify a complicated story, it helps to recall what was stated only two years ago by one of the leaders of the WB6 countries. In December 2017, during a conference organized by Friends of Europe, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama states in his quality of Albania’s gatekeeper: “Russia and China have many things to offer. Russia can give you power energy for the rest of your life if you give up the rule of law. It is not quite uninteresting… China has the luxury to plan for the next 100 years. I would not say they have nothing to offer. And then there is also radical Islam. In our region, we are multiethnic, multi-religious. If the EU will not run to catch us, believe me, many multi-problems can restart and then it will be much more costly to marry with us later”[15]. One can sense that political doubletalk is deliberate. The speech is not so much intended to deceive as to use the created geopolitical leverage to haste decisions that would favor his political pledge to get EU accession for Albania. EU is in a certain hazel coming from a believed return of the Cold War in the Balkans, while Rama hopes to succeed by tapping into it[16]. This speech can be highly challenging, especially when the Russians, Chinese and Turks in search of zones of influence are investing in the Western Balkans and using Coronavirus diplomacy for either geopolitical gain or commercial profit. Rama got into EU insecurities and he sounded credible in the promise that the country will comply with EU requirement, and the pledge was won despite the odds two years later. When one presents a situation as an opportunity, not a problem, and pledges to tell it as it is, it fits a double function, wobble the situation and control it by every action available. We may observe an effort to turn geopolitical challenges into political benefits. Everything looked like standard staging, with a leader in distress and a low moan of despair. Yet, Rama seems to be savvy on the situation.

Soon after this speech, the efforts to introduce a hasty strategy for the WB6 to mild out Russia, China, and Turkey’s influences into the WB6, did gain ground[17]. The geopolitical breeze was already blowing in favor of those who wanted the opening of the negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. The novel coronavirus has turned it into a hurricane. Grumbles about restrained enlargement policy beloved by the skeptics have been growing since. “Flexibility” has been the preferred euphemism for a concerted effort to water down the previous cautious attitude. The geostrategic importance of the region in combination with the need to support pro-European leaders has however weakened the strength of political conditionality and it has an explanation. During the last immigration crisis, the threat of uncontrolled flows coming from the East made EU highly dependent on the cooperation with Western Balkan on issues of security and control of boarders, and consequently security overshadowed other concerns such as corruption, rule of law or freedom of media in the countries of the region. The situation as it is observed and reported in the last strategic document of the European Commission[18] reveals a democratic backslide and stagnation in the Western Balkans Six countries. Albania is not mentioned explicitly but is part of the WB6. Now the gravity of the COVID-19 crisis offers a nihilistic twist to previous positions of enlargement skeptics like France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Sometimes a crisis is so harsh that previous behavior becomes irrelevant and the judgment blurs.

The approval of the opening of the accession talks with Albania this March, was welcomed yet it did not yield any particular enthusiasm in the country despite the government’s efforts to claim victory. The effort quickly was eclipsed by the Coronavirus crisis, distracted responses of the EU on the matter and the fact that the adopted Council decision placed further preconditions on Albania, notably related to electoral reform, the rule of law, and fighting corruption. However, even before that, EU enlargement fatigue has left the place to the weariness of patience of the public. In Albania, which is considered the most Europe-loving country in the continent, the support to European integration has slowly but steadily decreased. Based on longitudinal data of annual surveys by the Albanian Institute of International Studies (AIIS) since 2006, the support of Albanian public to EU integration has been almost unanimous, reaching in 2008 up to 95%. [19]After 2010, the support fluctuated between 85% and nearly 77% before the candidate status was granted in June 2014.[20]

In the case of Albania, the risk of switching preferences is high as economic linkages with the EU remain below the potential, which creates high political costs to pro-European elites in Albania. In 2016, the enterprises from the EU countries covered approximately 2.5 % of total active enterprises in the country. Focused mainly on the service sector rather than high value-added manufacturing industry or agriculture (809 enterprises from the total of 3944 enterprises) and the majority (3024) being small in size, employing only 1 to 4 people[21], their input on FDI hardly addressed the country’s economic structural problems and lack of connectivity with the region and Europe. Even trade between EU and Albania, is still below the potential, with Albania representing only 0.1 percent of its total trade. As the costs of reforms are upfront, the low expectation about the likelihood of full EU membership may influence an applicant’s calculation of gains in different directions. A delay of the EU membership is slowing the reform process or even undo certain reforms[22] and driving illegal Albanian immigration into Europe, which in Albanian social networks is named as a “free movement of people from below”. In other words, the government is more willing to bear the political costs of regulatory reforms if the EU credibly commits itself to enlargement. If this commitment turns out to be wavering, it may turn elsewhere for help.

Albanian EU membership perspective seems to have encouraged China to start working full steam on institutionalizing cooperation in the framework of 17+1 initiative, which is now integrated into its platform of Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese capital and infrastructure projects represent a tempting market proposition for Albania and a potential platform for China to leverage its growing economic and political influence in Europe[23]. In the last years, China has become the second Albanian trading partner with 7.1 percent of the total trade, leaving behind old-time partners like Greece and Turkey, though well behind the EU trade (67.5 %).[24] Still, the trend is very striking, as no one could account for Albanian export growth to China of over 6000 percent[25] [26]. China’s ambition to control Albanian strategic sectors and extractive industries, such as petroleum and chromium, road, air, and sea infrastructures, as well as agriculture, seems growing in pace. Only in 2016 China has invested into at least five main projects. In March 2016, China’s Geo-Jade Petroleum bought for a price of 384.6 million euros Canadian Bankers Petroleum oil exploration and production rights. An important deal that accounted for nearly 5 percent of Albanian nominal GDP[27]. On April 2016, China Everbright and Friedmann Pacific Asset Management took hold of Tirana International Airport. The investment is promising as Tirana airport is one of the fastest-growing in Europe, with annual passenger rates rising from 600,000 in 2005 to two million in 2015.[28]

China’s leverage seems to be a charming “soft power” offensive, mostly based on economic, infrastructure and trade penetration leading to dependency linkages. The so-called “Chinese wisdom” or “Chinese approach” comes as an alternative to Western democracy, “a new option for other countries” to solve their development problems[29]. Chinese approach does not engage in the domestic affairs of the country and gives little consideration to the nature of the regime and government. It favors economic and trade interests while showing political pragmatism. China pursues investments and is often able to come in as an investment alternative in a country in desperate need of foreign capital for its modernization.

After so many years of EU prompted reforms, Albania is still many years behind its neighbors. In 2016, Albania’s GDP per capita (at purchasing power standards) is at 13 percent of the EU-28 average[30]. Moreover, after late 2008, due to the global financial crisis Albania has also experienced a strong reduction of FDI and other capital inflows[31]. In these conditions, Chinese investments promise development, while the EU adjustment funds for development and structural and economic change would come only if Albania becomes full EU member. Ironically, Albania cannot be member without having transformed its economy. In this respect, China’s investments are both an opportunity and a challenge. Being state-backed or state-owned, most of Chinese companies adopt streamlined procurement procedures that facilitate their penetration in the Albanian market and the money they bring is tempting and potentially promising. Yet, the infrastructure projects and lending agreements burden the government with large debt obligations. Despite promises and perspectives, it remains to be seen if these investments will bring serious technological development and not just adjustment to increase profits, or an increase in environmental pollution and no increase in employment as most Chinese companies import their own labor from China and serve as proxies for the Chinese government.[32]

For Russia “in addition to economic opportunities, Albania has a significant political potential in the area. Albania has the fourth largest population in the Balkans, which tends to increase. The ‘Albanian factor’ has to be reckoned with. All this, along with nostalgic memories of the former strong friendship and the development of economic relations could yield good results, given a thoughtful approach to modern Albania”[33]. However, Albania has been strongly geared to the West, which does not encourage the development of strong linkages to Russia. The share of Russia in Albanian total trade is about 1.1 percent[34]. The EU-type economic sanctions that Albania imposed on Russia and counter-measures prohibiting imports of Albanian agricultural products to Russia, explains partly the low level of trade exchanges. Nevertheless, Russia has waged a robust campaign to increase its influence in Albania as elsewhere, which includes using cyberspace, funding, and disinformation to influence political parties and voting constituencies. The idea is that Moscow is trying to sow confusion and distrust and help advance its interests in the country without having to resort to conflict.[35] Sputnik based in Serbia since 2014, now with an opening section in Tirana, provides pretty much all defense and security news to mainstream media.[36] However, some of Russia’s growing sway is unseen by the public and difficult to be witnessed.

For the first time, in the Albanian media it is insinuated that Russia could have influenced last parliamentary elections of 2017. According to the investigative magazine Mother Jones, the hired an offshore company by the Democratic Party was supposedly controlled by Russians.[37] The assumption is that a victory of the DP would have blocked the judicial reform, thus inevitably chilling Albanian relations to the EU, which ultimately would have helped Russian plans to destabilize the entire region. Much of the story did not make sense for many Albanians and was considered a piece of fake news. Yet it has become clear that Russia will venture to seize every opportunity to pursue its grand design of rewriting the Balkan order in Russian characters.

In the 2010s, the rapid economic growth enabled Turkey to strengthen its linkages with Albania, which are now more ambitious and assertive. Ankara has been always a balancing actor in the Balkans preventing the creation of a Serb-Orthodox axis that may block Turkey’s way to Europe placing Russia back in an advantageous position and jeopardizing Albanian security interests. These calculations pushed Turkey to recognize the independence of Kosovo, even though risky parallels could be drawn with the Kurdish question[38]. Turkish security leverage on the Albanian security field is tangled recently as Turkey is aligning with Russia on different foreign policy, security and economic issues, while Albania is looking to advance with EU membership and is following EU and NATO policies regarding Russia.

Turkey is the third commercial partner of Albania[39] and an important source of foreign direct investments from several public and private enterprises in strategic sectors such as communication, infrastructure, and banking. In 2007, Albania received 42.2 percent of overall outward FDI from Turkey through the partial privatization of public assets. At the end of 2017, Turkish total direct investments in Albania reached 2.7 billion euros[40]. Nevertheless, Turkish FDI outflows are still insignificant compared to the investments from EU28 and individual member states[41]. Turkey is the sixth partner in terms of investments. Although the number of Turkish enterprises is increasing, they still represent 7.7 percent of total foreign and joint enterprises in Albania compared to 71.4% for the EU.[42] The volume of total trade reaching 423 million euros, which represent only 5.9 percent of all Albanian trade, leaving Turkey behind the EU28 (66.2%) and China (6.5%).[43]

Turkey proposes an alternative development model to Albania. The Ottoman Empire model of millet coexistence is proposed as a “complementary” rather than “competitive” to the European Union integration policy.[44] Following this course, Turkey has launched various Balkan initiatives for participation in newly established structures.[45] It established a visa-free regime with Albania and signed a free-trade agreement, as part of a Turkish style Schengen and economic community area in the Western Balkans. In fact, the idea is similar to EU Neighbourhood Policy. Up till now, many observers consider that Turkish policies show how the Europeanisation discourse is used as an instrument to establish it as primus inter pares. Without the European anchor Turkish leaders would not be in a position to promote Turkey as an example and call on Albania to rally around it.[46]

Turkey is extensively investing in the Albanian societal field. TIKA[47] projects, Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, Turkish education institutions and Turkish soap operas have extensively contributed to a kind of re-consideration of the Ottoman period and exposed and popularized Turkish culture and contemporary way of life. They have promoted the image of Turks as a modern people countering the traditional awkward image previously widespread in the country through history textbooks, which represented the Ottoman yoke as ruthless and responsible of country’s backwardness and the forceful conversion of Albanians from Christianity to Islam. Ironically, while for many foreigners the construction of a mega-mosque in Tirana, financed by Diyanet[48], is a fact that corrupts the Western choice of Albanians, its address is on George W. Bush Street.

In lieu of conclusions

Mainly because of the close linkages developed with the Western Balkans Six countries, until recently the EU has so far not perceived the “rise of the rest”[49] as a danger to its own interests in the WB6 counties. The record of EU investments in all the countries of WB6 is impressive. In the case of Albania, as a matter of fact, at the end of 2016, the EU remains, the first trading partner of Albania with 62 percent of imports and 77 percent of exports, the key FDI stock contributor with 59.3 percent of the total[50]  and the main investor in foreign and joint ventures with 70 percent of the total number.[51] The EU is the largest provider of financial assistance with €1.24 billion in EU pre-accession funds, €359 million provided in European Investment Bank loans since 1999, leveraging investments estimated of €1.2 billion[52]. The EU also stands as a leading donor in relation to the promotion of human rights by financing several projects in the framework of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights with a contribution of €86.5 million[53]. Visa liberalization regime for Albanian citizens in the Schengen area (2010) fostered social and cultural linkages. The exchanges under Erasmus+ and the support to civil society brought students, journalists, young politicians, trade union leaders and teachers closer to share ideas and projects with their European partners. In only one year, 2015-2016, 3660 students, academics and youth from Albania visited different EU academic institutions.[54] The participation in the EU Research and Innovation program created opportunities for Albanian academia to be part on projects for advancing science, industrial leadership and tackling societal challenges. Albania has participated on the FP7 (2017-2013) with 245 projects providing for €2.361.838[55]. Because of that, “Albania, a country with a relatively small volume of scientific publications has high-quality publications relative to the rest of the region. With 4.03 cites per document, it is the leader in the Western Balkans in the 2003–2010”[56]. Moreover, the EU provides funds for a wide range of projects and programs covering areas such as regional and urban development, employment and social inclusion, agriculture and rural development, consolidation of the justice system and fighting and supporting the formulation, coordination and implementation of anti-corruption policies (Euralius IV). These linkages increased the number of domestic actors with a political, economic, or professional stake in adhering to European norms that maintain the high support for EU membership. Moreover, the EU linkage is desirable, and not simply a rational calculation of possible benefits and an agency of problem-solving. Above all, it is a signifier of identity.[57] The well-known Albanian writer Ismail Kadare marks the importance by emphasizing that Albanian “sensational rebellion against the Ottoman state avowed a new idea and a new ideal: the division from the East and the alliance with the West.”[58]

However, the region and Albania remain among the poorest in Europe. And for more than a decade, the EU proposed model seems to be in competition with a “civilization challenger” like China[59], whose ultimate aim is to make Eurasia, including Western Balkans an economic and trading area to rival the transatlantic one[60]; a “spoiler power” like Russia that is trying to derail Balkan countries from the influences of Western institutions by exploit its favorable position with different communities in the region[61]; a growing “regional power” like Turkey that is significantly stronger than its Balkan neighbors and is looking to translate this strength into influence.[62] The challenges to the EU project in the Western Balkans are even bigger, at least in the short term, considering Beijing, Moscow, and Ankara’s tacit agreement to sidestep any suggestion of undermining each other’s initiatives with competing projects.

The belief that these geopolitical challenges can be solved by offering an ambiguous European enlargement proposal is magical thinking. This experiment has run its course long ago, because EU’s recent move is not a temporary rupture in an otherwise stable equilibrium. A more fragmented region is coming into being that in some ways maybe more flexible and open to opportunities. Especially now that autocracies promote vigorously alternative economic and “civilizational” models, using all means at their disposal, from investments on soft power to coercion, aiming to stabilize their neighborhoods and/or challenge Western hegemony.

ENIKA ABAZI is the Director of Peace Research Institute, Paris and lecturer, University of Lille. She has a Ph.D. from Bilkent University.

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Xinhua. 2020, March 17. China sends first batch of medical aid to Serbia to help fight COVID-19. edited by http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0317/c90000-9668981.html.

Yoruk, Murat-Ahmet. 2008, 16 April. “Perspektiva te reja ekonomike midis turqise dhe Shqiperise.”  Gazeta Shqiptare, www.balkanweb.com/site/perspektiva-te-reja-ekonomike-midis-turqise-dhe-shqiperise/.

Zakaria, Fareed. 2008, 12 March. “The rise of the rest.”  Newsweek https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2008/05/12/the-rise-of-the-rest.

[1] The decision was backed up by a package of aid for all the countries of the Wester Balkans Six, after criticism for lack of solidarity. Brussels announced 40-million-euro aid to help WB6, 15   to Serbia, four million to Albania and North Macedonia, five million to Kosovo, seven million to Bosnia-Herzegovina and three million to Montenegro. 374 million will be allocated to help cushion the economic impact of the epidemic. WB countries will also be allowed to take part in an EU joint procurement program to buy protective medical equipment (EURACTIV 2020, 30 March).

[2] Lasheras de Borja et al. Return to instability: How migration and great power politics threaten the Western Balkans. (London, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016)

[3] European Commission. “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans.” (2018) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf.

[4] Federica Mogherini. Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini following the Foreign Affairs Council Brussels. (2017)

[5] Amaël Cattaruzza. L’affirmation de l’Union européenne dans les Balkans. Vers une politique d’intégration régionale… mais de quelle région? Strates: Matériaux pour la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 15 (http://journals.openedition.org/strates/6688) 2008.

[6] Maria Todorova. Imagining the Balkans. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press. Reprint, 2009.)

[7] Enika Abazi and Albert Doja. The past in the present: time and narrative of Balkan wars in media industry and international politics. Third World Quarterly 38 (4):1012-1042. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1191345. 2017.

[8] They include Germany’s premature recognition of Slovenian and Croatian secession from Yugoslavia (1991). The resentment of the increasing US influence after Dayton Agreement (1995), South Balkan Development Initiative (1995) and Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (1996), that provoked the French initiated Royaumont Process (1995) that was launched one day before the Dayton Agreement leaded by the Americans (Ehrhart 1999, 331), complemented by German presidency initiative on the Southeast European Stability Pact initiative (1999) that was lunched to confirm the EU “irretrievably committed to becoming a Balkan power with specific responsibilities and interests” (European Parliament 30 April 1998).

[9] Xinhua. China sends first batch of medical aid to Serbia to help fight COVID-19. http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0317/c90000-9668981.html. (2020, March 17.)

[10] Gazeta Dita. Plani C dhe Plani D. http://www.gazetadita.al/vetem-rama-nderron-qendrim-nese-bota-permbyset-kemi-turqine/. 2020, 22 March.

[11] Milo Đukanović. Twitter: https://twitter.com/i/status/1247854322358128640 (2020, 8 April.)

[12] Reuters. Russia sends medical aid to Serbia to fight coronavirus. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-serbia/russia-sends-medical-aid-to-serbia-to-fight-coronavirus-idUSKBN21L17H. (2020, 3 April.)

[13] Inspired by Fareed Zakaria (2008, 12 March)

[14] Evan Osnos. Making China Great Again. As Donald Trump surrenders America’s global commitments, Xi Jinping is learning to pick up the pieces. (The New Yorker, 2018.) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/08/making-china-great-again

[15] Edi Rama. EU must marry Western Balkans quickly to avoid new risks. https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/eu-must-marry-western-balkans-quickly-to-avoid-new-risks-albania-pm/. (Brussels: Friends of Europe, 5 December 2017.)

[16] Vincent Wood. EU NIGHTMARE: Albania threatens Brussels ‘give us membership or prepare for CHAOS. (Express. 2017, 18 April.) https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/793091/EU-Albania-membership-war-European-Union-Balkans-free-movement-Edi-Rama.

[17] European Commission. A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf. (2018)

[18] Ibid. European Commission. 2018

[19] Enika Abazi et al. 2008. Albania and European Union: Rethinking EU Integration, http://www.houseofeurope.org/pdf/Perceptions_2008.pdf. (Tirana: AIIS. 2008.)

[20] AIIS. The European Perspective of Albania: Perceptions and Realities. (Tirana: AIIS press. 2014)

[21] INSTAT. Foreign Enterprises in Albania 2014-2016 http://www.instat.gov.al/media/3663/foreign-enterprises-in-albania.pdf (Tirana, 2017)

[22] Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümper. The Internal Value of External Options: How the EU Shapes the Scope of Regulatory Reforms in Transition Countries. (European Union Politics 5 (3):307-330. doi: 10.1177/1465116504045155. 2014.)

[23] Lucrezia Poggetti. China’s Charm Offensive in Eastern Europe Challenges EU Cohesion. (The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-charm-offensive-in-eastern-europe-challenges-eu-cohesion/. 2017, 24 April.)

[24] European Union. European Union, Trade in goods with Albania: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113342.pdf.

[25] Kenneth Rapoza. China Courts Albania Investment While U.S. Pushes Politics. (Forbes. 2017, 10 March.)

[26] Kenneth Rapoza, Albania Becomes Latest China Magnet. Forbes, 2016.  (https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/06/13/albania-becomes-latest-china-magnet/#81f12ac24901).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Fatjona Mejdini. Chinese Investments Raise Eyebrows in Albania. (Balkan Insight. www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/chinese-investments-raise-eyebrows-in-albania-05-02-2016. 2016, 03 May.)

[29] Xi Jinping. Report at 19th CPC National Congress. (Beijing: Xinhua: www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. 2017.)

[30] Saul Estrin and Milica Uvalic. Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balkans: What Role Has it Played During Transition? (2016. Comparative Economic Studies 58 (3):455–483.)

[31] Will Bartlett and Ivana Prica. The Variable Impact of the Global Economic Crisis in South East Europe, LSEE Papers. (London: LSE European Institute. 2012.)

[32] Jens Bastian. The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road”, www.ebrd.com/documents/policy/the-balkan-silk-road.pdf (European Bank for Construction and Development. London. 2017.)

[33] Vladislav Kurbatskiy. Albania and Russia Rapprochement. Moscow: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/albania-and-russia-rapprochement/: (RIAC. 2012.)

[34] European Union. Trade in goods with Albania: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113342.pdf (2012.)

[35] John Cappello. Russia Escalates Disinformation Campaign in Western Balkans. www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/john-cappello-russia-escalates-disinformation-campaign-in-western-balkans/. (2017, 05 April.)

[36] John Cappello. Russia Ramps Up Media and Military Influence in Balkans. (Washington: Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD): http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/john-cappello-russia-ramps-up-media-and-military-influence-in-balkans/. 2017, 13 October.)

[37] David Corn et al. How a Russian-Linked Shell Company Hired An Ex-Trump Aide to Boost Albania’s Right-Wing Party in DC. (. 6 March 2018. Mother Jones. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/03/how-a-russian-linked-shell-company-hired-an-ex-trump-aide-to-boost-albanias-right-wing-party-in-dc/.)

[38] Enika Abazi. A New Power Play in the Balkans: Kosovo’s Independence. (Insight Turkey 10 (2):67-80.)

[39]European Union. European Union, Trade in goods with Albania: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113342.pdf.

[40] Murat-Ahmet Yoruk. Perspektiva te reja ekonomike midis turqise dhe Shqiperise. (Gazeta Shqiptare, 2008, 16 April) www.balkanweb.com/site/perspektiva-te-reja-ekonomike-midis-turqise-dhe-shqiperise/.

[41] Trading Economics. Albania Foreign Direct Investment 2004-2018. (2018.) https://tradingeconomics.com/albania/foreign-direct-investment.

[42] INSTAT. Foreign Enterprises in Albania 2014-2016 Tirana: http://www.instat.gov.al/media/3663/foreign-enterprises-in-albania.pdf. 2017.

[43] European Union. “European Union, Trade in goods with Albania: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113342.pdf.”

[44] Ahmet Davutoglu. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2008. (Insight Turkey 10 (1):77-96. 2008.)

[45] Such as South East European Cooperation Process, the Regional Cooperation Council, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, Peace Implementation Council, and South-Eastern Europe Brigade and recently supporting the Western Balkans Fund Secretariat in Tirana.

[46] Ahmet Davutoglu. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2008. (Insight Turkey 10 (1):77-96.)

[47] Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

[48] Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs.

[49] Fareed Zakaria. The rise of the rest. (Newsweek 2008, 12 March.)  https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2008/05/12/the-rise-of-the-rest

[50] IMF. Country Report Albania: Selected Issues.  2017 17/374

[51] INSTAT. Foreign Enterprises in Albania 2014-2016 (Tirana, 2017) http://www.instat.gov.al/media/3663/foreign-enterprises-in-albania.pdf.

[52] EU Data. Albania On Its European Path. (Brussels, 2018)

[53] European Commission, IPA II. Revised Indicative Strategy Paper For Albania (2014-2020). (Brussels. 2018)

[54]EU Data. Albania On Its European Path. (Brussels, 2018)

[55] World Bank. Overview of the Research and Innovation Sector in the Western Balkans. (Western Balkans Regional R&D Strategy for Innovation. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2013.)

[56] Ibid.

[57] Enika Abazi. Albania in Europe: Perspectives and Challenges. (Eurasian Files (Avrasya Dosyasi): International Relations and Strategic Studies 14  (1):229-252, 2013 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01142295.)

[58] Ismail Kadare. Identiteti Europian i Shqiptarëve: sprovë [Albanian European Identity]. (Tirana: Onufri. 2006.)

[59] Jens Bastian. The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road”, www.ebrd.com/documents/policy/the-balkan-silk-road.pdf, (European Bank for Construction and Development. London. 2017.)

[60] The Economist. What is China’s belt and road initiative? The many motivations behind Xi Jinping’s key foreign policy. (2017, 15 May.)

[61] John Cappello. Russia Escalates Disinformation Campaign in Western Balkans. www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/john-cappello-russia-escalates-disinformation-campaign-in-western-balkans/. (2017, 05 April.)

[62] Darko Janjevic. Erdogan wants Balkans as ‘leverage’ on Europe. (Deutsche Welle, 2017.  (www.dw.com/en/erdogan-wants-balkans-as-leverage-on-europe-expert/a-38009794).

The post EU’s New Enlargement: Plenty of Nothing for Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Abstract

The Western Balkans is arguably the world’s biggest case-study of internationally-led democratization. Yet despite the great attention and resources dedicated to the region, international efforts have not produced the outcome we would expect. Democratization is at a standstill or even regressing and the stalled process of European enlargement has all but diminished any chance of substantial change. The regions stagnated process of democratization is, from the perspective of the international dimension of democratization, surprising. Public support and trust in the European Union and other Western-led international organization is much higher in the region than Western Europe and political parties have closely aligned their political programs with the accession criteria. Under such conditions, we would expect the region to have performed much better. This article will therefore take stock of the European integration literature on the Western Balkans in order to show the ways in which the European Union is aiding democratization in the Western Balkans.

Introduction

At the time of writing the European Council has just adopted a draft decision which gives Albania and North Macedonia the green light to commence accession negotiations. This is a welcoming sign to the citizens of the Western Balkans (WB) after years of delay. While Serbia and Montenegro have already began negotiations, the delays with Albania and North Macedonia had forced many to question to credibility of the enlargement process for the WB.[1] Democracy on the other hand, has either stalled or is regressing as a prominent scholar of the region has recently highlighted.[2] In this paper we seek to explore the relationship between European integration and democratization by asking how does European integration effect democracy in the WB.

       The role of European integration (and international forces more generally) in shaping transitional politics is perhaps one of the most widely researched topics in political science and international relations literature. And it is in this respect, that the EU has been labeled as the prime benefactor of new democracies in Europe.[3] The WB, however, seem to have resisted the effects of European integration. Despite being offered a credible membership perspective, apart from Croatia which became the latest EU member state in 2013, the region has stagnated. Bosnian and Herzegovina remains emblematic of a state with significant challenges in overcoming its ethnic divisions; Kosovo remains a contested state; North Macedonia has only recently been able to overcome its longstanding name dispute with Greece; Albania epitomizes most of the challenges transitioning societies face; Serbia has yet to come to terms with its recent past; meanwhile Montenegro may represent the only beacon of hope for the region. While each of these cases are fraught with peculiar challenges of their own, they have all been and continue to remain under the influence of integration process.

There is substantial evidence in support of the claim that international actors help move democracy forward, be it the post-communist world, Latin America, or the global south more generally.[4] While different international actors promote different kinds of democracy and through different means, the literature is conclusive on these distinctions and has consistently shown the superiority of conditional approaches.[5] Conditional approaches here refer to cases where the recipient state has to undertake reforms before receiving a reward, as opposed to incentivized approaches where a recipient state receives an initial reward with the hope that it will implement democratic reforms in order to continue receiving aid. Meanwhile, by democracy promotion we mean “the processes by which an external actor intervenes to install or assist in the institution of democratic government in a target state.”[6]

The EU’s enlargement policy which requires applicant candidate states to undertake reforms before moving closer to eventual full membership is a prime example for exploring the effects of the conditional approach. Yet, as this article will show, even this approach has its limitations, particularly when democracy promotion is confronted with simultaneous domestic challenges that may not necessarily require the same strategies and instruments. This is the case in the WB where democratization, reconciliation, and state building are developing side by side, but may not necessarily be complimentary with one another. In the remainder of the article, we will first provide a short overview of the democracy and democracy promotion literatures. Second, we provide an overview of the EU’s presence in the region by highlighting some of its achievements and failures. Last, the article concludes by emphasizing the major takeaways as well as highlighting some expectations for the near future.

Democracy and Democracy Promotion

Every democracy has a starting point, a birthday, which in new democracies often represents the country’s first democratic elections. At this point, the pillars of representative democracy are institutionalized into the new democracy’s body of laws. These pillars, first and foremost, refer to political rights and civil liberties such as the right to vote, the freedom of expression, the right to assembly and so on. However, the institutionalization of these right, in the legal sense of the word, does not necessarily secure the new democracy’s future. As the authoritarian and populist trend of the post-2008 global economic recession has shown, institutionalization is not enough in securing democracy. The rise of populism in Europe, the election of Donald Trump to the White House, and the democratic backsliding in some of the EU’s newest member states provide a clear illustration to the limits of institutionalist arguments. It is in this respect, the Linz and Stepan have argued that democracies become consolidate and endure not only when “governmental and nongovernmental forces alike…become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process,” but when such institutional changes are associated with behavioral and attitudinal shifts.[7]

            It is the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of democracy which today have taken center stage in the study of democracy. Thus, questions such as who supports populist parties, who supports anti-immigration policies, who voted for Donald Trump or Brexit, and how do political parties respond to such changes have become of increasing importance.[8] Transitioning democracies, however, are almost never dealing with a single transition. As Offe and Adler have argued, the post-communist democratic transitions of Eastern Europe evolved simultaneously with the region’s economic transition and process of nation building.[9] The latter is particularly relevant in the WB where the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has led to the creation of seven successor states. The issue that we want to address in this article is to illustrate how democracy promotion is undermined due to the simultaneous promoting of other ideas such as ethnic reconciliation and regional stability.

The WB are ideal testing grounds for such questions for the simple reason that the region has been a major recipient of EU democracy promotion and efforts to restore friendly relations within states and between them. For example, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which serves as the framework for the region’s European aspirations requires that each state first stabilize its relations with neighboring states, and only subsequently accede into the EU. It is under this framework that democracy, reconciliation, and regional stability are promoted. In the remainder of the article we provide an overview of the EU’s presence in the region and how it has been able to shape political developments.

Promoting What?

The body of literature that is democracy promotion has addressed a significant number of questions. Questions that can be broadly stated in the following lines: Who is it that is doing the promoting? What is it that is being promoted? How is the promotion being carried out? Why is democracy being promoted? And what effects are we observing? Most researchers, however, would agree that Western actors promote a liberal version of democracy, consisting of a set of partial regimes, that is, free and fair elections, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective representation.[10] Yet, even within the liberal model we find variation such as the social democratic model of Western Europe and the more liberal American variant. Although, there is some evidence in support of the claim the US to promotes a model of democracy closely linked with capitalism, while the EU is perceived as less ideologically committed by promoting a “fuzzy liberal” model of democracy.[11] Moreover, there are some indications showing that the EU promotes Lijphart’s consensual model of democracy compared to the majoritarian model.[12]

In the last decade, the promotion of democratic governance has also received substantial attention. Democratic governance, however, should not be conflated with democracy itself. As one prominent scholar of the field has pointed out, while democratic governance in not incompatible with liberal democracy, “the promotion of democratic governance does not target the core institutions of the democratic state – the electoral regime, individual rights, and the checks and balances of legislative, executive, and judicial organs. Rather, it focuses on the institutions of sectoral governance” such as transparency, accountability, and participation.[13] Democratic governance in this respect is thought to represent a more technocratic approach to democracy promotion. Some research is even suggesting that the EU has shifted its priorities from the promotion of democracy to the promotion of democratic governance.[14] As we will show below, this trend is worrisome for the WB where the EU’s focus on democratic governance and stability is of particular relevance.

Democracy Promotion Through EU Enlargement

Democracy promotion scholar Richard Youngs has famously stated that the Eastern enlargement of the EU was the most successful case ever of democracy promotion.[15] Besides the strict accession criteria based on the Copenhagen Criteria for membership, what gives EU membership power is the Union’s normative appeal.[16] New democracies seek to join the Union, not only for its economic benefits, but also because accession represents a certain status—of having escaped a country’s communist past and now moving toward a European future. Perhaps a quote from Romanian scholar Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, best illustrates effects of European integration:

“There is no doubt that EU enlargement has been a remarkable success…Not only did the prospect of the EU membership precipitate the reforms that were indispensable for the transformation of [Central and Eastern Europe] CEE states, but since it enjoyed large popular support it also enticed post-communist parties into becoming genuinely pro-EU parties…[and as a result], transitions with an EU prospect seem to be the best: they lead to democracy and prosperity earlier and with fewer uncertainties and risks than any other types of transitions.”[17]

            It was the conditional nature of EU accession, however, that led to the success of the Eastern enlargement. CEE states were expected to oblige to a pre-set EU agenda in order to secure membership. In other words, reforms came first, rewards came later. Yet, this approach is not without its limitations. Expected to oblige to a pre-set agenda of rules to which an applicant states had no say in formulating in the first place raises questions about the sustainability of reforms once membership is secured. Interestingly, research has shown that while post-accession compliance with EU rules—rules which have a basis in the acquis (EU body of laws) has been relatively stable—compliance with non-rule-based norms has lagged far behind.[18] The explanation for this observation is equally interesting.

            While the EU has a strong infringement procedure for failing to comply with the acquis, the Union’s tools are more limited when it comes to preventing democratic breaches. Beyond the activation of Article 7 of the EU Treaty which suspends a country’s voting rights in EU institutions, there is very little else at the EU’s disposal. Moreover, because the conditional nature of EU accession process forced applicant states to compete over the implementation of a pre-set agenda rather than alternative policies it did not encourage the development of democratic pluralism. In other words, because the pre-accession process prioritized the efficiency of policy adoptions over the legitimacy of such policies, the EU, paradoxically, while acting as a beacon of legitimacy in driving applicant states toward democracy it undermined the development of democratic practices.

Explaining post-accession compliance with democracy becomes even more interesting from the perspective of party politics. There is broad consensus in the literature that European integration had a profound effect on CEE party systems. Not only did the accession process shape political competition, but it also provided the framework though which parties built their political programs. As Vachudova, has argued, “in almost all cases, major political parties respond to EU leverage by adopting agendas that [were] consistent with EU requirements in the run-up to negotiations for membership.”[19] In this respect, former communist, illiberal, and authoritarian parties adjusted their ideological profiles to appear more supportive of integration. However, once accession was secured, these parties then appear to have reverted to their original ideologies, which in many cases had nationalist and authoritarian roots. The theoretical argument here is that the drive toward EU membership helped stabilize political competition and suppressed political tensions, although, once membership was secured, political tensions came to the fore, and political competition was reshaped once more.

Vachudova who is one of the prominent scholars of this field has recently argued that the process of EU accession is shaping political competition in the WB in a very similar pattern.[20] Former authoritarian and nationalist parties, such as the Socialist Party of Serbia (Slobodan Miloševic’s former party) or the Serbian Progressive Party (a breakaway faction of the nationalist Radical Party) have adopted agendas consistent with the accession criteria. A similar trend is apparent in Montenegro where all major political parties are supportive of EU accession.

Nevertheless, we now know that post-accession is a different story. As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi argues:

“When conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU vanishes like a short-term anesthetic. The political problems in these countries, especially the political elite’s hectic behavior and the voters’ distrust of parties, are completely unrelated to EU accession. They were there to start with, though they were hidden or pushed aside because of the collective concentration on reaching the accession target…Now that countries in the region have acceded to the EU, we see Central and Eastern Europe as it really is—a region that has come far but still has a way to go.”[21]

            The above quote may even provide us with insights into why the EU finds it difficult to promote democratic values that are sustainable in the long-run. There is now broad consensus in the scholarly community that the EU’s promotion strategies can be seen as ‘shallow’. The argument here rests on the claim that reforms are more likely to endure when they are accompanied by social learning. However, it appears that the EU’s top-down and technocratic manner of administering the accession process left little room for social learning, and as a result, what we are now witnessing in post-accession CEE is a prime case of ‘shallow Europeanization’. The question that we now turn to is, to what extent can we expect the EU’s influence in the WB to have a lasting and deep effect on values and norms that we associate with liberal democracies?

The EU in the WB

Any analysis of the process of integration must take as a starting point the supply and demand arguments for integration. By supply, we mean a credible perspective for EU membership. Meanwhile, by demand, we mean a desire for membership on behalf of the applicant states. There are a variety of ways through which these factors can be analyzed. For example, official documents and government speeches from member and non-member states can tell us the seriousness to which EU enlargement is being considered. We can also analyze party profiles and determine the extent to which political parties are placing an emphasis on pro or anti-enlargement policies. From a different angle, we can analyze popular views from the perspective of EU citizens or applicant states in order to determine popular desire for enlargement.

            There is consensus among the academic and policy communities that after the 2008 global financial crisis the EU entered a phase of enlargement fatigue. This argument suggests that due to a number of internal challenges such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit, and rising populism, an enlargement perspective became unrealistic in the short term. Indeed, current French President, Emmanuel Macron, has persistently pointed out that there will be no enlargement until the EU decision-making procedures have undergone deep reforms. There is an important distinction in the European integration literature that should be point out here. That is, the different between vertical and horizontal and integration. Whereas the former refers to the process of deepening integration by addressing internal concerns, the latter refers to widening integration by expanding membership. Theoretically, the two can proceed simultaneously. However, due to limitations in resources and the veto power held by member states, the two processes often proceed in turn. Thus, when internal reforms at on top of the agenda, the enlargement process slows down.

            This is an important consideration to bear in mind, as research has shown that when enlargement loses its credibility, reforms from candidate states stall.[22] This is precisely one of the reasons why WB elites have been unwilling to undertake the necessary reforms—the ultimate reward of membership is simply too far down the line and unrealistic in the short-term. Much of the literature on the effects of membership relies on rational choice arguments, in that elites are willing to undertake reforms if there is some immediate reward associated with the reform. When reforms are too costly, and the reward of membership is far down the line, politicians are unwilling to bend under EU pressure. Precisely for this reason, research has shown that democracy promotion which offers an enlargement perspective is more effective compared to other forms of promotion.[23]

            Turning our attention back to the supply and demand argument, utilizing survey data from the Eurobarometer survey we see that support for enlargement among existing member states has steadily declined over the last decade.[24] Support from EU citizens has declined from 53% in 2004 to 45% in 2018. More importantly, those standing against enlargement have increased from 35 % to 46% for the same time period. In other words, majority of EU citizens today stand against another enlargement, albeit these trends vary from country to country. On the other hand, support for enlargement from the perspective of the WB has also declined, albeit data available for this group of countries is a bit more sporadic and limited. In any case, if we compare level of support in 2014 versus 2018, we see an average decline of 3%, while those standing against have increased by 5%. These are not large fluctuations, but when we look at these trends for North Macedonia for which time-series data goes farther back, support has declined from 90% in 2007 to 74% in 2018.

            North Macedonia has also become the emblematic case in illustrating the effects of enlargement fatigue. Up till 2005 North Macedonia was the posterchild for the region. The country had overcome the potential for large-scale violence between the majority Macedonian population and the Albanian communities through the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, ethnic reconciliation was arguably heading in the right direction, reforms were slowly moving the country closers toward European integration, and in 2005 the European Commission granted the country candidate status, thus paving the way for eventual accession. Yet three years later, when Greece vetoed the country’s bid for NATO membership due to the name dispute between the two, the Nikola Gruevski government at the time used the rejection to play into Macedonian claims of historical grievances.[25] From 2008 until Gruevski’s government was forced to step down in 2016 following a series of scandals, inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians had gotten sour and democracy had steadily deteriorated until the country’s levels of democracy were near the bottom compared to other WB states. There are now hopes that democracy will get a kickstart after 2018 Prespa Agreement which settled the country’s name dispute with Greece. What North Macedonia’s experience shows, however, is that without a credibility perspective for EU membership, the region is prone to authoritarian reversals.

            Despite this important and positive role played by the EU in the region, there are claims to the contrary. One of such arguments suggests that the EU has done little to promote democracy. Rather, what it has promoted is stabilitocracy, that is, promoting regimes that provide political stability at the expense of democracy.[26] While there is nothing novel in the argument that Western powers promote stability at the expense of democracy, with the Cold War period providing numerous examples were the US helped stabilize authoritarian regimes as long as they aligned with the West, promoting such policies in the WB is rather counterintuitive considering the region’s drive toward EU membership. Nevertheless, the stabilitocracy argument does forces us to question the integration process in determining whether it can promote democracy in places like the WB.

            Another way through which we can analyze the effects of integration is by understanding the tools the EU utilizes as part of the enlargement process. In this way, we can develop a better understating of theoretical linkages and expected outcomes. The framework though which the accession process is judged and measures is based on what has come to be known as the Copenhagen Criteria. This list of accession criteria emerged as a result of CEE’s desire to join the EU following the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. The list effectively consists of three categories: political, economic, and legal. In the political camp reside the necessity for institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities; the economic camp consists of the need to establish a functioning market economy capable of competing in the common market; and the legal camp consisting of the institutional and administrative capacity to implement the acquis. While this list of criteria may at first sight appear specific enough, it is in fact vaguely broad.

            For instance, by what measure do we evaluate institutions of democracy, human and minority rights? When are we certain that an economic system has developed the capacity to compete within the common market? And how do we evaluate administrative capacity? The vagueness of the criteria has led to criticisms against the EU under the accusation of ‘moving the goal post’. That is, candidate countries fulfill a certain benchmark, only to be told that there is more work to be done, hence the EU moving the goal post further down the line. It is the dynamics of this framework, however, which gives the EU the leverage to drive reforms forward. As part of this framework, the EU produces an Annual Report which outlines the progress each candidate has made in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. For candidate states the report serves as an objective measure of political progress in the country, which governing and opposition parties utilize to their advantage. Thus, when the report highlights positive progress, governing parties pull out these positives to highlight their successful reforms in getting the country closer toward full membership. Meanwhile, opposition parties pull out the negatives and blame governments for their failure.

            Bearing in mind the popular support for integration in the WB, the reports therefore become a powerful tool in forcing governments to address the shortcomings of their reforms. Overall, however, the integration process is an executive focused process. There is little room for mass participation beyond the role of civil society in bringing forward government abuses, while the opposition and parliament are largely removed from the process as it is the government which negotiates directly with the EU. Grabbe has even argued that by marginalizing national legislatures, the EU is exporting its own democratic deficit.[27] For this reason, the process is criticized for being elite focused, and questions are raised as to whether such a process can lead to the necessary attitudinal shift within the masses that we associate with liberal democratic values. Indeed, the accession criteria constitute of institutional measures of democracy, thus leaving aside the other two components of a consolidate system—the behavioral and attitudinal aspects.

            The EU, however, has learned from its mistakes and has refined the enlargement process. Following Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession, the EU realized that rule of law and democratic standards in the two countries did not follow the trajectory that was expected from their membership in the Union. As a result, the EU redesigned its accession process, with new candidates required to first deal with ‘Judiciary and fundamental rights’ and ‘Justice, freedom and security’, Articles 23 and 24 of the Annual Reports respectively. The idea behind this change was to encourage behavioral compliance with rule of law very early on in the process, thus ensuring longer term compliance with democratic norms.

            The recent decision by the European Council to offer Albania and North Macedonia the green light to commence accession negotiation is a sign of hope that enlargement is back on. From a formal perspective, the WB is now closer to the EU. However, formal progress in the integration process does not seem to be associated with democratic progress. In a recent study, Richter and Wunsch ask why are we witnessing gradual improvements in formal compliance with membership criteria in the WB, while at the same time we witness stagnating, if not declining, democratic performance.[28] According to Richter and Wunsch, the integration process has helped set in place a series of mechanisms for state capture by legitimizing corrupt elites for formal progress in the accession process while silencing domestic opponents through the top-down nature of the accession process. In other words, not only in the integration process failing to deliver democratic progress, but under certain conditions it may even prove counterproductive. The integration progress may even disguise domestic problems with democracy by shifting focus on the accession criteria and accession process. As Elbasani and Šabić have argued, “[f]ormal compliance…often hides more than reveals regarding the façade nature of EU-led transfers.”[29]

Conclusion

The democracy promotion literature has come a long way since international actors began promoting it in earnest after the collapse of communism. The body of literature that was once primarily descriptive or correlative has evolved to include more causative assessments. The evolution of the literature was also made possible due to the growth of promotion activities from numerous international actors. This has broadened the empirical scope to allow for comparative research designs and the development of more generalizable findings. Actors themselves have been able to learn from their experience in order to formulate more effective promotion policies. Perhaps not all aspects of who, what, how, why and effects have been answered. Yet the democracy promotion literature today does represent a more theoretically coherent research program than two decades ago.

WB elites, however, appears to have resisted EU pressures for democratization. They even appear able to manipulate the process to their benefit. Meanwhile, European integration is often portrayed to the masses in misleading ways such that EU membership will serve as a panacea to their country’s problems. As a result, domestic politics is perceived as intractable, while the EU and other foreign actors as the saviors. Democracy is therefore misconceived as simply a system of rules in which smarter institutional designs from the West will able to overcome problems of corruption, state captures, accountability, transparency, and representation. However, democracy is built more on the belief that collective differences should be addressed through democratic means, rather than smart institutional designs which prevent corrupt politicians from using public office for personal gains.

As the EU attempts to refine its enlargement process by placing preconditions for the commencements of negotiations, such as the case of Albania, or by commencing negotiations with the Articles 23 and 24, such changes simply lengthen the process with the hope that early reforms will become embedded in larger society. It remains to be seen, however, as to what the European future of the WB holds. While the enlargement perspective has regained credibility, the recent history of CEE has shown us that membership is not a panacea. Deeper societal problems are unlikely to find recourse through European integration. While the European future of most WB states is unquestionable at the moment, a stagnated enlargement process could slow reforms even further and provide encroachment opportunities for regional powers such as Russia.

It is worth concluding this article by briefly bringing in the domestic context. While democracy promoters have found innovative ways to achieve their desired objectives, authoritarian rulers have also learned from their predecessors. Thus, while today’s democracy promotion policies may be more coherent, they face a more daunting and constraining domestic environment. This is evident in the fading away of the democratic zeitgeist that dominated the 1990s and the rise of authoritarian learning as anti-democratic elites have learned to share practices, know-hows, technologies and policies in ensuring they remain in power. WB elites and societies are no exception in this respect.

Acknowledgment:

Part of this manuscript may later appear in a college textbook edited by the author.

ELTION MEKA is a Researcher at the University of New York Tirana.

References:

Bieber, Florian. The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

Bridoux, Jeff, and Milja Kurki. “Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath: ideological convergences and divergences in US and EU democracy promotion in civil society.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 55-74.

Cianetti, L., Dawson J. and Hanley, S. “Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe–looking beyond Hungary and Poland.” East European Politics 34, no.3 (2018): 243-256.

Elbasani, Arolda, and Senada Šelo Šabić. “Rule of law, corruption and democratic accountability in the course of EU enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 9 (2018): 1317-1335.

Epstein, R.A., and U. Sedelmeier. Beyond conditionality: international institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 795–805.

Ethier, Diane. “Is democracy promotion effective? Comparing conditionality and incentives.” Democratization 10, no. 1 (2003): 99-120.

European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 90, December 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm, Accessed April 19, 2020.

Grabbe, Heather. How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity.’ Journal of European Public Policy, 8, no. 6 (2001): 1013-31.

Haukenes, Katrine, and Annette Freyberg-Inan. “Enforcing consensus? The hidden bias in EU democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe.” Democratization 20, no. 7 (2013): 1268-1296.

Hobson, Christopher, and Milja Kurki. “Introduction The conceptual politics of democracy promotion.” in The conceptual politics of democracy promotion, edited by Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki. Routledge, 2012.

International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, Europe Report N°212 – 11 (August 2011).

Kmezić, M. and Bieber, F. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion. BiEPAG Policy Study, (2017).

Linz, J.J and Alfred Stepan. Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 7, no. 2 (1996): 14-33.

Manners, Ian. “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” JCMS: journal of common market studies 40.2 (2002): 235-58.

Manners, Ian. “The normative ethics of the European Union.” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 45-60.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress” in Michael Emerson (ed.) Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood. CEPS Paperback Series. (2005).  pg.15-16.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “EU Accession Is No” End of History”.” Journal of Democracy 18.4 (2007): 8-16.

Norris, P. and Ronald Inglehart. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

O’Brennan, J. ‘On the slow train to nowhere?’ The European union,’Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western Balkans. European Foreign Affairs Review. 19 (2014): 221-241.

Offe, Claus, and Pierre Adler. “Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition in East Central Europe.” Social Research (1991): 865-892.

Pridham, Geoffrey. Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in post-communist Europe. Basingstoke, 2005.

Richter, S., and Wunsch, N. Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 27, no. 1 (2020): 41-62.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. “How Substantial is Substance-Concluding Reflections on the Study of Substance in EU Democracy Promotion.” Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 16 (2011): pp727-734.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. “EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange.” European Union Politics 9, no. 2 (2008): 187-215.

Schmidt, Jessica. “Constructing new environments versus attitude adjustment: contrasting the substance of democracy in UN and EU democracy promotion discourses.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 35-54.

Vachudova, M.A. “Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession.” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no.6 (2008): 861-79.

Vachudova, M.A. “EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On.” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no.1 (2014): 122-138.

Wetzel, Anne, and Jan Orbie. “With map and compass on narrow paths and through shallow waters: discovering the substance of EU democracy promotion.” Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 16 (2011): 705-725.

Wetzel, Anne, Jan Orbie, and Fabienne Bossuyt. “One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 28, no.1 (2015): 21-34.

Whitehead, L. ed. The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Youngs, Richard. The European Union and democracy promotion: A critical global assessment. JHU Press, 2010.

[1] O’Brennan, J. ‘On the slow train to nowhere?’ The European union,’Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western Balkans. European Foreign Affairs Review. 19 (2014): 221-241.

[2] Bieber, Florian. The rise of authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

[3] Pridham, Geoffrey. Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in post-communist Europe. Basingstoke, 2005.

[4] Whitehead, L. ed. The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford University Press, 1996.

[5] Wetzel, Anne, Jan Orbie, and Fabienne Bossuyt. “One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 28, no.1 (2015): 21-34.; Bridoux, Jeff, and Milja Kurki. “Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath: ideological convergences and divergences in US and EU democracy promotion in civil society.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 55-74.; Manners, Ian. “The normative ethics of the European Union.” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 45-60.; Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. “EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange.” European Union Politics 9, no. 2 (2008): 187-215.; Ethier, Diane. “Is democracy promotion effective? Comparing conditionality and incentives.” Democratization 10, no. 1 (2003): 99-120.

[6] Hobson, Christopher, and Milja Kurki. “Introduction The conceptual politics of democracy promotion.” in The conceptual politics of democracy promotion, edited by Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki. Routledge, 2012. p3.

[7] Linz, J.J and Alfred Stepan. Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 7, no. 2 (1996): 14-33. p14-15.

[8] Norris, P. and Ronald Inglehart. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

[9] Offe, Claus, and Pierre Adler. “Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the triple transition in East Central Europe.” Social Research (1991): 865-892.

[10] Wetzel et al. One of what kind?.

[11] Bridoux and Kurki. Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath.

[12] Haukenes, Katrine, and Annette Freyberg-Inan. “Enforcing consensus? The hidden bias in EU democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe.” Democratization 20, no. 7 (2013): 1268-1296.

[13] Schimmelfennig, Frank. “How Substantial is Substance-Concluding Reflections on the Study of Substance in EU Democracy Promotion.” Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 16 (2011): pp727-734. p730.

[14] Wetzel, Anne, and Jan Orbie. “With map and compass on narrow paths and through shallow waters: discovering the substance of EU democracy promotion.” Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 16 (2011): 705-725.; Schmidt, Jessica. “Constructing new environments versus attitude adjustment: contrasting the substance of democracy in UN and EU democracy promotion discourses.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 35-54.

[15] Youngs, Richard. The European Union and democracy promotion: A critical global assessment. JHU Press, 2010. p1.

[16] Manners, Ian. “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” JCMS: journal of common market studies 40.2 (2002): 235-58.

[17] Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress” in Michael Emerson (ed.) Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood. CEPS Paperback Series. (2005).  p15-16.

[18] Epstein, R.A., and U. Sedelmeier. Beyond conditionality: international institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 795–805.; Cianetti, L., Dawson J. and Hanley, S. “Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe–looking beyond Hungary and Poland.” East European Politics 34, no.3 (2018): 243-256.

[19] Vachudova, M.A. “Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession.” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no.6 (2008): 861-79. p862.

[20] Vachudova, M.A. “EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On.” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no.1 (2014): 122-138.

[21] Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “EU Accession Is No” End of History”.” Journal of Democracy 18.4 (2007): 8-16. p16.

[22] O’Brennan. On the slow train to nowhere?.

[23] Schimmelfennig and Scholtz. EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood.

[24] European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 90, December 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm, Accessed April 19, 2020.

[25] International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, Europe Report N°212 – 11 (August 2011).

[26] Kmezić, M. and Bieber, F. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion. BiEPAG Policy Study, (2017).

[27] Grabbe, Heather. How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity.’ Journal of European Public Policy, 8, no. 6 (2001): 1013-31. p1017.

[28] Richter, S., and Wunsch, N. Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 27, no. 1 (2020): 41-62.

[29] Elbasani, Arolda, and Senada Šelo Šabić. “Rule of law, corruption and democratic accountability in the course of EU enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 9 (2018): 1317-1335. p16.

The post Reigniting European Integration in the Western Balkans: What can we expect? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

The EU aims to initiate accession negotiations with Albania and North-Macedonia. The EU Ministers of the 27 Member States came to this decision on the 24^th of March during a video conference call. Such decision was welcomed by all parties and remains subject to final endorsement by European Council Members. Both Germany and Albanian opposition parties have sought to draw attention to the fact that the opening of the negotiations is subject to the fulfillment of 15 conditions, which go beyond those originally laid-out by the German Bundestag in September 2019. It is in light of these new conditions that the proposal found approval amongst previously sceptic Member States. The EU Commissions’ original proposal contained no such conditions.

Hope in the time of COVID-19

With political effort largely shifted towards managing the Corona-Crisis, the decision taken by the 27 European Ministers of the Member States with regards to the opening of the accession negotiations could have almost gone unnoticed. After the first cases in Albania were confirmed in Albania on the 8^th of March, the Government took swift measures to reduce social contact by curtailing freedom of movement. Citizens are currently allowed to leave their houses only during specific hours and for essential purposes. The country’s borders have been shut to almost all non-commercial transport, with exception to few commercial flights operating through the Airport. Public life has come to a still.

The Albanian Government declared the COVID – 19 Epidemic a national disaster, in line with provisions of the Civil Emergencies Law – a measure heavily advocated in previous days by Lulzim Basha, leader of the Democratic Party, which in turn is a member of the European People’s Party. Under such circumstances, the Government has the right to implement extraordinary measures that curtail civic freedoms, including restricting freedom of movement, imposing mandatory quarantine for specific groups or the population as a whole and enabling house-searches. In addition, the Government is now under an obligation to compensate individuals and enterprises for damages and losses that arise both as a result of the pandemic as well as the measures taken to contain it.

In these days of hardship, the Government nevertheless welcomed the decision of the EU Council of Foreign Affairs to start the accession negotiations. The current Prime-Minister and leader of the Socialist Party, Edi Rama, greeted such development by stating that Albania has “now entered a new historical phase”:

“The EU Gates have finally opened at a time when the doors of our own houses must remain closed. Our European journey continues, an extraordinary amount of work awaits us.”

President Ilir Meta also welcomed this decision and stressed upon the Government that no time should be lost in fulfilling the conditions.

“I greet the political decision taken today by the Council of Ministers. The approval to the start of the negotiations serves to confirm Albania’s european perspective. No time should be wasted in fulfilling the conditions necessary before the intergovernmental conference.”

Luzim Basha, leader of the biggest opposition party, also welcomed the decision but drew attention to the responsibility of the Albanian Government vis-à-vis the fulfillment of the conditions.

“By agreeing to start accession negotiations EU Member States have expressed their support towards Albania and its people. It is now up to us to satisfy the conditions. The faster we are able to fulfill our obligations, the faster will we be able to realize the wishes of the Albanian People.”

Overcoming hurdles

The proposal to initiate accession negotiations for Albania and North-Macedonia, a matter that has been widely discussed in recent years, ultimately failed to gain needed support in October 2019, in light of reservations from France, Denmark and the Netherlands. In addition to objections raised due to the high number of Albanian Asylum-Seekers, President Macron called for a fundamental reform to the procedure by which membership is granted. In the Netherlands, Members of Parliament raised concerns regarding the lack of the freedom of press, problems associated with the electoral reform, illegal immigration and a perceived inability to fight financial crime.

In February 2020 the European Commission addressed reservations put forth by France by proposing a reform to the membership process. The proposed reform calls for a strengthened role of Member States during membership negotiations as well as the application of a new system, which through expedited procedures and additional funding aims to promote adherence to the rule of law, in line with European standards. Any delays in, or actions that represent hindrances to the reform process will on the other hand be punished through a reduction in funds or the implementation of more stringent review procedures. Cooperation between the EU and candidate Countries should in addition be increased through financial investments.

The EU Commission’s Proposal contains another novelty, in that it forbids the closing of the 33 negotiation chapters in instances when objectives vis-à-vis rule of law are not achieved. In addition, the negotiation chapters are now to be organized in thematic clusters and shall approached as such, so that a cluster of chapters may only be completed as a whole. It is expected that negotiation chapters will be contained in 6 such clusters, respectively dealing with; fundamentals; the internal market; competitiveness and inclusive growth; green agenda and sustainable connectivity; resources, agriculture, cohesion and external relations.

Another novel provision enables Member States to assign and send their own experts to Candidate Countries in order to monitor actual progress with reforms. Before the reform such power could only be exercised by the European Commission.

Distrust towards the Commission

A month after the membership process reform-proposal the European Commission published the reports detailing the performance and progress of the Candidate Countries in implementing reforms in relation to the rule of law. Therein the commission acknowledged that both countries have achieved tangible and sustainable results. In light of such progress both the European Commission as well as European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi were in favor of an unconditional initiation of the accession negotiation.

It did however become clear during the videoconference on the 24^th of March that this recommendation would not find unanimous support amongst the Ministers of European Affairs, at least in Albania’s case. The multitude of problems that continue to plague the country served to cast a shadow of doubt over the objectivity of the report, which appeared to some to paint a picture that was essentially more positive than the actual circumstances could allow for. Several factors led to this conclusion, including: the fact that both the High- and Constitutional-Court have not functioned for over a year, an increase in corruption levels and nepotism, the Governments’ attempt to restrict freedom of the media, problems with organized crime and especially problems with drug and human trafficking. In light of such problems an unconditional approval seemed almost impossible, especially if one takes into account previous objections raised by France, Denmark and the Netherlands.

In order to enable the reaching of a consensus amongst the Member States as regards the initiation of the accession negotiations, the German Bundestag had in September — through the initiative of the CDU/CSU parliamentary groups and the SDP—  put forth a proposal wherein  the initiation of the negotiations was made contingent on the fulfillment of 9 conditions. These have now been increased to 15, in line with requirements delineated by Member States and have been integrated in the decision of the Council.

 Dr. Johann Wadephul, Vice-Chairman of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag who is in charge of Foreign Affairs, interprets this decision as a sign of Member States’ distrust towards the European Commission. Wadephul stated:

“The Commission proposed an unconditional opening of accession negotiations for Albania. That Member States made the opening of such negotiations contingent on the fulfillment of 15 conditions is clear evidence that Member States expect the European Commission to be more stringent and careful in monitoring progress, both in terms of thee fulfillment of the conditions as well as the negotiation process.”

Dr. Katja Leikert, vice-chairman of thee CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag and responsible for European Affairs underlined in her statement the role of the Bundestag in the role played in achieving consensus between Member States:

If the Albanian Government exercises the political will needed to fulfill these conditions, the German Government will support the government in this process. The German Bundestag has voted to initiate negotiations as early as 26 September 2019 but remained insistent that the Government should work to address serious deficiencies. By adopting such an approach, the Bundestag has shown Member States that put forth reservations a new path towards the opening of the negotiations, which was approved today with the decision to initiate the accession negotiations.

Two-step procedure for the opening of accession negotiations

The initiation of accession negotiations foresees amongst others the holding of two conferences, after which the negotiations related to specific chapters or specific clusters will be opened. The decision of the Foreign Ministers taken on March 24^th delineates a two-step procedure with regard to the fulfillment of the conditions, which must be realized before the first and second conferences respectively and thus before the initiation of the negotiations related to thee first cluster of Chapters, titled “Fundamentals”, which predominantly deals with matters concerning the rule of law.  There are in total 15 conditions to be fulfilled. This includes the 9 original conditions set forth by the Bundestag as well as 6 additional ones

Before the start of the first conference the Albanian Government must fulfill 6 preconditions:

• Enacting the electoral reform.
• Implementing the electoral reform and guaranteeing the functioning of the High-Court and the Constitutional Court. The pertaining opinions of the Venice Commission must be adopted.
• The process of building the Special Prosecution Unit for the Fight against Corruption (SPAK) and the National Investigation Bureau (NBI) must be completed.
• New Condition: With regard to the fight against corruption and organized crime the recommendations delineated in the action plan of Financial Action Task Force must be implemented. These recommendations aim to lead to increased transparency in relation to money circulation.
• New Condition: The Albanian Government must take measure to combat thee asylum-seeking phenomenon and guarantee the repatriation of asylum-seekers whose applications are denied.
• New Condition: Reviewing the new Media Law in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Before the second conference, and consequently before the start of the negotiations regarding the chapter clusters/first clusters, Albania must satisfy 9 additional conditions:

• Starting judicial proceedings against those judges and prosecutors for whom it has been established, as a result of the Vetting Process, that they engaged in criminal activity.
• Starting investigation proceedings against individuals accused of buying votes.
• Tangible and sustainable achievements in fighting corruption and organized crime at all levels, including the initiation and conclusion of judicial proceedings against high functionaries and politicians.
• Concrete achievements in implementing the Public Administration reform.
• The Constitutional must render a judgment on the validity of the local elections held on the 30^th of June 2019.
• New condition: The implementation of the 2017 Law for the Protection of Minority Groups.
• New Condition: Enacting a legislative bill in relation to the population census in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe.
• New condition: Progress in the process of registering property titles.

An analysis of the imposed conditions clearly shows the initial decision of the German Bundestag found support amongst other Member States and that its contents have been fully integrated in the Council’s Decision. The plan delineated by the German Bundestag served to address concerns raised by France, the Netherlands and Greece and acted therefore as a “golden bridge” towards gaining their approval.

A lot remains to be done

There exists a widely known expression within football-circles which is fitting to the current situation: ‘The game begins after the game.’ The monitoring process of progress made in fulfilling the conditions is now of primary importance will undoubtedly be a scrupulous one. This process should however not be turned into a box-ticking exercise. The conditions must be fulfilled both in substance and spirit. The European Commission must play an important role here. In contrast to the rosy outlook presented in the last progress-report, on whose objectivity the Ministers for European Affairs have expressed themselves most clearly,  in the future it will be necessary for the Albanian Government to be provided with constructive criticism and  closely monitored in its attempts to fulfill their obligations. The German Bundestag too, will certainly make use of its parliamentary right to both closely monitor this process and express its opinions in relation to potential improvement areas. If need be, other Member States may also be involved in such a process, especially those whose legislative branch is actively engaged in such matters i.e. as in the case of the Netherlands.

Even in Albania it is necessary that all political parties contribute to the realization of the objectives set out throughout this process. It is rather interesting to note that whilst the Albanian Government commented on the positive decision, it failed to acknowledge the fact that such decision came with 15 conditions attached, even though the content of such conditions and but also the mere addition thereof demonstrate that the situation in the last few years has worsened. The opposition must therefore exercise a most important role in supervising government action.

Leader of the opposition Lulzim Basha warned against excessive optimism:

“Politicians are at times willing to sell soap and say it is cheese. Some screamed victory even as a decision was taken not to open the accession negotiations. There is no time for games. We must change our behavior, otherwise we cannot gain EU membership.”

For the time-being Albania will have to face the great challenge posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU will support Albania in addressing this challenge. Such support will prove vital not only to Albania but to all of the Western Balkans. The EU has granted up to 50 Million Euros to Albania in an effort to combat the virus and the consequences that come with it. As much was stated by the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to Albania, Luigi Soreca, a few hours after the positive decision for the initiation of the accession negotiations. Aid packages include 4 Million Euro for medical equipment, 11 Million Euros for social security and up to 35 Million Euros in economic aid. We can only hope this challenge may be overcome as soon as possible, so that the country may redivert its attention to meeting the many challenges that lie ahead.

Not only in order to fulfill the EU’s conditions, but also to turn Albania into a truly democratic State.

The post The Opening of Accession Negotiations: A New Hope for Albania appeared first on Tirana Observatory.