Written by Foreign Policy

Albanian-American Relations in the Fall of 1946: A Stormy End

“We confess to not knowing much about Albania except the essentials: private cars are forbidden, men do not wear beards, adulterers can be sent to labor camps, state-owned stores sell one style of women’s shoes, all religion is unconstitutional, and in a recent election all 1,830,653 eligible voters cast their ballots for the ruling party. (one voting paper was found invalid).”



 Thus did a popular U.S. magazine begin a story on former King Zog of Albania under the heading “Muttontown’s King.” This little appreciated and even less understood country, bordering the Adriatic, endured as a rigidly communist dictatorship for over forty years. As such, western diplomats and historians alike were unable to penetrate its wall of silence. Peter R. Prifti began his 1978 book with an appropriate reminder: Albania remained “one the least known countries of Europe in the West.” To European and American societies, Nicholas Bethell colorfully remarked, Albania seemed as “unreal as Ruritania or Transylvania.”

    Anglo American intelligence sources personalized this ignorance of Albania. “Even in our more serious moments,” Kim Philby remembered, “we Anglo-Saxons never forgot that our agents (in Albania) were just down from the trees.” Yet these observations are all the more surprising since in Nicholas Pano’s view, this society “has at various times since 1945 enjoyed a prominence far out of proportion to its size and power.”

   Besides western unawareness, Albanian history, especially regarding local rivalries and suspicions about foreign presence, has contributed to the unique nature of this secretive state. Outside powers, such as Russia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and even Chine, at times this century, have related to an independent Albania, in J.F. Brown’s words, as “a client state.” Moreover, regional and international events have influenced the nation’s past. A short-lived free Albania, for example, disappeared in the cauldron of World War I, keeping alive persistent concerns about Rome, Athens, and Belgrade’s territorial aims. The current battles in the former Yugoslavia reinforce this point.

   In terms of U.S. policy specifically, Washington withdrew its diplomatic mission in mid-November, 1946 and each society antagonistically ignored the other for over four decades. The last weeks of the American presence with its myriad of furious charges and counter-charges, actions and reactions, culminated with an evacuation to navy vessels waiting on the stormy Adriatic. This period then is vital for understanding not only the background to a sometimes ferocious hostility between Washington and Tirana, but also the larger issues of the Cold War, State-Navy operations, and U.S. decisions affecting  diplomats in the field. As we shall see, the curious mixture of history, policy, and politics led to a unique, complete break in diplomatic relations in this part of the world. Moreover, the current chaotic conditions in post-Hoxha Albania have left many westerners curious about this country and its future, given “ethnic cleansing” in surrounding areas.

    Our story begins on April 7, 1939 as Italian troops rolled into Albania and permanently drove the king from the country. Washington made known its decision to withdraw State Department personnel in June. Within a short time, Mussolini’s fascist state had absorbed Albania.

    Several factors complicated U.S. wartime policy towards Albania. Its history from 1939-1945 was unique for future satellites and indeed Nazi-controlled Europe. Neither Soviet nor Anglo-American forces participated in large-scale operations there. A national Communist Party, founded two years after Rome’s invasion, spearheaded the Resistance. Enver Hoxha, a European-educated former teacher, helped lead the Communists or Partisans from the outset. His name would become intertwined with Albania’s until his death in 1985.

     While a late 1942 statement proclaimed American support for an independent Albania, Washington refused to recognize Hoxha’s F.N.C. (or L.N.C.) or either of several other major resistance forces. In fact, even the innocuous December release provoked a negative reaction from Greece. The two countries argued about territorial boundaries. Further, confusion existed about even the most basic principles of recognition. As late as spring, 1944, for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt queried State about Albania not being included at several U.N. meetings. State’s response was simple that there was no individual or group clearly in control. Policy-makers combined platitudes about the need for open elections and a free Albania with careful watch over nascent discussions regarding a possible postwar federation in the Balkans.

      Two key ideas permeated America’s pre-1945 Albanian strategy. On the one hand, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, British forces were the cornerstone of Allied involvement. The O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), under William Donovan, served as “a junior partner” in the area. Washington believed this approach could be beneficial. “Albanians generally have high regard for the United States,” as a summer, 1944 dispatch observed, as well as “particular confidence in us because of our disinterested position.” Secondly, the Americans focused on winning the war, thus “military considerations are paramount.”

      Yet, Albanian, especially the Partisans, identified American with Britain’s efforts. London began covert operations as early as spring, 1943. Although a major increase in British presence took place in the following months, London’s policies wavered between the need to support anti-German troops and a two-fold fear: Hoxha’s communists, and the country’s future, especially given possible use of Allied military aid in a civil conflict. Hoxha’s concern about Britain’s ultimate aims in the region, possible western backing for Greece, and the fact that his Partisans clearly led the fighting against the Axis complicated the internal political situation. Hoxha perceived Allied delays in delivering assistance, his being left “out of the loop” regarding certain operations, and London’s eagerness to land its own units in Albania as examples of Anglo-American efforts to stop him.

      Against this backdrop, Donovan’s O.S.S. conducted limited operations in the Balkans, especially rescuing downed pilots. Although Allied assistance helped lead to German withdrawal in November, 1944, Hoxha’s forces, as Reginald Hibbert suggested, “felt that they had extracted it [aid] from us [Britain] by their own undeniable efforts and that, had Britain had its way, they would not have won.” The Partisans, then, took a decidedly negative view of London’s (and by extension Washington’s) role in their victory. Given the potentially conflicting and confusing aims of defeating Germany and limiting communist influence, the Allies should have expected no other response.

      The war in Albania moved towards a rapid conclusion. Partisans retook Tirana in mid-November, and Hoxha proclaimed a new government with himself at the helm. As an Area Handbook noted, Berlin’s retreat left “a kind of political vacuum that the Communists, with superior political organizations and substantial armed partisan groups, were able to fill.” To British naval intelligence, the Albanians, at this juncture were “a strong and virile people.” Moreover, the country was “well armed, with its future to shape, its very frontiers in doubt, and surrounded by neighbors in much the same position of reconstructions as itself.” This allusion to Yugoslavia helps explain the deep ties between Tirana and Belgrade which lasted until 1948 and Tito’s break with Moscow.

      Perhaps befitting a small player in a global conflict, Albania’s postwar situation did not merit specific mention at wartime conferences through Yalta. Moreover, the October, 1944 Anglo-Soviet discussion regarding possible partitioning of Eastern Europe did not, at that time, focus on Tirana. Again, lack of knowledge contributed to this neglect. “Indeed Albania is less touched by western civilization,” an Intelligence survey observed in August, 1945, “and more remote from the general life of the Continent, than any other country.” Yet, as the Cold War took shape, this nation received more and more attention. For, while its relatively small size and population precluded global impact, a State Department release explained, its “significance… derives from its strategic situation and from its part in the complex of Balkan and Adriatic relations.”

     Washington dispatched Joseph E. Jacobs to represent U.S. interests and observe the postwar restructuring of Albanian society before deciding on official recognition. James took up his post in Tirana on V-E day. He went to see Hoxha the following day, and his initial impressions are worth noting in light of subsequent events. The Albanian leader “strikes me as a forceful character with ambitions,” Jacobs told State, “but suffering from effects of an inferiority complex because of his failure to win recognition.” Several weeks later, Jacobs analyzed the country’s leadership. Jacobs was “laboring under no illusions.” The Albanians were “a sincere, patriotic group of individuals who are going to be difficult to deal with” because “they are ignorant of the science of government, know little of international relations, and are highly sensitive” about their general lack of official recognition by the world community.

      Thus, even before V-J Day, the Allies had established a diplomatic presence in Albania. The Communists, now known as the ‘democratic’ front, as noted above, began to consolidate control, deal with opponents, and prepare for an end-of-year election. Accordingly, in early December, Party candidates received over ninety-three percent of the votes. Within six weeks, the now elected Constituent Assembly officially ended the monarchy and established the People’s Republic, followed in mid-March by a constitution. While some non-communists had been elected, they were systematically removed from power. Hoxha gradually assumed almost all important posts ranging from foreign affairs to defense.

      Given wartime tensions and the deepening suspicions of the early Cold War, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union would extend diplomatic recognition to Tirana even before the December 2 voting. Hoxha himself recalled this November 10 event, telling the Soviet representative of his appreciation for this “fresh proof of the sincere friendship of the Soviet people, their government, and Generalissmo Stalin for our people and their government.” Hoxha noted these feelings were in contrast with the Allied position on recognition which, as we shall see, had certain preconditions.

      On the same day as Moscow’s recognition of Albania, the United States and Great Britain set special conditions for their establishment of full relations. The Allied diplomatic missions, already on the scene, would continue to monitor the situation. The requirements were precise. Tirana must have not only “free elections leading to the formation of a truly representative government,” and “the enjoyment of freedom of speech and of assembly by non-fascist groups and individuals;” but also “an unfettered press and provision for foreign correspondents to work in the country.” Although all points were arguable, the final stipulation was Washington’s insistence that Albania honor various treaties effective on the last day of Albanian independence. (April 7, 1939)

     Understandably, Hoxha unfavorably contrasted these requirements with Moscow’s willing recognition. “The fact that conditions are placed…,” he complained, “astonishes us.” Moreover, the requests seemed “completely unreasonable,” especially in the light of Tirana’s contributions to the war effort, and “when the character of the regime is democratic, when the decisions and laws are made and put into practice in the most democratic way.” In addition, Hoxha was angry that his country had not been accepted into the U.N.

       Along with Tirana’s limitations on allied personnel in the country, the treaty imbroglio continued throughout 1946. The Albanians sooner claimed their versions of the agreements had been lost during the war. Washington dispatched copies but to no avail. Finally in mid-August, Tirana went part way, agreeing to accept multi-national treaties such as the Kellog-Briand pact. But Hoxha refused to accept agreements involving only Washington and Tirana. This issue would be a key factor in the withdrawal of the U.S. mission in mid-November.

      In March-April, London refused an exchange of diplomats with Tirana “owing to the unfriendly and uncooperative attitude” shown by Albanian officials to British personnel. Not unexpectedly, Tirana denied the British charges of non-cooperation involving war graves identification and limitations on movement within the country.

      While Hoxha and State battled over treaties and diplomatic harassment, Anglo-Albanian relations deteriorated rapidly into a “hot war.” The Corfu Straits separates Albania and Greece. In May, 1946, Royal Navy warships were steaming in this area which measures two to fifteen miles in width. Albanian forces fired at the cruisers Orion and Superb, which escaped damage. Diplomatic notes then revealed an impossible impasse. Hoxha’s claim of a three mile boundary effectively would block the passage. On October 22, two British destroyers hit mines in the channel with a number of casualties. Subsequent Royal Navy sweeping operations revealed over twenty mines. In Time’s words, “the implication that the Albanians had put the new mines there was inescapable.”

       As the conflict turned to the U.N. and the International Court of Justice at the Hague, Anglo-Albanian and by extension, American-Albanian relations continued to worsen. Hoxha adamantly defended his country’s position on Corfu when speaking with Stalin in the summer of 1947. “We do not know the British suffered the damage they claimed,” he explained, “and do not believe that they did, however, even if they did, we are in no way to blame.”  Almost twenty years after the incident, a London-published book on the affair referred to Albania in May, 1946 as “a brooding, secretive enigma” with “barred frontiers and armed guards.”

      Albanian harassment of Allied personnel did not spare Jacobs. The on-going battle over pre-war treaties led to his early March view “that our stay here is drawing to close.” Even at this time, he was “awaiting the final note from” Washington which he thought “will be the beginning of the end here but one can never tell.” As the British minister-designate, Thomas Cecil Rapp, waited in Italy for final instructions, Jacob’s March 11 dispatch reaffirmed his belief that “my days in Albania are drawing to a close.” “After one year’s dealing with them,” he continued, “I have had enough.” Jacobs thought his fellow-countrymen in Tirana shared these views with perhaps one exception, his aide, Harry Fultz, “who seems to be a glutton for punishment.” Four days later, he was even more pessimistic. If the mission didn’t leave soon for Italy, “we shall probably wind up our lives in a Siberian salt mine.”

      In the following months, Washington and Tirana moved further apart. An early April diplomatic message reported Jacobs’s “authority to leave Albania when in… (his) discretion he feels it (mission) can no longer remain… without jeopardizing safety personnel.” Adding the potential “fuel to the fire” the U.S. Senate in late July unanimously endorsed a pro-Greek position in a non-binding vote regarding Balkan boundary issues. In Nicholas Pano’s words, the Pepper Resolution “presented the communists with a potent tool with which to build up anti-American sentiment in Albania.” On July 27, John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs told his superior in Paris that Jacobs’s continued presence was “both futile and undignified.” The Senate vote gave Hoxha “a convenient excuse” to stonewall on the question of bilateral treaties in mid-August.

       Moreover, American sources in 1946 concluded that Hoxha was supporting the rebellion in Greece. While naval intelligence minimized Tirana’s value to Soviet machinations in the summer of 1946, “indications are that Albania, like Yugoslavia, has fallen under Soviet domination.” Ominously, Albania “can under certain conditions constitute an important supporting element in Soviet Mediterranean planning.” Camille M. Cianfarra in a late July New York Times article summed up contemporary American thought. News from Albania described the country as “a puppet state of Russia” and “a 100 percent Communist” nation in which “…the clergy are being annihilated, individual freedom does not exist and militarism is rampant.”

       Early September brought riots directed against the summer decisions at the Paris conferences, and Albania’s continued rejection by U.N. members. Jacobs told State on the second of “crowd shouting Albania will not yield an inch of territory without bloodshed.” Further, the “general atmosphere [was] tense and everything subordinated to mobilization.” On the following day, Jacobs suggested that any pro-Greek position on territorial disputes with Albania should be communicated to him because “in [the] interest of safety… I should be so advised so that at least six women here can be sent away.” The situation did not deteriorate in the next few weeks. Nevertheless, the Albanians, Jacobs noted in a September 19 letter, “seem particularly angry over not having gotten large reparations from Italy” since “they need the money to carry on.”

       By late September, 1946, then, open hostility over the U.N. and treaties, coupled with the absence of any British representatives, laid the groundwork for escalation on the diplomatic front. From Paris, Secretary of State James Byrnes concluded that this country should not recognize Tirana despite any movement on the treaties question since such a move “extended at this time would be widely misinterpreted.” But the widening American-Albanian dispute was not limited to these issues. The nationality act of 1940 required nationalized U.S. citizens to come back to America by mid-October. This fact, as well as on-going Albanian harassment, swamped the mission with requests for visas from citizens and relations alike. Tirana, however, blocked these efforts, leading to a diplomatic protest by the mission.

     On October 10, 1946, George D. Henderson took over as head of the U.S. mission in Tirana. Hugh De Santis in The Diplomacy of Silence, poignantly summarized Jacobs’s state. He was “weary of the mounting anti-American tone of the Albanian press,” as well as “the systematic campaign” directed against religious and political organizations. Thus, “Jacobs too, in his case quite literally, fled from his Balkan purgatory.” In mid-November, as the mission left Tirana, he would refer to the Government as “barbarous”, “ruthless” and “unscrupulous.”

       Washington had plenty of indications of this media campaign. Henderson reported an analysis of articles appearing in the weekly Hosteni. From mid-May to early November, 1946, the first months had seen “few direct attacks on the United States as such.” U.N. boundary, and reparation controversies, however, led to a change of tone. For “while these cartoons reflected most strongly the bitter resentment of the regime over these local issues, they began also to include elements of the vicious Soviet Anti-American propaganda campaign.” The Albanians became more virulent in September and October with their “lack of restraint and apparent ignoring of all consideration for American sensibilities.” Apparently, Tirana had concluded “it had nothing to lose” in attacking London and Washington and clearly agreeing with Belgrade and Moscow. Even Radio Tirana based a weekly show called the “Happy Hour” on Hosteni material. Henderson finally alluded to the possible link among Communist media sources in Europe and elsewhere.

        The combination of news attacks and these other factors placed increasing stress on mission personnel. On October 23, Henderson detailed exhausting twelve-hour days relating primarily to the citizenship issues. But, in addition, within the past few weeks, “two hostile public speeches by the Prime Minister… insinuating that this Mission had no reason to remain here” had complicated Henderson’s efforts. Hoxha’s October 16 message to a youth congress spoke of the mission’s “duties” as “finished”. Despite the threat, Henderson’s diplomats maintained operations and communications with Hoxha’s government from Caserta, Italy. Jacobs, on October 24, discussed preparations for possible withdrawal from Albania.

        While Hoxha’s basic question about the mission’s continued presence augured ill for the U.S. diplomatic personnel, their employees’ possible fate was even more ominous. As early as October 1, Jacobs had complained to Hoxha’s government about the arrest of a translator working for the mission. Jacobs believed that such a move, if based on his employment, was “totally unwarranted” because “his services are perfectly innocuous” translations of “public property.” In a related vein, on October 23, Henderson noted reports of charges against a number of Albanians for possible illegal dealing with the mission. Suspicion of anti-government activity extended even to supposed patriots. In response to rumors of the demise of the education minister on October 31, Henderson bluntly responded: “If true, purging this number one Communist bears out fanaticism with which hard core of regime [is] carrying out its threat to liquidate all who do not support present policies 100 percent.”

        Based on these on-going difficulties, by early November, Washington saw no need to maintain a diplomatic presence. The November 2 dispatch was succinct. “After careful consideration [of] all aspects [of the] situation,” State “has decided on immediate withdrawal US mission from Albania.” Henderson had mixed reactions. In a letter the same day to a fellow diplomat, he was “curious” as to their method of departure, and wondered if Washington “heeds my suggestion that a U.S. Navy ship… take us out in style.” He cited his “numerous telegrams” leading to “this drastic decision.” His feelings were undisguised. “It is a tremendous source of satisfaction to tell the boys here where to get off,” he explained, “even though during only such a brief period of time.” According to November 3 message, Henderson began “secret preparations” for the withdrawal and noted religious holidays for November 4-5 which could help these efforts since local employees would not be present.

        An internal American diplomatic cable discussed the nature of the message to Tirana about the move. The “mission has been unable to achieve [the] purposes for which it was originally sent,” specifically “to bring about mutual understanding and establishment of diplomatic relations between US and Albania.” Washington then told Henderson to notify “Hoxha at once… if necessary” at his home.

        November 4-5 brought increased preparations. State informed British officials in Washington of the move on the fourth. The next day Washington cabled the U.S. Embassy in Paris explaining that Tirana was being told of the departure. Also, on the fifth, Navy and State officials prepared for evacuation by sea. According to State, the Navy Department ordered the area command (Naval Forces, Mediterranean) to “make available [an] LST or similar vessel to effect withdrawal” of American personnel.

        But, as these efforts went forward, Henderson ran into a snag: an inability to reach Hoxha. The U.S. diplomat tried to see him as soon as possible. “After exhausting every diplomatic means [to] make appointment,” Henderson explained, he “was obliged to go [to] his residence whose entrance was guarded by at least six armed soldiers. [The] highest ranking officer went in five times to request Hoxha to receive letter in person [or] even on residence steps,” Henderson continued. Yet every time, despite the “clearest explanation [of the] importance and urgency of communication,” the American was told that Hoxha was “too busy,” but would be able to see him the next day at government offices. During the third attempt, Henderson managed to convince the Albanian officer to deliver a “French translation of [the] letter after reading which Hoxha [was] still too busy but would see me [the] same afternoon at [the] Ministry.” Finally, through the military representative, Henderson “told Hoxha… that if he still refuses accord US representative [the] courtesy of receiving letter personally,” Washington would be told. Unimpressed, Hoxha’s response was “substantially unchanged.” Then Henderson, probably more than a bit exasperated at this point, “gave original of [the] letter to officer who promised [to] give it immediately to him.” According to a November 5 internal message, State delayed its press release, needing “definite confirmation Henderson has succeeded [in] delivering message to Hoxha which he has been endeavoring to do both yesterday and today.” (November 5). Perhaps overly optimistic, the dispatch did note the Moslem holiday which “has been complicating delivery.”

        Hoxha must have gotten the message for State told the media on November 8 of the impending move. Washington’s discussion of the withdrawal focused primarily on the treaty issue. Henderson’s one page letter was diplomatically correct (and general) and concluded:

            In the circumstances, although my Government retains its sentiment

            of warm friendship for the Albanian people, it does not feel that there

            is any further reason for the Mission to remain in Albania. The United

            States Mission is accordingly being withdrawn.

        Notification of Hoxha led to acceleration of U.S. efforts on November 7. Washington ordered the mission to “destroy all codes and confidential records by burning.” In addition, Henderson should coordinate plans for the withdrawal with the area naval command and ask Hoxha’s government to allow the U.S. Navy to enter the port of Durazzo for the operation.

        These preparations occurred amidst rapidly worsening relations between Tirana and Washington, especially as members of the mission were accused of sabotage. Harry Fultz became the focal point of these charges. Fultz had been involved in education in Albania prior to the war. He served with the Office of Strategic Services in Italy during the conflict and had been with the mission in Tirana since the spring of 1945. Fultz allegedly led a group of Albanians bent on destruction of key governmental projects. The on-going trials showcased accusations against Fultz. The proceedings, to Hoxha, “brought to light the whole subversive policy” of the Allies. The Albanian leader specifically noted that both Fultz and Jacobs had been “terrified” and fled before the courts took action. The trials continued as the American mission got ready to depart.

        Again, not unexpectedly, U.S. diplomats struck back in controlled anger. As the crisis centering on Fultz escalated quickly, Henderson cabled State on November 9, proclaiming that Fultz clearly was innocent. While this fact did not deserve further mention, Henderson felt compelled to “emphasize [the] enormity of infamy [of] this regime.” Tirana had “now exceeded all bounds.” Henderson also reminded Washington that America “should be prepared [to] take direct immediate action” if Albania didn’t permit withdrawal or if “FULTZ [is] in any way endangered.” Henderson would “resist any attempt [to] arrest him.”

        Two separate messages reinforced this American position. A state cable on November 9 included directions to the mission in case U.S. diplomats faced internment Washington told Henderson to use his judgment but he could send a “dignified denial of charges” to the Albanians.

        In his report to the Albanians, Henderson disputed Hoxha’s view of Fultz mentioned above and stated unequivocally that the accused diplomat was leaving on November 14 as planned. Since Henderson had told Tirana about the withdrawal on November 5, clearly, “his departure cannot be constructed as lending credence to the infamous though ridiculous charges” directed at Fultz, “which have been fabricated and widely circulated by the official Albanian press and radio.” Henderson referred to Fultz’s commitment to the Albanians. “I wish to add,” he observed in closing, “that my Government feels it unnecessary to state that the fantastic charges in question have absolutely no basis in fact.”

        On the same day, Jacob in a memorandum to State, summarized the U.S. rationale for blocking Tirana’s entry into the U.N. His arguments noted “the campaign of calumny against the Mission and false charges” aimed at Fultz. These attacks included “the barbarous treatment of several Albanians.” The government’s approach was “ample evidence of the ruthless and unscrupulous character of the regime” serving “to indicate its unworthiness” of being in this world body.

        Under the circumstances, the safety of mission employees continues to concern Henderson and his staff. In a November 10 dispatch, he graphically stated his views. “If US permits its loyal innocent employees,” he argued, “to fall in (sic) hands (of) these satanic savages,” then “our recent war dead have really died in vain.” As noted in an early November cable, the presence of U.N.R.R.A. personnel further complicated matters. Henderson told Washington that in terms of American citizens, he would agree to take them out with the mission. He also wanted to at least make some provisions for local workers who “will certainly be arrested and probably tortured because they dared work for (the) Mission.” In terms of a specific worker, Rudolph Marinschak by name, he had to leave with the Americans since his presence “would sign (his) death warrant.” After repeated communication between State and the mission, Henderson reported final Albanian approval for the withdrawal, including Marinschak, on November 12.

        At the same time, the mission was attempting to safeguard its employees, it tried to obtain permission for naval vessels to visit Durazzo to remove the diplomatic staff. In fact, the request for exit visas and permission for the naval operation were sent to Hoxha’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 9. In another message that day, Henderson anticipated trouble given the “foul Govt attempt (to) smear (the) Mission coincident (with the) announcement (of) departure.” He couldn’t “predict what other rabbit may be pulled out of their hats.” Not unexpectedly, the Albanians responded at once “with astonishment” at the U.S. note regarding the navy. While Hoxha refused to let two naval vessels visit durazzo, civilian departure by air would be allowed.

         On-going discussions concerning the evacuation centered on the type of ship available as well as Albanian permission. Henderson repeated the need for naval transport since only warships were close by. While the mission wanted a larger vessel such as a cruiser to be involved, the Navy could dispatch only two destroyers. In the Navy’s view, the Noa and Perry would be adequate for both personnel and equipment. But Tirana still would not allow the U.S. Navy into their waters. Henderson’s exasperation was clear in a November 12 telegram. “Odds are all against me here,” he cabled State, “so (I) will understand if Navy gets fed up with delay ad uncertainty and calls off whole matter.” In that case, Henderson wanted State to provide air transportation as an alternative.

         To further complicate the issue, the Navy could not guarantee their involvement past November 14. Finally on November 13, Henderson reported that the Albanians would permit the mission to be ferried to the destroyers waiting in international waters.

        As the mission prepared to leave, Henderson was able to send final communications despite Albanian radio interference. He reported that his staff “spent six hours last night (November 12) trying (sic) (to) escape jamming to send message re ships.” Efforts to help local employees were illusory “since legal documents, justice and civilized code are perverted mockery here.” Not surprisingly then, a Navy memorandum on November 14 observed the “extremely touchy” relations with Tirana.

        The supposed final chapter in this saga involved the evacuation in stormy (appropriately enough) seas, successfully accomplished on November 12, 1946. On the following day, leaving some materials still ashore, the destroyers left Albanian waters. Actually, however, the withdrawal did not stop the charges and counter-charges. Hoxha provided the impetus for American reaction with a closing verbal barrage on the day of the mission’s departure. In his opinion, the U.S. diplomatic team not only had been “received with satisfaction,” but also gotten “everything it required for the performance of its task.” Despite Hoxha’s belief in his country’s “deep sympathies for the friendly American people,” the U.S. staff had used its “lengthy unjustified stay” in an attempt to disrupt Albanian-American relations. He specifically indicted Jacobs as well as the Department of State. In the New York Times’s view, the latter “made no formal comment” and Jacobs didn’t have “anything to say.”

      The official Bashkimi, on November 14, supported Hoxha in a report about the withdrawal. The move was “a new example of (the) way in which State Department practices atomic diplomacy” directed at nations not allied with America. Pre-war Albania existed as “a trusted colony” of the Allies. Hence, Tirana-Washington agreements really “were pacts of colonial economy.”

      State considered a public response. Henderson especially called for a strong reaction. In a telegram to Jacobs, he stated his apprehension about Washington’s lack of response to repeated attacks and “Hoxha’s slap at Department, yourself and Mission.” Henderson did acknowledge the problem “of refuting specious lies…and especially the vicious fabrication re Fultz.” Yet the world may “actually believe Hoxha’s story and suspect us because of our silence.” While a “gentleman’s code” may preclude a response, people were not accepting “fact that Hoxha and its foreign mentors practice thug’s ethics” though “officially pretending (to) observe forms of decency and accusing innocents of being what they are themselves.” It was particularly important to deal with “Fultz’s honor (which) has been besmirched” because of the “nightmarish” recently completed trial. Thus, “it can never be too late to set records straight on this score by giving lie to Hoxha and company.

       Reports from diplomatic and naval personnel must have further tempted State to respond. The Navy noted the presence of Albanian military on the coast during the operation. A critical cartoon appeared in Hosteni. A mid-November report explained that Hoxha’s government had “done everything possible to humiliate our diplomatic mission and obstruct its departure.” Henderson even graphically described various physical and psychological instruments of torture utilized against suspected traitors. Yet, despite these provocations and Henderson’s pleading, Washington, according to an early December dispatch, “decided against issuance (of a) formal press release.” State did tell the media “orally that ALB charges” directed at Fultz “were without foundation in fact.”

       Under the circumstances, perhaps no further comment was needed. Time, referred to “Hoxha (rhymes with got-cha)” in clearly negative terms. He had “been as truculent as a small boy who thinks his big brother can lick anybody.” While Albania accused the U.S. of espionage in trials as late as November 1947, Henderson’s poignant message, “American mission withdrawn from Albania and office closed November 14,” ended State’s presence. In January, 1947, a Department publication expressed policy for the next forty years: “there is now no diplomatic or other direct official contact between the Albanian regime and the United States.”

       While no American diplomats would reside in Tirana for decades, Washington and London attempted to overthrow Hoxha through covert operations during the next several years. Celebrated spy Kim Philby’s involvement in planning these moves helped doom the project from the outset. Stephen Garrett has called the 1950 action “a sort of comic-opera effort.” This disaster helped curtail any nascent plans to use force in satellite countries.

       In conclusion, Tirana’s relations with Washington were unusual on several fronts. On the one hand, no Allied armies marched through the country. At the same time, the nation’s history naturally led to Partisan suspicions of any Anglo-American presence. In addition, the combination of bitter events connected with the withdrawal, the efforts to destroy the government by force and years of non-recognition seem unparalleled in Eastern Europe. While U.S. battles with the Soviet Union and her neighbors are well-documented, American diplomatic personnel continued to function in many of these countries.

      Besides history, covert actions, and wartime circumstances, other factors colored American-Albanian relations including Hoxha’s strong doctrinaire approach and U.S. support for Greece during a widening Cold War. The relative youth of the communist movement, and in Reginald Hibbert’s view, its “ambiguous dependence” on Belgrade’s communists also contributed to the mutually virulent hostility. American policy and activity in Albania, then, were a small but unique part of the story of the early Cold War.

       Thus, the U.S. had withdrawn totally from a society once characterized as “an enigma to the West and an angina to the East.” While current events point to a possible change in relations, truly the events of the fall of 1946 signaled a lengthy and stormy (literally and figuratively) close to American-Albanian relations during the Cold War.

Edward J. Sheehy, FSC, Ph.D

Vice President of the Corporation

Associate Professor, Department of History

La Salle University


  1. The New Yorker, September 11, 1989, p.33. See also p. 34. Two weeks later, another American periodical called Iraq “an Arab Albania,” and cited one view of the country as “Tirana on the Tigris.” S. News and World Report, September 25, 1090, p. 40.
  2. Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Bethell, The Great Betrayal, London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984, p.9.
  3. Kim Philby, My Silent War, New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968, p.197. Nicholas C. Pano, “Albania,” in Communism In Eastern Europe, Second Edition, edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. P. 213.
  4. F. Brown, “Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey,” A Report prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand (Rand Report, Rand Corporation), November, 1975, p. 101. See Bethell, The Great Betrayal, pp. 9-25. For Albanian history into the early twentieth century, see J. Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom, New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971. For an overview, see William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1963, pp. 1-34.
  5. See Eugene K. Keefe et al, Area Handbook for Albania, Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1991, pp. 16-17. Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereinafter referred to as FRUS), 1939, Volume II: General; United States Government Printing Office, 1956, pp. 365-421.
  6. See Keefe, Area Handbook, pp. 17-21. Reginals Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory, London and New York: Printer Publishers, 1991, p. 49. Prifti, Socialist Albania, p. 9. Rene Ristelhueber, A History of the Balkan People, edited and translated by Sherman David Spector, New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1971, pp. 372-73. For Hoxha, see his The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, Tirana: The “8 Nentori” Publishing House, 1982, and Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle, Albania Defiant, translated from the Swedish by Paul Britten, Austin, New York, and London: Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp. 141-42.
  7. See Prifti, Socialist Albania, p. 14. FRUS, 1942, Volume II: Europe, 1962, pp. 827-29. 1943, Volume II: Europe, 1964, p. 1. 1944, Volume III: The British Europe, 1967, pp. 1304-1313. For an overview of U.S. policy for Albania, see Washington-Caserta #308, April 7, 1945, Roosevelt’s question and State’s response, see Memorandum by the Secretary of State for President Roosevelt, May 27 1944, FRUS, 1944, Volume III, pp. 271-72. For a report on current Albanian-Greek problems, see “Tempers Rising,” World Press Review, September, 1993, p. 33.
  8. Bradley, F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A., New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983, p. 305. Washington-Naples #391, July 20, 1944, FRUS, 1944, Volume III, p. 276. ibid., p. 275.
  9. See Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, especially, pp. 9, 22-23, 41, 215-38. Prifti, Socialist Albania, p. 21. FRUS, 1944, Volume III, pp. 271-95. For first-hand observations on British wartime operations in Albania see, for example, Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War, London: MacMillan & Chatto & Windus, 1948. David Smiley, Albanian Assignment, London:Chatto & Windus, The Hogarth Press, 1984. See also Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in Wouth-East Europe in the Second World War, London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976, pp. 173-83. For an Albanian view see Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto, The History of Albania From the Origins to the Present Day, London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 243.
  10. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 208. See Prifti, Socialist Albania, pp. 19-21. Ristelhueber, History of the Balkan Peoples, p. 372. Smith, The Shadow Warriors, pp. 234, 305-306. See also Stavro Skendi, ed. Albania, New York: F. A. Praeger, 1956, pp. 22-30 for further historical background.
  11. Keefe, Area Handbook, p. 19. Albania, Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain, B. R. 542, Geographical Handbook Series, August, 1945, p. 202.
  12. Albania, Naval Intelligence Division, p. 1. Albania: Policy and Information Statement, January 23, 1947, 711. 75/1-2347, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Washington, D. C. (NA). Unless otherwise noted, decimal files are located in RG 59, (NA). See also Keefe, Area Handbook, p. 19.
  13. Tirana- Washington #(7), May 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Volume IV: Europe, 1968, p. 25. Tirana-Washington #16, May 26, 1945, , pp. 33-34. See Tirana-Washington #(7), p. 26. Tirana-Washington #16, pp. 28-34. For further discussion of Albanian-American relations, see FRUS, ibid., pp. 1-80.
  14. See Keefe, Area Handbook, p. 19-20. Pano, “Albania,” p. 217. PAno, The People’s Republic of Albania, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 64-69.
  15. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 387. See , pp. 386ff. Albania: Policy and Information Statement, January 23, 1947.
  16. Anton Logoreci, The Albanians: Europe’s Forgotten Survivors, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, p. 86. See Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick, Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1990, p. 19. “Troubled Balkan Politics,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. LXXI, (December, 1945), p. 1510. New York Times, November 9, 1946, pp. 1 and 7. For a report on the question of free elections, see New York Times, July 30. 1946, p.11.
  17. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 390. See pp. 387-97. For more information on the Albanian position, see Tirana-Washington #524, Undated, Rec’s October 19, 1946, 711.75/10-1946 (Recd). For an early 1946 Albanian report on a possible anti-government conspiracy, see New Tork Times, January 30, 1946, p. 3.
  18. See Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 70-71 New York Times, March 11, 1946, pp. 45-46, November 9, 1046, pp. 1 and 7. For reports about the Soviet Union’s increasing influence in Albania during early 1946 and examples of anti-U.S. activity as well as questions about the mission’s role see FRUS, 1946, Volume VI: Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, 1969, pp. 1-15.
  19. New York Times, November 9, 1946, p. 7. See Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threeat to Albania, pp. 402-404. New York Times, March 11, 1946, pp. 45-46.
  20. Time, November 25, 1946, p. 33. See p.32. For other background on Corfu and Anglo-Albanian relations, see Logoreci, The Albanians, pp. 91-92, Newsweek, November 25, 1946, pp. 46 and 49. Belgrade via War-Washington #517, May 22, 1946, 875.01/5-2246. Intelligence Briefs. The ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) Review, August, 1946, p. 41, Operational Archives, Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard, (hereinafter referred to asd (OA), See also material in 1946-1947 OP35 file EF-3 Albania, (OA). For another view on this issue, see Leslie Gardiner, The Eagle Spreads His Claws, Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1966.
  21. Hoxha, With Stalin: Memoirs, Tirana: “8 Nentori” Publishing House, 1979, p. 69. Eric Leggett, The Corfu Incident,London: Seeley Service & Co., 1974, p.3. See Hoxha, p. 68. Logoreci, The Albanians, 91-92.
  22. E. Jacobs-George L. Brandt, Esquire, American consul General, Naples, March 2, 1946, RG 84, Box #2, Folder 124.3, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. (hereinafter referred to as (WNRC), Jacobs-Thomas Estes, Esquire, c/o American Consulate General, Vienna, Austria, c/o the American Embassy, Rome, March 15, 1946, in ibid. See Newsweek, March 11, 1946. Pp. 45-46. For the Paris-Washington #4512, September 10, 1946. 740.00119 Council/9-1046, Tirana via War-Washington #498, September 27, 1946, 740.00119 Council/ 9-2746. Washington-AmRep Tirana #172, October 2, 1946, 740.00119 Council/9-2746 Tirana-Washington #95, February 8, 1946 in FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, pp. 6-9. ibid., pp. 17-19, 22-27.
  23. Washington-AmPoland Caserta #110, April 5, 1946, 124.75/3-2846. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 70-71. The Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews), in Paris #3697, July 27, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, p. 21. Pano, ibid, p. 71. See #3697, ibid, p. 22. New York Times, July 30, 1946, p. 18. Washington-Tirana #76, May 8, 1946, FRUS, ibid., pp. 20-21.
  24. “Russia’s Mediterranean Interests, “The ONI Review, July 1946, p. 50. New York Times, July 29, 1946, p. 1. See also p. 10 “Crisis in Greece,” The ONI Review, February 1947, pp. 23-30. Intelligence Briefs, The ONI Review, September, 1946, p. 50. For a military view, see intelligence memorandum for General Norstad, 13 December 1946 (and attached estimate of the situation-Greece), RG 319 (War Department General Staff, Plans & Operations Division), Box #126, (NA). Material in RG 218 (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), Box #611, Folder tab CCS 381, Greece (7-12-45).
  25. Tirana-Washington #461, September 2, 1946, RG 84, Box #9, Folder 820. Tirana-AmEmbassy, Paris #52, September 3, 1946, in ibid. Jacobs-George D. Henderson, Esquire, Secretary of Embassy, Rome, Italy, September 19, 1946, RG 84, Box #1, Folder 123.
  26. Paris-Washington #4725, September 20, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, p. 27. See New York Times, September 21, 1946, p. 16. Department of State Press Release, #664 September 20, 1946, RG 84, Box #5, Folder 710, American-Albanian Relations, July 1946-March 1947. (hereinafter referred to as RG 84, Box #5). FRUS, ibid., 34-35. Tirana-Washington #350, October 23, 1946, 711.75/10-2346. Tirana-Washington #536, October 28, 1946, 711.75/10-2846. Tirana via War-Washington #538, October 29, 1946, 711.75/10-2946.
  27. Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 193-94. Jacobs cited in , p. 194. See Tirana-Washington #343, October 9, 1946, RG 84, Box #2, Folder 124.6.
  28. Caserta-Washington, November 26, 1946, #366, RG 84, Box #12, Folder 891. For a media report of a Hoxha speech in October, see Tirana via War-Washington. # 525, Undated (Rec’d October 19, 1946), 711.75/10-1946 (Recd), For Albanian editorial reaction to U.S. opposition to country’s entry into U.N., see Tirana-Washington, October 28, 1946, #535 RG 84, Box #3, Folder 500. For a specific example of Hosteni’s view, see Tirana-Washington, #540, October 30, 1946, RG 84, Box #5.
  29. Tirana-Washington #349, October 23, 1946, 124. 756/10-2346. Hoxha cited in Tirana via War-Washington #525. See Caserta via War-Washington #777, October 24, 1946, 711.75/10-2446. Tirana via War-Washington #538. Tirana also had problems with a U.N. relief agency. See Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, especially, pp. 408-415. For more information on Hoxha’s speech, see FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, pp. 31-34.
  30. Jacobs-Vasi Konomi, Esquire, Acting Director, Foreign Office, Tirana, Albania, October 1, 1946, RG 84, Box #2, Folder 124.3. Tirana-Wasahington #541, October 31, 1946, 875.00/10-3146. See Tirana via War-Washington #531, October 23, 1946, 875.00/10-2346. For Henderson’s “futile attempt” to have U.S. views printed in the Albanian media, see Tirana-Washington #364 (and enclosures), November 8, 1946, 740.00119 Council/11-846.
  31. Washington-AmRep Tirana #199, November 2, 1946, 711.75/10-1946. Henderson-Homer M. Byington, Jr., Esquire, Acting U.S. Political Adviser, Caserta, Italy November 2, 1946, RG 84, Box #12, Folder 879.6. Tirana via War-Washington #547, November 3, 1946, 711.75/11-346. Henderson’s request for possible naval transport is noted in this dispatch.
  32. Washington-Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, #One, SecDel #1124, November 4, 1946, 740.00119 Council/11-711.75/11-346. See also New York-Washington, DelSec #1093, November 5, 1946, 711.75/11-546.
  33. Washington-AmPolad Caserta #237, November 5, 1946, 124.75/11-546. See Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, November 4, 1946, 711.75/11-446. State-Navy, November 7, 1946, 124.75/11-546. Washington-AmEmbassy Paris #5891, November 5, 1946, 124.75/11-546.
  34. Tirana via War-Washington #549, Undated (Rec’d November 5, 1946), 124.75/11-546 (Recd). Washington-Council of Foreign Ministers, AmDel, New York, SecDel #1133, November 5, 1946, 740.00119 Council/11-546.
  35. Henderson-Hoxha, November 8, 1946, 124.75/11-846.
  36. Washington-AmRep Tirana #204, November 7, 1946, 124.75/11-546
  37. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 407. See ibid., pp. 375-407. New York Times, November 14, 1946, pp. 1 and 15, November 16, 1946, p. 6. For another discussion of the charges against Fultz see Tirana-Wasshington #811, November 17, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, pp. 38-41. For more background on Fultz, see Washington-Cairo #28, January 2, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Volume IV, pp. 1-2.
  38. Tirana via War-Washington #555, November 9, 1946, 124.756/11-946. Albania accused Fultz of plotting an Anglo-American invasion to support Greece if war broke out. See New York Times, November 16, 1946, p. 6.
  39. Washington-AmRep Tirana #208, November 9, 1946, 124.756/11-946. Henderson-Hoxha, November 14, 1946, RG 84, Box #5. For another report of the accusations, see Belgrade-Washington #A-252, November 15, 1946, 875.00/11-1546.
  40. Jacobs-Henderson, November 14, 1946, 501.AA/11-1446. See John M. Patterson, Acting Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State-Mr. Louis Chako, Lynn, indicated that “Albania was not qualified for (U.N.) membership under Article 4 of the Charter.” While Fultz was the alleged ringleader, see Tirana-Washington #572, November 13, 1946, RG 84, Box #1, Folder 124.1 for another example of an American citizen under attack
  41. Tirana via War-Washington #561, November 10, 1946, 124.75/11-1046. Tirana via War-Washington #547. See Tirana via War-Washington #568, November 12, 1946, 124.753/11-1246. Henderson felt so strongly about Marinschak’s situation that he considered sneaking “him out inside a crate of personal effects…” See Tirana via War-Washington #564, November 11, 1946, 124.753/11-1146. FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, pp. 27-28. For more background, see Tirana via War-Washington #560, November 10, 1946, 124.753/11-1046. Washington-AmRep Tirana #209, November 12, 1946, 124.753/11-1146. See also 124.753 file generally.
  42. Tirana via War-Washington #556, November 9, 1946, 124.75/11-946. Rome-Washington #82, January 10, 1947, November 9, 1946). See Note Verbale #79 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (dated November 9, 1946), RG 84, Box #8, Folder 811.1.
  43. Tirana via Army-Washington #556, November 12, 1946, 124.75/11-1246. See Note Verbale #80 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 9, 1946, RG 84, Box #5. Caserta-Tirana #87, November 12, 1946, RG 84, Box #1, Folder 124.1. Caserta-Washington #791, November 7, 1946, 124.75/11-746. Caserta via War-Washington #793, November 8, 1946, 124.75/11-1046. Caserta via War-Washington #798, November 11, 1946, 124.75/11-1146. Caserta via War-Washington #800, November 13, 1946, 124.75/11-1346. Tirana via Caserta-Washington #552, November 8, 1946, 124.75/11-846. Tirana via War-Washington #559, November 10, 1946, 124.75/11-1046. Tirana via War-Washington #565 November 11, 1946, 124.75/11-1146. Tirana via War-Washington #569, November 12, 1946, 124.75/11-1246.
  44. See Caserta via War-Washington #793. Rome-Washington #82, January 10, 1947 (Note dated November 13, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Mission). Tirana via War-Washington #571, November 13, 1946, 124.75/11-1346.
  45. Tirana-Washington #572, November 13, 1946, RG 84, Box #1, folder 124.1. Navy memorandum, 14 November 1946 in OP35 file EF-3 Albania, (OA).
  46. For an account of the naval evacuation, see my The U.S. Navy, The Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945-1947, Westport Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 79.Caserta (Henderson)- Washington #813, November 18, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VI, pp. 41-45. For a media view of the situation, see New York Times, November 14, 1946, pp. 1 and 15, November 16, 1946, p. 6. The Americans asked the French to watch over the property and material left behind. See files 124.75-124.752 for November-December, 1946, and RG 84, Box #1, Folder 124.1. See also Caserta-Washington #805, November 15, 1946, 124.75/11-1546.
  47. New York Times, November 15, 1946, p. 6. (Hoxha’s Notes). Ibid., pp. 1 and 6. See Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 407.
  48. Bashkimi, cited in Caserta-Washington # 825, November 20, 1946, 124.75/11-2046.
  49. Caserta-Washington #843, November 30, 1946, 124.75/11-3046. See Washington-AmPolad Caserta #251, November 16, 1946, 124.756/11-946.
  50. Washington-Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, SecDel #1158, November 15, 1946, 740.00119 Council/11-1546. Washington-AmPolad Caserta #271, December 6, 1946, 124.756/11-946. See Caserta-Washington #814, November 19, 1946, 875.00/11-1946. Rome (Former American Mission to Albania)-Washington #A-96, December 12, 1946, 875.00/12-1246. Washington-AmPolad Caserta #265, December 3, 1946, 124.75/11-3046. In describing Hoxha’s attempts to get “false confessions,” Henderson spoke of “gashing leg, filling (it) with salt…electric current…prolonged immersion in cold water up to neck; beating; splinters under fingernails; going through all preparations for execution even to firing blanks.” (cited in Bethel, The Great Betrayal, p. 29).
  51. Time, November 25, 1946, p. 32. See ibid., p. 33.
  52. Caserta-Washington #809, November 16, 1946, 124.75/11-1646. Albania, January 23, 1947, p. 1. See Intelligence Briefs, The ONI Review, November, 1947, pp. 48-50. For Albania after the U.S. withdrawal, see Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 73ff.
  53. Stephen A. Garrett, From Potsdam to Poland: American Policy Toward Eastern Europe, New Work, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2986, p. 11. See Bethell, The Great Betrayal, p. 5. Andrew Boyle, The Fourth Man, New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979, pp. 363-64. Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe, New York and London: New York University Press, 1991, pp. 43-45. Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, The Philby Conspiracy, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968, pp. 193-203. Philby, My Silent War. For an Albanian view, see Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, pp. 265-66.
  54. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 233. See Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 71-75. Prifti, Socialist Albania, p. 243.

Israel T. Naamani, “America’s Next Ping-pong Partner,” Jewish Frontier, Vol. XXXIX (January, 1972), p. 20. See also pp. 21-23.

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