Executive Summary

The European Union’s enlargement policy has historically been its most successful foreign policy instrument, driving democratic transformation, economic convergence, and regional stability. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has acted as a geopolitical catalyst, ending a decade of “enlargement fatigue.” However, this newfound momentum creates a dangerous rift between the “lightning pace” of Ukraine/Moldova’s path and the “decade-long stagnation” of the Western Balkans. However, the current stagnation of the enlargement process—particularly in the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood—poses significant and multidimensional risks for the Union itself.

The European Union increasingly acknowledges enlargement as a geopolitical necessity, yet it remains deeply divided over how and when it should happen. While candidate countries are expected to undertake difficult reforms, member states continue to postpone strategic decisions about the future of enlargement, institutional reform, and the EU’s long-term geopolitical role. The result is a dangerous status quo: accession fatigue in candidate states, declining trust in the EU, growing influence of external actors, and a widening gap between political rhetoric and actual progress.

This policy paper argues that non-enlargement is not a neutral outcome but a strategically damaging scenario. This paper argues that the costs of non-enlargement are already visible and will continue to increase if the EU fails to act. A failure to enlarge would weaken the EU’s credibility, reduce its geopolitical leverage, undermine security in its neighbourhood, fuel anti-European narratives, and deepen internal fragmentation within the Union itself It contributes to geopolitical vacuum formation, increases susceptibility to external influence (notably from Russia and China), weakens EU credibility, exacerbates internal divisions, and undermines regional security architecture. Furthermore, it accelerates democratic backsliding in candidate countries, producing long-term instability that ultimately spills over into the EU.

At the same time, enlargement without strict conditionality would be equally damaging. Admitting countries that have not completed reforms—especially in the rule of law, judiciary independence, public administration, and anti-corruption—would risk importing new veto players and illiberal actors into the Union.

The paper identifies key consequences across geopolitical, security, economic, and societal domains and proposes a set of actionable policy recommendations. These include restoring credibility through a clear accession roadmap, deepening gradual integration, strengthening support for civil society, enhancing security cooperation, and maintaining strict rule-of-law conditionality. Without a renewed commitment to enlargement, the EU risks losing both its neighbourhood and its strategic relevance in an increasingly competitive global order

This paper is based on interviews conducted with 12 experts from EU member states in March and April 2026. The interviews explored the political, security, economic, and institutional implications of a failure to enlarge the EU. Experts were also asked to propose recommendations for avoiding such a scenario. The discussion focused both on the consequences for the EU as a whole and on the specific implications for the member states from which the experts originated.

1. Introduction

EU enlargement has long functioned as a cornerstone of European integration and external action. From Southern Europe in the 1980s to Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s, enlargement has facilitated democratic consolidation, economic modernization, and the stabilization of post-conflict societies (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005).

Today, however, the enlargement process faces unprecedented stagnation. Despite formal commitments to the Western Balkans and the granting of candidate status to countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, progress remains slow, fragmented, and politically contested. The gap between rhetorical commitment and practical delivery has widened significantly.

This disconnect risks transforming enlargement from a credible policy into a symbolic framework devoid of transformative capacity. As candidate countries lose faith in accession prospects, the EU’s ability to shape political and economic developments in its neighbourhood diminishes. The prolonged stagnation of the enlargement process is not a neutral state of “waiting”; it is a regressive process that generates systemic costs for both the candidate countries and the European Union. When the path to membership transforms into an “endless labyrinth” of procedural hurdles, the resulting vacuum is rapidly filled by instability and anti-democratic forces.

This paper explores the consequences of such a scenario. It argues that abandoning or indefinitely postponing enlargement will not only destabilize neighbouring regions but also generate direct and indirect costs for the EU. These costs manifest in weakened geopolitical influence, increased security vulnerabilities, economic inefficiencies, and internal fragmentation.

2. The Geopolitical Consequences of Non-Enlargement

2.1. Emergence of a Strategic Vacuum

A stalled enlargement process creates a geopolitical vacuum in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. Historically, the prospect of EU membership has acted as a powerful anchor, aligning candidate countries with European norms and policies. Without this anchor, regions such as the Western Balkans and parts of the Eastern neighbourhood risk drifting into a “grey zone” of competing influences.

External actors—particularly Russia and China—are well-positioned to exploit this vacuum. Russia leverages historical, cultural, and energy ties to maintain political influence, while China expands its economic footprint through infrastructure investments and strategic projects under initiatives such as the Belt and Road (Hillman 2020).

This dynamic reflects what Farrell and Newman (2019) describe as “weaponized interdependence,” where economic networks are used for geopolitical leverage. In the absence of EU integration, candidate countries become more vulnerable to such practices, undermining both their sovereignty and the EU’s strategic interests.

2.2. Intensification of Great Power Competition

Non-enlargement transforms the EU’s neighbourhood into an arena of intensified geopolitical competition. Infrastructure development, energy supply, and digital networks increasingly become battlegrounds for influence.

For instance, large-scale projects such as railway corridors or energy pipelines are no longer purely economic ventures but strategic tools. Control over these assets allows external actors to shape political decisions, regulatory standards, and long-term dependencies.

Moreover, the EU’s reduced presence weakens its ability to set standards in areas such as environmental protection, labour rights, and digital governance. This creates regulatory fragmentation that benefits external powers while undermining the EU’s normative agenda.

2.3. Declining Global Credibility of the EU

The failure to deliver on enlargement commitments damages the EU’s credibility as a global actor. Enlargement has historically demonstrated the EU’s capacity to transform neighbouring countries through conditionality and incentives (Grabbe 2006).

When accession promises remain unfulfilled, this model loses legitimacy. Candidate countries begin to perceive the EU as unreliable, while external partners—including the United States—question its strategic coherence and capacity to act.

This credibility gap has broader implications. It signals internal divisions within the EU and suggests a lack of consensus on long-term strategic objectives. As a result, the EU’s influence in global governance frameworks and regional conflicts diminishes.

If the EU cannot stabilize and integrate its immediate geographical backyard, its claims to being a “global player” lose all credibility. This perceived weakness encourages external actors (Russia/China) to test the Union’s resolve more aggressively, not just in the neighborhood, but within Member States themselves.

The EU is a project built on values. When the Union fails to deliver on its promises to societies that have made enormous sacrifices for a “European future” (like Ukraine or North Macedonia), its soft power evaporates.

• Redundancy of the “European Model”: If the EU model is seen as “closed” or “exclusive,” it loses its appeal as a beacon for democratic reforms worldwide. This emboldens illiberal regimes within the EU to argue that democratic standards are optional, leading to a further erosion of the rule of law across the entire continent

2.4. The Cost of “Transactional Diplomacy”

As the EU’s transformative power diminishes, its relationship with the neighborhood becomes purely transactional. This forces the Union to constantly “outbid” rivals like Russia or the Gulf States to maintain basic stability, leading to an inefficient and expensive foreign policy that lacks long-term structural benefits. The shift toward transactionalism has transformed the enlargement process into a high-stakes financial negotiation. Instead of a merit-based proces, the relationship has evolved into a model where the EU must effectively “buy” the alignment of Balkan elites with its strategic initiatives. 

In a transactional framework, Balkan leaders act as strategic brokers. They leverage their control over key issues—such as migration routes, energy transit, or regional stability—to extract financial concessions from the EU. The concept of weaponized interdependence (as defined by Farrell and Newman) is central to understanding this dynamic. The Western Balkan migration route is a prime example of weaponized interdependence. Local leaders understand that the EU’s internal stability depends on their border management. This creates a “reverse leverage” where the EU pays a high “protection fee” to avoid a political crisis at home, often turning a blind eye to domestic corruption in the region. While the EU uses its financial power to influence the Balkans, Balkan elites have learned to weaponize their own fragility. They signal that without continuous EU “investments,” their states might collapse, export instability, or fall entirely under the influence of rivals (China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” or Russia’s energy leverage).

3. Security Implications

3.1. Fragmented Security Architecture

The Western Balkans and Eastern neighbourhood are integral components of European security. However, without full integration, cooperation remains partial and insufficient.

Although candidate countries collaborate with EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol, this cooperation is limited by institutional constraints and lack of trust. Information sharing, joint operations, and strategic alignment remain incomplete, creating gaps in the EU’s security architecture.

In crisis situations—such as a sudden increase in migration flows—these gaps can become critical. Member states may resort to unilateral measures, undermining collective responses and exacerbating instability.

• The Trust Deficit: Law enforcement agencies do not share goals fully because there is no perception of a “shared future.”
• The “Every Man for Himself” Risk: In a future migrant crisis, without integration, the current architecture will collapse as each country relies solely on protecting its own territory, leading to regional deterioration.

3.2. Migration and Border Management Risks

Migration management illustrates the limitations of partial integration. While candidate countries play a key role in controlling migration routes, they do not fully share the EU’s objectives or capabilities. 

Without full integration into the EU’s security architecture, the Western Balkan route remains a permanent vulnerability. Current cooperation with Frontex is transactional and fragile. In the event of a new major migration crisis, the lack of shared goals and trust would lead to a “save yourself” approach. Member states would likely reinstate internal borders (Schengen collapse), leading to the disintegration of one of the EU’s greatest achievements.

This creates a structural vulnerability: the EU depends on external partners for border control without having full oversight or alignment. In the event of a major migration crisis, this arrangement is likely to break down, leading to fragmented responses and increased pressure on EU borders.

3.3. Persistence of Hard Security Commitments

The EU continues to maintain security missions in regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. These missions require significant resources and limit the EU’s ability to respond to other global challenges.

Without enlargement, these commitments risk becoming permanent. Integration, by contrast, would allow for the internalization of security responsibilities and more efficient allocation of EU resources.

3.4. Hybrid Threats and Cybersecurity

The EU and its neighbourhood share a common security space, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and disinformation. Non-enlargement weakens collective resilience against these threats.

External actors exploit governance weaknesses, media capture, and societal divisions to spread disinformation and undermine democratic institutions. Without deeper integration, the EU cannot effectively counter these threats at their source.

3.5. External Interference in Security:

 External Interference in Security: A stagnant enlargement process allows strategic rivals to establish military and intelligence footprints in the region. This turns a potential “zone of peace and prosperity” into a “theatre of rivalry,” forcing the EU to spend significantly more on border defense and hybrid threat mitigation than it would have spent on the pre-accession process.

3.6. Importing Instability

A security vacuum in the neighborhood inevitably exports organized crime, human smuggling, and cyber threats into the heart of the Union. The cost of “policing” a hostile or unstable neighborhood far exceeds the cost of integrating it into a common law enforcement framework.

4. Economic and Environmental Costs

4.1. Missed Economic Opportunities

The Western Balkans and Eastern neighbourhood offer significant economic potential, particularly in the context of nearshoring and supply chain diversification.

Non-enlargement prevents the full integration of these markets into the EU economy, limiting growth opportunities and reducing economic resilience. It also increases the cost of maintaining stability through external funding mechanisms.

Lost Markets and Resources: While the EU hesitates, strategic rivals—primarily China—are securing long-term concessions in critical sectors such as rare earth minerals, energy infrastructure, and digital networks in the Balkans and the East. This creates a “leak” in the European Single Market’s influence, making the EU more dependent on supply chains controlled by revisionist powers.

Similarly, Enrico Letta’s report on the Future of the Single Market underscores that a larger EU remains the most effective tool to protect European interests and prosperity, uphold the rule of law, and defend EU citizens from external threats

4.2. Strategic Autonomy and Supply Chains

Enlargement is closely linked to the EU’s goal of strategic autonomy. Integrating neighbouring economies would strengthen supply chains and reduce dependence on external actors.

While the EU hesitates, strategic rivals—primarily China—are securing long-term concessions in critical sectors such as rare earth minerals, energy infrastructure, and digital networks in the Balkans and the East. This creates a “leak” in the European Single Market’s influence, making the EU more dependent on supply chains controlled by revisionist powers. Without enlargement, these regions may become integrated into alternative economic networks dominated by China or other powers, further weakening the EU’s position.

4.3. Environmental Externalities

Regulatory divergence in environmental standards creates cross-border risks. Peripheral regions may attract pollution-intensive industries, effectively becoming environmental “buffer zones.”

Issues such as water management, energy production, and pollution in shared ecosystems (e.g., the Adriatic Sea) require coordinated governance that is difficult to achieve without integration.

5. Internal EU Dynamics and Institutional Challenges

5.1. Deepening Internal Divisions

Enlargement debates increasingly reflect broader divisions within the EU. Member states differ on priorities, timelines, and conditionality, leading to policy paralysis. These divisions undermine the EU’s ability to act strategically and weaken its external credibility.

• Internal Political Cleavages: The “enlargement vs. treaty change” deadlock creates a paralyzing North-South and East-West divide. This internal friction prevents the EU from reaching consensus on other critical issues, such as defense spending or energy transition, as enlargement becomes a “hostage” to broader institutional disputes.

5.2. Enlargement Fatigue and Lack of Strategic Vision

The current approach to enlargement is characterized by short-term crisis management rather than long-term strategic planning. There is limited reflection on potential failure scenarios and their consequences.

This lack of strategic vision increases the risk of repeating past mistakes and failing to adapt to changing geopolitical realities.

Policy Recommendations             

Non-enlargement is not a neutral scenario—it is a strategic risk with far-reaching consequences. A stalled enlargement process weakens the EU’s geopolitical position, undermines its security, and accelerates fragmentation both internally and externally.

A renewed commitment to enlargement—grounded in credibility, conditionality, and strategic vision—is essential for safeguarding the future of the European Union as a global actor.

Restore Credibility through a Structured Accession Process

The EU must provide clear, transparent, and time-bound accession pathways. This includes:

• Defining intermediate milestones 
• Linking reforms to tangible benefits, Ensure consistent application of conditionality  
• Improving communication with citizens in both member and candidate states

Credibility is the cornerstone of effective conditionality.

Strengthen Rule of Law Conditionality

Geopolitical urgency must not undermine core principles. The EU should:

• Maintain strict accession criteria Avoid political shortcuts 
• Strengthen monitoring mechanisms, Ensure reforms are substantive and sustainable  
• Ensure reversibility of benefits in case of backsliding 
• This prevents the emergence of internal veto players that could weaken the Union from within, Prevent internal destabilization through premature accessio

Use Financial Leverage Strategically

• Expand pre-accession funding 
• Link financial support to concrete reform outcomes 
• Invest in infrastructure and green transition 

Strategic Communication 

For enlargement to succeed, EU leaders must move beyond technocratic language and engage in a sincere, transparent dialogue with their own societies. The lack of a clear narrative has allowed skepticism to grow, particularly regarding the perceived competition between the “new” candidates (Ukraine and Moldova) and the Western Balkans. EU leaders must communicate that the enlargement process is not a “zero-sum game.” Strategic communication cannot be limited to Brussels summits. It must reach the ” citizens in both the current Member States and candidate countries.

The EU must be clear that while the opportunity is geopolitical, the entry remains strictly merit-based. This “tough love” narrative helps reassure EU citizens that standards of rule of law and corruption-fighting will not be lowered for the sake of speed.

Strengthen Democratic Resilience

• Increase funding for civil society and independent media 
• Build transnational democratic networks 
• Counter disinformation and foreign interference 

Enhance Security Integration

Deepen cooperation in border management and law enforcement 

• Integrate candidate countries into cybersecurity frameworks 
• Develop joint responses to hybrid threats 

Invest in Youth and Future Leadership

• Expand educational and mobility programmes 
• Support emerging pro-European leaders 
• Encourage youth participation in governance 

_________________

The paper authored by Szpala on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post The Strategic Costs of Non-Enlargement: Why EU Inaction in the Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood Undermines European Security and Global Influence appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

The European Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies toward Eastern Europe have undergone significant transformation over the past decade, shaped by shifting geopolitical realities, internal EU debates, and divergent domestic political trajectories among partner states. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have long been regarded as the most advanced reformers within the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), sharing a declared strategic objective of EU membership and a commitment to political association and economic integration with the Union^[1]. Their cooperation with the EU was formalised through Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), which were designed to anchor long-term reform and gradual integration into the EU’s internal market.

This shared trajectory was further institutionalised through the launch of the Associated Trio format in May 2021. Established by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as a coordination mechanism, the Associated Trio aimed to strengthen cooperation on EU integration, align reform priorities, and jointly advocate for clearer membership perspectives within the EU framework^[2]. The format emerged in response to dissatisfaction with the Eastern Partnership’s increasingly heterogeneous nature and its inability to differentiate sufficiently between countries with explicit accession ambitions and those pursuing more limited forms of cooperation^[3].

By promoting coordinated diplomacy and joint reform messaging, the Associated Trio sought to increase its collective leverage vis-à-vis EU institutions and Member States. In this sense, the Trio represented an attempt to shift the EU’s eastern policy from a neighbourhood management logic toward a more explicitly enlargement-oriented approach, grounded in differentiation and merit-based progress^[4]. However, the political and strategic relevance of the Associated Trio has progressively faded since 2022.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine fundamentally reshaped the EU’s enlargement policy, prompting an unprecedented geopolitical re-evaluation of accession priorities. The EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 and to open accession negotiations with both countries in 2024 marked a decisive move away from regional formats toward individualised accession tracks^[5]. At the same time, Georgia’s domestic political trajectory—characterised by democratic backsliding, restrictions on civil society, and deteriorating relations with EU institutions—has undermined the premise of a shared reform path that underpinned the Associated Trio^[6].

As a result, the EU has increasingly adopted a bilateral and differentiated approach, prioritising country-specific conditionality over collective regional coordination. While the Associated Trio continues to exist formally, it no longer functions as a meaningful driver of EU integration, reflecting broader tensions within enlargement policy between geopolitical urgency and normative conditionality, and between regional cooperation and differentiated accession pathways^[7].

Against this backdrop, this paper examines the current state of EU enlargement, integration, and regional cooperation in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia; identifies the root causes of stagnation and declining credibility in the process; and assesses the most viable pathways forward. Drawing on desk research, analysis of EU progress reports and strategic documents, media monitoring, and expert assessments, the paper situates the decline of the Associated Trio within the broader crisis—and potential renewal—of EU enlargement policy in the Eastern neighbourhood.

The Current State of EU Integration for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

The EU integration trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have diverged significantly since 2022, despite their shared institutional and political starting point within the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio framework. While all three countries pursued Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) as pathways toward eventual EU membership, the post-2022 period has been marked by increasing differentiation, driven by geopolitical shocks, domestic political developments, and the EU’s recalibrated enlargement strategy.

 Ukraine: Accelerated Integration under Exceptional Circumstances

Ukraine’s EU integration has progressed at an unprecedented political speed, largely as a consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The war transformed Ukraine from a neighbourhood partner into a strategic frontline state, prompting the EU to grant candidate status within months of Kyiv’s application and to open accession negotiations in 2024^[8]. This acceleration reflects a broader geopoliticisation of enlargement, in which security considerations increasingly complement—and at times compete with—traditional merit-based conditionality.

At the same time, Ukraine’s progress is characterised by a paradox. On the one hand, the European Commission’s enlargement reports acknowledge substantial legislative alignment with the EU acquis, particularly in anti-corruption policy, judicial governance, public administration reform, and alignment with EU foreign and security policy positions (European Commission 2023; 2024). On the other hand, implementation gaps remain pronounced. Wartime conditions strain administrative capacity, weaken oversight mechanisms, and complicate the enforcement of newly adopted legislation. This reinforces a long-observed pattern in EU enlargement whereby formal compliance outpaces substantive institutional transformation^[9]

Moreover, Ukraine’s integration path has become increasingly exceptionalised. The scale of EU financial assistance, the creation of the Ukraine Facility, and the linkage between reconstruction and accession distinguish Ukraine from other candidates and undermine the original logic of regional coordination embodied in the Associated Trio. While this exceptionalism strengthens Ukraine’s short-term integration prospects, it may raise longer-term questions about the consistency and credibility of EU conditionality.

 Moldova: Reform Momentum amid Structural Vulnerability

Moldova’s EU integration trajectory represents a case of comparatively strong reform commitment combined with acute structural vulnerability. Like Ukraine, Moldova applied for EU membership in 2022 and was granted candidate status shortly thereafter. Accession negotiations formally began in 2024, reflecting Brussels’ assessment that Chişinău had met the initial political conditions related to judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, and public administration capacity^[10].

Moldova’s progress has been driven by a relatively cohesive pro-European political leadership and sustained cooperation with EU institutions. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova operates in a non-war environment, allowing for more consistent reform implementation. However, its integration path is constrained by state fragility, economic dependence, and external leverage—most notably Russia’s influence through energy supply disruptions and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict^[11].

Moldova thus illustrates a key tension in EU enlargement policy: while formal reform benchmarks may be met, external vulnerability and domestic polarisation threaten the sustainability of integration. The EU’s approach toward Moldova increasingly combines accession conditionality with resilience-building measures, including energy diversification, macro-financial assistance, and support for strategic communication. This hybrid model reflects an implicit recognition that classical enlargement tools alone are insufficient in highly exposed states.

 Georgia: Candidate Status without Credible Accession Momentum

Georgia presents the most analytically significant contrast. Despite long being considered a frontrunner in the Eastern Partnership, Georgia’s EU integration has stagnated and, in some areas, reversed drastically. Although Georgia was granted candidate status in late 2023 with conditions, the European Commission has repeatedly underlined serious democratic backsliding, including the erosion of judicial independence, restrictions on civil society, and confrontational rhetoric toward EU institutions^[12].

Moreover, Georgias case demonstrates the limits of EU leverage in contexts where ruling elites instrumentalise European integration rhetorically while undermining its normative foundations in practice. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia’s stagnation cannot be explained by war or institutional weakness alone, but rather by deliberate political choices by ruling elite. This has led the EU to effectively freeze meaningful accession engagement, reinforcing a de facto bilateral differentiation that excludes Georgia from the accelerated enlargement track.

Georgia’s case also highlights the collapse of the Associated Trio as a functional framework. The Trio presupposed parallel reform trajectories and shared strategic orientation; Georgia’s democratic regression has invalidated this assumption and reinforced the EU’s preference for country-specific conditionality over regional formats. Echoing this trend, one expert described the process as “pretty much frozen… with some progress being reversed.”^[13]

Comparative Assessment and Implications

Taken together, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia exemplify a shift in EU enlargement policy from a regionally coordinated, neighbourhood-based approach toward highly differentiated, geopolitically informed accession pathways. Ukraine’s integration is driven by security imperatives and exceptional support; Moldova’s by reformist leadership tempered by vulnerability; and Georgia’s by political backsliding that has eroded trust and momentum.

This differentiation has improved the EU’s capacity to tailor engagement, but it has also contributed to perceptions of inconsistency and declining credibility. The fading relevance of the Associated Trio underscores a broader structural challenge: the EU has yet to reconcile its normative enlargement framework with the geopolitical realities of its eastern neighbourhood. As a result, current integration trajectories remain uneven, fragile, and highly contingent on both domestic political will and external security dynamics. This fragmentation is widely acknowledged, with experts noting that “the Associated Trio doesn’t really exist anymore.”^[14] .”

Root Causes of Stagnation and obstacles in the EU Integration Process

Despite renewed geopolitical momentum since 2022, the EU integration processes of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia continue to suffer from persistent stagnation and in case of Georgia declining credibility. This stagnation is not the result of a single factor but rather a combination of domestic structural weaknesses, political agency, external interference, and limitations inherent in the EU’s enlargement methodology itself. While these factors manifest differently across the three countries, their cumulative effect has undermined both reform sustainability and trust in the enlargement process.

 Structural Governance Weaknesses and Implementation Gaps

A primary cause of stagnation lies in the enduring gap between formal legal alignment and effective implementation of reforms. Across Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, EU-driven reforms have often prioritized the adoption of legislation over deeper institutional transformation. This pattern reflects a broader limitation of EU conditionality, which is more effective in promoting rule adoption than rule enforcement.^[15]

In Ukraine, wartime conditions exacerbate these structural weaknesses. While legislative output has accelerated, oversight mechanisms and judicial independence remain constrained, raising concerns about long-term institutional resilience. Moldova faces similar implementation challenges, albeit in a non-war context, where limited administrative capacity and politicised institutions hinder consistent reform execution. Georgia, by contrast, demonstrates how implementation gaps can become politically intentional, with reforms selectively reversed or undermined by governing elites. As one expert noted, “it’s not even frozen—it’s backtracking… going back rather than moving forward.”^[16]

Domestic Political Dynamics and Elite Incentives

Political will remains a decisive factor shaping reform trajectories. In Ukraine and Moldova, reform momentum has been driven by relatively strong pro-European leadership; however, this commitment is uneven and vulnerable to electoral cycles, elite capture, and public fatigue. In Georgia, stagnation is best explained not by incapacity but by political choice. The ruling elite has increasingly framed EU conditionality as external interference, while instrumentalising European integration rhetoric for domestic legitimacy^[17].

This divergence highlights a critical weakness in the enlargement process: EU leverage is contingent on domestic elite incentives. Where elites perceive EU integration as politically or economically costly, compliance diminishes. The EU’s inability to effectively sanction democratic regression short of suspending the entire accession process further weakens its influence. This aligns with expert assessments that “the authorities effectively placed Georgia outside the EU accession process… accepting democratic deterioration as the price they are willing to pay.”^[18]

Reform Fatigue and Diminishing Societal Trust

Reform fatigue among both political elites and societies has contributed significantly to credibility loss. In all three countries, citizens have been exposed to prolonged reform demands without clear, tangible rewards. Prior to 2022, the absence of a credible membership perspective fostered scepticism about whether reforms would ever lead to accession^[19]. Although candidate status has partially restored optimism in Ukraine and Moldova, delays and vague timelines risk reigniting disillusionment.

In Georgia, declining public trust in the EU integration process has been actively fueled by Governing elites polarising narratives that portray the EU as inconsistent and politically biased. This erosion of societal consensus undermines one of the EU’s key sources of normative power: domestic demand for reform. As reflected in societal perceptions, “even if we changed our European policy today, restoring trust would take considerable time.”^[20]

 External Interference and Geopolitical Pressure

Russian influence remains a central external factor contributing to stagnation. Through military aggression, energy leverage, disinformation campaigns, and political interference, Russia has actively sought to disrupt EU integration efforts in all three states on the EU’s periphery.^[21]  Moldova’s energy vulnerability and unresolved Transnistrian conflict exemplify how external leverage constrains reform autonomy. In Georgia, demise of democratic institutions, indirect Russian influence and ideological convergence with Moscow^[22] intersects with domestic elite interests, amplifying anti-EU narratives without overt military pressure.

For Ukraine, the war has paradoxically strengthened EU commitment while simultaneously straining state capacity. This dual effect illustrates how geopolitical urgency can accelerate political decisions while undermining reform quality and sustainability. This is compounded by regional dynamics where “the region could become an arena of confrontation… in terms of influence and interests.”^[23]

 EU-Level Constraints and Methodological Inconsistencies

Finally, stagnation and credibility loss are partly rooted within the EU itself. Internal divisions among Member States regarding enlargement, concerns over absorption capacity, and enlargement fatigue have produced ambiguous signals to candidate countries .^[24] While the EU insists on merit-based conditionality, geopolitical exceptions—particularly in Ukraine’s case—create perceptions of inconsistency.

Moreover, the shift toward differentiated, bilateral accession tracks has effectively sidelined regional frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership and the Associated Trio. While differentiation allows for tailored engagement, it also weakens collective incentives and reinforces perceptions that enlargement outcomes depend more on geopolitical utility than on reform performance. Indeed, external observers highlight that “there is really not a strategy… no clear vision on how to deal with Georgia”.⁵

 Comparative Assessment

Comparatively, Ukraine’s stagnation is primarily structural and war-induced, Moldova’s is rooted in vulnerability and capacity constraints, and Georgia’s stems from authoritarianism and political backsliding. Yet all three cases expose a shared credibility problem: the EU’s enlargement policy struggles to balance geopolitical necessity with normative conditionality. Without addressing this imbalance, reform backsliding and scepticism toward EU integration are likely to persist.

Conclusion

The trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia illustrate not only the opportunities inherent in EU enlargement but also the significant costs of stagnation or non-enlargement. For the aspirant countries themselves, failure to secure full membership or a credible accession pathway threatens to undermine both political stability and economic development. In Ukraine, the absence of a tangible EU membership horizon risks eroding reform momentum achieved during the wartime period. While legislative alignment has accelerated under the extraordinary pressures of war, long-term institutional resilience remains fragile. If accession remains indeterminate, the domestic political elite may deprioritize reforms once immediate survival pressures subside, potentially reopening vulnerabilities to corruption, oligarchic influence, and inefficiencies in governance.¹ Similarly, public trust in European integration—already strained by the slow pace of EU decision-making and complex negotiation procedures—may weaken, undermining the social legitimacy of pro-European policies and stoking internal political polarization.²

In Moldova, non-enlargement carries comparable structural and security risks. The country’s institutional fragility, energy dependence, and ongoing geopolitical vulnerability make EU membership a critical anchor for sustainable governance and resilience against external pressures. Failure to progress credibly toward accession could embolden pro-Russian political actors, reverse recent reform gains, and increase the likelihood of political instability or policy oscillation, particularly in energy, trade, and security policy.^[25] Georgia’s situation is even more acute: democratic backsliding and elite instrumentalization of EU rhetoric indicate that the absence of credible conditionality or membership prospects exacerbates the risk of authoritarian consolidation. Non-enlargement may reinforce elite incentives to resist reform, diminish civic space further, and weaken the broader societal consensus on European integration.^[26] As participants emphasized, “we are losing the advantages we were proud of… restoring them will take a great deal of time.”⁸

From the EU’s perspective, non-enlargement carries tangible strategic, economic, and normative costs. Strategically, it risks leaving a geopolitical vacuum in the Eastern neighbourhood, one which Russia has repeatedly sought to exploit. Allowing stagnation or regression in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia could increase regional instability, disrupt energy and trade networks, and prolong security risks on the EU’s eastern flank.^[27] Economically, delaying enlargement limits the potential for integration of new markets and investment flows, including in sectors critical to energy security, agriculture, and digital infrastructure. This is particularly significant for the EU as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and strengthen supply chain resilience post-2022.^[28]

Normatively, non-enlargement undermines the credibility of the EU’s political and institutional model. The perception that the EU can reward compliance with formal legal alignment while failing to deliver meaningful accession signals weakens the Union’s transformative power. This risk is compounded by the selective application of conditionality, such as the accelerated negotiation track for Ukraine compared to the stagnation of Georgia. Inconsistent messaging risks creating a “credibility deficit,” reducing the EU’s ability to shape governance outcomes in other partner countries, and diminishing its normative appeal globally.^[29] From a strategic perspective, this risks that “the EU would lose a reliable partner in the region and access to key connectivity routes”.^[30]

Finally, the costs of non-enlargement are mutually reinforcing. For the aspirant states, the erosion of reform momentum and societal trust makes them more vulnerable to external influence. For the EU, failure to act decisively diminishes geopolitical leverage, economic opportunity, and normative authority. In this context, the strategic imperative is clear: sustained, credible enlargement pathways—combined with targeted support for governance, civil society, and resilience—are not only normative obligations but essential for the EU’s own security and influence. A coherent approach would reconcile geopolitical urgency with merit-based conditionality, ensuring that enlargement continues to serve as a transformative instrument rather than a symbolic gesture. Only by addressing the risks of stagnation and reinforcing incentives for reform can the EU, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia avoid the compounded costs of non-enlargement, securing long-term stability, prosperity, and democratic consolidation in the Eastern neighbourhood.

References:

Blockmans, Steven. The EU’s Geopolitical Turn: Enlargement as a Strategic Imperative. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2023.

Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.

Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.

Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140.

Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.

Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.

Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics(February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.

European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020.

European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023.

European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.

European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.

European Comission. European Council Conclusions on Ukraine. Brussels, 2022.

European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025.

Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024.

Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023.

Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).

Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638.

Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.

Lehne, Stefan. A Reluctant Magnet: Navigating the EU’s Absorption Capacity. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023.

Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021.

Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023.

Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679.

Footnotes (Chicago style)

1. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

2. Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

3. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

4. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

5. Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026.

6. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

7. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

8. Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026.

9. Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026.

^[1] European Commission. Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020. Brussels, 2020; Delcour, Laure. The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”. London: Routledge, 2019.

^[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Joint Memorandum on Enhanced Cooperation for European Integration (Associated Trio). Kyiv, 2021

^[3] Korosteleva, Elena. “Reassessing the Eastern Partnership: Bringing the Neighbourhood Back In.” Journal of Common Market Studies 59, no. 2 (2021): 1–17.

^[4] European Council. Council Conclusions on the Eastern Partnership. Brussels, 2021.

^[5] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024

^[6] Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024

^[7] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022.

^[8] European Comission. Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. Brussels, 2023; European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024

^[9] Börzel, Tanja A., and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU’s Political Conditionality in Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 121–140

^[10] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024.

^[11] Delcour, Laure, and Kataryna Wolczuk. “Between the EU and Russia: Integration, Vulnerability and Resilience in Moldova.” Europe-Asia Studies 75, no. 4 (2023): 623–642.

^[12] European Commission. Enlargement Package 2024. Brussels, 2024; Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2024: Georgia. Washington, DC, 2024

^[13] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[14] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[15] Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679

^[16] Respondent 1 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[17] Ekman, Per. “Geopolitics and Autocratisation in Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Georgia.” East European Politics (February 2026): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2026.2627182.

^[18] Respondent 2 (Georgia), interview by author, 2026

^[19] Bonomi, Matteo. Why Credible EU Membership Matters: How to Sequence Integration and Accession in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. IAI Brief. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2026.

^[20] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026

^[21] Kakachia, Kornely, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Shota Kakabadze. “Transactional Hedging versus Value-Based Hedging: How Small Frontline States Balance between European Integration and Russian Influence.” European Security 33, no. 4 (2024): 594–614. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2024.2388638

^[22] Kakachia, Kornely, and Shota Kakabadze. “Die georgisch-russischen Beziehungen: Von der Beeinflussung zur ideologischen Konvergenz.” Russland-Analysen 465 (2025).

^[23] Focus Group Participant (Georgia), focus group discussion, 2026

^[24] Respondent 1 (Moldova), interview by author, 2026

^[25] Gherasimov, Cristina. Moldova’s European Path: Between Reform Momentum and Geopolitical Pressure. London: Chatham House, 2023

^[26] Nodia, Ghia. Georgia’s Democratic Backsliding and the Crisis of Europeanisation. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2023

^[27] Blockmans, Steven, and Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU’s Eastern Enlargement after Ukraine. Brussels: CEPS, 2022

^[28] European Parliament. Towards Renewed and Beneficial EU Enlargement. Briefing, March 10, 2025

^[29] Manoli, Panagiota. “The EU Must Solve the Credibility Deficit in Its Enlargement Policy.” LSE European Politics Blog, 2026

^[30] Pociumban, Anastasia. Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in Its Eastern Neighbourhood. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), May 28, 2025

________________________

The paper authored by Kornely Kakachia on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post The Costs of Non-Enlargement and the Imperative for Strategic EU Engagement in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Executive Summary

The recent reinvigoration of the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkan region should be understood as an exogenous effect of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which entails a consistent and intricate interaction between the geopolitical reasons in favor of the EU enlargement and the transformative power of the European Union. Analyzing the costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans requires acknowledgment of the unique features of the EU polity, which relate to the EU integration as a peace project, an efficient single market, and a political system based on liberal democracy. From this perspective, the geopolitical drive and the transformative role of the EU are two sides of the same coin. In the absence of full membership of the Western Balkans in the European Union, the transformative role of the EU will erode, and the leverage of non-Western external powers will increase, causing the Western Balkan region to drift away from the European Union. The socioeconomic convergence of the Westen Balkan region with the EU will not be sufficient if it is not accompanied by an externally induced political accountability. Furthermore, Western Balkan societies risk becoming more polarized, and the gap between the citizens and the ruling elite may widen. 

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) has been, on the one hand, an affirmation of its identity, and on the other hand, a policy instrument for reinforcing and projecting the EU’s role as a normative power within and beyond its institutional boundaries. To a large extent, the EU’s enlargement policy is described as being central to its foreign policy (Armakolas et al., 2024; Koval & Vachudova, 2024), which enables the EU to sustain the stability and continuity of its peace project, as the most significant feature of EU integration. The central dilemma that the EU faces when addressing the prospective accession of the candidate states of the Western Balkans revolves around the assumed dichotomy between the transformative power of the EU to in shaping the domestic political system of the candidate states in the Western Balkans and the geopolitical momentum of the enlargement after following the Russian aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. 

The process of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, and the enlargement policy itself, with its regulatory, centralized, asymmetric, and rule-based practices, is usually construed as a self-contained and insular process (Džihić & Rauch, 2026; Morina, 2025; Shahini, 2024). The gap between the normative underpinings of the EU enlargement policy and the actual “ways of ruling” of the candidate countries in the Western Balkans is quite apparent. In other words, the presence of politicized public administrations, weak enforcement of rule-of-law norms, inconsistent practices of political accountability, and pervasive political corruption in the Western Balkans, which is conventionally referred to as “state capture” (Džankić, 2025; Vachudova, 2019, p. 64), bring to the fore the actual relevant scope and effect of the transformative power of the EU on the political systems of the Western Balkans. This particular perspective separates the transformative power of the EU from the existing geopolitical context. The geopolitical momentum is defined as leading to a suboptimal outcome of the EU enlargement, particularly if security and geopolitical reasons prevail over “strict norm enforcement” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 8) regarding the rule of law, media freedom, and accountable political institutions, transforming the EU enlargement policy into an instrument that rewards political membership (Nić et al., 2026, p. 8) of selected candidate countries in the Western Balkans. 

However, when the EU is primarily understood as a sustained peace project, with its unique post-national and post-sovereigntist institutionalized identity that combines liberal democracy with a single market, the geopolitical context becomes consistently interlinked with the transformative power of the EU, as it has always been in the previous rounds of EU enlargement to post-authoritarian countries, despite the different degrees of geopolitical challenges. Henceforth, this policy paper argues that to analyze the costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans and the efficiency of the current enlargement policy itself, it is important to consider the externalization effect (Hooghe & Marks, 2005), as suggested by the neofunctionalist approach, in conjunction with institutional reforms and political transformations in the candidate states. As Hooghe and Marks state, according to the neofunctionalist approach, the externalization effect is manifested as “solidarity induced by conflict with a foreign power – [that] can be a powerful source of integration” (2005, p. 215). 

This perspective is of utmost relevance to the Western Balkans, whose trajectory towards EU accession has experienced inconsistent credibility of the EU’s commitments, as characterized by its strategic ambiguity (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 6) when the European continent was not yet facing increasing geopolitical challenges from competing external powers (Morina, 2025). At the same time, it is important to highlight the fact that political representatives of the candidate states in the region, which are primarily incumbent governing elites, have not been consistently committed to the transformative political and institutional reforms (Džankić, Keil, & Kmezić et al., 2019; Kmezić, 2019, p. 93) demanded by the EU. The Russian war against Ukraine led to the phasing out of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. This previous EU policy had emphasized the increased linkage of the EU – and hence its leverage – to the eastern flank of the its institutional border. The overhaul of this policy and its replacement with an encompassing, vigorous, and renewed EU enlargement policy for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and for the Western Balkans, is a strong indication of this externalization. As a consequence, Zelenskyy’s response to Chancellor Merz’s policy proposal for an “associate membership” of Ukraine to the EU that “[w]e are defending Europe – fully, not partially, and not with half measures”(Hayden, 2026) underlines the pervasive and constant feature of this round of EU enlargement, indicating the external threat to the European peace project and security. The question posed by Hooghe and Marks (2005) two decades ago as to whether “external conflict with a foreign power” (p. 215) will shape the process of EU integration should be heeded and answered in the affirmative. 

 The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the role of external third parties involved in geopolitical competition with the EU in exerting influence in the semi-periphery of the EU by promoting alternative developmental and political trajectories that fall short of stable and consolidated liberal democracies, and which may stall the EU accession of the Western Balkan region, set the bounds for the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio. As the prevailing official narrative of the EU integration project evokes the resilience of its peace project through crises, the ability of the EU to forestall being downgraded or facing disintegration has been dependent on constant cycles of institutional and policy innovations, including its enlargement policy. Policy derogations and differentiated horizontal or vertical integration of the existing EU member states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2023), after successful rounds of EU enlargement, attest to David Mitrany’s functionalist idea of the EU polity as “a network of jurisdictions with variable membership, variable decision rules and of variable durability, depending on the need and acceptability” (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 208). Similarly, the establishment of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, “to financially support gradual integration” (Morina, 2025, p. 14) and “to integrate the region more closely into the single market” (2025, p. 14) prior to full membership, as well as the revision of the EU enlargement methodology highlighting the reversibility and close monitoring of the rule of law and democratic political institutions, through pre- and post-accession mechanisms such as the Rule of Law Report, demonstrate the important role of institutional innovations of the EU enlargement policy that reduce the costs of credible commitments of the ruling elites of the candidate states to the EU enlargement path. The process of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkan region involves, albeit to different degrees, practices of member state building (Keil, 2013; Keil & Arkan, 2014) and externally induced political accountability of political institutions, and of normative “alignment with the EU’s values, laws, standards, policies” (Shahini, 2024, p. 11). Therefore, the real and consequential costs of the non-enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkan region, as discussed in this policy paper, will affect, to a larger extent, the sustainability of the transformative reforms rather than merely the socioeconomic convergence (Shahini, 2024, p. 11). 

Exogeneous Spillover as the Geopolitical Driver of the EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans 

The actorness and normative power of the EU in “an increasingly rogue and illiberal international environment” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 8) is predicated upon the EU’s response to “competing geopolitical actors” (Džihić & Rauch, 2026, p. 9), and to conflicts or wars in the near abroad of the European Union. Phasing out the EU Eastern Partnership policy for the Eastern Trio and the opening of accession negotiations with Albania, as well as progressing with the accession negotiations with Montenegro, in the last few years are strong indicators that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has acted as a catalyst for provoking an exogeneous spillover (Binici, 2020, p. 12) to the EU enlargement policy and process. On the other hand, had the EU institutions been reluctant to exploit their policy innovation skills in the policy area of EU enlargement, such as the gradual integration as an example of policy innovation, the Western Balkans Growth Plan and other overlapping mechanisms of conditionality and benchmarking, which according to some experts do not help in resolving the inconsistency of the EU’s credibility (Emerson & Blockmans, 2025), the mutual interdependence between the exogeneous spillover of the continuous geopolitical challenge and the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans would not have been obvious. It should be noted that this concrete exogeneous spillover, in combination with the actual institutional and policy innovations of the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkans, has enabled the EU to break the cycle of “inconsistency and incremental transactionalism” (Džankić, 2025, p.75) and constrain the executive aggrandizement of the incumbent governments in the candidate states. 

The understanding that the geopolitical drive of the EU enlargement and its transformative power concerning the Western Balkans work at cross-purposes obfuscates the consistent interaction, if not interdependence, between security and geopolitical reasons for the EU to enlarge to post-authoritarian countries and political and institutional reforms, even in the previous round of EU enlargement. The historical context of the EU accession path of post-communist central European countries was marked with initial doubts and incertitudes on the part of key representatives of EU member states, which “tried to keep the new democratizing member states at bay” (Koval & Vachudova, 2024, p. 2) and initially provided European agreements that were short of full membership of the EU. However, the “membership perspective came after…missteps by the EU” (Koval & Vachudova, 2024, p. 2). As Koval and Vachudova argue, drawing parallels between the reinvigoration of the EU accession pathway of the central East European and the EU accession pathway of the Western Balkans: “In 1999 and 2022, the EU reached for enlargement in response to the war in its neighborhood” (2024). Although seemingly a less complex EU enlargement, the 1980s enlargement to the post-authoritarian states of the southern European region had still been motivated by an exogenous spillover effect due to the daunting task of safeguarding the emerging democracies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Nić et al., 2026). Ultimately, despite the different degrees of external challenges to the EU political system and regional integration, the geopolitical context has been a consistent structural feature of the reinvigorated EU enlargement policies and processes to regions that cannot simply be relegated to the external bounds of the EU as a “ring of friends”. For these reasons, this opportune critical momentum of the EU enlargement that emerges as a consequence of the exogenous shocks or due to “significant change[s] in [the] regional or international system” (Binici, 2020, p. 81) undermining the EU peace project and the single market (Anghel & Jones, 2024) compels the EU to be innovative in the EU enlargement process. Henceforth, the costs of not enlarging to the Western Balkans are higher. 

Socioeconomic Convergence without Political Accountability 

Although it may sound preposterous to claim that the Western Balkan region will attain a sustainable socioeconomic convergence, in the short term, with the EU, this particular EU policy goal with regard to the Western Balkans has been central to supporting the integration of regional economies into the EU single market for quite some time. The Common Regional Market (CRM) framework that was established for the Western Balkans 6, within the framework of the Berlin Process, predates the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, a roadmap and financial instrument for economic integration formulated in 2023. This particular economic policy of the EU towards the Western Balkans reflects a certain path dependency (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 115) of previous similar policies and is predicated on the institutional and policy practice of functional spillover. Furthermore, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is expected to have political effects as well, linking the financial support to “Reform Agendas, which in part concern the political and the rule of law fundamentals, plus some issues not subject to the EU acquis” (Emerson & Blockmans, 2025, p. 2). Just recently, the European Commission “made available €49 million to Albania, € 44.2 million to Montenegro, and € 65.7 million to North Macedonia under the Reform and Growth Facility” (European Commission, 2026). These funds are allocated primarily to research and innovation, digital technology, and educational policy and to foster a more competitive business environment. 

Notwithstanding the partial implications of this economic and financial policy, which may galvanize norm adoption (Kmezić, 2019, p. 89) concerning the rule of law and democratic institutions in the Western Balkans, without full membership as a final outcome (Morina, 2025, p. 2) of the EU enlargement policy, the socioeconomic convergence will not be sufficient to sustain politically accountable democratic institutions in the long run. One could argue that “…[the] gradual, incremental and horizontal expansion of regional institutionalization, …and regulatory capacity” (Binici, 2020, p. 84) of the EU policies, related to the EU single market, in the Western Balkan region may incentivize domestic interest groups to demand a more efficient and professional public administration, basic rule-of-law practices, and legal predictability without being able to make the incumbent governments and the executive power politically accountable. To a certain extent, if the EU and its institutions and representatives, through the EU enlargement policy, were to desist from interacting primarily with government elites, referred to commonly as “gatekeepers” (Kmezić, 2019, p. 89; Richter & Wunsch, 2020; Vachudova, 2019, p. 66), and involve instead more inclusive political institutions, such as the parliament, and state bureaucratic agencies that exercise horizontal accountability, socioeconomic convergence would be embedded into stable, democratic, and accountable political institutions. The experience of the erosion of democracy during the 16-year rule of Fidesz in Hungary, which was discontinued as a consequence of the societal mobilization and the appeal of restoring the affinity and identification of Hungary with Europe, as well as the short-lived but detrimental rule of the Law and Justice Party in Poland, indicate that such governments “…comply with the rules of the single market while backsliding on liberal democracy” (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1125). Ultimately, non-enlargement to the Western Balkans constitutes a high cost for the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in this region. 

Drifting Away from the EU: Authoritarian Leverage of External Powers 

In the absence of a successful enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkan region, due to the EU’s “strategic ambiguity,” and when the full membership of the Western Balkans is not perceived as the utmost end goal of the EU enlargement policy (Nić et.al, 2026, p. 3), the geopolitical competition between the EU and external powers such as Russia and China, among others, may radically tilt in favor of the latter. When the process of gradual integration is not sufficient to achieve the “political integration” (Risse, 2005, p. 292) of the Western Balkan countries into the EU—a process that implies, among other factors, a considerable political pressure exerted by pro-EU interest groups, civil society, and citizens compelling the political elite to “shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center” (Haas, 1958, p. 16, as quoted in Risse, 2005, p. 292)—the Western Balkan countries will drift away from the EU and develop or reinforce economic, political, and cultural linkages with the external powers, whose leverage will be enhanced. These kinds of arguments, which have been articulated by other experts before (Armakolas et al., 2024; Emerson & Blockmans, 2025; Morina, 2025), rest on the historical experience of the Western Balkans as a region in which “democracy – both as an ideology and as a political regime – has never become socially or institutionally embedded” (Vachudova, 2020 quoted in Džankić, 2025, p. 74; see also Mishkova, 2014). It has been proven that the trade-off between stability and democracy, which for years had been the EU’s informal, yet influential, policy stance on the Western Balkans, at times fomenting the illusion that stability and democracy are “inextricably linked” (Džankić, 2025, p. 75), undermines the transformative power of the EU. 

Taking advantage of the financial crisis of 2008, and of enlargement fatigue, external powers aimed to provide an alternative route to economic growth, modernization, and cultural and foreign policy affinities to the Western Balkan countries. The economic diplomacy of China in the Western Balkan region, as part of the global Belt and Road Initiative, has materialized into Chinese investments and developmental projects in infrastructure, energy, and transport (Chrzová et al., 2019; Rrustemi et al., 2019). On the other hand, Russia, exploiting the cultural, religious, and historical ties with the South Slavic states in the Balkans, has meddled in the region not only as an economic actor, investing in the oil industry, power plants, and tourism, but also as an ideological “disrupter” (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 107) of the societal consensus and support for the EU accession trajectory of the Western Balkan societies. Disseminating disinformation, supporting ethnonationalist leaders such as Dodik of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the 2018 constitutional referendum in North Macedonia, and fomenting skepticism if not distrust towards Euro–Atlantic institutions in Montenegro, Russia has intended to exercise its authoritarian leverage to forestall progress towards the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries and entrench authoritarian leaders in power, acting as a hindrance to the “return to Europe” of the Western Balkan region. It should be reiterated that the economic investments of the external powers in the Western Balkans are characterized as “corrosive capital” (Ben, 2023; Prelec, 2020), as exemplified by the Železara Smederevo steel manufacturing privatization in Serbia (Ben, 2023). In short, political elites and incumbent governments, acting as gatekeepers, allow corrosive capital investments that ultimately weaken political accountability, undermine sustainable economic growth, disregard wider public interests, and challenge rule-of-law practices. In the long run, if the overall goal of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans dissipates, the region will be mired in a constant and yet uncertain geopolitical competition between the EU and non-Western external powers. 

EU candidate countries that are characterized by contested statehood or bilateral disputes, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, are potentially more vulnerable to stagnation in terms of EU accession prospects and non-Western authoritarian leverage. The existing EU enlargement policy does not seem to have a clear strategy aimed at overcoming the structural invariants (Bechev, 2004) of ethnonationalism and intraethnic divides in the Western Balkans. As Koneska et al. argue, “these countries have been failing to balance between the predominant pro-EU discourse and popular support on the one hand, and challenges posed by the…unstable nation-state constellations and the latter’s incompatibility with the process of EU integration, on the other” (2023, p. 187). Predicated on regional cooperation and reconciliation norms, the policy goals of the Berlin Process, which sought to forge a post-sovereigntist and post-national state identity (Sako & Lleshi, 2025) of the Western Balkan countries, has had a limited effect across the region. The very fact that candidate countries such as Serbia, and to some extent Bosnia and Herzegovina, do not align their foreign policy with the EU Foreign and Security Policy shows that the ideological, cultural, and political influence of external powers is equally powerful and an impediment to a European identification and belongingness of these countries. In the end, besides other relevant factors, it should not come as a surprise that Montenegro and Albania, countries that have consistently aligned their foreign policy with the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, are primed as the frontrunners of the EU enlargement to the region. 

Elite–Citizen Divisions and Erosion of the EU Transformative Power 

Although there is considerable criticism of the policy of gradual integration and the overlapping and competing mechanisms of assessing the compliance of the candidate countries with the EU acquis, as well as democratic practices and rule-of-law norms, the EU institutions, through these innovative policy mechanisms of the EU enlargement policy such as gradual integration, “safeguard clauses” (Nić et al., 2026, p. 2), and “post-accession conditionality” (Nić et al., 2026, p. 5), and “transitional arrangements” (Lippert et al., 2026) can bring about a sustainable process of member state building. This particular goal entails accountable democratic institutions, good governance, and rule-of-law practices (Kmezić, 2019). However, if the EU institutions negotiate and interact primarily with the political elite and incumbent governments, without “widen[ing] genuine public participation in the decision-making” (Morina, 2025, p. 9) and without transforming the national parliaments of the candidate countries into pivotal arenas of policymaking, democratic accountability, and bipartisan cooperation, the transformative power of the EU will erode over time. The EU institutions in cooperation with national parliaments, without sidelining the incumbent governments, and civil society organizations need to formulate, sustain, and disseminate a communicative action process that enables societal dialogue and deliberation related to the member state building practices in the candidate countries. As a consequence, instead of demanding that candidate countries’ governments pursue a more inclusive and cooperative society-wide strategy (Morina, 2025), the actual process of benchmark mechanisms, monitoring, and communicative action processes could succeed in responding to the “right to democracy” and not just a “right of accession” (O’Brennan, 2001) of the Western Balkan societies by enforcing an externally induced political accountability in this region. 

According to the Balkan Barometer of December 2025 (Balkan Barometer 2025, 2025), 64 percent of Western Balkan citizens on average support EU membership, a much higher percentage than in previous years or decades. If the EU enlargement policy continues to be characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, and a lack of credible commitments to full membership of the Western Balkan countries, the gap between citizens and the ruling elites will widen. Such a persistent elite divide will potentially undermine the prospects of EU membership of Western Balkan countries and provoke another cycle of competitive authoritarian rule and democratic backsliding or further entrench the existing competitive authoritarian regimes in the region. At best, the EU will be compelled to respond to political and social mobilization in the Western Balkans in favor of restoring the EU prospect of the region, provided that the citizens themselves have not already succumbed to desolation. 

Policy Recommendations 

• The EU institutions and representatives need to constrain the exclusive influence of the executive and transform the legislature in each of the candidate countries as the focal point of political accountability and cooperation. 
• An efficient and sustainable process of member state building should be predicated on effective state bureaucracy and institutional mechanisms of horizontal accountability, as well as an autonomous and professionalized judiciary. 
• Socioeconomic convergence is not sufficient if not supported by externally induced political accountability, which recognizes the pivotal role of pro-EU constituencies and civil society. 
• The process of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans needs to be framed as a barrier to geopolitical competition with other external powers, which undermines the European integration as a unique peace project and as a post-national political system. 
• The EU, by upholding its commitment to full membership of the candidate countries as the end goal of the enlargement policy, will avoid a further divide between citizens and the political elite, which may instigate a deepening of democratic backsliding and authoritarian rule in the Western Balkans. 

References 

Anghel, V., & Jones, E. (2024). The geopolitics of EU enlargement: From club to commons. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 66(4), 101 – 114. 

Armakolas, I. Dimitrov, N., Ioannides, I., Nechev, Z., Popescu-Zamfir, O., & Zeneli, V. (2024). EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where there is a will, there is a way. (Policy Paper). Europe’s Futures. 

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_________________

The paper authored by Prof. Lleshi on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).

The post Costs of Non-Enlargement to the Western Balkans: State Building, Externally Induced Political Accountability, and EU Policy Innovation appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Your Excellency, it has been just over a year since you assumed your diplomatic post in Albania. Do you feel that you have found a second home here?

Partly, yes. Diplomats are professional nomads, with many “homes.” They come and go, always ready to leave. Yet, it’s not true that diplomats become less attached to a country because they know they’ll have to leave. On the contrary, they feel more affection, since they recognize that in every country, and in any experience, there’s something enriching. 

Over this intensive year, which key milestones would you highlight in the development of bilateral relations between Italy and Albania?

I’ve said it often, because I truly believe it: the common challenge for Italy and Albania is transforming their friendship into a strategic partnership. Our bilateral relationship reflects a multitude of new perspectives and can flourish across an array of promising pathways. Choosing what to do—and what not to do—is the basic definition of strategy. When I came here last year, I asked myself: “What is the core here?” I answered, first of all, that an intergovernmental Summit was needed, to consolidate our relations and to accompany Albania in the EU accession negotiations: the Summit was held in Rome in November, at the highest institutional level. We didn’t have a G2G agreement: it was signed, along with 16 other agreements in strategic fields. An Albanian Development Bank was needed: it now exists, created with the support of CDP too. In economic terms, compared to the past, Italy needed to move from a “labor-intensive” presence to a more “capital-intensive” and “innovation-oriented” one. This is the new approach we have been working towards.

You have been a strong advocate of the economic pillar of diplomacy, and much of your engagement in Albania has focused on strengthening economic ties. How would you assess the progress achieved so far?

When I took my office in 2025, I was given statistics saying that there were 2,600 Italian companies operated in Albania. However, I realized they were all small or very small. On the one hand, we have continued to support their internationalization in Albania, because these are a key driver of development. On the other hand, the new face of Italian corporate Italy in this country had also to encompass heavy industry, energy transition, digital technology, and high-value-added services. This is why we worked to bring a bunch of large Italian companies to Albania, global players active in these key sectors. Some have already arrived others will be landing soon. Their presence, in terms of economic diplomacy, is a win-win-win game: it will strengthen the internationalization of companies at a time of geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainty; it will make Italy’s positioning in Albania more solid, strategic and effective; it will help Albania raise its profile (including internationally) in such high-value-added fields. The recently signed Fincantieri-Kayo Joint venture, for example, will help modernize a yard ship and the maritime defense capacity of Albania, in the NATO framework. At the same time, it will create hundreds of new jobs, helping retain talent in Albania. Lastly, this JV will provide Fincantieri with additional shipbuilding capacity, to fulfill orders from around the world. This is a step aligned with a new work strategy: not just “Italy in Albania”, but “Italy with Albania”. The road is long, but we are happy with the results achieved in this year’s work. 

The two Prime Ministers, Edi Rama and Giorgia Meloni, have cultivated a friendly and highly cooperative relationship, marked by a positive personal rapport. How has this dynamic influenced institutional relations between the two countries?

Leaderships’ friendship boosts bilateral relations and make them easier. Diplomacy works to channel friendship towards joint projects, strengthening both the bond and the projects.

Bilateral relations are also deeply rooted in strong people-to-people connections, reflected in cultural exchange, education, and ongoing interactions between our societies. How does this dimension shape and inspire your daily diplomatic work?

The human factor is at the very heart of the Italy-Albania relationship. Our ties are not built only on geographical proximity or strategic interests, but on decades of daily interaction between people, which are still alive. We have hundreds of young Italians studying in Albania, and thousands of Albanian students in Italy. We have archaeological missions, artist residencies and cultural exchanges of all kinds. Furthermore, I guess Italians are the most, or one of the most, numerous tourists in Albania. All of this help strengthening institutional relations. The Embassy believes in this aspect of diplomacy. For this reason, on our social media we share the catchy stories of Albanians with ties to Italy, or who lived in Italy and then returned here: entrepreneurs, artists, chefs, scientists.

Finally, to the extent that you can share, what are your priorities for the coming years? What areas of cooperation should we expect to see further developed between Italy and Albania?

First, accompanying Albania on its path towards the EU accession: we are here to support the reforms required. Second: implementing the deals struck in Rome last November, which is a pragmatic way to help Albania accelerate its modernization. Third: in the next five years, 2025-2030, I would like to triple the Italian foreign investments made in Albania in the previous twenty-five years, that is 2000-2025. A big Italy-Albania business forum is under preparation with AIDA (to be hopefully held in fall 2026). Fourth: working to advance Corridor VIII: this is a geopolitical game changer able to generate stability and long-term economic value in the Balkans, offering many business opportunities. Italy is committed to boosting the implementation of the Corridor and the projects along this axis. 

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In November last year (2022) Albert Rakipi, a prominent figure in Albania’s international relations and think tank circles, contemplated a pressing question. With the European Union membership process losing momentum and leaving many disillusioned, he sought a way to ensure Albania’s enduring connection to the EU. His solution: bringing the College of Europe to Albania. 

The last time the College of Europe expanded, it was more than three decades ago to Warsaw’s Nanolin suburb, with its second campus opening before Poland’s EU membership. It was an anchor in the process. It was also a story that could be replicated in Albania, Rakipi believed.  

He then first shared the idea with trusted colleagues, including at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Albania’s top-rated think tank where Rakipi serves as chairman and where he has been a civil society leader for nearly 30 years. There was some disbelief, but not easily discouraged, Rakipi prepared a concrete project proposal and was looking for an opening. 

It came in early December 2022, at the massive EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Tirana, shortly before which Rakipi had secured a private meeting with Prime Minister Edi Rama to seek his support in making College of Europe’s campus in Tirana a reality. 

“It’s the type of thing that can happen only once in a 1000 years — or never,” Rakipi says as he recalls how his idea drew the support of the Albanian prime minister who immediately moved to include Rakipi’s project proposal in the folders of the EU leaders attending the meeting. By the summit’s end, the idea had received “in principle” support from the EU’s top leaders. 

Rakipi says it would not have become a reality without the support of Prime Minister Rama, who understood the project’s importance for Albania. Rama’s extensive connections with EU member state leaders and at times unorthodox lobbying efforts also played a significant role. “I am very grateful to Prime Minister Edi Rama for enthusiastically supporting the project. Having the College of Europe in Albania would have never been possible without Edi Rama as Prime Minister,” Rakipi says.  

Rama has spoken highly of the EU’s reaction, calling it a “great gift” and something “exceptionally important and significant for us.” 

The proposal had come at a strategic moment during the EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana, which was an ideal opportunity to signal the importance of the enlargement policy in the Balkans. 

Rakipi firmly believes that Tirana was the perfect location for the College’s third campus in the Balkans.

Apart from the geopolitical dynamics and the prime minister’s personal involvement, Rakipi emphasizes the role of the College of Europe’s Rector, Federica Mogherini, an Italian and a friend of Albania, was also invaluable. He suggests that the educational institution might not have come to Albania without her involvement. 

“I am grateful to Federica Mogherini, a friend of Albania, who said ‘yes’ without hesitation and with special dedication and passion,” Rakipi says.  “The College probably would not have come to Albania if the Rector had not been Mogherini.”

With the official ceremony, Tirana is ready for the College of Europe

For her part, Mogherini was clear-eyed and full of smiles as she delivered her speech at the official opening ceremony at the Tirana Pyramid, which will host the College and its first 31 students.

“We are inaugurating today in the beautiful Tirana, the first office of the College of Europe here in Tirana, which will lead the way for the establishment of our campus, which will start activities next September 2024-2025. It’s really an honor for me, I’m very proud, you see my smile, it’s a real smile, ” Mogherini said. “I would first like to thank all those who made such a thing possible.”

Of course, beyond Mogherini, it took the support of EU’s top leaders, including EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who viewed the establishment of the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision for the Balkans.

“This is fantastic. First and foremost, it is fantastic because adding a College of Europe in pursuit of higher education and excellence can only contribute to Albania’s and the region’s development and prosperity. But also, because the College of Europe will also reinforce all the efforts being made to bring Albania and the region into the European Union,” President von der Leyen said in a statement.

At the ceremony on Oct. 16, Von der Leyen described the college as a gift that Europe gives to Albania, but also a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe.

“Here we will have students from Albania, from all over the Western Balkans from the EU. They will lay the foundations as leaders of the future. This college will be the third campus because we have the first in Belgium, the second in Poland and the third here. This college came before Poland became a member country and I am convinced that the same will happen with Albania. Yesterday they opened the application process. Now students from all over Europe can apply. You can do these fantastic studies while exploring the fantastic Europe. This campus is a great gift from Europe to Albania. But not only this, but a great gift that Albania is giving to Europe,” von der Leyen said.

Prime Minister Edi Rama, during his speech at the inauguration ceremony, said that this project is something wonderful and that it happened faster than he thought it would happen.

“Who would have thought that this would happen so quickly? Yesterday the president of the Commission announced the opening of applications, today the doors of the representative office are opened and next year people will start studying at the College of Europe in Tirana. Something is happening and it is so amazing. This is a path full of lessons, and the European Union is a blessing for all our countries, it is a great blessing because it is the deepest source of how to build institutions.

“In the end, it is the institutions that matter,” Rama said. “Our past has been characterized by many bad things that are the result of the lack of institutions, even when some institutions were built from scratch, so the building of democratic institutions cannot be done unless you have the European Union to learn these. Knowledge is the most extraordinary gift that the European Union can give us.” 

Tying Albania permanently to the West

The EU Summit with the Western Balkans in Tirana back in December 2022 was an ideal moment because of the state of EU’s relations with the Western Balkans. The European Union opened the campus in Natolin in 1992. “It was a very symbolic action to integrate the former East. In a way, the time had come to give a signal for the enlargement policy in the Balkans, after almost a ‘freezing’ of the enlargement process in the Balkans. And the idea of the College of Europe project in Tirana was right. And there is no doubt,” Rakipi says, “that Tirana was the capital where the third campus of the college of Europe in the Balkans should be located.”

“President Ursula or President Michel and anyone else in Brussels or Tirana can now see the College of Europe in Tirana as a strategic investment and vision in the Balkans. But the idea and the project was born in Tirana at the Institute of International Studies, a leading reputable think tank that has been contributing to Albania’s bilateral relations during the last two decades. It’s all like a dream,” says Rakipi. “Since December of last year, nine months have passed and the College of Europe is like a baby that has just been born. I am very proud to have helped the country with a beautiful, useful and unrepeatable idea and project.” 

For Rakipi, this is ultimately “extraordinary and historic” because it is another step in tying Albania permanently to the West, said Albert Rakipi, the chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies. “Bringing the College of Europe to Tirana means bringing the first truly Western post-university educational institution since the creation of Albania’s modern state. It is the biggest development of its kind in education in 100 years, and will have the same impact in Albanian history as the pre-WWII French Lyceum in Korca and Harry Fultz’s American school in Tirana,” Rakipi said.

The College of Europe is the world’s first university institute of postgraduate studies and training in European affairs. It was founded in 1949 by leading European figures in the wake of the Hague Congress, which led to the creation of the European Movement. Its original campus is in Bruges, Belgium. A second Natolin (Warsaw), Poland campus of the college was established in 1992 ahead of Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU. 

“It is first and foremost a signal of hope, a symbol of the serious commitment that the EU has towards the region despite all the doubts cast by the delays and stagnation of certain milestones,” Rakipi says “It will also bring forward academic, social and cultural cooperation between the countries in the region, with their peers in the EU as well as naturally foster the process of reconciliation.” 

The think tank where the project was written

AIIS, the think tank where the project was written by Rakipi, is a non-governmental, non-profit research and policy institute created in recognition of the need for independent, in-depth analysis of the complex issues surrounding Albania’s security. AIIS was founded by a group of academics and analysts with extensive experience in foreign policy and policy-making issues. Over the three decades since its establishment, AIIS has sharpened its technical capacities to become a leading think-tank trusted by Albanian policy-makers and international partners in the fields of security studies, democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation.

To promote discussion and debate among the policy community, AIIS engages Albanian and international scholars as well as provides its products free of charge on its website. These services are made possible by the contributions of national and international donor communities to fund its activities. As a results-oriented, methodologically interdisciplinary team, AIIS aims to produce timely advice as well as analysis of the challenges facing Albania’s policy-makers. 

As of March 2023, AIIS is a member of the College of Security and Defense of the European Union. AIIS is also internationally ranked as Albania’s top and among the region’s top think tanks by the University of Pensylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index.

In the words of Daniel P. Serwer, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Albania has made tremendous progress in the last thirty years and is moving smartly towards its European home. AIIS is both a cause and a consequence. Its sharp analytical focus on the world beyond Tirana has helped what was once one of the most isolated countries on earth, become an active contributor to the international order. These have been marvelously productive years for both Albania and its leading institute!”

The post Albert Rakipi and The College of Europe: The Bold Idea that Brought EU’s Venerable Institution to Albania. appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

                  Abstract

The paper, which analyses Albania’s long and tumultuous journey to the EU, is structured into four distinctive sections: the first focuses on the democratisation road that Albania embarked after the collapse of communism and the impact of legacies on this process. The evolutionary path from an isolated authoritarian political system towards a liberal democracy went through a “dual transformation” process, combining political democratisation and economic transformation. However, the democratic transition in Albania, as the paper argues, proved to be quite challenging and painful, mainly as a result of certain historic, political, cultural and socio-economic legacies. These legacies from the past, as well as the setbacks of 1997-98, were responsible for hindering Albania’s successful transition to a modern liberal democracy, in particular in the first decade. The paper points out, however, that the main factor that has prevented Albania achieving good results in democratic reforms, has been the poor, incompetent and irresponsible political leadership.

The subsequent section analyses Albania’s path to Europe. On its road of democratisation, Albania was immediately oriented towards integration into the EU and North-Atlantic structures. “Return to Europe” became the most important ideological orientation for masses, intelligencia, youth and even political parties. The paper highlights the main milestones of Albania’s journey to the EU, starting with her inclusion in 2001 in the regional framework of the Western Balkans, known as the SAP, the efforts to fulfil the EU conditionality and criteria, the completion of SAA and the bumpy road of the visa liberalisation and candidate status.

The third part focuses on the domestic obstacles of Albania in the journey to the EU. The next milestone was the start of accession negotiations, but the EU was reluctant for many years to give the green light for that, due to not completion of key priorities in five areas, namely: the rule of law, judicial system, organised crime, corruption and public administration. This section of the paper analyses two of them, the judicial system and the organized crime.

The last section of the paper describes the efforts for launching the EU membership negotiations, which finally happened in 2022. The paper then identifies three factors upon which the pace of the negotiations is depending, including the speed of the domestic reforms and alignment of the country with EU laws; the political will, both the domestic and the European; and the EU absorption capacity and geo-political situation concerning the Ukrainian war. The paper concludes that lots of work still needs to be done to tackle all the current political, economic and social problems, including the further reform of the judiciary and the other stumbling blocks: the rule of law still weak, the corruption remains pervasive in many areas, the organized crime has become even more problematic (most notably in the areas of drugs and money laundering), public administration continues to be plagued by lack of professionalism and high levels of corruption and politization. Hence, Albania seems a long way off to join the club.

Collapse of communism and impact of legacies on the first decade of democratic transition

Albania is considered one of the weakest of the former communist states and one that has been amongst the least successful in negotiating the transition to democracy. In Albania the communist regime collapsed in 1990, providing the opportune conditions for the process of democratisation and transformation. Change came as a result of a “velvet revolution”, as in most of the other countries of the Eastern communist block, avoiding, in this way, the bloodshed of similar scenarios such as Tienanmen Square or Romania.[2] Because of the determination of the Albanian old communist caste not to follow the other Central Eastern European countries in their path towards democratic reforms and to open up, and because of terrible isolation and lack of information about what was going on in the rest of Europe (most Albanians did not even know that the Berlin Wall had fallen), the wind of change started to blow late in Albania. It started with the “invasions” of foreign embassies in the summer of 1990, followed by the students’ movement (their protests and hunger strikes),[3] street demonstrations and protests by the masses (mainly in Tirana) and in 1991 with a nation-wide strike of workers. Finally, the last bastion of Stalinism fell in 1991 (officially on the 4^th of June with the resignation of the last communist government), bringing to an end forty- seven years of communist rule in Albania.

According to Pridham[4] democratisation is the whole process of regime change from totalitarian rule to the setting up of a new liberal democracy. It is a multi-stage and multi-dimensional process, which involves the following stages: authoritarian regime collapse, pre-transition liberalisation, democratic transition, democratic consolidation and, finally, the entrenchment of liberal democracy. Since 1991, Albania started the evolutionary path from an isolated authoritarian political system towards a liberal democracy. However, the democratic transition has been long, painful and tumultuous. This has been, mainly, as a result of certain historic, political, cultural and socio-economic legacies.

Political legacy is related with the fact that Albania endured one of the toughest dictatorships in the communist bloc, being considered Europe’s most Stalinist country. There was an extreme degree of totalitarianism, which attempted to control every aspect of life. Albania was considered a ‘special case’ and an ‘exception’, even within the communist bloc. Political and civic pluralism and democratic institutions were forbidden, freedom of expression and independence of thought were completely crushed and ‘class struggle’ was invoked in a paranoid manner. It was also the country’s infamous self-imposed international isolation. The lonely ‘fortress Albania’ with its sealed borders, was even more isolated than its communist sister-states, which made it perhaps the most isolated country in the world, never mind Europe. Isolation thus became the keynote of Albania’s foreign policy. This meant that for decades the country was cut off from any kind of economic, political and cultural links with the outside world, being turned into a “gigantic prison”, with its people “locked” inside barbed wire fences.[5] This pathological isolation imposed by a xenophobic communist dictatorship prohibited the free movement of people and information (media, literature and art) and did not allow the existence of any international organisations in the country until 1991.

In terms of the economic legacy, Albania had a very low socio-economic starting point in the ‘90s with a background as the poorest country in Europe. Albania came out from communism as a very backward country, where feudal-medieval features were combined with those of a tough communist regime. The extreme poverty was a consequence of the communist regime’s centrally planned and collectivist economy, the full collectivization of agriculture, state ownership over everything and regulation of business, paranoid adoption of the principle of national self-reliance, and the worse of all, the abolishment of private property. The economy and society in general depended on a Spartan egalitarianism and on the Marxist-Leninist dogmatic ideology, the highlight of which was the creation of the ‘new socialist man’, indoctrinated with the communist ideology. A socialist society ‘blessed with social and economic equality’, forbade all religious institutions and beliefs, following the model of Chinese Cultural Revolution, and proclaiming Albania ‘the only atheist country in the world’.

Besides short-term legacy of the communist period, there was, however, an important longer-term historical dimension. Albania was, for 500 years, part of the Ottoman Empire, with its sultanate imperial system and legacy of patrimonial and personalistic rule. From this, it inherited an agrarian and largely feudal country with a great mass of peasantry, an under-developed state-society relationships, weak institutional capacity and a fragmented civil society. Albania, unlike Visegrad countries, who had been under Prussian and Hapsburg empires, did not share some of the history of Western Europe and experiences such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and 19^th century urbanisation.

Albania, therefore, did not have a strong tradition of capitalism and democracy, unlike some of the other Central and Eastern European former communist countries which embarked on the ‘era of changes’ with varying potential levels of these traditions.[6] Albania was experiencing democracy for the first time in its history and was clearly the country with the longest journey to travel from a rigid Stalinism to democracy.[7] Albania’s task of overcoming this legacy and ‘catching up’ with the West was therefore, challenging, even compared to other former communist states.

Subsequently, the first decade of democratic transition was turbulent and with some serious political setbacks, where the most notable were the unrest of 1997, caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes which brought the country on the brick of a civil war, as well as the Kosovo crisis in 1999 which provoked a huge flow of refugees into Albania.

These legacies from the past, as well as the setbacks, were responsible for hindering Albania’s successful transition to a modern liberal democracy, in particular in its first decade. However, the main factor that has prevented Albania achieving good results in democratic reforms, has been the poor, incompetent and irresponsible political leadership.

On the other hand, compared to other Western Balkan states, Albania has had some advantages on its road to democratisation. There is, for example, the fact that it has been a state (for more than 100 years), unlike other former entities of the Russian and Yugoslav Federations, which, after 1990, had to create new states as a result of the disintegration of their federations. Furthermore, in the Balkans, some of its neighbouring states managed, only recently, to sort out their constitutional and territorial status as well as their borders. Albania, on the contrary, has a strong advantage of having been, for a century, an independent state.Secondly, Albania, despite its location in a region of Europe that is a mosaic of overlapping ethnic and religious communities, has itself no major domestic inter-ethnic problems. The reason for this is that it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous. Thirdly, Albania is also remarkable in that it has experienced little if any of the religious conflict between its three religious groups, Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims,[8] which has been an important factor in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Albania remains a country of a good religious tolerance where the three main religious communities have lived in peace and harmony for centuries and still do. The mutual harmony of the religions in Albania is thus a factor of stability in an ethnically and religiously divided region. Albania can give a good example to Europe as a country with one of the most moderate Muslim populations in the world and a country of inter-religious understanding and tolerance, within a secular state. Unlike elsewhere in the Balkan countries and societies, where politics, religion and ethnicity are three key elements, in Albania and for Albanians only the first one has a big importance.[9]

In the beginning of the 1990s, Albania found itself having to build a system of democratic governance from scratch, starting the so-called “dual transformation”, which according to Pridham combines political democratisation and economic transformation.[10] Despite its dreadful history of paranoid self-imposed international isolation and dictatorship, Albania got off to a good start in the early years of the transition. Albania committed itself to political pluralism and on the 31^st of January 1991 the first multi-party elections were held. The initial phase of transition saw speedy and surprising progress, which won Albania a place among the most advanced former communist countries in terms of the rate and intensity of the reforms. Within a few years democratic institutions were set up and a democratic legal framework was introduced. Albania was accepted as a member of international political and financial institutions such as CoE, IMF, WB, and EBRD. Good results were also seen in the economy over a three-year period, about 70% of the economy was privatised, prices and trade were almost entirely liberalised and tight monetary and fiscal policies led to an admirable micro-economic stability. The newly emerging private sector proved to be highly dynamic, making the greatest contribution to overall economic growth. During 1993-1996, Albania experienced an annual growth rate of 9.5%. The analysis made by foreign experts and institutions during this period considered Albania a special case of successful transition and it had been seen by many mainstream commentators in the West as a model for post-Communist economic development.[11]

The path to Europe

In terms of foreign policy, Albania was immediately oriented towards integration into the EU and North-Atlantic structures. ‘Return to Europe’ became the most important ideological orientation for masses, intelligencia, youth and even political parties. It was synonymous with the rejection of communism and ‘Europe signified ‘democracy’. The ‘Land of the Eagles’, about which everyone knew so little, re-appeared on the European political map. The EU as the most important foreign policy goal was not only a priority of domestic politics, but also a matter of national interest, because it was perceived by all as might will offer tremenduous political, economic and socio-cultural benefits. Therefore, successive Albanian governments placed European integration as a priority on their political agendas. Relations between Albania and the (then) European Community (as the European Union was called before the Maastricht Treaty) started in 1991. In 1992 a “Cooperation and Trade Agreement” was signed between Albania and the EU. Albania was the first South-Eastern European country to conclude such an agreement. This agreement was established mainly to encourage trade and democratization with Albania, but it was also a response to the humanitarian crisis of 1991. Right after signing the agreement, Albania became eligible for funding under the EU Phare programme.

At the beginning of 1995, Albania officially asked for the opening of negotiations for an accession agreement with the EU. An evaluation undertaken by the Commission on the possibilities of free marketing of goods, services and capital in Albania, concluded that a ‘classic’ agreement like those that most countries have with the EU about their membership would be a premature step for Albania.[12] In January 1996, the EU Council of Ministers asked the Commission to compile a proposal for a new agreement that would strengthen Albania-EU relations (even though this was not on the level of a “European Agreement”). Unfortunately, the events that followed that year with the disastrous parliamentary elections in May and a year later after the collapse of pyramid schemes put a serious question-mark over Albanian democracy and the readiness of the country to progress towards integration, leaving this issue in stagnation. 

Three years later, in 1999, a very important step was undertaken by the EU: the European Commission proposed a “Stabilisation and Association Process” (SAP) for five Balkans countries, named the Western Balkans (WB) including Albania.[13] This was endorsed by the Fiera Council in 2000, which confirmed that the EU’s goal was the fullest possible integration of all WB countries into the economic and political mainstream of Europe, as well as recognized them as potential candidates for EU membership. The 2000 Zagreb Summit was also an important step in the commitment of the EU to the WB. It confirmed all of them as ‘potential candidates for EU membership. The Summit also established the SAP and its two components: a tailor-made contractual relationship called the “Stabilisation and Association Agreement” (SAA) and a new economic aid, called CARDS programme, both specifically designed for the SAP countries.

The SAP represented a historical turning point for Albania, because, for the first time, a concrete path was offered to Albania in its rapprochement with the EU. The SAA offered stronger incentives for pushing ahead with the reform process and also created more demanding political and economic conditions for the country. But, rather than pressures, they had to be considered more as opportunities that Albania could take or leave.

After the Zagreb Summit, Albania made considerable progress in fulfilling the commitments for opening negotiations. At the European Council Meeting in Gothenburg in June 2001, the European Commission concluded that it was appropriate to proceed with the negotiation of a SAA with Albania. In November 2001, the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, declared in Tirana that the opening of negotiations would be in March 2002, but the political stability of the country was made a condition for these to start. This, unfortunately, did not happen, because of a severe internal crisis within the Socialist Party in power during the second half of the year, which had negative implications for the reform process and the country’s political stability.[14] Nevertheless, the Council adopted the directives for opening the negotiation of a SAA with Albania at its meeting in Luxembourg in October 2002. The negotiations were officially launched on 31 January 2003.[15]

This was followed by three years of negotiations and finally the SAA was signed in June 2006 in Luxembourg. The next step to be taken was the ratification by all the Member States. However, it took three years for the ratification process to be completed and on 1 April 2009 the SAA entered into force.

The signing of the SAA and its ratification lasted long, respectively six and three years, longer than the other WB countries. Albania had a tough time also for reaching two other important milestones in its rapprochement with the EU. One was visa liberalization. The other was its acceptance as a ‘candidate country’.

Albania and Bosnia were the only countries in the WB to be rejected the visa liberalization request, which was granted only the second time. In November 2006 the European Commission decided to start visa facilitation negotiations with Albania, which was the first step toward a full abolishment of the visa requirements. In April 2007 the visa facilitation agreement was signed in Zagreb and on 1 January 2008 it entered into force.  In March 2008 EU Commissioner Franco Frattini opened in Tirana the dialogue toward the liberalisation of the visa regime between Albania and EU, which would enable citizens of Albania to travel to Schengen countries without needing a short term visa. On 27 May 2010 The European Commission proposed visa free travel for Albania and on 8 November 2010 the Council of the European Union approved visa-free travel to Schengen Area for Albanian citizens. After 4 years since the process started, on 15 December 2010 visa-free access to the Schengen Area entered into force, making it possible that the long dream of Albanians for the free movement in the EU to finally come true.

The ‘candidacy status’ had an even more complicated journey. Albania was the only applicant country in the whole history of the EC/EU to be rejected the candidacy’ three times ,[16] in December 2010, in October 2012, and in 2013. The EU countries, most notably Holland, decided not to grant the status to Albania due to not completion of 12 key priorities in five areas, which were conditions to be met in order to achieve official candidate status and start accession negotiations. On 24 June 2014, under the Greek EU Presidency, after 5 years, Albania was finally granted the ‘candidate status’.

The persistent obstacles in the journey to the EU

On 28 April 2009 Albania formally applied for membership in the EU. In November 2009 the Council of the EU asked the European Commission to prepare an assessment on Albania’s readiness to start accession negotiations. Five months later, in April 2010 Albania submitted answers to the European Commission’s questionnaire. Five years later, in March 2015, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement notified Albania the setting of a start date for accession negotiations to begin. It still required two conditions to be met, firstly, the government needed to reopen political dialogue with the parliamentary opposition, and secondly Albania must deliver quality reforms for all the five key areas, namely: the rule of law, judicial system, strengthening the fight against organised crime, developing a solid track record in the fight against corruption, and depolitisation of public administration. I have focused my analysis on two of them, the judicial system and the organized crime.

Judicial system

The most imperative reform was the one on judiciary. Many reports by international organizations (European Commission, Transparency International, Council of Europe, Freedom House, British Foreign Office, US State Department, Amnesty International etc.) have repeatedly pointed out that the judicial system in Albania is weak and continuous to be plagued by three problems: corruption, unprofessionalism and not independent (from politics and organized crime). Apart from lack of efficiency, the political influence on the institutions of the criminal justice system, as well as corruption in the judiciary, continued to be major causes for concern. The European Commission has constantly identified corruption in the judiciary as the No.1 obstacle of the progress of Albania towards the European Union, “the new legislation tackles many shortcomings related to the justice system’s lack of independence, efficiency and professionalism. However, corruption is widespread and remains an issue of concern”.[17] The justice system has been considered as the sector with the highest level of corruption in Albania. According to the 2018 annual study of the Freedom House “Nations in Transit”, Albania’s judicial framework and independence rating remained unchanged at 4.75,[18] with no progress made, since 2012. The report states, “High levels of corruption, combined with low levels of efficiency, characterized the Albanian judiciary”.[19] The problems in the judicial system were also identified in the US Department of State “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Albania”, which noted that “Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, political pressure, intimidation, widespread corruption, and limited resources sometimes prevented the judiciary from functioning independently and efficiently”.[20]

Therefore, one of the concerns of the Socialist government after coming to power in 2013 was the reform of the judicial system. However, the genuine call for the reform has not been led by Albanian political party leaders, but by diplomats in Tirana, most notably the then US Ambassador Donald Lu. Mr. Lu has been the most outspoken person for the judicial reform. In an interview to BIRN, Lu described it as “the most important reform in the 25 years since the fall of communism…It has the possibility of ridding the Albanian judicial system of corrupt judges and prosecutors who steal the money of ordinary citizens and allow organized crime figures, murderers and corrupt politicians to buy justice”.[21]

The justice reform process launched in July 2015 with a set of amendments that changed one third of the Albania’s Constitution. The reform aimed to tackle existing shortcomings in the sector, including weaknesses linked to independence and accountability of judges and prosecutors, lack of efficiency and professionalism.[22] The justice reform is being implemented ever since and its main features have included measures to fight corruption, by establishing a new Special Anti-Corruption and Organized Crime Structure (SPAK); measures to reduce the influence by the parliament and the executive on the judiciary; measures to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, measures to increase justice efficiency and access to justice.[23]

In addition to the institutional restructuring of the judiciary and as part of measures to fight corruption and re-establish public trust in the judiciary, the reform process foresaw the launch of a generalized re-evaluation of all currently serving judges, prosecutors and legal advisers, called the ‘Vetting’. The vetting started in October 2017, firstly with the establishment of the first-instance vetting body, the ‘Independent Qualification Commission’ (IQC), as well as the International Monitoring Operation (IMO), deployed under the aegis of the European Commission, which is supervising the Vetting process and exercising independent oversight. Since the Vetting started, over 800 professionals have been undergoing scrutiny. At the very start of the process a number of high-ranking judges and prosecutors resigned, refusing their assets to be verified, and some asked to retire.[24] By 2020, more than 286 dossiers have been processed, resulting in 62% dismissals, mostly for issues related to unjustified assets, or resignations.[25]

Even though the justice reform had the cross-party support, the Opposition has contested the follow-up process as being biased and controlled by the Socialist Party in power, starting with the individuals selected and appointed as the members and heads of the Vetting bodies, such as the IQC, the High Judicial Council (KLGJ) and the High Prosecutorial Council (KLP). They are the main self-governing bodies of the judiciary that are supposed to be independent from the government. The Opposition pretended that the dismissal of judges and prosecutors from the part of Independent Qualification Commission has been selective and biased, favoring the ones who have the support of the Socialists. As the opposition paper Exit.al points out, “It is becoming increasingly clear that the Independent Qualification Commission is not, in fact, completely independent. Now that nearly a hundred judges and prosecutors have passed through its ‘filter’, it seems that certain figures fulfilling ‘key roles’ in the recent capture of the judiciary are able to slip through the cracks”.[26] All this have put into question the credibility of the current “reform of the Albanian judiciary”. The vetting process and its results remain crucial to restore public trust in the judiciary and law enforcement bodies of the State.[27]

The other step in the judicial reform has been the “Law on Decriminalization”, which consists on barring people with criminal records from holding public office or most civil service jobs. The law, approved by the Albania’s parliament in December 2015, was in fact proposed by the Opposition, in response to a series of political scandals in which MPs with criminal convictions or facing serious charges (the so-called “law-breakers turned into law-makers”) have been exposed by journalists and political opponents. However, the “decriminalization law” has had only minor results in removing incriminated officials from public office and has not yet made a dent in the problem of state infiltration by organized crime.[28] Law breakers continue to be / become law-makers.

The then EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, while on a visit to Tirana, warned that Albania cannot be considered for EU membership until it thoroughly cleanses the justice system, “A deep reform of the judicial system will open the way to the beginning of negotiations for Albania to become part of the EU.” [29]

Organised crime

Organized crime gangs in Albania and abroad operate mostly in the areas of drugs, money laundering, human trafficking and smuggling. I will be focused on the first one, the drugs, which has been quite problematic during the last decades of transition and for which Albania has been heavily critisised by the EU and international organisations.

After coming to power in 2013, the Socialist government started a huge police operation in the village of Lazarat,[30] known as Europe’s “marijuana mountain”, the home base of gangs that produced marijuana with an estimated street value of $5.9 billion in 2013, equivalent to roughly half of Albania’s gross domestic product.

However, as the Freedom House “Nations in Transit” 2017 report pointed out “Two and a half years after the start of a government crackdown, drug dealers managed to plant at least 2.4 million cannabis seeds across the country, and to traffic across Albania’s borders tons of marijuana worth billions of dollars. The opposition accused the Prime Minister and Interior Minister of protecting drug lords in exchange for illicit proceeds and support”.[31] The report continues saying that “Albania still has a poor track record in investigating, identifying, prosecuting, and convicting key figures in drug trafficking and other organized crime activities. Despite police raids and crackdowns, financiers and traffickers managed to extend their cannabis plantations across the country, taking advantage of poor farmers and corrupt state officials”.[32]

The opposition called this ‘Cannabization of Albania’ and accused the ruling Socialist Party for turning Albania into a ‘Columbia of Europe’. According to an article of Independent Balkan News Agency, “During 2017, at least 2.5 million roots of cannabis were cultivated in Albania, according to official sources. This quantity was four times higher than in 2015. Furthermore, this reported quantity is based on police information which are believed to be several times lower than the real cultivated amount”.[33] The State Police and Interior Ministry leaders were consistently targeted by the opposition Democratic Party, which accused them of implications and involvement in this criminal activity, spreading cannabis enclaving or co-operation with organized crime. What was worse, the opposition has made repetitive allegations that the huge revenues from cannabis were used to buy the votes in the June 2017 parliamentary elections, which according to them explained the unexpected big victory of the Socialist Party in these elections. Over the last two years, large amounts of narcotic substances of cannabis, worth of billions of euros, were seized by Greek authorities while crossing Albanian-Greek border, or caught by Italian “Guardia di Finanzia” in the Adriatic waters, or while transported by small helicopters. This “historical record in cannabisation of the country”, has been reported almost every day in the media. According to the above article, “Recently, many quantities of processed drugs are being attempted to be trafficked to EU member countries. In different operations conducted in the recent days, Albanian, Italian and Greek police have seized several tons of marijuana. Many people believe that this is a small part of the quantity that is being taken out of Albania”.[34] 

The prestigious British newspaper “Independent” in an investigative article also describes Albania as a ‘Columbia of Europe’ and the country the HQ of drugs in Europe.[35] Both US and European law enforcement officials, says the article, have described Albania as the largest provider of cannabis to the EU, as well as an important transit point for heroin and cocaine. Based on the value of drug seizures, some estimate that the marijuana alone generates up to $4bn (£3bn) a year, half of Albania’s GDP. Cocaine comes in shipments of bananas and palm oil from Colombia. On 28 February 2018, authorities intercepted 613kg of cocaine disguised as a banana shipment from Colombia. Heroin is smuggled into Albania via clothing and shoe imports brought in from Turkey, one of the world’s largest textile exporters.[36] The article notes that “the traffickers now use the same networks they established to move vast amounts of bulky cannabis to distribute cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Central Asia via Italy to the rest of Europe. Albanian gangs are considered among the world’s top heroin, cocaine and cannabis traffickers. The drugs are loaded on high-speed zodiac inflatable boats bound for the Italian coast from Albanian ports. Also shipped back to Turkey, along the same networks used to bring heroin into the country. Traffickers have also taken to the air, with what some officials estimate as between five and 10 small planes”.[37] What more disturbing is, as the article points out, that “it’s quite clear that all these gangs operate with a certain level of political and police protection and support. Many fear the money has thoroughly infected the political elite. While the government denies it, experts say the traffickers have thoroughly infected politics and commerce, at the deepest levels. Scores of high-level Albanian officials – from mayors to ministers – have been implicated in the drug trade, and perhaps enable it”.[38] Not only politicians, but also “police are directly involved in the growing, cultivating, packaging, transport and selling of drugs” and the cannabis plantations have become like “so-called ‘no-go’ areas, taken over by armed drug traffickers bound together by clan ties”. “Albanian officials concede that they only intercept 10 per cent of drug shipments in and out of the country. One Western diplomat said the number was more like 5 per cent, leaving traffickers with enough wealth to buy up port authorities from Rotterdam to Izmir. The sophisticated trafficking groups have gotten so powerful that they have networks all over the world”. The drug industry is influencing everything – all strata of society, says the article, that includes money laundering, and party financing. “Albania is no longer a hub of cultivation,” said one EU official. “It’s become a center of investment, distribution, and recruitment”. The article, quoting some Western diplomats, concludes that, “Albania, the drug producer and distributor of Europe has become a narco-state and they’d lose too much money getting out of trafficking to get into the EU”.[39] 

The Italian television RAI 3 broadcasted a long documentary about the widespread of cannabis cultivation and production in Albania, titled “Narcotics”.[40] Despite the Albanian government and the State Police declarations that cannabis cultivation dropped drastically in 2017 and 2018 and the plantations had been almost wiped out, as a result of government anti-cannabis strategy and successful police operations, the RAI documentary revealed the shocking news that “This year the cannabis plantations have extended to one third of the country territory”.[41] Guardia di Finanza officers declared that massive cultivation and production of marijuana have re-started again this year, five times more than last year and using more refined genetic modified varieties of cannabis.[42] The Italian prosecutors noted that in addition to cannabis, Albania has become one of the most important suppliers for cocaine to Italy from Columbia and Ecuador, competing with the notorious Italian mafia organization Ndrangheta.[43] Albania also has become an important route for the Afghan opium, which is brought through Balkan networks and is processed at the heroin laboratories, found in several places in Albania and Kosovo and managed by Albanian mafia.[44]

Efforts for launching the EU membership negotiations

Albania hoped to open membership negotiations by December 2016. The Commission recommended the launch of negotiations on 9 November that year, but Germany announced that it would veto the opening accession talks until 2018. In early 2017, the European Parliament warned the government leaders that the parliamentary elections in June must be ‘free and fair’, before negotiations started, to admit the country into the Union. However, the situation before elections was complicated with the discovery of million roots of cannabis being cultivated everywhere and Albania, as mentioned above. A few months after the elections, the shocking scandal of the alleged links between an Albanian–Italian mafia group (which had trafficked huge amounts of cannabis and guns) with the then Interior Minister, shattered the politics and public opinion, and shed lights in the gravity of the link of Albanian government with organized crime.[45]

Three years later, in March 2020, the Council of the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Albania. But France blocked the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia until a new methodology for future enlargement was agreed at EU level. Even when that was sorted out, Albania could still not start accession negotiations because its candidacy was linked to that of North Macedonia, which was vetoed by Bulgaria. In June 2022, Bulgaria’s parliament approved lifting the veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia and subsequently the two countries received the green light to start accession talks that could ultimately lead to EU membership.[46] Finally, 11 years after the application, Albania managed to start the accession negotiations, officially launched on 19 July 2022.

The EU held its first intergovernmental conference with Albania in July 2022. The screening process is underway and no chapters have been opened thus far. Since the change of the enlargement methodology in 2020, the 35 negotiating chapters of the acquis Communautaire are now grouped into six clusters. In terms of the level of preparation, Albania is somewhat behind the rest of the candidates with active negotiation processes, at least according to the European Commission reports.[47]

The pace of the negotiations seems to depend on three factors: Firstly, the speed of the domestic reforms and alignment of the country with EU laws. A lot of work still needs to be done to tackle all the current political, economic and social problems and the five priorities set by the EU. Apart from the reform of the judiciary (which has produced some results), the four other priorities remain stumbling blocks: the rule of law still weak, the corruption remains pervasive in many areas, the organized crime has become even more problematic (most notably in the areas of drugs and money laundering), public administration continues to be plagued by lack of professionalism and high levels of corruption and politization. Secondly, the pace of the process will mostly depend on political will, both the domestic and the European. Thirdly, the EU absorption capacity: after the last enlargement – the ‘Big Ben’, when 10 countries joined at once, there has been a certain degree of reluctance for further enlargements. However, the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with fears over Moscow’s influence in the region, has increased the strategic importance of the Western Balkans to the EU. Therefore, an early decision to accept Albania and the other WB countries might be more for geo-political reasons, rather than fulfillment of the criteria and completion of reforms.

However, the prospect of EU membership and the whole process of integration and Europeanisation has proved to be very useful for Albania. Albanian democratization could have had a different trajectory without the presence of the EU pushing for and directing reforms. If it were not for the role of the EU and international community, Albania would continue to be a “Balkan Banana Republic”, left in the hands of irresponsible, incapable and egocentric politicians and governments, where corruption and organized crime would flourish, with the mafia, criminals and politicians, the country’s ‘nouveaux riches’, enjoying privileges, wealthy and luxurious lifestyles on the one hand, and the majority of the population living in poverty on the other.[48] 

Therefore, the EU remains the primary locus of Albania’s efforts in managing the difficult period of transition and its goal for the future, mostly because the prospect of EU membership is a credible prospect in its political horizon, a strong incentive and a powerful driving force for carrying out domestic reforms.

It is a positive fact that the EU is the only element of consensus that unites all political parties and all social groups. This leads us to believe that the two types of pressure:  the external one from the EU and from other international organizations on one hand, and internal pressure from the various domestic actors and the public who are interested in progress and EU membership on the other, will probably help Albania eventually to achieve the goal of accession. The help and support of external actors is important and necessary, but the reforms and all the steps of a successful integration process should, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the domestic actors, in particular the politicians. Putnam argues that “the quality of democracy depends on the quality of its citizens, so that every people gets the government they deserve”,[49] so hopefully Albanians will not continue to be labelled as ‘a people undone’ and be the last ‘catching the train to Europe’.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Balkan Insight “US Diplomat urges Albania to end judicial corruption”, 6 January 2016.

• Bogdani, M. “Contributing actors to the regime change in Albania: The first phase of transition and the role of the Student Movement” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, NY & London. 2020.

• Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris. London – NY, 2007. 

• Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Dajti 2000. Tirana, 2004.

• Biberaj, E. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Westview Press, 1998.
• Brzozovski, A. “Next steps for Albania and North Macedonia, as the EU agrees to start accession talks”. Euractiv. 19 July 2022.

• European Commission, “The Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_341.htm

• European Commission, “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2003”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_339.htm.

• European Commission, “Albania 2016 Progress Report”. Brussels, 9 November 2016.   https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_albania.pdf

• European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018.   https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-albania-report.pdf  

• European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. Brussels, 6 October 2020.

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/albania_report_2020.pdf

• Exit.al, “Prokuroret italiane per RAI 3: Ne Shqiperi lulezon trafiku i droges, ka rifilluar kultivimi masiv i marijuanes”. 8 August 2019.

• Exit.al, “Vetting Commission again confirms Government favorite”, 5 February 2019.

https://exit.al/en/2019/02/05/vetting-commission-again-confirms-government-favorite/

• Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2017 Report Albania. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/albania

• Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2018 Report Albania.https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/albania

• Ivkovic, A. “What is the EU perspective of North Macedonia and Albania a year after opening negotiations?”. European Western Balkans,14 August 2023.

• Independent, “Colombia of Europe’: How tiny Albania became the continent’s drug trafficking headquarters”, London. 27 January 2019.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/albania-drug-cannabis-trafficking-hub-europe-adriatic-sea-a8747036.html?fbclid=IwAR1DNZH4xJ1jjIgj-AuT8oCkIau3GKYCkFgF9rdE2mwzYTaxa6aEuxFPJIw

• Independent Balkan News Agency, “One and a half tons of drugs goes through Albanian customs, Greek customs officials discover it”, 17 February 2017.

http://old.balkaneu.com/one-and-a-half-tons-of-drugs-goes-through-albanian-customs-greek-customs-officials-discover-it/

• Meksi, E. “The Albanian dimension of integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS, 2003.

• Milo, P. Bashkimi Europian“. pp.277-99. Tirana:Albpaper, 2002.

• Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000.

• Putnam, R.D. et al. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 

• Rama, Sh. “Who slew the dragon? The collapse of communism, political change and the student movement in Albania” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, NY & London. 2020.

• Transitions Online “Albania urged to reform Judiciary”, 4 March 2016.

• Zeneli, F. “Sektorët prioritarë të ekonomisë dhe investimet e huaja”. Shekulli, Tirana, 4 October 2003.

• US Department of State “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Albania”. April 2018.https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper

[1] Author and Scholar of EU Politics & European integration, Prof. Assoc. Mirela Bogdani , currently teaching at University of New York Tirana

[2] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris, London – NY. 2007. 

[3] Rama, Sh. “Who slew the dragon? The collapse of communism, political change and the student movement in Albania” in Rama. Sh (eds). The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, Ny & London. 2020.

[4] Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000, pp.16.

[5] Bogdani, M. “Contributing actors to the regime change in Albania: The first phase of transition and the role of the Student Movement” in Rama, Sh. (eds) The end of communist rule in Albania: Political change and the roe of the Student Movement. Routledge, Ny & London. 2020.

[6] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Dajti 2000. Tirana, 2004.

[7] Biberaj, E. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Westview Press, 1998.

[8] According to a poll conducted in the time of Monarchy the religious composition in Albania was: 70 per cent Muslim, 20 per cent Greek Orthodox and 10 percent Roman Catholics. However, these figures are not only out-dated, but also inaccurate and unreal, given a history of 30 years of imposed atheism during communism, when two generations grew up without any religious faith whatsoever, and then the religious’ revival after 1990 when lots of people have been embracing various religions sometimes totally different from that of their roots.

[9] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I. B. Tauris. London – NY, 2007. 

[10] Pridham, G. The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum, 2000.

[11] Zeneli, F. “Sektorët prioritarë të ekonomisë dhe investimet e huaja”. Shekulli, Tirana, 4 October 2003.

[12] Meksi, E. “The Albanian dimension of integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS, 2003.

[13] European Commission, “The Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

[14] Milo, P. Bashkimi Europian“. Tirana:Albpaper, 2002.

[15] European Commission, “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2003”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March 2003.

[16] Only Turkey was rejected once, in 1997.  

[17] European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018.

[18] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. Albania 2018 Report.

[19] Ibid.

[20] US Department of State “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Albania”. April 2018.

[21] Balkan Insight “US Diplomat urges Albania to end judicial corruption”, 6 January 2016.

[22] European Commission, “Albania 2016 Progress Report”. Brussels, 9 November 2016.

[23] Ibid, pg.3.

[24] European Commission, “Albania 2018 Progress Report”. Strasbourg, 17 April 2018. pg.3.

[25] European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. Brussels, 6 October 2020, pg.5.

[26] Exit.al, “Vetting Commission again confirms Government favorite”, 5 February 2019.

[27] European Commission, “Albania 2020 Progress Report”. 6 October 2020, pg. 24.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Transitions Online “Albania urged to reform Judiciary”. 4 March 2016.

[30] Lazarat, a village in the south of Albania, had been effectively off-limits to local police for over a decade, becoming synonymous with uncontrolled crime.

[31] Freedom House, “Nations in Transit”. 2017 Report Albania.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Independent Balkan News Agency, “One and a half tons of drugs goes through Albanian customs, Greek customs officials discover it”, 17 February 2017.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Independent, “Colombia of Europe’: How tiny Albania became the continent’s drug trafficking headquarters”, London. 27 January 2019.

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Exit.al, “Prokuroret italiane per RAI 3: Ne Shqiperi lulezon trafiku i droges, ka rifilluar kultivimi masiv i marijuanes”. 8 August 2019.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Balkan Insight, “Albania ex-Minister accused in drug-smuggling scandal”, 17 October 2017.

[46] Brzozovski, A. “Next steps for Albania and North Macedonia, as the EU agrees to start accession talks”. Euractiv. 19 July 2022.

[47] Ivkovic, A. “What is the EU perspective of North Macedonia and Albania a year after opening negotiations?”. European Western Balkans,14 August 2023.

[48] Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. I.B.Tauris: London – NY, February 2007. 

[49] Putnam, R.D. et al. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1993. pg.3.

The post Albania’s rocky road to the European Union: How far from joining the club? appeared first on Tirana Observatory.

Introduction

Rule of law issues have increased in prominence in the European integration process during these last years. Allegations of violation of the principles of rule of law by some member states and calls for the activation of article 7 of the Treaty of European Union which allows to take measures against a member state which violates or threatens to violate the values on which the EU is founded have multiplied, regarding, especially, relations between the EU and Poland and Hungary. Problems with systemic corruption and connections between politics and organized crime are also present in EU’s relations with other EU member states, among them Bulgaria and Malta. This deterioration of rule of law in some EU countries – and the problems this creates for the EU – has brought to the forefront the significance of a solid set of rule of law principles as a prerequisite for any future accession to the EU, in particular, regarding the countries of the Western Balkans.

Although rule of law is included in the Copenhagen criteria and constitutes a prerequisite for candidate countries, its effective application and measurement of fulfillment varied in previous accession negotiations; accession was often determined more by political expediency rather than through an objective, means-based fulfillment of specific scoreboards. The recent developments inside the EU regarding rule of law violations have also affected the importance of rule of law in new accessions and led to making these criteria more measurable across the board.

This article examines the implications of rule of law in the negotiations and discussions between the EU and candidate states. It analyses how rule of law issues were treated in the previous enlargements, how these issues obtained prime significance as of lately and looks to the extent that rule of law is dealt with in the current accession context towards the countries of the Western Balkans. It examines how these considerations are introduced by the EU during the negotiations and its efforts to maintain relevant pressure even after formal negotiations end. Finally, it examines the effective significance of rule of law in the relations between the applicant states and the EU and the reaction of the latter but also candidate states in the way these matters are treated in the current negotiations. In addition, it examines weather the Russian invasion on Ukraine and the European perspective of Ukraine which opened in 2023 might influence the  possible changes on

Rule of law in the European Union

The European integration process contained from the start an implicit prerequisite of liberal and democratic values for its member states. Though the Treaty of Rome did not include any explicit reference to the democratic credentials of its own as well as applicant states, it was manifest that only countries which respected democratic  principles could be or become members of the EEC.[2] Following the 1967 military coup in Greece, the association agreement between the EEC and Greece was frozen. In a relevant resolution adopted on 2 June 1967 the European Parliament insisted that “the association agreement cannot be applied in its various facets unless the democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored in Greece” (European Parliament, 1967, 1).[3]

The Declaration on European Identity adopted by the heads of state of the EEC in Copenhagen (December 1973) specified that member states shared “the same attitudes to life [and were] determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights”, all of these being fundamental elements of the European Identity (Council of Ministers, 1973). In its opinion on the Greek application, in 1976, the Commission reiterated that “given […] Greece’s return to a democratic form of government, there can be no doubt, in the view of the Commission that the Community must now give a clear positive answer to the Greek request” and concluded that “the consolidation of Greece’s democracy which is a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece’s relationship with the Community”. (European Commission, 1976). The military coup in Turkey in 1980 also led, albeit belatedly and with reluctance, to the freezing of the country’s association agreement with the EEC.

Rule of law, as one of the fundaments of European integration, appeared in the considerations of the (then) European Court of Justice in its Opinion 1/91 on the EEA agreement, in 1991, which admitted that the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.

This requirement become clearer with the Treaty of Maastricht. Article F provided in paragraph 2 that “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] as general principles of Community law”. Almost in parallel, the newly-founded EU set up the so-called Copenhagen criteria to clarify the conditions for accession, in particular for countries of Central and Eastern Europe: the 1993 Copenhagen European Council while agreeing that these countries “that so desire shall become members of the European Union” added a number of conditions, among them that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Council, 1993).

Through successive EU treaty amendments, primary EU law also became clearer and more compelling. Attachment to the principles of rule of law is underlined in the preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon and became one of the foundational values of the EU in Article 2. In addition, adherence to, and commitment to promote the values or Article 2 were elevated into a formal condition for membership, as prescribed in Article 49 TEU.[4] In a parallel development and in recognition that rule of law should not only apply to candidates but also to member states, sanctions for its violation by member states were gradually introduced. The EU was enabled, albeit through a cumbersome and difficult procedure, to suspend the membership rights of member states whenever the values of article 2 TEU were being violated or, after the Treaty of Nice, there was a serious threat of them being violated. What is now Article 7 TEU introduces a permanent mechanism to monitor, among others, respect by member states of rule of law.

Political developments in some EU Member States which put at risk important rule of law elements at national level, increased the significance of rule of law in the EU legal order: the Union started looking at states’ performance that challenged its governance and good administration requirements. Thus, the concept, which originally was not clearly defined, gradually acquired more concrete features. Although the term continues to be understood in a slightly different manner by the various national legal orders, EU law, CJEU caselaw and doctrine have identified certain common qualities: among others the limitation of government by the law, changes of law following prescribed procedures, laid down in advance and publicly, the existence of legal remedies before an unbiased and independent judiciary, proportionality, and constitutionalism (EPRS, 2019). In various cases, starting with Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16), and in particular the two Commission cases v Poland (C- 619/18 and C-192/18), CJEU confirmed, as settled caselaw, that the Union is founded on the rule of law principle and in the last case underlined that the independence of courts is 

of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (paragraph 106).

Thus, during recent years, especially, after 2018, the “existential threat to the functioning and long-term survival of the EU legal order” obliged the CJEU to deal more extensively with the values of Article 2 TEU and “to mobilise [these fundamental values and principles] to progressively articulate a more comprehensive, coherent, and effective system of rule of law protection” (Pech-Cochenov, 2021, 14). In this process, the Court reshaped the meaning and scope of the rule of law principle which now can be much better applied both internally and in accession negotiations. In one of its latest cases regarding rule of law, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru (C-896/19), the Court further stressed that

compliance by a Member State with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to that Member State. A Member State cannot therefore amend its legislation in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law’ (paragraph 63).

Rule of law in accession negotiations

The centrality of rule of law requirements for the countries that aspired to join the European Union was clear from the start: the Copenhagen criteria were introduced specifically to provide more specific conditions to the very general at the time accession provisions of the Treaty and to assuage, to some extent, fears that states with weak or unstable democratic foundations could join the EU. In practice, the political criteria, in particular the state of democracy in the accession countries, gradually took precedence over the other criteria, at least in the EU prerequisites (Kochenov, 2004). The 1997 Luxembourg European Council (12-13 December 1997) set up the European Conference which opened negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, in its conclusions, it went further and specified more clearly that “compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations” (European Council, 1997,25).

The first enlargement negotiations following the adoption of these criteria (to the Scandinavian countries and to Austria) did not raise any major issue regarding rule of law, and relevant discussions went relatively smooth.[5] The following wave of accession negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was more complicated for the EU, both because of the size of the enlargement envisaged and due to the weaker democratic institutions and failings in rule of law among several of these countries. In this context, two specific negotiating chapters were shaped with the aim to assist enlargement countries to establish a society based on rule of law and to measure their progress in that area: chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) covered a wide variety of issues, in the fields of justice, internal security, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption and organized crime.

Rule of law turned even more problematic during the subsequent accession negotiations, with Bulgaria and Romania, which were considered to suffer from widespread systemic corruption and to lack sufficient breadth in their national constitutional systems to guarantee steady and permanent adherence to these principles. Croatia’s accession was also marred by issues relating to the rule of law, mostly due to its unsatisfactory cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and general corruption allegations – and border issues with Slovenia (Szpala, 2011).

In a recognition that rule of law was an absolute prerequisite for accession and, to a large extent, to alleviate fears that the EU would accept states which could later turn rogue or fall victims to corruption and maladministration, the EU introduced the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania. The Mechanism, although conceived as a transitional measure to assist the two countries to remedy these shortcomings, was a testimony to the fact that these two countries had not achieved sufficient progress in the fields of judicial reform and corruption, as well as the fight against organized crime for Bulgaria. Still the outcome demonstrated that political considerations were, in the event, more decisive and conclusive to the acceptance of their membership, sidestepping the rule of law criteria set by the very EU.

Nevertheless, the accession negotiations with these two countries demonstrated that, in fact, there was little direct relationship between improvements in rule of law and the progress in these negotiations: the EU was caught in a “Rule of Law dilemma” (Nicolaidis -Kleinfeld, 2012, 15). A clear end-based approach might be considered as aiming to stall enlargement as no state could sufficiently prove its rule-of-law credentials. A means-based reading of the Copenhagen criteria would bypass benchmarks and obligations in favour of a longer-term perception of these conditions. In either case, it proved difficult to use in an objective manner the criteria in the context of 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Political considerations eroded the mere enunciation of the principles, and it was, in both cases, more the avowed declarations of governments rather than objective developments that finally led the way.

The EU enlargement to the Western Balkans

Discussions on EU enlargement to the Balkan countries which were not members of the EU, generally called Western Balkans[6], date back to 1999. To establish a cooperation framework with the Balkans, the EU adopted the Stabilisation and Association Process to govern its relations with the countries of the region. Later, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe became a broader initiative involving all key international players of the region aiming to provide an economic and political perspective for the Balkans. At the first EU-Western Balkans summit meeting, in Thessaloniki in June 2003, the two sides confirmed their attachment to “the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights”. The final declaration endorsed the EU’s “unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” and next day’s European Council confirmed “its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria” (European Council, 2003, point 40).

Despite this commitment, the region’s European perspective remains quite illusory even today.  The “established criteria” are still far from being considered to have been “met”. It took a long time for the Western Balkans to apply for membership and even longer for formal negotiations to start. Twenty years after Thessaloniki, only two countries, Serbia and Montenegro, have officially opened accession negotiations and even with these two countries, discussions have stalled. In July 2022, the first intergovernmental conferences on accession negotiations took place with North Macedonia and Albania, following the resolution of Bulgaria’s veto over the former country’ s accession.

Montenegro, which became independent in 2006, applied for EU membership in December 2008, was granted candidate status in December 2010 but was the first to open accession negotiations in June 2012. Serbia submitted its application in December 2009, was granted candidate status in March 2012 and accession negotiations opened in January 2014. North Macedonia was the first Balkan country to apply for membership (as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2004) and was granted EU candidate status in December 2005. For many years, though, it was unable to open accession negotiations due to the dispute with Greece over the country’s use of the name ‘Macedonia’. Even after the resolution of this issue, in 2018, the Council failed to authorize the effective start of these negotiations mainly, but not exclusively, due to the opposition of Bulgaria which was only raised in June 2022. Albania applied for EU membership in April 2009 and was granted candidate status in June 2014. Although the Commission had recommended to open accession negotiations with the country already in 2016 (and again later), the Council did not authorize this till March 2020. Again, and despite the Commission’s draft negotiating framework, the opening of the talks was delayed due to the obstruction of the negotiations with North Macedonia.

Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo are further behind.  Today they qualify as potential candidate countries. Both have established a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and BiH submitted its membership application in February 2016. The case of Kosovo is complicated because of the dispute with Serbia and the fact that five EU member states have not recognized Kosovo’s independence and Kosovo has not been included in the EU visa liberalization regime.

The delays are due to inherent problems with the countries of the region – notably rule of law issues- and to the EU’s less than wholehearted embrace of further enlargement. The EU’s “enlargement fatigue”, following the 2004 accessions, has a persistent impact on accession discussions of the Western Balkans. This fatigue is strengthened by retrospective assessments of Bulgaria and Romania’s governance capacity which conclude “that ‘they were not ready’ to join in 2007 and that the EU should not have admitted them as members” (O Brennan, 2014, 225). The botched efforts to bring these two countries into the EU while their economies and state structure were insufficiently prepared and adapted to the EU norms, reverberate in accession negotiations both among the member states and, increasingly, among their citizens.

In addition, the various crises that the EU faced after the last enlargement (the eurozone crisis, Brexit, the refugee emergency, and the pandemic) weakened, in general, the EU’s appetite – and capacity- for expansion. The crises also modified the power relations within the EU, weakening the role of the Commission in favour of intergovernmental institutions (both the Council and, especially, the European Council). In enlargement politics this change meant that national politics, and even more domestic considerations, took more prominence in accession talks. This was already viewed with the Slovenian veto to Croatia’s accession on the grounds of their border dispute and, till recently, in Greece’s (till 2018) and Bulgaria’s more recently blocking the start of negotiations with North Macedonia over issues of the country’s name in the former case and identity, language and history in the latter (among others, the latter country’s failure to recognize an ethnic Bulgarian minority and disputes over the origins of the Macedonian language).

In parallel, European public opinion grew significantly cooler over enlargement. Replies to the standard Eurobarometer question whether “Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” gave increasingly negative answers. In autumn 2016 39% of EU28 citizens were in favour of further enlargement, as opposed to 51%. Only 28% among French and 25% among Germans supported enlargement. (Eurobarometer 86, 2016). In 2003, those supporting enlargement were 47% and those against 32% (Eurobarometer, 61, 2003). Although this erosion of support did not particularly refer to the Western Balkans but rather to Turkey – and, before the Russian invasion, Ukraine – it echoed in political positions at national and European levels. France introduced, in 2008, a constitutional provision that would allow the president to submit to a popular referendum any accession of a new country to the EU. In 2019, the same country blocked accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia and suggested a renewed approach to the accession process (which led to the Commission’s new methodology).

Reflecting this erosion, in his statement in the European Parliament plenary session ahead of the vote on the College of Commissioners newly-elected Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker put an official hold on the accession and stated that “there will be no new members during this Commission’s term of office: it is totally unfeasible” and stressed that the EU “must not let those waiting at the door think that it might open in the next five years” (Juncker, 2014). He qualified this negative since “enlargement negotiations will continue with the same vigour, the same drive, the same commitment as in the past”. In his 2017 State of the Union address, he  re-affirmed that “If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must also maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans” (Juncker, 2017). But the message that went through to the Balkan countries was that despite their efforts, accession would be a very long and distant goal.

Rule of law in the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans

Already then, Juncker had underlined that candidates should “give the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.” Concerns over the rule of law violations among member states who had joined after the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement, turned rule of law issues into one of the most central elements of the accession talks with the Western Balkans. Already in 2011, the EU identified strengthening the rule of law “as a continuing major challenge and a crucial condition for countries moving towards EU membership” (European Commission, 2011, 5). The issue has been given greater attention and the rule of law chapters – Chapter 23 on judicial reform and fundamental rights and Chapter 24 on freedom, security, and justice – were opened at an early stage in the negotiations both for Montenegro and for Serbia.

In the 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans, the Commission set an indicative date for the accession of Serbia and Montenegro which could “potentially be ready for membership in a 2025 perspective” (European Commission, 2018, 2).  In 2020, the European Commission adopted a revised methodology on accession negotiations. The aim is to enhance the accession process based on four principles: “credibility, predictability, dynamism and stronger political steer”. In practice the new methodology groups the accession chapters into six groups of issues (“clusters”), making negotiations more overarching and comprehensive and is supposed to act as an incentive on the side of the accession countries to accelerate their reforms and allow to move negotiations faster if they deliver faster (European Commission, 2020).

The policy of “fundamentals first” means that that political, economic, and institutional fundamentals are indivisible and mutually reinforcing. Thus, the Commission gives emphasis on the effective implementation of rule of law rather than mere legislative reforms and in mainstreaming rule of law. The revised accession methodology adopted in 2021 renders rule of law even more central in the accession negotiations, for example through the mainstreaming of anti-corruption measures. As the Commission text stipulates “negotiations on the fundamentals will be opened first and closed last and progress on these will determine the overall pace of negotiations” (European Commission, 2020, 3). In addition, these negotiations will include a “roadmap for the rule of law chapters equivalent to the previous action plans” which will be considered as “the opening benchmark”, as well as interim benchmarks. The conditionality is reinforced by the assertion that no other chapter will be provisionally closed before these benchmarks are met (European Commission, 2020).

The ongoing negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro were adapted to cater for the requirements of the new methodology although the content of the negotiations did not fundamentally change. The intergovernmental conference on the accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia which opened in July 2022 adopted fully the new methodology.

It is true that in the years after the 2004 accession, the content and the contours of rule of law have become clearer; relevant discussions are currently more evidence-based than in the past. Since the 2000s an increasing number of indices on rule of law, democracy, human rights, and good governance have been compiled and represent useful tools in assessing rule of law. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index[7], the Bertelsmann Transformation Index[8], the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators[9] and Freedom in the World[10], among others,allow to measure better and more accurately the level of rule of law achievements of countries and to assess the Commission’s own assessment of countries, allowing for better accountability.

One lesson of the previous enlargements was that rule of law reforms focused on legislative or even constitutional changes, usually with outside technical assistance, rather than in changing the state’s legal philosophy.  Thus, reforms remain often in paper only and lack effective implementation. This is often because they are adopted under EU pressure with little effective “reform ownership” from the part of the state. Thus, laws are either ignored or there is simply no capacity enforce them. For laws to be effective they must “be supported by a strong State that enforces laws across the whole of its territory—an assumption that is rarely justified” (Nicolaidis – Kleinfeld, 2012,18).

As a result, the emphasis in the negotiations with the Western Balkans was to establish an ongoing “rule of law dialogue with the countries of the Western Balkans […in order to…] strengthen preparations at earlier stages of the pre-accession process, based on in-depth analyses of the justice and home affairs sectors” (European Commission, 2011, 6)

In a wider context, adopting and adapting to the EU acquis has become one of the main problems in accession countries, because of the sheer size of the acquis and the proliferation of the required new legislation. As a result, legislation is often adopted by candidate countries indiscriminately by merely copying EU legislation which does not necessarily fit their specific needs and frequently requires subsequent legal adaptation. Paradoxically, this increases legal uncertainty among citizens and businesses as to the actual legal framework. This is true for economic reforms and for rule of law and one main contentious issue in the case with the Western Balkans.

The regular European Commission enlargement reports point out to substantive deficiencies in the Balkan states regarding rule of law. Despite the courageous efforts and the technocratic language of these reports, these deficiencies largely remain the same through these years: “an increasingly hostile environment for civil society, freedom of expression and freedom of the media, and attempts to exercise undue influence and political interference on the judiciary”, a “sound enforcement of anti-corruption frameworks” and the mainstreaming of corruption measures, “coherent and consistent efforts to contain and effectively address elements of state capture”  (European Commission, 2022A, 8). These statements are not particularly different from previous years. The Commission’s 2019 regular enlargement communication stressed the region’s “shortcomings” related to “a lack of political will, institutional resistance and an increasingly hostile environment for civil society”, “the existence of certain elements of state capture”, “instances of widespread corruption”, “the ineffectiveness of criminal procedures, giv[ing] strong signals of impunity, and contribut[ing] to the risk of criminal infiltration of the political and economic systems” (European Commission, 2019, 4). Issues such as the need for an independent and impartial judiciary, the reduction of ruling by decrees, timely delivery of justice and enforcement of judicial decisions are also often mentioned in EU reports regarding Western Balkans.

Despite some improvement in some of these areas, most of the shortcomings identified are always present in the Balkans and have marred negotiations. Of course, it is not only rule of law that is an obstacle to accession: neighborly disputes, inter-ethnic tensions and the unstable economy are all contributing to the difficult road of the Western Balkans towards the EU. The unfulfilled promises of EU accession weaken the attractiveness of reforms. On the Western Balkans, there is no discernable trace of the virtuous circle that allowed the adoption and permanence of reforms in rule of law and in the economy because of the accession perspective. In fact, what can be seen in the countries of the region is “democratic stagnation” (Bieber, 2019) or even “backsliding”, for instance in the case of Serbia. The accession paradigm does not seem to work in these countries’ case, either because the level of state capture is higher or because the accession perspective is perceived to be unreal or unrealistic. As Bechev puts it “the region does not generate sufficient levels of instability to disrupt or threaten the EU” and the latter prefers the, albeit imperfect, status quo to a bold move (Bechev, 2022).

But status quo does not seem to be a lasting one. The Balkans are increasingly attracted by populist rulers with an authoritarian streak, a practice that has led to the establishment of a new type of illiberal political system “that formally commits to EU integration […] but continues to govern through informal rules and clientelism” (Kmezić, 2020, 56).

Rule of law after the Russian invasion to Ukraine

The Russian war of aggression to Ukraine, besides its devastating effect on the country itself and international relations, changed considerably the EU – and the West’s – security priorities. Ukraine (together with Moldova and Georgia) applied for membership to the EU and the widespread support for the country’s resistance led to a speedy recognition of Ukraine’s (and Moldova’s) candidate status by the European Council of June 2022 which invited the European Commission “to report to the Council on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion on the membership application as part of its regular enlargement package” (European Council, 2022, point 12). The European Council emphasized that “The progress of each country towards the European Union will depend on its own merit in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, taking into consideration the EU’s capacity to absorb new members” (point 14). Rule of law was not specifically mentioned in what admittedly was a general, quite political, commitment – although immediately below in its conclusions regarding the Western Balkans, the Council reiterated the “the importance of reforms, notably in the area of rule of law and in particular those related to the independence and functioning of the judiciary and the fight against corruption” (point 17). The Commission’s opinion on Ukraine’s application although it concluded that “Ukraine is well advanced in reaching the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” and recommended that “Ukraine be granted candidate status” stated that this would be “on the understanding” that a number of steps would be taken. Almost all referred to rule of law issues, such as the implementation of legislation on the selection procedure for judges of the Constitutional Court, strengthening the fight against corruption, ensuring the implementation of anti-money laundering legislation, implementing the Anti-Oligarch law (European Commission, 2022B, 20).

The same June 2022 European Summit conclusions on the Western Balkans did not modify officially the EU’s stance on rule of law for the Balkan countries: the Council confirmed its “full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans” but referred to the revised methodology and the “importance of reforms, notably in the area of rule of Law” for the countries.

Ukraine has altered the EU’s (and Europeans’) view of the world. The conviction that Europe must be “geopolitical” was already a mantra for the Von Den Leien Commission but, the Russian aggression made clearer to European leaders and to Europeans that politics, rather than the economy and trade relations, should drive EU policy-making. A clear expression of this approach was the establishment of the European Political Community, an intergovernmental forum conceived to foster political dialogue and cooperation, to address issues of common interest and to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent.

 The crisis also made clear to Europeans that what Bieber (2018) called “stabilitocracy”, i.e. the European support to Balkan regimes that claimed to provide stability domestically and to espouse the European values while maintaining strong authoritarian trends and a dubious rule of law record was not viable in the long and even medium term: although tacit support for Russia, a traditional ally, was stronger in Serbia,  few politicians throughout the Balkans took a strong stance against the Russian aggression. The geopolitical developments became another puzzle for the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and for rule of law requirements, in particular. On the one hand, it became urgent to provide a viable path to accession that might deter the Russian and Chinese influence on the region. The unblocking of accession negotiations with North Macedonia was a tangible step towards the first direction. But a geopolitical emphasis also comes with discounts in other areas: to what extent should the EU tone down its rule of law requirements to address the security concerns over its southeast flank? The argument – an easy one to explain but much harder to implement – should be that the EU is stronger and therefore more attractive to candidates when it defends democratic values and rule of law within and outside its border. But this is not argument that would appeal to many leaders in Western Balkans and would seem ironic to many citizens of the region.

Conclusions

As rule of law becomes challenged within its borders, the EU tries to be more demanding from those states that request to join the EU. The Commission (2014, 1) underlined that “the rule of law is the backbone of any modern constitutional democracy” and “one of the main values upon which the Union is based”. This development renders rule of law prerequisites of paramount value for accession to the EU. In assessing observance of rule of law for Western Balkans countries, the EU tries to implement a multi-fold strategy which does not always sound coherent. It must mollify public unease over further enlargement, protect the EU from potentially illiberal or merely institutionally weak regimes trying to join the EU, provide a push for sustainability in institutional reforms and serve wider political objectives, in particular anchoring the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU enterprise. This strategy, up till now did not succeed.

Of course, rule of law requirements from candidate countries are not new: they equally applied to previous enlargements, too. But the outcome of those negotiations was not coherent. Although the EU had fleshed out specific conditions for democracy and rule of law, political considerations, especially at the time of the 2004 enlargement, took precedence. In the run-up to the accession, politics sidestepped substantive application of the democracy and rule of law criteria. During the 2004 negotiations, the EU put the rule of law threshold so low that, ultimately, the criterion was disregarded. To a large extent, “in the end the requirement to have the institutions guaranteeing democracy and rule of law in place was very similar to a formal condition applied in the previous enlargement rounds” (Kochenov, 2004). Political considerations prevailed even more during the 2007 and 2013 accession negotiations. The establishment of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was the proof that the Copenhagen requirements could be bent if sufficient political will was exercised upon the EU institutions.

The negotiations with the Western Balkan countries take place on these contradictory foundations. Enlargement fatigue and Euroscepticism means that rule of law is seen (and sometimes used) as a means to postpone (indefinitely) enlargement. This mentality defeats the purpose of the accession negotiations – to strengthen in a steadfast manner democratic resilience in these countries. Although the EU, in particular the European Commission, provide extensive analysis of the rule of law failings in these countries, the reluctance to enlargement is less linked to these specific failings but rather to a wider “enlargement fatigue” and to national considerations among member states. There is certainly a widespread apprehension over other “Hungaries” joining the EU but the opposition – and support – for accession is not linked to the progress or delay observed in each country regarding the Copenhagen criteria but to an, often prejudiced, view over these states.

Thus, Balkan countries and governments see the goalposts being moved during the game and become disillusioned. In fact, the erratic manner by which the EU applies the Copenhagen political criteria weakens domestic pressure in favour of necessary reforms. Reforms are perceived as a ritualized process rather than as a required change of the mentality of states and societies who realize that other paths, support from member states, successful diplomatic initiatives or even the international context, might be more useful for their accession efforts.

In fact, rule of law has deteriorated in almost all Western Balkans during recent years. Looking at the overall Rule of Law score over time of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index[11], in five out of the six states of the region there has been a deterioration of rule of law indicators with only Kosovo remaining stable. This does not bode well for the consolidation of rule of law before (or even after) EU accession.

As Kmezić (2020, 59) puts it “conditionality works well if membership criteria are clear, if the same criteria are applied to all applicants, if they are strictly but fairly monitored, if the findings are transparently communicated and if there is no doubt that the reward will come once conditions are met”. Evidence shows that this is not the case with the Western Balkans, increasing mutual mistrust.

The consequence of this is that Western Balkan countries turn to other alternatives which provide easy funding, do not ask many questions, and allow for the governing nomenklatura to continue ruling in a state capture context. Russia, but also Turkey and the Gulf states, and, increasingly, China provide various forms of financial and political support that compete and oppose the European approach. In the EU the anti-enlargement mood further complicates relevant discussions, and it is partly responsible for democratic backsliding in the Balkans, thus creating a vicious circle (Walldén, 2017).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine reminded the EU – and, more importantly some of its more reluctant member states – of the geopolitical value of the Western Balkans and the need to “anchor” the region more decisively in the EU, limiting the scope for third powers (such as Russia) to foment tensions in the region. The immediate outcome was the reinvigoration of accession talks with the return of a more dynamic European diplomacy towards the region. The unblocking of the accession path of North Macedonia and Albania was the most visible example of this change of mentality.

In the end, enlargement is eminently a political decision, both for the EU and for the candidate state. If the EU considers that there are superior interests at stake, economic, geopolitical or political, it may – and did – interpret widely the rule of law criterion in the hope that participation in the EU will enhance and solidify the fragile democratic institutions. It worked in most cases of the 2004 enlargement. It did not work fully in 2007. The case of the Western Balkans seems to lead towards the latter rather than the former scenario. But geopolitical considerations are impending, perhaps more urgently now than before. And the EU – and its member states – are more uncertain today than in the past as to where they want to head το.

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[1] Ioannis Papageorgiou  is Professor  School of Political Sciences Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

[2] It should be noted that the failed Treaty setting up a European Political Community of 1952 (which was drafted as a follow-up to the European Defence Community) stated in its preamble that member states were “determined to invite other European Peoples, inspired with the same ideal, to join with [them] in [their] endeavor” and in article 116(1) it provided that “accession to the Community shall be open to the Member States of the Council of Europe and to any other European State which guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms…”.

[3] According to point 1 of the resolution (in French) the EP « constate que l’accord d’association entre la Communauté européenne et la Grèce, qui prévoit l’adhésion ultérieure de ce pays à la Communauté, ne pourra être appliqué dans ses différentes phases que si les structures démocratiques et les libertés politique et syndicale sont rétablies en Grèce ».

[4] The first paragraph of article 49 TEU stipulates that “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union”.

[5] The only reference to rule of law in the Commission’s opinion on the accession of Sweden (31 July 1992) was the sentence “Sweden’s democratic traditions and human rights record are as valid as her important place in European history and culture”.

[6] The term, in this paper, comprises the six Balkan states which are not yet part of the EU: Albania, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. It is not, as the adjective denotes, include a geographical connotation; rather, it was coined by the EU to collectively qualify those countries in the Balkan peninsula which were not (yet) members of the European Union. As such, it is a political term: the group tends to shrink as countries will join the EU. For instance, Croatia, probably the westernmost Balkan country, ceased to be included in the group after its accession to the EU in 2013.

[7] https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022

[8] https://bti-project.org/en/?&cb=00000

[9] https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents

[10] https://freedomhouse.org/issues

[11] World Justice Project, rule of law rankings in  https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022

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An EU-Western Balkans summit will take place today in the picturesque estate of Brdo, hosted by the Slovenian Presidency of the EU. This is the fourth such summit, with the first one organised by the Greek Presidency in Thessaloniki in 2003. It was there that all countries of the region were promised an EU membership path and were told that their place is in the European Union.

That place has never seemed more insecure than now. To be sure, the process of achieving EU membership was always going to be hard, long and a moving target for the candidate countries. But the prospect was still within reach. That changed with the declaration of the former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 that there would be no further enlargement until 2019.

At the time, this sounded like an overly cautious assessment. Today, committing to the accession of any of the Western Balkans states by the end of the decade would cause deep division among member states. For Albania, 12 years after the submission of the country’s application for membership and almost two years after the EU Council’s decision to open accession negotiations in March 2020, no formal date for the start of negotiations has yet been given. The reasoning for this is linked to the grouping of Albania with North Macedonia, whose bilateral issue with neighbouring Bulgaria has blocked the way forward.

The problem is not only the length and unpredictability of the process. It is rather the fading of its substance. The process of EU integration has failed to capture and correct the backsliding of those countries misleadingly named as front-runners, while the negotiation process has become a bureaucratic exercise shrouded in the incomprehensible language of benchmarks. This has neither translated into progress nor wellbeing for the citizens of these states.

The hollowing of the substance of the accession process has come with a lowering of ambitions in relation to regional cooperation, too. Regional cooperation among the Western Balkan Six, as launched under the framework of the Berlin Process, has been built on four objectives: enhancing cooperation with the aim of fostering economic convergence; improving connectivity between the region and the EU; encouraging reforms related to the EU accession agenda, particularly those related to rule of law and anti-corruption; and finally, creating a conducive environment for solving bilateral issues and disputes.

Over the years, the process has come to be associated primarily with the implementation of the Common Regional Market, an objective agreed upon by the leaders of the region at the Sofia Summit last November. The political framework which linked regional cooperation to the EU accession process on the one hand, and solving bilateral issues on the other, has largely slipped to one side.

Today, at the EU-Western Balkans Summit, the EU member states have a chance to recover some of the leverage the EU has lost in the past few years in the region. There are at least four ways in which the EU and the Western Balkans can engage in more meaningful ways.

First, they must keep their promises. The accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia should open within a year. Kosovo must be granted visa liberalisation. Kosovars, a people of over two million, are now the only people in Europe prevented from entering the Schengen area without a visa, despite fulfilling all technical criteria since 2018. The process of accession negotiations will be long, tedious, and reversible, and the accession process may not look like any of the accession processes so far. But it will recover trust, the credibility of the EU, and still sustain the pressure – thin as it is – needed to implement a reform agenda. And it would certainly help to balance the role of Russia and China in the region.

Second, it is necessary to prepare for the long term. As accession negotiations continue, the EU will need to create and revamp its package of incentives for cooperation and help deliver on reforms for the Western Balkan Six. To be clear, the EU remains the main trade partner for the region. In the past two years, the EU has provided no less than 3.3. billion euros, together with the European Investment Bank, for tackling the Covid-19 health crisis and for helping the post-pandemic socio-economic recovery, out of which over 761 million euros have gone to support the recovery from the social and economic impact of the crisis. This investment must be secured and sustained through the preparation of the region to gradually integrate into the single market.

This might be done only gradually, within a plausible time frame and under conditions which do not burden the already weak post-pandemic economies of the region with extraordinary structural costs. This includes engagement with the private sector. Supporting companies from the region with the aim to integrate them into European supply and value chains might be one way. Helping small and medium enterprises to become more financially and technologically apt is another.

The full implementation of the Common Regional Market must go in tandem with the implementation of the EU Economic and Investment Package of 9 billion euros approved last year, which is dedicated primarily to the improvement of infrastructure, rail and road connectivity, and energy and digitalisation in the region. The focus must be on the frontloading of funding for the key infrastructure projects which connect the region to the rest of the EU, and on improving the competitiveness and investment climate in the region so that the package succeeds in mobilising up to 20 billion euros in investment within this decade.

Third, the region must be helped to ‘build back better’. This does not only mean in relation to infrastructure and the economy but also, critically, the human resources and human capital of the region. The Western Balkans has experienced a profound brain drain with much of the labour force migrating over the past few years. The EU must engage with the Western Balkans for the gradual integration of the region into the European Education Area and EU initiatives to foster research and innovation. It will need to create specifically tailored programmes for the strengthening of capacities in these policy areas for the region. Admittedly, the only way to approximate legislation in the areas above is through actual negotiations of the related chapters of the acquis.

Fourth, the EU must engage politically with the region. There is only so much that trade and economic relations can do. If there is no political framework through which the EU can engage with the Western Balkans, trade is unlikely to work miracles and bring disputing parties together. It would have cost little to the EU’s member states to include the Western Balkans in the consultation process for the Brdo Summit Declaration, but this would have signalled real political will to engage with and listen to the countries of the region.

In the area of bilateral disputes, political coordination with the United States remains critically important, given the specific features of state building in the region. In this respect, the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo must continue and it should be built on clear expectations and a roadmap, as well as real pressure from both partners on the parties to cooperate genuinely. This would include being bold enough to denounce any breaches and reinforce commitments.

The EU holds a degree of attraction not only because it is financially and economically useful, but because it has built its assistance to the region within a normative framework of values, norms and political identities. In other words, it has woven its financial mechanisms within a narrative of peace and security, of rule of law and good governance, and guaranteed rights and liberties. It is as much a mechanism for crafting meaning as it is for providing support.

But in the absence of this normative framework, money alone will never be enough to keep the Western Balkans at peace, democratically governed and secure. And if there is one region in the world where the EU can still rediscover its own meaning and confidence, it is the Western Balkans.

Odeta Barbullushi is an advisor to the Prime Minister of Albania. She received her doctorate in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham in 2010.

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Acknowledgements: This project is co-financed by the Government of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.

This project No. 22020042 was made possible through Visegrad+ Grant from the International Visegrad Fund.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in this research paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of International Visegrad Fund.

Impressum

Title: The new EU accession methodology. Is it enough to pull the Western Balkans in?

Publisher: Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” – Skopje

Authors: Zoran Nechev, Dragan Tilev, Jovana Marović and Alba Çela

Design: Dejan Kuzmanovski

This publication is available at:

http://www.idscs.org.mk

Introduction 

In times when the European Union is struggling to grow stronger from the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, its efforts in the area of enlargement are seemingly put on hold. For some time already, the Council remains frozen in a situation where the negotiations with both North Macedonia and Albania cannot be started; whereas Montenegro and Serbia are neither moving ahead nor have received their guidelines yet on how they will be integrated in the new Methodology for accession negotiations, initially designed for newcomers in the negotiations.

In light of this, this policy brief will try to shed new light on the new Methodology and elaborate in detail how the negotiation process will look like under these new circumstances for those that wait to start the process and those that are already negotiating. Based on this, the brief seeks to locate the challenges that the Commission, the Council and negotiating countries will face under the new methodology and formulate recommendations how to sufficiently address them in order to return the transformative power of the negotiation process and to avoid complete politization (bilateralisation) of the accession negotiation process.   

1. How did North Macedonia and Albania get to this point?

After signing the Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations with Bulgaria (2017) and the Prespa Agreement with Greece (2018), the Council of the EU accepted to put the decision on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia on the agenda for the first time in 2018. After several additional postponements in 2018 and 2019, the decision to open accession negotiations was finally adopted in March 2020, after the methodology for negotiations had been changed. This decision was  confirmed by the European Council. Thereby, all member states (27) made it clear that they want to see North Macedonia as a future EU member state and are ready to set the accession requirements without any preconditions (i.e. to define a General EU Position and a Negotiating Framework).

When it comes to Albania, the decision to give a green light to the opening of accession negotiation was accompanied by a list of 15 preconditions^[1] to be fulfilled before the first intergovernmental conference. Albania has adopted an Action Plan^[2] to fulfill these preconditions and has since managed to fulfill some of them. Among those, the electoral reform package (to be tested in the April 25 elections), it managed to complete the composition of new justice system institutions, most importantly the Constitutional Court, the National Bureau of Investigation (BKH) and Special Prosecutors for Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK). The problematic draft for a new media law has been returned for revisions by the Venice Commission and its adoption is still pending. The European Commission has evaluated the overall progress made on the preconditions sufficient for opening of the negotiations.

The general elections of 25^th of April are the stress test that has been mentioned several times by key high-level politicians from EU member states as well as Commission officials. Free and fair elections which will accepted by all sides on the political spectrum are necessary to move forward on the European agenda.

• New Methodology, new opportunities and new challenges

On February 5th 2020, based on Non-paper suggested by France, the European Commission launched a Communication with a proposal for “Enhancing the accession process – a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans”, endorsed by the Council on 25^th of March 2020,with the aim to drive forward the EU accession process, by making it more credible, more dynamic and predictable. The new methodology aims to balance a political vision with strict administrative requirements of the accession negotiations process. This changed approach intends to make the process of enlargement possible and realistic. As stated in the Communication, enlargement “remains more than ever a geopolitical investment into stable, strong and united Europe”.

Despite the fact that many of the elements and the wording of the proposed methodology sound the same as before, careful analyses bring us to the conclusion that changes are deep and that novelties are substantial. The proposed methodology can be seen as a new political framework for a technical “accession driven” gradual process, fully respecting merit-based principles.

Four key points characterize the proposed new Methodology: political commitment, dynamism, capacities, and reversibility.

The first of the key points, clear political commitment, is at the epicenter of the proposed methodology that should make the process of accession more credible, more accountable, more predictable, and more concrete. During the last decade, it has been noticed quite often that political statements and promises do not correspond with their implementation. This goes equally for the EU as for the accession countries. The new methodology seems to address this weakness through a proposed closer enhanced political steer. The main logic behind this is that once politicians agree on concrete roadmaps and action plans (rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, and stronger links with the Economic reform programme), they first have to give clear public political statements/orientations, and then will have to keep promises and to deliver expected reforms through professional and depoliticized administration in democratic and all-inclusive procedures, all the way during the negotiations.

Dynamism is the second key element that this methodology is bringing forward, as a potential for accelerated accession negotiations. The main novelty here is a grouping of all 33 acquis chapters into six clusters, offering a chance to accelerate the process, for example, with the opening of up to 9 chapters at once. Preconditions for this to happen are good preparation, strategic organization when planning the process, putting the right priorities in good order and making available all necessary resources to be able to implement expected obligations. Benchmarks, as introduced in 2005 and enhanced in 2011, remain, but now with opening benchmarks per cluster, plus interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and (24 Justice, Freedom, and Security) as a precondition for any advancement in all other clusters. In the end, closing benchmarks will be set for all chapters. “Fundamentals” (chapters 23, 24, 5, 18 and 32, as well as Economic criteria, functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform) is the most complex and certainly the most difficult cluster to negotiate. This cluster should lay down mutual trust and ensure a credible negotiation process. It will be the first cluster to be opened at the star and will remain open until the very end of the accession process.

Capacity is the third key point of the new methodologycan be considered as essential for successful negotiations and timely reforms. This more complex and more demanding process has to be matched with appropriate institutional capacities on both sides. If there is a political will on both sides, then the dynamism of the process will depend on the capacities and resources available, also on both sides. No one wants to end with a good document and strong will, but without sufficient capacity to implement.

The fourth key element in the new methodology is reversibility, or positive and negative conditionality. Countries that are progressing with their reforms and advancing in accession negotiations (closer integration and increased funds) will be awarded. On the other hand, they will be be sanctioned if stagnating, dragging behind, slowing down or even backsliding. Complying with the required criteria, and full harmonization with the acquis is a serious challenge. In principle, there is no objection to the positive and negative conditionality, but what raises serious concerns is the newly introduced decision-making model for initiating corrective measures, which is quite different from the one applied so far for Montenegro and Serbia, in which case, proposal can be placed by the Commission or 1/3 of the member states and must be adopted by the Council with Qualified Majority Voting-QMV. According to the new methodology, in the case of North Macedonia and Albania, proposals can be placed by the Commission or a single member state and adopted in simplified procedures, through the reverse QMV. In the case of North Macedonia, and to some extent to Albania, this mechanism can put the country under substantial pressure on very sensitive national issues, not necessarily connected with the acquis, including possible differences in interpretation of some aspects of our bilateral agreements.

• Negotiation Frameworks for North Macedonia and Albania. What we know?  

Together with the Decision of the Council of the EU to open accession negotiations (March 2020), the European Commission received the mandate to prepare the General EU Position, including the Negotiating Framework on the conditions under which the European Union will accept North Macedonia as its member state (the same procedure is under way for Albania as well). The European Commission has prepared draft General EU Position (GEUP) and Negotiation Framework (NF), and handed over to the German Presidency of the Council (COREPER and COELA) at the beginning of July 2020, with the aim to be adopted by the General Affairs Council (GAC), as well as confirmed by the European Council until end of 2020.

The negotiating framework is considered to be the most important document in which EU member states determine their main negotiation positions, obliging the European Commission as the institution leading the technical negotiations on behalf of the member states, to adhere to them, with the obligation to regularly provide feedback and to inform member states on the course and results of the negotiations. The NF defines the scope and structure and key requirements to be accepted and procedures and structures of negotiations.

Taking into consideration the complexity and specificity of the NF for North Macedonia (applying the new rules in line with the new revised Methodology) and the announced demands by Bulgaria (and by Greece in line with Prespa Agreement), the draft text, as expected, caused serious inconclusive discussions within COELA and COREPER, in the period between July to December. Due to unreasonable requirements by Bulgaria, the text of the draft NF could not be agreed upon, it did not reach the GAC and is still under consideration of the Council bodies and its Presidency. Therefore, the text of these documents is still not public.

The NF for Albania is also unknown for the time being, however, from what we know the resolution of the ongoing unresolved maritime issue with Greece through the International Court of Justice in the Hague will find its way into the document.^[3]

Furthermore, the GEUP prepared by the Commission and refined by the COELA and COREPER Council bodies, to be presented on the (First) Ministerial meeting opening the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of the Republic of North Macedonia to the European Union, will supposedly consist of:

• EU Opening Statement for Accession Negotiations, setting the legal frame and political stage and tone of the negotiations within the intergovernmental conference, that will remain open until the end of negotiations, finalized with initialing of the text of Accession Treaty by all sides allowing to North Macedonia becoming a full-fledged member of the European Union in line with Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, Copenhagen criteria, including regional cooperation and good neighborly relations, 

• Negotiation Framework, defines the 1) principles governing the negotiations, through the enhanced enlargement methodology with the pace based on our own merits and on the other side, depending on the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, and full respect of all required criteria, including political and economic, as well as harmonized legislation and ability to take on the obligations of membership; 2) frames substance of the negotiations, namely adoption and translation in Macedonian language all the acquis and ability to implement it correctly. Derogations are almost impossible, but transitional measures, if well elaborated can be negotiated. As for our participation into EMU and Schengen area, separate procedures will apply, after entry into the EU; 3) sets clear negotiating procedures, starting with formal process of screening, opening negotiations by clusters (6 clusters), starting from the Fundamentals, using opening benchmarks, interim benchmarks for rule of law chapters (23 and 24) and closing benchmarks per chapter (33 chapters). All decisions on opening and closing of clusters and chapters will be taken by unanimity; 4) sets procedure and organization (technical) details for smooth negotiation process, and 5) defines the grouping of the chapters and contents of the clusters.

• Application of the new Enlargement Methodology to Montenegro and Serbia: Much Ado About Nothing?

Montenegro is currently trying to meet 83 interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 (45 for Chapter 23 and 38 for Chapter 24), while Serbia has a total of 98 for these two chapters (48 for Chapter 23 and 50 for Chapter 24).[4] In order to meet these interim benchmarks, both Serbia and Montenegro have prepared action plans approved by the European Commission. The Commission also has the balance clause at its disposal which allows to block a country from opening new negotiating chapters until satisfactory progress on reforms under chapters 23 and 24 has been achieved. Negotiations so far have shown that regardless of the logic of the approach and the corresponding principles, success in these countries in implementing reforms and strengthening the rule of law is limited.It thus requires concretization of instruments and a more committed approach and effective monitoring. Is this possible to achieve with the new methodology? What do we know so far about its application to Montenegro and Serbia?[5] Although Montenegro and Serbia accepted a new methodology in May[6] and July 2020,[7] respectively (though in the case of Serbia it was done informally by the announcement of the President), the European Commission came only out in March 2021 with certain announcements on how the methodology could be adapted to these two countries already negotiating membership, while the presentation of a non-paper on the application of the new methodology is not expected before June. Such a delay, especially in the case of Montenegro, which has opened all chapters and thus gained the opportunity to open all six clusters at once (while Serbia has opened a total of 18 chapters so far), is not justified, and may be an indicator of the lack of adequate strategy within the European Commission in relation to the application of methodology. Having in mind what we know so far about the guidelines for the application of the revised enlargement methodology to Montenegro and Serbia the negotiating framework will not change significantly while the most important remarks are as follows:

The focus remains on the interim benchmarks as key instruments for improving the rule of law: These benchmarks were defined at the very beginning of the negotiations; they are not specific (concrete) enough to help the negotiating country to better respond to the demands.

The (same) action plans are still central elements for meeting the interim benchmarks: Once adopted and prepared, these action plans have been comprehensive, but in the meantime have become outdated and cannot help countries meet the interim benchmarks without adapting or rethinking indicators and new activities.

No other chapter will be closed until the interim benchmarks are met: Seen as a particularly important instrument and rule in disciplining and motivating a candidate country,[8]  it is not really a novelty since there has so far been the possibility of activating the balance clause while the chapter could not be closed permanently (only temporary) until Chapters 23 and 24 are closed.

Corrective measures will be taken only if there is a problem in meeting the interim benchmarks: Problems in meeting the interim benchmarks already exist, hence a different approach and more precise instruments are required.

Existing chapters will be grouped into six clusters: For Montenegro, this is no longer relevant since the country opened the last negotiating chapter in June 2020. Serbia  has opened a total of 18 negotiating chapters so far, and the other chapters are in different clusters. This potentially means that the procedure for meeting the opening benchmarks will only apply to individual parts of the cluster, when the time comes, and about which, as before, the EU member states will have the final say based on results in the rule of law.

Regular political international conferences between the EU member states and the candidate countries at least once a year: This novelty is good for sending strong political messages and committing candidate countries, but without overcoming the political decision-making in the Union that now takes precedence over merit-based will not have a special role in the process.

Incentives still unknown: Although the new methodology introduced in February last year predicted that candidate countries would be rewarded in line with the results achieved, it is still unclear what this will look like in practice, which is particularly problematic given that insisting on sanctions alone may not be particularly encouraging for the reforms.

• Comparison between SRB/MNE and ALB/MKD

It has to be noted that the EU enlargement policy and accession negotiations process with it, has evolved substantially since its beginnings. The goal remains the same, full flagged EU membership, the paths toward that goal, means, and dynamism are constantly changing however. Over time, the changing political environment within the EU is causes substantially strengthened and stricter rules and criteria. Since the “big bang” expansion of the EU (10 plus in 2004), every new enlargement was followed with more rigid criteria and stricter rules, like at the time of accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2007), Croatia (2013), and further on with opening of the negotiations for Montenegro (2012) and Serbia (2014). Inefficiency of the last two has provoked first France, and then the EU as a whole, to change yet again the accession negotiation process and to introduce new unique rules.

The intention was to make the process more political, more dynamic and more just for all, based on countries individual merits, but at the same time creating an equal playing field for all the countries from the Western Balkans region. In order to achieve this goal, initially the Commission, and consequently the Council bodies and MS’s representatives (COELA and COREPER), are trying to transpose in practice all elements from the New Methodology into the Draft Negotiation Frameworks designed for North Macedonia and Albania, as well as Document on the application of the revised Enlargement Methodology to the accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia.

The position, so far, of most of the EU member states is that the new generation of negotiation Frameworks with all elements from the new methodology will apply to North Macedonia and Albania (latter to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), while at the same time negotiation frameworks for Montenegro and Serbia will remain as they are (in legal terms), but these two countries will have to accept the new Methodology and to comply with it, as described in that additional explanatory document, except in the cases when it does not contradict with their negotiation frameworks.

If this position of the Council sustains, the principle of “equal playing field” is seriously in question, since different set of rules will apply to different groups of countries (MN and SR against MK and AL), which at the end instead bringing the region closer together, will cause further divisions and potential bitterness. Further on, differences in the scope and procedure of proposing corrective measures can have strong negative unpredictable impact on the process as a whole.

• Conclusion

The proposed new Methodology is more complex, more political and demanding (lessons learned) than any other before, but if both sides are persuaded and dedicated, it offers a chance to lay down a credible, dynamic and sustainable political process.

There are many unknowns in how the process will look like under the new methodology, however, the main one will be how the increased politicization will impact the accession negotiations of both North Macedonia and Albania. We still need to see how the countries already negotiating will be integrated in the new methodology. And finally, there is a need for better elaboration of the differences among negotiation frameworks and potential consequences caused by different decision-making procedures when initiating corrective measures, for the two groups of countries (those waiting to start negotiations and those already negotiating). The risks to create further gaps are substantial. Success of the new methodology may depend on correct understanding of the consequences.

Information about the International Visegrad Fund –

The Visegrad Fund is an international donor organization, established in 2000 by the governments of the Visegrad Group countries—Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia

to promote regional cooperation in the Visegrad region (V4) as well as between the V4 region and other countries, especially in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership regions. The Fund does so by awarding €8 million through grants, scholarships and artist residencies provided annually by equal contributions of all the V4 countries. Other donor countries (Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States) have provided another €10 million through various grant schemes run by the Fund since 2012.

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[1] “The Opening of Accession Negotiations: A New Hope for Albania”, TOBIAS RUETTERSHOF, Tirana Observatory https://tiranaobservatory.com/2020/05/08/the-opening-of-accession-negotiations-a-new-hope-for-albania/

[2] The Action Plan makes the distinction between the measures that should be fulfilled prior to the first and second intergovernmental conference however interestingly uses the term “priority” instead of condition or precondition.” Action Plan to fulfill priorities set by the European Council , 21.09.2020 (PLANI I MASAVE PËR PËRMBUSHJEN E PËRPARËSIVE TË PËRCAKTUARA NGA KËSHILLI I BASHKIMIT EVROPIAN) https://www.parlament.al/Files/Integrimi/plani%20i%20veprimit%20FINAL.pdf

[2] IMO definition: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/20144/most-frequently-asked-questions-international-monitoring-operation_en

[3] “Albania and Greece seek joint maritime border resolution from The Hague”,

[4] Jovana Marović, Tena Prelec, Marko Kmezić „Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: Call for a Revolution against Particularism“, BiEPAG, January 2019, http://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Strengthening-the-Rule-of-Law.pdf

[5] “EU’ s Várhelyi warns Serbia & Montenegro about rule of law in closing chapters“, N1, 17 March 2021, https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/eu-s-varhelyi-warns-serbia-montenegro-about-rule-of-law-in-closing-chapters/

[6] „Montenegro accepts new methodology, good platform for intensifying reforms”, the Government of Montenegro, 15 May 2021, https://www.gov.me/en/News/224514/Montenegro-accepts-new-methodology-good-platform-for-intensifying-reforms.html

[7] “Serbia accepts new methodology in EU accession talks – President Vucic”, SeeNews, 10 July 2020, https://seenews.com/news/serbia-accepts-new-methodology-in-eu-accession-talks-president-vucic-705971

[8] Aleksandar Ivković “Application of the new methodology to Montenegro and Serbia: Principles remain the same, more emphasis on interim benchmarks”, European Western Balkans, 24 March 2021, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/03/24/application-of-the-new-methodology-to-montenegro-and-serbia-principles-remain-the-same-more-ephasis-on-interim-benchmarks/

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